

IGOs and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements

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Abstract: Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars. International third parties frequently support the negotiation of CPAs. Implementation of CPAs varies across post-conflict countries and over time, yet few studies have offered broadly generalizable knowledge on how third parties can further support the implementation of CPAs. This study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), those IGOs that command high economic leverage over member states are particularly well equipped to address major roadblocks to CPA implementation. Empirical analyses of new data on the implementation of CPAs from 1989–2015 show a positive association between post-conflict countries' participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and CPA implementation. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast illustrates the processes by which IGOs can help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.

After more than 50 years of civil war, the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a historic peace deal in November 2016, which requires one or more stakeholders to commit to processes ranging from disarmament to institutional reform and development policies. As of April 2019, one third of these commitments have reached advanced levels of implementation, while one third has not been initiated at all ([Peace Accords Matrix 2019](#)). The same report notes multiple challenges, including lack of progress in transitional justice mechanisms and security guarantees for former fighters. What explains the degree to which comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs), such as the Colombia Peace Agreement, make progress toward implementation? Figure 1 shows that implementation varies both between and within peace agreements, emphasizing the need to understand the source of this variation.

The implementation of CPAs has wide-ranging consequences for a variety of political, social, and economic outcomes. Successful implementation facilitates recovery, promotes political stability, and even affects negotiations between governments and armed groups outside of the CPA ([Joshi and Quinn 2016](#)). At a time when the United Nations and other international actors place more emphasis than ever on supporting peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery processes, understanding how CPAs can be implemented successfully is key for policymakers and scholars. To advance knowledge on this question, this study focuses on the role of international actors in supporting peace agreement implementation.

As one of the first to examine quantitative data on implementation over time, the study builds an argument about central challenges in CPA implementation and how specific international actors can help overcome these challenges. Among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), IGOs possessing high economic leverage are particularly well equipped to address major roadblocks to CPA implementation. These IGOs possess institutional structures, notable economic resources, and permanent ties to member states that help directly incentivize stakeholders to implement CPA stipulations (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks; see [Table A2](#) for the full list).

As the example of Colombia illustrates, stakeholder resistance is often the central obstacle to CPA implementation. The leverage of IGOs can be key to overcoming such resistance. Implemen-

tation as defined in this study requires the active participation of stakeholders in a post-conflict country. These stakeholders include government agencies (including the security sector) at the national and local level as well as armed opposition groups and militias. CPAs, such as the Colombia Peace Agreement, contain a number of stipulations calling for specific steps by these stakeholders. Implementation is then the ratio of stipulations that stakeholders have successfully carried out, compared to the overall number of stipulations.

We begin by highlighting the special position of CPAs among a broader variety of agreements intended to end violent internal conflicts. We describe key challenges to implementation, rooted in the literature on principal-agent problems and stakeholder involvement. Building on the specific challenges in this context, we identify shortcomings of commonly present third parties in the implementation context. Next, we use the literature on institutional design and IGOs with high economic leverage to point out their specific advantages in getting stakeholders to follow up on their obligations in CPAs. Empirical analyses of detailed data on the implementation of CPAs from 1989–2015 test the argument, followed by case evidence from the implementation process of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement in Ivory Coast after 2007. We conclude with suggestions for follow-up research and implementations for concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.

The importance of CPAs

Conflict parties use different types of agreements to stop fighting, including ceasefire agreements, partial peace agreements, CPAs, and implementation agreements. Many conflicts see multiple types of such termination arrangements ([Kreutz 2010](#); [Bell and Badanjak Forthcoming](#)). CPAs, a small fraction of these different arrangements, are unique by their multidimensional nature. Their provisions deal with the resolution of grievances, power and resource sharing, autonomy, disarmament, security sector reform, and others. CPAs thus outline the policy reforms to be implemented in the post-conflict years.

In this study, we focus exclusively on CPAs for two reasons. First, the benefits of CPAs com-

pared to other partial peace agreements are well documented, including the lowest rate of conflict recurrence of all agreements (Joshi and Quinn 2016), longer periods of peace (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015), and more peaceful elections (Joshi, Melander, and Quinn 2017). As an indication of the quality of post-conflict peace, CPAs are associated with the lowest infant mortality rate compared to other types of conflict termination (Joshi 2015).

Second, empirical studies find that the most effective civil war agreements are those that are implemented at higher levels (Joshi and Quinn 2015; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Civil war agreements which are implemented at higher levels also reduce the probability that future opposition groups (that were not part of the previous peace agreement) will challenge the government in the future (Joshi and Quinn 2016). Aduda (Forthcoming) also shows that failed partial peace agreements lead to less subsequent involvement by external mediators. Altogether, this suggests that CPA implementation has macro-level country effects that influence oppositional group behavior beyond those groups that negotiated the agreement.

Given the importance of CPAs as a road map for implementation, and the lasting effects of implementation, this study aims to explain variation in the overall level to which a peace agreement is implemented, as opposed to a narrow focus on one or more components in the agreement. Focusing on the implementation of peace agreements in their entirety is important because the provisions in an agreement are intended to work together in an integrative fashion toward a larger goal. The global trend over the last three decades has been towards negotiating comprehensive agreements that incorporate short-term goals such as ending hostilities and demobilization alongside a larger agenda of attempting to reform some of the structural and historical sources of grievances that fueled the conflict. Arguments by Bell (2006), Fazal (2013), and many others suggest that changes in international norms of accountability, laws, and the increased attention to civil conflict have created an atmosphere where negotiating a peace agreement reflects a much higher level of commitment than in the past. Bell (2006) points to the increasingly accepted view of the “peace agreement as a binding document”, noting that the “structure and language of peace agreements suggest that the parties mutually view them as legal documents” (Bell 2006, 378). Before the

1980s, civil war peace agreements contained little in the way of policy reforms that would require an implementation process to put the new policies into practice. However, contemporary “[p]eace agreements have become relevant to attempts to reconstruct societies” through the implementation of socio-political reforms (Bell 2006, 374). In summary, attempts to end a civil war through an extensive, long-term process of implementing a comprehensive set of reforms is a relatively new development in world politics that is under-researched and under-theorized.¹

Challenges in CPA implementation

Once conflict actors engaged in negotiations reach a comprehensive settlement, an implementation process begins. In much of the literature, implementation in general is defined as “the carrying out of a basic policy decision” (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, 5). The emphasis is on compliance with the policy directives as they were given and/or perceived. We likewise define implementation as the degree of compliance with the directives of a statute. Agreements vary considerably in the extent to which they are successfully implemented (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015; Joshi, Lee, and Ginty 2017). This variation in implementation is largely attributable to the government’s inability to overcome domestic resistance to reforming the policy status quo by those who disproportionately benefit from it (Joshi and Quinn 2016).

Variation in CPA implementation (Figure 1) captures challenges in implementing CPAs. Walter (1997, 339) identifies the credible commitment problem as a general explanation for why conflict parties frequently fail to implement peace plans, especially full demobilization. Stedman (2008, 668) similarly emphasizes rebel demobilization as the “single most important subgoal” in peace agreement implementation. Both suggest that short-term implementation is the most volatile period, setting the stage for the main focus of this study on the immediate post-conflict period and up to 10 years after a CPA was signed.

Variation in the larger implementation process in the years following conflict cessation raises an

¹According to our estimates, political/electoral reforms were virtually absent in civil war peace agreements from 1940 to 1979. During the 1980s, the number of agreements containing political/electoral reforms rose to roughly 30 percent of all agreements. The share of agreements containing political reforms rose to around 50 percent in the 1990s, and reached 60 percent in the 2000s.

important research question in and itself, but it also highlights a critical background process that influences the degree of compliance achieved in ceasefire and demobilization. When demobilization stalls, it is often because the rebel group is responding to delays in the larger implementation process, that is, the implementation of the remainder of the peace agreement. In the Northern Ireland implementation process, for example, Sinn Fein refused to demobilize until greater implementation had been achieved in powersharing and transitional justice aspects of the peace agreement (Oberschall 2007, 176). In El Salvador, in the first year of the peace process, the government did not meet established deadlines, and in response, the FMLN, which had been demobilizing on schedule, refused to complete the process until progress in implementation was observed. After the signing of the General Agreement between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1997, the UTO rank and file abstained from the DDR process, stating they would begin to demobilize when they saw government action on the implementation of the peace agreement, with a particular emphases on political reforms, joint dispute resolution, and the release of UTO war prisoners.

As these cases show, implementation failures occur for different reasons — some early on and some years later. One dominant theoretical approach to explaining implementation in the field of policy studies is principal-agent (PA) theory. This approach treats governments not as unitary actors but as divided into many different policy jurisdictions and divisions of power and authority, who almost always resist policy change. Such a view of implementation is consistent with the general diagnosis in the post-accord peacebuilding literature that emphasizes domestic resistance to implementation and variables influencing the ability of governments to overcome spoiler resistance to implementation. Walter (1997), Hampson (1996), and Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002, 665) all see spoiler resistance as a major threat to implementation. They similarly concluded that the level of commitment by international actors was the key variable in overcoming the domestic spoiler challenge in their study. This view is also consistent with a general approach in the policy sciences that sees domestic resistance as one of the largest obstacles to the implementation of policy reforms. In their study of the implementation of anti-corruption reforms in developing countries,

Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) suggest that the foundational problem is one of holding implementation agents accountable.

We expect that post-civil war settings are similarly characterized by high levels of domestic resistance to the implementation of policy reforms. Because civil wars are fought between groups currently in power and groups currently excluded from power, the winning coalitions of the rebel leadership and the government leadership have little overlap. Each side may thus see comprehensive peace agreements as instruments in which the leaders of excluded groups are attempting to divert political power and control over resources away from the government's coalition and over to the rebel coalition. Therefore, when the time comes for them to be put into practice across the various policy domains, government actors will resist the implementation of these policy reforms. Each reform will fall under the jurisdiction of some group that can coordinate to oppose it.

In order to reach a comprehensive settlement that has any chance of being implemented at a future date, government leaders have to pre-negotiate with the leaders of the policy jurisdictions most affected because it is them who will be in charge of implementing the reforms being negotiated.² If the government proceeds unilaterally with its concession-making without gaining consent from relevant stakeholders, and without offsetting the costs of the reforms for those affected by them, the government sets itself up for failure and the peace agreement will be difficult to implement.

To explain why implementation varies, we consider the aforementioned obstacles to peace accord implementation as instances of principle agent problems. These problems are not easily resolved by a strong third party willing to back the agreement in some general diplomatic sense or willing to step in and provide stability and/or security in the early stages of implementation. Theoretical treatments of PA problems emphasizes three primary drivers of low implementation outcomes for any policy, law, or rule change that is to be put into practice, and enforced: preference asymmetry, information asymmetry, and moral hazard (Miller 2005).

First, PA theory predicts high levels of shirking (i.e., covert non-compliance) by agents tasked with implementation when the preferences of said agents regarding the new policies do not align

²These processes are sometimes referred to as track-two processes.

with those of the principals pushing the new reforms. Preference asymmetry in this context means that the implementation agents within the institutions where the reforms are to be implemented are very likely to favor the policy status quo.

Second, information asymmetry is another source of discord between principals and agents in policy reform implementation processes. This asymmetry refers to the fact that the principal is usually at a steep informational disadvantage concerning the implementation process at localized levels as compared to the agents who work in closer proximity to the actual implementation process. The principal lacks complete information on agents' inputs in the production of the desired implementation outcome, whether positive or negative, because constant monitoring is either impossible or too costly.

Third, greater degrees of implementation shirking are understood as resulting from moral hazards: situations where the costs of noncompliance will be disproportionately paid by someone other than the violators. For example, if a civil war resumes over the non-implementation of a peace agreement, the cost of fighting the renewed war would fall mostly on the national military, and most of the blame for low implementation would fall upon the elite even if non-elites inside the bureaucracies were largely responsible for the lack of implementation.

We should expect all of these problems — preference asymmetry, information asymmetry, and moral hazard — to be especially acute in a post-accord civil war setting. A negotiated CPA represents a bargain struck between warring parties in which one side has agreed to voluntarily diminish its military power and demobilize in exchange for social, political and economic reforms, the implementation of which mostly fall under a government mandate and must necessarily follow demobilization. The bulk of the implementation effort in putting these reforms into practice is carried out not by the top level elites that negotiated the agreement, but by those working within the numerous policy jurisdictions affected by the accord.

Given what we know from PA theory, we have every reason to expect that agents working within the policy jurisdictions affected by a peace agreement will have strong incentives to resist efforts to reform the status quo. The types of reforms that would be sought by an opposition group

in a civil war peace agreement will be particularly distasteful to many agents who are tasked with their implementation. Thus the implementing agents tasked with complying with the reforms in the peace agreement should not be thought of as a random sample of implementing agents. Rather, the implementing agents, as a group, should have the greater conflict of interest with the principals that negotiated the reforms and are pushing for their implementation.

Peace agreement implementation therefore involves implementing agents who will often oppose the preferences of the principles who negotiated the reforms. The principles pushing for implementation will also often be at an informational disadvantage as most of the implementation mandates will fall outside the executive branch, which houses most of the members of the government's delegation to the negotiations that produced the accord. Moral hazard is also likely in civil war settings as the principals will be the target of the bulk of popular discontent over low implementation.

Third parties and implementation

Third party guarantees may assist the warring parties in overcoming the security dilemmas inherent to demobilization processes. Numerous studies have argued that strong third party guarantees such as peacekeeping operations should help the warring parties nurture a precarious peace until the situation can be stabilized. Such guarantees can facilitate the implementation of settlements (Walter 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Fortna 2003; 2004; Mattes and Savun 2010; Joshi 2013). This line of research typically focuses on conflict recurrence, but less is known about what type of third party support can specifically facilitate CPA implementation. Given the associations of positive outcomes associated with CPA implementation, a better understanding of how third parties can contribute to implementation is warranted.

Our argument here returns to the key challenges of implementation outlined above. Standard third party enforcement devices, such as UN peacekeeping operations, principally play a verification role as an information provider as well as physical protection. This can help end conflicts, but cannot force actors to implement policies within different agencies or bureaucracies. The obsta-

cles to implementation are sufficiently different from the obstacles in earlier phases of civil war negotiations that they require a different form of third party support. The type of third party support that may have helped civil war actors enter into negotiations and successfully reach a final agreement is not necessarily suited for helping civil war actors overcome some of the most common problems that block, delay, slow down or generally inhibit implementation processes from reaching high levels of compliance. For instance, it is clear that peacekeepers provide immediate benefits, but as [Beber, Gilligan, Guardado, and Karim \(2019\)](#) and others suggest, the positive impact of peacekeepers on political contestation and broader economic recovery can evaporate once missions leave.

The role of international organizations

Given the challenges and PA problems associated with achieving high levels of implementation of policy reforms, we seek to identify the types of third parties that could realistically influence the actual implementation of many specific statutes, many of which fall under different policy jurisdictions. An effective third party would need institutionalized channels of influence and the ability to influence bureaucratic behavior and compliance at the level crucial to implementation, below high-level government channels. As [Campbell \(2018\)](#) shows, international third parties often fail to achieve their goals in peacekeeping operations precisely when they lack connections and accountability to local stakeholders. Second, the third party must have a strong intrinsic self-interest in promoting CPA implementation. Third, expertise in the policy domain and resources with which to design programming are needed. Fourth, the third party needs independence from larger strategic interests, partisan politics and interest group pressures.

We argue that IGOs with high economic leverage and institutionalized structures come closest to meeting these requirements ([Karreth 2018](#); [Tir and Karreth 2018](#)). These IGOs are a small subset of international organizations. They derive considerable economic leverage from the range of policy issues they cover and from the institutionalized tools they may use to exercise this leverage over member states. [Table A2](#) and [Karreth \(2018\)](#) provide more details on this definition. Examples

of IGOs with high economic leverage include the World Bank, the IMF, or regional development banks.

Their relative independence from member governments and command of substantial tangible resources position these IGOs well to break through the gridlock caused by pro-status quo stakeholders affiliated with the government. First, reneging on an agreement would be quite costly to the government because current and future IGO-based benefits would be lost. This puts notable pressure on the internal government stakeholders to find a compromise among themselves in order to secure future IGO-based benefits. Few other third party actors have this kind of influence. Power-grabbing attempts by stakeholders that may stand to lose from a CPA to protect their positions would be counterproductive, despite seeming tempting. If a portion of the CPA were to be blocked, IGO sanctions would likely follow. This makes it unlikely that power-grabbing stakeholders would be notably better off. Second, the promise of future IGO-related resources can go a long way to assuage the fears of those potentially on the losing end. That is, increased resources can be used to placate or even buy off the would-be losers from trying to sabotage the CPA. And since IGO-related benefits can be expected to be long-term if not permanent, the expected value of the resources to be gained is quite high. Thus, despite some parties losing some influence with CPA implementation and reforms to the status quo, there are notable opportunities to reach internal agreements to attenuate potential losses to various stakeholders.

IGOs with high economic leverage also specialize in the monitoring and verification of member state compliance with regulatory or policy reforms that the member states may prefer not to implement. The past several decades have seen a proliferation of IGOs in different policy sectors, most with the primary task of coordinating policies between member states in a particular policy domain in order to achieve effective cooperation at the international level. This inherently means that member states are required to implement policy changes recommended or required by such an IGO to join and retain membership. The mission of these IGOs could not be fulfilled if member states were allowed to benefit from membership without implementing the required policy reforms. Thus IGOs with high economic leverage do not have to justify getting involved in policy reform

processes in member states. Their natural and stated interest is to impact policy in these domains in member states. They can act swiftly; they do not have to start from scratch when it comes to building the relationships and institutional ties with the many agencies and offices that will be involved in implementing the CPA.

IGOs with high economic leverage further impact the kind of domestic policy jurisdictions that are commonly the targets of reform in CPA implementation processes (such as development, health, education, reconstruction, cultural protection, agriculture, finance, or trade). This means that particular IGOs can bring pressure to bear on the specific policy jurisdictions that hold implementation mandates. The more such IGOs can incentivize implementation compliance and providing active accompaniment and funding, the greater the amount of implementation achieved.

Opposition and former rebel movements, too, are subject to the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage. If former rebels continue to control or dominate sections of the country after the CPA is signed, they will benefit from resources provided by IGOs. If they make resources conditional on cooperating in implementing the CPA, IGOs can serve to overcome resistance among these non-governmental stakeholders as well. Prior research has repeatedly demonstrated that non-state actors and explicitly rebel and dissident groups are receptive to such signals and, more broadly, can respect rules and conditions from international sources (Jo 2015; Fazal and Konaev 2019).

Lastly, IGOs with high economic leverage also have durable institutional structures and a lasting presence in member states. They typically do not leave or disengage a member state country and pull out its employees and resources due to a change in political leadership or due to changes in public opinion. Thus, such IGOs are better suited than nation-states at performing the long-term function of implementation accompaniment and monitoring. IGOs with high economic leverage are set up to protect their organizational interests and designed and structured to operate independently.

In sum, the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage can help toward implementing CPAs at high levels when governments pre-negotiate acceptable CPA terms with the relevant con-

stituencies inside the bureaucracies that typically implement policy reforms associated with peace agreements. During the implementation process, these IGOs can exert target pressure upon the group of elites and agents who are mandated to implement particular provisions in the agreement. IGO leverage through structure and resources is key: without standing institutionalized structures and resources, IGOs have no more influence than other third parties.

IGOs with high economic leverage frequently act in concordance with each other in program design, funding, as well as the sanctioning of non-implementation and rewarding implementation progress. It logically follows that stakeholders in a country that is a member of more such IGOs will be more incentivized to implement than those in a country involved in fewer IGOs with considerable economic leverage. A country having more memberships is eligible to receive more resources and more coordination potential for achieving implementation progress. Multiple memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage sends a signal to other IGOs, states, and donors that money they donate in support of implementation is less likely to be wasted through non-compliance. Therefore, we expect the implementation-promoting effects of participating in IGOs with high economic leverage to be greater when the country is simultaneously a member of multiple such IGOs, leading to our main hypothesis:

H1: Comprehensive peace agreements are implemented at higher rates in post-civil war countries that are members in more IGOs with high economic leverage — compared to civil war countries with fewer such memberships.

Quantitative evidence on IGOs and implementation

We analyze a quantitative measure of the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements since 1989, using detailed data from [Joshi, Quinn, and Regan \(2015\)](#). For 34 peace agreements and up to 10 post-conflict years per agreement, this yields 323 post-conflict agreement-years with information on covariates, providing the sample for our analyses. We use the aggregate implementation score from this project to assess implementation rates. This rate is equivalent to “a normalized annual percentage that ranges from 0 to 100%” (see the Peace Accords Matrix code-

book). Higher rates indicate that at a given point in time, the stakeholders in a post-conflict country had implemented more of the provisions in the CPA. Because implementation varies across conflicts and across years (see Figure 1), we use yearly implementation scores as the outcome for our analyses of variation in implementation. Conflicts where peace agreements fail and fighting resumes exit the sample at that time, though we also show that the main results hold if these cases are coded as not implemented (Table A7) or dropped (Table A8). The implementation measures cover the time between 1989 to 2015.

Empirical strategy

Peace agreement implementation measures the rate of provisions in a CPA that are implemented at the end of a given year (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). This measure varies by year and across conflicts. We examine this variation using yearly data on implementation across conflicts and several regression estimators to account for autocorrelation and differences between groups (countries and CPAs). Figure 1 illustrates that different CPAs start at different baselines and that implementation also changes over time, making a more flexible specification the most desirable approach to these data.

The first set of results (1) uses Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares with panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and panel-corrected standard errors, incorporating a suggestion in Beck and Katz (1995, 637). Given the upward trend in implementation over time within a conflict (see Figure 1), we control for the time passed since the CPA was signed, using the logged count of years (after finding that the trend is close to a logarithmic function); this helps address serially correlated errors. We also note that the number of time points is small (no more than 10), suggesting that the above specification is suitable. Alternative estimates include (2) conflict-specific varying intercepts and address temporal dynamics through conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation; (3) varying intercepts for conflicts and years; and (4) fixed effects for conflict countries (to account for country-specific features) and robust standard errors.




Figure 1 Implementation scores for 34 conflicts, 1989–2015. Lines indicate the yearly implementation rate for one post-conflict period. Implementation scores range from 0 to 100 and indicate a weighted ratio of implemented agreement provisions and overall provisions. CPA names are followed by the date on which they were signed. Source: Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015).

Key explanatory variables

We measure the influence of IGOs on CPA implementation by counting that country's number of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage. These IGOs are formal intergovernmental organizations with centralized administrative infrastructures that can act without the immediate need for consent of all member states. Institutional features to this end include financial authority, decision-making structures independent of immediate member state consent; bureaucratic structures; formal independence; and the prior use of incentives toward member states. They also possess economic leverage over member states, across one or more of the following issue areas: trade, currency coordination, economic development, investment, production, and natural resource extraction. This definition follows [Karreth \(2018\)](#).³ Post-conflict countries' memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage center at a mean and median of 5. At CPA signing (and afterward), countries in the sample vary considerably in their membership count ([Figure 2](#)). Summary statistics for this and all other variables are in [Table A5](#). To probe the importance of *economic* leverage over stakeholders in post-conflict countries, we also contrast IGOs with high economic leverage with other highly structured IGOs (HSIGOs). HSIGOs are IGOs with centralized structures and decision-making capabilities ([Table A3](#); see also [Tir and Karreth 2018](#)), but not all HSIGOs command high economic leverage. To clarify that IGO structure and leverage indeed drive implementation, we also present estimates including membership counts in IGOs with lesser structures: medium-structured and low-structured IGOs. All IGO measures are lagged by one year.

Control variables

CPA characteristics. Following a recent study of implementation ([Joshi, Lee, and Ginty 2017](#)), our analyses control for provisions that are potentially associated with higher implementation levels. A transitional power sharing government guarantees members of the opposition cabinet-level government positions. Dispute resolution provisions create a domestic commission "to solve dis-

³We use the Correlates of War data on states' membership in intergovernmental organizations, version 2.3 ([Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004](#)) to calculate membership counts. These data end in 2005. Because IGO memberships change only very slowly, we impute values from the year 2005 for all subsequent country-years in our data.




Figure 2 Counts of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage for 34 countries in the year of CPA signing.

agreements that arise during the implementation process” (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). And verification provisions “create a ... mechanism to monitor and verify the implementation of the peace agreement.” (ibid.). All are binary measures of whether such provision exists or not.

Conflict characteristics. In line with prior work, we expect that conflict characteristics are related to implementation. We control for conflict severity using the logged count of battle deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), the duration of the conflict in years (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015), and for whether a conflict was fought primarily over territory or not (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).

External involvement. We consider prior mediation history a key predictor for CPA implementation. Prior mediation indicates interest from mediators, as a potential accumulation of good relations between mediators and conflict parties, and probably at least some interest between the conflict parties to find a solution. To measure the mediation past of a conflict, we count the number of mediation events compiled from DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011) and Melander,

Möller, and Öberg (2009). This is the count of years with mediation until the year in which a peace agreement was formed. While our analyses focus on the role of IGOs for implementation, we also consider UN peacekeeping operations because they can facilitate mediation, agreement negotiation, and implementation by providing physical security and enforcing terms of intermediate or final agreements. We control for the presence of UN peacekeepers using a measure compiled from International Peace Institute (2016), a binary indicator for the presence or absence of UN peacekeepers in a conflict.

Country characteristics. The configuration of demographic and political factors can facilitate or complicate implementation. Our analyses account for the share of the population excluded from the political process (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), the overall population size (Gleditsch 2002; World Bank 2010), and for institutions associated with electoral democracy in a country (Lührmann, Dahlum, Lindberg, Maxwell, Mechkova, Olin, Pillai, Petrarca, Sigman, and Stepanova 2018). Economic growth may improve satisfaction with the peace process and, therefore, reduce stakeholder resistance. We control for this factor using the yearly economic growth rate from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). Natural resources may intensify competition and strengthen constituencies averse to implementation; we control for the presence of hydrocarbons, gemstones, or drugs using data from Lujala (2010).

Findings and discussion

Our theory suggests that IGOs with high economic leverage are a relevant actor in determining the degree to which CPAs are implemented after they are signed. Evidence from 34 agreements in 30 countries is consistent with this argument. Across model specifications, we find a positive and sizeable association between countries' membership counts in these IGOs and the implementation level of CPAs. One additional membership in one of the ten IGOs with high economic leverage is associated with an increase in the CPA implementation rate per year between 2 and 5 points across model specifications (Table 1). Over ten years, such an additional IGO membership can therefore

increase the aggregate implementation rate by several dozens of points. This finding holds after adjusting for the main determinant of higher implementation rates, the time passed since the CPA was signed. Only IGOs with high economic leverage show this association; other HSI­GOs are not associated with higher CPA implementation rates. This finding holds across different estimators. Other IGOs (MSIGOs and LSIGOs) are also not substantively associated with higher implementation rates (Table A6).

Table 1 Regression estimates of CPA implementation

	(1) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(2) Conflict random effects and conflict-specific CAR(1) autocorrelation	(3) Conflict and year random effects	(4) Country fixed effects and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage	1.69* (0.64)	2.85* (0.95)	4.65* (0.96)	5.37* (1.42)
All other HSI­GOs	0.84 (0.55)	0.71 (0.47)	−0.85 (0.81)	−1.09 (0.98)
Years after conflict (logged)	16.50* (0.96)	12.99* (1.42)	13.51* (0.77)	13.78* (1.86)
Transitional power sharing government	−7.00* (2.35)	1.98 (6.42)	−3.05 (7.70)	
Dispute resolution committee	16.05* (1.39)	15.30* (6.21)	13.42* (7.36)	
Verification mechanism	26.58* (5.71)	24.28* (7.63)	23.55* (9.22)	
Conflict duration (logged)	−1.45 (0.96)	−0.78 (2.53)	2.41 (3.09)	−44.94* (4.26)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−1.84* (0.94)	−3.44 (2.30)	−4.61 (2.81)	
Territorial conflict	−2.19 (1.67)	−1.52 (8.04)	−2.22 (9.78)	
Years with mediation (logged)	5.84* (1.78)	1.84 (4.35)	1.90 (5.30)	−59.05* (5.92)
UN PKO before CPA	−3.61 (3.46)	2.01 (7.51)	4.48 (8.97)	27.07* (6.19)
Population (logged)	−2.76* (1.14)	−3.23 (2.54)	−2.74 (3.01)	−9.19 (15.28)
Economic growth	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
Excluded population	−0.03 (2.49)	2.14 (2.22)	8.42* (3.51)	8.81* (4.18)
Natural resources	−7.69* (1.40)	−8.70 (8.39)	−14.83 (10.06)	
Democracy	−0.87 (1.51)	−1.37 (0.89)	−0.53 (1.59)	−0.63 (1.73)
Intercept	64.11* (11.44)	80.93* (37.59)	69.99 (45.13)	
N	323	323	323	323
CPAs	34	34	34	34
Log Likelihood		−933.45	−1141.44	

* $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test).

The substantive impact of IGOs with high economic leverage can be illustrated by comparing

a CPA in a country on the lower end of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, such as the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Conflict in Cambodia (1991), to one on the higher end, such as the Chapultepec Peace Agreement in El Salvador (1992). Cambodia in 1991 and subsequent years was a member to 2-3 IGOs with high economic leverage; El Salvador during the same time was a member in short of 4-5 such IGOs. The implementation rate between the two CPAs differs, on average, by about 20 points — a sizable difference.

CPAs with dispute resolution committees and verification mechanisms are implemented at higher rates, consistent with prior literature. Results for other control variables vary depending on how estimators account for CPA- and country-specific variance. Using the FGLS estimator, results suggest that deadlier conflicts may see lower implementation rates. Conflicts that experienced more mediation may also see higher implementation rates. More populous countries and those with natural resources see lower implementation rates. Allowing CPA-specific intercepts, most of these associations become noisier.

Accounting for endogeneity, unobserved confounders, and early CPA termination

Control variables and the fixed-effects model in column (4) attempt to account for any other characteristics influencing CPA implementation. For additional evidence toward this study's hypothesis, instrumental variable estimates address the possibility of IGO memberships masking other country features that might facilitate CPA implementation as well as IGOs screening out member states that might be fragile or stand low chances of CPA implementation. This IV model is estimated using two-stage least squares and fixed effects for countries and post-conflict years. With this specification, any country characteristics and temporal dynamics are absorbed in the fixed effects. As an instrument for memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, we use the average count of memberships in these IGOs of all other countries in that country's region (as defined by the World Bank's World Development Indicators), excluding the count of the country of interest. This instrument is valid because IGO memberships in other countries in the region are plausibly independent of any events occurring in the conflict country of interest. If country A is considered fragile and a

risky member after a conflict, an IGO might not admit country A (or suspend its membership, in rare cases; cf. [von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019](#)), but no IGO will plausibly screen out member states B and C. But because some IGOs with high economic leverage operate only in some regions, it is reasonable to assume and empirically true that regional memberships strongly predict a country’s memberships. Therefore, the only plausible path for an association between the regional IGO measure and mediation in a conflict country is through that country’s participation in IGOs. [Table 2](#) shows a significant association between the instrumented count of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage. Because of the two-way fixed effects model, the coefficient on IGOs now stands for the average difference in implementation across time periods and countries, not for a given year, and is thus considerably larger, at an estimated 20 points.

Table 2 Instrumental variable estimates of CPA implementation, with fixed effects for countries and year count after conflict and robust standard errors.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage (instrumented)	20.03* (9.72)
All other HSIGOs (instrumented)	-4.93 (6.47)
Fixed effects for countries	Yes
Fixed effects for post-CPA years	Yes
Adj. R ²	0.75
N	323
CPAs	34

* $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test).

Three CPAs failed before the 10-year implementation window was completed. We present three ways of treating this cases. The main estimates ([Table 1](#)) treat each CPA year the same way, and the cases leave the sample after the CPA fails. In [Table A7](#), we retain these CPA years, but code them as 0 throughout, regardless of the actual implementation levels. In [Table A8](#), we drop them from the sample. In each case, the positive association between IGOs with high economic leverage and CPA implementation remains statistically significant at a substantively meaningful size, similar to what is shown in [Table 1](#).

The role of IGOs in Ivory Coast

Beyond a statistical association, we turn to case evidence to probe the substance of our argument. We focus here on Ivory Coast, a post-conflict country that is mostly typical along key characteristics, but that participated in comparatively high number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Figure A1 in the SI illustrates that Ivory Coast is, overall, a typical case (Seawright and Gerring 2008) along the key explanatory variables used in this study.

Ivory Coast enters our sample with the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA). The OPA ended a civil war that had started in 2002. The agreement was signed by the government of Laurent Gbagbo and the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI, also known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire or New Forces, FNCI or FN) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The accord was truly a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), tackling a multitude of contentious issues and providing a framework for a transition to peace. It covered issues such as the cease fire; power-sharing; transitional government; demobilization; electoral, civil administration, military, police, and citizenship reforms; reintegration; amnesty; and internally displaced persons (S17).⁴

Per our theory, given the country's high count of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage (8 in 2007), its CPA should see a high rate of implementation. Figure 3 shows that this is the case, with the predicted 9-year implementation score of 80 out of 100. This comes close to the actual 9-year implementation score of 83 percent (S17). In comparison, a hypothetical Ivory Coast that was the same along all variables but participated in fewer IGOs with high economic leverage would have seen considerably lower implementation rates.

More concretely, our argument also suggests that IGOs with high economic leverage clearly signal to stakeholders that taking steps to implement the OPA is necessary for continued engagement of these IGOs. Access to IGO-based economic resources is contingent on stakeholders to give up resistance to implementation. IGOs can exercise this leverage through public statements, through conditions attached to loans or for participation in IGO-related programs. Practically, IGOs with high economic leverage can also demonstrate their insistence on implementation by

⁴Citations for all sources labeled S are in the supporting information




Figure 3 Observed and estimated implementation scores for Ivory Coast. Estimated values are regression predictions based on actual membership count in IGOs with high economic leverage (8) and hypothetical scenarios (5 and 3 memberships). Hypothetical scenarios are regression predictions based on the IGO membership variable changed to the respective scenario, and all covariates held to their observed values of Ivory Coast in the respective year. 5 memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage is the median case in the data, and 3 memberships correspond to the 10th percentile of the membership count variable. Source: Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015) and estimates from column (3) in Table 1.

releasing benefits only after key steps toward implementation have been taken. IGOs may also support implementation directly with funds. In this section, we track how much the experience of Ivory Coast mirrors these expectations.

The implementation of OPA terms started off well, with goodwill political steps and the dismantling of the buffer zone, which had split the country into a northern and southern region. At the same time, the World Bank (one IGO with high economic leverage) quickly realized that “the full plan cannot be implemented comprehensively because of lack of funding for the other key elements” (S29:1). That is, the comprehensive nature of the agreement also meant that it would be quite costly to implement, at about 138.8 billion CFA francs (S2). The government thought that it could cover just over one-third of the cost, or about 49 billion CFA francs (*ibid.*). This immediately raised concerns that implementing the OPA would result in only makeshift solutions, which in turn would fail to consolidate the peace and increase the chances of conflict resumption. Observers pointed out that “the individual calculations of the signatories do not necessarily bode well for a comprehensive settlement of the crisis” (S3: 19). In response to such assessments, the International Crisis Group issued a call to the international community to “rapidly provide financial and technical assistance as needed by the government to execute fully all operations pertaining to the OPA” (S10; see also S2; S3).

Led by IGOs with high economic leverage such as the World Bank, IMF, and ECOWAS, the international community responded quickly. For example, the World Bank met with the disputants “to develop operational plans and budget for dismantling militias, cantonment of combatants, restarting state-administrative activities” (S21: 3-4); “to assist the national institutions in the planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme” (p.14); and to assist in “mobilizing resources needed for the reintegration and civic service programmes” (p. 15). Specifically, the Bank immediately provided US\$120 million to support these goals. The IMF provided US\$62.2 “to help Côte d’Ivoire build the foundation for sustained recovery in an environment of improving security, regain political stability, and reunite the country” (S6: 1).

Following these financial assistance efforts in 2007, in 2008 ECOWAS (and the EU) provided resources to help the state electoral commission restore records (S25), an important task given the OPA's agenda of electoral reform and considering that some of the main points of contention in the war were citizenship and voting eligibility. Furthermore, in 2009, the same entities provided US\$95 million to help the government in implementing the peace agreement through provisions for elections, redeployment of state administration, return of internally displaced persons, and socialization programs for former combatants (S26). The World Bank and IMF provided budgetary support of US\$100 and US\$150 million (S26), respectively, while ECOWAS and the World Bank contributed to the implementation activities relating to the reconciliation and former combatants dialogue efforts (S27). In 2010, for instance, the World Bank (and EU) provided support for Restoration of State Authority and Peace Consolidation article of the Ouagadougou Agreement, to assist with "the rehabilitation and equipping of administrative, court and penitentiary facilities" (S28: 17).

These examples show clear evidence of deep and extensive IGO involvement in facilitating the implementation of the OPA. Importantly, IGOs with high economic leverage targeted these resources to specific programs that related to implementing the OPA. These IGOs provided funding to assist with, for instance, reconciliation efforts; former combatant dialogue; the provisions for elections, redeployment of state administration; return of internally displaced persons; socialization programs for former combatants; the rehabilitation and equipping of administrative, court and prison facilities; the planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; the restoration of electoral records; and civic service initiatives. These efforts fit well with our assertion that IGOs with high economic have a long-term self-interest in member state peace and stability. A civil war country needs to return to peace in order for these IGOs to be able to continue their missions, which typically relate to the issues of economic development, growth, and trade. IGOs with high economic leverage are therefore willing to invest substantial resources in order to see the member country turn a peace agreement into lasting peace.

The implementation of the CPA's terms in Ivory Coast partially depended on help from IGOs

with high economic leverage. The government simply did not have sufficient resources to pay for the implementation. This issue would have led to the collapse of the peace process and probable return to war per the contemporary observers (S10; S2; S3; see also S29). That IGOs with high economic leverage targeted their resources to specific implementation programs is critically important because the targeted (as opposed to general) funds increase the chances of specific terms being implemented. World Bank documents identify the rationale of targeted funding being critical to addressing key conflict-causing issues, whose resolution is necessary for peace consolidation:

“The proposed support will help respond to the situation by providing funding for: (a) the economic (re)integration of ex-combatants, individuals associated with armed groups, and of youth-at-risk more in general; (b) the national identification process, including the modernization of the national civil registry, which is a pre-condition not only for free and fair elections but also for restoring equitable access to social services; (c) the rehabilitation and re-equipment of social and economic infrastructure in the communities most affected by conflict, and (d) the strengthening of social capital throughout the country. This is expected to have a significant impact on improving the chances for sustainable peace by: addressing one of the key causes of the conflict (“national identity” manifest through official identification and registry), encouraging vulnerable groups such as youth associated with conflict to resume productive lives, improving access to basic social services, and enhancing the implementation capacity of community-based development organizations.” (S29: 1)

...

“Targeted support by the Bank at this critical juncture will facilitate the stabilization of the improved but fragile situation, helping to create conditions under which the country can resume pro-poor social and economic development and begin to mend the social divisions that deepened over the past four years. [...] By supporting key chapters of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, this project will not only respond to emergency needs but also address the deep-rooted causes of conflict and therefore contribute to

the prevention of further conflict.” (S29: 3)

IGOs with high economic leverage also took an active role in monitoring the progress of peace terms implementation and released further resources only once they were satisfied that genuine progress was being made. The World Bank constantly monitored the implementation of OPA terms, preparing progress reports twice a year (S29). Furthermore, “[i]n order to proceed beyond the first disbursement of project resources, satisfactory early implementation of key actions will be required” (ibid., p. 18). Similarly, “[i]mplementation of the proposed project is a critical element in the sequence of ... [actions to] allow for the successful resumption of other projects in the Bank portfolio” (ibid., p. 4). This sequential and contingent release of funds is key to structuring incentives in ways that incentivizes the government and former rebels to honor promises they have made to avoid renegeing on peace agreement terms and work toward OPA implementation. Without such a conditional, sequential incentive structure, the ex-combatants’ temptations to renege or succumb to internal resistance to reforms would have been much greater. Therefore, beyond regular meetings with the government and ex-rebel leaders, the World Bank sent in experts to review implementation requirements and progress (S22; S23). Pending promising results for, for example, the reinsertion and community rehabilitation program focusing on demobilized combatants, to which the World Bank contributed US\$40 million, the Bank approved three additional projects worth US\$126 million to deal with institution building, governance, reconstruction, and health (S24).

For its part, the government understood quite clearly that to receive further IGO funds it needed to continue to meet various OPA implementation benchmarks — lest it lose future IGO support. For example, “[t]he authorities recognized that early progress in implementing the Ouagadougou Accord and demonstrating improvements in governance, particularly in public finances and the energy and cocoa/coffee sectors, were important first steps in gaining donor and private sector support” (S6: 21). In a letter from Prime Minister Soro and Minister of Economy and Finance Charles Koffi Diby to the Managing Director of the IMF, the authors state that “The government is determined to complete the reunification of the country quickly and to implement the other aspects

of the roadmap.... The support of the [IMF] ... is of crucial importance during this pivotal period“ (S7: 34). Similarly, Lauren Rutayisire, the IMF’s Executive Director for Côte d’Ivoire notes that “[g]oing forward, my authorities are committed to implementing all the remaining activities of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord The continuous assistance of the international community is key in accompanying this momentum [and] my authorities will appreciate the Board’s support for an additional assistance under the IMF’s EPCA program.” (S7:96).

This pattern of government compliance with OPA terms implementation and contingent, sequential provision of IGO funds worked well initially. By 2010, the OPA implementation rate climbed to 65 percent, with most specific OPA accord provisions starting to reach intermediate levels of implementation (S17). But things took a major turn for the worse in December 2010 when Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede the presidency to Alassane Ouattara after an apparent election loss (S18). The international community’s reaction to the election dispute and ensuing sporadic violence was relatively quick, prolific, and largely united in pressing Gbagbo to recognize the election result (S11). Condemnations, visa bans, membership suspensions, and the like came from organizations to which Ivory Coast was a member such as the African Union and the UN, as well as powerful third-party organizations such as the EU. Though high-profile, these efforts proved largely ineffective in convincing Gbagbo to give up power. The violence instead intensified (S1; S12).

Working behind the scenes of high-profile attempts to resolve the crisis, IGO actions were probably the most effective in ending the violence ([Tir and Karreth 2018](#)). Through its BCEAO (the Central Bank of West African States) and UEMOA (the West African Economic and Monetary Union) arms, ECOWAS suspended Gbagbo’s access to state funds (S4; S5).⁵ Similarly, the World Bank and IMF suspended disbursement of already committed funds, around US\$313 million and US\$220.2, respectively (S8; S19; S30). Following these signals, major foreign banks (e.g. Societe Generale, Citibank, BNP Paribas, and Standard Chartered) ceased operations in Ivory Coast (S20).

A cumulative effect of these moves — along with economic sanctions imposed by the EU

⁵BCEAO serves as the country’s and region’s central bank.

and other international actors — was that Gbagbo was quickly running out of funds with which to pay his government and — most critically — his military (S20). Consequently, Gbagbo’s forces experienced mass desertions, including officers and generals (S13; S14). The disintegration of Gbagbo’s forces seriously undermined his ability to keep control of the presidency and he was arrested by pro-Ouattara forces in April 2011.⁶ Gbagbo’s arrest resulted in the situation in Ivory Coast stabilizing quickly and, notably, making for a much shorter and less lethal conflict than many observers have initially expected (S15; S16).

In part to help maintain the newfound stability and to incentivize the return to implementing the OPA terms, the IMF and World Bank soon resumed their programs in the country, pledging US\$4 billion worth of resources (S9). And the situation soon returned to the previous pattern of OPA terms implementation followed by contingent and sequential release of further IGO resources. Accordingly, OPA implementation scores started to rise once again after the 2010 reversals, reaching 83 percent by 2016 and showing intermediate to full levels of implementation of OPA provisions (S17).

The 2010-11 events provide a hard test of the role of IGOs with high economic leverage to help implement the terms of Ivory Coast’s CPA. The events certainly show that it is possible for the government to attempt to renege on the terms it has agreed to, such as holding and respecting the outcome of free and fair elections. But the developments also show that these IGOs have impactful tools at their disposal with which they can effectively exercise pressure on a member state at risk of violent conflict. So while a skeptic may argue that IGOs failed to completely deter government misbehavior, such attempts are nevertheless ultimately likely to be miscalculations. The leverage of these IGOs is a powerful device with which stakeholders in member states can be compelled to implement CPA terms, as Laurent Gbagbo and his allies came to experience.

⁶French helicopters assisted with securing the area around the Gbagbo residence but did not intervene in the arrest themselves (S16).

Conclusion and future research

This study asks why the implementation of peace agreements varies both within and after post-conflict countries. We propose that a specific type of international organizations, IGOs with high economic leverage, are particularly well placed to overcome stakeholder resistance to CPA implementation. Quantitative evidence is consistent with this argument. After peace agreements are signed, countries face substantial hurdles to implementing the terms of these agreements. Across post-signing periods of 34 CPAs since 1989, we find that some of these hurdles are less damaging for implementation when IGOs with high economic leverage are present to provide incentives and guarantees, and otherwise facilitate the buy-in of relevant stakeholders for implementation.

These findings have substantial implications for practical aspects of peacebuilding and for preventing that countries experiencing domestic armed conflicts fall into recurrent conflict traps. The evidence suggests that the economic leverage of IGOs, where present, has positive implications for CPA implementation. For mediators and other third parties facilitating peace agreements, this suggests two things. On the one hand, efforts may be more promising in contexts where IGOs can back up the efforts needed to implement CPAs. On the other hand, an extension of the argument implies that directly harnessing the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage and coordinating CPA design and implementation support with these IGOs is a worthwhile avenue.

For scholarly work on peace agreement implementation and long-term prospect for peace, our study highlights IGOs with high economic leverage as a key third party with qualities distinct from other third parties. This emphasis comports well with a recent literature on the role of external actors for conflict termination and prevention (e.g., [Karreth and Tir 2013](#); [Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2017](#); [Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017](#); [Tir and Karreth 2018](#)). Our study also adds to growing evidence that IGOs have impacts well beyond their initial mandates, initially framed as a “pathology” ([Barnett and Finnemore 1999](#)), and more recently documented in a variety of contexts ([Johnson 2014](#)). However, as suggested in [Tir and Karreth \(2018\)](#), this influence of IGOs beyond their core mandate need not always be negative. Lastly, we emphasize in

particular the importance of institutional structures and of distinguishing between different types of IGOs. This supplants other recent work on the role of IGOs for domestic political contention (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019; Breslawski and Cunningham Forthcoming), but also provides further opportunities for examining how institutional structures can be linked to concrete negotiation behavior and post-conflict outcomes.

Future research should further probe the roles of IGOs with high economic leverage in facilitating post-conflict peace. One limit of the present study is the focus on a correlation between countries' memberships in these IGOs and CPA implementation, without a quantitative measure of the activities of IGOs that target stakeholders as stipulated in our argument. Quantitative investigations and additional case studies of IGO activities, including promises and threats of providing and withholding material support and other signals, can yield further insights into this aspect. A second aspect worthy of further investigation concerns the implementation of other types of peace agreements. This study cites widespread evidence for the specific role of CPAs in the post-conflict reconciliation process. CPAs are the most durable and impactful type of conflict-ending agreements. Yet, the path to CPAs is paved by other agreements, which themselves vary in implementation (Bell and Badanjak Forthcoming). Studying the role of third parties and, specifically, IGOs with high economic leverage in facilitating steps toward forming and implementing these agreements would also promise insightful. We plan to pursue both lines of inquiry in future research.

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Supporting Information

This supplementary document contains:

- A A list of all comprehensive peace agreements used in the analyses
- B A list of all IGOs referenced in this study
- C Summary statistics and sources for all variables used in the analyses
- D Full results for all statistical models discussed in the manuscript
- E A list of news sources and documents used for case evidence

A Comprehensive peace agreements

Table A1 List of CPAs

Country	CPA name and date
Angola	Lusaka Protocol, Nov 15 1994
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding, Apr 04 2002
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT), Dec 02 1997
Bosnia	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov 21 1995
Burundi	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement / Pretoria Protocol, Nov 02 2003
Cambodia	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23 1991
Congo-Brazzaville	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, Dec 29 1999
Croatia	Erdut Agreement, Nov 12 1995
Djibouti	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale, Dec 26 1994
Djibouti	Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, May 12 2001
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Jan 16 1992
Guatemala	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec 29 1996
Guinea-Bissau	Abuja Peace Agreement, Nov 01 1998
India	Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), Feb 20 1993
Indonesia	MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Aug 15 2005
Ivory Coast	Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), Mar 04 2007
Lebanon	Taif Accord, Oct 22 1989
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement, Aug 18 2003
Macedonia	Ohrid Agreement, Aug 13 2001
Mali	National Pact, Jan 06 1991
Mozambique	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Oct 04 1992
Nepal	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nov 21 2006
Niger	Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, Apr 15 1995
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug 30 2001
Philippines	Mindanao Final Agreement, Sep 02 1996
Rwanda	Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993, Aug 04 1993
Senegal	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC, Dec 30 2004
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Peace Agreement, Nov 30 1996
Sierra Leone	Lomé Peace Agreement, Jul 07 1999
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Jan 09 2005
Tajikistan	General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, Jun 27 1997
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on East Timor, May 05 1999
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, Apr 10 1998

B IGOs

Table A2 List of IGOs with high leverage emanating from a combination of (1) economic leverage and (2) institutional prerequisites. Source: [Karreth \(2018\)](#).

IGO	Economic leverage: Issues covered ¹	Institutional prerequisites: tools available ²
African Development Bank	1	5
Asian Development Bank	4	4
Caribbean Community	3	3
Common Southern Market	1	1
Commonwealth Secretariat	1	5
Economic Community of West African States	3	4
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2	5
European Economic Community	2	5
European Investment Bank	2	4
European Union	3	4
World Bank	1	5
International Coffee Organization	4	2
International Fund for Agricultural Development	2	2
International Monetary Fund	1	5
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1	4
Southern African Development Community	2	4
West African Economic and Monetary Union	3	4

¹ Numbers: sum of issues covered by the IGO (Trade, Currency, Development, Investment, Production, Resources).

² Numbers: features available to the IGO (Financial authority, Decision-making, Bureaucracy, Independence, Use of carrots & sticks).

Table A3 List of highly structured IGOs. Source: [Tir and Karreth \(2018\)](#).

Abbr.	Full name of the organization
AMCO	African Malagasy Coffee Organization
AP	Andean Parliament
CATC	Commonwealth Air Transport Council
CERN	European Organization for Nuclear Research
ComAB	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau/Imperial Agricultural Bureau
EADB	East African Development Bank
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELDO	European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization
ESA	European Space Agency
ESRO	European Space Research Organization
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Commission
G15	Group of Fifteen
GRBDO	Gambia River Basin Development Organization
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAIC	Inter-American Investment Corporation
IBEC	International Bank for Economic Cooperation
IBPMP	International Bureau for the Protection of the Moselle against Pollution
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCROM	International Center for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property
ICES	International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICFO	International Coffee Organization
ICPRP	International Bureau for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOLM	International Organization for Legal Metrology
IOOC	International Olive Oil Council
ISDB	Islamic Development Bank
LATIN	Latin Union
NDF	Nordic Development Fund
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SCHENGEN	Group of Schengen
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WPact	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

C Detailed information on variables

Table A4 Variable sources

Concept	Variable	Source	Scale
Implementation score	Aggregate Implementation Score (achieved points divided by total possible points)	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	0-100
IGO memberships	Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage	Karreth (2018) and Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004)	Count
	Memberships in highly structured IGOs	Tir and Karreth (2018) and Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004)	Count
	Memberships in medium structured IGOs	Tir and Karreth (2018) and Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004)	Count
	Memberships in low-structured IGOs	Tir and Karreth (2018) and Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004)	Count
CPA characteristics	Transitional power sharing	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	Binary
	Dispute resolution committee	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	Binary
	Verification mechanism	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	Binary
External involvement	Years with mediation	DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011) and Melander, Möller, and Öberg (2009)	Logged
	UN PKO before CPA	International Peace Institute (2016)	Binary
Conflict characteristics	Conflict duration in years	Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015)	Logged
	Battle deaths during conflict	Lacina and Gleditsch (2005)	Logged
	Conflict over territory	Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015)	Binary
Country-level characteristics	Population size	Gleditsch (2002); World Bank (2010)	Logged
	Economic growth (GDP growth, annual %)	World Bank (2010)	Percent
	Excluded population relative to the sum of ethnically relevant population	Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009)	0-1
	Natural resources (Oil, diamonds or drugs present)	Lujala (2010)	Binary
	Democratic political institutions (VDem Pol-yarchy index)	Lührmann et al. (2018)	Standardized

Table A5 Summary statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max
Aggregate implementation score	66.0	21.7	1.9	51.8	70.0	84.0	95.8
IGOs with high economic leverage	5.3	1.6	2	4	5	6	10
HSIGOs	16.1	3.1	10	14	16	18	28
All other HSIGOs, excluding IGOs with high economic leverage	10.8	2.5	6	9	10	12	18
MSIGO memberships	8.3	3.3	3	6	8	10	23
LSIGO memberships	21.8	8.6	6	15	20	28	42
Years after conflict (logged)	5.4	2.9	1	3	5	8	10
CPA provides for transitional power sharing government	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
CPA provides for dispute resolution committee	0.6	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
CPA provides for verification mechanism	0.8	0.4	0	1	1	1	1
Conflict duration (logged)	7.6	1.4	4.4	6.8	7.6	8.9	9.5
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	7.2	1.8	4.3	5.7	7.2	8.7	10.6
Territorial conflict	0.3	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Years with mediation (logged)	1.5	0.8	0.0	1.1	1.8	2.1	2.8
UN PKO before CPA	0.3	0.4	0	0	0	1	1
Population (logged)	16.3	1.6	13.3	15.3	16.1	17.1	20.8
Economic growth	4.5	9.0	-50.2	2.6	4.5	6.3	89.0
Excluded population	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.000	0.1	0.4	0.9
Natural resources	0.7	0.4	0	0	1	1	1
Democracy	-0.2	0.7	-1.7	-0.9	-0.2	0.3	1.5
Year	2002.3	5.5	1989	1998	2002	2006	2015

D Regression results referenced in the main text

Table A6 Regression estimates of CPA implementation.

	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Conflict random effects and conflict-specific CAR(1) autocorrelation	Conflict and year random effects
IGOs with high economic leverage	3.57* (0.60)	3.79* (1.29)	2.61* (1.19)
All other HSIGOs	0.16 (0.76)	-0.21 (0.74)	-0.46 (0.86)
MSIGOs	0.51 (0.76)	1.44* (0.71)	1.89* (0.81)
LSIGOs	-0.20 (0.32)	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.62* (0.36)
Years after conflict (logged)	16.02* (0.66)	15.39* (1.06)	14.12* (0.80)
Intercept	21.61* (7.59)	17.71 (10.89)	32.56* (9.86)
N	323	323	323
CPAs	34	34	34
Log Likelihood		-1059.64	-1177.06

* $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test).

Table A7 Regression estimates of CPA implementation, coding implementation as 0 for 3 CPAs in which conflict resumed fewer than 10 years after CPA signing.

	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Conflict random effects and conflict-specific CAR(1) autocorrelation	Conflict and year random effects	Country fixed effects and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage	2.50* (0.71)	3.06* (1.00)	4.60* (1.00)	5.11* (1.46)
All other HSIGOs	0.92* (0.52)	0.81* (0.48)	-0.83 (0.86)	-1.09 (0.98)
Years after conflict (logged)	16.13* (0.92)	12.21* (1.42)	12.93* (0.80)	13.03* (1.91)
Transitional power sharing government	-5.47* (2.16)	0.36 (9.49)	-4.75 (9.88)	
Dispute resolution committee	16.28* (2.57)	20.84* (9.11)	16.80* (9.44)	
Verification mechanism	27.63* (5.98)	29.58* (11.33)	28.32* (11.85)	
Conflict duration (logged)	-0.64 (1.98)	-1.86 (3.72)	1.58 (3.93)	-68.42* (4.78)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	-2.18 (1.65)	-7.50* (3.39)	-7.55* (3.58)	
Territorial conflict	-0.71 (1.99)	1.80 (11.90)	0.40 (12.49)	
Years with mediation (logged)	1.72 (2.55)	-2.09 (6.39)	-1.85 (6.75)	-74.07* (5.99)
UN PKO before CPA	0.82 (3.43)	7.01 (11.07)	10.21 (11.50)	19.02* (6.54)
Population (logged)	-4.05* (1.10)	-4.45 (3.65)	-3.76 (3.77)	-6.87 (15.55)
Economic growth	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Excluded population	-0.03 (2.75)	1.90 (2.23)	8.79* (3.59)	9.50* (4.34)
Natural resources	-6.01* (3.45)	-8.90 (12.37)	-14.84 (12.86)	
Democracy	-0.85 (1.39)	-1.37 (0.89)	0.40 (1.63)	0.28 (1.76)
Intercept	76.09* (25.09)	131.65* (54.54)	111.19* (56.87)	
N	323	323	323	323
CPAs	34	34	34	34
Log Likelihood		-940.81	-1152.01	

* $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test).

Table A8 Regression estimates of CPA implementation, removing 3 CPAs in which conflict resumed fewer than 10 years after CPA signing.

	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Conflict random effects and conflict-specific CAR(1) autocorrelation	Conflict and year random effects	Country fixed effects and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage	3.06* (0.84)	2.80* (0.95)	4.56* (0.95)	5.16* (1.43)
All other HSIGOs	-0.02 (0.56)	0.71 (0.47)	-0.95 (0.78)	-1.18 (0.98)
Years after conflict (logged)	15.98* (1.02)	12.30* (1.42)	13.44* (0.77)	13.78* (1.92)
Transitional power sharing government	-7.46* (2.08)	-2.32 (5.94)	-7.95 (6.36)	
Dispute resolution committee	10.94* (2.95)	18.74* (6.20)	13.45* (6.60)	
Verification mechanism	24.49* (5.49)	27.35* (7.03)	26.65* (7.53)	
Conflict duration (logged)	0.92 (1.88)	-1.14 (2.33)	2.56 (2.54)	
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	-2.14* (0.99)	-3.19 (2.20)	-3.19 (2.39)	
Territorial conflict	-6.68* (2.54)	-2.93 (7.30)	-4.22 (7.86)	
Years with mediation (logged)	2.96 (2.52)	0.78 (4.10)	0.33 (4.44)	-30.58* (5.06)
UN PKO before CPA	1.83 (3.59)	-0.80 (7.45)	4.25 (7.95)	
Population (logged)	-2.16* (1.16)	-4.15* (2.34)	-3.58 (2.50)	-9.56 (15.47)
Economic growth	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)
Excluded population	0.39 (2.56)	1.87 (2.23)	8.03* (3.52)	8.69* (4.21)
Natural resources	-9.29* (2.80)	-4.27 (7.72)	-9.83 (8.26)	
Democracy	-0.84 (1.49)	-1.37 (0.90)	-0.31 (1.61)	-0.37 (1.76)
Intercept	52.80* (17.20)	97.46* (35.54)	76.09* (38.35)	
N	309	309	309	309
CPAs	31	31	31	31
Log Likelihood		-882.71	-1085.24	

* $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test).

E Ivory Coast compared to all other cases




Figure A1 Ivory Coast in the first year of its CPA, compared to all other cases in the data at the same time point, along key variables. Histograms show the distribution of all cases (except Ivory Coast), and dark dots show the value of Ivory Coast on the respective variable. For display purposes, continuous variables are standardized (centered around 0 and divided by one standard deviation).

F News sources and documents used for discussion of the peace process in Ivory Coast

- S1 The Associated Press. 2010. "Ivory Coast: Pressure Grows After Vote." The New York Times. December 14, 2010 Tuesday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/18.
- S2 Ayangafac, C. (2007). The Ouagadougou Political Accord: Imminent divorce or the renewal of vows. Situation Report by the Institute for Security Studies. URL: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPOUAGA.PDF>
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- S6 IMF. (2007). IMF Executive Board Approves US\$62.2 Million in Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance for Côte d'Ivoire. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr07176>
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- S10 International Crisis Group. (2007). Côte d'Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement bring peace? Africa Report Number 27. URL: <https://bit.ly/2Yq06Iv>
- S11 Nossiter, Adam. 2010. "Security Forces Open Fire On Protesters in Ivory Coast." The New York Times. December 17, 2010 Friday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/18.
- S12 Nossiter, Adam. 2011a "Opposition Forces in Ivory Coast Take Towns on 2 Fronts." The New York Times. March 30, 2011 Wednesday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/22.
- S13 Nossiter, Adam. 2011b "Gbagbo Is Said to Be Close to Defeat in Ivory Coast." The New York Times. April 2, 2011 Saturday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/22.

- S14 Nossiter, Adam. 2011c "Ivory Coast Battle Nears Decisive Stage in Key City." The New York Times. April 1, 2011 Friday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/22.
- S15 Nossiter, Adam. 2011d. "WORLD BRIEFING AFRICA; Ivory Coast: U.N. Vehicles Attacked." The New York Times. January 14, 2011 Friday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/20.
- S16 Nossiter, Adam, Scott Sayare, and Dan Bilefsky. 2011. "Leader's Arrest In Ivory Coast Ends Standoff." The New York Times. April 12, 2011 Tuesday. Date Accessed: 2015/07/22.
- S17 Peace Accords Matrix. 2018. Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA). University of Notre Dame. URL: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/ouagadougou-political-agreement-opa>
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- S23 UNSC S/2008/250. 2008. "Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire," United Nations Security Council (S/2008/250), April 15, 2008. URL: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/250
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- S26 UNSC S/2009/196. 2009. "Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire". United Nations Security Council. (S/2009/196). April 13 2009. URL: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/196

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- S29 World Bank. (2007). Côte d’Ivoire – Post-Conflict Assistance Project (English). Washington, DC: World Bank. URL: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/775081468028456714/pdf/40211.pdf>
- S30 World Bank. 2010. “World Bank Statement on Côte d’Ivoire.” December 22, 2010. Accessed July 26, 2015. URL: <https://bit.ly/2M1tX3d>