Rules of Aid: A survey experiment on aid to post-conflict countries

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Abstract

International donors allocate the majority of their Official Development Assistance (ODA) to countries affected by civil war and political violence (OECD 2018). Scholarship on international aid has historically argued that donor aid allocation is motivated by strategic alliances not the needs of the recipient country (Alesina and Dollar 2000). This scholarship, however, overlooks the current donor response to post-conflict countries and donor policies that may shape their engagement there. Over the past decade, global multilateral organizations and member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have committed themselves to refocusing their aid efforts on post-conflict countries and to responding to the nuanced on-the-ground dynamics in these contexts (IDPS/OECD 2011). Using an original survey-embedded experiment completed by over 1,100 aid experts, we find that donors do not just give aid to buy the favor of allies but, instead, respond to changing dynamics on the ground. Donors respond, however, in predictable ways. Their aid modalities, like all organizational routines, provide them with limited allocation options that they seem to use to reward positive behavior of the recipient country and to sanction perceived negative behavior. These results, which hold across different donors and recipient countries, challenge assumptions within the post-conflict peacebuilding and international aid literature, demonstrating that aid donors are not only motivated by strategic interest but also by events in the post-conflict country and their alignment with donor development policy.

1 Introduction

How do international aid donors allocate aid to post-conflict countries? Scholarship on international aid argues that donors allocate aid to buy support of strategic allies, regardless of the level of need (Alesina and Dollar 2000, De Mesquita and Smith 2009, 2013). Increasingly, however, donors are allocating the majority of their Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the most impoverished, and neediest, countries in the world, many of which are also affected by political violence and civil war (OECD 2018).[1] Post-conflict countries, a subset of these countries, are classified as having undergone a civil war, a peace process, and democratic elections (OECD 2010a, 2012, 68). Compared to countries that are in the midst of civil war, international aid policy set by the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, and United Nations argues that post-conflict countries merit an influx of aid to ensure that the peace agreement can be implemented and economic and social development can restart (Assembly 2005, OECD 2012).[2] These donors claim increased aid to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries is motivated by their commitment to achieve the development standards outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (OECD 2015) and break these countries' cycle of underdevelopment and violence (Collier et al. 2003, United Nations and World Bank 2018). Donor policies also contend that effective aid to these contexts is responsive to the changing dynamics on the ground, creating an incentive for peaceful cooperation and sanctioning violent conflict and exclusion (IDPS/OECD 2011, World Bank 2011, DESA 2016). Do donors, in fact, attempt to use aid as an incentive for peace by responding to the dynamics of conflict and cooperation on the ground, as their policies require? Or, do they simply use aid as a tool to support strategic allies, as existing scholarship argues, and ignore the nuanced political dynamics in these often less strategically important fragile and conflict-affected states?[3]

The literature on international aid is inconclusive on the question of how international aid donors allocate aid to post-conflict countries. The study of aid allocation has been dominated by the debate over whether donors give aid to support strategic allies or whether aid is given to countries with the greatest humanitarian or development need (Alesina and Dollar 2000, De Mesquita and Smith 2009). It has not considered the

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[1] Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD as: "Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount)" (OECD 2008).

[2] The OECD member states include 36 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

[3] Fragile and conflict-affected states refers to a category of approximately 75 countries, 27 of which are considered to be chronically fragile, that the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and the OECD consider to be most at risk of descending into further war and persistent underdevelopment. For the OECD, fragility refers to "the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies" (OECD 2018, 82). Post-conflict countries are a sub-set of conflict-affected countries that have experienced civil war, a comprehensive peace process, and held democratic elections (OECD 2012). Although policymakers often assume post-conflict countries are no longer affected by violence (OECD 2010a), violence and its precursors often linger in post-conflict countries (Campbell et al. 2017).

implications of these seemingly divergent motivations for donor responsiveness to changing political and security dynamics within the recipient country. More recent scholarship has argued that the juxtaposition of strategic interest and recipient need belies the simultaneous motivations behind aid allocation decisions (Dietrich 2016, Bermeo 2016, Girod and Tobin 2016, Winters 2010), but has not investigated the motivations for aid to post-conflict countries (Findley 2018, Zürcher 2017).

A cursory look at post-conflict countries reveals important variation in donor aid allocation between countries that is not explained by the existing literature (OECD 2019). For example, the civil wars and peace processes in Liberia and Burundi both ended in 2005 with the democratic election of each country's first post-conflict president, President Sirleaf in Liberia and President Nkurunziza in Burundi. International aid donors, however, responded in different ways. Between 2005 and 2017, ODA to Burundi increased from US $ 180.5 million to US $ 210.9 million, while ODA to Liberia increased from US $ 144 million to US $ 407 million, almost three times the original amount (OECD 2019). What explains the different aid allocation behaviors to these two seemingly strategically unimportant, high-need post-conflict countries? We contend that the difference in donor aid allocation responses is motivated, at least in part, by the signals that donors received about each country's progress toward peace. For example, Liberia's post-conflict government has implemented important security and governance reforms, instituting the main power sharing provisions of its peace agreement (Afolabi 2017). Burundi's post-conflict government, however, became increasingly authoritarian, limiting the freedom of expression of independent media and committing extrajudicial killing of opposition party representatives and local human rights defenders (Campbell 2018). What explains the difference in donor aid allocation to these two post-conflict countries?

In this paper, we contend that donors respond to the political and security dynamics of post-conflict countries but in predictable ways. We focus on donor responses in the immediate aftermath of post-conflict elections that were classified as free and fair (Kumar 1998, Bishop and Hoeffler 2016). By analyzing donor behavior from this relatively optimistic baseline, we are able to isolate whether the signals that donors receive would be positive or negative according to the ideal post-conflict trajectory that donor policies prescribe (United Nations and World Bank 2018). We expect that signals that the post-conflict country is advancing in a positive direction, in line with donor expectations, will lead donors to reward the government by increasing development aid directly to the government and decrease humanitarian aid that bypasses the government (Dietrich 2013, DiLorenzo 2018). When donors receive signals that the post-conflict country is regressing, then donors are likely to give more humanitarian aid that bypasses the government and less development aid that more directly supports the government. This is because donors have a limited set of aid modalities - or ways of delivering aid - at their disposal and each one comes with a set of constraints that shape how the aid can be allocated (OECD 2005, Bandstein 2007). Rather than developing a new aid allocation approach to each new context, donors match their existing aid delivery options to familiar signals

from the post-conflict country (Feldman and March 1981, Herriott et al. 1985, March 1999).

To capture how donors respond to a post-conflict country's transition, we asked professionals working for donor and implementing organizations. We used an original expert-based survey-embedded experiment administered to over 1,100 (out of a total respondent pool of 12,000) individuals operating in over 180 countries to uncover the perceived patterns of donor behavior in post-conflict countries. Our large number of respondents (1,130) from diverse organizations operating in different country contexts allowed us to assess whether the perceived patterns of aid allocation are consistent across post-conflict countries, irrespective of the background of the respondents, the countries in which they have worked, or the organizations for whom they work or have worked.[4]

We randomly assigned each of the over 1,100 survey respondents one of four vignettes that described either a post-conflict country experiencing high levels of violence and low levels of political inclusion (strong violence), low levels of violence and low political inclusion (mild violence), low levels of violence and moderate levels of political inclusion (mild peace), or low levels of violence and high levels of political inclusion (strong peace), all in the aftermath of a civil war, the signature of a comprehensive peace agreement, and the country's first post-conflict elections.[5] To examine the potential effect of donor strategic interest on respondent perception of aid allocation behavior, we also randomly assigned a prompt before each vignette indicating whether or not the country was a donor priority country. As we discuss below in our results section, over sixty percent of respondents reported having experienced the country scenario described in their vignette, indicating the relevance of our vignette formulation.

This paper makes several important contributions to the study of donor allocation behavior in post-conflict countries. First, we provide an empirical test of the patterns of donor aid allocation behavior in post-conflict countries that sheds light on the relevance of broader aid allocation claims. Our finding that aid experts report donors increase and decrease their aid in response to changes in the country context demonstrates that what is happening on the ground in recipient countries shapes donor aid allocation decisions, challenging existing claims that donor aid allocation is determined solely by strategic interest. Second, because our experimental design enables us to examine the perceived allocation behavior of different types of aid - budgetary, development, transitional, and humanitarian aid - we are able to test how the same country country context shapes the allocation of different types of aid, whereas prior scholarship has examined each type independently. Third, this is the first study to use an experimental design to examine the perceptions of

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[4]While the use of experiments in development aid scholarship has grown over the last decade, such studies rarely focus on identifying the determinants of donor behavior. Instead, studies evaluate how citizens in developing countries perceive development aid (Dietrich et al. 2018, Findley et al. 2017), or randomize the assignment of the development program to identify its precise impact (Blattman et al. 2013, Banerjee et al. 2015). To the best of our knowledge, Swedlund (2017) is the only other study that uses survey experiments to elicit the opinion of donors about development aid, although she focuses on how donors and recipient governments negotiate aid agreements in peaceful countries.

[5]By randomly varying the specific country context in our survey experiment, we aimed to mitigate the potential social desirability bias that may arise when donors and implementing agencies are asked to describe aid allocation behaviors in different post-conflict countries. Knowing very well how OECD donor policies indicate aid should be allocated (OECD 2005, 2007, IDPS/OECD 2011), these experts might have over-reported desired allocation behavior in a non-experimental context.

an understudied population - aid workers, including those that work for different aid organizations, different types of aid organizations (i.e., International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs), Bilateral donors, and Multilateral donors), and in different country contexts. These experts are the actors who are arguably best placed to identify the common patterns that shape aid allocation behavior. Finally, by studying donor behavior in post-conflict countries, we make contributions to both the aid allocation literature and the post-conflict peacebuilding literature, which have remained disconnected in spite of the fact that donors allocate the majority of their aid to fragile and post-conflict states.

2   Post-Conflict Aid: Buying friends or peace

The dominant international aid literature argues that aid allocation is motivated largely by donor foreign policy priorities (Schraeder et al. 1998, Dietrich 2013, Bermeo 2016). Aid is viewed as a tool with which bilateral aid donors "buy" unrelated policy concessions from recipient governments (Alesina and Dollar 2000, De Mesquita and Smith 2009, 2013). The purpose of development aid, from this perspective, is not necessarily to achieve development aims but to use fungible aid to incentivize recipient governments to support the foreign policy preferences of the donor country.

Other scholarship, however, challenges this contention. It argues that achieving development outcomes in the recipient country is also a foreign policy aim and one potential motivation for bilateral aid allocation (Berthélemy 2006, Feeny and McGillivray 2008, Dietrich 2013, Bermeo 2016). Using cross-national studies of bilateral development aid allocation at both the national and sub-national levels, this newer aid literature aims to explain why donors choose to allocate development aid to particular countries, and not others, and why these bilateral donors choose one set of aid modalities over another.

Scholars' investigations of the heterogeneous motivations for bilateral aid allocation point to several factors. First, donor strategic interest and recipient need are not mutually exclusive (Greenwade 1993, Hoeffler and Outram 2011, Büthe et al. 2012, Heinrich 2013, Dietrich 2019). Instead, because poor countries are often sources of insecurity, migration, and terrorism for donor countries, donors have a strategic interest in providing aid to governments to contain the most proximate threats (Bermeo 2016, 2017). Second, donors are motivated to achieve development outcomes in recipient countries, leading them to bypass poorly governed recipients in favor of aid allocation to third-party organizations, such as INGOs or private contractors, that can deliver development aid directly to the population (Dietrich 2013, Knack 2013, Steele and Shapiro 2017). Third, donors prefer to give aid to recipient countries that mirror their regime type (Bermeo 2011), their economic policy (Dietrich 2016), or the preferences of domestic interest groups or political parties (Travis 2010, Kleibl 2013). Fourth, when giving aid directly to poorly governed recipients, donors use aid modalities

that give them more control over aid implementation (Winters 2010, Winters and Martinez 2015). In sum, while this scholarship suggests that aid allocation is conditioned by donor foreign policy preferences, the types of aid modalities at donors' disposal, and the characteristics of the recipient country, it does not explain how this combination of factors influences aid to the type of country that currently receives most of the aid, countries affected by political violence and civil war.

The scholarship on aid and conflict focuses on the effect of international aid on violence, not on donor aid allocation behavior in response to violent or cooperative dynamics on the ground. These studies suggest, however, that dynamics on the ground matter for aid effectiveness in conflict-affected countries (De Waal and de Waal 1997, Anderson 1999, Uvin 1998, Terry 2002). Aid provides opportunities for rent seeking that may simultaneously increase the population's welfare and opportunities for violence (Weintraub 2016). Aid also potentially increases the losing party's ability to use violence to renegotiate a post-war settlement (Narang 2014), and supplies new lootable resources that can increase opportunities for violence (Wood and Sullivan 2015).[6]

The scholarship on post-conflict peacebuilding and peace processes looks at this relationship from yet a different angle and argues that intervenors use standard templates when allocating aid to post-conflict countries (Barnett 2006, Campbell et al. 2011, Autesserre 2014, Gowan and Stedman 2018). These scholars claim that international intervention in post-conflict states has a clear blueprint of the state that they want to create: one grounded in rule of law, liberal democratic institutions, and a market-based economy (Paris 2004, Barnett 2006). While these scholars identify broader norms that guide intervention in civil wars, they do not indicate how international intervenors respond to different contexts, instead assuming that international intervenors are largely unresponsive to evolving conflict dynamics. The focus of this scholarship on broader trends is influenced by the fact that it analyzes the shared behavior of all international actors in a particular country, without distinguishing between the dozens of states, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private contractors operating in post-conflict countries, each of which has a potentially different governance and incentive structure (Campbell 2018).

Other scholarship analyzes the intervention patterns of the United Nations, African Union, and other multilateral organizations. This scholarship argues that these multilaterals have developed an "international regime for treating civil war" (Gowan and Stedman 2018). When the war is ongoing, they try and use conflict mediation to enable warring parties to reach a comprehensive peace agreement (Stedman et al. 2002, Walter 2002). Then, once the warring parties have reached a comprehensive peace agreement, they deploy a UN or hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Others corroborate these claims, arguing that UN peacekeeping mandates have become increasingly standardized, containing largely the same components regardless of the actual context in which UN peacekeeping is being

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[6]For a detailed review of scholarship on the effect of aid on conflict dynamics, see Findley (2018), Zürcher (2017).

deployed (Petrie and Morrice 2015, Howard and Dayal 2018). While this scholarship helps us to understand the likely behaviors of the UN and African Union, it does not tell us how international aid donors are likely to respond to these contexts, even though countries recovering from or at risk of violent conflict are the largest recipients of foreign aid. The primary literature on aid allocation to post-conflict countries is produced by donors themselves. It argues that donors should allocate aid in response to the specific needs of the post-conflict country, without following a prescribed sequence or pattern (OECD 2007, OECD 2017). Nonetheless, high-level reports such as the 2011 World Development Report and the joint UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace report find that donors have failed to adopt such a targeted and responsive approach (United Nations and World Bank 2018).

The scholarship reviewed above points to several puzzles about aid allocation to post-conflict countries. Is aid allocation to post-conflict countries driven solely by donor strategic interest in spite of the findings that aid can foment violent conflict? Or is aid allocation fundamentally driven by donors' need to support programs that they believe will build a liberal-democratic state, regardless of the particular country context? Or, do donors allocate aid in response to the specific needs of the country whose post-conflict transition they they aim to support, as indicated in their policy directives?

3   Theoretical Expectations

In post-conflict countries, we expect that changes in donor aid allocation, if there are any, are conditioned by the available aid modalities at a donor's disposal and how these match onto the signals that a donor receives about whether the recipient country is progressing or regressing toward peace, as conceptualized in donor policy frameworks. Building on theories of organizational decision-making, we expect that rather than ignoring changes in the post-conflict country, which would spurn two decades of donor commitments to pay attention to conflict dynamics (Uvin 1999), or developing a different aid allocation approach for each post-conflict country, donors develop similar aid allocation response to countries that exhibit similar political and security dynamics.

Research on bureaucratic decision-making, particularly in relation to foreign aid (Martens et al. 2002, Ebrahim 2005, Gibson et al. 2005), points to the difficulty that organizations face in developing new solutions to each policy problem that they face (March 1999). Instead, organizations tend to match existing solutions to new problems. They pay attention to information about the new context that they are familiar with and discard the rest (Feldman and March 1981, Herriott et al. 1985, Levitt and March 1988). We expect that a similar pattern will hold for aid allocation to post-conflict countries. Guided by policy frameworks that outline how a post-conflict country *should* transition to peace, we expect that donors will follow a relatively consistent pattern in their response to post-conflict countries by increasing aid to reward supposed

progression toward peace and decreasing aid in response to signs of regression toward violence and civil war.

The hypotheses we develop below describe how we expect donors to respond to progression or regression in a post-conflict country's political and security context. To develop these hypotheses, we first discuss the standard aid allocation modalities available to OECD donors operating in post-conflict countries. Then we describe donor policy guidelines for post-conflict countries and the types of related events that are likely to signal regression or progression. Subsequently, we outline hypotheses that integrate the available aid modalities with a set of standard political and security events in the post-conflict country context to predict donor aid allocation responses.

3.1 Donor Aid Types and Modalities

Before outlining our expectations of how aid donors respond to post-conflict countries, we consider the aid allocation responses donors have at their disposal. Donor aid allocation to post-conflict countries is limited by the types of aid at their disposal and the delivery modalities associated with each type. We focus our analysis on the four traditional types of Official Development Assistance (ODA): humanitarian, development, transitional aid (e.g., peacebuilding, governance, or democratization aid), and budgetary aid. These types of aid differ in whether their modalities - or the way that aid is allocated - focus on giving aid directly to the recipient government, through parallel systems but in collaboration with the government, or bypass the government and are delivered via IOs, INGOs, or national NGOs.

Budgetary aid directly funds the recipient governments budget. It is composed of "unearmarked contributions to the government budget with the purpose to implement poverty reduction strategies, macroeconomic or structural reforms (SIDA 2019, 42). This support "is not linked to specific projects and includes a lumpsum transfer of foreign exchange" (Bandstein 2010, 9). Budgetary aid requires a high degree of confidence in the recipient government's policies and in the ability of the recipient government to absorb the resources and allocate them toward objectives that donors support.

Development aid funds projects or sector-wide programs that are implemented directly through the recipient government bureaucracy or in parallel systems established by IOs or INGOs (Bandstein 2010, 9). Projects can be implemented by IOs, INGOs, or private contractors but are implemented under a general development cooperation agreement to support the governments priorities. Sector-wide programs are often implemented through a pooled fund established by a group of donors and managed by the recipient government and the donors (Bandstein 2010, 10). The provision of development aid that uses these modalities, thus, signals confidence in the recipient government but not sufficient confidence or capacity to merit only budget aid.

Transition financing "covers a broad spectrum of activities that traditionally falls between the 'humanitarian' and 'development' categories, including recovery and reconstruction activities and security related

and peacebuilding activities (often referred to as stabilisation)" (OECD 2010b, 15). Transitional aid aims to help "build the capacity of nascent government structures" (OECD 2010b, 16). As a result, it does not seek to bypass the recipient government, as is the case with much humanitarian aid, nor does it seek to directly support established government capacity, as is the case with much development aid. Instead, donors often give the aid directly to an IO, such as the United Nations, or to INGOs, to collaborate with the recipient government in implementing these types of interventions that aim to build the capacity of both the state and society to sustain peace (OECD 2007, OECD 2010a, 2011).

Humanitarian assistance is aid that is "intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters associated with natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur" (Initiatives 2019, 73). Humanitarian aid tends to focus on delivering goods and services directly to the population, often without collaborating directly with the host government. In fact, donors often provide humanitarian aid directly to INGOs or IOs precisely because they do not have confidence that the government is willing or able to serve the interests of its population (OECD 2011, 2017).

Given that donors have different types of aid and associated modalities at their disposal that vary in how much the recipient government controls the aid, we expect donors to substitute different types of aid in response to the signal they receive from the post-conflict country. When donors receive signals that give them confidence in the government, we expect that they will give aid that more directly benefits the recipient government. When donors receive signals that reduce their confidence in the government, we expect that they will give aid that bypasses the government and aims to benefit the population more directly. Below, we describe types of events in the post-conflict country that we expect will signal to donors progression toward peace or regression toward war.

3.2 Post-Conflict Transitions

According to the main agenda-setting organization for western donors, the OECD, post-conflict countries are those that have experienced a civil war, undergone a peace agreement, and held democratic elections (OECD 2010b). The immediate aftermath of the countrys first post-conflict elections is held up in the policy and academic literature as a crucial turning point in a country's peace process, determining whether the country can break out of the conflict-underdevelopment trap (Stedman et al. 2002, Assembly 2005, Walter 2011, United Nations and World Bank 2018). The OECD, the World Bank, and the United Nations have outlined a common idea of what a successful and unsuccessful post-conflict transition look like (World Bank 2011, United Nations and World Bank 2018).[7] If the post-conflict government implements the peace agreement

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[7]There is broad scholarship arguing that countries state formation trajectories are uncertain and unique (North et al. 2009, Campbell et al. 2011, Suhrke 2011, Barma 2016). We do not contest this finding but contend that in spite of this uniqueness, donors exhibit consistent aid allocation responses in response to the same post-conflict environment.

and institutes reforms to foster inclusive political and security institutions, then the country is viewed as making positive progress toward peace. If, however, the post-conflict government fails to implement the peace agreement and oppresses opposition groups and violence between the former warring parties breaks out, then the country is viewed as regressing toward war.

The 2018 joint United Nations-World Bank report, *Pathways for Peace*, echoing prior policy documents, identifies the ideal outcome of a post-conflict transition: a situation without violence and built on sustainable development, justice, equity, and protection of human rights as defined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations and World Bank 2018, 78). To achieve this ideal post-conflict transition, the OECD's aid effectiveness agenda for fragile and post-conflict states, *A New Deal for Fragile States*, commits its member states and conflict-affected states to using aid to foster: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services (IDPS/OECD 2011). Because we are concerned with how international donors respond to conflict and peace dynamics in post-conflict countries, we focus our analysis on the first two goals: legitimate politics and security. To create *legitimate politics*, the New Deal argues donors and recipient governments should "foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution" (IDPS/OECD 2011, 2). To create *security*, the New Deal states that donors and recipient governments must "establish and strengthen people's security" (IDPS/OECD 2011, 2).

The donor policy agenda for fragile states, however, does not give guidance as to exactly how donors should achieve legitimate politics and security (IDPS/OECD 2011, OECD 2012, United Nations and World Bank 2018). In fact, reports on progress made toward these goals argue that we cannot understand patterns of donor behavior in post-conflict countries because each post-conflict country is unique and donors, thus, respond differently (OECD 2012, Nunnenkamp 2016, Donaubauer et al. 2019). Policy documents support this assumption, arguing that donors should do a conflict and fragility assessment and identify opportunities to influence progress towards legitimate politics and security, either directly by funding political and security reforms or indirectly by using their aid to compel these reforms (World Bank 2011, OECD 2011, xvii and 103). We contend, however, that donors respond in similar ways to what they perceive as positive and negative signals about the post-conflict context.

3.2.1 Positive and negative signals

What factors might signal to international donors that a post-conflict country is progressing toward legitimate politics or security or regressing toward war?

For a post-conflict country, the nature of its *legitimate politics* is outlined its comprehensive peace agreement.[8] Peace agreements aim to create legitimate politics primarily by: outlining a power-sharing arrange-

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[8] A peace agreement is considered comprehensive if it resulted from negotiations that included the main conflict actors (that is, either the central rebel group or a majority of groups) and the main issues underlying the conflict (that is, negotiations were not limited to one policy or issue area) (Joshi and Quinn 2015, 881).

ment for the signatories, describing the provisions for democratic elections, and establishing measures to foster independent civil society and media (Stedman et al. 2002, OECD 2012, Joshi and Quinn 2015, 2017, United Nations and World Bank 2018). While there are certainly more governance provisions in individual agreements, we aim to capture the common provisions that are likely to guide donor responses to the post-conflict country (Joshi and Darby 2013, Bell and Badanjak 2019).

A wide range of scholarship supports this focus on power-sharing arrangements, democratic elections, and the creation of independent civil society and media. The democratization literature identifies the importance of civil society and independent media for holding democratic governments accountable to their population (ODonnell et al. 1986, Diamond et al. 1999, Carothers 2011). The literature on peace agreements argues that power-sharing provision, irrespective of the particular type, are necessary for reduced levels of violence over the long term (Stedman et al. 2002, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007, Joshi and Quinn 2017). Likewise, the scholarship on peacebuilding and statebuilding finds that democratic institutions are necessary for post-war societies to break the "conflict trap" that can lead to a cycle of violence and underdevelopment (Collier et al. 2003, Doyle and Sambanis 2006).[9] Other scholarship is critical of international attempts to create liberal democratic institutions in post-conflict countries, which we do not contest (Campbell et al. 2011). Instead, we use existing policy frameworks and related scholarship to identify the factors that might spur donors to alter their aid allocation behavior in post-conflict countries.

For a post-conflict country, donors view *security* as whether the population feels more secure (IDPS/OECD 2011, 2). Increased security of the population is reflected throughout the academic literature and policy documents on civil wars (Mason and Mitchell 2016). It is also grounded in the basic Weberian definition of the state, whose primary purpose is to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory (Max et al. 1946). We are not arguing that the post-conflict state can provide this degree of security (Muggah 2008), nor are we arguing that violence is inherently bad for democracy (Thaler 2012, Chenoweth et al. 2017). Instead, we expect that donors will interpret signals of improved security for the population and reduced incidents of violence as indications that the post-conflict country is progressing toward donors' ideal notion of post-conflict security.

Backsliding in *legitimate politics* is likely to be most apparent in the disintegration of the power-sharing arrangements, including through exclusion or repression of opposition groups, and the reduction in the independence of civil society and media (United Nations and World Bank 2018). Backsliding in *security* is likely to be most apparent in increased violence, particularly against the population, and related population displacement. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report addresses these two factors together, arguing that illegitimate state institutions - those that are neither accountable to their population nor

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[9]The literature on UN peacekeeping finds that it plays an important role in guaranteeing the peace, enabling the parties to the conflict to disarm and implement the peace agreement (Walter 2002, Fortna 2008). We do not examine the role of UN peacekeeping although our vignettes do not preclude their presence.

inclusive of diverse political preferences - are more likely to experience "repeated bouts of violence" (World Bank 2011, 86).[10]

3.3 Hypotheses

We expect that donors will respond to signals of a post-conflict state's progression or regression in relatively consistent ways. Rather than each donor developing a unique approach to each new context, we expect donors to respond in similar ways to the same context (Levitt and March 1988). We contend that this response is conditioned by 1) whether the events in the country context signal to donors that a post-conflict country is progressing toward peace or regressing toward increased violence, and 2) the degree of cooperation that donor aid types and modalities require with the post-conflict government.

Given donors' commitment to helping post-conflict countries implement power-sharing provisions, create democratic institutions, foster independent civil society and media, and create security for populations, we expect that events pointing to the post-conflict country's success at furthering these aims would be associated with increased aid that directly supports the recipient government: development and budgetary aid. Because budgetary aid is given directly to the recipient government's budget, the allocation of budgetary aid indicates a higher degree of confidence in the recipient country than normal project and program development aid. We would, thus, expect donors to give budgetary aid when they have high confidence that the post-conflict country is making progress toward legitimate politics and security, as manifest, for example, in a second round of free and fair democratic elections that resulted in a change in the dominant political party (ODonnell et al. 1986). When donors have more moderate confidence that the post-conflict country is progressing toward legitimate politics and security, for example as manifest in the implementation of the peace agreement and increased sense of security of the population, we expect increases in development aid, but not in budgetary aid.

We expect that when donors see moderate, as opposed to significant, progression or regression in the post-conflict country, they will give aid that is intended to strengthen the capacity of the government to create legitimate politics and security: transitional aid. Transitional aid is aimed to support the government but is often managed or implemented by IOs, INGOs, or private contractors, reflecting donor uncertainty about the recipient government's ability to effectively implement peacebuilding, security sector, or post-conflict reconstruction interventions (OECD 2010b).

In response to signals of both moderate and high levels of post-conflict progress, we expect reductions in humanitarian aid, however, because it bypasses the government and responds to immediate humanitarian

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[10]While the scholarly literature is inconclusive as to whether exclusive political settlements, oppression of opposition parties, or oppression and violence against civil society, media, or the population are, in fact, precursors to renewed longer-term violence in post-conflict countries, we base our analysis on the fact that the policy frameworks adopted by donors contend that they are (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Walter 2002, Collier et al. 2003, Chenoweth et al. 2011, 2017).

needs, which should subside with the reduction of violence.[11] But when violence against civilians increases, particularly by the government and opposition groups, we expect that donors will increase humanitarian aid, particularly when they receive information that the population has been displaced by the violence.

We expect that donor confidence in the post-conflict government will be reduced by signals that it is violating its commitment to legitimate politics, outlined in the peace agreement, and security. Consequently, when the post-conflict government uses its authority to detain opposition figures, place new restrictions on civil society or independent media, or used violence against civilians, we expect that donors will reduce development and budgetary aid, which directly supports the government's policies and budget.

Below, we outline our hypotheses that synthesize the above expectations. Because we expect donors to make decisions about all of their potential types of aid - budgetary, development, transitional, and humanitarian - in response to changes in the country context, we indicate our expectations for the effect of different contexts for each type of aid. We also summarize our expectations in Figure 1.

> *H1 - Strong Violence:* Signals that a country is failing to honor its commitment to legitimate politics and security lead to decreases in budgetary aid, development aid, and transitional aid, and to increases in humanitarian aid.

> *H2 - Mild Violence:* Signals that a country is failing to honor its commitment to legitimate politics lead to decreases in budgetary aid and development aid and increases in transitional aid humanitarian aid.

> *H3 - Mild Peace:* Signals that a country is making moderate levels of progress toward legitimate politics and security lead to increases in development aid and transitional aid and decreases in budgetary and humanitarian aid.

> *H4 - Strong Peace:* Signals that a country is making high levels of progress toward legitimate politics and security lead to increases in budgetary aid and development aid and decreases in transitional aid and humanitarian aid.

4 Research Design

To understand how donors allocate aid to post-conflict countries, we surveyed individuals who are best informed about aid allocation in these countries: staff working for aid agencies and their implementing partners. In particular, the majority of our respondents had past experience with aid allocation to post-conflict

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[11]Immediate humanitarian need could of course also result from environmental disasters or entrenched scarcity. In this analysis, we only focus on potential security and political contributors to humanitarian need.

Figure 1: Expectations for Aid Allocation Behavior in Post-Conflict Countries

	Strong Violence	**Mild Violence**	**Mild Peace**	**Strong Peace**
Humanitarian Aid	⇑ Hum. Aid	⇑ Hum. Aid	⇓ Hum Aid	⇓ Hum Aid
Transitional Aid	⇓ Tran. Aid	⇑ Tran. Aid	⇑ Tran Aid	⇓ Tran Aid
Development Aid	⇓ Dev. Aid	⇓ Dev. Aid	⇑ Dev. Aid	⇑ Dev. Aid
Budgetary Aid	⇓ Bud. Aid	⇓ Bud. Aid	⇓ Bud. Aid	⇑ Bud. Aid

countries, including in contexts that resemble our vignette treatments. Simply relying on existing aid commitment data to infer regularities in donors' aid allocation decisions would not have allowed us to understand how donors actually allocate aid in response to different post-conflict trajectories. Aid commitment data is derived from donors' longer-term aid planning processes that, by design, do not account for unanticipated changes in a post-conflict country or donor aid allocation decisions in response to these events (Tierney et al. 2011). To test our hypotheses about donor aid allocation in response to progression or regression in a country's post-conflict transition, we designed a survey experiment that we administered to over 1,100 (out of a total pool of 12,000 experts who received the survey) aid experts working for donor and implementing agencies in over 180 countries.

We fielded our survey in July and August of 2017 and opened it for a final round in March 2018. We opted for an experimental approach instead of regular surveys because social desirability could bias pure survey-based results, potentially leading to an overestimation of donor responsiveness to post conflict contexts. Since it would be difficult to hide the purpose of our survey, donors and implementing partners might feel the need to show more aid allocation responsiveness to specific events in a country's post-conflict transition than is actually present (OECD 2005, 2007, IDPS/OECD 2011). Using a survey experiment allows us to circumvent this problem (Morton and Williams 2010, Mutz 2011).

4.1 Treatment Design

Our experiment consisted of an informational vignette in which we presented a scenario of a hypothetical country A that varied with respect to four different potential scenarios in its post-conflict transition, which we label strong violence, mild violence, mild peace, and strong peace in this paper, but not in the survey. Each of these informational vignettes is a bundled treatment consisting of two pieces of information about the post-conflict country, one about political inclusion and one about security as outlined in our theoretical framework. Our informational vignettes are not intended to represent all scenarios in all post-conflict countries, but to reflect typical scenarios experienced by actual post-conflict countries as depicted in Table 18 in the Appendix. As a result, we refrained from completely randomizing these two aspects in order to present our aid experts

with typical scenarios so that they could describe donor behavior that has actually occurred.Furthermore, the treatment texts are formulated as stylized descriptions of a hypothetical country instead of a description of an actual country for two reasons. First, since we survey experts with considerable but varying country-specific knowledge and experience we required a set-up that worked for all experts. Second, by surveying individuals with a diverse set of experiences about a hypothetical scenario, we are able to observe broader patterns of donor response across contexts and donors, identifying rules of aid allocation that were previously unobserved. Our approach, thus, enables us to maximize the external validity of our findings.

To establish the same baseline for each of our post-conflict countries, and to ensure that each respondent was given the same conceptualization of a post-conflict country, corresponding to the OECD's definition of post-conflict countries (OECD 2010a), each of our treatment vignettes is proceeded by a short description of Country A that was identical for all respondents:

> *[Country A] is a post-conflict country, which means that it has experienced civil war or significant armed violence. It has undergone a peace process and has held its first round of democratic elections.*

After this common introduction, each of our survey respondents was randomly assigned to one of four contexts: strong violence, mild violence, mild peace, and strong peace. These treatment contexts represent a shift from the original prompt about the country context, indicating whether or not the country progresses toward peace or regress back toward violence and war.

The four hypothetical country scenarios that we provide resemble country contexts that over 70% of our respondents reported to have experienced (see 3). Furthermore, these scenarios reflect the events that actually took place in 54 of the countries in which our respondents were based within two years prior to their completion of the survey. We provide an overview of the countries that fit our scenario and why so in Table 18 in the Appendix. The fact that a vast majority of our respondents knew the scenario and have experienced such a scenario shows that despite the fact that our treatment vignettes are hypothetical, they convey the type of information about actual contexts with which people were familiar. The four hypothetical country contexts presented to respondents are:

> *Strong Violence* - Lately in Country A, violence has significantly increased. Opposition groups and government are increasingly using violence resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and the displacement of hundreds of people.

> *Mild Violence* - Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has grown. The government is responding to the tension by detaining opposition politicians and placing restrictions on independent media outlets and national NGOs.

Mild Peace - Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has declined. Parts of the peace agreement(s) are being implemented and the population generally feels safe to move about the territory.

Strong Peace - Lately in Country A, following recent elections that were widely viewed as free and fair, the government has undergone a peaceful change in the dominant political party. Independent media and national NGOs are flourishing.

In addition to the four treatment vignettes, half of the treatments included an additional sentence labeling Country A as a top priority country for the donor, signifying that the donor had strategic interest in the country. The other half read of Country A as not a top priority country for the donor. Given the emphasis in existing aid scholarship on the importance of strategic interest for donor aid allocation behavior, we took this factor into account in our treatment design. Including the top priority/ not top priority status in our treatment allows us to investigate whether the strategic interest of the donor in the recipient country overrides the effect of the particular post-conflict dynamics or whether these country dynamics are the decisive factor, as our argument suggests. With the inclusion of the country's priority status, we have eight different treatment groups.

To ensure the comparability of our treatments we kept the wording at a similar length and provided about the same level of detail for each treatment. We pretested our survey using our respondents for New Guinea. We opted for New Guinea because it is a country with a relatively small number of potential respondents, which allowed us to test the survey on actual aid experts while not losing too many potential respondents for our final survey. Furthermore, it was important to restrict ourselves to one specific country for our pre-test so as not to violate the Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption (SUTVA) if respondents of the pretest had spoken about our survey to their colleagues, our potential future respondents.

Following our treatment vignette, we first asked respondents whether they had already experienced the specific situation described in our scenario. This question serves two purposes. First, it is important for us to differentiate between respondents with actual experience with the scenario from those without so that we can identify whether experience makes a difference in their response. Second, for those respondents who had not experienced their scenario we introduced our set of outcome variables with the line: *If you have not experienced or observed the context described in Country A, please just tell us your opinion in response to the questions below.* We pay attention in our analyses to these two types of respondents because for the respondents with no prior experience of the scenario, our questions are truly hypothetical; whereas, for respondents with prior experience of countries that resemble the scenario, our questions are not hypothetical. Since the majority of our respondents had prior experience with the type of country context described in their treatment vignette, they represent true experts about aid to these types of post-conflict situations.

Our outcome variable is derived from a question that asks whether in the respondent's treatment scenario, s/he believes that his/her organization (in cases where the respondent worked for a donor organization) or his/her main donor (in cases where the respondent worked for an implementing agency) would increase, decrease, or not change the amount of aid to the country. We ask this question with respect to the four categories of aid outlined in our theoretical framework: (1) Budgetary Aid; (2) Development Aid; (3) Transitional Aid Peacebuilding, Governance, Early Recovery, etc.); and (4) Humanitarian Aid (We created four different dependent variables, one for each type of aid, with three possible values each (i.e., increase, decrease, no change). Table 7 provides an overview.

Table 1: Dependent variables

Amount of aid	1) Development Aid 2) Humanitarian Aid 3) Budgetary Aid 4) Transitional Aid (Peacebuilding Governance , Early Recovery etc.)	- decrease - no change - increase

4.2 Respondent Pool

In establishing a list of potential respondents, we strove to include as many experts on the allocation of aid in conflict-affected countries as possible, focusing on donors who set the post-conflict aid agenda that we outlined in our theoretical framework.[12] In particular, we assembled a contact list of over 12,000 people who work for over 1,600 donor or implementing partner organizations at the country level. These people are experts in the sense that they have specialized knowledge about the behavior of donors during post-conflict peace processes. This approach is similar to Swedlund (2017) who presents evidence from 114 heads of development cooperation working in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries. We follow Swedlund's argument that "the fact that donor officials are not widely studied is a missed opportunity (Brown 2011); they are the human face of donor agencies and thus have important insights into the practices and behaviors of donors.' (Swedlund 2017, 465)'

Our goal in establishing our respondent pool was to achieve the highest possible coverage of these aid experts to maximize the external validity of our findings. One big obstacle to this approach is that the universe of experts on the allocation of aid in conflict affected countries is not known. There is no fixed list of experts from which to sample our respondents. We took the following approach to circumvent this difficulty and reach the most comprehensive set of experts possible.

First, we combined all contact lists that the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) creates of the donors, United Nations organizations, and INGOs that operate in countries where OCHA is

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[12]This includes staff of the United Nations and World Bank, the two multilateral organizations most engaged in establishing donors' vision of post-conflict transitions. It also includes staff of bilateral donors who are members of the OECD, as well as their implementing partners.

present, which includes over fifty countries that are experiencing natural or man-made disasters, including civil war, resulting in increased need for life-saving assistance to the population (OCHA 2020). Second, we integrated this list with the contact lists of country-based UN leadership maintained by the UN Development Group (UNDG), which is charged with the coordination of development aid in all countries that receive development aid. Third, we added the contact lists maintained by the Logistics Cluster of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which lists the specific contact people in donor and implementing agencies that can support logistical coordination during humanitarian emergencies. Fourth, we searched the websites of OECD donors to collect the available contact lists for their country-based staff. Finally, we asked survey respondents to recommend additional experts who could complete the survey and distributed the survey to this snowball sample.

To maximize our response rate and to minimize any potential sample selection biases, we provided respondents the opportunity to answer our survey in English and French. Furthermore, we ensured our respondents full anonymity and that it would not be possible to trace their answers back either to their person or their organization. In addition, since interviewing experts is asking them to share with us their scarce time, we offered them with the opportunity to give us feedback, as a signal that we take their expertise seriously, and we promised to send them the findings of our study.

To illustrate our respondent pool, Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of the 12,000 experts we contacted.[13] Darker shades in Figure 2 indicate countries with a higher number of experts and, thus, potential respondents. It becomes apparent from this heatmap that we have contacted not only experts actually based in recipient countries but also quite a number of experts based in donor countries. The countries with the highest number of contacted experts were the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and Myanmar, in which we contacted more than 500 experts each.

Out of this respondent pool, 1,130 experts from 186 countries replied. Table 13 in the Appendix lists all countries where our contacted and actual respondents were located and the number of experts per country. Countries from which we did not receive any response are mostly small island states, such as Antigua and Barbuda, but also some donor countries, such as Poland. Recipient countries from which we received the largest number of responses are the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Mali, Myanmar, and Nepal, all of which had more than 50 respondents. The United States (29 respondents) is the country with the highest number of respondents based in a donor country followed by Finland (11 respondents) and Switzerland (9 respondents).

Table 2 further illustrates the composition of our respondents and the relationship between our respondents and respondent pool. It lists the number of respondents per type of organization in column 2. In particular, we distinguish between bilateral and multilateral donors, multilateral implementing organiza-

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[13]This heatmap was made by Jessica Braithwaite, Assistant Professor, University of Arizona.

Figure 2: Heatmap of contacted experts by resident country

tions, international and national nongovernmental organizations as well as private contractors. It becomes apparent that most respondents work for either multilateral implementing organizations, such as the UN, or INGOs. The category with the fewest respondents is private contractors. To put these numbers in perspective, columns 3 and 4 provide the percentages of experts per organization type for our actual respondents and for our respondent pool, respectively, demonstrating that the distribution for our respondents is similar to that of our respondent pool. The biggest difference between our respondents and respondent pool is in the INGO category, with a difference of eight percentage points between the respondents (24%) and respondent pool (32%) as well as the "Other" category with a difference of 7.8 percentage points. This implies that while, in general, our experts match our respondent pool, some types of organizations are slightly over-represented (e.g. bilateral and multilateral donors) while others are slightly under-represented (e.g. international and national NGOs as well as multilateral organizations).

Table 2: Overview of Respondents

Type of Organization	Number of respondents	Percentage of respondents	Percentage in respondent pool	Organizations with multi-mandate
Bilateral Donor (such as DFID, USAID)	109	9.6%	5.2%	59
Multilateral Donor	50	4.4%	1.6%	13
Multilateral Impl. Organization (such as UNDP)	413	36.5%	39.9%	335
International NGO (such as MSF)	272	24%	32%	198
National NGO	173	15.3%	20.3%	124
Private Contractor	14	1.2%	0.1%	8
Other	99	8.8%	1%	57

Finally, Table 2 shows in column five how many of these organizations are multi-mandate (i.e. focus on more than one type of aid intervention), such as the World Bank, in contrast to organizations that have a single mandate, such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF). These numbers show that with the exception of the multilateral donor category, a majority of respondents work for a multi-mandate organization. We consider this important since it implies that these experts have experience with different types of aid and should be better able to judge how their organization responds to changes in post-conflict countries with respect to different aid categories as proposed in our theoretical argument.

To provide more information about our respondents, Figure 3 displays descriptive statistics differentiated by our four main treatment scenarios. The first five sub-graphs in each row show how many experts worked for a donor or implementing agency, respondents' age and gender distribution, whether they considered themselves as international or national staff, and the percentage of respondents who had experienced the described scenario. As already apparent in Table 2, a majority of our respondents work for implementing agencies. These descriptive statistics also show that while age is almost normally distributed an overwhelming majority of our respondents is male. With regard to the type of staff, we observe that international and national staff are almost balanced. More importantly, in addition to describing our sample in more detail, Figure 3 shows that the profiles of respondents do not vary significantly by treatment group. In fact, if we compare the four different rows in Figure 3 we observe that the treatment groups are nicely balanced with regard to all represented variables. The fourth column of Figure 3 also establishes the expertise of the majority of our respondents in the subject of the survey: over sixty percent of respondents in each of our treatment groups experienced the scenario about Country A provided to them.

Figure 3 also allows for a first visual inspection of our four dependent variables by treatment scenarios. The last sub-figure in each row shows the percentage of respondents opting to either decrease, increase, or not change the respective type of aid - budgetary, development, transitional, and humanitarian aid - in response to the treatment scenario. It becomes apparent that with the exception of transitional aid (the last bar in each sub-figure), for which the distribution seems very similar across treatments, the percentages of respondents answering decrease, increase, or no change markedly differs by treatment scenario. For example, we can observe that the percentage of respondents choosing to increase development aid in response to the strong or the mild peace treatment is about twice as large as in the case of strong or mild violence. While the pattern seems the same for budgetary aid, the second to last bar in each sub-figure, the percentage of experts choosing no change under strong or mild peace is much larger for budgetary aid than for development aid. Finally, the graphs show that the pattern is reversed for humanitarian aid (the second bar in each sub-figure), in which case a vast majority of our respondents opted to increase under conditions of strong violence and to decrease under conditions of strong or mild peace. In the next section, we will investigate in more detail whether these purely descriptive results also hold up under inferential analysis.

Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics for Respondents

Strong Violence Treatment

| Type of Actor | Age | Gender | Type of Staff | Experianced Scenario | Change in Aid |

Mild Violence Treatment

| Type of Actor | Age | Gender | Type of Staff | Experianced Scenario | Change in Aid |

Mild Peace Treatment

| Type of Actor | Age | Gender | Type of Staff | Experianced Scenario | Change in Aid |

Strong Peace Treatment

| Type of Actor | Age | Gender | Type of Staff | Experianced Scenario | Change in Aid |

Decrease   No Change   Increase

5 Empirical Results

This section presents our analysis of aid allocation patterns in post-conflict countries soon after their first post-conflict elections. We proceed in several steps. First, we discuss a difference-in-means analysis to evaluate whether each of our four treatment vignettes is associated with changes in the different types of aid, as predicted by our theoretical framework, and thus whether the patterns displayed in Figure 2 indeed reflect statistically significant differences. In a second step, we show the results of a multinomial regression analysis indicating the predicted probability of an increase, decrease, or no change for each type of aid category being associated with each of our four treatment vignettes. We then discuss the results of additional analyses to underline the robustness of our findings. For both the difference-in-means and multinomial analyses, we present the results of each of the four treatment groups by pooling the priority and non-priority status of the recipient country and then show in the robustness section that our results are not sensitive to the priority/non-priority distinction.

Starting with the difference-in-means analysis, Figure 4 shows the results of a t-test comparing each of the three informational treatment vignettes - strong violence, mild violence, and mild peace - to the informational treatment vignette for strong peace for each of our four different aid variables - budgetary, development, transitional, and humanitarian. Since we could not have asked about our outcome variables without providing a specific type of scenario, our survey does not have a control group in the common sense (i.e. a group that received no information as is common in most survey experiments). In contrast, we rely on the strong peace treatment as our baseline category. The logic of selecting strong peace as the baseline category is that the strong peace vignette is closest to the normal mode of operation for most donors (OECD 2010b). As a consequence, the dots in Figure 4 depict the difference between each treatment group's mean on the respective aid variable, ranging from 1 (decrease) to 3 (increase), and the mean of the strong peace treatment group while the bars show the 95% confidence intervals. Positive values suggest that the respective treatment group is more likely to choose "increase" in that type of aid than those respondents having read the strong peace vignette. Negative values suggest that the treatment group was more likely to move towards decrease than those having received the strong peace vignette.[14]

The results displayed in Figure 4 show that our experts seem to indicate a clear pattern of aid allocation in response to our treatment scenarios as predicted by our theoretical framework. In particular, we observe that respondents are significantly more likely to opt for an increase in humanitarian aid in response to strong violence and mild violence as compared to strong peace in line with hypothesis 1 and 2. As predicted, we also see that our experts' responses for development and budgetary aid show a significantly negative difference for both the strong and mild violence treatment. Hence, under conditions of both mild and strong

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[14]Table 9 in the Appendix shows the results if we rely on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test instead. The findings are identical.

**Figure 4:** Difference in Means by Treatment[15]

violence, our respondents opt to reduce the type of aid that would allow governments most control over its use (i.e. development and budgetary aid), whereas they opt to increase the type of aid that mostly bypasses governments (i.e. humanitarian aid). The one exception to this pattern, and where the results are in contrast to our theoretical expectations, is transitional aid. In this case, we observe no differentiated reaction by our experts to our treatment scenarios at all; a finding which already became apparent from the visual inspection of Figure 2.

The difference-in-means analysis shown in Figure 4 indicates that, with the exception of transitional aid, our respondents opt for significantly different aid allocation patterns in violent contexts as compared to more peaceful contexts. However, the difference-in-means analysis hides a more nuanced analysis of the most likely response given each treatment vignette. Our multinomial regression results help to answer this question. In this analysis, we use the four aid categories as dependent variables and the treatment variables as our independent variables. Since our dependent variables range from 1 (decrease) to 3 (increase) we considered a multinomial logistic regression framework to be most appropriate.[16] In these regression models, we do not include any covariates other than our treatments because we are primarily interested in the average treatment effects. Due to our experimental research design, the allocation of our treatments is independent of any potential third variables. We can, thus, obtain the average treatment effect by analyzing the number

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[16]Since our dependent variables are ordinally scaled we could, in principle, also estimate an ordered logistic regression. Yet, for some of our regressions the parallel regression assumption is violated (Long and Freese 2006). To ensure comparability of our results we use multinomial regression models for all regressions.

of individuals who opted for increase, decrease, or no change in aid without controlling for other factors; randomization broke the link between these other factors and our outcome of interest. In our robustness checks section, below, we discuss potential heterogeneous treatment effects and show that the results do not change if we add control variables.

Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities – Multinomial Regression[17]

Since the regression output of multinomial models is not intuitively interpretable, we show the predicted probabilities of our four different multinomial models here and present the corresponding regression tables in the Appendix (Table 9). Figure 5 shows for each treatment vignette the predicted probability that

our experts choose no change, increase, or decrease for each aid type.[18] Beginning with the strong peace treatment vignette, which is depicted in the last panel of each sub-figure, we observe that hypothesis 4 is confirmed for both development and budgetary aid, for which increase seems the standard choice. In the case of humanitarian aid, experts are not as clear-cut in their decision as we would have expected theoretically: while decrease is the option with the highest probability, in line with hypothesis 4, the confidence intervals of decrease and increase slightly overlap. For transitional aid, where a clear majority of experts opt to increase under conditions of strong peace, the results are actually the opposite of what we expected. The interesting aspect of transitional aid, however, is that increase is not only the most preferred option under conditions of strong peace but also under all other conditions. Simply put, and as already seen in the difference-in-means analyses, our treatments do not elicit significantly different reactions from aid experts regarding transitional aid.

With regard to hypothesis 3, mild peace, the results for development aid support our expectations that respondents will opt for an increase in development aid. The results for humanitarian aid are also mostly in line with hypothesis 3 since, as predicted, decrease is the most likely option although the difference between increase and decrease is not as pronounced as it is in the case of development aid. In case of budgetary aid, we observe that whereas it is not statistically significant that increase is the most common choice of experts, it is still a much more common choice than decrease, which is in contrast to our hypothesis 3. This suggests that in relation to budgetary aid our experts do not seem to distinguish mild peace and strong peace as clearly as we would have expected theoretically.

Finally, turning to hypothesis 1 and 2, we observe our predicted pattern. Increasing humanitarian aid is, by far, the most likely expert choice, especially under the strong violence vignette but also under the mild violence vignette. Under both the strong and mild violence vignette, experts also decide to decrease budgetary aid. The results for development aid are not statistically significant.

The findings as discussed so far provide for some first conclusions. As predicted by our theoretical framework, we observe that aid experts react to negative signals about the post-conflict country context with a decrease in those types of aid that would more directly support the recipient government (i.e. development and budgetary aid). In contrast, aid experts increase humanitarian aid in response to these same negative signals, which can be interpreted as a sign to bypass the governments in times of trouble and allocate aid more directly to the population. We observe the exact opposite pattern if a country sends positive signals by holding elections and promoting civil society. The one exception is transitional aid, for which we do not observe any differentiated reaction. Instead, the standard aid expert choice is to increase transitional aid under all treatment scenarios. This may be due to the fact that transitional aid is supposed to help war-torn countries make the transition toward peace, justifying its choice in all scenarios. It may also be that recipients

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[18]Table 7 in the Appendix shows the equivalent descriptive distribution of our dependent variables split by donor organizations and implementing agencies.

have little knowledge of the determinants of transitional aid allocation since the financial allocation for this type of aid is much smaller than humanitarian, development, or budgetary aid (OECD 2010b).

Figure 6: Difference in Means – Scenario known[19]

Difference in Means (Baseline: Strong Peace)

Up to this point, we included all 1,130 respondents in our analysis, combining individuals who have experience with the treatment scenarios with individuals who have never experienced them. One could argue, however, that only the first are real experts because they have experience with aid allocation in the scenario that we provided to them. We now differentiate between respondents who know the scenario and respondents who do not. Figure 6 shows the results for those respondents who stated after reading their respective treatment vignette that they know the scenario (i.e. our actual experts) while Figure 7 shows the results for those who did not know the respective scenario.

The results as displayed in Figures 6 and 7 reinforce the findings discusssed up to this point and provide further evidence in support of our theoretical predictions. If respondents have clear experience with contexts similar to the ones described in their treatment vignette (i.e. the real experts), then their chosen aid allocation response is the same as the results discussed above. The results also hold for respondents who do not know the scenario. The only difference is that results for experts who know the scenario have much smaller confidence intervals than for those who do not know the scenario, indicating that we estimate the effect under experts who know the scenario with more precision.

5.1 Additional Analyses

In this section, we present several additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, we show our main findings split by whether the respondent worked for a donor organization or an implementing agencies. These two expert groups might differ slightly in their assessment of donor aid allocation behavior. Second, we presents our results with our sample split between those who were told that hypothetical Country A was a priority them (if the respondent worked for a donor), or for their donor (if the respondent worked for an implementing agency), versus a non-priority country. In each of these additional analyses, the main results presented above hold. Finally, we show that our results are not sensitive to our estimation method.

To account for the fact that donor organizations and implementing agencies might differ in their response to our treatments, we display our results differentiated for these two types of actors. In the Appendix, we display both the difference-in-means analyses spilt by donors (Figure 9) and by implementing agencies (Figure 8) as well as the multinomial regression results split by the two groups (Tables 5 and 6).[21] From these results it becomes apparent that the two groups are highly similar in their response to our treatment scenarios with a few slight differences. For one, the effect sizes, especially for humanitarian aid, are much bigger for the donors than for implementing agencies. Second, while implementing agencies opt for a clear reduction of budgetary aid under strong violence, donors are less certain to make this choice. The confidence

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[21]Figures 10 to 13 in the Appendix provide results that further differentiate whether implementing agencies and donors have experienced the scenario or not.

intervals are also much larger for donors than for the implementing agencies. This has to do with the much smaller number of respondents in the donor category. While one could now challenge whether we have enough power in the donor category, we refute this challenge by referring to the fact that we find both consistent and significant results that are in line with our theoretical predictions. The one exception concerns the findings for transitional aid where we do not find significant results either for donors or implementers, which we attribute to transitional aid not following our general classification of post-conflict transitions than a problem of statistical power.

The multinomial regression results split by the two groups (Tables 5 and 6) reveal further, albeit still minor, differences. With regard to development aid under the strong and mild violence treaments, donors are more likely to opt for no change. Implementing agencies, however, are equally likely to support decrease and increase. Respondents followed a similar pattern when describing humanitarian aid allocation. If we look at the mild violence treatment, no change is the most likely option for donors but implementing agencies react with either increase or decrease, but not with no change. In contrast, donors are much more eager to cut humanitarian aid in response to peace while implementers are much more reluctant to do so. Finally, if we look at budgetary aid we observe that donors mostly agree on decreasing aid in times of mild violence while implementers are undecided with all three options being almost equally likely.

We now discuss the role of strategic interest in relation to our results that incorporate the distinction of whether fictitious Country A is a priority country or not. The corresponding Figures are displayed in the Appendix and differentiate between donors (Figures (14 and 15)) and implementing agencies Figures (16 and 17). We find that this distinction does not make a difference for implementing agencies, as Figures 16 and 17 in the Appendix show. This may be due to the lack of information most implementing agencies have about the role of strategic interest in donor behavior or it may be because strategic interest, in fact, does not play a decisive role in donor aid allocation decisions. The inclusion of priority versus non-priority in our treatment does not seem to affect donor behavior, as Figures 14 and 15 in the Appendix show, with two exceptions. First, in situations of mild violence, donors are not as decisive about increasing humanitarian aid in a priority country as they are in a non-priority country. Second, donors completely shift their aid allocation choice in relation to development aid. In situations of mild violence with a priority status, donor respondents tend to increase development decrease, while they choose to decrease development aid in situations of mild violence with a non-priority status. In sum, in this one circumstance, mild violence treatment and development aid allocation, donor respondents seem to clearly take into account whether a recipient country is a priority country or not. Only if it is not a priority country, do they decrease development aid given the negative signal they have received. Whether donors tend to trust priority countries more than non-priority countries in times of mild violence and therefore do not cut back development aid or whether it is simply that they think these countries are too important to decrease aid, is outside the scope of our analysis.

To further corroborate the robustness of our findings we have run a seemingly unrelated ordered probit analysis to account for the fact that respondents decision with regard to one type of aid might not be independent of his or her decision to increase, not change, or decrease other types of aid. We also added several control variables to our multinomial regression model to show that these additional covariates do not affect the results. Both types of results can be found in the Appendix, Tables 7 and 8. Again, the results do not differ from our main results, which highlight the robustness of our main results.

6   Conclusion

In this paper, we have sought to explain patterns of donor aid allocation to post-conflict countries. The dominant aid literature argues that donors give aid to their strategic allies to gain favor, not in response to the needs of impoverished populations (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Yet, OECD donors now allocate the majority of ODA to fragile and conflict-affected countries that often have little strategic importance (OECD 2018). Furthermore, donor have not only committed to giving more aid *to* conflict-affected countries; they have also committed to using this aid to shape behavior *within* conflict-affected countries, incentivizing progression toward peace and dissuading regression toward war (OECD 2011). Existing scholarship has largely overlooked donor aid allocation behavior to post-conflict countries in part because of poor data on actual aid allocation patterns. This paper helps to mitigate this data problem using a survey of 1,130 aid experts working in over 180 countries - the first global survey of aid experts - combined with an experimental design to identify how donors allocate aid in response to positive and negative signals about a country's post-conflict transition.

Taken together, our findings suggest the existence of a shared set of rules governing aid allocation by OECD donors and multilateral organizations in conflict-affected states, pointing to a broader previously unobserved international aid regime (Krasner 1983, Haggard and Simmons 1987). Our results also show that donors are more responsive to positive and negative trends in post-conflict countries than anticipated by either the aid or the post-conflict peacebuilding literature. In our survey, aid experts chose to increase humanitarian aid and decrease development aid when the post-conflict country gave signals of regression toward violence and civil war. When donors received signals that the post-conflict country was progressing toward peace, our aid experts chose to increase development aid and decrease humanitarian aid. The patterns of behavior for transitional aid were less clear, possibly because transitional aid is allocated during all phases of a country's war-to-peace transition or because respondents had less experience with transitional aid, which constitutes a far smaller percentage of ODA than either humanitarian or development aid (OECD 2010b). We attribute these patterns of responsiveness to the donor policy agenda for post-conflict countries, which outlines the characteristics of a successful post-conflict transition, and the limited aid modalities at donors'

disposal. Rather than reinventing the wheel in each post-conflict country, donors follow a standard set of aid allocation rules; they give aid that supports the government when events on the ground signal positive trends and give that bypasses the government in response to negative trends (March 1999).

This paper offers several areas for additional inquiry. It points to the importance of further examining how donors use the full aid portfolio at their disposal, including development, humanitarian, and transitional aid. By narrowing their focus on one type of aid, prior studies have overlooked how donors may substitute one type of aid for another as well as the combined effect of different types of aid. This new line of research may be particularly relevant for aid to fragile and conflict-affected countries, where normal development cooperation with the recipient government is not feasible and donors may choose to use different aid modalities (OECD 2005, 2007). Additional research could also examine in more detail the conditions under which strategic interest alters donor behavior, as indicated by our finding that donor strategic interest seems to affect the allocation of development aid under our "mild violence" treatment but not under our other treatments. Finally, research could investigate the effect of these different donor aid allocation behaviors on violence and cooperation, identifying whether and how shifts in aid actually influence the behavior of the recipient government and society and, in turn, shapes potential violent or cooperative behavior.

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Appendix

Table 3: Multinomial Regression

	(1) Humanitarian	(2) Transitional	(3) Development	(4) Budgetary
Outcome=Decrease (Baseline Outcome=No Change)				
strong violence	0.53**	0.66	1.07	2.16***
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.55)
mild violence	0.27***	0.53**	1.05	2.11***
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.53)
mild peace	1.02	0.78	0.56*	0.62*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Constant	3.12***	1.06	1.16	0.80
	(0.56)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.15)
Outcome=Increase (Baseline Outcome=No Change)				
strong violence	3.01***	0.96	0.23***	0.67
	(0.82)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.16)
mild violence	0.83	0.59**	0.29***	0.65*
	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.16)
mild peace	0.95	0.87	0.83	0.81
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Constant	2.51***	5.57***	4.18***	1.61***
	(0.46)	(1.02)	(0.70)	(0.26)
Observations	1,099	1,077	1,110	837

Standard errors in parentheses – *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Relative Risk Ratios displayed

Table 4: Distribution of aid allocation by treatment

	Implementing Agencies			
	Development Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Budgetary Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	41% decrease 28% no change 31% increase	18% decrease 9% no change 72% increase	46% decrease 27% no change 28% increase	11% decrease 14% no change 74% increase
Mild violence	38% decrease 24% no change 38% increase	24% decrease 21% no change 55% increase	43% decrease 27% no change 30% increase	13% decrease 21% no change 66% increase
Mild Peace	13% decrease 20% no change 66% increase	47% decrease 14% no change 40% increase	19% decrease 35% no change 47% increase	13% decrease 14% no change 74% increase
Strong Peace	19% decrease 16% no change 65% increase	44% decrease 16% no change 49% increase	24% decrease 28% no change 48% increase	15% decrease 13% no change 72% increase

	Donors			
	Development Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Budgetary Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	26% decrease 47% no change 28% increase	3% decrease 13% no change 85% increase	42% decrease 25% no change 33% increase	2% decrease 14% no change 84% increase
Mild violence	19% decrease 61% no change 19% increase	3% decrease 57% no change 40% increase	67% decrease 28% no change 6% increase	3% decrease 17% no change 80% increase
Mild Peace	5% decrease 15% no change 79% increase	63% decrease 28% no change 10% increase	9% decrease 41% no change 50% increase	9% decrease 23% no change 69% increase
Strong Peace	12% decrease 15% no change 73% increase	64% decrease 11% no change 25% increase	23% decrease 38% no change 38% increase	10% decrease 12% no change 78% increase

Figure 8: Difference in Means by treatment – Implementing Agencies[22]

Difference in Means (Baseline: Strong Peace)

Figure 9: Difference in Means by treatment – Donors[23]

Difference in Means (Baseline: Strong Peace)

Table 5: Multinomial Regression – Implementing Agencies

	(1) Development	(2) Budgetary	(3) Humanitarian	(4) Transitional
Outcome=Decrease				
strong violence	0.19	0.73***	-0.37	-0.33
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.36)
mild violence	0.26	0.66**	-0.95***	-0.62*
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.34)
mild peace	-0.57*	-0.45	0.19	-0.16
	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.36)
Constant	0.19	-0.18	1.04***	0.10
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.25)
Outcome=Increase				
strong violence	-1.30***	-0.50*	1.11***	-0.04
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.27)
mild violence	-0.94***	-0.41	0.01	-0.55**
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
mild peace	-0.22	-0.26	0.16	-0.02
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Constant	1.40***	0.54***	0.93***	1.69***
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Observations	947	747	961	928

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline Outcome=No Change

Table 6: Multinomial Regression – Donors

	(1) Development	(2) Budgetary	(3) Humanitarian	(4) Transitional
Outcome=Decrease				
strong violence	-0.42	1.02	-3.36***	-1.57
	(0.70)	(0.73)	(1.22)	(1.27)
mild violence	-0.96	1.39*	-4.58***	-1.39
	(0.74)	(0.74)	(1.16)	(1.28)
mild peace	-0.92	-0.99	-0.95	-0.76
	(1.02)	(0.94)	(0.67)	(0.95)
Constant	-0.18	-0.51	1.75***	-0.22
	(0.61)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.67)
Outcome=Increase				
strong violence	-2.14***	0.29	1.11	-0.06
	(0.57)	(0.70)	(0.77)	(0.65)
mild violence	-2.75***	-1.61	-1.16	-0.29
	(0.62)	(1.18)	(0.71)	(0.69)
mild peace	0.03	0.20	-1.91**	-0.76
	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.90)	(0.63)
Constant	1.61***	0.00	0.81	1.86***
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.60)	(0.48)
Observations	163	90	138	149

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline Outcome=No Change

Figure 10: Implementing Agencies – Scenario known[24]

Figure 11: Implementing Agencies – Scenario unknown[25]

Figure 12: Donors – Scenario known[26]

Figure 13: Donors – Scenario unknown[27]

Figure 14: Donors – Priority country[28]

Figure 15: Donors – No priority country[29]

Figure 16: Implementing Agencies – Priority country[30]

Figure 17: Implementing Agencies – No priority country[31]

Table 7: Seemingly unrelated probit regression

	(1) Implementing Agencies	(2) Donors
Humanitarian		
strong violence	0.83***	2.17***
	(0.11)	(0.31)
mild violence	0.47***	1.10***
	(0.11)	(0.29)
mild peace	-0.01	-0.15
	(0.11)	(0.29)
Transitional		
strong violence	0.09	0.17
	(0.12)	(0.30)
mild violence	-0.09	0.03
	(0.12)	(0.32)
mild peace	0.03	-0.33
	(0.12)	(0.30)
Budgetary		
strong violence	-0.58***	- 0.47
	(0.12)	(0.31)
mild violence	-0.53***	-1.28***
	(0.12)	(0.35)
mild peace	0.03	0.29
	(0.11)	(0.32)
Development		
strong violence	-0.75***	-1.04***
	(0.11)	(0.26)
mild violence	-0.62***	-1.06***
	(0.11)	(0.27)
mild peace	0.09	0.28
	(0.11)	(0.29)
Observations	999	172

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

47

Table 8: Multinomial Regression

	(1) Humanitarian	(2) Transitional	(3) Development	(4) Budgetary
Outcome=Decrease (Baseline Outcome=No Change)				
strong violence	0.53**	0.74	1.20	2.31***
	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.64)
mild violence	0.28***	0.62	1.11	2.31***
	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.64)
mild peace	1.14	1.14	0.55*	0.61
	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.18)	(0.18)
35-44	0.47	1.80	3.11**	1.13
	(0.24)	(0.86)	(1.40)	(0.45)
45-54	0.35**	1.15	2.45**	1.71
	(0.17)	(0.54)	(1.07)	(0.66)
55-64	0.34**	1.07	2.56**	1.33
	(0.17)	(0.52)	(1.16)	(0.54)
65-84	0.24*	0.38	1.67	0.71
	(0.20)	(0.45)	(1.11)	(0.53)
male	1.18	1.09	1.16	1.07
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.24)
international staff	1.03	0.82	0.95	1.07
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Constant	6.81***	0.83	0.45	0.52
	(3.47)	(0.42)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Outcome=Increase (Baseline Outcome=No Change)				
strong violence	2.76***	0.94	0.23***	0.67
	(0.82)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.18)
mild violence	0.78	0.58**	0.27***	0.64
	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.18)
mild peace	0.88	1.04	0.86	0.89
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.22)
35-44	0.83	2.09**	1.13	1.22
	(0.41)	(0.75)	(0.39)	(0.44)
45-54	0.56	1.74	0.67	1.20
	(0.27)	(0.60)	(0.22)	(0.43)
55-64	0.49	1.47	0.82	0.99
	(0.24)	(0.53)	(0.28)	(0.38)
65-84	0.82	1.68	0.69	0.60
	(0.60)	(1.06)	(0.38)	(0.44)
male	1.22	0.99	1.29	1.10
	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.24)
international staff	0.68*	0.72*	0.70**	0.72*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Constant	4.33***	3.79***	5.03***	1.49
	(2.20)	(1.43)	(1.82)	(0.55)
Observations	916	900	923	694

Standard errors in parentheses – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Relative Risk Ratios displayed

Table 9: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test – Baseline Strong Peace

	(1) Humanitarian	(2) Transitional	(3) Development	(4) Budgetary
strong violence	significantly different	no difference	significantly different	significantly different
mild violence	significantly different	no difference	significantly different	significantly different
mild peace	no difference	no difference	no difference	no difference

Table 10: List of countries contacted with number of individuals contacted and replied

Country	Contacted	Replied
Afghanistan	159	19
Albania	27	4
Algeria	25	5
American Samoa	1	0
Angola	16	6
Antigua and Barbuda	7	0
Argentina	27	1
Armenia	28	6
Australia	14	2
Austria	3	3
Azerbaijan	26	2
Bahamas	1	0
Bahrain	9	1
Bangladesh	44	6
Barbados	13	1
Belarus	13	0
Belgium	21	6
Belize	10	0
Benin	17	2
Bhutan	23	3
Bolivia	24	2
Bosnia & Herzegovina	25	6
Botswana	16	1
Brazil	42	3
Brunei	3	3
Bulgaria	2	1
Burkina Faso	460	44
Burundi	26	11
Cambodia	32	8
Cameroon	490	2
Canada	12	1
Cape Verde	8	0
Central African Republic	566	50
Chad	354	0
Chile	19	1
China	28	4
Colombia	42	7
Comoros	20	1
Cook Islands	1	0
Costa Rica	15	0
Cote d'Ivoire	11	2
Croatia	5	0
Cuba	9	2
Cyprus	7	0
Czech Republic	32	2
DPR Korea	23	1
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,507	199
Republic of Congo	15	65
Denmark	7	1
Djibouti	17	2
Dominican Republic	23	5

Table 11: List of countries continued

Country	Contacted	Replied
East Timor	16	0
Ecuador	39	1
Egypt	56	9
El Salvador	30	7
Equatorial Guinea	12	1
Eritrea	12	0
Ethiopia	77	10
Fiji	39	1
Finland	90	11
France	13	3
French Polynesia	1	0
Gabon	11	0
Gambia	16	2
Georgia	41	5
Germany	3	7
Ghana	30	5
Greece	88	1
Guatemala	22	6
Guinea	228	3
Guinea Bissau	29	2
Guyana	8	1
Haiti	55	11
Honduras	12	2
Hong Kong	3	0
Hungary	1	1
Iceland	270	3
India	26	6
Indonesia	78	2
Iran	24	1
Iraq	16	6
Ireland	1	0
Israel	3	4
Italy	2	1
Jamaica	16	1
Japan	5	0
Jordan	36	7
Kazakhstan	25	2
Kenya	23	12
Kiribati	1	0
Kosovo	23	0
Kuwait	17	3
Kyrgyzstan	36	3
Lao PDR	23	2
Lebanon	48	6
Lesotho	10	1
Liberia	49	6
Libya	28	2
Luxembourg	47	1
Macedonia	9	0
Madagascar	26	8
Malawi	30	4
Malaysia	16	0
Maldives	11	1

Table 12: List of countries continued

Country	Contacted	Replied
Mali	781	71
Mauritania	417	32
Mauritius	6	1
Mexico	19	5
Micronesia	1	0
Moldova	27	0
Mongolia	31	1
Montenegro	7	0
Morocco	29	0
Mozambique	88	5
Myanmar	1,617	176
Namibia	14	1
Nepal	202	50
Netherlands	3	2
New Zealand	5	0
Nicaragua	87	8
Niger	427	46
Nigeria	32	7
Norway	14	3
Oman	5	0
Pakistan	27	9
Palestine	57	0
Panama	14	4
Papua New Guinea	32	4
Paraguay	25	1
Peru	20	5
Philippines	39	2
Poland	2	0
Portugal	1	0
Qatar	3	0
Romania	2	0
Russia	2	1
Rwanda	32	4
Samoa	14	3
Sao Tome and Principe	12	0
Saudi Arabia	14	2
Senegal	16	16
Serbia	24	4
Sierra Leone	41	4
Singapore	3	0
Slovak Republic	112	6
Slovenia	10	2
Solomon Islands	19	1
Somalia	46	10
South Africa	24	0
South Korea	2	1
South Sudan	109	9
Spain	61	0

Table 13: List of countries continued

Sri Lanka	26	3
St. Kitts and Nevis	3	0
Sudan	62	21
Suriname	7	0
Swaziland	10	0
Sweden	12	1
Switzerland	73	9
Syrian Arab Republic	28	7
Tajikistan	34	3
Tanzania	38	0
Thailand	18	2
The F. Yugoslav R. of Macedonia	1	2
Timor-Leste	7	2
Togo	12	0
Tonga	12	1
Trinidad and Tobago	2	1
Tunisia	35	6
Turkey	18	4
Turkmenistan	18	1
Uganda	36	10
Ukraine	23	6
United Arab Emirates	15	1
United Kingdom	220	3
United States of America	27	29
Uruguay	13	2
Uzbekistan	27	1
Vanuatu	12	1
Venezuela	13	5
Vietnam	28	5
West Bank and Gaza	2	0
Yemen	33	4
Zambia	16	3
Zimbabwe	23	2

Figure 18: Respondent countries of residence experiencing a treatment scenario

Respondent countries of residence experiencing a treatment scenario

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Afghanistan	Strong violence	Political violence is common, especially during election cycles. A resurgent Taliban and rise in Islamic State activities has led to more violence. A number of actors perpetrate attacks on civilians.
Algeria	Mild peace	Algeria has experienced a sharp decrease in violence, and reconciliation laws passed in 1999 and 2006 have helped to stabilize the country. Journalists continue to face harassment.
Angola	Mild violence	Since 2016, Angola has imposed restrictions on media and assembly. Clashes with Cabinda separatist groups continue.
Bangladesh	Mild violence	In 2018, the opposition leader was detained. Journalists continue to face harassment and intimidation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mild peace	Political process excludes minorities from holding certain offices. Attacks on journalists are regular.
Burkina Faso	Mild peace	While Islamist violence and social unrest continue, the country experienced a peaceful transition of power in 2016 elections.
Burundi	Strong violence	The Inter-Burundian Dialogue was suspended in January 2016. The country continues to experience civil and political unrest. There have been credible reports of torture and enforced disappearances at hands of government and security forces. There is no viable opposition or media freedom.
Cambodia	Strong violence	In July 2016, a critic of the Prime Minister is assassinated in the capital. The Supreme Court bars the opposition in 2017. Since 2016, levels of outright violence are low, but civil unrest continues. There is no media freedom.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Central African Republic	Strong violence	The country held its first peaceful elections in 2015/16, but violence between various militias and the government resume in November 2016. Aid agencies withdraw from the country in July 2017. Ongoing violence and political/civil unrest continue to impact large numbers of people throughout the country.
Chad	Strong violence	The government cracked down on journalists and the opposition in September 2017. Power is concentrated in the executive. Civil and political unrest is on-going, and attacks by Boko Haram are frequent.
Colombia	Mild peace	The FARC disbands, but clashes between the ELM and the government are on-going.
Comoros	Mild peace	While there have been peaceful transfers of power and no significant civil/political unrest since 2016, several organizations report that journalists self-censor given the country's defamation laws/penalties for defamation.
Côte d'Ivoire	Mild peace	Attacks by Islamist militants occurred in March 2016. From 2016 into 2017, soldiers and police have mutinied over pay and working conditions. In 2017, civilian deaths resulted from these mutinies. Journalists are harassed. The media is nominally free but faces government scrutiny.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Strong violence	Ongoing conflict has displaced millions of people. Ethnic violence kills 2,000 in June 2017, and civilians have been killed and displaced during clashes between government and militias in the first few months of 2018.
Djibouti	Mild violence	Rates of political violence are low, but there is a complete lack of media freedom and no viable opposition.
Dominican Republic	Strong peace	There is a vibrant opposition party, and the media is free and independent.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Ecuador	*Mild peace*	Since 2017, the media has begun to operate independently. There is a viable opposition, and elections are free and fair. Political institutions are not completely independent, and human rights abuses continue to occur.
Egypt	*Mild violence*	The government quashes dissent and jails journalists. In 2016, the government imposed sweeping oversight of the media. Sectarian violence continues. Opposition groups have called for a boycott of the 2018 elections.
El Salvador	*Mild peace*	Elections are generally credible, and a viable opposition exists. Journalists face harassment, especially when investigating corruption, but the media is generally free. While civilians experience high levels of violence at the hands of gangs and militias, government attacks on civilians are very rare.
Equatorial Guinea	*Mild violence*	In January 2016, police arrest opposition members and their families. Elections are not seen as credible, and the country has not experienced a transition of power since 1979. In May 2018, the Supreme Court upholds a ban on country's main opposition party which itself was accused of acts of violence prior to 2016 elections. Despite this, attacks on civilians are infrequent.
Ethiopia	*Strong violence*	Security forces kill dozens of civilians in 2016-18. Ethnic tension and civil unrest continue. Opposition parties exist, and elections are somewhat credible, but post-election violence is common. In 2016, the government restricted internet and social media access and jailed journalists in response to anti-government protests. The state of emergency was lifted in 2018, but restrictions on movement and media persist.
Fiji	*Mild peace*	The media faces some restrictions, and journalists were charged with sedition in 2018. There is viable political opposition, and elections are schedule for November 2018.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
FYR Macedonia	*Strong peace*	A democratically-elected coalition government, headed by former opposition members, enjoys popular support. Despite restrictions on media prior to 2017, the situation is improving.
Gambia	*Strong peace*	Following 2016 elections, which ousted long-time incumbent Jammeh, independent media have begun to take hold in the country. While the transitional process continues, the country has seen a dramatic improvement politically and in terms of human rights.
Guatemala	*Mild peace*	Elections are seen as credible, though corruption is rampant. In 2017, the president expelled head of a UN anti-corruption mission. Opposition exists and the media are partly free, but civil unrest is on-going.
Guinea	*Mild violence*	In 2018, the country held its first free local elections since the end of military rule in 2005, but opposition claimed the government rigged the vote. Media censorship continues. In 2017, the government closed radio stations for insulting state institutions
Guinea-Bissau	*Mild violence*	In 2017, radio stations were closed for four months. Journalists engage in self-censorship. Political coverage is restricted. On-going human rights violations, weak rule of law, and political instability contribute to a tense political climate, but fears of widespread violence have failed to materialize.
Haiti	*Mild peace*	There were isolated incidents of election violence in 2016 and 2017, but the elections were seen as credible overall.
Honduras	*Mild violence*	Corruption and political tension is widespread. Elections in 2017 were not free and fair. Journalists and the media faced threats and violence during the election cycle.
Indonesia	*Mild violence*	The government uses anti-blasphemy laws to threaten and intimidate the media. Opposition groups face harassment but can run for office, and elections are generally seen as fair. Islamist insurgency and social unrest continue to undermine political progress.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Iran	*Mild violence*	Approximately two dozen people were killed during mass protests in December and January 2017/2018. Islamist-inspired attacks continue to occur. Candidates for office must be approved by the Guardian Council. Human rights abuses are pervasive.
Iraq	*Mild violence*	The 2018 parliamentary elections were largely seen as free and fair. On-going tension in the Kurdish provinces and continued Islamist violence undermine steps toward peace. Journalists are harassed and attacked by pro-government militias as well as by opposition groups.
Lesotho	*Mild violence*	During the 2017 elections, the country experienced politically-motivated killings. Members of opposition groups are targeted, but civilians are largely spared. The media faces restrictions and cannot operate completely independently.
Liberia	*Strong peace*	The 2017 elections were free from violence, and the country experienced a peaceful transfer of power. The new president promises to address freedom of expression, but old laws that target journalists are still active. A lack of financial resources compromises the independence of the media, as outlets may seek funding from political groups.
Libya	*Strong violence*	The UN-backed government declares state of emergency after dozens of people are killed in clashes with militias in 2018. Factionalism and weak rule of law persist, and outbreaks of violence are regular.
Madagascar	*Mild violence*	Clashes between opposition supporters and security forces leave two dead in April 2018. Protests against deaths were permitted after security forces left the area in the capital. Political and civil tension lingers, but violence is not widespread.
Mali	*Mild peace*	While the country continues to experience Islamist attacks, the government and militia groups have conducted joint patrols to protect civilians and target suspected members of terrorist groups. Media freedom is improving.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Mozambique	*Mild violence*	The death of the leader of Renamo, a rebel group, cast doubt on the peace process which began in 2017. Tension between the government and rebel groups is on-going. The last elections were held in 2014.
Myanmar	*Strong violence*	Separatist violence persists, particularly between rebel groups (usually ethnic minorities) and government forces. The government carried out genocide against the Rohingya in Rakhine state and continue to abuse ethnic minorities in Kachin state.
Namibia	*Strong peace*	Following post-independence separatist insurgencies, Namibia has conducted free and fair elections and the media is generally independent and operates without restrictions.
Nepal	*Mild violence*	In November 2017, Maoist rebels targeted civilians prior to legislative elections. Journalists also faced harassment during this election cycle. Relations between the government and rebels remain tense, though former rebels have entered into political office.
Niger	*Mild violence*	Despite a lack of state capacity and on-going Islamist attacks, violence between the government and opposition groups or civilians is infrequent. The main opposition boycotted the 2016 elections. The media does not operate independently.
Papua New Guinea	*Mild peace*	There were no major outbreaks of political violence, though journalists were targeted by security forces in 2017 elections.
Philippines	*Strong violence*	Political violence persists throughout the country. In 2018, over 30 people were killed during elections. A government crackdown, violent terrorist and separatist activity, and human rights abuses persist throughout the country.
Republic of the Congo	*Strong violence*	In 2016, opposition groups boycott the election, calling it fraudulent. Opposition members were forcibly disappeared, and persistent human rights abuses continue to occur throughout country

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Rwanda	*Mild violence*	Opposition groups faced a crackdown in the 2017 election. The elections not seen as credible. In September 2018, opposition members were elected to parliament for the first time. Media freedom is low, with opposition outlets shut down.
Serbia	*Mild peace*	While civil tensions continue to exist, particularly between ethnic groups, civil/political violence is minimal. Journalists face threats and intimidation. These incidents are rarely investigated.
Sierra Leone	*Mild peace*	In April 2018, the opposition won the presidency, and the country experienced a peaceful transfer of power. Opposition groups face harassment but are generally able to run for office and operate in the country. The media is partly free and independent but are subject to libel and defamation laws. In 2017, three journalists were charged with "seditious and criminal libel."
Somalia	*Strong violence*	In 2016, leaders in two regions (Puntland and Galmudug) agree to a ceasefire in the disputed city of Galkayo. Fighting there displaced 90,000 people. Elections were held in November 2017, which resulted in a peaceful transition of power. Despite this, ongoing tensions between factions and clans, as well as an al-Shabab insurgency, undermine much of the peace processes
Tajikistan	*Strong violence*	In a referendum in May 2016, presidential term limits were lifted. The election was not credible. No viable opposition exists in the country. In 2016 and 2017, the government cracked down on opposition members, who faced lengthy sentences for vague charges of "extremism."
Timor-Leste	*Strong peace*	Since 2016, elections have been free and fair, with opposition gaining power in 2018. Media is vibrant and allowed to operate independently.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Tunisia	*Strong peace*	While general elections haven't been held since 2014, municipal elections in 2018 were free and fair, with many parties vying for seats. Public officials sometime harass journalists, though this has not led to jail sentences or spurious charges
Uganda	*Strong violence*	General elections in 2016 were marred by violence, killing over 20 people. Electoral violence is common during and after campaigns. Opposition exists, but it is subject to harassment and intimidation. In June 2017, the government directed security officers to scan internet media for articles/posts critical of the government.
Ukraine	*Mild peace*	Following revolution in 2014 and Russian-backed insurgency in the eastern part of the country, the Minsk talks failed to resolve the conflict. Opposition parties in Kiev-controlled areas are free to operate. Journalists are harassed, particularly in east.