

Untouchable Forces: Restoring Trust in Security in Weak States?*

Aila M. Matanock Natalia Garbiras-Díaz
University of California, Berkeley

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Abstract

How can weak states improve security? We build on existing work theorizing that a crucial component of strengthening security is improving citizen perceptions of the institutions providing security and then thereby securing their cooperation with those institutions. We examine whether foreign missions that states invite to conduct security functions, “delegation agreements” (DAs), are able to change citizens’ perceptions on these dimensions. We argue DAs are likely to improve citizen perceptions of security while they are operating but to have little transfer effect to state institutions. We test the theory by examining the U.N.’s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a team of investigators and prosecutors that operated in Guatemalan courts from 2007-2019, which was a canonical and seemingly successful DA. In this “most likely” case to detect any transfer effects, we use a survey experiment to examine, first, whether invoking CICIG as a case investigator increases citizen beliefs that the perpetrators and their state collaborators will be correctly identified, prosecuted, and convicted. We find that the CICIG prime does have consistently positive effects. We then examine citizen perceptions of institutions, and, measuring several outcomes, we find that CICIG has little transfer effect to state security institutions, although a successful CICIG may reduce the legitimacy of the state to some extent. Our results identify a positive effect from this foreign mission but no overall shift in citizen perceptions and subsequent pathway to increased security through their cooperation.

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Introduction

In April 2015, an investigation revealed that at least 40 Guatemalan government officials were involved in a network of corruption in Guatemala's customs office, and, within months, the sitting President Otto Pérez Molina was forced to resign. Guatemala had faced rising crime and impunity, attributed to clandestine and illegal security structures that developed during the state's civil war but then turned their focus to illegal profit-seeking after the 1996 peace agreement, which allowed elites to impede any cases brought against them for criminal acts. Eventually, the foreign investigators and prosecutors of a U.N. mission, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG for its acronyms in Spanish), helped to produce a series of successful investigations and prosecutions in Guatemalan courts, including the 2015 *Línea* case that led to Pérez Molina's resignation, and the conviction of more than 600 serious criminals. While CICIG has been effective in these court cases, as we describe, we know little about its broader effects on security in Guatemala. CICIG has just left Guatemala, and so understanding its transfer effects to state institutions has become especially important. In addition, this type of cooperative statebuilding is growing, and CICIG has produced pressure for more similar missions, and so assessing its effects is also crucial outside this case.

We examine whether cooperative statebuilding missions improve citizen perceptions of security and security institutions broadly, both foreign and state.¹ We build on existing work theorizing that a crucial component of strengthening security is improving citizen perceptions of the institutions providing security and then thereby obtaining their cooperation. We posit that missions that delegate state functions to foreign personnel under agreements with host states, cooperative "delegation agreements" (DAs), are likely to improve citizen perceptions of security while they are operating but have little transfer effect to state institutions. We therefore expect policy gains from this type of statebuilding to be limited.

We design a national-scale survey experiment in Guatemala to test our theory. DAs are an increasingly popular form of statebuilding mission, and we select CICIG as a canonical and seemingly successful case, providing a most likely case in which to detect any transfer effects. We first examine whether CICIG is viewed as effective, or, in other words, whether invoking CICIG as a case investigator increases citizen beliefs that the perpetrators and their state collaborators will be correctly identified, prosecuted, and convicted. We find that invoking CICIG does have positive effects on perceptions of effectiveness, and we find that invoking the government in the case as a collaborator has only a slight attenuating effect that is not statistically significant. We then examine attitudes toward security institutions, and, measuring several outcomes, we find that the foreign statebuilder has little transfer effect to state security institutions. The notable exception is that invoking a successful statebuilder reduces the legitimacy of the state as the entity that should

¹"Statebuilding" is a term that others have coined to refer to an externally-led process of institutional reform, and we use it in the same sense throughout the rest of this study (see, for example, [Lake 2016](#), p. 18).

deal with crime broadly. There is also some evidence that an unsuccessful statebuilder receives less trust and is less likely to be seen as the correct entity to pursue a hypothetical case. Taken together, our results suggest that CICIG is viewed as effective, perhaps especially when working independently, and that CICIG's performance matters for citizen perceptions toward it. CICIG, however, generally does not seem to change views toward state institutions, except the potentially concerning result on state legitimacy as security provider. We conclude that a successful foreign mission does not transfer positive citizen perceptions to state security institutions, as the work on statebuilding might suggest, and, indeed, it *may* undermine the state in its security role.

A scholarly contribution of this paper is to extend the work on international engagement to better understand global governance by looking beyond conventional tools that tend to either consist of aid, advice, and training or, at the opposite extreme, foreign invasion. A small but influential body of work suggests that international actors may seek to replace or bolster domestic rule of law institutions through shared sovereignty (Osiander, 2001; Krasner, 2004, 2009; Lake, 2009; Risse, 2011). But this work has just begun to explore how well such shared sovereignty arrangements work (Matanock 2014, Matanock in progress, Blair 2018). Our findings are also consistent with literature on foreign funding for non-governmental organizations that shows they may also undermine state service provision, suggesting that this type of statebuilding may struggle with some of the same issues as other weaker forms of global governance (Cammett and MacLean, 2014).

A policy contribution of this paper is to better understand how well this type of statebuilding works. Statebuilding in recent decades has become a mechanism used by global and regional powers to overcome the many contemporary challenges to global security that emanate from weak states (see Dobbins et al. 2007; Dobbins 2003). Following the Cold War, the United States initially became the reluctant "world's policeman" (from the U.S. Defense Planning Guide quoted in Gellman 1992), responsible for conducting many of these statebuilding operations to mitigate transnational threats. Resource constraints and the legacy of failure in securing Afghanistan and Iraq have now rendered support for large U.S. invasion rare (Gates, 2010, p. 2), however. The shifting budget priorities of a new U.S. administration only make the downsizing of these operations even more likely (Dayal, 2017). An alternative to invasion occurs when states invite intervention to help strengthen their institutions, specifically, "delegation agreements," wherein host states allow other sovereign actors to provide state functions (Matanock 2014, Matanock in progress). In these cases, foreign troops, police, investigators, prosecutors, or judges are empowered to help secure and reform these host states, but their effects especially in the longer-term on dimensions such as state legitimacy are not clear (Matanock, 2014). Strengthening security is often a crucial component of these missions, but it has rarely been directly tested as an outcome, especially in terms of citizen perceptions and potential for cooperation on security. The Guatemalan experience that we examine is important to understand in its own right, and, while scope conditions may apply, it also potentially helps us understand similar missions occurring elsewhere.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, drawing on emerging work, we offer a categorization of statebuilding, where we discuss a category of cooperative statebuilding with potential to strengthen states. Second, we discuss the importance of citizen perceptions of security provision and institutions for long-term cooperation, and then we theorize about the effects of cooperative statebuilding on these perceptions. We then describe the specific Guatemalan case that we choose. Next, we present the survey experiment and its results. Finally, we conclude with implications about what these results mean in the current Guatemalan context and more broadly across other cases of statebuilding.

1 Statebuilding that reforms institutions by invitation

Weak states present challenges to their civilians, as well as to international security, through the consequences of poor governance, an inability to deter competitors, and potentially even collapse. Civilians face daily hardship. Transnational threats also loom. Beyond the direct spread of the conflict, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism may be problematic for states tied to these weak states, especially with increasing globalization (e.g. [Brown 1996](#), and, especially, [de Jonge Oudraat 1996](#), [Dobbins 2003](#), [Chiozza, Gleditsch and Goemans 2004](#), [Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008](#)). Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan cautioned that “no challenge in international relations today is more pressing or more difficult than that of supporting weak states” (in his comment on [Dobbins et al. 2007](#)).

The traditional conceptualizations of statebuilding tends to involve the host state trying to reshape its own institutions or, alternatively, an outside actor taking complete control at least temporarily to remake institutions as under invasion or even neotrusteeship ([Dobbins, 2003](#); [Fearon and Laitin, 2004](#); [Lake and Fariss, 2014](#); [Lake, 2016](#)).² Intermediate options are less explored than either end of this spectrum, but, based on a growing body of work, there are many cases where host states themselves request statebuilding and then share sovereignty with foreign sovereign entities during institution reform. Under these “shared sovereignty” arrangements, host states need not submit to complete control to gain resources or assistance in reform ([Cooley and Spruyt, 2009](#); [Krasner, 2004, 2009](#); [Lake, 2009](#); [Risse, 2011](#)). Specifically, “delegation agreements” (DAs) are treaties or other international agreements that provide shared sovereignty in a host state’s security institutions for a fixed period ([Matanock 2014](#), [Matanock in progress](#)).

²This category includes “foreign-imposed regime change” (FIRC)s, often operationalized as cases in which foreign actors are “primarily responsible” for removal (see [Downes and Monten 2013](#)), or after wars of forced change (see [Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter 2008](#)). These overlap with neotrusteeships imposed by the international community on weak states (e.g. [Fearon and Laitin 2004](#)), often after war, as in the Balkans ([Krasner 2004](#), p. 102). Many studies focus only on missions conducted by the major powers (see [Pickering and Peceny 2006](#)). Large-scale statebuilding operations like Afghanistan and Iraq, then, are often examined together with “nation-building” operations in Kuwait in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999 ([Dobbins et al. 2007](#), p. vii).

An intermediate option for statebuilding is delegation agreements (DAs). DAs occur when host states provide personnel from foreign states or intergovernmental organizations with temporary authority to reform state security institutions while working together to implement laws and policies for the host's citizens and territory (Matanock, *in progress*).³ DAs consist of troops, police, investigators, prosecutors, or judges given authority to increase rule of law through their service *and* to change rule of law institutions in the host state, too.⁴ Observers have described these missions as efforts "to insert a backbone" into the government of that host state (Rees, 2008, p. 153). This type of invited interventions are classic shared sovereignty arrangements where multiple sovereign actors share authority (a concept developed by but not specified in its types by Krasner 1999).

Delegation agreements have only recently been identified as a unified statebuilding option, and they remain underanalyzed, even as they occur in many weak states. The United States and other major powers have sought collaborative statebuilding options, as they have been increasingly frustrated by the aftermath of expensive invasions and by aid efforts that cannot produce the change sought (e.g. Gates (2010); Frontier Design (2019)). Statebuilding missions that are undertaken at the invitation occur in many instances and are spreading. Recent work shows that approximately 40 percent of Sub-Saharan African states from 1980 to 2015 hosted at least one delegation agreement (Matanock, *in progress*). On the policing side, many of the best known cases are enacted as peacekeeping missions under Chapter IV of the U.N. mission; on the judicial side, many are intergovernmental hybrid courts and tribunals such as the Special Court of Sierra Leone. But major and regional powers also initiate these missions ad hoc, especially in geographically close states. For example, the Pacific Islands Forum, led by Australia, enacted delegation agreements first in the Solomon Islands and then building out to other states in the region (Matanock, 2014). We examine a case in Guatemala in this paper, for example, and there have now been other somewhat similar missions in the region.⁵

Despite the importance of this type of statebuilding, we do not yet see many systematic studies

³These either entail dual key approval, where both sovereign entities must sign onto a decision, or temporarily substituting the foreigner's judgement above that of its domestic counterpart, depending on the depth of the shared sovereignty (Matanock 2014, Matanock *in progress*).

⁴We, like existing work (Matanock, *in progress*), focus on developing and testing theory in the context of security institutions because these are a central state function under any conception of the state (e.g., Weber 2014; Fukuyama 2004; Schneckener 2011 for a summary). The security institutions are those that "have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens" (Chalmers 2000; cited in Jackson 2011, p. 1811). This definition is close to many of those used in practice, such as that of United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID): "state institutions and authorities that have a responsibility to protect both the state and the communities within it" (DFID 2002, p. 7; cited in Jean 2005, p. 249).

⁵For instance, in 2015, the Honduran government and the Organization of American States (OAS) announced what was initially designed to be a similar deal, the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). Like CICIG, MACCIH was invited by the government to address impunity and corruption. But, eventually, MACCIH was not allowed to investigate cases on its own. El Salvador also had external assistance, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups, to strengthen its judicial system in the aftermath of its civil war in 1994. Finally, in late 2018, a Colombian senator also suggested a similar mission for that country.⁶

of these missions, especially their effectiveness. In theory, these improve the rule of law in these states' own institutions, yet their effects have not yet been explored. We return in our theory to the particular features of these missions, including when they occur, and differences among them, to discuss potential scope conditions for our study.

2 A theory of statebuilding and citizen perceptions about security provision and institutions

We want to better understand cooperative statebuilding, and, given that many policymakers' aims in using DAs is improving security and state institutions, we focus on a central pathway through which they could work. First, building on different strands of the literature, we posit that effective security institutions rely on citizens' cooperation. Crucially, we note the importance of positive citizen perceptions for security institutions to be effective without substantial costs. Over the longer-term, in particular, the state centrally needs these positive citizen perceptions. Next, we document existing arguments about how outside actors can help provide security and strengthen state security institutions, and, potentially, create positive citizen perceptions. But we find very little evidence of transfer in existing examples. So we theorize that, although statebuilders often improve security provision, and perhaps even some aspects of state security institutions, they are unlikely to improve citizen perceptions of the state and thus the state's own strength through this pathway.

2.1 Sustained state security provision relies on citizens' cooperation

Security and rule of law more broadly, and especially the state institutions that interface with citizens, are often seen as cornerstones of building stronger states. Many missions focus first, or even exclusively, on security and rule of law, because this provides the basis from which to effectively develop other institutions and other desired outcomes, such as stable markets (for a summary, see [Schneckener 2011](#)). This priority has regained focus in recent decades, but it was seen as central even by very early theorists, extending back especially to Thomas Hobbes' work on the essence of the state (e.g. [Fukuyama 2004](#)).

In the broadest terms, the process of "restoring—or in some instances creating for the first time—that monopoly of violence and especially its legitimacy" requires strong security institutions that are trusted and receive the cooperation of citizens ([Lake 2016](#), p. 4, [Anderlini and Conaway 2004](#), p. 31). In more specific terms, policing relies on collaboration with the public. This subsection explores these bodies of existing work that lead to this same conclusion about the importance of citizen perceptions of security institutions.

The state's ability to coerce, and to provide security and order generally, is backed by voluntary cooperation from citizens, theorized as legitimacy in work on building states. Considering Thomas Hobbes' argument that citizens subordinate themselves to a sovereign, David Lake develops concepts of state authority but also of legitimacy wherein citizens agree to restrict their own rights in exchange for the order provided by the state (Lake, 2009, 2016). To some extent legitimacy is based on trust, but it can also be defined as having the "right to rule" or the right to make decisions, reinforced by general agreement with those decisions they make (drawing on different sources both from the statebuilding literature, such as Keohane 2007, but also work on court decisions, such as Mondak 1994). Legitimacy can help gain compliance with laws beyond what is expected by coercive force (e.g. Hurd 1999; Tyler 2001); the state can exact further "quasi-voluntary" compliance (see Levi 1988, p. 48-70 and Lake 2007). Legitimacy, in turn, then strengthens the mandate of the sovereign to coerce as well: "because a sufficient number of the ruled accept the ruler and his edicts as legitimate, the ruler can employ force against individual free riders and even dissidents," which also deters potential free riders and dissidents (Lake, 2007). The decisions made by institutions with the right to do so are met with deference, producing cooperation without the need for continuous coercion, which lowers the cost of governing effectively.

Theories about the importance of legitimacy point to its role in reducing the cost of governing but also in improving government through a "virtuous cycle" (Stollenwerk, N.d.; Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009; Levi and Sacks, 2009). In general terms, under a virtuous cycle, cooperation continuously improves good governance, leading to further cooperation, and further good governance, and so forth. Fundamentally, legitimacy follows from the provision of social order (Lake 2009, 2016; also see Levi 1988, 1997). But producing social order through coercion alone is costly and may not invoke legitimacy if repression is used indiscriminately to put down immediate threats, for instance (Weber, 2014; Easton, 1975; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Krasner and Risse, 2014). Instead, legitimacy also develops from the provision of justice (Keohane, 2007, p. 5), which includes characteristics like equality before the law (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), as well as from other factors such as general agreement among the population with past policy (e.g. Mondak (1994); Gibson and Caldeira (2009)). That is, if citizens believe governments "have promoted immoral policies, have ignored their interests, or have actually betrayed them," they are unlikely to feel obliged to cooperate (Levi, 1997, p. 16). When these governance outcomes can be achieved alongside social order, though, existing theory expects that the increased legitimacy will then produce increased cooperation by citizens, and, in turn, their cooperation improves governance, reinforcing a virtuous circle (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Krasner and Weinstein, 2014; Schmelzle, 2012).

Similar theories emerge when considering the operation of state security or rule of law institutions specifically. Police, in particular, rely on citizen cooperation to identify problems and address them. Citizens have a central role in reporting crime and in providing information throughout any investigative and prosecutorial processes (Skogan, 2011; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Akerlof and

Yellen, 1994; Tyler, 2004; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Ungar and Mejía-Hernández, 2011).⁷ Citizens need not only trust the institutions to which they are reporting so that they feel secure that they will not face retribution if they report crime, but, more mundanely, they must not feel their time is being wasted when they go through the process, from calling or walking in to file a complaint to testifying in court (e.g. Nanes N.d.). They are thus needed through the judicial process.

Theories about trust in state security institutions and their willingness to cooperate also hinge on ideas about good governance and reinforcing cycles. Civilians form expectations about how they will be treated and how their information will be received from their own past experiences with the police and other security institutions, from the experiences of those in their communities, and from any other observable signals they receive from media reports or other sources (e.g. Nanes N.d.; Tyler 2004; Weitzer and Tuch 2004; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015; Lyall 2010; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Saunders 2013; Diamond and Lobitz 1973; Rusinko, Johnson and Hornung 1978; Tyler and Huo 2002). The cooperation of citizens, however, does not depend only on the outcome in a particular interaction; similar to governance overall, cooperation stems from citizen perceptions that institutions are transparent and procedurally fair (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2004, 2006). Perceptions of corruption, in particular, may affect the attitudes of civilians and their propensity to cooperate with the state (Gottlieb, 2016). Security institutions, in their immediate interactions with civilians and their mandate for enforcement, play a crucial role in building a strong state, and their own capacity is similarly related to broader ideas of legitimacy and virtuous cycles (Enloe, 1980; Lipsky, 2010; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Bayley, 2008; Perito, 2011; Ben-Porat and Yuval, 2012).

2.2 Does statebuilding strengthen state security institutions?

An open question, however, is whether improved security provision driven by foreign personnel can produce positive effects on citizen perceptions, cooperation, and, ultimately, allow state institutions to provide sustained security and order without substantial costs. Can foreign actors help (re)build this component of states? Cooperative statebuilding under DAs is a process by which international actors intervene in an effort to strengthen state institutions.⁸ We do not yet have convincing evidence that cooperative statebuilding helps strengthen the state, and, specific to this article, we know almost nothing about its effects on citizen perceptions of security institutions. We describe that literature in this subsection before turning to hypotheses about why statebuilding may matter, considering its effects on security provision and state institutions and then, centrally, citizen attitudes.

⁷The same is true of counterinsurgency in places where the state faces active and armed competitors (see Kalyvas 2006; Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015; Berman and Matanock 2015). More broadly, “without a sustained and substantial presence in terms of time and force size,” they “cannot win the population’s trust” (Lyall and Wilson, 2009, p. 77).

⁸Again, following existing work, we use “statebuilding” to refer to an externally-led process in particular throughout this study (e.g. Lake 2016, p. 18).

So far, most existing studies of statebuilding examine broad outcomes. Rather than addressing citizen perceptions of the state, or even security provision for communities, much of this work assesses war rates or democratization.⁹ Among those cross-national studies on cooperative statebuilding, peacekeeping missions specifically requested by weak states to police parts of their territory and otherwise engage in rule of law functions and state institution reform appear equally effective in reducing conflict recurrence as compared to “enforcement” missions that are often imposed (Fortna 2008, p. 44; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2019).¹⁰

Case studies, often of statebuilding requested by weak states, at times examine more specific outcomes but show mixed findings regarding whether statebuilders help (re)build states. A set of case studies in security contracting, for example, shows some successes and some failures, thinking about outcomes broadly (Ciorciari and Krasner, 2018; Ciorciari, N.d.). One study shows decreasing crime rates with this type of statebuilding in two cases (Matanock, 2014). So far, however, only one study assesses the effects on perceptions toward both the outside actor and the state security institutions: focused on a substantial peacekeeping mission in Liberia that was requested by the government, it shows decreased trust in state institutions, even as it increased the use of these institutions (Blair, 2018). This mission is one of the most invasive cooperative statebuilding cases. In contrast, our paper will examine a much more limited mission, seeking to build on this study. Most other survey-based studies of statebuilding, typically invasion and security provision in its aftermath, do not measure perceptions of the states themselves (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013; Stollenwerk, N.d.).

Considering international involvement more broadly to identify any useful evidence for this paper, we find little evidence of transfer of positive citizen perceptions about programs to their perceptions of the state, although the results are again mixed. When outside actors invoked as involved in development programs, citizen perceptions about those foreigners, the quality of the projects, and, in one study, local authorities improve, but perceptions about the state more broadly do not change (Dietrich and Winters, 2015; Dietrich, Mahmud and Winters, 2018; Winters, Dietrich and Mahmud, 2017). In one particular case where the type of aid signaled government corruption, citizen perceptions about their local government were degraded, but their willingness to comply with the government was unchanged (Baldwin and Winters, 2018).

Complementing this work, then, we develop theory about statebuilders’ effects on citizen perceptions regarding security and their potential transfer to state security institutions, and we examine survey evidence on a canonical and seemingly successful case of a statebuilding mission

⁹Much of this work also comes from studies of the aftermath of invasion not cooperative statebuilding: for example, on rates of internal and external war, see Downes and O’Rourke 2016; Peic and Reiter 2011; on democratization, see Peceny 1999; Pei and Kasper 2003; Pickering and Peceny 2006; on both, see (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. vi-vii); (Lake, 2016, p. 3, 7).

¹⁰Perhaps closest to measuring state strength in terms of governance and what we explore in this paper, one study shows that statebuilding missions (proxied by U.N. presence which likely combines invasion and cooperative statebuilding) have little effect on development outcomes (Lake and Fariss, 2014).

requested by a weak state to test it.

2.3 Statebuilders can start virtuous cycles but they are unlikely to transfer to the state

Although a state providing improved security may be able to reestablish a cooperative virtuous cycle, as discussed, it is not clear that an outside actor can accomplish the same (Englebert, 2002; Zartman, 1995). We argue in this subsection that statebuilders often improve security provision and even some aspects of state institutions, but that they are unlikely to strengthen the state through the citizen attitudes. We describe potential scope conditions of our study, including those that emerge from examining cooperative statebuilding.

2.3.1 Statebuilders can start virtuous cycles

Statebuilders tend to provide an influx of coercive capacity, strengthening the provision of security. These missions are organized deployments of foreign military or civilian personnel with access to funds dedicated to their mandates. Invited interventions bring coercive capacity through several mechanisms, especially augmenting expertise and resources. First, foreign judges, prosecutors, investigators, and forces typically come equipped with more training and new practices relative to what their counterparts in these weak states have. For example, police, investigators and prosecutors in contexts of weak state security institutions commonly rely on witness statements that are easier to corrupt than are wiretaps, advanced forensics, or other modern techniques (e.g. Wagner and Jacobs 2008); these missions tend to introduce these modern law enforcement methods. Next, these personnel are often deployed as cadres that already have been working together for the same governmental or intergovernmental agency, improving their coordination. Finally, statebuilders in these circumstances are also agreeing not merely to send their own personnel but also to fund their work and, often, the reforms they oversee. Even when the foreign personnel are sent by neighboring states with similar levels of resources, often when the intervention is done within the region, training and funding are still provided by major powers and global intergovernmental organizations. The United States has devoted an entire training program to readying those deploying from others states to multilateral peacekeeping operations, and it funded troops from the Economic Community of West African States deployed to Liberia in the 1990s, for example (Security Assistance Monitor, 2018; Pitts, 1999, p. 5). These resources can then provide additional governance capacity. Many statebuilding missions directly provide security by, for example, increasing policing to stabilize areas not under government control and augmenting prosecution processes to punish those challenging the government in these territories, as well as using both these mechanisms to also potentially deter criminals.

Certain features also position these missions to improve security provision beyond their influx

of capacity. Missions are foreign and often established through intergovernmental organizations, which mean their personnel do not necessarily respond to the same incentives and opportunities as their domestic counterparts who are embedded in the state's political systems—and these characteristics of statebuilders can augment coercive capacity given that the weakness of many security institutions involves corruption. First, although at times they are supported by carefully selected domestic staff, the foreign nature of these personnel means that they often do not have the same incentives or opportunities to participate in widespread corruption controlled by local or even national political rings, for instance, as those embedded in the weak state. They have not risen through the ranks of the state, potentially with the assistance of other officials in their institutions and also of politicians to whom they may then owe their loyalty; they also do not have the same familial or otherwise close personal ties to the members of the community whose debts also can be leveraged to gain their loyalty if it is not already owed. Second, most modern statebuilding missions are conducted by IGOs. Even if mission personnel are not directly involved in the host state's political systems, foreign states may seek to prioritize their geopolitical concerns in these local contexts, choosing leaders sympathetic to a particular ideology, for example (Lake, 2016). About security sector programs specifically, concern arose that they would “be hijacked by actors pursuing the traditional Cold War agenda of military assistance and the patron-client relations it engendered,” legitimizing arms sales, rather than contributing to strengthening and reforming the security institutions (Bellamy, 2003, p. 113). IGOs, especially those that engage in intervention, are more likely to make collective decisions and so are less likely to fall into the partisan agenda of their members. These personnel who are not embedded in the state's political system can see both security provision and institutional reform with a perspective that does not place the same priority on partisan dynamics in deciding who to prosecute and punish, as well as which domestic personnel and structures to change when reforming—they thereby potentially offer a more regularized way to conduct security provision and reform of security institutions.¹¹

We therefore expect that outside actors will be perceived as providing better security (H1a). Assuming that these missions are seen as providing good governance, especially security provision, then, we anticipate that they may even spark a virtuous cycle. We therefore also expect that invoking a successful statebuilder will be associated with an increase in trust in that entity (H2a) and may even increase propensity to report crime to it (H3a),¹² and the opposite will be true for an unsuccessful statebuilder. Although we expect positive effects, it is also possible to see negative effects, if, first, the mission does not match the characteristics described and is complicit in state corruption, for example, or, second, if these advantages of foreign missions are overwhelmed by drawbacks like insufficient

¹¹In this argument, of course, we stand in contrast to existing work that prioritizes local knowledge to inform the politics, practices, and norms essential for security provision (Autesserre, 2009); we do not disagree with the importance of information, highlighted in both the counterinsurgency and community policing literature (Skogan, 2011; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Akerlof and Yellen, 1994; Tyler, 2004; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Ungar and Mejía-Hernández, 2011; Kalyvas, 2006; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai, 2015; Berman and Matanock, 2015), but we anticipate that this is not a fatal flaw for all missions. In contrast, corruption in a force is.

¹²However, the case we choose is a hard case for this final hypothesis on the statebuilding mission because it, like many other outsiders, has not actively sought to have citizens report crime directly to it.

local knowledge that makes them ineffective. We therefore test H1a and all of our hypotheses empirically, but we also describe types of statebuilding and potential scope conditions that follow from our case later in this subsection.

2.3.2 Do virtuous cycles transfer to the state?

Does this type of statebuilding change citizen attitudes, potentially improving perceptions of security institutions, especially those of the state to allow for sustained security provision without substantial cost, as described above? In theory, there are arguments on both directions. On the one hand, these communities that previously were not provided security by the government may be won back from competing service providers by the supply of consistently good services, including security.¹³ There are numerous potential mechanisms through which the outside actors may thus be operating (where we draw on work about foreign actors such as the volume from [Cammett and MacLean 2011](#)). First, citizens may simply see improved services and associate them with the state, producing a halo effect through a lack of knowledge. Second, in some statebuilding missions, including the one we explore in this paper, the foreign actors explicitly seek a demonstration or “example setting” effect wherein their personnel try to demonstrate that there are no exceptions to the enforcement of laws in the state. These missions choose high-profile actions such as retaking towns captured by rebels or pursuing court cases against top officials in order to show that no one is above the law and no territory is free from enforcement. The hope in these cases is that this would teach citizens to “see and believe that justice can be done” even within their own institutions ([Castresana-Fernandez, 2011](#)). In this case, citizens seeing these improved services may associate them with the statebuilder or the state, but, in either event, they will be more likely at least in the short-term to believe in their security and act as though institutions can enforce the law. Finally, to the extent that statebuilders work closely with those in the state, they can also produce perceptions that state security institutions are experiencing increased capacity and decreased corruption in security, producing transmission effects.

On the other hand, any virtuous cycle established by statebuilders may not transfer to the state. Citizens may come to trust outside actors, potentially enhancing cooperation with them (and, under the virtuous cycle, perhaps also then again boosting their efficacy in providing security), but these perceptions may not transfer to the state. If statebuilders need to be removed from state political systems to be effective, then having domestic actors conducting the security functions may even undermine such a virtuous cycle. Moreover, if coercive capacity helps build legitimacy through effective governance provisions, then states where statebuilding occurs may be seen as even more deficient (see, on peacekeeping, for example, [Fortna 2008](#), p 40). These states are breaking the charade of strength, so that, even if the state’s weakness was well-known, a state-

¹³On this point, for an overview of the importance of security provision in counterinsurgency, see [Berman and Matanock \(2015\)](#); in winning community support, see [Tyler \(2001\)](#).

building mission may further diminish perceptions of state security institutions. In addition, any security provided or even reforms made to security institutions “may be perceived as being imposed by outsiders,” so they may not take root in either changing state institutions or, as we focus on, changing perceptions about the state (see [Bellamy 2003](#), p. 101).

We find more persuasive the weight of arguments that transfer from even successful state-builders to states is difficult, especially based on how little evidence has been found so far, so *we expect that state security institutional involvement will undermine any gains in perceptions of statebuilders providing better security (H1b). We also expect that positive perceptions of statebuilders will not be associated with an increase in trust in other state security institutions (H2b), or with any change in propensity to report crime to the state (H3b).* Finally, being unsuccessful may harm the overall authority and legitimacy provided to a statebuilding mission, but, more interesting, these transfer effects also lead us to hypothesize that these missions, and especially whether or not they are successful, *will drive views on which entity is the correct authority to investigate and prosecute cases (H4).* Again, however, there are arguments that statebuilders may transfer positive perceptions to the state, but these are open questions to test rigorously.

2.3.3 Scope conditions

Finally, we anticipate that the specific category of statebuilding mission can affect any transfer process of perceptions to state security institutions. In particular, the relationship between the government and the statebuilding mission is likely to influence whether any positive perceptions spillover. In addition, and related, any limits to the mandate for the statebuilding mission are also likely to have an effect although the direction is less clear. We turn to these characteristics of different statebuilding missions now to describe which we analyze in this paper and how they fit into our theory about transfer.

We argue that delegation agreements are a most likely category for transfer. The way in which DAs are structured, especially because they tend to receive legitimacy from the start, makes them potentially a most likely case in which to detect any transfer effects following our theory. We describe their crucial characteristics in this sense, and then we turn to the question of scope conditions that may then apply to the results from our study and be further tested.

Delegation agreements have characteristics that conform to the ideal type of effectiveness above. First, they are especially likely to be conducted by IGOs, rather than single states ([Matanock, in progress](#)), which makes them less likely to be perceived as partisan by those on the ground. Second, they tend to only be deployed if these IGOs can provide them with the resources needed, given that they are special missions that require a concrete plan for their funding and staffing, which increases the odds that they are capable, as well.

In addition, in terms of the relationship between states and statebuilding missions, these missions arrive at the request of the host government, which may make transfer more likely. We think of this as a type of legitimacy. Legitimacy can derive from several sources, especially when thinking about the actors provide security in a state, including input, output, or even simply following norms of appropriate behavior that conform to both international standards and local standards (e.g., [Krasner and Risse 2014](#), p. 556). Input legitimacy is the trust or deference that occurs when the governed have a say in the process of governance, providing it a participatory quality ([Scharpf, 1999](#)). The development community often calls this providing a voice for “stakeholders” or local ownership, but the importance of different actors in the host state depends on the type of delegation and the underpinning structure of the ruling government ([Krasner and Risse, 2014](#), p. 556). For example, although the ruling elite make the decision about whether to delegate authority about national security institutions, if they are elected, this is likely to provide a stronger basis for input legitimacy than if they are not. These delegation chains can succeed to the same extent as longer ones if individuals know whether the agreement improves their condition and the mission has the incentive to make a Pareto-improving proposal ([Lupia and McCubbins, 1998](#); [Lake, 2007](#)). Not all of this is about the formal role of domestic actors in providing actual input for the mission: the process also means that the mission acknowledges the host state’s sovereignty over the use of force within its borders and its right to delegate that authority. When missions use the state’s authority, they reaffirm its legitimacy even at the same time as it may be seen as weaker than before (related, see [Hurd 2008](#)). On average, then, through both mechanisms, we believe that these make any positive perceptions of the statebuilding missions more likely to transfer to the state.

In terms of the mandate for these statebuilding missions, the characteristics of DAs may make transfer more likely, as well, but the direction of this effect is not as clear as for legitimacy. Because DAs are established at the request of the host state, outside actors receive authority that is almost always constrained in terms of how much it can reform the state, because incumbents usually have interests in maintaining as much authority as possible ([Matanock 2014](#), [Matanock in progress](#)). Forced intervention, in contrast, completely takes over the state providing the mission more freedom. The limited mandate, though, means that these statebuilding missions must work with state security institutions.¹⁴ Foreign missions are often allowed to choose their counterparts, influence their behavior, and theoretically oversee reform of other state security institutions. Thus, DAs can screen for corruption and transfer capability—knowledge and resources, such as equipment and even templates for legal provisions allowing wiretapping—to the units with whom they work. The ties may make the transfer of any positive perceptions of the statebuilding mission to the state more likely. But, because of the limits, statebuilding missions are constrained in how much they can reform, which may mean they cannot clean or change state security institutions sufficiently to see a change in citizen perceptions.¹⁵ These effects do not necessarily all point in

¹⁴Either with dual key authority as in our case or overriding authority in certain spheres as in [Blair \(2018\)](#).

¹⁵In fact, by highlighting the reforms needed, the statebuilders may undermine these missions—another part of the argument against a transfer effect across missions.

a positive direction, but, taken together with the input legitimacy provided by statebuilding missions, we believe that this case is overall a most likely case for transfer.

Overall, especially given our skepticism about the possibility of statebuilding missions' positive effects spilling over, we wanted to select a category of statebuilding and a specific case that are most likely to experience transfer. We believe DAs provide this. However, the characteristics of these missions may also mean that there are scope conditions to whatever effects we find. It may be only in cases where missions are invited to intervene and constrained to work closely with partners that they have any effect, for example. Even the actors behind these missions, often IGOs, may drive these effects. But, given that we know almost nothing about the effects of statebuilding on transfer, and that this category of statebuilding is important as described above, it seems as if any case is a good place to start, and perhaps especially a most likely case given how skeptical the theory is of any transfer.

3 The Guatemala and CICIG context

The U.N.'s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala is a canonical case of a delegation agreement, an intervention invited by the host government to provide security and help reform state institutions. CICIG is constrained in its mandate negotiated with the host government, but its invitation provided legitimacy in the ways expected under the conceptualization described above. CICIG overall has been seemingly successful, including through a major investigation that it completed just before our survey, but also on the whole in the cases it conducted and even some reforms it pushed to overcome corruption as we describe next. It is therefore an ideal case in which to test for transfer. We choose CICIG in Guatemala to empirically test our theory because it provides a most likely case of finding broader effects on positive citizen perceptions through transfer due to its characteristics. Of course, should we find transfer effects, we would want to then explore what might be additional scope conditions in terms of its canonical or seemingly successful nature. In this section, we describe why CICIG is such a useful case, first focusing on the origins and mandate of CICIG, and then turning to the dimensions on which CICIG seems to have succeeded, including its investigations and joint prosecutions, its capacity transfer, and (more limited) state reform.

3.1 CICIG's structure

CICIG was designed to deal especially with rule of law problems that affected security in Guatemala. Guatemala's civil war ended in 1996, and, after that, the Political Instability Task Force does not list Guatemala as failing, but the level of crime and especially impunity remained high. Indeed,

Guatemala City is among the most crime-ridden in the world outside of the context of war. The violence has been primarily criminal not political (Reilly, 2008). An inability to overcome impunity has made reducing crime very difficult (Feiser, 2010). Impunity (“the *de facto* or *de jure* absence of criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil responsibility and the ability to avoid investigation or punishment,” according to the agreement that the state signed to rectify this problem) weakened the police and judicial sectors, and, in turn, the failure to provide security undermined trust in the state (as we will show in some survey data). Convictions in criminal cases, even major cases, was estimated to be in the single digits, which allowed violence to continue with no expected punishment (Alston, 2007). Impunity was usually attributed to the criminal structures and clandestine security structures that took root during in the Guatemalan civil war, 1960-1996 (Feiser, 2010). Their reach within the police and judicial systems has meant that criminal “will almost certainly get away with [their crimes]” (Alston, 2007).

CICIG was established through a process that began in 2003. Following peacekeeping missions during Guatemala’s peace process in the 1990s, the Guatemalan government requested the creation of a joint Guatemalan and U.N. commission through the Department of Political Affairs in December of that year (A/RES/63/19). This initial body would have been given authority to prosecute alone, a deeper form of shared sovereignty, but that aspect was declared unconstitutional in 2004. In 2006, then, the government signed what had been redrafted as a partial governance delegation agreement. By 2007, after its ratification by Congress, CICIG brought U.N. appointees into crucial positions in the Guatemalan government. CICIG was enacted for a two-year period initially, and then has been extended each time it has been set to expire. Indeed, its origins and these extensions certainly indicate the type of input legitimacy expected for DAs. After the initial failure,¹⁶ it was proposed and negotiated by the then vice president, was supported across Guatemalan institutions, and ultimately was largely ignored by the broader population for years.¹⁷ That is not to say there are always close relations between CICIG and the government: CICIG’s mandate has been extended for the third time until 2019, but the current president of Guatemala, Jimmy Morales, has now tried to force the mission out. That Morales has turned on CICIG—coinciding with an ongoing investigation conducted by CICIG against Morales, alleging corruption on the president’s campaign in 2015—is not surprising, and it mirrors the turn of the prior president, who was ultimately charged with corruption after CICIG’s investigation. These reform missions often target the government and so naturally find resistance once the specific missions are underway (despite that candidates, including Morales, typically support them before taking office and, of course, departing incumbents have incentives to put them into place; see [Matanock in progress](#)).

CICIG’s functions, according to its mandate, are to identify the corruption of the security sector

¹⁶That commission was ruled unconstitutional because foreign prosecutors were to be allowed to work on their own in domestic courts; CICIG makes them joint alongside domestic counterparts.

¹⁷Matanock (in progress) discusses the decisions to invite CICIG and to structure the intervention like this in much more depth.

and work with the state to dismantle it, specifically through two categories of action: (1) individual investigation, prosecution, and punishment, and (2) advice on institutional reform to allow the state to more effectively execute these functions (A/63/511; [Hudson and Taylor 2010](#)). CICIG's purpose is to support, strengthen, and assist Guatemalan state institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations and other criminal conduct related to these entities (A/63/511). CICIG thus seeks to tackle both impunity and related corruption. This mandate, according to the international agreement that established the mission, will help strengthen security, increasing the ability of institutions to protect Guatemalan citizens and provide access to justice, and, in turn, increasing their cooperation.

First, on the individual cases, the U.N. provides investigative and prosecutorial teams that could conduct and oversee organized crime cases brought before Guatemalan judges. The federal investigators and prosecutors that are part of CICIG are paid or overseen by the U.N. not the Guatemalan government. CICIG was not granted full authority to prosecute on its own—such authority had been a component of the original proposal in 2003 that was ruled unconstitutional—but it can either present criminal charges to the Public Prosecutor's Office or join criminal proceedings as a "querellente adhesivo," what we call a joint or co-prosecutor.¹⁸ Once the Public Prosecutor's Office opens a case and admits CICIG as a co-prosecutor, the commission has the ability to introduce evidence and file procedural motions.¹⁹ CICIG was granted full authority to investigate any person, official, or private entity for crimes that it suspects are related to the illegal criminal structures and clandestine security organizations; it also has the ability to request statements, documents, and general cooperation from any individual or entity in the government.²⁰

Second, in terms of shaping the broader states institutions, CICIG also selects and trains a special prosecutorial unit, the Special Prosecutor's Unit assigned to CICIG (UEFAC due to its Spanish acronym), as it was known until 2008, and then the Special Anti-Impunity Prosecutor's Bureau (FECI).²¹ This team is composed of members of the Public Prosecutor's Office's office and reported directly to its head, but it is selected and trained by, and then works continuously with, CICIG. Through FECI, CICIG can more directly initiate and run prosecutions. More broadly, CICIG is also allowed to identify current civil servants that commit infractions and participate in their disciplinary proceedings.²² Finally, CICIG is also mandated to recommend policies and reforms to the state's legal and institutional systems directly to the legislature.²³

¹⁸"Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG" 2006, Article 1; [Pastor 2011-2012](#).

¹⁹Código Procesal Penal de Guatemala, Decreto 51.92, Articles 116-121 cited in [Wirken 2011](#).

²⁰"Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG" 2006, Article 1.

²¹Convenio de cooperación bilateral entre el Ministerio Público y la Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), February 27, 2008, Article 308 cited in [Wirken 2011](#).

²²"Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG" 2006, Article 3.

²³"Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG" 2006, Articles 2-3.

To do this work, CICIG brings considerable capacity and resources: CICIG has an annual budget of approximately \$20 million dollars for its relatively limited operation ([Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016](#)). Its budget comes through a U.N. trust fund created for the commission (A/63/511). With this budget, CICIG has hired national and international experts.²⁴ Having foreign staff working at CICIG provides a series of benefits that should translate into more efficient investigations. First, as we theorized above, it reduces the extent to which the staff is susceptible to extortion and other threats from criminal organizations. As the latest report from the Open Society Justice Initiative explains, “Foreigners did not have relatives living in Guatemala who could be subject to pressure or threats; their personal and professional relationships were not linked to life in Guatemala nor were they affected by the activities of the Public Ministry.” (p. 101). Second, as we also theorized, foreign prosecutors bring their expertise in working abroad and knowledge in cutting-edge investigative methods (such as wiretapping or the development of witness protection programs).²⁵ CICIG is therefore also able to employ cutting-edge technology to find and store information, methods to process and present evidence, and litigation techniques ([CICIG, 2015b](#)).

3.2 CICIG’s successes

CICIG has seemingly met much success, especially in its role in specific cases, securing high conviction rates. After twelve years of operation in Guatemala, the Commission alongside the MP initiated more than 120 high-profile investigations,²⁶ 70% where it served as co-prosecutor, and 100 in which FECCI was involved. The investigations involved 70 criminal structures operating in Guatemala, as well as almost 1,600 people (including 161 public servants) ([CICIG, 2019b, 2015a](#)). Although we cannot make a rigorous comparison of the conviction rates of cases prosecuted with CICIG and those prosecuted without it to test the Commission’s direct effect on crime reduction, the evidence suggests that cases where the Commission has served as co-prosecutor tend to be more likely to end in a successful conviction. Specifically, according to CICIG’s last report, out of the 1,540 people involved in their investigations, 400 have already been convicted, which translates in a conviction rate of 26%. Compared to the almost single digit conviction rates in similar cases in which CICIG is not involved—up to ten percent depending on the sample—this approximately 20 percent rate is significantly higher.²⁷ There is consensus that CICIG selects the highest impact cases, but also the hardest cases, based on its philosophy of example setting described

²⁴To date, CICIG has around 148 staff members, including 80 from Guatemala; the rest are from Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Venezuela ([CICIG, 2015b](#)).

²⁵For instance, the current Commissioner had wide experience in Colombia dismantling a network of politicians with relationships with paramilitary groups and drug gangs.

²⁶This figure is smaller than the number of investigations that CICIG opened overall. For instance, while by 2012 the Commission had opened 289 investigations, in that same year only 55 were active ([CICIG, 2012](#), p. 26).

²⁷In 2015, CICIG presented new system designed to measure impunity in Guatemala; using existing data on crimes overall from 2005-2014, they estimate a conviction rate of 10 percent. See full report here.

above. So differences in conviction rates are unlikely to be driven by selection.²⁸ As an illustration, the first two cases in which the commission participated as a joint prosecutor were “Masacre de Zacapa” and “Mariachi Loco.” The first case consisted of a mass murder at Zacapa in 2008 involving drug-trafficking groups. The case ended with the conviction of 14 people in 2010 (CICIG, 2019b). The case of “Mariachi Loco” revealed a criminal structure within National Police. A commissary and three agents were convicted in 2009 after being involved in illegal detentions and aggravated robbery.

Beyond conviction rates, CICIG’s success seems to have also translated into improvements in other objective measures of crime in Guatemala. Specifically, recently, the [International Crisis Group \(2018\)](#) and [Trejo and Nieto-Matiz \(2019\)](#) estimate that CICIG has contributed to reduce Guatemala’s homicides in 4,500 and 18,000 murders, respectively.²⁹ This suggestive evidence indicates that, aside from directly improving the efficiency of prosecution, CICIG has also been able to improve security more broadly in Guatemala.

CICIG has also been able to transfer capacity to the unit and additional personnel with which it works directly. Through a “learning-by-doing” approach, in cases involving CIACs, the commission has worked together with government officials, especially the FECCI, the specialized unit composed of prosecutors who were initially chosen and then trained by CICIG. In doing so, CICIG seeks to transfer knowledge and expertise to local authorities. The evidence is clear that FECCI has improved its capacity in terms of preparing evidence, analyzing crime scenes, and litigation ([Washington Office on Latin America, 2015](#); [International Crisis Group, 2011](#); [Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016](#)). In particular, the Commission estimates that the efficiency rate of the prosecutions conducted along with FECCI—i.e., the relationship between the presentation of charges and the enactment of conviction—is about 85% (CICIG, 2019b, p. 52). FECCI is currently investigating more than 119 cases, however, so its reach is relatively limited. Moreover, there is less evidence that such capacity transfer has extended beyond the entities that collaborate directly with the commission ([Washington Office on Latin America, 2015](#); [International Crisis Group, 2011](#); [Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016](#)); in fact, some analysts argue that CICIG’s concentration on FECCI—likely driven at least in part by CICIG’s trust in the unit—has limited the extent to which capacity transfer will extend to other agencies ([International Crisis Group, 2016](#)).³⁰ Recently, with CICIG’s support, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has created units designed to join the commission’s efforts in fighting human-trafficking and extortion. However, prosecutors working in these new units so far lack

²⁸CICIG’s selection rule is to take the cases that otherwise would not result in a conviction and that will have a noticeable conviction ([Castresana-Fernandez, 2011](#)), so, if anything, the selection effect should make CICIG’s conviction rate lower than the non-CICIG rates.

²⁹Both studies calculate these figures by constructing a synthetic control, i.e., the counterfactual crime trajectory that Guatemala would have had, had CICIG not been in place in the past decade in the country.

³⁰CICIG has also been focused centrally on Guatemala City in much of its investigations and prosecutions to this point (a critique leveled, for example, in an author interview with Claudia Escobar 2017). In October 2016, however, CICIG and FECCI opened new headquarters in Quetzaltenango, a department that has one of Guatemala’s highest crime rates and incidence of drug-trafficking. While it is too early to assess its effects, such a move may strengthen the capabilities of prosecutors outside the capital city.

the technical training and budget to successfully advance their investigations ([International Crisis Group, 2016](#), p. 16). CICIG has also provided technical assistance to the staff working in other Guatemalan security institutions. For instance, after having identified a lack of well-trained police as problematic to its witness protection program, CICIG has trained 48 graduates of the National Civil Police academy to serve as the only protection unit for witnesses.

While CICIG has been successful in specific cases and somewhat successful in transferring capacities to domestic institutions, success in reforming other state security institutions has been more limited. First, CICIG has used criminal and disciplinary action to remove corrupt individuals from different institutions, but its lack of authority has not always allowed these. CICIG has had corrupt members of law enforcement and judiciary removed from all levels of the hierarchy, including the conviction in 2013 of the former Director of the National Police (in the *Amatitlán* case) and, last year, the removal of the *antejuicio* for two justices accused of influence peddling ([Castresana-Fernandez, 2011](#)). However, with regard to judicial nominees and other types of authorities such as the General Attorney or members of Special Commissions in Congress,³¹ the commission can express its views, but it could not actually block them or directly remove them. For instance, consider the Supreme Court and appeals court: with CICIG's urging, Guatemala signed a law that opened the process of selecting judges to comment by CICIG and domestic NGOs ([Valladares, 2009](#)). But, when CICIG objected to six candidates (out of thirteen total) for Supreme Court, three were appointed anyway by the legislature. On the other hand, the legislature did rule out all 30 appeals court candidates (out of 90 total) that CICIG or these NGOs opposed. While this was a step toward a cleaner justice system, CICIG could not directly overrule corrupt or otherwise unsuitable choices, and so it only worked when the legislature took its advice ([Valladares, 2009](#)).

Second, on broader institutional reform, two of the most important recommendations, which have contributed considerably to improving the effectiveness of prosecuting cases, have been the reform to the witness protection system and the introduction of wiretapping. Wiretapping, for instance, was not allowed in Guatemala before 2009, but the MP and the National Civil Police are now allowed to use the technique in their cases. CICIG-endorsed reforms that included *antejuicio*, however, faced resistance ([Castresana-Fernandez, 2011](#); [Hudson and Taylor, 2010](#); [Wirken, 2011](#)). *Antejuicio* is a form of immunity provided by pre-trial. The pre-trial privilege is a defense mechanism of the government that protects dignitaries or public officials against complaints that are unfounded, spurious, or motivated by political interests. For instance, if a president were to be accused—as happened when CICIG requested the removal of President Morales' immunity in 2017—the case would not be opened before an exhaustive review of the accusation by the proper entity (which could be Congress, the Supreme Court, or the appeals court). However, due to the way public servants have benefited from this privilege due to a lack of specific regulations in the

³¹For a more comprehensive list of the reports that CICIG has produced with respect to these nominations, visit http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=informes_tematicos.

procedure, *antejuicio* has become an obstacle to the investigation of the criminal acts. Often, during the processing of the pre-trial hearing, the public official or dignitary is not suspended from his or her position and therefore can use his or her influence to alter or destroy evidence, or otherwise change the final decision in the case. These processes, which have remained unaltered, have impeded the work of CICIG and the security sector institutions in Guatemala, although the commission has proposed related legislation as recently as last year. Overall, then, CICIG has had mixed success on specific institutional reforms to help investigate and prosecute, but it has not accomplished constitutional reform of the justice system. A pressing aspect of this reform would reshape the selection process for justices, which has been described as highly politicized and susceptible to corruption. Partial legislation on particular issues may help strengthen some elements of the justice system, but, according to CICIG's 2017 Annual Report, it continues to advocate more encompassing change (CICIG, 2017).³² Although CICIG was mandated to propose policy reforms and legislation, it was not provided any control or authority in enacting these changes. As a former Commissioner said, "all the final decisions were Guatemalan" (Castresana-Fernandez, 2011).

In terms of specific cases, and even advising some institutional reforms directly related to criminal prosecutions and cleaning those institutions of particular corrupt officials, then, CICIG has seemingly had at least some success. CICIG has at times employed public pronouncements and international pressure on law makers, but it also has created domestic units and helped domestic movements that exert pressure, as well. The most emblematic case was the 2015 protests that erupted after CICIG's revelations of the involvement of the former president Otto Pérez Molina in the infamous *La Linea* case.³³ These movements, along with the other characteristics of CICIG suggest that if any DA is likely to see transfer to domestic institutions.

3.3 Existing evidence on trust in CICIG and other Guatemalan security institutions

CICIG actively sought to involve citizens in its initiatives, as it recognized that they played a key role in holding politicians accountable and fostering a culture of legality.³⁴ For this reason, the Commission designed multiple strategies to reach out to citizens, raise public awareness of the need of the fight against corruption, and inform them about any progress with respect to ongoing investigations using various multiple channels (the media, social networks, etc.). In 2018, the Commission made more emphasis on this goal by redesigning their website—and making it multilingual (available in Spanish, Maya and English), boosting its interactions with users in

³²Since the introduction of this reform, only 3 articles have been approved and 19 are still pending for discussion; currently, the discussion is suspended in Congress (CICIG, 2019b). For more detailed discussion of the reforms CICIG proposed and their outcomes, see Appendix X.

³³See for instance the following media reports on this: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/guatemala-president-otto-perez-molina-cicig-corruption-investigation> and <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-president-to-son-otto-perez-molina-and-a-day-for-hope-in-guatemala>.

³⁴For instance, by partnering with the universities of San Carlos de Guatemala and Rafael Land, and the GIZ, they implemented a citizen campaign #YoNoMePresto (CICIG, 2019a, p. 58).

Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube—which resulted in a 35% increase, between 2018 and 2019, in the number of their followers in their social media [CICIG \(2019a\)](#). This strategy also redounded in a positive image of the Commission amongst users of social media: “The analysis of verified accounts shows that 6 out of 10 users who talk about the work of the Commission, express positive sentiments” ([CICIG, 2019b](#), p. 83).


Aside from CICIG’s endeavours to foster citizen engagement with its activities, existing survey evidence suggests that CICIG outpaces other state security institutions in terms of trust. Using time series coming from LAPOP surveys conducted in Guatemala between 2010 to 2019,³⁵ we trace average trust in the relevant Guatemalan institutions over time. As Figure 1 indicates, CICIG is the most highly trusted, and its public support has increased compared to levels in 2010: between 2012 and 2017 the share of Guatemalans who trusts it increased in almost 50 percentage points. However, in 2019, the share of citizens who trust the Commission decreased by the same amount going back to similar levels as in 2010, yet it is still more trusted than other domestic security providing institutions. Notice that this decrease in trust could be explained by former president Morales’ systematic attacks to the Commission, as reported in CICIG’s last report ([CICIG, 2019b](#)); and that the MP also experienced a drop in trust, suggesting a trend. CICIG’s domestic partner, which we refer to as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, or Ministerio Público (MP) throughout this section,³⁶ however, has also seen an increase in its average trust, becoming the second most trusted institution in Guatemala (among those that the survey asks about). Today, more than half of the adult population in the country trust the MP, whereas ten years ago, only about 30% trusted this institution. Other institutions, however, most notably the police, do not similarly improve.

Taken together, these figures suggest that the MP has been able to capitalize on CICIG’s partnership with it to build a reputation that leads citizens to feel more confident that prosecutions (and, eventually, convictions) will actually occur. We can more rigorously test these relationships in our survey experiment.

³⁵LAPOP did not ask about CICIG in earlier waves; we are working to secure other earlier survey data that asks about CICIG, but we have not been able to do so yet.

³⁶CICIG works primarily with the Special Anti-Impunity Prosecutor’s Bureau (FECI), but it also works more broadly with the MP in Guatemala, so we use this acronym throughout the paper.

(a) Trust in Security Providing Institutions 2004-2017



Percentage who answered 5-7 to the question: 'To what extent do you trust...', where 1 = 'Not at all' and 7 = 'A lot'. Source: LAPOP

(b) Trust in Guatemalan Institutions 2019




Figure 1: Trust in CICIG and Guatemalan Security Institutions

4 Research design

To test the theory, then, we ran a survey experiment about CICIG in Guatemala. We included vignettes in the survey, which primed respondents on the involvement of CICIG and, later, the success of the security provider in other recent cases, and asked them to answer a series of questions that composed the measures for the outcome we studied.³⁷

4.1 Manipulating the security institution involved

In order to evaluate cases in which CICIG is expected to take the lead versus those in which another organization is, we showed respondents the following hypothetical case about a crime related to drug-trafficking that is under investigation.³⁸

Security has been an important issue in the elections. For the following questions, I am going to ask you to consider a hypothetical case: during an important anti-corruption investigation, two witnesses were found murdered in a rural area in the Department of [state where the individual is being surveyed].

Then, to manipulate the security institution involved in the case, and theoretically the extent to which respondents perceive that the investigators are independent, we varied the origin of the investigating team. Specifically, our treatment sought to get subjects to think about CICIG, an actor increasingly known to Guatemalans.³⁹ As such, respondents received the following text, depending on the experimental condition they are assigned to:⁴⁰

Investigators [from CICIG, an international U.N. commission/from a collaboration between CICIG, an international U.N. commission,

³⁷Survey experiments that use vignettes to prime subjects on a specific issue, have been widely used in political science. Examples include: voting behavior (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012), race and politics (Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002), among others. The purpose of a prime is to “bring to mind a particular consideration” (Mutz, 2011, p. 50). For a more detailed discussion about methodological considerations in survey experiments see Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk (2007).

³⁸Using a hypothetical case may raise concerns about the extent to which citizens may be able to fully understand and engage with the case; yet, we chose to use hypothetical given the sensitivity of the issue, as well as to avoid deception. However, we designed the case as to mimic as much as possible the type of cases that CICIG usually investigates. To do so, we read through the list of CICIG’s opened investigations, as well as major cases covered by the media. To be sure, while the description of the case resembles opened cases, we intentionally made modifications in order to avoid misleading subjects and make them relate the case to an existing one.

³⁹According to data from LAPOP, the percentage of respondents who don’t know the Commission has gone from 26.31% in 2010 to 5.15% in 2019. In the case of the MP, this percentage has remained below 5% during the same period of time.

⁴⁰Note that there is one group that is not primed with any entity. This is our control group.

and the Attorney-General's Office/NOTHING] suspect that police agents had informed the capo also under investigation about these two witnesses. Presumably, the information the agents provided allowed the criminals to murder these two witnesses. The case of who killed these two witnesses is ongoing. Murders like this have historically gone unpunished in Guatemala.

4.2 Manipulation of perceived success

We then also manipulate the perceived success of CICIG or the other security institutions involved in investigating and prosecuting cases like the one described by showing respondents the following vignette:⁴¹

Although hypothetical, this case is not far from reality. Investigators and prosecutors [from CICIG, the international U.N. commission/from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Attorney-General's Office/NOTHING] have been [SUCCESSFUL/UNSUCCESSFUL] in a number of its recent cases against criminal structures that threaten the rule of law in Guatemala.

Combining these two manipulations, we randomly assigned respondents to one of the 6 experimental groups depicted in Figure 2, each of these corresponding to one possible combination of the levels of our two treatments.

The first stage randomization, i.e., which agency is involved in the case investigation (either CICIG, CICIG and the MP, or no agency), allows us to test hypotheses H1a and H1b. The second stage randomization, i.e., whether the agency invoked is generally successful or not, provides a combined test for the remaining hypotheses (H2a through H4).

4.3 Sample and survey

We conducted our survey in Guatemala during the weeks leading up to the 2015 presidential election; it was completed on October 21, 2015.⁴² It was implemented by Borge y Asociados, a polling

⁴¹This information may be malleable, although we are aware that citizens may have some priors based on what they see and listen to on the media.

⁴²We did not receive any data from the survey from the firm until October 26, 2015, after the pre-analysis plan was registered on EGAP's website to record our hypotheses and research design.




Figure 2: Experimental Design Voters survey

firm with longstanding experience in conducting public opinion surveys in Central America. It was a module in a larger survey that asked other questions, mostly about marketing. All questions were asked in Spanish.

The survey was fielded in the same year that CICIG released the results of one of its crucial investigations in Guatemala, known as *La Línea*, which led to the resignation of the former president, Otto Pérez Molina, and the conviction of more than twenty other high level government officials. So, this makes the case an especially likely case to detect transfer effects of CICIG because respondents are likely to be positive about the commission. As noted above, we wanted a successful case that made these transfer effects most likely because we are skeptical that they exist. The timing also means that CICIG had more visibility for Guatemalans, exposed to its work through the news coverage, however. On that dimension, this moment makes it more difficult to detect effects of CICIG and any other effects because the commission was so well-known at the time, as shown by the sharp drop on the number of Guatemalans who do not know of CICIG (see Figure 9 in Appendix A). Priming subjects on CICIG, and also its success, may move them less than it would in another context causing us to underestimate any effects. If there are, therefore, very small transfer effects, for example, we may miss them. (But we also could not identify a case exists where a DA has been successful but is not visible, which would be ideal for our study, so we considered this the best option.)

The sample was designed to understand a wide set of questions using the frame of last electoral register. Using a multi-stage sampling process, Borge y Asociados made a first selection proportional to the number of voters per electoral center by department and municipality. Thus, in this first stage, they selected the number of voting centers (clusters) that represents the number of registered voters for the coming October 2015 elections. Within these clusters, at a second stage, they randomly sampled 12 individuals to be surveyed, respecting a gender quota of 50% women and 50% men, and only surveying those Guatemalans aged 18 years and older. The final sample size is 1,200 respondents, which corresponds to 12 face-to-face surveys drawn from 100 clusters (based on voting stations). This sample is representative at the national level. Finally, randomization of respondents to each of the our treatment conditions was done within clusters.⁴³

4.4 Measuring the outcomes of interest

Respondents were asked a set of questions designed to measure our main outcomes of interest: i) perceived effectiveness of the agency in charge of the hypothetical case investigation, ii) trust in CICIG and the Guatemalan institutions, iii) willingness to report an act of corruption or activity related to organized crime to different security institutions, and iv) appropriateness of different security institutions to involve themselves in this type of governance. The questions used to capture these variables, and their ordering, are presented in Appendix G.

4.5 Empirical strategy

Our first analyses use a difference of means estimator, comparing the means across experimental groups for our outcomes of interest, to test the effect of CICIG’s involvement on these outcomes (H1a). Our basic specification estimates the effect of invoking CICIG as the main investigator—either working alone or with the MP—on respondents’ perceived effectiveness of the investigation. We estimate this average treatment effect using an OLS regression, with White-Huber standard errors.⁴⁴ Since we are also interested in testing the extent to which involving the MP in the case hurts the perceived independence of the investigation (H1b), we include an indicator for when the MP is involved in the case as well. We therefore estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CICIG_i + \beta_2 MP_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{k,i}$ is each observed outcome described in the previous section; $CICIG$ and MP are indicators, each corresponding to whether CICIG is stated to be involved in investigation, and whether

⁴³Given that this is a survey experiment, we analyze our data at the individual level.

⁴⁴Which correct for different variances across experimental groups.

the is MP also participating in the case, respectively. Based on equation 1, our estimators of interest are $\hat{\beta}_1$ and $\hat{\beta}_2$.

Our second analyses use a difference-in-difference estimator. These tests measure the effect of invoking both CICIG and its success on citizens' i) trust in CICIG (H2a) and Guatemalan institutions (H2b); ii) likelihood of reporting crime to CICIG (H3a) and other domestic security institutions (H3b); and iii) legitimacy granted to CICIG and other domestic security institutions to prosecute crime (H4). We are therefore interested in the estimated coefficient of the interaction term (i.e., $\hat{\beta}_3$) of the following equation that we estimate using OLS with robust standard errors:

$$Y_{i,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CICIG_i + \beta_2 Success_i + \beta_3 Success_i \times CICIG_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $CICIG$ is equal to 1 if CICIG was invoked in the investigation and 0 if no agency was invoked; and $Success_i$ is equal to 1 if subject i was shown the investigations to lead to successful convictions, and 0 otherwise.⁴⁵

5 Results on effectiveness, trust, and crime reporting

In the context of CICIG's successes, as well as its characteristics as a delegation agreement that has worked closely with domestic institutions, then, we analyze experimental evidence on the effect of CICIG on several questions designed to test our hypotheses. First, we ask about whether Guatemalans perceive CICIG as effective when involved in a case (H1a), and whether having domestic partners closely involved changes those perceptions (H1b). Second, priming on CICIG's involvement and now also on its success, we ask respondents about their perceived trust of CICIG and other state security institutions (H2a, b), their willingness to report an act of corruption or activity related to organized crime to different security institutions (H3a, b), and the appropriateness of different security institutions to involve themselves in this type of governance (H4).

5.1 Manipulation checks

We start by presenting the results of the manipulation check we included in the survey instrument. After showing the hypothetical case, respondents were asked whether they remembered the agency to which the investigators belonged. Table 1 summarizes the results. We provide two sets of comparisons. First, we compare the control group with the group primed with CICIG working alone and being involved in the case investigation (labeled "Control vs. CICIG" in the

⁴⁵Given our interest in the marginal conditional effect of success given CICIG being invoked, in this set of analyses we limit our sample to subjects who were primed with CICIG working alone or did not receive any prime.

table). The second set compares the control group with the group primed with CICIG working in the investigation along with the MP (labeled “Control vs. CICIG and MP” in the table). For each one of these sets, we run simple *t*-tests comparing the proportion of individuals who responded different agencies or combinations of such to our manipulation check question across experimental groups.

The first line compares the proportion of respondents who answered that CICIG was the main investigator between the control group and the treatment group primed with CICIG working alone (answer labeled “CICIG”). The second line compares the same experimental groups but the outcome is the proportion of respondents mentioning CICIG, either alone or with the MP (answer labeled “Any CICIG”). The third line compares the proportion of respondents who answered that CICIG and the MP were the main investigators between the control group and the group receiving CICIG/MP’s treatment (answer labeled “CICIG and MP”). The fourth and fifth lines analyze the same comparison group but the outcome is the proportion of respondents mentioning CICIG, either alone or with the MP (answer labeled “Any CICIG”), and the MP, either alone or with CICIG (answer labeled “Any MP”), respectively. The last line, still compares the same groups but the outcome is the proportion of respondents who answered either CICIG, the MP or both (answer labeled “Any CICIG and/or MP”).⁴⁶

The results in Table 1 indicate that respondents who were told about the case being investigated by CICIG were significantly more likely to later accurately identify the hypothetical investigators in the case. The proportion of respondents listing either CICIG, the MP, or both agencies is also significantly higher for the group treated with the CICIG and the MP prime.⁴⁷ But, there was not statistical difference between the proportion of respondents who mentioned CICIG and the MP as the hypothetical investigators between respondents who received the CICIG and the MP prime versus the control group. As we noted above, this could be the case because respondents had so recently seen CICIG and the MP working together in the high-profile *La Línea* case that many in the control assumed these were the actors. Our manipulation therefore may have been weak, which makes it harder to expect significant effects for our main analyses, especially for the marginal effect of the inclusion of the MP in the case investigation.⁴⁸ Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that our vignette successfully made respondents see CICIG as involved but was less successful in priming respondents on the MP.

Based on our question about what respondents in the *control group* were thinking, Table 2 explores which agencies respondents thought were involved in the hypothetical case (since they were just told investigators or prosecutors). The majority stated that they did not know the agency

⁴⁶In contrast to the first comparison set, in the second comparison set we test for more answers involving the MP, as this institution was also mentioned in the prime.

⁴⁷Notice that the proportion of respondents answering “Any MP” is also greater among the treated group and this difference seems to be statistically meaningful with a *p*-value of 0.14.

⁴⁸When measuring the effectiveness outcomes, though, we reminded respondents about their corresponding vignette. See survey instrument in the Appendix.

Table 1: Manipulation checks. Difference in the proportion of respondents in each type of answer to the question: *In this [hypothetical] case, do you recall where the investigators are from?*

	Answer	Prop. control	Prop. Treatment	Difference	p-value (diff)
<i>Control vs. CICIG</i>	CICIG	0.09	0.19	0.1	0.00
	Any CICIG	0.3	0.41	0.1	0.00
<i>Control vs. CICIG and MP</i>	CICIG and MP	0.18	0.2	0.02	0.59
	Any CICIG	0.3	0.36	0.06	0.08
	Any MP	0.45	0.5	0.05	0.14
	Any CICIG and/or MP	0.54	0.64	0.1	0.00

which the investigators belonged to (30.3%). Yet, notice that the MP also receives a large share of responses (26.77%), as well as the government (10.35%). This suggests that the latter are the default institutions when respondents think about this type of investigations. However, CICIG, either working alone, with the MP or with the government, also receives a share of responses (9%, 18.43%, and 3.3%, respectively). These figures indicate that our baseline group is already thinking about the MP and, to a lesser extent, about CICIG when thinking about cases in Guatemala. This poses a hard test for us to be able to identify and test for the effect of invoking both institutions, although more sharply for the case of the MP’s involvement (i.e., H1b), as described above.

Table 2: Answers to the question: *In this [hypothetical] case, do you recall where the investigators are from?* for the control group (no phrase)

Answers to question	Percent
CICIG	9.09
The MP	26.77
The government	10.35
CICIG and the MP	18.43
CICIG and the government	3.28
The police	1.52
Department of investigation	0.25
Does not know	30.30
Total	100.00

5.2 CICIG and citizen perceptions of effectiveness (H1a and H1b)

We find that when we elicit CICIG’s involvement in the case investigation (either alone or along with the MP), respondents are more likely to be positive about the prospects of the case resolu-

tion, and the difference is consistently statistically significant. Table 3 presents the formal test of the effect of our primes on respondents' responses for the questions related to the effectiveness of the institutions in charge of investigating the hypothetical crime. From this table, it is easy to see that, across questions, citizens have a more positive view of the security institutions when CICIG is involved (H1a). First, respondents who were primed with CICIG were more likely to believe that the authorities from each one of these entities would correctly identify the perpetrators of the abduction in our hypothetical case (an increase in the perceived likelihood in 0.6 scale points). The same was true for their belief that the identified perpetrators would be successfully prosecuted, resulting in a conviction (an increase in the perceived likelihood in 0.22 scale points). And, finally, the same was true of their belief that the police agents who provided the information on the witnesses resulting in the murders will be identified and punished (an increase in the perceived likelihood of 0.26 scale points).

Table 3: Difference in means estimator: Effectiveness (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Identify the per- petrators	(2) Successfully prosecuted and convicted	(3) Police agents identified and punished
CICIG involved in the case	0.580*** (0.114)	0.221* (0.115)	0.256** (0.117)
MP also involved in the case	-0.113 (0.112)	0.0241 (0.112)	-0.142 (0.117)
Constant	4.046*** (0.0808)	4.251*** (0.0835)	4.137*** (0.0832)
Observations	1,177	1,178	1,169
R-squared	0.025	0.005	0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

When we compare the results of the treatment between the prime that only mentions CICIG and the prime that mentions a joint effort with the MP (following equation 1), however, we see a slight weakening of crucial results as expected (although the effects are not statistically significant). For our first outcome (identification of the responsible of the crime) and third outcome (police agents will be identified and punished), the effect is slightly stronger when CICIG works alone, than when it does so with the MP (the difference corresponds to about 0.113 and 0.142 scale points, respectively). The opposite is true for our second outcome (conviction of the crime): the effect is larger for those primed with both CICIG and the MP, although the difference is close to 0. While the coefficient of the difference (second row of Table 3) is not statistically significant, its negative sign on these two rows tentatively suggests that citizens may perceive CICIG as effective

(H1a) but that these traits are somewhat undermined by working with a counterpart that has less capacity and potentially is more corruptable (H1b).⁴⁹

5.2.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects

We further test whether the effect discussed above is larger among citizens who reside in Guatemala City than in the rest of the country.⁵⁰ The logic for this additional test is that CICIG's operations and most well-known cases have taken place in the capital city.⁵¹ This, in turn, should make citizens living in Guatemala City more knowledgeable and presumably more trustful of the mission. Indeed, in our sample, the share of respondents who trust CICIG is larger among those surveyed in Guatemala City than in the rest of the country (74.05 versus 67.35, respectively).

Table 4 explores heterogeneous treatment effects of CICIG on effectiveness, by area of residence. The effect of priming on CICIG on citizens' estimated probability of identifying the perpetrators of the crime is positive and statistically significant for both respondents living in Guatemala City and elsewhere. However, this effect is larger among the former and this difference is statistically significant (\approx half a scale point). Nevertheless, this heterogeneity is not present for the remaining two outcomes. Interestingly, for the second and third outcomes, the positive and statistically significant effect of priming on CICIG is only driven by survey respondents residing outside Guatemala City (the sign of the coefficient is positive in both cases). One possible interpretation for this finding is that these two questions appeal to the perceived effectiveness of local institutions, which tend to be weaker and thus CICIG's involvement may provide more legitimacy to the prosecution and conviction processes.

5.3 A successful CICIG

In the previous section, we showed that respondents tend to be more optimistic about the effectiveness of criminal investigations when they are led by CICIG, either alone or with the MP, although the MP has a slightly negative but not statistically significant effect. In this section and the next ones, we explore the effects of a successful CICIG on various outcomes, compared both to other state security institutions and to an unsuccessful CICIG.⁵² In all of our estimates, the base-

⁴⁹In Appendix B.1, we also include the formal tests for both primes (CICIG alone and with the MP) on our other sets of outcomes: i) trust in CICIG and the state security institutions; ii) willingness to report crime; and, iii) perceived legitimacy in prosecuting crimes. See Tables 5 to 7.

⁵⁰We also explore heterogeneity in terms of individuals' prior experience with violence during the civil war and level of education, but we do not detect any statistically meaningful variation. These analyses are in Appendix E.

⁵¹In fact, one of CICIG's biggest challenges has been to reach out and gain more prominence at the local level (Martha Lucía Zamora, 2018, personal communication with one of the authors).

⁵²Respondents in the control group were also primed on successful resolution of case investigations, but without associating such success to any specific agency.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Effectiveness: Guatemala City

VARIABLES	(1) Identify the per- petrators	(2) Successfully prosecuted and convicted	(3) Police agents identified and punished
CICIG involved in the case	0.405*** (0.109)	0.253** (0.110)	0.232** (0.112)
Guatemala City	-0.0880 (0.206)	0.353 (0.217)	0.257 (0.215)
Guatemala City x CICIG	0.521** (0.245)	-0.0802 (0.256)	-0.190 (0.259)
Constant	4.066*** (0.0891)	4.168*** (0.0904)	4.077*** (0.0904)
Observations	1,177	1,178	1,169
R-squared	0.033	0.011	0.005

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See note in Table 8.

line group corresponds to respondents who were primed with unsuccessful investigations with no reference to any agency. Tables 8 to 10 in the Appendix present the results of the estimation of the joint effects our two prime experiments.⁵³

A note on power: In the results that we present in the following sections, we report some null-findings. Notice that we could be underpowered to reject the null in some of these cases, especially with the outcomes that are measured in a 1-7 scale. We are limited in the extent to which we can test for this possibility *ex-post*, since we do not have good priors on the expected effect sizes of our treatment (beyond the observed data from our sample). However, in Appendix C, we include some tests and a detailed discussion about this. Following [Hoening and Heisey \(2001\)](#), we first look at whether the estimated confidence intervals indicate a “near-null”. In addition, we then conduct *ex-post* power calculations that rely on data on the observed outcomes in the control groups, as well as on other series of assumptions that we further describe in the Appendix.

5.3.1 A successful CICIG and trust in security institutions (H2a and H2b)

When respondents were asked about trust in CICIG, those primed with both CICIG as the entity investigating the crime and *unsuccessful* case resolutions are less trusting of this entity (a decrease

⁵³Note that the effectiveness outcomes were measured before the “success” prime was introduced, so we cannot measure its effect on those outcomes.

of 0.28 points; see Table 8). However, a successful CICIG does not increase trust in this entity (as originally expected, according to H1a): specifically, this effect is close to zero.⁵⁴

When respondents were asked about trust in other domestic institutions, the signs of the coefficients of interest provide insights of the effect of CICIG on trust in security provider institutions in the country, but, importantly, these effects are not statistically significant. In particular, a perceived unsuccessful CICIG reduces trust in the justice system and the perception of fair trial in Guatemala, and it slightly increases trust in the National Police. Conditional on being perceived as successful, priming on CICIG reduces support for domestic institutions, except for the perception of fair trial, which is larger among those primed an unsuccessful CICIG. Despite this suggestive evidence, we are limited to draw conclusions from these null results since we do not have enough statistical power to detect effects of the size we estimate, except in the case of CICIG, and thus these results should be interpreted cautiously.

The results on trust (see Figure 3) provide mixed evidence for our theoretical expectations. In terms of H2a, while we find no evidence that a successful statebuilder leads to increased trust in this entity, we find that invoking an unsuccessful CICIG undermines trust in this institution. This suggests that citizens may be more willing to punish a perceived lack of success than to reward perceived success from CICIG. In addition, we find that a successful statebuilder is not statistically associated with increased trust in other domestic security institutions, confirming our initial hypothesis (H2b).⁵⁵


5.3.2 A successful CICIG and reporting crime to security institutions (H3a and H3b)

We next analyze the organizations to which respondents say they will report crime (H3a and H3b). We do not observe any statistically significant effect for these outcomes (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, a close look at the confidence intervals of the estimated effect of a successful CICIG suggest that if anything, the latter reduces support to the proportion of citizens who would advise reporting to a domestic institution (see Appendix C). Overall, then, we do not find evidence for either H3a or H3b.

In general, a close look at the responses and the coefficients of our treatment indicators suggest that citizens are more likely to report crime happening at the community level (see the exact wording of this question in Appendix G) to either to the MP or to the National Police (the two

⁵⁴The lack of more results on the positive effect of CICIG on trust could be due to ceiling effects. Note that CICIG already is the institution with the highest levels of support, which makes it a hard variable to move. See Figure 1, which uses data from LAPOP, and Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix A, which uses data from our original 2015 survey.


⁵⁵However, looking at the confidence intervals of the estimates in this set of results, we observe that the findings for the negative effects of a successful CICIG on trust in the justice system and the national police are further away from the null, whereas the effects of an unsuccessful CICIG are clustered around zero. Together, this may suggest that the effect of a successful CICIG may be closer to reduce trust in domestic security providing institutions.



Note: This figure plots point estimates of the average treatment effect of CICIG’s prime on trust in Guatemalan institutions, by perceived success. Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. The difference of the estimated effects is not statistically significant for none of the outcomes. See Table 8 for formal tests.

Figure 3: Trust in CICIG (*H2a*) and in domestic institutions (*H2b*). Support measured in a 0-100 scale

domestic institutions asked about), rather than to CICIG. This evidence is not surprising given the more limited presence CICIG has had at the local level and the perception that the commission only deals with high profile cases (Martha Lucía Zamora, 2018, personal communication with one of the authors).



Note: This figure plots point estimates of the average treatment effect of CICIG’s prime on reporting to crime to either CICIG or domestic institutions, by perceived success. Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. The difference of the estimated effects is not statistically significant for none of the outcomes. See Table 10 for formal tests.

Figure 4: Reporting crime to CICIG (*H3a*) versus to domestic institutions (*H3b*)


5.3.3 A successful CICIG and authority for security institutions (H4)

Finally, using the same primes, we turn to the results about what we see as measures of legitimacy: who respondents think should play the leading role in investigating and prosecuting the hypothetical case and which entity *should* take care of any increases in crime and impunity.

First, considering who respondents think should play the leading role in investigating and prosecuting the hypothetical case we described (see question *CICIG_AUTH2* in Appendix G), Figure 5 shows that an unsuccessful CICIG reduces the proportion of respondents who indicate CICIG should be in charge of leading this type of investigation by 16 percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant. Although invoking a successful CICIG does increase this proportion, its effect is not statistically significant.⁵⁶ However, the difference in the size of the effects of invoking a successful CICIG versus an unsuccessful CICIG is statistically significant (the difference in differences estimator is 0.14). This suggests that a successful CICIG has a statistically larger effect than an unsuccessful CICIG on whether it is seen as the right entity to lead the hypothetical case investigation.

We also find that the unsuccessful CICIG prime increases the proportion of citizens who instead state that a domestic institution—either the MP or the National Police—should lead the case investigation by 11 percentage points.

⁵⁶Yet we may be underpowered to detect such a small effect.




Note: This figure plots point estimates of the average treatment effect of CICIG’s prime on the proportion of respondents stating that either CICIG or domestic institutions should play a leading role in investigating crime, by perceived success. Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. The difference of the estimated effects is only statistically significant for the proportion of respondents who state that CICIG should play a leading role. See Table 9 for formal tests.

Figure 5: Leading role investigating hypothetical case: CICIG versus domestic institutions (*H4*)

Second, and supportive to the theory that perceived success matters to respondents when thinking about who would they grant authority to deal with crime (see Figure 6), we ask about which level of government should take care of increased crime and impunity.⁵⁷ Respondents who were primed with successful investigations but without reference to any agency were more likely to consider that the national government to be the right entity to intervene. Given that most respondents in our control group associated the hypothetical investigations with the MP, which is part of the national government, this is not surprising. In other words, invoking a successful CICIG reduces the likelihood that citizens would grant such authority to the national government (the proportion increases in 8 percentage points, with respect to the baseline; see Table 10 in the Appendix). This effect is statistically significant. Furthermore, the proportion of people who grant the national government the authority to investigate crime is significantly smaller for the group primed with a successful CICIG than the one primed with an unsuccessful CICIG. Finally, we find no evidence that priming on CICIG, either successful or unsuccessful, affects the proportion of respondents granting CICIG the authority to investigate and prosecute crime. However, a close look at the confidence intervals for the point estimates indicates that the proportion of respondents who would grant CICIG with the authority to deal with crime is reduced when primed with an unsuccessful CICIG. The estimated effect is 6 percentage points, and the range of values within the confidence interval suggest that the effect may be further away from the null. That is, we find

⁵⁷“If your neighborhood were to experience high levels of crime and impunity, what level of government would you suggest providing authority to in order to deal with this problem”.

suggestive evidence that citizens may be more likely to punish a perceived unsuccessful CICIG than to reward a successful one.



Note: This figure plots point estimates of the average treatment effect of CICIG’s prime on the proportion of respondents granting CICIG versus other domestic institutions the authority to investigate and prosecute crime, by perceived success. Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. The difference of the estimated effects is only statistically significant for the proportion of respondents claiming that the National Government should have such authority. See Table 10 for formal tests.

Figure 6: Grant authority to deal with crime: CICIG versus domestic institutions (*H4*)

These results suggest that CICIG is crowding out legitimacy of Guatemala’s institutions in this instance, especially when it is successful, although in others it may be fostering it (when nothing is mentioned and when CICIG is labeled unsuccessful).⁵⁸ Overall, we find that invoking a

⁵⁸CICIG has sought to improve citizen perceptions about CICIG’s effectiveness. For instance, starting in October 2017, after the intensification of the tensions between President Jimmy Morales and CICIG Commissioner Ivan Velásquez,

statebuilder changes the views on which entity is the correct authority to investigate and prosecute crime (H4), yet, the final effect is contingent on whether it is perceived as successful (in which case it undermines authority to domestic institutions) or unsuccessful (in which case it boosts authority to domestic institutions).

6 Discussion and Conclusions

In our discussion and conclusion, we plan to address:

1. What these findings suggest about the theory.

Specifically, (1) we do not find that a successful CICIG leads to increased trust in the commission, but we do see that an unsuccessful CICIG decreases trust in the commission; it does not move attitudes toward state institutions in a statistically significant way; (2) we do not find any statistically significant effects on propensity to report crime to either CICIG or state institutions; but, finally, in terms of legitimacy, (3a) we find that citizens are less likely to view an unsuccessful CICIG as the correct entity to conduct a hypothetical investigation but more likely to view a successful CICIG as such, and we find no statistically significant effect on state institutions in this role; (3b) however, we find that a successful CICIG undermines perceptions about state institutions being the legitimate authority to deal with crime when asked broadly.⁵⁹

2. What this means in the longer term for CICIG, especially if it is forced to leave.

3. What this means broadly for statebuilders seeking to conduct similar missions in other cases (see the concept for a description of some of these mission if curious).

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the commission established a routine of publishing any news related to case developments or results of investigations every Thursday (called "Jueves de CICIG") (Martha Lucía Zamora, 2018, personal communication with one of the authors).

⁵⁹Given the number of tests we have included in the analysis (see Appendix F), we have conducted a multiple comparisons correction that controls the "false discovery rate" using the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) method. After conducting this correction, we observe that neither of the effects remain statistically significant. For this reason, we take the results presented in the previous section carefully, as neither of our p -values survive after controlling for a false discovery rate of 0.1.

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Appendix

A Additional figures




Figure 7: Trust in Guatemalan Institutions: 2015 Survey Evidence




Figure 8: Trust in CICIG and the MP by treatment group (*independence* and *success* primes): 2015 Survey Evidence




Figure 9: Share of population with no knowledge of CICIG (from LAPOP Guatemala)

B Results

B.1 The independent effects of CICIG on citizen perceptions about the rule of law

Table 5: Difference in means estimator: Trust (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Justice system	(2) National Civil Police	(3) CICIG	(4) Fair trial	(5) U.N.
CICIG involved in the case	-0.118 (0.121)	-0.0873 (0.118)	-0.156 (0.117)	-0.0710 (0.113)	-0.171 (0.137)
MP also involved in the case	0.0287 (0.118)	0.0372 (0.115)	0.193* (0.117)	0.0127 (0.109)	0.104 (0.131)
Constant	3.707*** (0.0883)	2.940*** (0.0836)	5.174*** (0.0787)	4.013*** (0.0814)	4.163*** (0.0967)
Observations	1,195	1,198	1,174	1,183	1,147
R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 6: Difference in means estimator: Authority (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) CICIG	(2) Domestic Institution
CICIG involved in the case	-0.0525 (0.0333)	0.0525 (0.0343)
MP also involved in the case	-0.0375 (0.0321)	0.0175 (0.0336)
Constant	0.360*** (0.0240)	0.595*** (0.0246)
Observations	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.006	0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 7: Difference in means estimator: Report (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Report crime	Advice not to report	Report to CICIG	Report to domestic institution	Local government	National government	CICIG
CICIG involved in the case	-0.159 (0.140)	0.0150 (0.0130)	-0.00500 (0.0258)	-0.0275 (0.0301)	0.0425 (0.0339)	-0.0300 (0.0273)	-0.0275 (0.0332)
MP also involved in the case	-0.0249 (0.137)	-0.0175 (0.0128)	0.00500 (0.0258)	0.0225 (0.0302)	-0.0175 (0.0342)	0.0575** (0.0280)	-0.0125 (0.0326)
Constant	3.382*** (0.0987)	0.0275*** (0.00819)	0.160*** (0.0184)	0.778*** (0.0208)	0.338*** (0.0237)	0.197*** (0.0199)	0.340*** (0.0237)
Observations	1,190	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

B.2 The joint effects of CICIG and its success on citizen perceptions about the rule of law

Table 8: Difference in differences estimator: Trust (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Justice system	(2) National Civil Police	(3) CICIG	(4) Fair trial	(5) U.N.
CICIG involved (alone)	-0.0637 (0.169)	0.0300 (0.165)	-0.283* (0.170)	-0.206 (0.159)	-0.310 (0.196)
Successful Investigation	0.0250 (0.177)	0.210 (0.167)	-0.0147 (0.158)	0.0964 (0.163)	-0.146 (0.194)
Successful inv. and CICIG involved	-0.109 (0.243)	-0.235 (0.236)	0.253 (0.234)	0.273 (0.226)	0.277 (0.274)
Constant	3.695*** (0.125)	2.835*** (0.113)	5.181*** (0.117)	3.964*** (0.116)	4.238*** (0.141)
Observations	797	799	785	788	761
R-squared	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.008	0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. For these estimations, we exclude the group primed with both CICIG and the MP. The baseline group corresponds to respondents who were primed with unsuccessful investigations with no reference to any agency.

Table 9: Difference in differences estimator: Authority (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) CICIG	(2) Domestic Institution
CICIG involved (alone)	-0.125*** (0.0466)	0.105** (0.0483)
Successful Investigation	-0.0600 (0.0480)	0.0500 (0.0491)
Successful inv. and CICIG involved	0.145** (0.0665)	-0.105 (0.0686)
Constant	0.390*** (0.0346)	0.570*** (0.0351)
Observations	800	800
R-squared	0.009	0.006

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See note in Table 8.

Table 10: Difference in differences estimator: Report (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) Report crime	(2) Advice not to report	(3) Report to CI- CIG	(4) Report to do- mestic institu- tion	(5) Local gov- ernment	(6) National gov- ernment	(7) CICIG
CICIG involved (alone)	-0.177 (0.203)	-0.00500 (0.0178)	0.00500 (0.0365)	-0.0200 (0.0428)	0.0300 (0.0481)	0.0200 (0.0376)	-0.0650 (0.0471)
Successful Investigation	0.0742 (0.197)	-0.0150 (0.0164)	0.0100 (0.0367)	0.0150 (0.0417)	-0.0150 (0.0474)	0.0750* (0.0397)	-0.0500 (0.0474)
Successful inv. and CICIG involved	0.0352	0.0400	-0.0200	-0.0150	0.0250	-0.1000*	0.0750
Constant	(0.280) 3.345***	(0.0260) 0.0350***	(0.0516) 0.155***	(0.0602) 0.770***	(0.0679) 0.345***	(0.0546) 0.160***	(0.0664) 0.365***
Observations	792	800	800	800	800	800	800
R-squared	0.002	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.007	0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See note in Table 8.

C Discussion on power and confidence intervals

C.1 Trust

A close look at the confidence intervals depicted in Figure 3 (see also Table 11), suggest that the negative effects of priming on a successful CICIG on trust in the justice system and the national police are more spread away from the null than the effects observed for a prime on a unsuccessful CICIG. Likewise, the negative estimated effect for an unsuccessful CICIG on the perception of a free trial in Guatemala is less clustered around zero than the slightly positive effect of a successful CICIG.

C.2 Report crime

We next look at the results of the effect of CICIG's prime on reporting crime to different security institutions. Here, we observe that the confidence intervals are clustered close to zero (with an estimated effect that ranged from 1 to 4 percentage points). In terms of the proportion of respondents who state that they would report to CICIG, we note that both effects a close to zero. In the case of the proportion of respondents who would instead report to a domestic institution, we observe that the values contained within the confidence intervals for both a successful and an unsuccessful CICIG are for the most part on the negative side and the point estimate is further away from zero; although the estimated effect for an unsuccessful CICIG is closer to the null.

C.3 Leading role in case investigation

We then look at the estimated confidence intervals for the proportion of respondents who state that CICIG versus domestic institutions should investigate the hypothetical crime. Here, the only two null effects correspond to the effect of a successful CICIG. Nevertheless, for both outcomes, the point estimate is either very close to or zero, and the confidence intervals are also centered around the null.

C.4 Authority to investigate crime

Finally, we examine the confidence intervals of the set of results on granting different levels of government and CICIG with the authority to deal with crime. Here, we find two interesting results. On the one hand, in both cases—i.e., a successful and an unsuccessful CICIG—leads to an increase in the proportion of respondents who claim the local government should deal with crime

at the local level. This could be due to the wording of the question which may have biased against granting CICIG with the authority, since it referred to a very local problem (i.e., at the neighborhood level), whereas CICIG is more centralized and takes care of high profile national level cases. On the other hand, however, we notice that most of the values included in the confidence intervals of the effect of an unsuccessful CICIG on the proportion who claim CICIG should be granted with the authority are on the negative range (i.e., further from the null), whereas the effect of a successful CICIG is about zero.

Table 11: 95% Confidence Intervals for the estimates of the models

Variable	Unsuccessful CICIG		Successful CICIG		Diff-in-diff	
	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper
Trust						
Justice system	-0.397	0.269	-0.515	0.170	-0.586	0.369
National Civil Police	-0.295	0.355	-0.536	0.126	-0.698	0.228
CICIG	-0.617	0.052	-0.344	0.285	-0.205	0.712
Fair trial	-0.519	0.107	-0.249	0.382	-0.171	0.717
U.N.	-0.695	0.075	-0.410	0.344	-0.261	0.815
Authority						
CICIG	-0.217	-0.033	-0.073	0.113	0.014	0.276
Domestic Institution	0.010	0.200	-0.096	0.096	-0.240	0.030
Report						
Report crime	-0.576	0.223	-0.521	0.238	-0.515	0.585
Advice not to report	-0.040	0.030	-0.002	0.072	-0.011	0.091
Report to CICIG	-0.067	0.077	-0.087	0.057	-0.121	0.081
Report to domestic institution	-0.104	0.064	-0.118	0.048	-0.133	0.103
Local government	-0.065	0.125	-0.039	0.149	-0.108	0.158
National government	-0.054	0.094	-0.158	-0.002	-0.207	0.007
CICIG	-0.158	0.028	-0.082	0.102	-0.055	0.205

C.5 Ex-post Power Calculations

We also conduct *ex-post* power analysis, using the realized data in our control groups, to estimate the power that we have to detect an effect if there were a true effect. We separately look at the conditional effects of our CICIG prime, for both unsuccessful and successful primes. We also look at the power of the difference between those two effects. We perform this analysis using simulations of hypothetical experiments (replicating our factorial design), assuming constant treatment effects and only using the control group data. We use Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the proportion of times we reject the null (with a significance level of $\alpha = 0.1$) across 500 replicates of the experiment.

Table 12 presents the results of the calculation of the statistical power to detect an effect as large as the one we observed in our experiment (i.e., the observed estimated effect). According to the calculations in the table, we are underpowered (based on the convention of 0.8) to detect the observed effects in our data. The effects that we have better power to detect are the ones corresponding to the effect of CICIG’s prime among those who perceive it as unsuccessful, for outcome that measures the proportion of respondents granting either CICIG ($\hat{\tau} = -0.12$) or a domestic institution ($\hat{\tau} = 0.11$) with the role to investigate the hypothetical case. We are also somewhat powered to detect the difference in the effect of CICIG’s prime on the proportion of citizens who would grant CICIG with such authority, between the successful and unsuccessful primes, as well as the effect of an unsuccessful CICIG on the proportion of individuals who believe that the national government should deal with crime ($\hat{\tau} = -0.08$). In general, we are better equipped in statistical terms to detect an effect with the outcomes that measure changes in proportions, than to do so with outcomes measured in a 1-7 scale.

Table 12: Ex-post power analysis for the observed effect of CICIG’s prime on different outcomes conditional on perceived success and the difference in these effects.

	Unsuccessful	Successful	Difference
Trust			
Justice.Syst.	0.09	0.25	0.13
National.Police	0.11	0.32	0.29
CICIG	0.52	0.11	0.27
Free Trial	0.36	0.14	0.34
Report to			
CICIG	0.13	0.13	0.17
Domestic Institution	0.12	0.27	0.11
Leading Role			
CICIG	0.78	0.10	0.68
Domestic Institution	0.70	0.10	0.51
Authority			
Local Gov.	0.16	0.29	0.11
National Gov.	0.13	0.60	0.56
CICIG	0.36	0.10	0.23

Note: Monte Carlo simulations with 500 replication for each outcome. Constant treatment effects are assumed. All of the calculations use the realized outcome data for the control groups. The estimated effects are the ones reported in section 5.

We next calculate power for varying hypothesized true effects (τ s). Figures 10 to 13 present this analysis.

From these figures, we can observe that the size of the estimated effects with the observed data are considerably smaller than the ones we would have power to detect: for instance, for the effect on trust in the justice system, notice that, according to standard values of power, we would be powered to detect an effect as large as 0.4 (in absolute value), whereas the range of the

estimated effects of CICIG's prime for this outcome is $[-0.17, -0.06]$. The same is true for the rest of the trust (see Figure 10) and report outcomes (see Figure 11). In the case of the outcomes about which institution should play leading role in case investigation, the effects that we detect fall into the range of effect sizes for which we have enough power ($|\tau| > \approx 0.11$). Finally, with the series of outcomes ask about the level of government should have the authority to investigate crime, again, we find that the only effect that falls in the range of detectable effects is the one we identify for the proportion of respondents who consider that it should be the national government when primed with a successful CICIG ($\tau = -0.08$).




Figure 10: Power trust outcomes with varying τ




Figure 11: Power report outcomes with varying τ




Figure 12: Power authority outcomes with varying τ







Figure 13: Power leading role outcomes with varying τ

D Other figures not shown in main text for the joint effects of CICIG and its success on citizen perceptions about the rule of law



E Heterogeneous treatment effects by exposure to violence during civil war and level of education on effectiveness

Table 13: CATE Effectiveness: Exposed to violence during Civil War

VARIABLES	(1) Identify the per- petrators	(2) Successfully prosecuted and convicted	(3) Police agents identified and punished
CICIG involved in the case	0.436*** (0.111)	0.187 (0.116)	0.110 (0.117)
Civil war violence exp.	-0.174 (0.202)	-0.0733 (0.193)	0.0184 (0.197)
Vileonce x CICIG	0.362 (0.243)	0.200 (0.236)	0.316 (0.241)
Constant	4.087*** (0.0898)	4.278*** (0.0966)	4.137*** (0.0964)
Observations	1,159	1,162	1,151
R-squared	0.026	0.006	0.008

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See note in Table 8. The data on exposure to violence comes from [Kitagawa \(2018\)](#).

Table 14: CATE Effectiveness: Level of education

VARIABLES	(1) Identify the per- petrators	(2) Successfully prosecuted and convicted	(3) Police agents identified and punished
CICIG involved in the case	0.243 (0.203)	0.0960 (0.205)	0.0458 (0.207)
Education level	-0.0255 (0.0991)	-0.0603 (0.105)	0.0182 (0.105)
Education x CICIG	0.193 (0.121)	0.0922 (0.125)	0.0975 (0.128)
Constant	4.084*** (0.166)	4.342*** (0.172)	4.110*** (0.174)
Observations	1,177	1,178	1,169
R-squared	0.029	0.005	0.005

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See note in Table 8.

F p -values for all tests conducted

Variable	Unsuccessful CICIG	Successful CICIG	Diff-in-diff
Justice system	0.707	0.324	0.655
National Civil Police	0.856	0.224	0.319
CICIG (Trust)	0.097	0.853	0.279
Fair trial	0.196	0.678	0.228
U.N.	0.114	0.861	0.313
CICIG (Auth)	0.008	0.674	0.030
Domestic Institution	0.030	1.000	0.126
Report crime	0.385	0.465	0.900
Advice not to report	0.779	0.066	0.124
Report to CICIG	0.891	0.681	0.699
Report to domestic institution	0.641	0.409	0.803
Local government	0.533	0.252	0.713
National government	0.596	0.044	0.067
CICIG	0.168	0.831	0.259

Note: Shaded cells correspond to statistically significant effect with $\alpha = 0.1$.

G Survey Instrument (English version)

See next page.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT:

For many of the following questions, we are going to be using this card to classify your response. On this card, there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion were between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].

Now we will turn to a few more questions about the current situation in the country. As you may know,

[BEGIN RANDOMIZATION POINT #1]

[Phrase for A group] Jimmy Morales polled strongly in the recent September 6th election, and he may attract many of the voters from other candidates making him very likely to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th. His campaign financing, as the winner, will then likely be investigated by the International Commission against Impunity Guatemala, also known as CICIG.

[Phrase for B group] Sandra Torres polled strongly in the September 6th election, and she may attract many of the voters from other candidates making her very likely to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th. Her campaign financing, as the winner, will then likely be investigated by the International Commission against Impunity Guatemala, also known as CICIG.

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #1]

Using the numbers provided in the ladder to answer, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot,” and you can use any number,

CICIG_AUTH1: How important do you think it is to investigate the campaign financing of the winning candidate?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

MAN1: As far as you know—including the information we just provided—which candidate is likely to attract many of the voters from other candidates to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th?

(Jimmy) Morales

(Sandra) Torres

Neither of these

[DO NOT READ:

DK

DR]

Security has been an important issue in the elections. For the following questions, I am going to ask you to consider a hypothetical case: during an important anti-corruption investigation, two witnesses were found murdered in a rural area in the Department of *[state where the individual is being surveyed]*. Investigators

[BEGIN RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, an international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, an international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

suspect that police agents had informed one of the capos also under investigation about these two witnesses. Presumably, the information the agents provided allowed the criminals to murder these

two witnesses. The case of who killed these two witnesses is ongoing. Murders like this have historically gone unpunished in Guatemala.

MAN2: In this case, do you recall where the investigators are from?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which ones the respondent answers:

CICIG/International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

The Public Ministry

Both CICIG and the Public Ministry

Other: _____

Does not remember]

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to again ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, 1 is “Not at all” likely in this case and 7 is “A lot,” likely, and you can use any number.

EFFEC1: How likely do you think it is that investigators

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

will correctly identify the perpetrators of this abduction?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”...

EFFEC2: If they are identified, prosecutors from

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

will try them in [state where the individual is being surveyed], how likely do you think it is that they will be successfully prosecuted (resulting in a conviction)?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

EFFEC3: Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”... , how likely do you think it is that the police agents who provided the information on the witnesses resulting in the murders will be identified and punished?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Although hypothetical, this case is not far from reality. Investigators and prosecutors

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

have been

[RANDOMIZATION POINT #3]

[Phrase for Group *] “*SUCCESSFUL*”

[Phrase for Group ^] “*UNSUCCESSFUL*”

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #3]

in a number of its recent cases against criminal structures that threaten the rule of law in Guatemala.

AUTH_CICIG2: What organization do you think SHOULD play the leading role in investigating and prosecuting this murder case we described?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which one the respondent answers:

The National Civil Police

The Military

The Public Ministry

CICIG

Another organization: _____ [WRITE IN IF THEY SELECT A DIFFERENT ONE]]

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”...

B1: When you hear about a scenario like the one, to what extent do you trust the justice system?

(Read: If you do not trust the justice system at all, choose number 1; if you trust the justice system a lot, choose number 7, or choose any number in between the two.)

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B2: To what extent do you trust the National Civil Police?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B3: To what extent do you trust the CICIG?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B4: To what extent do you think the courts in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Turning to the current situation in your area, if a typical person in your community, whom you knew, were to witness an corruption related to organized crime, or another illegal act related to organized crime,, using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” likely and 7 is “A lot” likely...

REPORT1: How likely do you think is that he or she would report it?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

REPORT2: If he or she were going to report it, WHO IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION YOU would advise them to report it TO?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which one the respondent answers:

The National Civil Police

The Military

The Public Ministry

CICIG

Another organization: _____ [WRITE IN IF THEY SELECT A DIFFERENT ONE]

I would not advise them to report it]

REPORT3: Sometimes people have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency. If your neighborhood were to experience high levels of crime and impunity, what level of government would you suggest providing authority to in order to deal with this problem?

The local government

The national government

CICIG

A different level

[If they select “a different level”, ask]

Which? _____

CICIG_AUTH3: Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”, to what extent do you agree with the following statement: “The U.N. is helping Guatemalans like me.”
[1-7, DK, DR scale]