

Migration and Economic Coercion*

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Abstract

The dominant narrative on economic coercion focuses on institutional, cultural, and reputational factors to explain why some countries use economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. In this article, we argue that the linkage between economic sanctions and migration is an important consideration for potential sanction givers. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries that host a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Hence, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to reduce migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.

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In February 2011, the European Union (EU) deliberated the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's regime for its perpetuation of violence on its own people. Although the proposal received overwhelming support from prominent Western European liberal democracies, such as Germany and France, Italy and Malta strongly opposed this act of coercion, which in part led to the EU's overall refrain of issuing immediate sanctions against Libya as talks came to an end. Instead, the EU agreed on a symbolic joint communique condemning the "unacceptable use of force against civilians" in February 2011. It was only after the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 was adopted on March 12, 2011 that the Council of the European Union adopted legislation to implement sanctions on the Gaddafi regime.

Why were Italy and Malta against imposing economic sanctions on Libya? More generally, why do some countries favor the use economic sanctions, while others are more reluctant to resort to sanctions as a foreign policy tool? Italy and Malta present an interesting empirical puzzle considering their shared EU membership status with the other 26 member states who preferred the use of sanctions. Existing explanations of economic coercion are also unconvincing in the case of Libya given the series of institutional, economic, and cultural similarities between Italy, Malta, and the EU member states.

Historically, states have imposed economic sanctions as punishment for the target country's violation of international norms, for non-compliance with international agreements, or to shift the target country's behavior in a way that serves the interests of sending country (Masters 2017). Conventional wisdom too holds that liberal democracies often impose sanctions on autocratic regimes that violate international norms or international humanitarian law. But while it is seen that democracies implement more sanctions (Lektzian and Souva 2003)—and primarily on autocracies rather than other democracies (Cox and Drury 2006)—this empirical regularity cannot explain why the fully democratic governments of Italy and Malta opposed restrictive measures against Libya.

Other theories of economic coercion, such as domestic interest group dynamics, are

also insufficient for explaining Italy and Malta's reluctance to impose sanctions on Libya. Economic sanctions often disrupt the cross-border flows of goods and services between the sending and target state. Since some import-competing firms benefit when insulated from foreign competition, the imposition of sanctions can act as a trade policy tool to appease protectionist interests (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; 1988; 1989). Yet this explanation fails to establish why Italy, a top importer of Libyan goods, nevertheless opposed economic sanctions on the Gaddafi regime.¹ If Libya posed a significant competitive threat to the protectionist interests in Italy, the Italian government should have actually *supported* the use of sanctions. It could instead be the case that firms and consumers relying heavily on imports from Libya lobbied the Italian government to oppose restrictive measures against Libya.² However, while this trade-based argument can potentially explain Italy's position, it cannot account for the decision of Malta—a country that does not have a significant trading relationship with Libya.³

Lastly, reputational theories suggest that states often implement or support sanctions to isolate the target country from the broader international community (Peterson and Drury 2011) and to demonstrate its own resolve (Drezner 2003). However, these perspectives again lack power in explaining the sources of opposition from Italy and Malta, as they neither maintained an alliance nor shared strategic interests with Libya at the time. It is possible that they worried about the security ramifications of the sanctions, given the close geographic proximity with Libya. But this possibility does not explain why Greece,

¹Notably, Libya's top export destination is Italy, at a revenue of \$3.46 billion in 2015 (OEC 2017).

²Of the \$3.46 billion dollars in revenue from Libya's exports to Italy in 2015, 54% of this was in petroleum gas, and 42% was crude petroleum, products that Italy is plausibly reliant on, and are among its overall top imports (OEC 2017).

³OEC (2017) notes that Malta's top export destinations are Egypt, Germany, China, Italy, and Hong Kong. Its top importers are South Korea, China, Italy, Russia, and Kazakhstan. We infer from this that Malta does not economically rely on a trade relationship to Libya.

another EU member state across the Mediterranean from Libya, did not join Italy and Malta in opposing the sanctions.

Given that the current literature is ill-suited to explain Italy and Malta's opposition to sanctions, we pose our own answer: the use of economic coercion is driven by government concerns about how such measures will affect future immigration flows into policymakers' countries. Previous scholarship has overlooked the linkage between economic sanctions and migration. This is surprising because economic sanctions often cause substantial economic distress on the target country, prompting citizens of the target country to emigrate abroad. Importantly, these emigrants tend to move to countries where their co-ethnics already reside since co-ethnic networks can facilitate migration and settlement (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes 1995; Massey et al. 2005). The size of the target country's migrant network in a destination country is therefore an important determinant of migration pressure. As a result, policymakers pondering upon economic coercion must be wary of the extent to which sanctions cause a sudden increase in immigration into their own countries. In the case of Libya then, Italy and Malta opposed the sanctions because their large communities of Libyan immigrants make Italy and Malta priority destinations for potential migrants from Libya. A surge in immigration from Libya, as the result of sanctions, would have jeopardized the political viability of the governing parties of Italy and Malta at the time.

In this article, we extend this logic of economic coercion and migration to an empirical analysis of European Parliament resolutions pertaining to sanctions against Syria in 2011, Iran in 2014, and Libya in 2015. We assess whether roll-call votes cast by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can be explained by the stock of migrants from target countries already living in an MEP's country. Overwhelming support is found for our hypothesis that MEPs are less likely to support restrictive measures when their countries host a large number of immigrants from the target country. This result remains robust to alternative measures of migration and different model specifications.

Our theory and findings contribute to a growing research program connecting international migration with decision-making in foreign policy.⁴ While many see the political backlash against immigration and refugees as fomenting the rise of populist right-wing parties in Europe⁵, only a handful of scholars have examined whether immigration may alter the behavior of policymakers in issue areas seemingly distant from international migration, such as economic sanctions. While we do not deny the importance of other features in instructing the use of economic coercion, we make the case that policymakers consider economic sanctions with attention to their political effects at home. Therefore, domestic political motives stemming from immigration could compromise the implementation of multilateral economic sanctions.

Theoretical Perspectives

Linking foreign policy issues to international migration is a relatively new research program in political science. In this section, we integrate insights from several literatures on economic coercion, migration, and the link between the two, as well as the politics of immigration in advanced democracies to present a theory of economic coercion and migration pressure. We hypothesize for why and how migration networks might impact the sanctions policies of the migrant-hosting states. We also consider the lobbying influence of diasporas on sanctions policies toward migrants' home countries, though we do not find this alternative explanation convincing.

A. Sanctions and Emigration

Both analysts and academics have noted the association between economic sanctions and emigration from the target state, particularly emigration to the United States (Bossuyt

⁴See Bermeo and Leblang (2015); Bernhard and Leblang (2016) for examples.

⁵See Golder (2016) for an example.

2000; Garfield 1999; Haass 1998). One of the most notable cases is the imposition of US sanctions on Haiti in the early 1990s.⁶ The United States imposed economic sanctions on Haiti in 1991 after a government coup ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The US began by freezing Haitian government assets located in the US and halting foreign aid, followed by blocking imports and exports, and restricting flights to and from Haiti. The economic distress induced by the sanctions resulted in a higher unemployment rate and loss of income among many Haitians. At the macro-level, Haiti's gross domestic product decreased by 5.2 percent in 1991, and a further 10 percent in 1992. Exports during this time were less than a third of what they were in the 1980s. The humanitarian crisis was also severe. A study reported that up to 1,000 children died per month as a result of the sanctions, and that even more were suffering from severe malnutrition (French 1993). With the disastrous effects of sanctions, Haitian emigration to the US grew, and remittances to Haiti increased substantially. Only 5,000 Haitians lived in the US in the mid-twentieth century, and this changed drastically by the mid-1990s as the coup and impending embargo caused natives to flee. Today, the US is the top destination for Haitian migrants (Schulz and Batalova 2017).

The humanitarian crisis and subsequent emigration following economic sanctions are not peculiar to the Haitian case, but are widely documented by scholars and international agencies, such as the UN.⁷ Even targeted or "smart" sanctions are limited in their ability to minimize adverse humanitarian costs on civilian populations of target states (Tostensen and Bull 2002). As in the case of Haiti, economic recession and deteriorating living conditions resulting from sanctions can further increase emigration out of the target state. Our own analysis of sanctions confirms this conjecture. Using data from the EMIG global database for international migration (Moses 2011), we estimate an OLS model to measure

⁶Among those who discuss the effects of sanctions on Haiti are Gibbons (1999); Gibbons and Garfield (1999); Haass (1998).

⁷See Bruderlein (1998) and Shagabutdinova and Berejikian (2007).

differences in emigration flows as the result of economic sanctions being imposed on a country. Our sample comprises 122 countries from 1946 to 2005. Shown in Table A4 of the appendix, sanctioned countries are consistently associated with greater emigration in the following years.⁸ Even after controlling for economic development, population, and regime type, as well as incorporating both country and year fixed effects, economic sanctions are associated with greater emigration in the subsequent 2-3 years.

The Haitian case also demonstrates an important role played by the Haitian diaspora in facilitating further emigration into the US. The migration literature has noted that existing migrants often help their co-ethnics migrate to the host country and provide settlement assistance upon their arrival (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes 1995; Massey et al. 2005). More specifically, co-ethnic networks help newly-arrived immigrants find work opportunities (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Rex and Josephides 1987; Hily and Poinard 1987; Wilpert 1988), locate affordable housing (Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Sassen 1995; Ivan, Bernard and Kim 1999), and integrate into society in host states (Boyd 1989; Eric and Ooka 2006; Hagan 1998). Since diasporas make migration less risky and reduce the transaction costs of relocating to the host country, existing migrant networks generate substantial migration pressure from migrants' home countries.

While the political climate during the Cold War led to a more welcoming response from the US toward Cuban immigrants (especially high-skilled ones), migration flows from poorer countries under economic distress present political challenges to policymakers of immigrant-receiving states. Since economic sanctions are often placed on poor autocracies, migrants from the target country may be regarded less desirable and possessing lower values. Although these migrants are unlikely to compete with natives in the labor market, citizens of host countries often oppose immigration inflows from other parts of the world due to their perceived threat on native culture and identities.⁹

⁸For these models, we use economic sanctions data from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database.

⁹For instance, see Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012); Sniderman, Hagendoorn and

B. Unwanted Migration and Electoral Incentives

Our argument uses this notion of unwanted immigration to illustrate the dilemma of policymakers as potential sanction givers. Imposing economic sanctions on major immigrant-sending states can constrain policymakers since they may face more migration pressure as a result of the sanctions. This theoretical framework builds on the previous literature that has explored similar linkages between migration and other economic flows or policy issues. For instance, policymakers' concern for unwanted migration is found to drive their foreign aid decisions (Bermeo and Leblang 2015). In addition, Bernhard and Leblang (2016)'s case-specific focus mirrors the Libyan case of our study. Focusing on Germany's domestic politics, they argue that had Angela Merkel *not* supported a second Greek bailout, the result would have been a massive inflow of migrants from southern Europe, which would have undermined Merkel's electoral viability. In the German case, the short-term political costs of supporting a bailout outweighed the potential long-term political costs of increased migration. In our illustrative case, we argue that Italy and Malta's cost-benefit analysis follows along a similar logic. Although there may have been short-term costs to opposing sanctions on Libya, a potential increase in immigration as a result of the sanctions posed a greater threat to the electoral viability of incumbent governments.

Since targeted sanctions countries tend to be autocratic and poor, immigration from these countries can be unpopular among citizens of the developed world. First, migrants may pose an economic threat to native workers. Actual or perceived competition for low-skill jobs may activate anti-immigrant sentiment among the least skilled individuals of host countries that, in turn, diminishes the electoral viability of politicians (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006). Second, poor migrants can present a new strain on the host country's welfare state. Immigrants benefiting from social welfare provisions may prompt a need for higher taxes on the native rich and middle-class or may induce a "crowding out" effect when competing for public services among the native poor (Hanson,

Prior (2004).

Scheve and Slaughter 2007). Third—and especially considering many of the EU’s target countries have been Islamic—underlying values and cultural anxiety tend to turn many natives against immigrants from the developing world (Sides and Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Public opposition to immigration, for any of these reasons, may also intensify further to the extent that immigrants are granted political power in host countries (Dancygier 2010).

These popular responses to immigration make the linkage between *unwanted* immigration and sanctions a politically relevant consideration. Since countries with a large immigrant stock from the target country receive higher migration pressure from the target country, policymakers in these countries will do everything in their power to reduce immigration inflows. One way to curb immigration pressure is to oppose economic sanctions on the target country, as sanctions tend to create economic distress resulting in a higher emigration rate. An observable implication of this argument is that countries with a larger migrant stock from the target country will refrain from imposing economic sanctions on the target.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Policymakers from countries with a larger migrant stock from the target state are more likely to oppose economic sanctions on that target state.

C. An Alternative Explanation

As an alternative explanation, one may argue that the lobbying influence of diasporas can induce policymakers to oppose economic sanctions. Considering the damage of sanctions inflicted upon the target country, migrants who maintain close contact with their home countries may lobby against economic sanctions. The literature on diaspora politics has shown that powerful ethnic lobbies often shape the foreign policies of their host states (Ambrosio 2002; Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Since they are often the most invested electoral base on matters regarding their homeland, they can be

one of the most vocal or influential interest groups in foreign policymaking concerning their origin countries (that is, if they are franchised or have sufficient resources). This lobbying mechanism is another channel through which a large migrant stock can drive the foreign aid policy of a state (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).

In this section we highlight three broad reasons why this alternative mechanism is unlikely with respect to economic sanctions. First, in the case of economic sanctions, the anecdotal evidence and public opinion data suggest that migrants tend to *support* sanctions on their home countries run by dictators. If sanctions are often placed due to a country's humanitarian failures and a broader disregard for the international community, then there are valid reasons why migrants of the target country would wish to express discontent with the regime. Thus, in several cases, migrants have actually supported economic sanctions against their home country. This was certainly the case with the Cuban embargo, where Cuban immigrants have been particularly fervent in displaying their intense dislike of Castro's regime (Shain 1994; Vanderbush 2009). In fact, it has only been recently that Cuban immigrants have begun showing even marginal support for lifting the US embargo on Cuba.¹⁰ Moreover, migrants who left Cuba within the twenty-year span from 1960-1980, still show resistance to the US diplomatic engagement with their home country.

While the Cuban example has been the most prominent, other diasporas have expressed discontent to their home country's regime by trying to influence American foreign policy. Some Chinese Americans supported the US sanctions against their home country post-Tiannenmen Square. Haitian Americans were so outraged about the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide that they demanded sanctions against the Haitian military responsible for the coup (Shain 1994). These cases therefore demonstrate that diasporas tend to express support sanctions on their homelands when their home countries' governments are autocratic.

¹⁰See Grenier and Gladwin (2014) for public opinion data on Cuban Americans, and Osorio (2013).

Second, migrants' political influence is limited when they are not citizens of host states. Although some member states of the European Union grant electoral rights to non-citizen legal immigrants, immigrants generally have few electoral rights in major destinations like Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. This variation within the EU is largely due to electoral reform efforts during the 1970s, and in the early 1990s. The 1970s saw multiple European countries considering how they should give electoral rights to non-citizen residents, including a) EU nationals, and b) third-country nationals who come from outside of Europe. In the 1990s, the EU began to develop legal frameworks that would define what it means to be a "citizen" of the EU. This was also part of a broader effort to further institutionalize the EU across its various state members.¹¹

What is the current status of electoral rights for non-citizen residents in the EU? Among the 29 European states, only 17 grant some electoral rights to non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. These states are Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, six cantons in Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The UK, specifically, only allows immigrants from the Commonwealth to participate in elections. Moreover, even though these 17 countries allow for some non-citizens to vote, there is still a wide variation in the effective electoral rights, and how residence status is attained. For example, Spain and Portugal only allow electoral rights on a reciprocity basis, meaning foreigners only gain voting rights when their country of origin also allows the Spanish and the Portuguese to have electoral rights. The other 12 European states—Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Romania—do not allow for non-citizens to vote in any local elections. This illustrates the difficulty for migrants—especially ones from non-EU countries—in being able to affect policy outcomes regarding their own home country.¹²

¹¹All information on the history of electoral rights in the EU derived from Day and Shaw (2002) and Groenendijk (2008).

¹²To measure this lobbying mechanism, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) use the status of

Third, even if migrants have voting power through acquired citizenship, citizenship acquisitions are such a small share of the total migrant community that they cannot exert much influence on policymakers and political outcomes. This is especially true for EU countries with restrictive citizenship regimes. For instance, in 2013, Italy had a Libyan migrant stock of 38,000, and of that stock, only 111 Libyan migrants since 2006 have naturalized to become Italian citizens. This subset of Italian citizens of Libyan origin since 2006 constitutes only about a 0.3% citizenship share of total Libyan migrants residing in Italy. In Malta, there is a relatively higher citizenship acquisition share among Libyan migrants—approximately 10%—but this still represents an extremely small voting base.¹³

Finally, it is possible that wealthy migrants may be able to exert some influence on their host countries' policies without having voting rights. In this case, the number of migrants or the size of a migrant diaspora may not capture the extent to which migrants can influence their host countries' foreign policies. We posit two necessary conditions for this mechanism to hold. First, migrants need to have a strong attachment to their home countries. Second, they need to be wealthy to sway their host countries' foreign policies in the absence of a sizable migrant voting bloc. In the empirical section, we operationalize these factors by including the measure of remittances from the immigrant-hosting state to the immigrant-sending state in the model specification. We believe that this is the best empirical strategy at our disposal as the variable controls for both the extent to which migrants maintain contact with their home countries and the size of their economic influence.

migrants' dual citizenship and voting rights in destination countries. While their data's timeline ends in 2008, ours begins in 2010, therefore making their particular measures unusable in this dataset for testing said mechanism.

¹³All data on migrant shares taken from Eurostat (2017).

The European Union

This section provides background information about how sanctions are legislated in the EU. We also justify the European Parliament as an appropriate focus for studying migration and economic coercion. The three resolutions we use in the empirical analysis pertain to Syria in 2011, Iran in 2014, and our motivating case, Libya in 2015. Contextual details of these resolutions are briefly summarized in this section.

Restrictive Measures and the European Union

EU sanctions—more commonly referred to by the EU as “restrictive measures”—are deliberated and legislated under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where the Council of the European Union (hereafter, the Council) acts as the chief decision-making body (Portela 2010).¹⁴ The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy first propose restrictive measures. If the Council unanimously agrees to the proposal after discussion, restrictive measures are then implemented through the adoption of a Council regulation.¹⁵ When legislating restrictive measures, the European Parliament possesses only the power to draft non-binding resolutions, which can act as a signal for the Council to take or withhold action. Accordingly, though the Council is required to inform the European Parliament of any restrictive measures that are successfully passed, the European Parliament possesses no formal power in initiating, blocking, or enforcing EU economic sanctions. It is worth noting, however, that the European Parliament’s lack

¹⁴An exception to this rule is the withdrawal of aid, development assistance, or trade arrangements under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Under certain circumstances, these may be invoked outside the purview of the Council (see Portela 2010, p. 27-28). While some might categorize such actions as sanctions, we only seek to look at restrictive measures explicitly agreed under the CFSP.

¹⁵See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/adoption-review-procedure/>.

of formal power vis-à-vis sanctions legislation should not be equated with lack of *informal* power since opinions emanating from the European Parliament often act as a useful litmus test for the Council when gauging public opinion. Furthermore, European Parliament bills may kick-start the legislation of sanctions in the Council by bringing attention to certain events abroad, as seen most recently in the case of EU targeted sanctions against Nicolás Maduro's regime in Venezuela.¹⁶

Compared to the Council, the European Parliament carries three desirable qualities for testing our argument. Most important, the European Parliament is widely recognized as the democratic body of the EU since—unlike the Council—it is directly elected by EU citizens. Voter accountability is essential toward testing our theory, which requires policy-makers be vulnerable to the perceived political costs of unwanted immigration into their respective countries. In addition to direct elections, MEPs are typically nominated by the national governments and party elites of their home state, which greatly reduces their incentives to support EU-level policies that go against the interests of national constituencies (Hix 2001). MEPs that disregard the preferences of EU citizens risk not only their electoral chances, but also their chances of being nominated and moving further up the ladder within their party. Though European elections are commonly referred to as “second-order” elections, evidence also suggests EU citizens primarily use European elections to punish their respective national governments (Hix and Marsh 2007). MEPs should therefore view the political risks of immigration shocks faced by national governments as an equal risk to their own electoral and professional interests.

Second, the non-binding feature of European Parliament resolutions diminishes the prospect of strategic voting among MEPs—that is, voting in contrast to one's true pref-

¹⁶In August of 2017, the EU refrained from issuing sanctions against Venezuela. This policy stance later shifted after a European Parliament vote for sanctions, which passed on September 14, 2017. See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170911IPR83509/venezuela-meps-call-for-eu-sanctions>.

erences in order to acquire some outside benefit or to “trade” votes with legislators on a different bill. In other words, MEPs are likely to be sincere in the context of sanction votes since a vote on a non-binding resolution will be of little value to trade to other MEPs. This has been similarly argued for resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) where legislation is also non-binding (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017).

Third, Council resolutions adopting restrictive measures are agreed upon unanimously by member states, which precludes any variation in our outcome of interest (i.e., a vote for sanctions) unless we are able to identify failed resolutions. Unfortunately, we were unable to find data on such failed resolutions. This is likely due to inherent selection bias for sanctions bills since resolutions are unlikely to be put up for vote unless preparatory bodies within the Council believe the resolution has *ex ante* unanimous support.

The European Parliament is also a more suitable setting for testing our hypotheses than other national or supranational legislatures. The European Parliament represents a range of 28 liberal democracies with significant, but varying susceptibilities to migration inflows.¹⁷ Accordingly, our focus on Europe gets to the heart of the puzzle of why countries with relatively similar economic systems, political institutions, and cultures nevertheless vary in their preferences toward economic sanctions. The exposure of many European states to migration pressures stemming from the Middle East, North Africa, and former colonies also suggests that Europe is an especially relevant area for testing our argument. Our theory should be less applicable to areas of the world where immigration inflows are at or near zero. Likewise, supranational assemblies such as the UNGA include a majority of countries where migration pressures are either non-existent or not politically salient.

Lastly, it is important to note that EU sanctions have recently departed from “targeted” sanctions (e.g., travel bans, asset freezes, and other measures directed toward specific individuals) and have historically leaned toward comprehensive restrictive measures such

¹⁷The European Parliament consisted of only 27 members for one of the years in our analysis. Croatia acceded to the European Union in 2013.

as the employment of broad financial sanctions, trade embargoes, and the withdrawal of European investment projects within target countries (Portela 2016a; b; Masters 2017). Although targeted sanctions also have the potential to inflict widespread humanitarian damage (Tostensen and Bull 2002), we argue that a more comprehensive sanctions policy gives us greater leverage in testing our argument. For our theory to apply, it is only required that MEPs *perceive* sanctions may intensify migration pressures from the target country, and not whether economic sanctions ultimately have this effect empirically. Nevertheless, in Table A4 in the appendix, we show preliminary results showing the positive relationship between economic sanctions and emigration. It is conceivable that policymakers of sanctions are keenly aware of this relationship although we currently do not have qualitative data to confirm our conjecture. Accordingly, we assume that such perceptions are more likely to be present in the current era of EU sanctions in which international migration has become an important global force once again.

Details of the EU Sanctions Bills in the Dataset

Syria

In 2011, the European Parliament voted on a Joint Motion for a Resolution regarding the civil war in Syria (European Parliament 2011). The Syrian Civil War erupted from localized pro-democracy protests in March of 2011, which quickly evolved into nationwide protests calling for the resignation of Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. As the government and opposition began to take up arms, the protests soon transformed into a bloody civil war and humanitarian crisis. The war has been notable in both its human cost and the international attention it has received. According to UN estimates, the Syrian war had left at least 250,000 dead and 12 million displaced due to conflict. The conflict garnered attention from major states and various international organizations due to war crimes committed by both sides, the employment of chemical weapons, and the presence of

jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS).

In response, on June 23, 2011, the European Council adopted legislation to impose comprehensive sanctions on the Syrian regime. MEPs later vocalized their viewpoints on the Council decision in a Joint Resolution on July 5, 2011, with a bill affirming the Council's decision to impose sanctions on Syria and

“...to suspend all preparations for new bilateral cooperation programmes, to suspend the ongoing bilateral programmes with the Syrian authorities under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the MEDA instrument, to invite the European Investment Bank (EIB) not to approve new financing operations in Syria for the time being, to consider suspending further Community assistance to Syria in light of developments and not to take further steps with regard to the Association Agreement with Syria...” (Section 9)

The wording of the resolution explicitly indicates the extensive nature of proposed restrictive measures with potential effects on the civilian population through the suspension of development finance, trade initiatives, and foreign credit to public and private financial institutions. EU sanctions on Syria also include an energy embargo on oil and petroleum products that comprised a large portion of Syrian exports to Europe (Portela 2012; Walker 2016). Given both the comprehensiveness of EU sanctions toward Syria and the high-profile nature of the conflict, it is particularly interesting to ask whether domestic political considerations over immigration has lead to any reluctance among MEPs to support the Council's measures.

Iran

Restrictive measures are also a key component of EU foreign policy toward Iran and nuclear proliferation. In response to Iran's nuclear program and Iran's defiance of previous UN resolutions, the Council issued economic sanctions against Iran in January of 2012. In addition to freezing assets of Iran's central bank and restricting the trade of precious metals, these new restrictive measures most notably included an “unprecedented” embargo on

Iranian petroleum and crude oil (Blair 2012). The goal of these measures was to reopen negotiations with the Iranian government in hopes of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear military capability. The World Bank estimates Iranian exports shrunk by \$17.1 billion or roughly 13.5% between 2012-2014, with the most heavily affected sectors being oil, automobiles, construction, and finance (Devarajan and Mottaghi 2015).

An interim plan was soon reached in November of 2013 between Iran and major European powers, which would later morph into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit Iran's nuclear development in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions. The European Parliament voiced their opinions toward the matter in a 2014 Joint Motion for Resolution (Parliament 2014). This bill called for a gradual *lifting* of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran and voiced approval for the Council's January 2014 Joint Plan of Action that grants Iran partial relief from the sanctions. The European Parliament bill further implores that all nuclear-related sanctions toward Iran should be gradually be removed upon reaching a comprehensive agreement ensuring a peaceful Iranian nuclear program (Section 3). Moreover, the bill explicitly refers to the collateral damage on Iran's civilian population, stating that the European Parliament

“...is concerned about the possible outbreak of infectious diseases such as polio and measles, especially among children, and urges the EU to ease access to relevant medication which has otherwise been difficult to obtain because of the sanctions.” (Section 6)

Libya

Our last bill of analysis deals with contemporary EU sanctions toward Libya. In 2015, the European Parliament voted on a 2015 Joint Motion for a Resolution involving the situation in Libya, which states support for UNSC Resolution 2171, which “broadens the existing international sanctions on Libya to include the criminal responsibility of people who engage in or support acts that “threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct the successful completion of its political transition” (Paragraph 12). The wording

of the resolution underscores the more targeted nature of sanctions toward Libya relative to both Syria and Iran. However, the UNSC sanctions referred to in the Libya bill have also included a range of restrictive measures aimed at Libyan institutions crucial toward public infrastructure such as “the Central Banks of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign Bank, and the Libyan Investment Portfolio” (Carisch and Rickard-Martin 2011, p. 4).

Research Design

We test our hypothesis by analyzing votes in the European Parliament. In particular, we assess whether the stock of migrants originating from a particular target state shapes the individual decisions of MEPs to impose economic sanctions on the target state. Our sample is comprised of MEP votes on the three resolutions pertaining to sanctions toward Syria (2011), Iran (2014), and Libya (2015). We acquired these data by accessing the *VoteWatch* Europe database. We also searched *VoteWatch* for any other European Parliament bills referring either to the imposition or lifting of economic sanctions on other states outside the EU.¹⁸ Unfortunately, roll call votes involving economic sanctions, especially comprehensive measures, are sparse in the European Parliament, restricting our sample to the three resolutions above. This threatens the generalizability of our estimates. However, given that we are virtually limited from expanding our sample, it is worth noting some theoretical elements that assuage this concern.

Our three resolutions first involve substantively interesting sanction cases where both national security objectives and immigration (from the target state) are politically salient issues. Our analysis therefore still allows us to test how MEPs weigh the tradeoff between

¹⁸Public access to the *VoteWatch* Europe database only includes roll call votes from the 8th European Parliament. We were able to access roll call votes of the 6th and 7th European Parliament as well which date back to 2004. See <http://www.votewatch.eu/>.

national security considerations and domestic pressures against immigration. Moreover, it is unclear whether the preferences of MEPs vis-à-vis sanctions are formed under the same mechanisms today as they were prior to the *de facto* shift in European Union sanction policies around 2010. Policy analysts note that EU foreign policy since 2010 has reflected a growing consensus among European policymakers that economic sanctions should be comprehensive and primarily geared toward imposing economic harm on target regimes, even at the risk of inflicting collateral damage on civilian populations (Carisch and Rickard-Martin 2011; Portela 2016a; b; Masters 2017). This policy mindset contrasts sharply with the idea of targeted sanctions—namely, those comprising arms/weapons embargoes, visa bans, and assets freezes on select individuals—which are deliberately constructed in a way that minimizes their humanitarian impact. MEPs may perceive targeted sanctions as less likely to intensify migration pressures than sanctions that are more comprehensive. In line with our theory then, the analysis focuses on the time period where MEPs are most likely to perceive economic sanctions as politically costly.

We pool the roll call votes for each resolution into a single sample, which allows us to incorporate MEP country and year fixed effects into our model. Our sample totals 1,713 observations after accounting for MEP absences and abstentions, which are both coded as missing. The unit of analysis is MEP.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is *Pro-Sanctions Vote* indicating whether or not an MEP votes in favor of sanctions for a given resolution. A 1 indicates an MEP voting in favor of sanctions, while a 0 indicates an MEP voting against sanctions. For roll call votes on the Syria and Libya resolutions, this is done simply by coding “yes” votes as 1 and “no” votes as 0. However, because the Iran resolution is a roll call vote for *lifting sanctions*, the coding is reversed—“yes” votes for the Iran resolution are coded as 0, while “no” votes are coded as 1. We understand that pooling bills and coding in this fashion may be problematic if

votes toward imposing sanctions are somehow formulated differently by MEPs than votes toward lifting sanctions. We attend to this potential problem by including target country fixed effects (i.e., fixed effects for resolutions), which control for any confounding variables specific to the resolution, the year of the vote (since each resolution occurs in a different year), and any state-level characteristics specific to the sanction target.¹⁹ In addition to MEP absences, we choose to drop all abstentions from the analysis. However, coding abstentions as effective “no” votes does not significantly change our main results.

Explanatory Variables of Interest

Our main explanatory variable of interest, *Migrant Stock_{ij}*, is the stock of migrants in the MEP’s country, *i*, that are from the targeted country, *j* (e.g. Syria, Iran, and Libya). In line with the existing literature (Leblang 2010; Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Bernhard and Leblang 2016), we take the log of (1 plus) migrant stock to account for diminishing marginal effects of migration pressure. These data come from the UN Global Migration Database. We prefer this data source over the OECD International Migration Database since missing OECD data causes multiple countries to drop from our models including the United Kingdom, Greece, and Portugal. UN data is available in 10-year increments with 2010 as the last year of recorded bilateral migration data. To estimate one-year lagged data for Iran (2013) and Libya (2015), we interpolate values for *Migrant Stock_{ij}* using the average annual rate of change occurring between 2000 and 2010. However, simply using migration stock values from 2010 does not change the substantive or statistical significance of our estimates.

The size of migrant stocks from a given country may also only matter relative to the population size of the MEP’s country or to the size of the total migrant stock in the MEP’s

¹⁹Importantly, this does not include dyadic variables such as bilateral factor flows from the target country that differ cross-nationally in our dataset. We also attempt to control for these in our models.

country. We take several steps to account for any relative aspects in migrant stocks. First, we report estimates that control for the population of the MEP's country. Second, in subsequent models, we replicate our results substituting in *Migrant Stock_{ij}* as a percentage of the population of host country *i*. Finally, we again replicate our results by instead substituting in *Migrant Stock_{ij}* as a percentage of the total annual stock of migrants in host country *i*.

Controls

To account for omitted variable bias, we include several control variables that are likely to be correlated with both migration and the propensity of MEPs to vote in favor of sanctions. We introduce these control variables sequentially into our empirical models to demonstrate how, if at all, the inclusion of certain controls affects our main estimates.

In the event that immigration is correlated with the state of the economy, we incorporate several macroeconomic indicators from the Comparative Politics Data Set from Armingeon et al. (2016) that control for domestic economic conditions within the MEP's country. *Unemployment_i* controls for the unemployment rate (as a percentage of the civilian work force) in the MEP's country. *Real GDP Growth_i* controls for the real annual rate of GDP growth in each MEP's country. Since dire economic conditions are shown to intensify anti-immigrant sentiment and increase the electoral success of far-right parties (Golder 2003; Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2016), we expect coefficients for these two terms to be negative.

We also control for the size of the welfare state in each MEP's country by including the variables, *Personal Income Tax_i* and *Welfare Taxation_i*, which indicate a country's total revenue (as a percentage of GDP) from personal income taxes and social security contributions, respectively. These data come from the OECD Revenue Statistics. The expected relationship between size of the welfare state and our dependent variable can be argued in one of two ways. First, large welfare states may compensate native citizens for any negative

consequences stemming from an open immigration policy (Cameron 1978; Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt 2005), thus lessening the pressure on MEPs to vote against sanctions. This argument would predict our tax measures to be positive. Alternatively, MEP's may be under greater public pressure to vote against sanctions if beneficiaries of large welfare states believe immigrants are an added fiscal strain on the welfare state (Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007). This alternative would thus predict our tax measures to be negative.

Migrant Stock_{ij} is also likely to be correlated with both geographical distance and whether country *j* is a former colony. If states are less (more) likely to sanction geographically proximate countries and former colonies, leaving these factors unaccounted for will bias our estimates upward (downward). Using data from the CEPII database, we therefore control for distance between the largest city in country *i* and the largest city in country *j*, weighted by the population of the biggest city as a percentage of the country's total population.²⁰ We also include a dummy variable, *Former Colony_{ij}*, which equals 1 if the MEP's country was ever in a colonial relationship with the target country.

To account for any relationship between international trade and immigration, we control for the number of exports to and imports from country *j* as a percentage of GDP. These data also come from the CEPII database. We expect a negative sign for both of these variables since MEPs will hesitate imposing economic sanctions to the extent that sanctions inflict collateral damage on European import-dependent and exporting firms. However, a positive sign for *Imports_{ij}* would support that sanctions are a protectionist tool to protect domestic import-competing firms (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; 1988; 1989).

Along similar lines, we control for the (logged) annual stock of refugees from country *j* to country *i* using data from the UNHCR Statistical Database. Predictably, refugee stocks are highly collinear with our main independent variable with a correlation coefficient of 0.845, which inflates the standard errors of *Migrant Stock_{ij}* in our model. We nevertheless

²⁰See <http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=3877> for more information on the weighted distance measure.

report estimates including the control, $\ln(Refugees_{ij})$, to demonstrate that migrant stocks maintain a negative effect on *Pro-Sanctions Vote* that is independent of the stock of refugees. Lastly, we control for remittances from the MEP's country to target country j . Including the remittances measure in the model specification controls for both the extent to which migrants maintain contact with their home countries and the size of their economic influence. We obtained data on remittances from the World Bank, which is unfortunately missing data for Libya. The reader should therefore note that estimates controlling for remittances only include resolutions for Syria and Iran in the sample.

Model Specification

Given our dependent variable, an individual MEP's vote on sanctions bills, is dichotomous, we estimate the model using logistic regression with standard errors clustered on MEP-country, formally specified as:

$$\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(1 + MigrantStock_{ij,t-1}) + \gamma X_{i,t-1} + \eta_i + \delta_j + \alpha_{party} + \epsilon$$

where j denotes the target country (alternatively, the immigrant origin country), i denotes the MEP's country, and p is the probability of an MEP voting in favor of sanctions on country j . $X_{i,t-1}$ is a vector of control variables described in the previous section at $t-1$. According to our Hypothesis 1, we predict β_1 to be negative.

To ameliorate concerns for endogeneity, all right-hand side variables are lagged one year.²¹ We also include a number of fixed effects that can control for a series of omitted factors not picked up by the vector $X_{i,t-1}$. First, MEP country fixed effects (η_i) account for any time-invariant country-level differences between each MEP's country. Given the short

²¹We are aware that this does not precisely address the endogeneity concern for the linearly interpolated migration stock data. However, as we have mentioned before, using the 2010 stock data does not change the central results in any significant way.

time period, this is likely to include most structural features of an MEP's home government, membership in the Eurozone, and unobservable cultural differences between MEPs' countries. Second, we incorporate bill fixed effects (δ_j) which—because our three bills are all from different years and aimed at different target states—have both year fixed effects and target country fixed effects embedded within them. Bill fixed effects can therefore control for systemic economic shocks specific to a given year, time-invariant characteristics of the target state, cross-national differences in the composition of immigration inflows from country j (such as skill level), and any special circumstances within the European Parliament that differentiate the three resolutions. Lastly, party discipline is generally strong in the European Parliament with some parties also clustering disproportionately within certain EU countries (Hix 2001). We therefore incorporate party fixed effects (α_{party}) to control for any bias European party agendas may have on our estimates.²²

Results

We present estimates relevant to Hypothesis 1 in Tables 1 and 2. To demonstrate the robustness of our estimates, we introduce fixed effect dummies and control variables sequentially throughout Models 1-11. Model 1 begins with the simple bivariate relationship between (logged) migrant stocks and the probability of voting in favor of sanctions. Models 2 through 4 estimate this same relationship, but sequentially adding in bill fixed effects, MEP country fixed effects, and party fixed effects. Models 5 through 11 then introduce the series of controls described in the preceding section. We keep all types of fixed effects in these remaining models except for Model 6 where MEP country fixed effects are dropped in order to include the anti-immigrant sentiment measure that we possess country-level data on for only one year. None of the above fixed effects cause any observations to drop

²²The baseline for our model includes independent (i.e., non-associated) members of the European Parliament.

Table 1: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.118** (0.043)	-0.097* (0.040)	-0.119 (0.086)	-0.138* (0.059)	-0.228** (0.087)
Libya Bill _j		2.888*** (0.281)	2.954*** (0.273)	3.605*** (0.317)	3.831*** (0.344)
Iran Bill _j		3.250*** (0.343)	3.365*** (0.372)	3.926*** (0.395)	3.744*** (0.376)
Population _i					0.358 (0.237)
Unemployment _i					-0.100 ⁺ (0.058)
Real GDP Growth _i					0.096 (0.110)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}					0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}					0.839** (0.311)
Party Fixed Effects				✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

from the analysis—however, we do lose observations in some models due to missing data for some of our controls.²³

For all models in Tables 1 and 2, the coefficient for *Migrant Stock_{ij}* has the expected negative sign. MEPs are less likely to vote for sanctions when their countries face high migration pressure from the sanction target—though the statistical significance of this relationship varies depending on the model. For instance, for the simple bivariate relationship with no fixed effects in Model 1, MEPs from countries with the smallest reported migrant stock (i.e., 0) have a 76% probability of voting for sanctions, while MEPs from countries with the highest reported migrant stock (i.e., roughly 121,000) have only a 44.2% probability of voting for sanctions. This relationship is significant at the 99% level.

The inclusion of bill fixed effects causes the statistical significance of *Migrant Stock_{ij}*

²³Full descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1 of the appendix.

Table 2: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
ln(Migrant Stock _{ij})	-0.109** (0.034)	-0.200* (0.086)	-0.231* (0.099)	-0.194* (0.089)	-0.243+ (0.129)	-0.716* (0.323)
Libya Bill _j	3.786*** (0.316)	4.002*** (0.410)	3.966*** (0.335)	3.697*** (0.416)	3.778*** (0.402)	
Iran Bill _j	3.726*** (0.389)	3.764*** (0.377)	3.619*** (0.417)	3.668*** (0.395)	3.862*** (0.404)	0.986 (2.719)
Population _i	-0.001 (0.004)	0.286 (0.216)	0.414+ (0.229)	0.247 (0.211)	0.396 (0.248)	1.145* (0.480)
Unemployment _i	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.096* (0.047)	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.057)	-0.114+ (0.065)	-0.269* (0.123)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.010 (0.062)	0.088 (0.096)	0.127 (0.113)	-0.023 (0.128)	0.127 (0.139)	0.061 (0.174)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.000* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001+ (0.000)	0.003 (0.003)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.191 (0.181)	0.413 (0.406)	0.880** (0.317)	0.451 (0.587)	0.913* (0.360)	3.417** (1.043)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i	0.103 (0.254)					
RWP Vote Share _i		-0.069 (0.044)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)			250.045 (202.548)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)			-834.396 (532.524)			
Personal Income Tax _i				-0.311 (0.254)		
Welfare Tax _i				0.001 (0.591)		
ln(Refugees _{ij})					-0.010 (0.155)	
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})						-0.825 (0.738)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1065

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

to drop to the 95% level in Model 2. The size of $Migrant\ Stock_{ij}$ also diminishes slightly, suggesting that there may be important year- or target country-specific variables that overestimate $Migrant\ Stock_{ij}$ if left unaccounted for. Nevertheless, the negative association between migrant stocks and pro-sanction votes in Model 2 remains substantively large—


MEPs from the country with the highest migrant stock are still approximately 27 percentage points less likely to vote for sanctions compared to MEPs from countries with the lowest migrant stock. *Migrant Stock_{ij}* loses statistical significance once adding in MEP-country fixed effects in Model 3. However, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is negative and statistically significant at the 95% level once we account for the party affiliation of MEPs in Model 4.²⁴ Again moving from minimum to maximum values of migrant stocks, the probability of MEPs voting for sanctions drops by approximately 35 percentage points.

While these initial models suggest support for Hypothesis 1, they are unable to account for any time-variant country-level variables of the MEP's country, nor dyadic variables such as trade or refugee flows that could covary with migration. Model 5 controls for unemployment, real economic growth, (weighted) distance between *i* and *j*, and former colonial relationships between *i* and *j*. Population of *i* is also included as a control variable for the remaining models since migrant stocks are likely to only matter relative to the MEP country's population size. Here, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is again negative and significant at the 99% level. To better illustrate substantive effects, Figure 1 displays predicted probabilities from Model 5 across the range of migrant stock values in our dataset, holding all other covariates at their mean. MEPs from countries with the highest migrant stock are estimated as roughly 52 percentage points less likely to vote for sanctions compared to MEPs from countries with the lowest migrant stock. Our motivating case of sanctions against Libya is again particularly instructive. Italy and Spain, for instance, are Mediterranean countries with relatively similar population sizes, but drastically different stocks of Libyan migrants—roughly near 39,000 and 0, respectively, according to official records.²⁵ Based on this difference, Model 5 estimates Italian MEPs have a 43.3% probability of voting for sanctions

²⁴We report the coefficients for party dummies in Table A5

²⁵Official records may include both legal and undocumented immigrants. While it is unreasonable to believe that the number of Libyan migrants in Spain is zero, policymakers are highly likely to use this information when crafting a variety of public policies. A zero may also imply that the number of Libyan migrants in Spain is negligibly small while it

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Sanctions Vote (Model 5)



Note: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other covariates held at their mean.

against Libya compared to 89.5% for Spanish MEPs, holding all other covariates at their mean.

Keeping the same set of controls as Model 5, Models 6 and 7 introduce our measures for anti-immigrant popular sentiment and right-wing populist vote share.²⁶ For those interested in the unconditional relationship of anti-immigrant sentiment and right-wing populism, neither Model 6 nor Model 7 indicate any direct relationship between popular dislike of immigrants and MEPs voting for sanctions. *Migrant Stock_{ij}*, however, is again negative and significant at the 99% level in Model 6 and at the 95% level in Model 7. may not in fact be exactly zero.

²⁶We include these variables separately since we theorize them as alternative measures of the same underlying concept, popular dislike of immigrants.

Moving from minimum to maximum values of migrant stocks in Model 6, there is a roughly 28.4 percentage point decrease in voting for sanctions (with controls held at their mean). In Model 7, the same move is associated with a 47.4 percentage point decrease.

Model 8 excludes anti-immigrant popular sentiment measures and instead controls for trade flows between the MEP's country and the sanction target. Controlling for bilateral trade, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is negative and statistically significant at the 95% level. The substantive significance of *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is also of similar magnitude to Model 5. If we instead remove bilateral trade variables and include controls for the size of the MEP country's welfare state in Model 9, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* remains negative and statistically significant at the 95% level. Here, MEPs from countries with the highest migrant stock are approximately 47 percentage points less likely to vote for sanctions compared to MEPs from countries with the lowest migrant stock.

Models 10 and 11 control for refugee stocks and bilateral remittances, respectively. We remain cautious of making inferences from these models, as refugee stocks are highly collinear with migrant stocks and missing data on bilateral remittances causes the Libya resolution to drop from the analysis. Nevertheless, despite the high multicollinearity between migrant and refugee stocks, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* remains negatively associated with pro-sanction votes in Model 10 and is still statistically significant at the 90% level. Likewise, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is negative and statistically significant (at the 95% level) even when controlling for remittances in Model 11.

In sum, the empirical findings are largely consistent with the main argument. In Table A10 of the Appendix, we also interact the migrant stock variable with whether the MEP is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) party, which includes several right-wing Euro-skeptic national parties. Here, we find a robust positive interaction coefficient that washes out the negative association between migration pressures and support for sanctions; ECR MEPs are more likely to support sanctions against the target country when the MEPs' countries host a greater number of migrants from that country.

This suggests several possibilities. First, ECR MEPs are hawkish toward target countries whose emigrants are often reviled as undesirable in the MEPs' countries. Second, right-wing parties are in need of some migration in order to win political support. On the one hand, they cannot support sanctions since consequent rises in immigration threatens the electoral viability of their members. On the other hand, they cannot oppose sanctions since this would curtail immigration flows that increase the salience of their policy platform. The position of right-wing parties therefore captures the short-term political calculus of the ECR party.

Robustness Checks

The remainder of analysis provides robustness checks for the negative relationship between migration and MEP voting on economic sanctions. Most importantly, we substitute in two different measures of migrant stock and replicate the initial results of Models 1 through 11. First, we use migrant stocks from country j as a percentage of the MEP country's total population (Models A14-A24). Next, we use migrant stocks from country j as a percentage of the total migrant stock in the MEP's country (Models A25-A35). Estimates using these measures are displayed in Tables A6 and A7 in the appendix.

When using migrant stocks as a percentage of the MEP country's population, the results are largely similar to our main estimates. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for the migrant share of population is negative in all models. Only in the bivariate model with no fixed effects is the migrant share measure statistically insignificant. The substantive effect of migrant stocks is also of similar magnitude as in the preliminary models. For instance, in Model A18—which includes all three types of fixed effects and multiple time-variant controls for the MEP's country including population, unemployment, real GDP growth, (weighted) distance, and former colonial relationships—moving from the tenth percentile to ninetieth percentile of our migrant stock measure is associated with a roughly 14.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for sanctions. This relationship

is significant at the 99.9% level.

Similar results are obtained when substituting in $Migrant\ Stock_{ij}$ as a share of total migrant stocks. The coefficient in migrant stocks is negative in all eleven models. Except for the bivariate regression with no fixed effects or controls, the coefficient is statistically significant at least at the 95% level. The substantive effect of migration is also slightly larger when rescaling migrant stocks in terms of share of total migrants. Again replicating Model 5, increasing the migrant stock measure from the tenth percentile to the ninetieth percentile is associated with a roughly 26 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for sanctions. This relationship is significant at the 99.9% level. Hence, even when scaling migrant stocks in terms of MEP country population and total migrant stocks, the substantive and statistical significance of our main results appear to hold.

Initially, we chose to analyze individual MEPs' votes because using the votes ameliorates the endogeneity concern between our country-level explanatory variables and policymakers' revealed preferences. For instance, it is unlikely that individual MEPs' votes are causing changes in the country-level explanatory variables in a reverse direction. Despite the methodological advantage of this identification strategy, one might still argue that using the individual votes as the dependent variable is artificially expanding the number of observations and, in turn, shrinking the standard errors. This is a reasonable concern because our main explanatory variable is a country-level variable that does not vary among MEPs within the same country for a given roll-call vote. To address this concern, we use the percentage of pro-sanctions votes as the dependent variable in the MEP's country. This variable varies between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating that an EU country consists of more MEPs who vote in favor of sanctions on a target country j . MEP abstentions and absences are again dropped from the analysis. Because party membership in the European Parliament is an individual-level nominal variable, we also omit party fixed effects from these models. By collapsing the data in this fashion, this leaves us with a total 83 observations, with the MEP's country now being the unit of

analysis.

Given that our dependent variable is now a proportion, we estimate the effect of *Migrant Stock_{ij}* using a fractional logit model as shown in Table A8 of the appendix. In line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is negative and statistically significant in all ten of our fractional logit models. The substantive effect of migrant stocks is also similar to our main results. For instance, in Model A39—which includes our main covariates, MEP-country fixed effects, and bill fixed effects—moving from minimum to maximum values of migrant stock is associated with a roughly 0.46 decrease in the proportion of pro-sanction votes by the MEP country.

Lastly, we revert back to our individual-level measure of pro-sanctions vote and employ a mixed effects model to account for parameters varying at multiple levels of analysis. Our individual-level explanatory variable is party membership of the MEP, while *Migrant Stock_{ij}* and the rest of our covariates are at the country-level. Results for these mixed effect models are shown in Table A9. Here, *Migrant Stock_{ij}* is again consistently negative, though it loses statistical significance when controlling for remittance flows.²⁷ In sum, support for Hypothesis 1 is robust to alternative scalings of migrant stock and different choices in model specification. Consistently, European countries with large migrant stocks from the target state appear more averse to imposing sanctions than European countries where migrant stocks from the target state are trivial.

An Empirical Extension: Libya as a Transit Country

Up to this point, we have argued that the reluctance of some EU member states (e.g., Italy and Malta) to impose sanctions on Libya can be explained by the large number of migrants from Libya living within the borders of the EU member states. However, Libya's unique geographic location distinguishes the North African country from the other

²⁷Again, we are tentative in making any inferences from this null result since we are missing remittance data on Libya.

target states; it is a major hub for immigration flows from other poor or conflict-ridden countries throughout Africa and the Middle East looking to make an eventual journey into Europe across the Mediterranean. The existence of transit migrants in Libya is a potentially important feature to consider vis-à-vis the use of economic sanctions for two reasons. First, economic sanctions may cause the Libyan government to relax restrictions on transit migration into Europe as a retaliatory measure (Emsden 2011; Faris 2011; Henneberg and Boduszynski 2017). According to our argument, these transit migration flows will also result in negative political consequences for EU countries possessing a large stock of not only Libyan migrants, but also migrants from other geographically proximate regions. Second, the adverse humanitarian effects of sanctions will also increase the desire of transit migrants in Libya to emigrate, leading to the same negative political effects within EU countries.

While we are agnostic about which of these two mechanisms is most at play, we now attempt to test whether there is any association between transit migrant stocks in MEPs' countries and opposition to the use of sanctions against Libya. If we find at least some evidence for the effects of transit migrant stocks on MEPs' opposition to sanctions, this would provide additional support for our argument that it is *not* the diaspora's electoral influence but the migration pressure that drives the relationship between a large migrant stock in an EU member state and its MEPs' reluctance to support EU sanctions.

To do this, we again analyze MEP votes on the 2015 European Parliament resolution pertaining to sanctions against Libya. In addition to Libyan migrant stocks, we also consider the (logged) stock of migrants in MEPs' countries that originate from countries sending large amounts of migrants to Libya. These countries include Egypt, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. We select these countries on the basis of their level of economic development (i.e. they are poorer than Libya) and whether they are significant senders of migrants to Libya. In other words, transit migrants from these countries are most likely to factor into the decisions of MEPs since they are both unwanted

Table 3: Transit Migrant Stocks in MEPs' Countries and Voting for Sanctions against Libya


	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Libya}})$	-0.364** (0.112)	-0.363** (0.140)	-0.375*** (0.069)	-0.443*** (0.125)	-0.471** (0.181)	-0.432** (0.163)	-0.471*** (0.127)	-0.882*** (0.214)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Chad}})$	-0.144+ (0.087)							
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Egypt}})$		-0.154 (0.187)						
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Niger}})$			-0.199** (0.070)					
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Nigeria}})$				-0.015 (0.133)				
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Somalia}})$					0.024 (0.145)			
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Sudan}})$						-0.014 (0.094)		
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Syria}})$							0.046 (0.113)	
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{i,\text{Yemen}})$								0.553+ (0.290)
Observations	640	640	640	640	640	640	640	640
Baseline Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on Libya. Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Baseline control variables include Population_i , Unemployment_i , Real GDP Growth_i , and Distance_{ij} , and Colony_{ij} . In order to preserve observations, party dummies are included only where party membership does not perfectly predict failure. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

and sizable. For control variables, we use the same baseline of controls in previous models for the MEP's country, which are population, unemployment, real GDP growth, (weighted) distance from Libya, and whether Libya was a former colony. MEP party fixed effects are also included in some models. Estimates for transit migrant stocks are reported in Table 3, as well as graphically represented in Figure 2.

Conforming to our expectation, a handful of the coefficients of transit migrant stock measures, especially those from Africa, are consistently negatively signed, though the levels of statistical significance for these findings vary. MEPs from countries holding a large amount of migrants from countries, such as Chad and Niger, are more likely to oppose sanctions than MEPs from countries with a negligible amount of migrants from these same countries. Since we are only looking at one bill pertaining to Libya—a major gateway to Europe from Africa—these results are, of course, only suggestive. Nevertheless, it appears in some cases that transit migration may also factor into the calculus of policymakers when deciding to impose economic sanctions. The connection between international migration and foreign policymaking is therefore likely to extend beyond simple bilateral migration

Figure 2: A Graphical Representation of Transit Migrant Stocks in Libya



Note: Coefficients are from models reported in Table 3. Darker areas indicate a greater migrant stock in Libya as a percentage of that country's population. Gridded areas represent either missing data or countries with greater GDP per capita than Libya.

flows, and future empirical research on the topic should further explore this complexity.

Conclusion

Why do some countries resort to economic coercion while others refrain from doing so? We sought a novel answer to this puzzle in the cross-border movements of people. In this article, we specifically focused on the role of migration in constraining policymakers in their use of economic sanctions. When policymakers host a large migrant stock from

the target country, they oppose sanctions out of fear that such restrictive measures might increase migration from the target into their own countries. As migrant networks link a country to another, policymakers must be cautious when their foreign policy tools can jeopardize their electoral success through increased immigration. The findings in this article demonstrate that migration pressure is an important aspect of globalization that limits the foreign policy options of democracies.

Our main result is robust to several specifications and the inclusion of other alternative explanations. We have assessed the various roles of economic and cultural anxiety among MEPs' fellow citizens in accentuating the effect of migration pressure on MEPs' opposition to economic sanctions. Since the time period of our focus coincides with the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean, we have also considered models that estimate the conditional effects of migration pressure on MEPs' voting behavior in three contexts: (1) right-wing populism; (2) anti-immigrant sentiment; and (3) welfare chauvinism. From the results in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix, we find little evidence for the moderating effects of these contextual variables. The association between migration pressures and the use of economic coercion does not appear to be confined to states where hostility toward immigrants is most visible. We have also considered other indicators of international migration: (1) remittances outflows from MEPs' countries to the target country; and (2) refugee stocks from the target country in MEPs' countries. Neither shows statistical significance as an explanation for MEPs' probability of voting for sanctions.

The results have several implications of how policymakers decide to use economic coercion. In accordance with the previous literature, we further show the issue linkage that exists between migration and foreign economic policies. In particular, our unique identification strategy shows how migration pressures factor into policymakers' cost-benefit calculus when faced with significant foreign policy decisions. This paper has thus bridged together two research programs that have evolved relatively separate from one another. In the process, this article elucidates the important role of diasporas in shaping

the foreign policies of the host country.

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Appendix

Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrices

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote for Sanctions	0.566	0.496	0	1	1713
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	7.374	3.023	0	11.701	1713
Migrants _{ij} as % of Population _i	0.039	0.083	0	0.698	1713
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i	0.456	0.882	0	4.964	1713
Libya Bill _j	0.374	0.484	0	1	1713
Iran Bill _j	0.300	0.458	0	1	1713
RWP Vote Share _{ii}	5.704	6.328	0	28.2	1713
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i	2.477	0.204	1.798	2.986	1713
Personal Income Tax _i	8.602	3.645	2.769	28.168	1522
Welfare Tax _i	12.630	3.663	0.330	18.604	1522
Population _i	38.281	28.689	0.415	81.777	1713
Unemployment _i	10.281	5.536	5	26.5	1713
Real GDP Growth _i	1.312	1.826	-5.939	5.691	1713
Former Colony _{ij}	0.071	0.256	0	1	1713
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	2790.64	955.403	373.986	5343.777	1713
Exports to Origin Country (as % GDP _i)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.008	1699
Imports from Origin Country (as % GDP _i)	0	0.000	0.000	0.002	1699
$\ln(\text{Refugees}_{ij})$	4.964	2.541	0.693	9.750	1621
$\ln(\text{Remittance Outflows}_{ij})$	2.335	1.583	0.000	4.871	1065

Interactive Effects of Anti-Immigrant Forces

In this section, we consider some interactive effects concurrent with the recent literature on migration. First, the relationship between support for sanctions and migration may depend on the level of right-wing populism in a country. While unwanted immigration pressure from targeted sanctions countries can shape the sanctions decisions independently, some policymakers are more politically susceptible to this pressure. Particularly, policymakers of countries with growing right-wing populism may seek to curb immigration to exclude right-wing populist parties from mainstream politics. It is well-established in the literature that right-wing populist parties often take over the issue ownership of immigration to garner votes (Arzheimer 2009; Eatwell 1998; Green et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). These parties blame migrants for urban and economic crises, giving the migration issue increased saliency by emphasizing the potential domestic costs to their potential support base. Although immigration is not the only issue on the agenda of right-wing populist parties, it is usually a central one for their supporters. For instance, Eatwell (1998) notes that Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the National Front party in France, became more favorable to voters when he set an actual policy agenda on immigration.

To preempt the rise of right-wing populism, mainstream parties in the coalition may seek to decrease immigration issue saliency by restricting immigration (Meguid 2005). Policymakers may use policy tools other than immigration policy to achieve this goal. Refraining from imposing sanctions that could generate immigration inflows from the target country is one way to curb future immigration. Therefore, migration pressure can induce policymakers to oppose economic coercion even more vehemently when their countries experience substantial growth of right-wing populist parties.

HYPOTHESIS 1A: Right-wing populism increases the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.

We also look at the potential effect of heightened anti-immigrant sentiment in a country. Although an increasing right-wing populist vote share is an indicator of a growing negative public sentiment toward immigration, the absence of right-wing populism may not necessarily indicate the lack of public opposition to immigration. For instance, electoral institutions may prevent anti-immigrant interests from materializing into organized political parties (Dancygier et al. 2015; Golder 2003), and the media may sensationalize increased immigration leading to heightened threat perception among natives (Hopkins 2010). Policymakers without a significant threat from right-wing populist parties may thus still try to increase their popularity by accommodating the policy preferences of anti-immigrant voters. When immigration creates a perception of labor market competition (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012), competition for resources (Dancygier 2010; Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007), or ignite ethnocentric and prejudicial attitudes (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Kinder and Kam 2009), policymakers will respond to an increasing electoral base of those who prefer a closed immigration policy. In a country where such electoral base is present, policymakers whose countries are connected to a target country through a migrant network are even more likely to oppose economic sanctions.

HYPOTHESIS 1B: Anti-immigrant public opinions increase the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.

Since the sanctions target countries tend to be poor, migrants from these countries could trigger other forms of economic anxiety among native voters. The public's belief that these migrants are net consumers of welfare can induce policymakers to become more wary of immigration inflows, especially when immigrants tend to be uneducated and unskilled. However, voters may not base their attitudes toward immigration on the level of welfare spending as long as they do not carry a heavy tax burden. When voters' contributions to the welfare system are substantial, policymakers can be held more accountable when the

level of immigration increases. The previous scholarship has found some evidence that policymakers of welfare states tend to restrict low-skill immigration (Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007; Peters 2017; Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri 2011). As voters of welfare states worry about the possibility of welfare depletion by poor migrants, policymakers of welfare states may be more sensitive to the connection between economic sanctions and migration.

HYPOTHESIS 1C: *Welfare taxation increases the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.*

We now test Hypotheses 1A through 1C to assess whether certain contexts will further strengthen the relationship between migration and MEP voting on economic sanctions. Tables A2 and A3 display a series of models where we interact migrant stocks with: (1) The level of anti-immigrant popular sentiment; (2) The percentage of right-wing populist vote; and (3) The level of welfare taxation. For these interaction models, we maintain all types of fixed effects when possible and only the baseline of controls as in Model 5. We also test Hypotheses 1A through 1C using alternative measures of migrant stock. Models I1 through I3 use the same *Migrant Stock_{ij}* variable as in previous models. Models I4 through I6 instead operationalize migrant stocks from target country *j* as a percentage of the MEP country's total population. Lastly, Models I7 through I9 measure migrant stocks from target country *j* as a percentage of country *i*'s total migrant stock. For all of these models, our primary focus is with the significance of the interaction term. We are less concerned with interpreting the component term, *Migrant Stock_{ij}*, by itself since this coefficient often reflects out-of-sample observations.²⁸

²⁸Two of our modifying variables—anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare taxation—have minimum values above zero. Hence, the coefficient for *Migrant Stock_{ij}* in these interaction models portrays the effect of migrant stock at nonsensical values of the modifying variable. Right-wing populist vote share does, however, take values of zero in our dataset. The coefficient of our migrant stock measure in these models remains negative

Table A2: Conditional Effects of Migrant Stocks on the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(I1)	(I2)	(I3)	(I4)	(I5)	(I6)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.217* (0.091)	-1.199** (0.459)	-0.137 (0.185)			
Migrants _{ij} as % of Population _i				-3.654** (1.300)	-30.517* (13.477)	-7.518* (3.112)
RWP Vote Share _i	-0.141 ⁺ (0.081)			-0.105* (0.050)		
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{RWP Vote}_i$	0.009 (0.008)					
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x RWP Vote _i				-0.319* (0.133)	-0.572 ⁺ (0.302)	
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		-3.152* (1.455)				
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{Anti-Immigrant Sentiment}_i$		0.452* (0.186)				
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i					11.785* (5.745)	
Welfare Tax _i			0.210 (0.531)			0.235 (0.535)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{Welfare Tax}_i$			-0.007 (0.014)			
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x Welfare Tax _i						0.104 (0.186)
Libya Bill _j	4.107*** (0.407)	3.781*** (0.296)	3.443*** (0.327)	4.036*** (0.425)	4.027*** (0.320)	3.182*** (0.333)
Iran Bill _j	3.595*** (0.434)	3.653*** (0.377)	3.524*** (0.349)	4.763*** (0.496)	3.757*** (0.378)	4.707*** (0.511)
Population _i	0.308 (0.211)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.366 ⁺ (0.212)	-0.030 (0.133)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.076 (0.139)
Unemployment _i	-0.090* (0.046)	-0.052* (0.022)	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.102* (0.041)	-0.037 ⁺ (0.020)	-0.068 (0.054)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.089 (0.093)	-0.012 (0.056)	0.029 (0.111)	0.115 (0.086)	0.054 (0.063)	0.055 (0.100)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.001* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.376 (0.399)	0.255 (0.184)	0.833 ⁺ (0.460)	0.050 (0.312)	0.035 (0.184)	0.667 ⁺ (0.380)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1522	1713	1713	1522

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A3: Conditional Effects of Migrant Stocks on the Probability of Voting for Sanctions (Cont'd)

	(17)	(18)	(19)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i	-0.624** (0.230)	-1.974* (0.794)	-0.835*** (0.246)
RWP Vote Share _i	-0.086 ⁺ (0.049)		
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x RWP Vote _i	-0.020 (0.029)		
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		-0.999* (0.500)	
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		0.691* (0.338)	
Welfare Tax _i			0.253 (0.527)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x Welfare Tax _i			-0.005 (0.014)
Libya Bill _j	3.721*** (0.434)	3.832*** (0.330)	3.069*** (0.339)
Iran Bill _j	4.748*** (0.473)	3.749*** (0.360)	4.881*** (0.536)
Population _i	0.031 (0.121)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.100 (0.140)
Unemployment _i	-0.103** (0.039)	-0.052* (0.022)	-0.077 (0.055)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.054 (0.076)	0.012 (0.052)	0.050 (0.102)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.200 (0.291)	-0.054 (0.208)	0.826* (0.388)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects	✓		✓
Observations	1713	1713	1522

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Hypothesis 1A predicts that the association between immigration and MEP opposition to sanctions will increase to the extent that right-wing populist parties are present. However, we find little support for this. The interaction term between right-wing populist vote and *Migrant Stock_{ij}* in Model I1 is indistinguishable from zero. Only when measuring migrant stocks as a percentage of the MEP country's population does the interaction term and statistically significant.

reach statistical significance. Even here though, the increasing marginal effect of migrant shares as right-wing populist vote share grows is rather flat. For instance, when right-wing populist parties receive no share of the vote, moving from minimum to maximum values of migrant share in Model 15 elicits approximately a 55-percentage-point decrease in the probability of voting for sanctions. When instead holding right-wing populist share at its mean, moving from minimum to maximum values of migrant share elicits a roughly 62 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for sanctions (Only a 7 percentage point difference in effect).²⁹ We also find no evidence supporting the prediction of Hypothesis 1C that higher amounts of welfare taxation will intensify the relationship between immigration and MEP opposition to sanctions.

Hypothesis 1B posits that high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will increase the extent that migration promotes MEP opposition to sanctions. Here, in fact, the interaction term between migrant stocks and our anti-immigrant sentiment measure is consistently *positive* in Models I2, I5, and I7. Figure A1 in the appendix plots the marginal effect of *Migrant Stock_{ij}* across the range of anti-immigrant sentiment values in our data set. Only with low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment do migrant stocks appear to increase MEP opposition to economic sanctions. For countries with anti-immigrant sentiment scores roughly above the mean (*Anti-immigrant Sentiment_i*=2.5), the association between migration pressures and pro-sanction votes disappears. What accounts for this unintuitive finding? A likely explanation is that the positive interaction term reflects some sort of “ceiling effect” in countries with either high levels of immigration or high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Arzheimer 2009). In other words, when anti-immigrant sentiment

²⁹When moving into extremely high values of right-wing populist vote share, the marginal effect of migrant share on voting behavior starts to become *smaller*. However, we only have a smaller number of observations once right-wing populist vote share moves beyond 12 percent, thus causing the confidence intervals to widen and the marginal effects of migrant share to become indistinguishable from zero.

is extremely strong, actual levels of migration are unlikely to have any additive effect on MEP opposition to sanctions. This interpretation would also explain why both component terms are consistently negative.

In sum, we find little evidence for Hypotheses 1A through 1C with an exception of right-wing populist parties in some models. It does not appear that anti-immigrant sentiment, presence of right-wing populist parties, or size of the welfare state exacerbates the negative relationship between migrant stocks and MEP opposition to sanctions. This might be perceived as positive news in the sense that especially xenophobic parts of society are unable to sway the behavior of MEPs any more than under “normal” circumstances. However, one may also interpret these null findings as suggesting that the political costs of immigration are not confined to countries where anti-immigrant sentiment is most visible.

Additional Results

Table A4: Effects of Sanctions on Emigration (1950-2005)

	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-1}$	0.604*** (0.155)	0.240* (0.100)	0.552** (0.172)	0.009 (0.166)	0.023 (0.159)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-2}$	0.337** (0.119)	0.189+ (0.099)	0.303* (0.124)	0.323* (0.125)	0.234+ (0.128)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-3}$	0.585** (0.193)	0.287* (0.121)	0.609** (0.202)	0.265 (0.194)	0.255* (0.119)
GDP per Capita $_{i,t-1}$				0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Population $_{i,t-1}$				0.000* (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)
Polity $_{i,t-1}$				0.025 (0.023)	-0.063 (0.038)
Constant	9.047*** (0.222)	9.477*** (0.158)	9.398*** (0.237)	9.307*** (0.211)	9.879*** (0.709)
Country Fixed Effects		✓			✓
Year Fixed Effects			✓		✓
Observations	2958	2958	2958	2119	2119
Countries	122	122	122	96	96

Note: This table portrays estimates using OLS regression. The dependent variable is (logged) emigration out of country i at time t . Emigration data comes from the EMIG 1.2 global database for international emigration. Sanctions data comes from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset. Standard errors are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A5: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament (Party Dummies Reported)

	(A6)	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)
ln(Migrant Stock _{ij})	-0.138* (0.059)	-0.228** (0.087)	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.200* (0.086)	-0.231* (0.099)	-0.194* (0.089)	-0.243+ (0.129)	-0.716* (0.323)
Libya Bill _{ij}	3.605*** (0.317)	3.831*** (0.344)	3.786*** (0.316)	4.002*** (0.410)	3.966*** (0.335)	3.697*** (0.416)	3.778*** (0.402)	
Iran Bill _{ij}	3.926*** (0.395)	3.744*** (0.376)	3.726*** (0.389)	3.764*** (0.377)	3.619*** (0.417)	3.668*** (0.395)	3.862*** (0.404)	0.986 (2.719)
EPP _i	2.257* (0.962)	2.186* (0.938)	2.253* (0.935)	2.188* (0.950)	2.155* (0.956)	2.290* (1.005)	2.182* (0.962)	-1.665 (1.153)
S&D _i	2.248* (0.977)	2.182* (0.954)	2.280* (0.948)	2.194* (0.969)	2.152* (0.972)	2.285* (1.017)	2.138* (0.981)	-1.802 (1.139)
Greens/EFA _i	-0.732 (0.965)	-0.806 (0.941)	-0.760 (0.921)	-0.759 (0.967)	-0.808 (0.962)	-0.584 (1.013)	-0.922 (0.980)	-2.715* (1.197)
ALDE/ADLE _i	2.353* (1.008)	2.329* (0.992)	2.376* (0.947)	2.341* (1.003)	2.239* (1.003)	2.479* (1.069)	2.224* (1.020)	-1.367 (1.078)
ECR _i	4.149*** (1.015)	3.994*** (0.988)	4.190*** (1.030)	4.007*** (0.994)	3.989*** (0.988)	4.174*** (1.033)	3.926*** (1.013)	1.052 (1.292)
EFDD _i	0.244 (0.954)	0.092 (0.902)	0.296 (0.934)	0.122 (0.929)	0.077 (0.928)	0.184 (0.959)	-0.012 (0.921)	-2.021+ (1.208)
GUE-NGL _i	-0.968 (1.258)	-0.980 (1.213)	-0.757 (1.133)	-0.939 (1.242)	-0.972 (1.241)	-0.784 (1.302)	-1.294 (1.291)	-2.065 (1.401)
Population _{ij}	0.358 (0.237)	0.358 (0.237)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.286 (0.216)	0.414+ (0.229)	0.247 (0.211)	0.396 (0.248)	1.145* (0.480)
Unemployment _{ij}	-0.100+ (0.058)	-0.100+ (0.058)	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.096* (0.047)	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.057)	-0.114+ (0.065)	-0.269* (0.123)
Real GDP Growth _{ij}	0.096 (0.110)	0.096 (0.110)	0.010 (0.062)	0.088 (0.096)	0.127 (0.113)	-0.023 (0.128)	0.127 (0.139)	0.061 (0.174)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001+ (0.000)	0.003 (0.003)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.839** (0.311)	0.839** (0.311)	0.191 (0.181)	0.413 (0.406)	0.880** (0.317)	0.451 (0.587)	0.913* (0.360)	3.417** (1.043)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _{ij}			0.103 (0.254)					
RWP Vote Share _{ij}				-0.069 (0.044)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP) _t					250.045 (202.548)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP) _t					-834.396 (532.524)			
Personal Income Tax _{ij}						-0.311 (0.254)		
Welfare Tax _{ij}						0.001 (0.591)		
ln(Refugees) _{ij}							-0.010 (0.155)	
ln(Remittance Outflows) _{ij}								-0.825 (0.738)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEP Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1065

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, .5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A6: Migrant Share of MEP County Population and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)	(A23)	(A24)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Population _i	-0.444 (0.770)	-2.369** (0.804)	-3.737* (1.567)	-4.234*** (0.957)	-5.024*** (1.505)	-2.679*** (0.489)	-5.543*** (1.251)	-4.744** (1.768)	-6.106*** (1.660)	-3.693* (1.812)	-10.784*** (2.397)
Libya Bill _j		3.012*** (0.270)	3.135*** (0.287)	3.820*** (0.320)	3.867*** (0.391)	3.972*** (0.328)	4.041*** (0.421)	4.022*** (0.373)	3.524*** (0.438)	3.694*** (0.454)	
Iran Bill _j		3.324*** (0.355)	3.499*** (0.376)	4.092*** (0.390)	4.632*** (0.513)	3.889*** (0.380)	4.712*** (0.493)	4.546*** (0.564)	4.880*** (0.456)	5.240*** (0.583)	5.164* (2.034)
EPP _i			2.250* (0.961)	2.250* (0.961)	2.191* (0.939)	2.342* (0.925)	2.181* (0.959)	2.168* (0.957)	2.279* (1.018)	2.184* (0.963)	-1.617 (1.137)
S&D _i			2.220* (0.978)	2.220* (0.978)	2.165* (0.958)	2.349* (0.938)	2.170* (0.981)	2.141* (0.976)	2.249* (1.033)	2.106* (0.989)	-1.727 (1.124)
Greens/EFA _i			-0.809 (0.966)	-0.809 (0.966)	-0.884 (0.949)	-0.675 (0.907)	-0.814 (0.982)	-0.865 (0.970)	-0.681 (1.034)	-1.007 (0.974)	-2.664* (1.184)
ALDE/ADLE _i			2.377* (1.006)	2.377* (1.006)	2.354* (0.992)	2.494** (0.947)	2.355* (1.006)	2.272* (1.002)	2.496* (1.078)	2.249* (1.020)	-1.283 (1.071)
ECR _i			4.118*** (1.018)	4.118*** (1.018)	4.011*** (0.990)	4.205*** (1.022)	4.026*** (0.998)	4.017*** (0.986)	4.216*** (1.036)	3.961*** (1.010)	1.304 (1.249)
EFDD _i			0.201 (0.956)	0.201 (0.956)	0.094 (0.898)	0.329 (0.918)	0.107 (0.930)	0.082 (0.926)	0.113 (0.954)	-0.087 (0.899)	-2.058+ (1.200)
GUE-NGL _i			-0.947 (1.238)	-0.947 (1.238)	-0.985 (1.207)	-0.671 (1.117)	-0.947 (1.253)	-0.967 (1.228)	-0.817 (1.322)	-1.288 (1.275)	-1.980 (1.379)
Population _i					0.026 (0.163)	-0.007+ (0.003)	-0.013 (0.131)	0.075 (0.155)	-0.059 (0.102)	-0.006 (0.173)	1.365*** (0.408)
Unemployment _i					-0.097 (0.062)	-0.040+ (0.022)	-0.102* (0.042)	-0.063 (0.055)	-0.024 (0.050)	-0.094 (0.065)	-0.302* (0.109)
Real GDP Growth _i					0.144 (0.109)	0.054 (0.065)	0.116 (0.084)	0.180+ (0.103)	-0.019 (0.120)	0.196+ (0.113)	-0.033 (0.169)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}					-0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.002)
Former Colony _{ij}					0.567** (0.204)	0.035 (0.194)	0.032 (0.303)	0.620** (0.209)	0.245 (0.427)	0.603** (0.207)	4.048*** (1.001)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i						-0.069 (0.217)					
RWP Vote Share _i							-0.112* (0.049)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)								149,525 (231.972)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)								-927,621+ (486.332)			
Personal Income Tax _i									-0.462+ (0.247)		
Welfare Tax _i									0.002 (0.607)		
Refugees _{ij} as % of Population _i										-30.779 (21.013)	
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})											-1.549** (0.543)
Party Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1065

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, .1, .5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A7: Migrant Share of Total Migrant Stock and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(A25)	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)	(A35)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i	-0.257 (0.159)	-0.278** (0.097)	-0.573*** (0.169)	-0.572*** (0.124)	-0.721*** (0.169)	-0.345*** (0.086)	-0.737*** (0.156)	-0.738*** (0.195)	-0.905*** (0.210)	-0.789** (0.245)	-1.583*** (0.424)
Libya Bill _j		2.965*** (0.255)	3.028*** (0.261)	3.717*** (0.315)	3.558*** (0.381)	3.843*** (0.332)	3.745*** (0.427)	3.689*** (0.351)	3.416*** (0.443)	3.346*** (0.430)	
Iran Bill _j		3.263*** (0.333)	3.462*** (0.333)	4.022*** (0.358)	4.670*** (0.482)	3.866*** (0.357)	4.702*** (0.466)	4.558*** (0.537)	5.082*** (0.473)	5.172*** (0.532)	6.180** (1.193)
EPP _i				2.217* (0.966)	2.170* (0.949)	2.343* (0.934)	2.166* (0.965)	2.139* (0.963)	2.272* (1.020)	2.188* (0.970)	2.1634 (1.156)
S&D _i				2.184* (0.985)	2.133* (0.970)	2.368* (0.945)	2.143* (0.989)	2.104* (0.984)	2.240* (1.036)	2.105* (0.997)	1.742 (1.144)
Greens/EFA _i				(0.985)	(0.970)	(0.945)	(0.989)	(0.984)	(1.036)	(0.997)	(1.144)
ALDE/ADLE _i				-0.791 (0.960)	-0.852 (0.955)	-0.645 (0.915)	-0.789 (0.982)	-0.847 (0.972)	-0.675 (1.034)	-0.935 (0.986)	-2.676* (1.198)
ECR _i				2.337* (1.014)	2.320* (1.004)	2.523** (0.957)	2.324* (1.016)	2.231* (1.011)	2.469* (1.080)	2.239* (1.031)	1.324 (1.087)
EFDD _i				4.113*** (1.019)	4.039*** (0.990)	4.257*** (1.033)	4.047*** (0.996)	4.048*** (0.982)	4.208*** (1.035)	4.018*** (1.004)	1.296 (1.273)
GUE-NGL _i				0.236 (0.957)	0.091 (0.908)	0.335 (0.929)	0.114 (0.937)	0.071 (0.931)	0.121 (0.957)	-0.072 (0.913)	-2.025+ (1.216)
Population _{ij}				-0.940 (1.234)	-0.970 (1.218)	-0.629 (1.124)	-0.934 (1.256)	-0.965 (1.236)	-0.831 (1.328)	-1.245 (1.290)	-1.996 (1.395)
Unemployment _{ij}				0.079 (0.152)	0.079 (0.152)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.040 (0.121)	0.140 (0.140)	-0.026 (0.106)	0.034 (0.152)	1.232** (0.419)
Real GDP Growth _{ij}				-0.101* (0.051)	-0.101* (0.051)	-0.049* (0.024)	-0.102** (0.039)	-0.069 (0.049)	-0.035 (0.051)	-0.095+ (0.049)	-0.222+ (0.122)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}				0.068 (0.094)	0.068 (0.094)	0.027 (0.054)	0.057 (0.075)	0.097 (0.092)	-0.026 (0.125)	0.088 (0.100)	-0.102 (0.193)
Former Colony _{ij}				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.002)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _{ij}				0.625** (0.204)	0.625** (0.204)	-0.019 (0.202)	0.173 (0.278)	0.680*** (0.198)	0.394 (0.445)	0.689** (0.221)	3.387** (1.048)
RWP Vote Share _i							-0.092* (0.046)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)								266.622 (262.569)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)								-871.454+ (451.181)			
Personal Income Tax _i									-0.469+ (0.248)		
Welfare Tax _i									0.003 (0.599)		
Refugees _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i										-0.497 (3.175)	
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})											-1.086+ (0.647)
Party Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1065

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A8: Migrant Stocks and the Proportion of MEP Votes for Sanctions by MEP Country

	(A36)	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.101* (0.051)	-0.098** (0.035)	-0.143* (0.063)	-0.176* (0.072)	-0.145* (0.067)	-0.155* (0.073)	-0.194* (0.083)	-0.157* (0.063)	-0.209+ (0.121)	-0.536** (0.166)
Libya Bill		3.274*** (0.273)	3.450*** (0.302)	3.438*** (0.386)	3.450*** (0.320)	3.442*** (0.378)	3.349*** (0.411)	3.181*** (0.429)	3.392*** (0.541)	1.142 (1.571)
Iran Bill		2.885*** (0.303)	2.928*** (0.282)	2.927*** (0.314)	2.851*** (0.268)	3.147*** (0.347)	3.059*** (0.332)	2.909*** (0.438)	2.921*** (0.470)	
Population _i				0.100 (0.268)	0.004 (0.006)	0.070 (0.231)	0.185 (0.223)	0.208 (0.255)	0.190 (0.287)	1.019** (0.389)
Unemployment _i				-0.105+ (0.054)	-0.067+ (0.035)	-0.103* (0.048)	-0.072 (0.054)	-0.031 (0.049)	-0.123+ (0.065)	-0.212** (0.075)
Real GDP Growth _i				0.028 (0.103)	-0.013 (0.073)	0.031 (0.085)	0.090 (0.114)	-0.094 (0.111)	0.105 (0.107)	0.050 (0.118)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}				0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003+ (0.002)
Former Colony _{ij}				0.545 (0.428)	0.010 (0.303)	0.071 (0.370)	0.680+ (0.360)	0.045 (0.473)	0.625 (0.464)	2.974*** (0.750)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i										
RWP Vote Share _i						-0.098* (0.042)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)							211.248 (165.242)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)							-940.512* (422.976)			
Personal Income Tax _i								-0.330 (0.219)		
Welfare Tax _i								-0.309 (0.370)		
$\ln(\text{Refugees}_{ij})$									0.066 (0.159)	
$\ln(\text{Remittance Outflows}_{ij})$										-0.585 (0.524)
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	83	83	83	83	83	83	80	66	71	54

Note: This table portrays estimates using fractional logit regression. The dependent variable is the proportion of MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A9: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament (Mixed Effects)

	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)	(A49)	(A50)	(A51)	(A52)	(A53)
ln(Migrant Stock) _{ij}	-0.074* (0.031)	-0.111** (0.042)	-0.112** (0.043)	-0.092* (0.042)	-0.113* (0.046)	-0.084+ (0.043)	-0.177** (0.065)	-0.077 (0.098)
Libya Bill	3.672*** (0.197)	3.795*** (0.227)	3.789*** (0.228)	3.836*** (0.228)	3.848*** (0.245)	3.642*** (0.243)	3.820*** (0.241)	
Iran Bill	3.866*** (0.197)	3.740*** (0.259)	3.745*** (0.259)	3.749*** (0.253)	3.686*** (0.275)	3.493*** (0.280)	3.662*** (0.282)	3.404*** (0.275)
EPP	2.231*** (0.301)	2.222*** (0.303)	2.226*** (0.304)	2.161*** (0.303)	2.161*** (0.307)	2.243*** (0.307)	2.235*** (0.309)	-1.558** (0.481)
S&D	2.226*** (0.306)	2.245*** (0.308)	2.248*** (0.309)	2.174*** (0.309)	2.180*** (0.312)	2.244*** (0.314)	2.221*** (0.313)	-1.616*** (0.487)
Greens /EFA	-0.677+ (0.353)	-0.786* (0.354)	-0.784* (0.354)	-0.816* (0.352)	-0.791* (0.358)	-0.630+ (0.356)	-0.913* (0.363)	-2.805*** (0.547)
ALDE / ADLE	2.399*** (0.356)	2.341*** (0.358)	2.344*** (0.358)	2.278*** (0.358)	2.231*** (0.360)	2.420*** (0.371)	2.260*** (0.367)	-1.271* (0.511)
ECR	4.251*** (0.796)	4.158*** (0.798)	4.157*** (0.799)	4.042*** (0.799)	4.092*** (0.800)	4.152*** (0.802)	4.135*** (0.809)	1.077 (1.149)
EFDD	0.165 (0.438)	0.239 (0.453)	0.243 (0.454)	0.161 (0.451)	0.178 (0.457)	0.320 (0.467)	0.131 (0.468)	-1.650* (0.681)
GUE-NGL	-0.895* (0.378)	-0.805* (0.384)	-0.806* (0.384)	-0.850* (0.377)	-0.840* (0.386)	-0.704+ (0.385)	-1.121** (0.400)	-1.955** (0.599)
Population _{ij}	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)
Unemployment _{ij}	-0.054** (0.019)	-0.053** (0.019)	-0.053** (0.019)	-0.057** (0.018)	-0.051* (0.021)	-0.056** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.020)	0.005 (0.023)
Real GDP Growth _{ij}	0.012 (0.053)	0.012 (0.053)	0.012 (0.053)	-0.002 (0.052)	0.019 (0.055)	-0.040 (0.056)	-0.000 (0.057)	0.085 (0.058)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.250 (0.335)	0.250 (0.335)	0.254 (0.335)	0.128 (0.311)	0.324 (0.341)	0.164 (0.309)	0.330 (0.345)	0.190 (0.445)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _{ij}			0.098 (0.429)					
RWP Vote Share _{ij}				-0.019 (0.014)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP) _{ij}					112.240 (162.735)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP) _{ij}					-294.947 (315.722)			
Personal Income Tax _{ij}						-0.031 (0.025)		
Welfare Tax _{ij}						-0.026 (0.025)		
ln((Refugees) _{ij})							0.095 (0.072)	
ln(Remittance Outflows) _{ij}								-0.028 (0.168)
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1621	1065


Note: This table portrays estimates using mixed-effects logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, .1, .5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A10: Conditional Effects of Migrant Stocks on ECR Membership

	(A54)	(A55)	(A56)	(A57)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.127*** (0.033)	-0.278** (0.085)	-0.152** (0.054)	-0.199* (0.098)
ECR Member	1.564 ⁺ (0.869)	1.404 (0.858)	0.906 (0.918)	0.902 (0.929)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{ECR Member}$	0.308** (0.115)	0.326** (0.123)	0.276* (0.118)	0.246 ⁺ (0.128)
Population _i		0.008* (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.334 (0.288)
Unemployment _i		-0.077* (0.030)	-0.051 ⁺ (0.027)	-0.098 (0.066)
Real GDP Growth _i		-0.216 ⁺ (0.124)	0.031 (0.068)	0.070 (0.125)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}		0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 ⁺ (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}		0.123 (1.123)	0.351 (0.227)	0.663 ⁺ (0.395)
Libya Bill _j			2.806*** (0.252)	3.109*** (0.351)
Iran Bill _j			3.277*** (0.382)	2.965*** (0.446)
MEP Country Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713

Note: This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Figure A1: Marginal Effect of Migrant Stocks Across Levels of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment



Note: This figure displays the marginal effect of (logged) migrant stocks across levels of anti-immigrant sentiment for a MEP country with migrant stock at its mean. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other covariates are also held at their mean.