Environmental Issue Linkage as an Electoral Advantage: The Case of NAFTA *

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Abstract

Does linking trade to environmental protection increase the legislative support for trade agreements? If so, how? Why would legislators alter their votes on trade agreements in return for commitments on environmental policy—which may be hard to enforce? I argue that certain legislators may have strong incentives to take an advantage of this linkage. Those with already strong pro-environmental reputations develop stronger incentives to reinforce their environmental support to the environmental side of agreements and maintain the support from important pro-trade constituencies if they represent electorally competitive districts. To test the argument, I use novel time-series survey data on evolution of the legislators’ positions on NAFTA during discussion and finalization of the environmental side of the free trade agreement. This allows me to estimate the extent to which individual legislators changed their positions on NAFTA after the inclusion of the environmental side agreement. I find that pro-environmental legislators in safe districts significantly decreased their support for NAFTA once the side deal was agreed upon, whereas those in competitive districts stood their ground and increased their support in the final voting stage. This article shows how the effect of international institutions is importantly moderated by electoral considerations.

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Developed democracies have increasingly attached post-materialistic issues—whether they be environmental or human rights provisions—to their Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) to increase pro-trade support domestically. Developing countries have accepted them, expecting those linkages to facilitate the ratification of PTAs in developed democracies. Scholars view linkages as institutional strategies that enhance the prospects of international cooperation through inter-state logrolling: With linkages, developed democracies can promote fair trade while developing countries can gain access to those lucrative markets.¹

However, this theory leaves unexplained the question why legislators in developed democracies would support trade agreements in exchange for post-materialistic issue linkages. Post-materialistic issues are typically not salient during legislative elections, especially at subnational levels. For example, when the Clinton administration attached an environmental side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to gain support from House Democrats, only 2% of the American voters listed environmental issues to be the most decisive factor in the 1992 House election.² Because the social benefit of issue linkages is geographically diffuse, legislators with geographically constricted constituencies may not have strong incentives to change their trade attitudes because of linkages.

Given this theoretical misalignment, do post-materialistic issue linkages increase support for trade agreements from legislators? If so, how? While recent studies show that such linkages may increase support for trade among citizens of developed countries, it is important to understand the legislative logic of issue linkages.³ In particular, recent anti-globalization sentiment is felt most acutely in legislative chambers with a strong subnational mandate. In the U.S., the House of Representatives has been more strongly opposed to trade liberalization than the Senate: Most notably, the Obama administration faced strong opposition from

²The American National Election Studies, 1992 Time Series Study. VAR 900228: Did you tend to prefer one of the House of Representatives candidates because of this issue?
³Ehrlich 2010, 2018; Tingley and Tomz 2014 For studies on the effectiveness of environmental linkages in developing countries, see Bernauer and Nguyen 2015.
House Democrats during negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership despite its extensive labor and environmental provisions.\textsuperscript{45} In the European Union, the passage of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was blocked by the Belgian regional parliament of Wallonia. Faced with the anti-trade backlash, presidents in developed democracies have increasingly touted post-materialistic provisions as a solution to make trade deals popular.\textsuperscript{6} Despite the urgency of the matter, we do not have a refined understanding of how post-materialistic linkages increase support for fair trade from this important legislative veto player with geographically peculiar political incentives.

Focusing on the linking of trade and environmental issues in the U.S. House of Representatives, I provide a theory that explains legislative decisions supporting issue linkages. I argue that pro-environmental legislators increase the support for environmental linkages when they face electoral challenges. Although not typically salient to most voters, environmental issues are salient to a potentially crucial bloc. Pro-environmental members of the Congress become more sensitive to losing support from those environmental voters when they face close elections. If these members support trade deals with no linkage, environmental voters may withdraw their support. Although environmental voters constitute a small portion of constituencies, losing their support may have decisive consequences in close elections. Moreover, those members have strong incentives to cater to their positions to influence median voters with positive attitudes on trade liberalization. Together, these members have to navigate tight electoral space and satisfy voters of various ideological stripes (e.g., environmental voters and pro-trade groups). I argue that issue linkages boost support for trade deals only during close elections. Under these conditions, linkages can help pro-environmental members preserve the support from environmental voters and still satisfy pro-trade voters whose preferences are close to the median.


\textsuperscript{5}For the literature on the inter-chamber difference on their trade attitudes, see Baker 1995; Baldwin 1985.

\textsuperscript{6}Consider Senator Elizabeth Warren’s new trade agenda. See Warren, Elizabeth. “Trade—On Our Terms.” July 29, 2019. Available here. Similarly, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, demanded that the E.U. negotiate trade agreements exclusively with countries that ratified the Paris Climate Agreement.
In contrast, pro-environmental members in safe districts are less likely to be swayed by linkages. Pro-environmental members in safe districts have an electoral leeway to discount the demand from environmental voters who constitute only a small portion of their constituencies. When the median voter has clear anti-trade (or pro-trade) preferences, the members would oppose (or support) the trade deal anyway. Supporting the agreement because of a concession in one issue area (e.g., the environment) may not go a long way to gain the voter support in districts where the median constituency preferences are clear.

I apply the theory to make sense of the case of NAFTA, the first trade agreement with an enforceable environmental side agreement. Consistent with the general theory, I test two hypotheses. First, I test whether House members were more likely to condition their support for NAFTA on environmental linkages if they had stronger reputations for their commitment to environmental protection. I test the validity of the theory along with alternative accounts that emphasize partisan and protectionist reasons. Second, I explore how the conjunction of members’ environmental reputations and electoral competition produced pro-NAFTA support from those who might have otherwise opposed the trade deal.

I use novel survey data that allow me to capture members’ time-varying attitudes on NAFTA in the run-up to the final roll call votes for the NAFTA Implementation Act in November 1993. The survey data are useful in two respects. First, the “comments/concerns” section of the survey contains information about each member’s concerns regarding NAFTA. For example, if a member had concerns about NAFTA’s environmental impacts, the comment section records “environmental concerns.” Using the information, I explore who made linkage claims. In this analysis, I demonstrate that members with strong environmental reputations are more likely to demand environmental linkages; I do not find any evidence suggesting that protectionist legislators demand environmental linkages. Second, the time-series survey provides a rare opportunity to test whether members changed their positions on NAFTA as the executive attached the environmental side agreement. Exploiting the temporal variation, I find that after the Clinton administration finalized the side accord,
pro-environmental members in competitive districts were approximately 10% points more positive about NAFTA than pro-environmental members in safe districts.

This article makes contributions to the literature on the political economy of trade and international institutions. First, this article is one of the first to systematically investigate individual legislators’ responses to post-materialistic issue linkages. Many studies on post-materialistic values in trade politics have exclusively focused on citizens’ preferences. Simultaneously, the studies that look at trade and legislators have paid a scant attention to the value-based aspect of trade politics. As a result, there has not been a serious academic debate on whether legislators count on citizens’ preferences for fair trade and update their positions on trade deals accordingly. This article is an attempt to initiate that conversation.

Second, this article complements the existing theory of issue linkages. The existing theory has largely focused on the benefits of inter-state logrolling. However, this line of studies has left unanswered how issue linkages reshape domestic cleavages on trade liberalization. Although an issue linkage is a product of international logrolling, it prompts domestic logrolling among legislators as well. Without successful logrolling at a domestic level, issue linkages fail to facilitate inter-state logrolling. This article takes the issue with an assumption that pro-environmental politicians would altogether respond positively to environmental linkages. Instead, I demonstrate that pro-environmental legislators respond differently to environmental issue linkages depending on their electoral calculus. By doing so, I show that the effect of international institutions can be better understood by analyzing the incentives of domestic political agents.

This article proceeds as follows: First, I identify the puzzle of environmental issue linkages. Second, I present a theory that connects issue linkages and electoral politics. Third, the NAFTA section provides a historical context. Fourth, the empiric section details the elite survey data and results on both the claims of issue linkages and the effects of issue linkages on the final vote on the NAFTA Implementation Act. Last, the article concludes

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7Ehrlich 2010; Bechtel et al. 2012; Tingley and Tomz 2014; Bernauer and Nguyen 2015
with broader implications of the findings for our understanding of the relationship between electoral institutions and the effectiveness of value-based issue linkages.

Credibility and Salience in Domestic Politics of Linkages

How do value-based issue linkages make trade deals politically feasible among legislators with strong reelection motives? A long line of studies have revealed the domestic politics of issue linkages. But much of the analytical efforts have focused on linkages of multiple economic issues (e.g., tying tariff reductions with agriculture and semi-conductor industries) or economic issues and highly salient security issues (e.g., negotiating trade agreements in tandem with alliance negotiations).

Yet value-based issue linkages are analytically distinct from linkages of material or security issues for two reasons: lower credibility and salience.

First, many studies on issue linkages recognize that credibility is an important component of linkage politics. For instance, Davis shows that trade negotiators strategically package trade negotiations to involve multiple sectors, expecting to counter the strong domestic resistance against liberalization from protectionist industries. In so doing, she demonstrates that the involvement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can enhance the credibility of issue linkages vis-à-vis powerful protectionist industries. However, this theory does not address how the credibility problem is overcome vis-à-vis weak post-materialistic issue stakeholders. In particular, legislators find it difficult to make their commitment to environmental protection dynamics between environmental voters and pro-trade businesses. While environmental

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8Davis 2004; Hafner-Burton 2011; Davis 2009; Farrell and Newman 2018. Moravcsik (1998) argues that issue linkage does not enlarge coalitions by weakening well-organized interest groups, because toothless linkage is not sufficient to buy support from concentrated interests. As such, issue linkage facilitates cooperation, the argument goes, when stakeholders of linked issues are diffusely organized (i.e. taxpayers or consumers). Recently, Farrell and Newman (2018) examine how non-governmental actors with a stake in a linked issue gain bargaining power, as linkage creates access to previously unavailable political opportunity structures.

9Among others, Davis (2004) investigates the linkage of tariff reductions in the agriculture and manufacturing industries. Davis (2009) and Poast (2013) study the linkage of security alliances and trade.

10Davis 2004. Also see Eichengreen and Frieden 1993.
stakeholders can mobilize their broader constituents to oppose trade deals running up to ratification, their power subsides dramatically once the constituents lose interest in those deals in the post-ratification phase. In contrast, pro-trade businesses with concentrated interests can patiently lobby their governments to ignore violations of environmental clauses.\textsuperscript{11} In this obsolescing bargaining environment,\textsuperscript{12} environmental voters find it risky to support environmental provisions because pro-trade groups are better equipped to influence governments’ decisions on enforcement.\textsuperscript{13} Not all legislators may want to change their positions on trade agreements despite environmental linkages because those linkages may not be seen as credible by environmental voters. Only those who can credibly vouch for the enforcement of the linkage would condition their pro-trade support on environmental linkages.

Second, many existing studies suggest that post-materialistic linkages would boost pro-trade support in developed democracies. Most notably, Hafner-Burton argues that pro-trade leaders strategically link human rights issues to trade negotiations to gain support from pro-human rights legislators.\textsuperscript{14} Other researchers focus on citizen preferences for fair trade. Using individual survey data, Ehrlich shows that there is a significant portion of constituencies who...
support fair trade, and they are distinct from people who support economic protectionism.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Tingley and Tomz show that environment-conscious citizens are likely to support the use of economic sanctions to enforce climate cooperation as the linkage of sanctions increases the credibility of climate cooperation.\textsuperscript{16}

However, these studies leave unanswered \textit{how} post-materialistic linkages boost the support from office-seeking legislators whose constituencies are geographically constrained. Environmental issues, like other post-materialistic issues, are not typically salient in legislative elections. In 1993, when the NAFTA Implementation Act was passed in Congress, only 8\% of the American public responded that “environmental protection is the single most important election issue” to them.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, only 2\% of the public responded that environmental issues affected their candidate preferences in House elections.\textsuperscript{18}

The literature on the relationship between the constituency size and legislative behavior would support this point on the low salience of post-materialistic issues in legislative elections. Because legislators are better able to claim the credit for geographically targeted and visible concessions such as remedial packages (e.g., Trade Adjustment Assistance Program), the existing literature would suggest that strongly determined veto players facing partisan or economic protectionist voters would prefer those traditional concessions through which they can gain credit from their constituents, not value concessions such as environmental linkages.\textsuperscript{19} For example, Lee and Oppenheimer show that Senators representing smaller states prefer specific benefits such as federal grants and projects because of their greater credit-claiming values.\textsuperscript{20} While scholarly findings on the relationship between constituencies’ size

\textsuperscript{15}Ehrlich 2010.
\textsuperscript{16}Tingley and Tomz 2014.
\textsuperscript{17}The American National Election Studies, 1992 Time Series Study. Specifically, I focus on VAR 900223: In the campaign in this district for the U.S. House of Representatives, what would you say was the single most important issue to you?
\textsuperscript{18}The American National Election Studies, 1992 Time Series Study. VAR 900228: Did you tend to prefer one of the House of Representatives candidates because of this issue?
\textsuperscript{19}For a relevant argument, see Howell 2013. Additionally, Kriner and Reeves 2015 show that even presidents resort to particularistic strategies to reward their loyal supporters in the U.S. context. For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between presidents and legislators in the realm of international trade, see Milner and Tingley 2015.
\textsuperscript{20}Lee et al. 1999.
and district preferences on trade are mixed, the existing studies on the U.S. politics suggest that politicians operating in plurality systems with smaller districts are unlikely to be swayed by post-materialistic linkages (e.g., environmental provisions). Instead, they tend to exchange their votes on trade bills for district-specific favors.

The Electoral Theory of Value-based Issue Linkages

In this section, I advance a theory that explains why certain legislators increase support for trade deals because of environmental linkages despite credibility and salience problems. While I recognize that issue linkages are mainly devised to facilitate international negotiations, such negotiation strategies may be futile if they fail to boost support from legislators in the times of ratification.

My theory disaggregates the legislative aspect of the linkage politics in signaling and partnering stages. At the signaling stage, legislators make linkage claims to express their preferences on non-trade issues. In the context of trade-environmental linkages, they may decide whether to condition their support for trade deals on environmental linkages. At the partnering stage, the legislators who had demanded an issue linkage decide whether to partner with pro-trade or anti-trade factions, given the linkage.

The two-stage approach is useful in explaining two aspects of legislative incentives on issue linkages. First, the effect of the linkage signaling may vary depending on legislators’ prior reputations. The literature on the issue entrepreneurship in the U.S. Congress reveals that legislators tend to invest their time to cultivate reputations as experts or reliable advocates in specific issue areas. These studies find that legislators are better able to gain credit for policy entrepreneurship (e.g., issue linkages) when they already have prior reputations. However, studies that view issue linkages as non-tariff barriers do not consider such signaling

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21 Baldwin 1985; Karol 2007
22 Also see Rickard 2012; McGillivray 2004.
23 Among others, see Keohane and Nye 1977.
costs. For example, if a pro-labor member without any prior engagement in environmental advocacy demands environmental provisions, it may not be taken seriously by peer members and voters. Second, even if signaled preferences are credible, they alone may not necessarily explain legislators’ decisions at the partnering stage. Facing the same issue linkage, pro-environmental members who had signaled their support for the linkage may choose different coalition partners (e.g., pro-trade vs. anti-trade groups) depending on what those partners can offer. For these reasons, I theorize legislators’ decisions on issue linkages in these two stages separately.

Signaling Linkage Preferences: Policy Reputations as a Solution to the Credibility Problem

I argue that legislators with pro-environmental reputations are better equipped to change their positions on trade based on environmental issue linkages. Legislators can benefit by environmental issue linkages if they can convince environmental voters of the worth of an environmental side agreement.

For environmental linkages to help legislators convince environmental voters without damaging their reputations, voters need to have credible information from outsiders to accurately identify sincere legislators who truly care about environmental issues. Environmental activists (e.g., NGOs) can play a crucial role in providing credible information on legislators’ true preferences.

How do NGOs generate credible information? NGOs can access politicians when an issue gains salience because of increased media attention. During period of high salience, activists do not necessarily need close ties with politicians to set up meetings with legislators or testify before the Congress. Activists’ interactions with legislators in this period do not generate useful information about legislative preferences about the issue. However, the activists continue their attempts to gain access to legislators even when the issue becomes

\[25\text{Carpenter 2002.}\]
less salient. During the low salience period, the activists may find it difficult to gain access to legislators. In this circumstance, if legislators sincerely care about the issue at hand, the activists will still have access to them. Even when legislators cannot take a policy action on activists’ preference, they tend to give an explanation. It is those interactions in hard times that generate credible information about legislators’ true preferences about environmental protection. The NGOs carefully document these behind-the-scenes interactions. They often publish these pieces of information in the form of rankings.\textsuperscript{26} In other times, they share fine-grained qualitative information about their evaluations of legislators. Thus, the collected information can serve as a credible moral capital for legislators whose reputations may be tarnished if linkages are violated.\textsuperscript{27}

Taken together, as activists generate credible information about legislators’ preferences over environmental protection, the voters can screen for sincere legislators willing to support trade agreements conditional on environmental linkages. On the part of legislators, having good reputations among NGOs helps them reduce the cost of building their credibility on issue linkages. They can build such credibility by serving as a political liaison between environmental NGOs and business communities in the form of proposing draft proposals for side agreements, meeting foreign counterparts, drafting and signing letters to call for enforceable environmental protection clauses, and allocate floor speeches on trade agreements to discuss environmental issues.\textsuperscript{28} Because of the credibility cost of issue linkages, legislators with long track records of pro-environmental policy efforts and close ties with environmental NGOs are more likely to condition their support for trade liberalization on environment protection as they can build such credibility at lower transaction costs compared to those without such reputations.

\textsuperscript{26}Recent studies on international politics show that comparative information such as rankings is conducive for policy reforms, and enhance the effect of information on international cooperation. See Kelley and Simmons 2015; Doshi et al. 2019; Cooley and Snyder 2015.

\textsuperscript{27}Dai 2002. The author provides a framework to explain how voters who care about environmental outcomes need NGOs’ expertise to evaluate environmental policies due to the non-visible and technical nature of environmental policies and outcomes.

\textsuperscript{28}Most notably, Ron Wyden and Max Baucus served as liaisons between green groups and legislators.
I explore the relationship between policy reputations and linkage claims. If my conjecture is valid, I expect to find that legislators with higher ratings from environmental NGOs tend to condition their support for major trade deals on environment protection.

_Hypothesis 1_: *Legislators with stronger reputations among environmental activists are more likely to condition their support for NAFTA on environmental protection and demand linkage than those with weaker reputations.*

**Partnering Stage: Electoral Competition and Issue Linkages**

Do legislators’ policy reputations among environmental activists fully explain their support for deals packaged with environmental linkages? In this section, I explore the moderating role of the electoral politics in explaining legislators’ decisions to support package deals.

While trade may be an issue of low salience in general, it may still matter in competitive elections. Pro-environmental legislators in competitive districts face an electoral dilemma even if trade is not an electorally salient issue. They may choose to placate pro-trade interests by supporting trade liberalization and hope that environmental voters will still support them at the ballot box. When losing some votes may have severe electoral consequences, legislators become risk-averse. Alternatively, they can oppose trade agreements instead of tapping into pro-trade support (e.g., campaign donations). Either way, the risk of choosing one side is higher in competitive districts because losing support from one side can have decisive effects on elections.

How does electoral dilemma help us understand legislators’ support for issue linkages? If legislators in competitive districts can convince environmental voters of the credibility of environmental linkages and earn their support for package deals, they can compensate for the loss of protectionist voters’ support on the ballot. Environmental issue linkages help

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29Studies that investigate the effects of elections in trade politics find that electoral incentives play a marginal role. See Guisinger 2009.

30Corroborating this line of reasoning, existing studies show that politicians’ responsiveness to environmental groups’ demands changes depending on electoral concerns. List and Sturm 2006 show that incumbents are more likely to form their decisions on environmental policies in line with green voters demands, “if
pro-environmental members resolve the dilemma and incentivize them to support package deals.

At the core of the theory is the substitutability of electoral resources. Because protectionist and environmental groups typically rely on mobilization tactics as their primary mode of organization, the electoral resources held by protectionist and green groups are highly substitutable. In contrast, pro-trade groups have increasingly adopted the inside lobbying and financial contributions to promote their goals. As such, the electoral resources that legislators can gain from pro-trade and environmental groups are complementary.

Pro-trade interests hold financial political resources whereas protectionist groups are relatively better endowed with mobilization resources. Pro-trade interests, such as multinational enterprises (MNEs) and business associations, gain access to formal trade policy-making processes by lobbying and financing campaigns.31 Schattschneider would call them lobbying insiders.32 Unlike the context in Schattschneider’s time, the recent studies find the inside lobbying in trade policy-making processes is monopolized by export-oriented industries, and not import-competing industries.33 In contrast, protectionist interests (i.e., labor unions) are increasingly reliant on the outsider politics as their mode of organization. I call this advantage one of mobilization resources. Unions mobilize their members and public to write letters to politicians, participate in protests, and make petitions in alliance with other advocacy groups.34 In Tarrow’s words, protectionist movements resemble contentious collective actions that are “distinct from lobbying.”35 The ways in which the two groups can influence electoral outcomes are different. Pro-trade interests provide the campaign finance behind the scenes so that politicians can use resources to buy median voters’ support through political elections are competitive and attracting additional votes is particularly valuable.” Dai (2005) presents a theory to show that well-informed green voters can pressure governments to comply with international environmental agreements, if policymakers face high electoral pressure. In general, electoral competition increases the electoral significance of green voters despite the low salience of the issue.

32 Also see Schattschneider 1935; Dür and Mateo 2016.
33 Rodrik 2018; Woll 2008.
34 See Von Bülow 2009.
35 Tarrow 1998.
advertisements. Protectionist interests are better able to mobilize ideologically extremist voters to oppose specific candidates by launching protests or distributing negative information about those candidates.

While environmental activists adopt various organization methods, contentious collective actions tend to be their main mode of organization. While environmental lobbies have grown significantly over time, many environmental NGOs deliberately choose not to lobby for various reasons and adopt outside mobilization as their primary means of affecting political outcomes. For example, Hadden shows that networks among environmental NGOs are critical in explaining environmental movements. Overall, because environmental groups specialize in mobilization, rather than insider lobbying, what they can contribute is similar to what protectionist groups can do.

In consideration of electoral resources held by pro-trade, protectionist, and environmental groups, I theorize that legislators in competitive districts have stronger incentives to pursue a complementary strategy such as supporting issue linkages. The Downsian model shows that it is important to attract the support of ideologically median voters in order to win elections. Studies find that voters with poor political information are more likely to be moderate and change their candidate preferences than voters with strong political preferences. To attract the support from moderates, therefore, it is advantageous to tap into lucrative campaign contributions from pro-trade interests and thereby increase candidates’ mass media exposure. As such, pro-environmental legislators in competitive districts hope to tap into pro-trade contributions. However, the pursuit of pro-trade money risks activating

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36 See Gawande et al. 2009.
37 See Dunlap and Mertig 2014.
38 In the U.S. context, the proportion of environmental campaign contributions is typically meager compared to other economic interest group lobbies with a stake in trade policies. Environmental lobbies constituted only one tenth of labor lobbies in U.S. politics, when NAFTA was ratified. Specifically, environmental campaign contributions around the time when NAFTA was being negotiated in 1992 were $1.6 million, while the contributions made by a group of U.S. transportation unions in the same year amounted to $12 million. Center for Responsive Politics. Available here.
40 Downs 1957.
41 Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Palfrey and Poole 1987; Federico and Hunt 2013.
broader anti-trade mobilization by protectionist and green groups. Furthermore, the likelihood that environmental voters cast a deciding vote is higher in close elections than safe elections. To sum up, those running for competitive seats are uncertain about the likelihood of gaining support from moderate median voters whose vote may be bought through aggressive campaigns, and they also have reasons to worry about negative campaign mobilization from ideologically extremist voters (e.g., environmental issue voters) whose withdrawal of support may negatively affect electoral outcomes. When the level of electoral sensitivity increases as described, legislators have stronger incentives to adopt a complementary strategy that can satisfy diverse constituencies.

In safe districts, legislators are more likely to pursue a specialization strategy because they do not have a strong incentive to attract campaign donations to secure the support of median voters in general elections. Their electoral security in general election allows them to vote on trade bills according to their own personal conscience, not needing to pursue pro-trade contributions that would provide financial resources necessary to gain median voters’ support. Instead, they have a leeway to discount environmental issues or use them to form a coherent partisan brand by connecting pro-protection and environmental agendas. The electoral security provides them with a latitude to consider a relatively non-salient issue like environmental protection as part of their broader partisan package because doing so is instrumental in earning loyalty from partisan activists.

Testing the validity of this component of the theory requires a more nuanced approach. My theory suggests that legislators with strong reputations in environmental protection support trade deals with environmental safeguards only when they represent competitive electoral districts. As such, the main task is to test the moderating effect of the electoral competition on the relationship between legislators’ environmental reputations and their support for trade deals with environmental safeguards. I thus estimate a set of statistical models to test the interaction effect.

Hypothesis 2. Legislators with stronger environmental reputations are more likely to in-
crease their support for NAFTA if they represent competitive districts than if they represent safe districts, once the environmental side agreement is finalized.

**NAFTA Context**

In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. was still heavily invested in the multilateral form of trade liberalization. However, as the Uruguay Round negotiations stalled, business groups demanded that the government further expand market access through PTAs. In particular, as the opening of the Mexican market was expected to benefit large corporations, big businesses fiercely lobbied Congress to pass NAFTA. \(^{43}\) Starting in the early 1990s, the U.S. thus began to negotiate PTAs with developing countries whose environmental preferences were not as strong as those of the U.S. Despite the lobbying pressure from business groups, however, the public remained much more reticent in its support for NAFTA.

In this context, President Clinton was sworn into office in January 1993. By this time, the agreement had already been signed by all negotiating parties, in December 1992. As Clinton had made his support for NAFTA clear during his campaign, his administration considered passing NAFTA in Congress to be a top priority. Clinton also pledged to attach labor and environmental safeguards to NAFTA during the campaign. In 1992 Clinton said, “[F]rom the outset of this campaign, I have stated that I will support a free trade agreement with Mexico so long as it provides adequate protection for workers, farmers and the environment on both sides of the border.” \(^{44}\)

However, it was not clear at the time whether these issue linkages would be sufficient to pass NAFTA in Congress. In the 1992 general elections, the Democratic Party maintained

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\(^{43}\)See Statements from U.S. Business Leaders, May 21, 1993. For example, Edwin L. Artzt, the Chairman and Chief Executive of P&G, said, “Since the opening of the Mexican market in 1986, P&G’s U.S. export of goods and services to Mexico has grown from almost nothing to more than $100 million, and it should approach $200 million once NAFTA is well established.” Available in Clinton Presidential Records, 1993. “Office of Speechwriting and Michael Waldman. [NAFTA] To David Gergen From Anne Wexler [Binder].” Available here.

its majority status in the House and the Senate, with the 103rd Congress comprised of 57 Democratic and 43 Republican Senators, and 258 Democrats, one Independent, and 176 Republicans in the House.

Because the protectionist Democratic Party remained in control of the legislature, forming a pro-NAFTA winning coalition would be extremely difficult even with concessions on labor and environmental issues. In no uncertain terms, the administration had to secure support for NAFTA from Democrats despite the party’s loyalty to labor unions, while also securing support from Republicans despite the President’s partisanship. Furthermore, the Democratic Party had remained loyal to labor groups since the 1970s, despite the rise of pro-trade New Democrats. As such, the division of loyalty in the party made it difficult to rally the Democratic Party as a whole in support of NAFTA. Taken together, the mismatch of political and economic preferences of the pro-NAFTA and anti-NAFTA groups created clear tensions.

At this point, House Democrats were considered to be the most important veto players. As Figure 1 illustrates, a staggering majority of House Democrats said they were either undecided or leaning against NAFTA in a congressional survey conducted in March of 1993. While Republican House members were more favorable than their Democratic counterparts, a significant portion of them also said they were undecided. As such, President Clinton faced an adversarial legislative landscape in which to pass NAFTA. To secure ratification, he had to develop a creative strategy that would expand the pro-NAFTA legislative coalition and that would be palatable to congressional Democrats, especially House Democrats.

What might the President do? A reader familiar with American politics may consider pork barrel politics as the most viable strategy for presidents facing contentious bidding, and President Clinton was no exception. The Clinton Administration used various kinds of pork to gain legislative support for NAFTA. However, the Administration knew that pork

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46A Washington Post article in the run up to the congressional vote neatly describes the prevalence of pork barrel politics as follows: “Rep. Esteban E. Torres (D-CA) was considered a prize catch in the battle over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A prominent Hispanic American legislator and a
barrel politics had its limits. At that time, they were also attempting to build a coalition for a health care bill, and offering particularistic concessions for NAFTA would deplete the available resources that would be essential for this and other important policy agendas. To clarify the point, in August 1993, Robert Pastor, the former Director of Latin American Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), emphasized the limits of buying votes with particularistic favors. He wrote, “If the President wins NAFTA by a sliver in which he has to make concessions for every last vote, he will emerge weakened to deal with health care.” In this context, environmental issues were considered politically appropriate to make NAFTA popular. In the early 1990s, environmental issues were already being discussed in the context of the NAFTA negotiations before President Clinton came into power. As fast-track authority for GATT was scheduled to expire in June 1990, the Bush Administration submitted a request for an extension of the fast-track authority in March of 1990. Activists with stakes in various issues attempted to infiltrate the iron curtain of the trade policy-making process. According to Audley’s analysis of media coverage on NAFTA between June 1990 and May

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former official with the United Auto Workers, Torres came under intense pressure from supporters and opponents of the pact. When he finally said yes last week, his vote came at a hefty price: a jointly funded, bi-national North American Development Bank to help cushion the impact of the pact on workers and communities. And on the day he announced his support, not one other legislator stood up with him—even though some administration officials had been led to believe as many as eight others might join Torres. “One man, one bank,” sighed one House Democrat.” Cited from Dan Balz, “White House Intensifies NAFTA Push.” Nov 1, 1993. The Washington Post. Available here.

1991, 15% of the coverage focused on environmental issues related to NAFTA, while immigration and human rights aspects of NAFTA gained only 4% and 3% of the newspaper coverage.\footnote{Audley 1997.} On the legislative level, Ron Wyden (D-OR)’s “Dear colleagues” letter channeled the public attention on environmental issues to the legislative body. In response, the Bush Administration made a verbal commitment to a parallel track for environmental issues.

Further, environmental protection had become a Democratic issue by this time. Specifically, more than a third of House Democrats expressed concerns about the environmental effects of NAFTA by June of 1993. As Figure 2 shows, House Republicans did not consider the environmental impacts of NAFTA to be as serious as the Democrats did. As such, attaching environmental safeguards to NAFTA appeared to be a promising strategy for the administration to appeal to those House Democrats.

Would these self-proclaimed pro-environmental House Democrats lend support to NAFTA if the agreement included environmental clauses? If the executive were certain that they would, this strategy would be the most cost-effective and promising coalition strategy. Yet, the Clinton Administration had strong reasons to suspect that many of those green Democrats would not support NAFTA even in exchange for an environmental side agreement. As Figure 3 shows, 52% of those self-professed green House Democrats said that they were opposed to or leaning against NAFTA. There was the possibility, then, that these leg-
islators might use environmental issues to justify their protectionist positions. As a result, the executive remained uncertain as to whether the environmental side agreement would pay off and attract adequate support from House Democrats.

Data

To test the hypotheses, I draw from the surveys of members’ attitudes on NAFTA. The elite survey was conducted monthly throughout 1993 in the run-up to final votes for the NAFTA Implementation Act in November 1993. The survey was commissioned by the biggest pro-NAFTA business coalition (USA*NAFTA). The canvassers of the survey visited individual members to conduct face-to-face interviews with the members or their staff.

The primary goal of the survey was to gauge whether individual members had supported or opposed NAFTA and why they held that position. As such, the survey contains two sets of important information. First, it surveys elite attitudes on NAFTA over time. The survey’s estimates rank each member’s attitude toward NAFTA on a scale from one to five (5=against, 4=leaning against, 3=undecided, 2=leaning in favor, 1=favor). Second, the survey contains the information about each member’s concerns regarding NAFTA in
Table 1 – Congressional Surveys on NAFTA in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey date</th>
<th>Canvasser</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Information coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 1993</td>
<td>USA*NAFTA Coalition</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Attitudes (1-5 scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 1993</td>
<td>USA*NAFTA Coalition</td>
<td>House,</td>
<td>Attitudes (1-5 scale),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Comments on NAFTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 1993</td>
<td>USA*NAFTA Coalition</td>
<td>House,</td>
<td>Attitudes (1-5 scale),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Comments on NAFTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22, 1993</td>
<td>CongressDaily</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Attitudes (1-5 scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15, 1993</td>
<td>The Associated Press</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Attitudes (1-5 scale)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

its “comments/concerns” section. For example, if a member had concerns about NAFTA’s environmental impacts, the comment section records “environmental concerns.” Closer to the final vote, major media companies conducted similar surveys. Notably, the Associated Press and Congress Daily conducted a similar survey on legislators’ attitudes in October and November.

I investigated three sources for data: trade journals, presidential records, and media coverage. First, a membership-based trade journal, the *Inside U.S. Trade*, featured two surveys of member attitudes on NAFTA conducted in March and September, 1993.\(^{49}\) Because the USA*NAFTA coalition treated the survey as confidential, they published the results only sparingly. Second, I retrieved survey results dated June 16 through archival research of the Clinton Presidential Records. In June, the coalition shared the survey results with the Clinton administration. Third, I investigated the media coverage of NAFTA. Through these investigations, I recovered two sets of the media-led surveys of member attitudes on NAFTA. Taken together, I retrieved five waves of the congressional survey on NAFTA (See Table 1).\(^{50}\)

I used the surveys to construct two outcome variables of my interest: linkage claims and linkage support.

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\(^{49}\)See Cinar and Gulotty N.P. for the September survey.

\(^{50}\)For a more detailed explanation, see Lee et al. N.P.. In the June 16 survey, there are 46 missing observations (24 House members in New York, 18 in Texas, three in Tennessee, and one in California). The missingness is due to the accidental omission of two pages of the House survey in the Presidential Records.
Empirics

Hypothesis 1: Reputations and Linkage Claims

Are legislators more likely to condition their support for trade deals on environmental protection if they have stronger reputations in the domestic environmental community? Or, is environmental linkage a function of party politics and protection in disguise? To test the relationship between legislators’ policy reputations and their engagement in linkage politics, I estimate a set of logistic regression models with various controls.

The outcome variable of interest captures whether legislators conditioned their support for NAFTA on the agreement’s environmental impact in the run up to the final votes in Congress. Drawing from the comments/concerns of the June 16 survey, I code 1 for the members who expressed concerns about NAFTA’s environmental impacts, and 0 for the members who did not. As such, this variable directly captures legislators’ revealed preferences for environmental safeguards. I call this variable Linkage claims.

I hypothesized that only those legislators with strong reputations for dedication to environmental protection among activists can manage to condition their support for NAFTA on environmental issues. In order to measure the legislators’ environmental reputations, I use the annual scorecard indicators by the League of Conservation Voters. The scores are based on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, and are “calculated by dividing the number of pro-environment votes cast by the total number of votes scored.” The League selects which votes to include in the indicators based on “the consensus of experts from about 20 respected environmental and conservation organizations.” The indicator usually includes environmental issues such as energy, global warming, public health, public lands and wildlife conservation, and spending for environmental programs. I use the legislators’ lifetime scores, rather than the annual scores, because the cumulative data better capture their genuine commitment to, and hence reputations regarding, environmental protection.

51 See the League of Conservation Voters website: scorecard.lcv.org.
I also include individual legislators’ partisan affiliations as a control variable (Party). Policy debates in this time period show that the environmental and labor side agreements were designed to placate House Democrats. The party hypothesis makes more sense when it comes to the labor side agreement, because labor groups have been loyal to the Democratic Party since the 1970s. Similarly, environmental groups oftentimes allied with the Democratic Party. However, environmental groups in this time period were less invested in the Democratic coalition than were labor groups. Therefore, it is unclear whether this hypothesis will be validated in the empirical test. That said, if the hypothesis is valid, we should find that congressional Democrats were more likely to condition their support for NAFTA on environmental protection than were their Republican peers.

I include Education as a covariate to capture the effects of constituents’ education level on linkage claims. This variable represents the proportion of individuals over the age of 25 who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, as a share of the population. Researchers argue that environmental quality is a post-materialistic good which educated groups are socialized to indulge in once their basic material needs are met. As such, highly educated individuals are more likely to have stronger preferences for environmental protection. At the same time, these individuals are likely to support trade liberalization because highly skilled individuals tend to gain from trade expansion in a skill-abundant economy like the U.S. As a result, members representing more highly educated constituents are likely to support trade liberalization and environmental protection at the same time. If individual preferences for trade and environmental protection are shaped by socialization through education, members representing this group of individuals should be most likely to emerge as aggressive advocates of issue linkage.

Legislators representing pro-protection groups may strategically adopt environmental protection to justify their stance on NAFTA and to broaden their anti-NAFTA coalition.

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52 Karol 2009.
53 Data source: the Census.
54 Inglehart 1995; Abramson and Inglehart 1994.
55 Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Ehrlich 2010.
Existing research finds that such protectionist economic incentives play an important role in justifying non-trade social clauses.\textsuperscript{56} In order to control for this possibility, I include information on the campaign contributions that each legislator gained from labor groups in the most recent election, as of 1993 (\textit{Labor PAC}).\textsuperscript{57} The expectation is that legislators highly dependent on labor lobbies may be more likely to adopt environmental concerns as another reason to oppose NAFTA, not necessarily because they care about environmental issues but to use the issue to broaden anti-NAFTA sentiment in their districts. If this alternative hypothesis is valid, I should find that the coefficient on this variable is positively associated with legislators’ tendency to mention environmental protection as a major source of their concerns about NAFTA.

- \textit{Results}

The results from the logistic regression models are reported in Table 3. First, I run a model that includes only members’ environmental policy reputations, which is the main explanatory variable. As expected, members with strong reputations among environmental activists are more likely to condition their support for NAFTA on environmental protection. Substantively, the model predicts that a member whose rating from the environmental community is at the lowest level is expected to condition his NAFTA support on environmental protection by 4\%.\textsuperscript{58} The predicted probability for those with the highest rating increases to 44\%. The coefficient on this variable is highly significant ($p < 0.01$). The positive and

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{The Expected Signs of the Coefficients}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Variables & Expected signs \\
\hline
Reputation & + \\
Democrats & + \\
Education & + \\
Labor PAC & + \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{56}Fischer and Serra 2000; Bhagwati 1995.
\textsuperscript{57}This is drawn from the database on “Influence & Lobbying” on OpenSecret.org.
\textsuperscript{58}For instance, Senator Dirk Kempthorne from Idaho had the lowest rating of 0.01, and he did not list environmental protection as a concern about NAFTA. Senator Kempthorne listed “sugar” and “fair trade” as his major concerns about NAFTA.
highly significant coefficient shows that legislative preferences for environmental linkages are a function of their ability to convince green groups of the environmental benefit that the linkage can deliver. Those who cannot convince green groups due to their weak environmental reputations do not expend effort demanding environmental linkages, because they cannot claim credit for the linkage from green groups.

Can the strong effect of Reputation on Linkage survive the inclusion of other potential explanatory variables?

One alternative account entertained in policy circles was a partisanship hypothesis. That is, Democrats demanded environmental linkages to a greater extent than Republicans did, because environmental protection is a Democratic issue. To test the partisanship hypothesis, I add Democrats in the second model as a control variable. The sign of the coefficient on Reputation is still positive and statistically significant. However, I do not find strong evidence to support the partisanship hypothesis. Holding the Reputation variable at its mean value, congressional Democrats are predicted to list environmental effects as part of their concerns about NAFTA at a rate of 17.4%, while Republicans are predicted to do so at a rate of 14.5%. The magnitude of the coefficient is not as substantial as Reputation. Furthermore, the coefficient on Democrats is not statistically significant at conventional confidence levels.

In Model 3, I add Education to test whether members representing highly educated constituents are more likely to demand environmental linkage due to those voters’ stronger environmental preferences. Reputation remains positive and highly significant. As for Education, I do not find strong evidence that members representing highly educated constituents are more likely to demand the linkage. However, with the September survey, I find strong evidence suggesting that members representing highly educated constituents are more likely to demand environmental linkages. See Appendix 1 (Table 7). In this additional analysis, Reputation remains positive and significant. The results may indicate that members representing highly educated districts strategically demand environmental linkages closer to the final vote, while members with environmental reputations persistently demand the linkage throughout the legislation process.

59However, with the September survey, I find strong evidence suggesting that members representing highly educated constituents are more likely to demand environmental linkages. See Appendix 1 (Table 7). In this additional analysis, Reputation remains positive and significant. The results may indicate that members representing highly educated districts strategically demand environmental linkages closer to the final vote, while members with environmental reputations persistently demand the linkage throughout the legislation process.
that voters’ raw preferences for environmental protection do not explain politicians’ decisions to link issues. Instead, members condition their support for trade on environmental protection, only when authoritative outside watchdogs can vouch for their credibility.60

Table 3 – Relationship between Policy Reputations and Demands for Environmental Linkages before the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (June, 1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Linkage Claims</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUTATION</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRAT</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>(1.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOR DONATION</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATISM (DW-NOM1)</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-3.22***</td>
<td>-3.24***</td>
<td>-3.61***</td>
<td>-3.61***</td>
<td>-3.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaie information criterion</td>
<td>346.38</td>
<td>348.11</td>
<td>348.76</td>
<td>350.76</td>
<td>351.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

I then include Labor PAC to test whether environmental linkage claims are a protectionist strategy in disguise. In this model, the positive association between members’ environmental reputations and demands for linkage still remains highly significant. By contrast, I do not find affirmative evidence that labor contributions positively affect demands for environmental linkages. Model 4 shows little evidence supporting the labor protection hypothesis: the negative sign on the Labor PAC coefficient indicates that pro-labor members are less likely to claim they are concerned about the environment, and the coefficient is not statistically significant across the models.

To test if environmental linkage claims are a manifestation of progressive ideology, Model 5 represents a fully saturated model with the inclusion of Conservative ideology.61 The results show that members’ issue-specific reputations better explain their linkage behavior than their

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60 The Pearson correlation estimate of Reputation and Education is 0.11 (p < 0.02).
61 I use DW-nominate scores that capture members’ economic ideology. Available at https://voteview.com/about1.
ideological predispositions.

The results from the model imply two related takeaway points: *Legislators demand environmental linkages only when they have the reputational capital to convince constituents who care about the environment, and they do not find environmental protection to be a useful tool to rally partisan voters or pro-protection groups for trade liberalization.* Throughout the tests, I find that neither legislators’ party affiliations and nor their associations with labor PACs explain their engagement in linkage politics. Substantively, the results indicate that legislators do not use environmental issues to protect labor groups or to prove their loyalty to the Democratic Party. By contrast, environmental policy reputations prove to be an important factor explaining legislative support for environmental linkage. The *Reputation* variable is positively correlated with *Linkage* and remains consistently significant throughout the tests. Taken together, the results enhance our understanding of who finds issue linkage useful. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that privileges partisanship and protectionist motivation, my results reveal that legislators invoke environmental issue linkages sparingly and only when they have the ability to convince environmental groups and environmental voters.\(^62\)

**Hypothesis 2. Reputations, Electoral Competition and Linkage Effects**

We now know that pro-environmental legislators demanded linkages, while pro-labor and Democratic legislators (all else equal) did not. Yet, demanding such a linkage does not always lead to supporting the linkage. We thus do not yet know whether pro-environmental legislators lend support for trade deals when environmental linkages are attached.

To the question “does issue linkage work?”, I hypothesized the following: as the executive formally attaches environmental linkages to a trade agreement, pro-environmental legislators

\(^{62}\)I conduct the same set of analyses based on the survey conducted in September, 1993. See Appendix. With an exception of *Education*, the results based on the September survey are largely similar.
in competitive districts are more likely to support the linkage than are similar legislators in safe districts. After the finalization of the linkage, those in competitive districts are strongly incentivized to support the linkage and to take a pro-trade position to attract pro-trade support without losing support from environmental groups. The linkage does not incentivize pro-environmental legislators in safe districts to support the package deal, because they do not have the incentive to pursue pro-trade support. If this expectation is valid, I should find that pro-environmental legislators in competitive districts are more likely to have changed their positions in support of NAFTA in the September survey (one week after the finalization of the environmental agreement) after having opposed it in June (before the side agreement), compared to those in safe districts.

The Outcome Variable: Linkage Effects

To test the linkage effect, I studied whether certain members became more positive about NAFTA immediately after the conclusion of the environmental side agreement. To construct an outcome variable that captures the effect, I used members’ attitudes on NAFTA in surveys conducted at two time points: the first survey on June 16 (pre-linkage) and the second on September 20 (post-linkage). To measure members’ change in their attitudes on NAFTA in this time period, I reconstructed the measure such that the greater number indicates a stronger support for NAFTA. I then subtracted the June estimates from September estimates to measure the degree by which individual members increased their support for NAFTA from June 16 to September 20.

Why did I select June 16 and September 20? On May 21, NAFTA parties circulated the first draft text of environmental and labor side agreements. The Composite Draft of the environmental agreement shows that the negotiating parties had divergent preferences on the enforcement: the U.S. proposed that the dispute settlement mechanism in the NAFTA agreement should be used to resolve environmental disputes (e.g., trade sanctions as an en-

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forcement tool) whereas Canada and Mexico were opposed to it. As such, the June 16 survey captures members’ baseline attitudes on NAFTA, assuming that the environmental side agreement would lack any meaningful enforcement mechanism. On September 13, NAFTA member parties signed an environmental side agreement with strong enforcement provisions preferred by the U.S. The final agreement allows for monetary fines and the suspension of trade benefits as enforcement tools. As such, the September 20 survey captures the members’ updated attitudes on NAFTA as the Clinton administration delivered a stronger environmental agreement than they had expected on June 16.

The Interaction of Environmental Reputation and Electoral Competition

The main focus of the current analysis is whether the interaction of environmental reputation and electoral competition has a positive effect on legislative support for NAFTA. As such, I draw from the reputation score that I constructed based on the annual scorecard indicators by the League of Conservation Voters, and interact it with another variable that captures electoral competition in each district. I call this variable Competition. Competition is a binary variable that measures the competitiveness of the most recent past election in which the member of Congress ran. For the House of Representatives, the most recent election was held in 1992. I code congressional districts as competitive if the winning candidate gained less than 60% of the total vote.

Some studies may expect environmental reputations (Reputation) to be, on average, negatively correlated with an increase in support for NAFTA; One strand of the existing literature on issue linkage argues that issue linkage does not boost support for a policy because stakeholders of the attached issue are expected to demand stronger linkages. If this argument is applicable to the case of NAFTA, I should find that legislators with stronger

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64For instance, the U.S. proposed that the environmental Ministerial Body should install a similar implementation scheme as the NAFTA dispute settlement, which would allow for economic sanctions. However, Mexico and Canada were opposed to the idea.


66I conduct a set of robustness checks by varying the threshold for competitive elections. See Appendix 3 and Table 9.

environmental reputations withdraw support for NAFTA as they are disappointed about the weakness of the side agreement.\textsuperscript{68}

_Electoral competition_ is expected to be positively associated with linkage effects. Studies suggest that electoral competition makes politicians care about non-salient issues such as women’s rights and the environment.\textsuperscript{69} Members in competitive districts, then, have stronger incentives to prioritize environmental considerations than those in safe districts.

The interaction of _Reputation_ and _Competition_ is expected to show a positive sign. My theoretical expectation is that legislators with environmental reputations tend to increase their support for trade deals in return for environmental linkages if they are facing competitive elections.

_Control variables_

A series of other important developments also took place from June to September of 1993. For instance, labor groups fiercely lobbied to oppose NAFTA. As a counter, President Clinton finalized the labor side agreement along with the environmental accord. The summer recess also gave legislators better ideas about what their constituents wanted. To control for these changes that arose between June and September of 1993 and that may have affected the outcome of interest, I include the same set of control variables that I used in the previous analysis. Those variables are _Education_, _Democrat_, and _Labor PAC_.

All else equal, Congressional Democrats should be more likely to change their positions in opposition to NAFTA after the finalization of the environmental side agreement than Republicans. If parties exercise discipline on trade and individual legislators care about scoring loyalty points with their parties, I expect that Democrats will take protectionist turns more easily than Republicans. However, President Clinton, a Democrat, made NAFTA a key part of his policy platform. As such, Democrats in Congress must have been conflicted between

\textsuperscript{68} However, another body of studies argues that issue linkage boosts support from those stakeholders (and legislators with close ties with those stakeholders) because the linkage creates a new opportunity to mainstream their policy agenda. See Hafner-Burton 2011. As such, the relationship needs to be empirically tested.

\textsuperscript{69}Bouton et al. N.P.; List and Sturm 2006.
loyalty to the president (pro-trade) and the party (protectionist). To sum up, I do not expect this relationship to be strong.

Typically, Education is expected to be positively correlated with support for trade liberalization. That said, it is not clear whether Education plays an equally important role in explaining the “change” in legislative support for trade deals. Because voter make-up is a relatively static factor, legislators representing highly educated districts may have already taken their constituents’ trade preferences into account in June. If this were the case, the relationship between Education and an increase in support for NAFTA is expected to be positive yet weak at best.

I include labor donations to control for the effect of the labor side agreement that was negotiated in the same time period and labor lobbies. I expect to find Labor PAC to be negatively associated with linkage effect. Labor groups competed with pro-trade lobbies to win legislative support for their side. For members highly dependent on labor contributions, labor’s support was the most important consideration in their decisions on NAFTA. In general, I expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the outcome variable, because labor groups strategically changed their contribution plans closer to the NAFTA vote. However, if the labor side accord negotiated by the Clinton administration convinced some pro-labor legislators to support NAFTA despite labor’s lobbying efforts, the correlation may not be as strong as expected.

Table 4 summarizes the expected signs of the coefficients on the explanatory and control variables.

- Results: Does Electoral Competition Increase Pr-environmental House Members’ Support for Trade Deals with an Environmental Side Agreement?

I estimate OLS regression models in which Reputation is interacted with Competition. If the theoretical expectation is valid, I expect to find that the interaction term is positively associated with support for NAFTA.

The results are striking. The results from Model 1 (reported in Table 5) indicate that
members with stronger environmental reputation, all else equal, decreased their support for NAFTA from June to September despite the conclusion of a stronger environmental side agreement. Although the significance of the coefficient on Reputation weakens as Democrat is included, the negative sign of the coefficient suggests that the environmental issue linkage did not dramatically increase support for the trade agreement from pro-environmental members.

The results from Model 2-4 provide evidence in support of my theory. Model 2 is an interaction model where I interact Reputation and Electoral Competition. The sign of the interaction term is positive in line with the general theory, and statistically significant.

The results from Model 2 are visualized in Figure 4. Substantively, the results indicate that a member with the best environmental voting record running in a safe district is expected to decrease her support for NAFTA by 15.3 percentage points in September from her baseline support in June. A very similar member with the worst environmental voting record in a safe district is estimated to decrease her support by only 2.6 percentage points in September. According to the results, if members in safe districts are strongly committed to environmental issues, we can expect to see a significant drop in their support for trade deals even if environmental safeguards are attached.

In competitive districts, the opposite is true. As the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term indicates, a legislator with the best environmental voting record is expected to decrease her support for NAFTA by only 5.9 percentage points compared to

Table 4 – The Expected Signs of the Coefficients on Change in Support for NAFTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Expected signs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor PAC</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation:Competition</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
her position in June. Further, the expected support from pro-environmental members in competitive districts, -5.9 percentage points, is slightly higher than -6.3 percentage points, the estimated support score of a legislator with the lowest environmental reputation score in competitive districts. The estimated support score for a pro-environmental member in a competitive district is 9.4 percentage points higher than the expected support from the most environmentally conscious legislator in a safe district. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables such as partisanship, ideology, labor lobbies, and education.

To contextualize the results, the general sentiment about NAFTA in the Congress became significantly negative in early September of 1993. The Clinton administration needed 217 votes to pass the NAFTA Implementation bill in the House. In August, approximately thirty members were either undecided or negative about NAFTA.\(^7\) However, another undisclosed survey conducted on September 10, three days before the signing of the environmental side agreement, records that fifty one members were undecided or negative about NAFTA. In this adverse environment, pro-environmental members in competitive districts stood their ground.

- **Final Votes: How Long Does It Last?**

Based on the analysis of the elite survey data, we have some evidence to support the theoretical claim that electoral competition increases pro-environmental members’ support for trade deals with environmental safeguards only if they represent competitive districts. But, these results do not capture their final decisions. Did the influence of electoral pressure and policy reputations get translated into final votes in Congress? The NAFTA Implementation Act (H.R. 3450) was passed in the House on November 17, 1993, approximately two months after the September survey. I thus test whether the moderating effect of electoral competition is still borne out in the final votes.

In this case, I use logistic regression models to estimate legislators’ final votes. It is

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\(^7\) *Inside U.S. Trade*, a trade journal, records that the Clinton Administration was thirty votes short as of August 1, and thirty-one votes short as of August 27, 1993. See Special Report in *Inside U.S. Trade*, October 1, 1993.
Table 5 – Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (OLS Regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPUTATION</td>
<td>−0.07**</td>
<td>−0.13***</td>
<td>−0.12**</td>
<td>−0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPETITION</td>
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<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
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<td>−0.001</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
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<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.19 (df = 383)</td>
<td>0.19 (df = 380)</td>
<td>0.19 (df = 380)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.11*** (df = 3; 383)</td>
<td>2.22** (df = 6; 380)</td>
<td>2.21** (df = 6; 380)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Figure 4 – Marginal Effects of Environmental Reputation on Support Increases by Electoral Conditions
appropriate to use logistic models in this case because the outcome variable is binary. More importantly, my goal is to estimate individual members’ tendency to change their positions on NAFTA given their baseline attitudes in the pre-linkage period. Therefore, I include the estimates of individual members’ positions collected in June of 1993 in order to capture the extent to which they changed their positions in the final vote count in November compared to their proclaimed positions in June. If the theoretical expectation is valid, I expect to find members with strong environmental reputations to be more supportive of NAFTA with the environmental side agreement if they are facing competitive elections.

The results reported in Table 6 provide evidence in support of the theory. In Model 4, the interaction term between environmental reputations and electoral competition is positive and highly significant ($p < 0.01$). As the results from Model 5 and 6 show, the hypothesized relationship survives the inclusion of control variables.

The results from Model 4 are visualized in Figure 5. Overall, the hypothesized relationship holds up: members’ environmental reputations and legislative support for NAFTA are positively associated only for those in competitive electoral districts, not those representing safe districts. Specifically, the predicted probability of supporting the NAFTA Implementation Act increases from 38.92% to 65.12% as an electorally pressured member’s environmental reputation increases from the lowest level to the highest level. This suggests that members under fire in their home districts are more willing to use environmental issue linkages to convince even a small number of environmental voters, if they have the reputational capital to convince them. By keeping support from environmental groups, these members can pursue other types of electoral resources provided by pro-trade groups without having to worry about a broader backlash from environmental-labor coalitions.

By contrast, members in safe electoral districts behave in exactly the opposite manner. For these members, their environmental reputations are negatively associated with their sup-

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71 In this baseline model, I include labor lobbies as a control variable, because the conclusion of the labor side agreement was another important change that might have swayed pro-labor members.

72 Although I believe that members’ positions in June are a function of their partisanship, voter education, and ideology, I include these variables as controls in the additional tests.
port for NAFTA in the final vote. Substantively, the predicted probability of supporting the NAFTA Act decreases from 74.20% to 43.72% as an electorally safe member’s environmental reputation score increases from the lowest level to the highest level. This is in line with the theoretical expectation regarding legislative behavior in safe districts. Because these legislators are certain about getting support from median and moderate voters, they do not have strong incentives to pursue fungible electoral resources such as pro-trade campaign contributions. These legislators are more interested in sending signals to primary voters with more activist ideologies and in earning partisan loyalty. If they are respected by the environmental community, they can use that reputation as a steppingstone to gaining support from mobilized primary voters by forming broader left-leaning Democratic coalitions that include environmental, labor, and human rights activists.73 Thus, the natural choice for these legislators is to oppose NAFTA to send credible signals to the hybrid anti-trade coalition.7475

In sum, the most important finding of the article is that pro-environmental members respond differently to environmental linkages because their electoral strategies are different. Compared to pro-environmental members in safe districts, pro-environmental members in competitive districts were 21.4 percentage points more likely to support NAFTA with the environmental side agreement. In safe districts, they have the leeway to use environmental issues to form a coherent partisan brand by connecting pro-protection and environmental agendas. Electoral security provides them with the latitude to consider a relatively non-salient issue like environmental protection as part of their broader partisan package, because doing so is instrumental to earning loyalty from partisan activists. For these legislators, environmental, trade, and security issues are all connected through the partisan logic that

73See Appendix for supporting evidence.
74It is worth mentioning the Republican corollary to the theoretical framework. For pro-environmental Republicans in safe districts, they have the electoral leeway to discount environmental voters.
75If the executive had attached a Republican issue (e.g., abortion), we would expect to find a similar pattern. Pro-life Republicans may want to appeal to right-wing activist voters by forming broader coalitions of free traders, security hawks, and pro-life activists. They may thus tend to support trade liberalization to appeal to the hybrid pro-trade coalition that would be instrumental in cultivating their partisan loyalty. This expectation is borne out in the passage of the China Permanent Normal Trade Relations Act in 2000. Republican legislators attempted to attach security provisions on nuclear proliferation, a prohibition on abortion, and promotion of American business values, among other measures.
will further their political careers. As such, environmental issue linkages alone may not be enough to buy support from these legislators. In contrast, pro-environmental legislators in competitive districts are pressured to frame environmental issues differently to secure their immediate survival. Their primary goal is to secure support from median and moderate voters. As such, they are willing to frame environmental issues as a stand-alone issue detached from other partisan issues and to advocate for the usefulness of environmental clauses in trade agreements, because doing so helps them gain campaign contributions from pro-trade groups and increase their media exposure to median voters.

Table 6 – Relationship between Member Characteristics and Support for NAFTA in the Final Roll Call Votes

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<td>4.56***</td>
<td>4.78***</td>
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<td>4.51***</td>
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<td>(0.48)</td>
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<td>(0.51)</td>
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<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
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<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
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<td>(1.94)</td>
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<td>–1.63***</td>
<td>–1.55***</td>
<td>–0.90</td>
<td>–1.23*</td>
<td>–1.66**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.58)</td>
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<td>Akaike information criterion</td>
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<td>368.73</td>
<td>363.52</td>
<td>364.83</td>
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</table>

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Conclusions

The environmental safeguards attached to NAFTA represented an unprecedented political experiment to overcome the legislative uncertainty surrounding the ratification of the trade deal. At that time, the consensus in the Clinton administration was that the environmental
side agreement would be essential to attract the support from House Democrats who cared about environmental issues. But, did the side agreement work as planned? Despite important economic and environmental consequences of NAFTA, there have been no rigorous tests of the claim that the issue linkage successfully boosted the support for the trade agreement.

Studies on issue linkage rarely delve into the question of why some pro-environmental legislators change their positions due to environmental linkages while other pro-environmental legislators do not. This is an important and unfortunate omission, because most issue linkages ranging from human rights to security, expand coalitions by dividing and conquering existing issue stakeholders. When a new issue is attached, some support the linkage and others resist. Because there are almost always both proponents and opponents of an issue linkage, it is important to answer the question, “who flips?”

From this context, this article contributes to our understanding of how issue linkages build up policy coalitions. The most important finding of the article is that electoral compe-
tition plays a key role in changing pro-environmental legislators’ decisions: pro-environmental House members in competitive districts were found to be approximately 20% points more likely to extend their support for NAFTA after the side agreement was attached, compared to pro-environmental legislators in safe districts.

Additionally, this article’s findings demystify the conventional wisdom of policymakers without empirical scrutiny. Specifically, it is commonplace to see arguments suggesting that environmental safeguards can placate import-competing industries and labor unions. Yet, I do not find an evidence to support protection in the disguise hypothesis. The statistical findings indicate that pro-labor legislators rarely condition their support for NAFTA on environmental protection disingenuously. The losers of the trade liberalization may find it hard to believe that environmental side accords would protect their businesses. Instead, the analysis of the elite survey data shows that legislators make value claims on trade liberalization only when they can credibly convince environmental groups to support the linkage using their pre-existing reputational capital.

The electoral competition does not explain the effects of issue linkages in all types of legislatures. According to my analysis of the Senate positioning, the electoral theory of issue linkages does a better job explaining the trends of support in the House of Representatives than in the Senate.\textsuperscript{76} In the Senate, where elected officials face larger electoral constituencies and long electoral cycles, the evidence does not suggest that electoral incentives moderate the effect of issue linkages. Instead, senators were typically more likely to increase their support as the executive attached the environmental side accord, regardless of the electoral environment or their policy reputations.

This may serve as a first step toward understanding the effects of electoral institutions on issue linkage strategies in developed democracies. If the findings are acceptable, environmental clauses may boost the support for trade agreements more dramatically in legislatures with larger constituencies and longer and/or staggered electoral cycles, regardless of leg-

\textsuperscript{76}See Appendix 4.
islators’ policy reputations or electoral incentives. Because electoral institutions in these legislatures are deliberately designed to supply “stability and experience,” the members of those legislatures are strongly incentivized to support the safeguard provisions that enhance environmental welfare with public implications, still maintaining the electoral leeway to support those provisions even if they do not expect to use linkages to their immediate electoral advantage. We might thus expect that the positive effect of value-based issue linkages would be stronger if the European Parliament, which has larger constituencies, were the only legislature to get involved in a ratification process. If regional and national parliaments with geographically constrained constituencies were to play a role along with the European Parliament in a ratification procedure, the effect of environmental linkages would likely be moderated by an electoral competition.

Together, this article’s findings show rather convincingly that the channel through which issue linkages deliver legislative support is complicated by electoral incentives. The findings may have readily applicable policy implications for pro-trade political leaders. If they are facing a legislature in which many incumbents operate in competitive electoral environments, attaching a value-based issue may boost the support from those legislators who care about the attached issue. Further, the findings suggest that pro-trade leaders would be ill-advised to expect that environmental linkages would help them to earn support from the economic losers of free trade.

77 The flip side of this argument would suggest that the absence of issue linkage may decrease the chance of ratification more dramatically in this type of legislatures. I find that this de-linkage strategy decreased support for the streamlined trade deal with the U.S. in the European Parliament. See Lee, Boram. “Does Attaching Environmental Issues to Trade Agreements Boost Support for Trade Liberalisation?” *Bruegel*. April 24, 2019. Available here.

78 In the passage of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the E.U., the Belgian regional parliament of Wallonia vetoed the deal despite numerous social clauses attached to the deal. The French-speaking and largely socialist region voted down the agreement based on its weak consumer, environmental, and labor standards in 2016. The Walloon Parliament happens to be the only regional parliament with geographically apportioned constituencies (arrondissements), not an at-large province-based constituency. Presumably due to the difficulty of passing trade deals in those parliaments, the European Commission has recently pursued a de-linkage strategy, precisely because the passage of trade agreements with social clauses (mixed agreements) requires the consent from national and regional parliaments.
References


Lee, F. E., Lee, F. E. and Oppenheimer, B. I. (1999), Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation, University of Chicago Press.


**Appendices**

1. **Linkage Claims: How Robust Are the Results?** How robust are the results? Did legislators behave differently after the side agreement was finalized? If their goal was to gain
support from green groups, they must continue to signal their interest in the environmental side agreement. If they removed environmental issues as part of their concerns after the signing of the side deal, there would be reason to suspect that the strong explanatory power of environmental reputations is limited to the pre-side agreement period. To test this, I conduct the same set of analyses on the data drawn from the September wave of the legislative survey. If legislators recalibrated their positions on environmental linkage after the signing of the side agreement, these tests will pick up the differences.

The coefficients are reported in Table 7. Among others, two points are noteworthy. First, legislators’ environmental reputations remain positively associated with their demands for environmental linkages. That is, members with strong environmental reputations continue to signal their interest in the environmental effects of NAFTA even after the finalization of the side agreement. This evidence supports my argument that pro-environmental legislators support the linkage to gain credit from green groups: for them to gain credit from green groups, they must keep harping on environmental issues until after the trade agreement is ratified. The strong results in the September data corroborate this reasoning. Second, in line with the previous analysis, I do not find evidence in support of the protectionist hypothesis. One may argue that congressional Democrats and pro-labor legislators may have formed last-minute coalitions with radical environmental groups and demanded environmental linkages after the signing of the side agreement. I do not find any evidence to support this counterargument. The coefficients on Democrat are again positive yet statistically non-significant. The same is true of pro-labor members. The coefficients on Labor PAC are consistently not significant across the tested models.

### Table 7 – Relationship between Policy Reputations and Demands for Environmental Linkages before the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (September, 1993)

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<th>Environmental Linkage Claims in U.S. Congress (Sep, 1993)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.72)</td>
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<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(1.68)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<td>(0.99)</td>
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<td>369.39</td>
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<td>368.09</td>
<td>369.26</td>
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Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
2. Does primary competition explain linkage effects? Alternatively, one may argue that environmental issue linkage boosts support from members in districts where Democratic primaries are competitive. To test this, I subset my data set into pro-environmental House Democrats (whose environmental ratings are higher than the House average score of 0.52). I regress the linkage effect variable (measured by their change in attitudes on NAFTA from June to September) on the number of Democratic primary candidates in each district (variable: DEM PRIMARY CANDIDATES). The primary data is drawn from Pettigrew et al. (2014). If environmental issue linkage boosts pro-trade support from Democratic members facing competitive Democratic primaries, I should find a positive relationship between these two variables. However, the results indicate otherwise. As the results in Table 8 indicate, I find significant and negative associations between the number of Democratic primary candidates and members’ support for NAFTA after the finalization of the side agreement.

Substantively, these additional tests show that ideology-heavy electoral competition (e.g. competitive Democratic primaries) may activate perverse incentives on the part of legislators. Partially in line with Moravcsik’s argument on issue linkage, pro-environmental members facing ideology-heavy electoral competition may demand stronger issue linkage in order to further prove their commitment to the issue at hand. My main results on electoral competition in general elections show that environmental issue linkage boosts support from members under pressure to portray themselves as moderate.

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<td>$-0.02^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.02^{**}$</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.21 (df = 180)</td>
<td>0.21 (df = 179)</td>
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<td>2.44^{*} (df = 3; 179)</td>
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Notes: $^{***}p < .01; ^{**}p < .05; ^{*}p < .1$

3. How Competitive Should Future Elections Be? I consider electoral pressure to be relatively high, if a member’s previous vote share did not exceeded 60%. I conduct additional tests by lowering the threshold of electoral competition to 51%. As the results in Table 9 show, the signs of the baseline variables and the interaction term are consistent with the
general theory throughout the models. Overall, the coefficients are statistically significant except for the 51% threshold.

**Table 9 – Relationship between Member Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA at Different Levels of Electoral Competition (OLS Regressions)**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Linkage Effect by Vote Share</th>
<th>(&lt;58%)</th>
<th>(&lt;57%)</th>
<th>(&lt;56%)</th>
<th>(&lt;55%)</th>
<th>(&lt;52%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPUTATION</td>
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<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>-0.06</td>
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<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
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<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LABORPAC</td>
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<td>-0.001</td>
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<td>387</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual standard error (df = 382)</td>
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<tr>
<td>F statistic (df = 4; 382)</td>
<td>3.56***</td>
<td>3.36**</td>
<td>3.62***</td>
<td>2.53**</td>
<td>2.47**</td>
<td>2.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

4. Did Senators Respond to the Side Agreement Differently? The last important finding concerns the differential responses to the linkage among Senators and House members. The results show that Senators increased their support for NAFTA after the finalization of the environmental side agreement significantly more so than House Representatives. In fact, Senatorial responses in support of NAFTA increased by 0.25 points (on a 0-1 scale) more than the responses from their House counterparts in the post-linkage period (See Table 10). The positive and significant coefficient on this variable suggests that Senators found the side agreement more useful than did Representatives regardless of their policy reputations on environmental issues. This finding is in keeping with the theoretical conjecture that Senators with larger constituencies respond better than House members to issue linkages with public goods implications.

Further evidence suggests that the logic of issue linkage operates differently in the Senate and the House. Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between legislators’ demands for issue linkage and their support for NAFTA over time. Senators who demanded environmental linkages in June slightly increased their support in September as the environmental side accord was finalized. By contrast, House Representatives, both those who expressed environmental concerns and those who did not, decreased their support for NAFTA altogether. The contrast manifests itself more visibly in the final congressional votes on the NAFTA Implementation Act in November. Senators who expressed environmental concerns and demanded the linkage ended up supporting the bill more than those who did not. In the House, the exact opposite occurred. House members who had demanded environmental safeguards
in June decreased their support in September at the same rate as those who had not. The divergent trends in the two legislative chambers reveal that the logic of issue linkage operates differently in the Senate and the House.

Table 10 – Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (OLS Regression)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Support Score</th>
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<td>REPUTATION</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRAT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
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<td>LABORPAC</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENATE</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>COMPETITION</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
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</table>

Observations 486
R-squared 0.04
Adjusted R-squared 0.03
Residual standard error 0.71 (df = 479)
F statistic 3.71*** (df = 6; 479)

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Figure 6 – Change of Legislative Support for NAFTA before and after the Finalization of the Environmental Agreement