Policies against human trafficking:

The role of religion and political institutions

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Abstract

I investigate empirically the role of religion and political institutions in policies against human trafficking, using the new 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index. The dataset contains 170 countries. The results show that governments in countries with Christian majorities implement stricter anti-trafficking policies than countries with Muslim majorities. The differences between countries with Christian and Muslim majorities is pronounced in dictatorships but less so in democracies. The influence of religion on the overall 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index is driven by protection and prevention policies. As compared to prosecution policies that mainly target the perpetrators of human trafficking, protection and prevention policies mainly protect the victims of human trafficking, i.e. predominantly women. The conclusions are consistent with other empirical findings regarding the association between religion, political institutions, and human development.

Keywords: human trafficking, religion, political institutions, human rights, gender equality

JEL Classification: F22, O15, O11, Z12, F59

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1. Introduction

The human trafficking problem has worsened in many countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) states that "a conservative estimate of the crime puts the number of victims at any one time at 2.5 million…it affects every region of the world and generates tens of billions of dollars in profits for criminals each year." (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/faqs.html#Who_are_the_victims_and_culprits_of_human_trafficking – assessed on July 22, 2012).

Because human trafficking threatens national security and compromises domestic human rights (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012), anti-trafficking policies are an important instrument in human development policies. To combat human trafficking, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted in the year 2000 the *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* and its *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children*. Cho et al. (2012a) have introduced the novel *3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index*, which measures to what degree government policies reflect these guidelines. Data is provided for up to 179 countries over the period 2000-2009. Cho et al. (2012a) and Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) exploit variance across countries and over time by using panel data to examine whether variables such as income per capita, corruption, rule of law, women's rights, voting behavior in the UNGA and spatial dependencies influence anti-trafficking policies.[2] The results show, for example, that democracies and countries that combat corruption have implemented strict anti-trafficking policies.

A pertinent question is who the victims and culprits of human trafficking are. The UNDOC states that "victims of trafficking can be any age, and any gender. However, a disproportionate number of women are involved in human trafficking both as victims and

[2] Akee et al. (2010) examine the influence of ethnic fragmentation and conflict on human trafficking. Using micro-data from Eastern Europe, Omar Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) show that individual trafficking risks are much higher in regions with large emigration flows.

as culprits." (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/faqs assessed on July 22, 2012). Because many of the victims are women and combatting human trafficking reinforces human rights, cultural traits and religion are likely to influence policies against human trafficking. Religion has been shown to influence human development and economic policy-making. Religion influences, for example, gender equality: in the education system and the labor market, discrimination against women is quite prevalent in countries with Muslim majorities. By contrast, discrimination against women is less pronounced in countries with Christian majorities. I review the empirical evidence on gender discrimination in the next section. Religion has also been shown to influence political institutions which, in turn, influence human development and economic policies. Empirical studies examining how religion shapes human development and economic policy-making therefore need to consider feedback effects via political institutions.

I investigate empirically how religion and political institutions influence anti-trafficking policies as measured by the new 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index and its sub indices on prosecution, protection and prevention policies. As compared to Cho et al. (2012a) and Cho and Vadlamannati (2012), I do not estimate panel data models but cross-sectional models, because the religion variables do not vary over time. I follow the related empirical literature investigating the role of religion in human development and economic policy-making and consider Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and indigenous religions as the five major religion groups. My main focus is however on the difference between the two largest groups, Islam and Christianity.

To be sure, I elaborate on the types of religion on policies against human trafficking and not religion as such (vis-à-vis atheism). For encompassing surveys on the consequences of religion and religiosity see, for example, Iannaccone (1998).

2. Background

2.1 Religious doctrines

The religious doctrines do not appear to give rise to large differences in policies against human trafficking. Both Christian beliefs and Islamic law denounce human trafficking. Christian beliefs actually condemn human trafficking since it violates sexual morality and human dignity. Christians have been active in combating human trafficking (Zimmerman 2010). Christian convictions shaped, for example, the moral sensibilities of the abolitionist movements in the 18th and 19th century. After the British Member of Parliament William Wilberforce converted to Christianity, he campaigned against slave trade. Consequently, the Slave Trade Act was passed in 1807 and the Slavery Abolition Act was passed in 1837. To be sure, Christians also held slaves and some Christians even justified the practice of slavery on supposed grounds of Christian theology (Zimmerman 2010: 570). The social purity movements in the late 19th- and early 20th century and the religious freedom movements in the late 20th century constituted however a basis for the anti-trafficking movements in the 21st century. Discussing the relationship between Christianity and anti-trafficking in the United States, Bernstein (2010: 66) arrives at the result: "two different shifts in feminist and conservative Christian sexual politics have made the contemporary campaign against sex trafficking possible: the feminist shift from a focus on bad men inside the home to bad men outside the home, and the shift of a new generation of evangelical Christians from a focus on sexually improper women (as prior concerns with abortion suggest) to a focus on sexually dangerous men."

The position of the UNODC (2010) report *Combatting trafficking in persons in accordance with the principles of Islamic law* is that "Islamic law, though it does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, explicitly prohibits many of the acts and elements that constitute trafficking in persons. Islam is particularly explicit on the

prohibition of slavery. Similarly, Islam prohibits sexual exploitation for profit" (UNODC 2010: 2).[3]

Islamic doctrine of consent needs to be distinguished from harmful customary practices such as female genital mutilation, forced feeding of women, son preference, early marriage etc. "Indeed, women and children are the targets of the most serious violations of human rights that occur in Muslim countries as a result of these harmful customary practices" (UNODC 2012: 28 f.). On human trafficking, especially women and children, in countries of the Middle East see Mattar (2002). The small differences in religious doctrines between Christian tenets and Islamic law deviate a great deal from empirical evidence on how, for example, gender equality is obeyed in countries with Christian and Muslim majorities.

2.2 Religion and human development

Religion has been shown to affect gender equality. Countries with Protestant majorities enjoyed, for example, gender equality in education (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2010, Norton and Tomal 2009).[4] In countries with large Muslim populations, on the other hand, girls are discriminated in the education system (Norton and Tomal 2009, Cooray and Potrafke 2011). Islam also impairs women's relative status as measured by a composite indicator capturing institutional arrangements that are liable to influence, for example, females´ labor-market prospects (see Potrafke and Ursprung 2012 who use the new Social Institutions and Gender Index compiled by Branisa et al. 2009). Discrimination is especially severe in the Middle East. While "most governments in the Middle East have now formally endorsed, with reservations, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)… Yet the Arab Human Development Report documents that the region has some of the high rates of female illiteracy and the lowest rate

[3] Rubin (2011) elaborates on interest restrictions in Islam and Christianity and argues that underdevelopment in countries with Muslim majorities does not relate to Islam itself.
[4] Countries with a high share of protestants have high income per capita and a high education level (e.g. Becker and Woessmann 2010, Hillman 2009: 524f., 535f.).

of female labor force participation in the world. Women in the region encounter serious problems of basic health care, educational access, and income poverty, as well as suffering from exposure to violence, limited legal rights, and lack of access to justice" (Norris 2009a: 2). Women in the Middle East are underrepresented in the workforce and in government. The discrimination against women notwithstanding, experts disagree whether it is oil or Islam that drives gender inequality (Tripp 2009, Charrad 2009, Norris 2009b, Kang, 2009, Caraway 2009, Ross 2008, 2009a, 2012a, and Groh and Rothschild 2012).

The influence of religious creeds on gender equality is ambiguous: Seguino (2011) uses World Value Surveys data and finds that no religion stands out as more gender-inequitable than others. Norris (2009 and 2011) and Guiso et al. (2003) who also use World Value Surveys data do however find that religion influences attitudes towards gender equality and that support for gender equality is lowest in countries with Muslim majorities.

A straightforward hypothesis is that discrimination against girls and women in countries with large Muslim populations is likely to exist in tandem with disregard for anti-trafficking policies. The reason is that victims of human trafficking are usually women who are forced into prostitution (Di Tommaso et al. 2009, Bettio and Nandi 2010, Omar Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010, Cho et al. 2012b, Nautz and Sauer 2008).[5] Indeed, human trafficking is "a form of extreme exploitations for sexual and labor purposes and the vast majority of victims are marginalized foreign women (UNODC 2006)." (Cho 2012b:3).[6]

[5] Muslim dominated origin countries had low human trafficking outflows indicating that "female mobility is discouraged in Islamic countries which have presumably more conservative attitudes towards women" (Cho 2012b: 18). In a similar vein, the results by Rao and Presenti (2012) show that human trafficking is not more likely in countries with greater gender equality.

[6] Religion and political institutions also affect attitudes to child labor and the prevalence thereof. Maffei et al. (2006) find that more repressive political regimes are more permissive of child labor. On rights of the child and Convention on the Rights of the Child and Basic Immunization, see Gauri (2011).

2.3 Religion and hierarchies between sexes

Many experts maintain that Islam has a hierarchical and authoritarian character. Bennett (2010: 35) referring to Mawdudi´s *Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam* which was first published in 1939 (2nd edition in 1972) describes, for example, the relationship between men and women in Islam as follows: "Islam recognizes man as naturally stronger than women, so God raised men a "rank" above women for the latter´s protection and maintenance, distinguishing their roles. Men are suited to lead, women to nurture. Consequently, their rights are similar but different (Qurán 2:228)".[7] Islam is also associated with polygamy. Mawdudi insists that Qurán 4:3 gives men permission to marry up to four wives. Men are allowed to marry a Jewish or a Christian wife, while women are only allowed to marry Muslims.[8] Others disagree that Islam discriminates by gender (Fadel 2012).[9]

Catholicism also used to have a hierarchical and authoritarian character. Women, for example, are still not allowed to become a priest. Guiso et al. (2003: 265 ff.) show however that Catholic values have changed after the Second Vatican Council in 1962: Catholics became much more tolerant. As compared to Islam, Catholicism does not insist so much on natural differences between men and women. Protestantism has never had any hierarchical and authoritarian character. By contrast, Protestant values are fairness and diligence (Weber 1905). Overall Christian values are far less associated with gender issues than Islam.

The model by Inglehart and Norris (2003), Norris and Inglehart (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) "suggests that long-standing religious traditions in each society have a

[7] Hillman (2004) has described Nietzschean behaviour as the strong being unconstrained by ethics in actions toward the weak. With women naturally physically weaker than men, women in Nietzschean societies are victims of male domination.

[8] To be sure, Bennett (2010) does not hold the view that "Muslim women are equal but different" and shows for the Muslim countries Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey that women served as state leaders promoting gender equality.

[9] On Islamist feminism see Halverson and Way (2011).

deep and enduring impact upon contemporary social values and moral attitudes, including support for gender equality in politics, as well as shaping broader attitudes towards sexual liberalization" (Norris 2011: 6).

2.4 Religion and political institutions

Religion has been shown to influence political institutions.[10] Many empirical studies show that countries with Muslim majorities enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than countries in which Muslims are a minority (Lipset 1994; Midlarsky 1998; Barro 1999; Karatnycky 2002; Fish 2002; Ross 2001, 2009, 2012b; Donno and Russett 2004; Borooah and Paldam 2007; Rowley and Smith 2009, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2012; Potrafke 2012).

Correspondingly, Voigt (2005) shows that the presence of Islam is inimical to property rights-protection, the rule of law, and constitutional democracy. Timur Kuran´s momentous studies show how Islam inhibited economic development (Kuran 1997, 2005 and 2011; Kuran and Singh 2012, Kuran and Lustig 2012). Islamic institutions that helped to delay economic modernization in the Middle East encompass many facets (Kuran 2011: 287ff.). In Islam´s first few decades, Kuran identifies the inheritance system, the acceptance of polygyny, the Ban on *ribā*, the absence of corporation, the choice of law limited to non-Muslims, the prohibition of apostasy, and the absence of merchant organizations. Institutions that delayed economic modernization have developed after Islam adopted the contract law, the waqfs, the court system, and capitulations. The Middle East´s institutional history also curtails its present economic performance (Kuran 2011: 293 ff.). One obstacle to full modernization includes "political systems with low capacity for innovation and experimentation". Kuran (2011: 294) identifies "the weaknesses of private sectors and civil societies, which are rooted in the region´s institutional history, breed complacency toward autocratic rule" as historical legacies.

[10] Facchini (2010) shows that Islam and institutions of freedom are negatively related. Coşgel et al. (2009) elaborate on the nexus between legal constraints and economic power of rulers in Islamic history. On economic performance in Islamic countries, see also Hillman (2007a). For an overview of the relation between democracy and economic development, see Hillman (2007b).

2.5 Hypotheses

To investigate how religion influences anti-trafficking policies through political institutions, I adapt the theoretical framework of Berggren and Bjørnskov (2011a) as illustrated in Figure 1.[11] First, depending on institutions, religion directly influences politicians who design anti-trafficking policies. Second, religion influences the expressive behavior of the population at large and interest groups, to which politicians respond. With different institutions reflecting social customs and attitudes to women, political decision making and the implementation of anti-trafficking policies thus differ across political systems. In democracies, politicians (the governing parties, members of parliament) will be more responsive to median voter attitudes in implementing anti-trafficking policies. In autocracies, dictators abide by the customs and follow the preferences of the elites that support the regime. Voters and politicians are likely to care about human trafficking not only because of moral issues and human right concerns, but also because human trafficking is associated with larger shadow economies and, as a consequence, more corruption and lower economic growth (e.g., Belser 2005).

Figure 1. Influence of religion and political institutions on Anti-trafficking policies



Source: adapted from Berggren and Bjørnskov (2011a).

[11] On behavior and religion, see Berggren (1997). On religion and social trust see Berggren and Bjørnskov (2011b).

Against the background of the differences between countries with Muslim and Christian majorities, and differences between political systems such as democracies and dictatorships, religion and political institutions are predicted to influence anti-trafficking policies. The hypotheses to be tested are (see also Box 1):

H1: *Anti-trafficking policies are more likely to be present in countries with Christian than with Muslim majorities.*

H2: *Political institutions enhance/mitigate the influence of religion on anti-trafficking policies: countries with Christian majorities have more effective anti-trafficking policies when they are democracies. Democratic institutions strengthen anti-trafficking policies in countries with Muslim majorities.*

Box 1. Strength of Anti-trafficking policies

	Democracy	Dictatorship
Christian majority	**+**	**?**
Muslim majority	**?**	**-**

3. Data

3.1 The Anti-Trafficking Policy Index

To measure Anti-trafficking policies, I use the novel *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* by Cho et al. (2012a). This index provides data for up to 179 countries over the period 2000-2009. My sample contains only 170 countries because the religion or democracy variables are not

available for 9 countries.[12] The index is coded to reflect policies in three different dimensions: (i) prosecuting (criminalizing) traffickers, (ii) protecting victims, and (iii) preventing human trafficking. The index is based on "raw data derived from two reports on human trafficking, the Annual Report of Trafficking in Persons (United States State Department, 2001-2010) and the Report on Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 and 2009)" (Cho et al. 2012a: 7). Compliance with these requirements is individually evaluated and measured by three sub indices called "prosecution", "protection" and "prevention" policy – the three prime dimensions of anti-trafficking policy. The "prosecution" sub index "measures the level of governments´ efforts to punish and prosecute traffickers and other related offenders (such as employers of trafficking victims, law enforcement officials who collude with traffickers, and clients of services provided by human trafficking victims)" (Cho et al. 2012a: 7). The "protection" sub index "assesses the level of governmental efforts to protect and assist the victims of human trafficking" (Cho et al. 2012a: 8). The "prevention" sub index "evaluates the level of governmental efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking" (Cho et al. 2012a: 9). I list the criteria for the three sub indices in Table A1. For a more encompassing description on the anti-human trafficking indices see Cho et al. (2012a). All three sub indices assume values on a five point scale between 1 (lowest value of strictness) and 5 (highest value of strictness). The overall anti-trafficking policy index is computed as the unweighted sum of the three sub indicators and thus assumes values between 3 (softest anti-trafficking policies) and 15 (strictest anti-trafficking policies).

I use the averages of the overall index and the three sub indices over the period 2000-2009 in every individual country, because I investigate the influence of religion on anti-trafficking policies, and religious majorities do not vary over that period. The data show that governments in developed countries implemented stronger anti-trafficking policies

[12] I cannot include Hong Kong, Kosovo, Macau, Montenegro, Netherlands Antilles, Serbia, Taiwan, Timor Leste, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

than governments in developing countries. Anti-trafficking policies were strong in countries such as Belgium (14.4), Germany (14.8), Norway (14.5) and the United States (15) and low in countries such as North Korea (3), Somalia (3.3), Iraq (4.0) and Eritrea (4).

The worldwide average score of the overall 3P index is 8.92. The worldwide average score of the prosecution sub index is 3.34, of the protection sub index 2.57 and of the prevention sub index 2.99. The level of compliance with the UN requirements thus differs across the three policy fields. These patterns show that "in terms of compliance with anti-trafficking policy, countries take the "justice and prevention" aspect of the crime more seriously, than the human rights aspect, as pointed out by Simmons and Lloyd (2010)" (Cho et al. 2012a: 10). Table A2 shows the correlations across the overall 3P, and its sub indices on prosecution, protection and prevention policies.

3.2 Religion and democracy

I use the data on religious fractionalization by Alesina et al. (2003). This database reports for each country over the period 1980-1998 the percentage of the population belonging to the three most widespread religions in the world. The category "Muslim" is for some countries subdivided in "Shia Muslim" and "Sunni Muslim", for other countries this sub-division is not recorded. I therefore combine the available data to obtain a single variable that describes the share of Muslims in the total population of each country. Countries with Muslim majorities are, for example, Afghanistan (99%), Iran (99.57%), Iraq (97.03%), and the Maldives (100%). The average Muslim share in the sample is 25.25%. In a similar vein, I also combine the different Christian religions such as Protestantism, Catholicism and Orthodox. Countries with Christian majorities are, for example, Argentina (95.25%), Belize (100%), Honduras (97.23%), and Luxembourg (95.22%). The average Christianity share in

the sample is 43.97%.[13] The average shares for Buddhism are 4.84%, for Hinduism 2.24% and for indigenous religion 4.55%. Israel is the only country with a Jewish majority. I therefore do not include a Jewish variable because it would basically be a dummy variable for Israel. The dataset by Alesina et al. (2003) also contains a variable for "other religion" and "no religion". Following the related empirical studies on religion, I consider Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and indigenous religions as the five major religion variables and consider the other religions/categories by the variable "other". These data reveal that Islam and Christianity are the most widespread religions around the world. I therefore focus my discussion on the difference between Islam and Christianity. For robustness checks I also measure religion with dummy variables that take on the value one when a particular religion is dominant in a country. The information is from the Encyclopaedia of World Geography (1994) and the CIA World Factbook (2010).

I use the Democracy-Dictatorship dummy variable by Cheibub et al. (2010). The Democracy-Dictatorship variable distinguishes between regimes in which executive and legislative offices are allocated in contested elections and those regimes in which this is not the case. The variable assumes the value one for democracies and zero otherwise.[14] The data by Cheibub et al. (2010) are available till 2008 and I therefore use the average democracy score over the period 2000-2008 which assume values between 0 and 1. There are 97 countries in the sample that have been assigned to be entirely democratic and 68 countries that have been assigned to be entirely autocratic over the period 2000-2008. Countries shifting between democracy and autocracy have been, for example, Burundi (0.44), Georgia (0.56), Nepal (0.33), and Thailand (0.78). For robustness checks I also

[13] I acknowledge, of course, that a high a share of an individual religion in a country does not necessarily imply high religiosity. Investigating the influence of religiosity on human anti-trafficking policies would be a different approach. In particular, data on religiosity are not available for the entire sample I use. Data on religiosity are not available, for example, for several countries with Muslim majorities.

[14] See Cheibub et al. (2010) for a more encompassing discussion on classifying democracies and dictatorships. The more traditional measures of democracy were the POLITY IV and the Freedom House indices. These indices have, however, been criticized on several grounds (Munk and Verkuilen 2002, Vreeland 2008, Cheibub et al. 2010).

measure political institutions with the more expansionary (type 2) coding by Cheibub et al. (2010) and the Constraints on the Chief Executive variable (POLITY IV sub index).

3.3 Correlations

To illustrate the association between anti-trafficking policies, religion and democracy, I first present correlations between the overall anti-trafficking policy index, Muslim and Christian majorities, and democracy, and second between the overall anti-trafficking policy index and the interaction of Muslim and Christian majorities and democracy. Figures 2 and 3 show that anti-trafficking policies are positively associated with Christianity and negatively with Islam. The correlation coefficient between the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* and Christianity is 0.36, and -0.41 between the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* and Islam. Figure 4 shows that anti-trafficking policies are positively associated with democracy; the correlation coefficient between the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* and democracy is 0.56. The influence of religion on anti-trafficking policies appears to be enhanced by democracy: Figure 5 shows that Christianity has a more positive influence on anti-trafficking policies when a country is democratic. By contrast, Islam appears to only mitigate anti-trafficking policies in democracies (Figure 6). Table A3 lists all countries included and the individual values of the share of Christians, Muslims and the democracy score.

The correlations between the sub indices for prosecution, protection and prevention reveal similar patterns: the correlation between the religion variables is weakest with the prosecution sub index and strongest with the protection sub index. The correlation between the democracy variable is weakest with the prevention sub index and strongest with the prosecution sub index. I do not present these figures to save space. All figures are available upon request.

4. The empirical model

The basic econometric model has the following form:

$$\text{Anti-trafficking Index}_{ij} = \Sigma_k \alpha_k \, Religion_{ik} + \beta \, Democracy_i + \Sigma_k \gamma_k \, Religion_k * Democracy_i$$
$$+\Sigma_l \delta_l \, Continent_{il} + \Sigma_m \varepsilon_m \, Legal\ Origin_{im} + \Sigma_n \zeta_n \, x_{in} + u_{ij}$$

$$\text{with i = 1,...,170; j=1,..,4; k=1,...,5; l=1,...,4; m=1,...,4;n=1,...,6} \qquad (1)$$

The dependent variable *Anti-trafficking Index*$_{ij}$ associates anti-trafficking policies in country *i* for index j (overall 3P, prosecution, protection, prevention). *Religion*$_{ik}$ describes the religion variables. I distinguish between Christianity (reference category), Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous Religion and others. *Democracy*$_i$ is the democracy variable. *Religion*$_k$ * *Democracy*$_i$ *is* the interaction term between the religion and democracy variables. I include the interaction term to test whether political institutions have mitigated/enhanced the influence of religion types on anti-trafficking policies. I normalize the religion and democracy variable before interacting. *Continent*$_{il}$ are continental dummy variables assuming the value one if country i belongs to continent *l* and zero otherwise. I distinguish between five different continents: Africa (reference category) Asia, Europe, America and Oceania. *Legal Origin*$_{im}$ are legal origin dummy variables (La Porta et al. 1999). I distinguish between five different legal origins: British (reference category), French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist.[15] Table A2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables. The vector $\boldsymbol{x}_i$ contains the economic control variables. Following Cho et al. (2012a) I include the logarithm of per capita GDP, the logarithm of total population, an OECD dummy variable, the women's economic rights indicator (Cingranelli and Richards), absence of corruption (CPI index by Transparency International) and the

[15] I acknowledge that Scandinavian legal origin is associated with a larger welfare state and higher levels of social trust (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011).

oil/gas income per capita (Ross 2012).[16] All these variables refer to the average of the annual data over the period 2000-2009.

I estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors clustered by continent. Recall that, first, as compared to Cho et al. (2012a) and Cho and Vadlamannati (2012), I do not estimate panel data models but estimate cross-sectional models because the religion variables do not vary over time. Second, my dependent variable does not have an ordered structure because I use the averages of the anti-trafficking indices over the 2000-2009 period. There is thus no need, for example, to estimate an ordered probit model.

5. Results

5.1 Basic results

Table 1 shows the regression results for the overall 3P index. The control variables display the expected signs and are statistically significant in several cases. The coefficients of the regional dummy variables for Asia and Europe have positive signs and are statistically significant in columns (2) and (3) but do not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (4) and (5) and suggest that countries in Asia and Europe have a higher level of anti-trafficking policies than countries in Africa. By contrast, countries in Oceania and America have a lower level of anti-trafficking policies than countries in Africa. The coefficients of the French legal origin variables do not turn out to be statistically

[16] The women's economic rights index is available for the 2000-2007 period. The CPI index is not available for all 170 countries over the 2000-2009 period. I take the average of the available data for every individual country.
In section 2, I hypothesize that religion influences women´s rights. For example, women´s rights are less pronounced in countries with Muslim majorities. The religion variables are thus likely to be correlated with the women´s rights variable. For example, the correlation coefficient between the Muslim share variable and the women´s rights variable is -0.41. It is important to note that the inferences regarding the religion and political institutions variables do not change when the women´s rights variable is excluded. In a similar vein, the influence of the women´s rights dramatically decreases when I estimate the model only for countries with non-Muslim majorities. I have included the women´s rights to avoid potential concerns about omitted variable bias.
I use the oil/gas income data by Ross (2012) as measured in constant 2000 USD (Internet Source: Michael L. Ross, 2011-04, "Replication data for: Oil and Gas Production and Value, 1932-2009", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15828 UNF:5:Hwe3jAjxG7fgOMzpGQXOxw== V4 [Version]). I divide the oil/income data by the population data from the Penn World Tables.

significant. The coefficients of the socialist legal origin variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (5), the coefficient of the German legal origin variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) and Scandinavian legal origin variables are statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (2) and (3) and indicate that anti-trafficking policies are somewhat stronger in countries with a socialist, German and Scandinavian legacy as compared to countries with a British legal origin. This finding is plausible because, first, many former socialist countries are major sources of human trafficking outflows and, second, countries with socialist, Scandinavian and German legacy have promoted gender equality. Per capita income does not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (4) and (5). This finding corresponds with the results by Cho et al. (2012a). The coefficient of the population size variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (4) and at the 1% level in column (5) and has a positive sign. This estimate indicates that anti-trafficking policies as measured by the overall 3P Index is in a given country by 0.43 points higher than in an otherwise similar country if it has a 1% bigger population. The coefficients of the OECD and the women's economic rights variable have the expected positive sign but do not turn out to be statistically significant (columns 4 and 5). The CPI index measuring the absence of corruption has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (5). It indicates that the overall 3P index is about 0.39 points higher when the CPI increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 10), or that the overall 3P index is about 0.8 points higher when the CPI increases by one standard deviation. The finding that corruption mitigates anti-trafficking policies is also in line with the empirical findings by Cho et al. (2012a). The women´s economic rights and the oil/gas income variable do not turn out to be statistically significant.

Most importantly, the results reported in Table 1 show that types of religion and political institutions have influenced anti-trafficking policies: democracies had stronger anti-trafficking policies than dictatorships. The coefficient of the democracy variable is statistically significant

at the 1% level in columns (1) to (5). The coefficients of the Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous Religion and other religion variables mostly do not turn out to be statistically significant (except the coefficient of the Indigenous Religion variable in column 2). By contrast the coefficient of the Islam variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (2), at the 5% level in columns (3) and (5) and at the 10% level in column (4). The coefficient has a negative sign which indicates that countries with Muslim majorities had less strict anti-trafficking policies than countries with Christian majorities (reference category). The numerical meaning of the effect in column (5) is that, at an average degree of democracy, the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* decreased by about 0.49 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* in a country with no Muslims is by 1.4 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim country.

The marginal effects of the religion variables have, however, to be interpreted conditionally on the interaction with the democracy variable (see Friedrich 1982). In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate the marginal effects. Because the religion and the democracy variables have been normalized before interacting (mean zero, variance one), the coefficients and t-statistics of the religion variables in Table 1 reveal the influence of the individual religion (as compared to Christianity) at the average level of democracy. I follow Dreher and Gassebner (2012), also evaluating the marginal effects at the minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e., when a country was a stable democracy or a stable dictatorship throughout the 2000-2008 period. Table 2 indicates that there were significant marginal effects describing differences in religious influence in democracies and dictatorships.

The marginal effects presented in Table 2 can be interpreted as follows: in dictatorships, the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* decreased by about 0.67 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the *Anti-Trafficking Policy Index* in a dictatorship with no Muslims is by 2.1 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely

Muslim dictatorship. This marginal effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of the Islam variable evaluated for pure democracies does however not turn out to be statistically significant indicating that Islam did not mitigate anti-trafficking policies in democracies.[17] Buddhism had a negative influence on anti-trafficking policies in democracies rather than in dictatorships. This result might be surprising at a first glance. The reason for this finding is however driven by only a few countries that indeed reveal the reported relationship for the overall *3P Index*: Buddhist democratic countries are, for example, Japan (9.5), Mongolia (9.0) and Sri Lanka (9.4), whereas Buddhist autocratic countries are Burma/Myanmar (6.8), Cambodia (9.1), Laos (9.0), and Vietnam (11.0).

Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for the prosecution sub index. At an average level of democracy, Buddhist and Hinduist countries had somewhat stricter anti-trafficking policies than Christian countries, whereas countries with dominating Indigenous religion had somewhat less stricter anti-trafficking policies than Christian countries. The Islam variable has the expected negative sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant. The marginal effects in Table 4 show that religion, evaluated for pure dictatorships and democracies, hardly influenced the prosecution index: only the marginal effect of Hinduism in dictatorships and of indigenous religions in democracies is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates for the protection sub index. The results are similar to the overall 3P anti-trafficking index. At an average level of democracy, countries with Muslim majorities had low protection of victims. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (2) and (3) and at the 10% level in column (5). The numerical meaning of the effect in column (5) is that, at an average degree of democracy in a country, the protection sub index decreased by about 0.20 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the protection sub index in a country with no Muslims is by 0.58 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim country. This effect is thus

[17] These marginal effects are not out-of-sample predictions. Countries with Muslim majorities that have been entirely democratic are, for example, Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey.

numerically smaller than the effect of the Islam variable on the overall 3P index. In column (5) the coefficient of the Buddhism variable is statistically significant at the 10% level and has a negative sign. The numerical meaning of this effect is that, at an average degree of democracy in a country, the protection sub index decreased by about 0.07 points, when the share of Buddhists increased by one standard deviation, implying that the protection sub index in a country with no Buddhists is by 0.30 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Buddhist country.

The marginal effects presented in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: in dictatorships, the protection sub index decreased by about 0.32 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the protection sub index in a dictatorship with no Muslims is by 0.9 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim dictatorship. The marginal effect of the Islam variable evaluated for pure democracies does however not turn out to be statistically significant indicating that Islam did not mitigate anti-trafficking protection policies in democracies. Buddhism had a negative influence on anti-trafficking protection policies in democracies rather than in dictatorships.

Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates for the prevention sub index. The results are similar to the overall 3P anti-trafficking index and the protection sub index. At an average level of democracy, countries with Muslim majorities had low prevention of human trafficking. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (2), at the 5% level in column (3) and at the 10% level in column (5). The numerical meaning of the effect in column (5) is that, at an average degree of democracy in a country, the prevention sub index decreased by about 0.19 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the prevention sub index in a country with no Muslims is by 0.55 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim country. This effect is thus numerically similar to the effect of the Islam variable on the protection index. The coefficient of the Indigenous Religion

variable is statistically significant at the 10% in column (2), the coefficients of the Buddhism and the other religion variable are statistically significant at the 10% level in column (5).

The marginal effects presented in Table 8 can be interpreted as follows: in dictatorships, the prevention sub index decreased by about 0.27 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one standard deviation, implying that the prevention sub index in a dictatorship with no Muslims is by 0.78 points higher than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim dictatorship. The marginal effect of the Islam variable evaluated for pure democracies does however not turn out to be statistically significant indicating that Islam did not mitigate anti-trafficking prevention policies in democracies. Buddhism had a negative influence on anti-trafficking prevention policies in democracies rather than in dictatorships. The other variable had a negative influence on anti-trafficking prevention policies in dictatorships rather than in democracies.

Why is it that religion influences the protection and the prevention sub indices, but does not influence the prosecution index? Cho and Vadlamannati (2012: 252f.) elaborate on strategic decisions governments undertake by adopting or not adopting strict anti-trafficking polices. Governments are likely to select obligations with which they can comply with the lowest cost while satisfying the preferences of major powers in international politics such as the United States. As compared to protection and prevention policies, prosecution policy appears to be most costly to implement. For example, the obligations of prosecution require adopting the newly defined concept of human trafficking in national legislation. By contrast, the obligations of prevention policies do not require adopting new legislations, but rather include anti-trafficking public and media campaigns, and controlling borders, airports and train stations. While protection and prevention policies are less costly than prosecution policies, they may contradict with Islamic values. “Protection policies mainly protect victims, while prosecution policies mainly target the perpetrators” (Cho et al. 2012a: 34). In countries with Muslim majorities, protection appears to be very costly in a normative sense because it requires

acknowledging human trafficking victims (including prostitutes) as victims and providing assistance for them. It is conceivable that Muslim dominated countries do not want to protect victims of human trafficking which are mostly women and receive expressive utility by not adopting protections and preventions policies (see Hillman 2010 on expressive behavior). These results perfectly correspond with, first, the empirical studies showing that women are discriminated in Muslim dominated countries and, second the study by Berggren and Bjørnskov (2011a) showing that religion influences de facto enforcement but not necessarily de jure rules.

5.2 Robustness checks

I have checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Cho et al. (2012a) investigate whether anti-trafficking policies diffuse across countries by using spatial autoregressive models. Their results show that anti-trafficking policies are influenced by the anti-trafficking policies in neighbor countries but the numerical influence is small. In any event, I have also included the averages of the spatially weighted lags by Cho et al. (2012a), respectively.[18] The results show that the spatially weighted lags lack statistical significance in almost any specification. These results – as well as all the discussions of the following robustness tests – refer to specifications including the entire set of explanatory variables to address possible concerns about potential omitted variable bias. Including the spatially weighted lags does not change the inferences regarding the religion and democracy variables at all.

Democracies can be coded more expansively. Cheibub et al. (2010) have coded conservatively, i.e. they have coded a country as a democracy only if there has been alternation in power. Some countries appear, however, to have "contested" elections for the executive and legislature, but there has never been an alternation of the government. The

[18] I thank Seo-Young Cho for providing their data. In fact, I included all the spatially weighted lags used in Cho et al. (2011), respectively.

alternative coding by Cheibub et al. (2010) considers these cases as democracies. I have included the more expansive democracy coding. At an average level of the more expansive democracy coding, inferences do not change. Evaluated at the minimum and maximum level of democracy, inferences do however somewhat change: non-democratic and democratic countries with Muslim majorities had less strict policies against human trafficking; an effect which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The effect of the Islam variable slightly fails statistical significance in dictatorships. As before, the Islam variable does not influence the prosecution sub index, but coding democracies more expansively, the Islam variable also does not influence the prevention sub index, neither in democracies nor dictatorships. By contrast, countries with Muslim majorities had less strict protection, on average, in democracies as well as in dictatorships.

I have also used the "constraints on the chief executive" index (POLITY IV) as an alternative democracy measure. This index assumes values between 1 (pure autocracy) to 7 (pure democracy). Using this democracy measure reduces the sample to 151 countries. The results show, that at an average level of political institutions, countries with Muslim majorities had low prevention. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Evaluated at the minimum and maximum of political institutions, the Islam variable had a negative influence on the overall 3P index and the protection sub index in pure dictatorships and no effect in pure democracies (as compared to Christianity). This finding perfectly corresponds with the results using the democracy/dictatorship data by Cheibub et al. (2010), as the effect showing no influence of the Islam variable on the prosecution sub index.

I have replaced the data on religion by Alesina et al. (2003) which report the percentage of the population belonging to the three most widespread religions in the world by religion dummy variables that take on the value one when a particular religion is dominant in a country. The information is from the Encyclopaedia of World Geography (1994) and the

CIA World Factbook (2010). The results show that the influence of the Islam variable is stronger on the prosecution sub index and weaker on the prevention sub index as compared to the results using the religion data by Alesina et al. (2003).

I have also included the KOF indices of globalization (Dreher 2006, and Dreher et al., 2008), which represent an attempt to measure globalization in the broad sense that has been accepted in the recent empirical literature.[19] It measures globalization on a scale of 1 to 100, where higher values represent higher levels of globalization and distinguishes between three different dimensions of globalization (economic, social, and political dimension). I have included all three KOF globalization sub indices and the overall KOF index of globalization. They do not turn out to be statistically significant and including them does not change the inferences regarding the religion and democracy variables.

I have replaced the oil/gas income variable by the individual oil and gas income variables (Ross 2012) and alternatively an oil exporter dummy variable that takes on the value one if exports of oil exceed 50% of total exports (Easterly and Sewadeh 2001). The three variables do not turn out to be statistically significant and including them does not change the inferences regarding the religion and democracy variables.

Migration and trafficking inflows are also likely to influence anti-trafficking policies. I have therefore included net migration (total annual number of immigrants minus the total number of emigrants) and the stock of migrants (share of population) in a country. I use the average data provided by the World Bank for the periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010, respectively. The net migration variables have the expected positive signs and have a statistically significant influence on the overall 3P index (only the one for the period 2001-2005 – an effect which is statistically significant at the 5% level), the protection and

[19] The KOF index has frequently been used to measure globalization in recent empirical research on the influence of globalization on human development and economic policy-making (see, for example, Bergh and Nilsson 2010a, 2010b). Globalization has influenced the empowerment of women. See, for example, Neumayer and de Soysa (2007, 2011), Cho (2012) and Dreher et al. (2012).

prevention sub indices but lack statistical significance on the prosecution sub index. The migration stock variables have the expected positive signs but do not turn out to be statistically significant (except the stock for the period 2001-2005 when the prevention sub index is used which is statistically significant at the 10% level). In any event, including these variables does not change the inferences regarding the religion and political institution variables at all.

I have also included an index capturing the incidence of human trafficking into a country taken for the Index on Incidence of Reporting of Destination Countries provided by the UNODC Report. The index assumes ordinal scores from 0 (no reported inflow of human trafficking) and 5 (very high inflows) and is used in related studies such as Cho et al. (2012b). Including this index reduces the sample size to 147 countries and does not change the inferences: the trafficking index is statistically significant at the 5% level when the overall 3P and the prosecution sub index is used but does not turn out to be statistically significant when the protection and prevention are used. The Islam variable has a strong negative influence on the overall 3P, the prevention and protection sub indices (on average as well as in dictatorships). There is even a negative effect of the Islam variable on the prosecution sub index which statistically significant at the 10% level on average and at the 5% level under dictatorships.

Potential endogeneity problems with respect to religion cannot occur because anti-trafficking policies over the period 2000-2009 cannot influence religion as measured over the period 1980-1998.

The reported effects could also be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in individual countries. For this reason, I checked whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. The results (not reported here) indicate that this is not the case.

6. Conclusion

I have investigated empirically the influence of religion and political institutions on anti-trafficking policies as measured by the new 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index and its sub indices on prosecution, protection and prevention policies. The results show that countries with Christian majorities have relatively strict anti-trafficking policies while Muslim majorities have not tried so hard to stop human trafficking. The differences between countries with Christian and Muslim majorities is pronounced in dictatorships but less so in democracies. The influence of the Islam variable on the overall 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index is driven by protection and prevention policies. As compared to prosecution policies that mainly target the perpetrators of human trafficking, protection and prevention policies mainly protect the victims of human trafficking, who are women. Autocratic rulers in Muslim-dominated countries may well not protect women from being objects of trafficking. The conclusion is consistent with empirical findings describing the association between religion, political institutions and human development that show that Muslim dominated countries discriminate against women. However, democracy ameliorates the gender bias presumably because women vote. Women´s suffrage is relevant: empirical research has shown, for example, that the size of government, especially social expenditures increased when women had the right to vote (Lott and Kenny 1999, Aidt and Dallal 2008). In a similar vein, mitigating gender disparities in elected office is likely to promote gender equality and stricter anti-trafficking policies. Future research needs to be done on how policies against human trafficking reduce trafficking as such.

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Figure 2: Overall Anti-Trafficking Index and Christianity share variable.



Correlation coefficient: 0.36. Source: Cho et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2003).

Figure 3: Overall Anti-Trafficking Index and Islam share variable.



Correlation coefficient: -0.41. Source: Cho et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2003).

Figure 4: Overall Anti-Trafficking Index and democracy variable.



Correlation coefficient: 0.56. Source: Cho et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2003).

Figure 5: Overall Anti-Trafficking Index and interaction between Christianity share and democracy variable.



Correlation coefficient: 0.48. Source: Cho et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2003).

Figure 6: Overall Anti-Trafficking Index and interaction between Islam share and democracy variable.



Correlation coefficient: 0.06. Source: Cho et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2003).

Table 1: Regression Results. Dependent variable: 3P Anti-trafficking Index
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by continent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islam	-0.308	-0.6021***	-0.5535**	-0.5010*	-0.4903**
	[0.82]	[6.20]	[4.36]	[2.64]	[2.97]
Buddhism	0.1468	-0.0344	-0.0389	-0.0481	-0.1523
	[0.82]	[0.51]	[0.33]	[0.91]	[2.07]
Hinduism	0.0584	0.0781	0.101	0.1441	0.0928
	[0.48]	[0.82]	[1.00]	[0.87]	[0.55]
Indigenous Religions	-0.1294	-0.1613*	-0.1306	-0.0348	-0.1041
	[0.59]	[2.44]	[1.56]	[0.36]	[1.30]
Other	0.0902	-0.2061	-0.1453	-0.1142	-0.2398
	[0.52]	[0.85]	[0.58]	[0.57]	[1.69]
Democracy	1.3138***	1.1417***	1.0569***	0.8980***	0.8281***
	[8.48]	[10.09]	[6.76]	[7.96]	[5.54]
Islam*Democracy	0.04	0.0969	0.1627	0.1605	0.1531
	[0.27]	[0.71]	[1.09]	[0.75]	[0.69]
Buddhism*Democracy	-0.1851*	-0.1347**	-0.1837**	-0.2236***	-0.1388
	[2.25]	[3.27]	[3.60]	[5.02]	[1.44]
Hinduism*Democracy	-0.2212	-0.2699	-0.2497	-0.3248*	-0.2712
	[1.42]	[1.98]	[1.64]	[2.32]	[1.54]
Indigenous Religion*Democracy	-0.2141**	-0.1416*	-0.1204	-0.1142	-0.0984
	[2.96]	[2.40]	[1.80]	[1.75]	[1.45]
Other*Democracy	0.1868	0.1452	0.1547	0.111	0.1044
	[0.86]	[0.68]	[0.83]	[0.86]	[1.05]
Asia		0.6541**	0.7489**	0.014	0.2466
		[4.31]	[3.72]	[0.04]	[0.87]
Europe		1.8581***	1.9577**	0.395	0.4878
		[6.20]	[3.01]	[0.50]	[0.70]
America		-1.0259**	-0.8497	-1.0729**	-0.7808
		[4.12]	[2.09]	[3.42]	[2.04]
Oceania		-2.4352***	-2.2902***	-1.8942**	-1.6011*
		[8.96]	[5.78]	[3.27]	[2.46]
Legal Origin (french)			0.2749	0.149	0.2005
			[0.81]	[0.34]	[0.48]
Legal Origin (socialist)			-0.1804	0.6722	1.0931**
			[0.33]	[2.03]	[3.25]
Legal Origin (german)			1.6488***	0.3604	0.3513
			[11.23]	[0.32]	[0.54]
Legal Origin (scandinavian)			0.7801*	0.6759*	-0.2441
			[2.28]	[2.38]	[0.83]
log per capita GDP				0.2982	-0.1441
				[1.36]	[1.27]
log Population				0.4288**	0.4352***
				[4.44]	[4.90]
OECD				1.4149	0.7802
				[1.58]	[1.28]
Women´s Economic Rights					0.3483
					[0.69]
Absence of corruption					0.3860**
					[3.16]
Oil/gas income					-0.001
					[0.03]
Constant	8.8958***	8.6734***	8.4587***	2.3327	4.0105*
	[21.26]	[87.01]	[36.51]	[0.92]	[2.66]
Observations	170	170	168	166	160
R-squared	0.38	0.56	0.57	0.71	0.72

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 2: Marginal effects. Dependent variable: 3P Anti-trafficking Index
Referring to Table 1 column (5).
Reference category Christianity.

	Dictatorship	Democracy
Islam	-0.669***	-0.351
	[5.41]	[0.98]
Buddhism	0.009	-0.278**
	[0.06]	[3.78]
Hinduism	0.409	-0.154
	[1.50]	[0.68]
Indigenous Religions	0.011	-0.194
	[0.16]	[1.49]
Other	-0.361	-0.145
	[2.01]	[0.85]

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3: Regression Results. Dependent variable: Prosecution Index OLS with robust standard errors clustered by continent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islam	-0.0274	-0.0967	-0.1291	-0.1221	-0.0948
	[0.18]	[1.51]	[1.72]	[1.48]	[1.05]
Buddhism	0.1555*	0.0856*	0.0596	0.0533*	0.0134
	[2.47]	[2.66]	[1.27]	[2.45]	[0.44]
Hinduism	0.1054	0.1014**	0.1062***	0.1119*	0.0931*
	[2.04]	[4.27]	[4.73]	[2.56]	[2.36]
Indigenous Religions	-0.1408	-0.0918*	-0.1094*	-0.0815	-0.1004*
	[1.63]	[2.39]	[2.28]	[2.05]	[2.65]
Other	0.1353*	0.0009	-0.0396	-0.0111	-0.0551
	[2.48]	[0.01]	[0.48]	[0.20]	[1.55]
Democracy	0.5401***	0.4223***	0.4125**	0.3533**	0.3258**
	[9.01]	[5.81]	[4.58]	[4.16]	[3.40]
Islam*Democracy	-0.07	0.0057	0.0164	-0.002	-0.0232
	[0.63]	[0.04]	[0.12]	[0.02]	[0.21]
Buddhism*Democracy	-0.0935**	-0.0462	-0.0346	-0.0581*	-0.0358
	[3.75]	[1.70]	[1.22]	[2.36]	[0.87]
Hinduism*Democracy	-0.1279*	-0.0989	-0.1042	-0.1329*	-0.1183
	[2.45]	[1.53]	[1.39]	[2.16]	[1.77]
Indigenous Religion*Democracy	-0.1212***	-0.0714*	-0.0647	-0.0696	-0.0738
	[6.41]	[2.30]	[1.83]	[1.96]	[1.94]
Other*Democracy	0.0209	0.0279	0.033	0.0041	0.0011
	[0.26]	[0.31]	[0.36]	[0.09]	[0.02]
Asia		0.4726***	0.4461***	0.2539	0.2716
		[7.80]	[5.96]	[1.64]	[1.99]
Europe		1.0462***	0.9478**	0.5346	0.4523
		[5.71]	[3.22]	[1.44]	[1.15]
America		-0.0702	-0.1163	-0.1386	-0.042
		[0.38]	[0.49]	[0.56]	[0.17]
Oceania		-0.2697	-0.4351*	-0.2013	-0.2493
		[1.58]	[2.25]	[0.81]	[0.85]
Legal Origin (french)			0.0681	0.0106	-0.0245
			[0.33]	[0.06]	[0.17]
Legal Origin (socialist)			0.2002	0.4305**	0.5627**
			[0.99]	[3.38]	[3.15]
Legal Origin (german)			0.1329	-0.2828	-0.331
			[0.57]	[0.52]	[0.79]
Legal Origin (scandinavian)			0.0619	0.0887	-0.1629
			[0.61]	[1.36]	[1.27]
log per capita GDP				0.0651	-0.0101
				[0.95]	[0.21]
log Population				0.1744***	0.1892***
				[7.30]	[5.76]
OECD				0.4036	0.1759
				[1.59]	[0.93]
Women´s Economic Rights					0.1462
					[0.71]
Absence of corruption					0.1066
					[1.77]
Oil/gas income					-0.0279
					[1.93]
Constant	3.2832***	3.0017***	2.9727***	0.9147	0.9347
	[16.88]	[41.82]	[20.84]	[1.71]	[1.44]
Observations	170	170	168	166	160
R-squared	0.38	0.52	0.52	0.63	0.65

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Marginal effects. Dependent variable: Prosecution Index
Referring to Table 3 column (5).
Reference category Christianity.

	Dictatorship	Democracy
Islam	-0.068	-0.116
	[1.68]	[0.62]
Buddhism	0.055	-0.019
	[0.78]	[0.60]
Hinduism	0.231*	-0.014
	[2.47]	[0.22]
Indigenous Religions	-0.014	-0.167*
	[1.04]	[2.34]
Other	-0.056	-0.054
	[1.03]	[0.82]

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: Regression Results. Dependent variable: Protection Index.
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by continent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islam	-0.1511	-0.2524**	-0.2075**	-0.1902	-0.2002*
	[1.41]	[3.70]	[3.20]	[1.88]	[2.47]
Buddhism	-0.0101	-0.059	-0.0366	-0.0344	-0.0650*
	[0.18]	[1.82]	[0.80]	[1.20]	[2.47]
Hinduism	-0.0451	-0.0317	-0.0199	-0.0067	-0.0238
	[1.04]	[1.28]	[0.73]	[0.15]	[0.55]
Indigenous Religions	-0.0036	-0.0386	-0.0086	0.0193	-0.0063
	[0.05]	[1.26]	[0.25]	[0.41]	[0.15]
Other	-0.0182	-0.0996	-0.0346	-0.0368	-0.0795
	[0.24]	[0.96]	[0.32]	[0.34]	[0.91]
Democracy	0.4070***	0.3752***	0.3339***	0.2859***	0.2742***
	[6.08]	[9.81]	[6.95]	[6.49]	[5.98]
Islam*Democracy	0.067	0.0595**	0.0859*	0.0924	0.1005
	[1.07]	[3.85]	[2.38]	[0.94]	[1.03]
Buddhism*Democracy	-0.0587	-0.0560**	-0.0911***	-0.1041***	-0.0761*
	[1.83]	[4.17]	[6.75]	[6.72]	[2.49]
Hinduism*Democracy	-0.0746	-0.1080*	-0.0979	-0.1201**	-0.1017
	[1.20]	[2.25]	[1.91]	[2.81]	[1.78]
Indigenous Religion*Democracy	-0.0736*	-0.0619	-0.0562	-0.0497	-0.0426
	[2.40]	[1.99]	[2.04]	[1.27]	[1.27]
Other*Democracy	0.0582	0.0326	0.0283	0.0264	0.0222
	[0.92]	[0.47]	[0.50]	[0.35]	[0.36]
Asia		0.0812	0.1729*	-0.0792	0.0251
		[1.37]	[2.22]	[0.54]	[0.23]
Europe		0.4409***	0.6123**	0.1067	0.1745
		[7.67]	[3.25]	[0.41]	[0.96]
America		-0.4658***	-0.3426**	-0.4264***	-0.3060**
		[10.94]	[3.13]	[6.38]	[3.38]
Oceania		-0.9743***	-0.8183***	-0.7043**	-0.4806*
		[26.50]	[5.58]	[3.57]	[2.40]
Legal Origin (french)			0.1474	0.1092	0.151
			[1.01]	[0.60]	[0.72]
Legal Origin (socialist)			-0.2642	0.0115	0.1828
			[1.61]	[0.11]	[1.09]
Legal Origin (german)			0.7498***	0.3521	0.3588
			[8.44]	[0.86]	[1.50]
Legal Origin (scandinavian)			0.2590*	0.2252	-0.1299
			[2.35]	[1.57]	[1.02]
log per capita GDP				0.1055	-0.0762
				[0.98]	[0.80]
log Population				0.1324*	0.1208*
				[2.60]	[2.26]
OECD				0.4269	0.2091
				[1.18]	[0.75]
Women´s Economic Rights					0.0468
					[0.33]
Absence of corruption					0.1561*
					[2.55]
Oil/gas income					0.0115
					[0.61]
Constant	2.6095***	2.6271***	2.5040***	0.5134	14.084
	[21.34]	[127.77]	[26.89]	[0.40]	[1.27]
Observations	170	170	168	166	160
R-squared	0.34	0.48	0.52	0.62	0.62

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6: Marginal effects. Dependent variable: Protection Index
Referring to Table 3 column (5).
Reference category Christianity.

	Dictatorship	Democracy
Islam	-0.317***	0.109
	[6.20]	[0.66]
Buddhism	0.024	-0.134**
	[0.46]	[4.32]
Hinduism	0.095	-0.116
	[1.10]	[1.94]
Indigenous Religions	0.043	-0.045
	[0.68]	[0.98]
Other	-0.105	-0.059
	[0.71]	[0.93]

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7: Regression Results. Dependent variable: Prevention Index
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by continent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islam	-0.308	-0.6021***	-0.5535**	-0.5010*	-0.1891**
	[0.82]	[6.20]	[4.36]	[2.64]	[3.33]
Buddhism	0.1468	-0.0344	-0.0389	-0.0481	-0.0886*
	[0.82]	[0.51]	[0.33]	[0.91]	[2.29]
Hinduism	0.0584	0.0781	0.101	0.1441	0.028
	[0.48]	[0.82]	[1.00]	[0.87]	[0.30]
Indigenous Religions	-0.1294	-0.1613*	-0.1306	-0.0348	0.0039
	[0.59]	[2.44]	[1.56]	[0.36]	[0.18]
Other	0.0902	-0.2061	-0.1453	-0.1142	-0.1052*
	[0.52]	[0.85]	[0.58]	[0.57]	[2.27]
Democracy	1.3138***	1.1417***	1.0569***	0.8980***	0.2329**
	[8.48]	[10.09]	[6.76]	[7.96]	[4.35]
Islam*Democracy	0.04	0.0969	0.1627	0.1605	0.069
	[0.27]	[0.71]	[1.09]	[0.75]	[1.05]
Buddhism*Democracy	-0.1851*	-0.1347**	-0.1837**	-0.2236***	-0.0301
	[2.25]	[3.27]	[3.60]	[5.02]	[0.91]
Hinduism*Democracy	-0.2212	-0.2699	-0.2497	-0.3248*	-0.055
	[1.42]	[1.98]	[1.64]	[2.32]	[0.81]
Indigenous Religion*Democracy	-0.2141**	-0.1416*	-0.1204	-0.1142	0.0144
	[2.96]	[2.40]	[1.80]	[1.75]	[0.67]
Other*Democracy	0.1868	0.1452	0.1547	0.111	0.0731
	[0.86]	[0.68]	[0.83]	[0.86]	[1.85]
Asia		0.6541**	0.7489**	0.014	-0.0686
		[4.31]	[3.72]	[0.04]	[0.50]
Europe		1.8581***	1.9577**	0.395	-0.1013
		[6.20]	[3.01]	[0.50]	[0.51]
America		-1.0259**	-0.8497	-1.0729**	-0.4251**
		[4.12]	[2.09]	[3.42]	[4.28]
Oceania		-2.4352***	-2.2902***	-1.8942**	-0.8589***
		[8.96]	[5.78]	[3.27]	[4.90]
Legal Origin (french)			0.2749	0.149	0.0845
			[0.81]	[0.34]	[0.58]
Legal Origin (socialist)			-0.1804	0.6722	0.3211*
			[0.33]	[2.03]	[2.52]
Legal Origin (german)			1.6488***	0.3604	0.2229
			[11.23]	[0.32]	[1.17]
Legal Origin (scandinavian)			0.7801*	0.6759*	-0.0138
			[2.28]	[2.38]	[0.16]
log per capita GDP				0.2982	-0.0722
				[1.36]	[1.21]
log Population				0.4288**	0.1270*
				[4.44]	[2.73]
OECD				1.4149	0.363
				[1.58]	[1.11]
Women´s Economic Rights					0.1519
					[0.93]
Absence of corruption					0.1347**
					[3.68]
Oil/gas income					0.0183
					[1.45]
Constant	8.8958***	8.6734***	8.4587***	2.3327	17.147
	[21.26]	[87.01]	[36.51]	[0.92]	[1.99]
Observations	170	170	168	166	160
R-squared	0.38	0.56	0.57	0.71	0.62

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 8: Marginal effects. Dependent variable: Prevention Index
Referring to Table 3 column (5).
Reference category Christianity.

	Dictatorship	Democracy
Islam	-0.270*	-0.126
	[2.64]	[1.66]
Buddhism	-0.053	-0.116***
	[0.72]	[5.64]
Hinduism	0.092	-0.022
	[0.85]	[0.18]
Indigenous Religions	-0.013	0.017
	[0.35]	[0.67]
Other	-0.190**	-0.039
	[3.61]	[0.57]

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A1: Description of the Anti-trafficking index

Prosecution: The sub-index on 'prosecution policy' measures the level of governments' efforts to punish and prosecute traffickers and other related offenders (such as employers of trafficking victims, law enforcement officials who collude with traffickers, and clients of services provided by human trafficking victims). The prime requirements for governments to implement are broken down into six areas: (i) the adoption of anti-trafficking law, (ii) the adoption of child trafficking law, (iii) the application of other relevant laws, (iv) the stringency of penalties, (v) the level of law enforcement, and (vi) the collection of crime statistics.
Protection: The sub-index on 'protection policy' assesses the level of governmental efforts to protect and assist the victims of human trafficking. Nine prime requirements imposed by the Protocol (article 6, 7 and 8) are evaluated: (i) no punishment of victims, (ii) imposing no self-identification in order to prove their status as a victim; (iii) assistance for legal proceedings, (iv) the provision of residence permits, (v) basic services for housing, (vi) medical training, (vii) job training, (viii) assistance for rehabilitation and (ix) assistance for repatriation.
Prevention: The index on 'prevention policy', evaluates the level of governmental efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking. Based on the requirements of the Protocol provided in article 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, seven areas are evaluated. Examples are the implementation of campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; training government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and international organizations; and facilitating cooperation with other governments.

Source: Cho et al. (2011: 7ff.)

Table A2: Description of the Anti-trafficking index

	overall 3P	*Prosecution*	*Protection*	*Prevention*
overall3p	1			
Prosecution	0.88	1		
Protection	0.92	0.68	1	
Prevention	0.91	0.67	0.85	1

Source: Cho et al. (2011)

Table A3. List of countries included.

Country	3P	Christi-anity	Islam	Demo-cracy	Country	3P	Christi-anity	Islam	Demo-cracy
Afghanistan	6.8	0	99	0	**Ecuador**	9.7	95.89	0	0.78
Albania	11.3	12.32	69.91	1	**Egypt**	5.6	11	89	0
Algeria	4.7	0.07	99.93	0	**El Salvador**	9.7	95.42	0	1
Angola	7.4	69.75	0	0	**Equatorial Guinea**	7.8	93.62	0	0
Antigua and Barbuda	7.0	85.92	0	1	**Eritrea**	4.0	0	69.32	0
Argentina	9.6	95.25	1.49	1	**Estonia**	8.9	33.33	0	1
Armenia	9.8	64.57	0	1	**Ethiopia**	9.4	61	32.94	0
Australia	14.1	51.80	0	1	**Fiji**	6.8	52.87	7.81	0
Austria	13.7	80.35	0	1	**Finland**	11.9	85.14	0	1
Azerbaijan	8.6	0	93.41	0	**France**	12.6	78.08	5.51	1
Bahrain	6.8	0	81.16	0	**Gabon**	9.9	67.77	0	0
Bangladesh	11.0	0	88.30	0.78	**Gambia**	7.6	0	94.89	0
Barbados	5.8	67.41	0	1	**Georgia**	9.9	36.65	10.96	0.56
Belarus	9.3	49.25	0	0	**Germany**	14.8	76.66	2.13	1
Belgium	14.4	87.90	0	1	**Ghana**	9.6	64.16	14.39	1
Belize	8.6	100	0	1	**Greece**	9.5	91.76	1.33	1
Benin	9.3	20.94	12.02	1	**Guatemala**	9.7	97.72	0	1
Bolivia	8.4	97.48	0	1	**Guinea**	8.7	10.04	85.01	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10.9	47.92	42.92	0	**Guinea-Bissau**	7.8	14.73	45.74	0.89
Botswana	6.7	44.88	0	0	**Guyana**	9.0	38.76	8.96	0
Brazil	10.8	67.91	0	1	**Haiti**	6.1	91.41	0	0
Brunei	5.8	0	67.26	0	**Honduras**	8.6	97.23	0	1
Bulgaria	10.8	36.84	13.1	1	**Hong Kong**	10.0	8.41	0	
Burkina Faso	9.3	9.97	50	0	**Hungary**	10.6	88.51	0	1
Burma/Myanmmar	6.8	4.91	3.83	0	**Iceland**	9.5	89.29	0	1
Burundi	7.8	65.02	0	0.44	**India**	9.5	2.18	11.97	1
Cambodia	9.1	0	2.18	0	**Indonesia**	8.8	9.62	87.21	1
Cameroon	7.7	52.24	21.78	0	**Iran**	6.6	0	99.57	0
Canada	12.5	82.45	0.94	1	**Iraq**	4.0	2.97	97.03	0
Central African Republic	6.2	42.45	15.1	0.33	**Ireland**	11.4	91.53	0	1
Chad	7.0	34.73	53.86	0	**Israel**	10.0	0	14.89	1
Chile	10.9	89.16	0	1	**Italy**	13.8	81.74	1.21	1
China	10.1	6.02	1.43	0	**Jamaica**	9.0	53.05	0	1
Colombia	11.8	91.96	0	1	**Japan**	9.5	0.67	0	1
Congo, Democratic Republic of th	7.4	85.97	1.4	0	**Jordan**	7.2	3.41	96.59	0
Congo, Republic of the	6.5	65.37	1.77	0	**Kazakhstan**	9.4	10.33	47.02	0
Costa Rica	9.4	85.99	0	1	**Kenya**	8.8	61.57	6	1
Cote d´Ivoire	8.0	26.1	38.67	0	**Kiribati**	4.7	92.39	0	1
Croatia	12.1	86.92	1.17	1	**Korea, Republik of**	13.3	26.29	0	1
Cuba	4.1	41.88	0	0	**Kosovo**	9.5	0	0	
Cyprus	10.1	74.42	22.09	1	**Kuwait**	6.4	0	85.35	0
Czech Republic	12.4	41.19	0	1	**Kyrgyz Republic**	8.8	5.51	70	0.44
Denmark	13.8	86.52	0	1	**Laos**	9.0	0	0	0
Djibouti	5.8	2.22	97.78	0	**Latvia**	10.6	29.48	0	1
Dominican Republic	8.8	88.27	0	1	**Lebanon**	6.1	24.86	55.31	0

Table A2. List of countries included (continued).

Country	3P	Christi-anity	Islam	Demo-cracy	Country	3P	Christi-anity	Islam	Demo-cracy
Lesotho	6.4	70.09	0	0	**Rwanda**	9.6	74	0.97	0
Liberia	7.3	67.72	13.92	0.33	**Saudi Arabia**	6.1	2.95	96.68	0
Libya	4.5	0	97.06	0	**Senegal**	9.2	2	92.0	1
Lithuania	12.6	74.59	0	1	**Serbia**	9.4	0	0	1
Luxembourg	12.5	95.22	0	1	**Sierra Leone**	7.5	9.94	60.04	1
Macau	6.0	0	0	1	**Singapore**	8.8	12.87	14.92	0
Macedonia	11.4	54.41	29.9	1	**Slovak Republic**	10.3	66.48	0	1
Madagascar	9.1	27.03	8.69	1	**Slovenia**	11.6	82.65	0	1
Malawi	10.6	48.41	20.02	0	**Solomon Islands**	4.0	94.85	0	1
Malaysia	7.8	6.41	52.88	0.11	**Somalia**	3.3	0	99.86	0
Maldives	4.5	0	100	1	**South Africa**	7.1	66.25	0.45	0
Mali	8.2	1.03	89.99	1	**Spain**	13.4	66.73	1.15	1
Malta	9.5	93.46	0	0.11	**Sri Lanka**	9.4	6.91	7.53	1
Mauritania	7.1	0	99.25	1	**St. Vincent and the Grenadines**	6.0	0	0	1
Mauritius	10.8	27.12	16.1	1	**Sudan**	4.4	9.09	73	0
Mexico	8.7	94.22	0	1	**Suriname**	8.4	37.59	19.72	1
Micronesia, Federal State of	5.0	77.97	0	1	**Swaziland**	5.5	66.67	0	0
Moldova	9.2	34.88	0	1	**Sweden**	13.5	86.46	0	1
Mongolia	9.0	0	4.17	0	**Switzerland**	12.4	86.07	0	1
Montenegro	9.6	0	0	0	**Syria**	5.5	5.52	86.02	0
Morocco	9.1	0	99.83	0	**Taiwan**	9.9			1
Mozambique	8.4	20.73	28.22	0	**Tajikistan**	9.1	1.43	85.10	0
Namibia	7.0	80.52	0	0	**Tanzania**	8.8	43.99	37	0
Nepal	10.2	0	3.77	0.33	**Thailand**	11.9	0.54	4.04	0.78
Netherlands, the	14.1	54.95	4.34	1	**The Bahamas**	6.2	72.86	0	1
Netherlands,Antilles	10.0	0	0		**Timor.Leste**	7.8	0	0	1
New Zealand	12.4	49.85	0	1	**Togo**	8.2	34.93	14.97	0
Nicaragua	8.9	89.60	0	1	**Tonga**	4.0	59	0	0
Niger	8.4	0	88.69	1	**Trinidad & Tobago**	7.0	59.13	5.80	1
Nigeria	10.9	34.96	42.98	1	**Tunisia**	6.0	0	99.48	0
North Korea	3.0	0	0	0	**Turkey**	10.1	0	99.76	1
Norway	14.5	88.42	0	1	**Turkmenistan**	4.0	0	86.91	0
Oman	7.5	3.72	87.60	0	**Uganda**	8.0	83.79	10.55	0
Pakistan	9.2	2.03	94.93	0.11	**Ukraine**	10.2	40.57	0	1
Palau	9.0	63.16	0	1	**United Arab Emirates**	8.4	0	96.03	0
Panama	10.0	94.68	0	1	**United Kingdom**	12.9	65.94	1.41	1
Papua New Guinea	6.3	92.09	0	1	**United States**	15.0	84.74	1.35	1
Paraguay	9.4	93.27	0	1	**Uruguay**	9.3	82.93	0	1
Peru	9.0	95.79	0	0.89	**Uzbekistan**	9.3	0.97	88	0
Phillipines	11.3	88.35	4.57	1	**Venezuela**	7.0	92.72	0	1
Poland	12.4	92.11	0	1	**Vietnam**	11.0	7.73	0	0
Portugal	12.6	92.20	0	1	**Yemen**	7.2	0	99.89	0
Qatar	6.0	0	95	0	**Zambia**	9.8	39.77	0	0
Romania	11.3	91.89	0	1	**Zimbabwe**	7.5	41.62	0	0
Russia	9.0	17.24	10	0	**Total**	8.9	43.97	25.25	0.57

Table A3. Data description and sources.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Aggregate 3Ps	179	8.92	2.55	3	15	Cho et al. (2011)
Prosecution	179	3.34	1.06	1	5	Cho et al. (2011)
Protection	179	2.59	0.91	1	5	Cho et al. (2011)
Prevention	179	2.98	0.84	1	5	Cho et al. (2011)
Christian (Alesina et al)	172	45.51	36.44	0	100	Alesina et al. (2003)
Islam (Alesina et al)	172	26.13	37.30	0	100	Alesina et al. (2003)
Buddhism (Alesina et al)	172	5.01	19.04	0	95.83	Alesina et al. (2003)
Hinduism (Alesina et al)	172	2.32	11.15	0	92.52	Alesina et al. (2003)
Indigenous Religions (Alesina et al)	172	4.70	11.74	0	64.27	Alesina et al. (2003)
Other (Alesina et al)	173	15.90	19.13	0	85.1	
Democracy	175	0.57	0.48	0	1	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Christian	179	0.58	0.49	0	1	Bateman and Egan (1994), CIA World Factbook (2010)
Islam	178	0.28	0.45	0	1	Bateman and Egan (1994), CIA World Factbook (2010)
Buddhism	178	0.07	0.25	0	1	Bateman and Egan (1994), CIA World Factbook (2010)
Hinduism	178	0.03	0.17	0	1	Bateman and Egan (1994), CIA World Factbook (2010)
Indigenous Religions	179	0.02	0.13	0	1	Bateman and Egan (1994), CIA World Factbook (2010)
Democracy (type 2)	159	4.90	2.03	1	7	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Constraints on Chief Executive	175	0.78	0.39	0	1	Marshall and Jaggers (2011)
Africa	179	0.27	0.45	0	1	own calculation
Asia	179	0.27	0.45	0	1	own calculation
Europe	179	0.22	0.42	0	1	own calculation
America	179	0.18	0.38	0	1	own calculation
Oceania	179	0.05	0.22	0	1	own calculation
Legal Origin (UK)	173	0.31	0.46	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (french)	173	0.43	0.50	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (socialist)	173	0.20	0.40	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (german)	173	0.03	0.18	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (scandinavian)	173	0.03	0.17	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
per capita GDP	175	11912.16	14189.41	173.67	81174.45	Penn World Tables 6.3 Summers and Heston (1991)
Population (total)	175	36267.69	131350.40	20.25	1294055	Penn World Tables 6.3 Summers and Heston (1991)
OECD	179	0.17	0.37	0	1	own collection
Women´s Economic Rights	174	1.33	0.56	0	3	Cingranelli-Richards- Human Rights dataset
Absence of corruption	171	3.99	2.11	1.4	9.55	Transparency International (2011)
Oil/gas income (per capita)	165	1015.66	3563.19	0	32370.54	Ross (2012)/ own calculation
Oil income (per capita)	165	664.59	2340.42	0	17097.29	Ross (2012))/own calculation
Gas income (per capita)	165	351.09	1470.37	0	15273.25	Ross (2012)) own calculation
KOF index of globalization (overall)	170	56.04	17.29	19.30	92.32	Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)
KOF index of globalization (economic)	142	60.24	17.63	25.25	95.87	Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)

Table A3. Data description and sources (continued).

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
KOF index of globalization (social)	175	48.67	21.76	8.86	93.82	Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)
KOF index of globalization (political)	176	63.88	21.37	4.98	97.46	Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)
Oil exporter	179	0.08	0.28	0	1	Easterly and Swadeh (2001)
Migration stock (2001-2005)	176	8.23	12.96	0.05	80.51	Worldbank (2011)
Migration stock (2006-2010)	176	8.46	13.35	0.05	86.55	Worldbank (2011)
Net migration (2001-2005)	173	-748.05	658576.8	-2702060	5675799	Worldbank (2011)
Net migration (2006-2010)	173	42.94	565220.4	-2430065	5051899	Worldbank (2011)
Trafficking	151	1.43	1.51	0	5	UNODC (2006)