

**Underwriting peace:  
The role of international influences in securing civil war state peacekeeping consent**

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**Abstract**

The success of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) relies heavily on (robust) consent being given by the civil war parties (the government and rebels) to the intervention and associated activities (e.g. demobilization, monitoring, disarmament, policing, elections, etc.). Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or both parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than continued fighting. Given that the PKO resources are scarce, how can third parties anticipate which civil wars may be more amenable to eliciting and sustaining (robust) PKO consent – and thus increasing the odds of mission success? Similarly, how can the warring parties credibly signal that they are willing to provide (robust) and enduring consent to PKOs – and thus increase their chances of receiving peacekeeping help? We argue that tangible stakes that a civil war country has in rebuilding its connections with the international community and the leverage that the international community has over the state are key to incentivizing the warring parties to provide and maintain their consent to PKOs. We focus on international influences in the form of trade ties and the civil war state's memberships in certain economically-oriented international organizations (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks). These organizations can provide tangible benefits when the state complies with its transition-to-peace obligations and deny or withhold the benefits when the state fails to do so – thus providing a means of enforcement of the state's commitments to peace. In other words, internationally integrated civil war states have tangible incentives to both allow PKOs and to help fulfill the mission of return to peace. In turn, third parties are also more encouraged that consent given by the parties is credible and that its investment of scarce PKO resources in such countries is more likely to be fruitful. Empirical analyses of PKOs since World War II provide preliminary support for these ideas.

## **Introduction**

In September 2007, amid widespread armed attacks by rebel groups against civilians in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, MINURCAT, aimed at curbing the violence and strengthening the rule of law. Significant UN resources were directed toward the mission, including an authorized strength of over 6,000 uniformed and civilian personnel, and total estimated expenses amounting to \$1.39 billion (United Nations 2019). Yet, after less than three years, the government of Chad indicated its desire for the UN to completely withdraw, which was completed by the end of 2010. From the perspective of the UN and the international community, the mission was considered a failure, where only limited successes were achieved in carrying out the mission's mandate. While the government of Chad had agreed to the mission at the outset, closer analysis indicates that it was never completely on board with the operation and subsequently sought to restrict the capacity of the mission to deliver peace. Specifically, the lack of a clear political process attached to the mission's mandate compromised the likelihood of its success from the beginning, and even led to the initial desire of the Security Council not to deploy the mission at all (Johnstone 2011, 171).

The mission to Chad is just one example of a difficult and common problem faced by the UN and other intergovernmental organizations with peacekeeping capacities when seeking to intervene in conflicts: the consent of the warring parties (the government and rebels) to a political process that seeks peace and political stability as its goals. Not obtaining consent – and ideally robust consent – of the parties may lead to major obstructions to the fulfillment of the mandate, or a demand for complete withdrawal, as occurred in Chad. Such outcomes pose major threats to the PKO providers, where mission objectives are thwarted, peacekeepers are put at risk, and the mission is drawn into a long and expensive deployment with no clear exit strategy (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, 5). Beyond this, the reputation of the PKO providers is challenged, seen as ineffective at addressing global conflicts and humanitarian crises. Such has been the case in a number of UN missions, including those in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and Sudan.

PKO providers therefore face a dilemma as to where peacekeeping missions stand the greatest likelihood of success, and therefore where the limited PKO resources should be devoted in seeking to address conflict. Analogously, how can a civil war state credibly signal that it not only wants a PKO but that it is committed to working with the mission and toward peace? That is, PKO providing organizations such as the UN ideally want the consent to both be given and to endure through the mission – in order to avoid Chad-like scenarios. Hence, the organization must make assessments as to the likelihood of sustained cooperation, without being in the position to guarantee that such cooperation will persist throughout the mission.

In this study, we argue that the civil war state's ties with the international community incentivize the state to both consent to a PKO and to signal that the consent is credible. One part of our argument is that a civil war state's trade ties provide an important and lucrative incentive for the state to return to normalcy and once again reap the full benefits of trade. Continuing conflict and surrounding uncertainty represent mounting opportunity costs in terms of trade profits foregone. And the more the civil war state used to rely on trade prior to the war, the more adversely impactful are these costs for its economy. Such a state therefore possesses a potent incentive to want to return to peace. It thus has a self-interest in consenting to a PKO and seeing the mission through to its end – so that it can return to peace, normalcy, and to benefiting economically.

Second, we focus on a certain subset of IGOs of which the civil war state may be a member. These organizations have a high degree of institutional and economic leverage over member states; we thus call them high-leverage IGOs or HLIGOs. As the moniker suggests, these organizations possess notable financial resources and carry mandates relating to economic growth, trade, investment and financial flows (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks). Memberships in these organizations thus provide the civil war state a means to return to economic growth and prosperity – and can also bolster the trade ties the civil war state seeks to reestablish. But the impact of these organizations goes further. For successful implementation of their mandates, the peace and stability of member countries are critical. This gives HLIGOs a self-interest in helping resolve civil wars in member states.

Most notably, their ability and will to conditionally offer material incentives to pursue peace — or deny those benefits in the case of renewed fighting, non-compliance, or peacekeeping mission consent withdrawal — can help resolve the particularly thorny credible commitment problem (Walter 1999; 2009). Thus, a country's extent of memberships in HLIGOs increases the incentives of the government to pursue peace over continuing or resuming the conflict. HLIGO memberships therefore increase the likelihood that the host government will both give and maintain consent to the political process overseen by a peacekeeping operation. And in turn, perceiving this external leverage over the government and more credibility to the civil war state's consent signal, peacekeeping organizations will be more willing to deploy a mission to that conflict.


We test this argument by analyzing the effects of civil war states' trade ties and membership in HLIGOs on consent given to peacekeeping operations and the subsequent deployment of those operations to episodes of civil war. The latter set of tests are a potential indicator that PKO providers such as the UN see an economically and institutionally integrated civil war state as a good bet for the utilization of their scarce PKO resources. Our initial tests indicate that international influences play a role in civil war states providing their consent to peacekeeping and in PKO deployment decisions. These findings suggest that a civil war state's international (economic) ties can play an important role in promoting PKOs and resolving civil conflicts.

### **Where do peacekeepers go?**

The increasing demand for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has placed considerable constraints on the UN and other providers of peacekeeping such as the African Union, NATO, and ECOWAS, which regularly struggle to obtain the finances and personnel required for their operations (Passmore et al. 2018). Taking expenses as an example, Figure 1 shows the rapid rise in UN peacekeeping costs over recent decades, made worse by the persistent failure of member states to pay their assessed dues. Aside from having limited resources, the efficacy of peacekeeping has been in constant question as missions often experience failure or are perceived to be wasting member state resources. Such

organizations, and the UN in particular, are therefore under increasing pressure to use their peacekeeping resources both efficiently and effectively. This pressure has been borne out in peacekeeping deployment decisions. Fortna (2008) reports that of 115 civil wars between 1944 and 1997, only 30 received a UN mission, and only 5 of these occurred before the end of the Cold War (277). The 2015 report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations asserted that “[T]he proliferation of conflict is outpacing our efforts” (2). With limited resources, and facing the critical oversight of the international community, such organizations must therefore be discerning in how to most effectively employ peacekeeping to civil wars. While they cannot overlook the most serious cases, they must also limit intervention to those cases where it has a reasonable chance of success.

Figure 1: Total peacekeeping expenditures and total peacekeeping arrears by UN member states, 1975-2015



Existing research has gone to considerable lengths to explain why peacekeeping operations are deployed to some conflicts and not others. Studies have found that missions tend to be deployed to the most severe cases, either where casualties are highest (Aydin 2010; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003) or where the conflict has endured for a longer period (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Factors likely to deter deployment include the conflict country having a strong military, a larger economy, or being a major power (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Walter 2009). Factors with inconclusive results include the regime type of the conflict country (Fortna 2008; Perkins and Neumeyer 2008), the presence of a peace agreement (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Perkins and Neumeyer 2008), a previous major power intervention (Aydin 2010; Mullenbach 2005), and the level of extractable resources in the conflict country (Aydin 2010; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). A broader debate within this research agenda surrounds the issue of what the driving incentive to send a mission is: whether for the public good of the global community, or for the interests of a select few actors. The former posits that humanitarian concerns and global peace drive deployments (Beardsley and Schmidt 2011; McClean 2008; Paris 2004; Russett 2005; Weiss 2007), while the latter argues that mission choice may reflect the interests of the Security Council Permanent Five (Stojek and Tir 2015) or other powerful states (Aydin 2010; Mullenbach 2005; Diehl 2008).

While much research has addressed reasons for intervening, little attention has been given to the willingness of the conflict parties to accept peacekeeping as a determinant of deployment. Moreover, and directly related to this willingness, little is known about what role the likelihood of success plays in this decision. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that the expectation of success or failure within the Security Council and among member states often plays a key role in whether a mission is deployed (Guehenno 2015). Some studies have addressed the factors that make a mission more likely to be successful: more robust peacekeeping forces are effective at reducing civilian and battlefield violence (Hultman et al. 2013, 2014), preventing conflict spillover (Beardsley 2011), and supporting enduring peace agreements (Walter 1997; Hultman et al. 2016). However, little clarity exists on how these factors affect the initial decision to deploy a mission based on the UN's calculation of success. Moreover, given that civil conflicts and

associated interventions are dynamic events that face constant flux, where conditions can improve or deteriorate, peacekeeping organizations must make calculations as to how anticipated outcomes during the mission might affect the outlook of the mission. They will be reluctant to deploy where the conditions are likely to regress. Persisting in such conditions risks costly investment and likely ultimate failure, while early withdrawal signals incompetence and poor judgment. The decision to deploy a PKO is therefore a complex matter that must consider various aspects of the conflict up to that point and the likely course that will emerge once the mission is deployed.

Related to the prospects for success, two issues are relevant. The first is the role played by consent of the conflict parties to a peacekeeping intervention. Since peacekeeping missions typically rely on such consent (unless they are “enforcement” missions), whether or not consent is given and maintained throughout the missions may be a critical determinant of the success of that mission. Second is the role played by other external actors: the degree to which involvement by other organizations can support or hinder the mission. Both of these subjects have received little attention in the academic literature, despite being prominent features of peacekeeping policy discussions. Consequently, there is much to be understood about how consent to peacekeeping and the impact of third-party organizations affect the success of PKOs. This study bridges this gap and addresses both areas by arguing that certain organizations – those with sufficient authority and leverage to shape conflict party behavior – encourage more robust and credible consent from the conflict parties and thereby instill greater confidence in the peacekeeping provider that any deployed mission will stand a greater chance of success.

### **Consent in peacekeeping**

A critical determinant of a successful PKO is having the cooperation of the conflict parties. Since its inception, consent has been one of the three guiding principles of United Nations peacekeeping, along with impartiality and the limited use of force (Langholtz 2010, 45). These have since been reiterated in major peacekeeping documents such as the 2000 Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000) and the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (United Nations 2015). These

principles emphasize that consent given by the warring parties goes beyond just the acceptance of a PKO to also include as a prerequisite the ongoing commitment to a political process towards peace. It states that, “In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict, and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace” (United Nations 2018). In practice, the UN has sought the consent of all parties to a conflict when establishing missions (with the exception of Chapter VII enforcement missions, which do not require consent). In reality, however, the UN has sufficed in many instances with the consent of only the host government (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, 11). Evidence that enforcement missions – those without consent – are less effective at creating lasting peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004, 2008) further emphasize the importance of gaining conflict party consent to a PKO.

The issue of consent between the peacekeeping organizations and the conflict parties is a form of credible commitment problem, a prominent explanation for continued conflict between actors. Traditionally, the theory posits that two actors who stand to lose more from continued fighting than negotiating peace may still engage in conflict as they do not perceive the other side as credible and fear they will not honor a peace agreement (Fearon 1995; Kydd 2006). This typically results from the belief that change brought about by the agreement will shift the other side’s relative power position and give it a renewed resolve to fight. Civil conflict research rarely extends the commitment problem to other actors involved in the dispute. The peacekeeping organization’s relationship with the conflict parties regarding consent to peacekeeping is an example of how such a commitment problem might exist between actors beyond just those fighting domestically. Just as a settlement between the conflict parties is prone to breaking down if one or both sides cannot credibly commit to upholding it, so consent to a peacekeeping intervention can do the same. One or multiple parties might refuse to consent to a mission altogether, or missions might be accepted with severe restrictions on their operational scope. Consent might also be given reluctantly or with little real intention of complying with the mission, thereby leaving a tenuous foundation on which the operation rests. Should consent break down thereafter, the mission will find itself in a complex environment, unable to fulfill its objectives and facing a lengthy, dangerous, and likely



failed engagement. Ironically, although the peacekeeping organizations like the UN can serve as a solution to the commitment problem between combatants by deploying peacekeepers (Walter 1997), they can do little to enforce consent and thereby overcome their own commitment problem. As is discussed below, organizations like the UN lack the independence from member state influence and direct leverage over its members to force a state into compliance. In fact, the very attempt to push conflict parties to comply with a peacekeeping intervention once the mission has been deployed may very well end with the mission being forced out of the conflict altogether. Peacekeeping therefore experiences a dilemma in deploying missions where it cannot guarantee the parties will uphold their initial consent, resulting either in peacekeeping having limited initial application, or a reduced effect once in the field.

The extent to which initial consent is given typically reflects the perceived power position or expected gains of the conflict parties at the time of negotiating the intervention. A government believing it will lose more by allowing a PKO will be reluctant to offer consent, or will negotiate a much less robust mission. The former - refusing to consent to a mission - occurred in the case of Indonesia's conflict with the GAM separatist rebel movement in the Aceh region, where the Indonesian government made clear early on that it had no desire to accept a PKO for fear of losing more of its sovereign territory, as had occurred with the UN's presence in East Timor several years earlier. Consent to a mission was therefore a nonstarter, and the conflict's resolution relied on other third-party mediation mechanisms instead. In the latter instance -- giving limited consent to a mission, Chad -- serves as an example. Despite the UN's desire to implement a political mission, the Chad government insisted that the rebels were mere "mercenaries" and that there was no political solution at which to arrive. Rather, the government saw the main problem as a humanitarian one, leaving the UN with a mandate limited to protection of civilians as fighting continued between government and rebel forces (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 459). The UN agreed to these limited terms, but would subsequently have little ability to address the underlying incompatibility between the warring parties. The reason the government was willing to accept any UN presence at all was its perception that it could benefit from the mission, where the UN would provide a buffer against rebel attacks. However, this optimism was short-lived when it became clear the UN sought

to maintain impartiality and would not provide protection specifically to the government (460). This would later lead to the government withdrawing its consent altogether.

The second element of consent to peacekeeping concerns the degree to which it is sustained throughout the life of the mission. Initial consent may be given genuinely, reluctantly, or even nefariously, where the parties perceive that the presence of a mission can strengthen their position rather than lead to compromise and peace. Once the mission commences, the parties then decide whether or not to uphold that consent, which can be supported or undermined in a variety of ways. Two components feeding into this decision are shifting relative power and inaccurate expectations. With shifting relative power, one or both warring parties may see the presence of a PKO as beneficial for its cause. For the government, this may be providing support to and legitimation of the regime against rebel encroachment. For the rebels, it could be offering them a seat at the negotiating table or preventing government assaults on rebel-held communities. Whatever the reason, the presence of the mission will be seen as a way to improve the current position of the respective party. Consent becomes unstable as these relative power positions shift. As Fearon (1995) argues, actors cannot credibly commit to conflict avoidance since a change in their relative power position down the road may alter their perceived payoffs from conflict, and thus reignite fighting. In the case of a peacekeeping mission, a conflict party may gain from the presence of the mission (or due to unrelated circumstances), at which point it will no longer perceive the benefits of the mission's presence and either reduce or completely withdraw its consent for the mission. Moreover, the UN often has little bargaining power with which to sustain conflict party consent. As one party's relative power position increases in a way that threatens the prospect of peace, any attempts by the peacekeeping organization to challenge the non-cooperation of that actor may incite rejection of the mission altogether. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when Joseph Kabila's presidency was legitimized through the 2006 presidential election, he began to consolidate his power. He thus saw the presence of the UN's MONUC mission as an obstacle to his strategy. However, his increasing control of government and popular support left the UN reluctant to challenge him on counts of increasing use of

widespread violence against civilians for fear of being sidelined or pushed out altogether (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 462-63).

A second factor influencing shifting consent is inaccurate expectations held by the parties. They may anticipate the presence of a PKO to be in their favor, only to discover that the mission hampers its strategies or impedes its ability to acquire more relative power. As discussed previously, this occurred in Chad, where the government incorrectly expected MINURCAT to reinforce its sovereign authority and repel opposition violence. Once this understanding of the mission's contribution was rectified, the government became much more hostile to its presence and pushed for its exit in 2010.

Consent should therefore be thought of as a complex and dynamic feature of a peacekeeping intervention. As such, conflict parties can retract consent at any time of their choosing. Moreover, such a retraction does not need to be explicit and total. Rather, the parties have a range of options for withdrawing or reducing consent. Most obvious is an explicit statement that it no longer desires the mission's presence in the conflict. This has occurred in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Eritrea. More common are incremental and implicit retractions of consent through small and repeated obstructions to the mission's completion of its mandate. This might include preventing the movement of supplies, delaying or blocking visas for senior mission personnel, failure to protect peacekeeping personnel and property, or even direct attacks on peacekeepers (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, 23-24). At a higher level, the mission might gradually be excluded from negotiations and limited to an assistance role. In Côte d'Ivoire, as President Laurent Gbagbo became more skeptical of the interposition of the UN in its civil war, he sought to move it to the sidelines in favor of a domestically-driven peace process. UNOCI's role was subsequently reduced to one of merely providing financial and technical support to the peace process and the elections (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 455).

Conceptualizing consent as this more fluid notion illuminates more accurately the challenges faced by the providers of peacekeeping, which go beyond merely negotiating with the parties in the initial stages. Having the consent of the warring parties is not only a foundational premise of peacekeeping, but is also considered a major predictor of the success of a mission, alongside having the requisite capacity to

fulfill the mandate (Langholtz 2010, 32). Lacking such consent therefore risks partial or monumental failure of the mission. Thus, for peacekeeping to be effective and successful, it is vitally important to not only secure consent, but to do so with the knowledge that that consent is likely to be sustained throughout the mission. Yet, since the UN and other peacekeeping organizations have few of their own mechanisms to evoke and maintain credible consent from the conflict parties, they must find an alternative way to do so or expect to have only a limited impact in civil conflicts at great expense to itself and its member states. We argue that broader but tangible international influence can help provide such a guarantee.

### **International influences on conflict management**

In this study, we argue that the civil war state's ties with the international community incentivize the state to both consent to a PKO and to signal that the consent is credible. We focus on two forms of these ties. First, the civil war state's trade ties provide an important and lucrative incentive for the state to return to normalcy and once again reap the full benefits of trade. The literature has amply demonstrated that wars are costly to the states involved in terms of dropping trade, investment, and economic growth (Resnick 2001; Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Bussman and Schneider 2007). That is, continuing conflict and surrounding uncertainty represent mounting opportunity costs in terms of economic opportunities foregone. One important dimension of this issue is that the more the civil war state used to rely on trade prior to the war, the more adversely impactful are these opportunity costs for its economy. Such a state therefore possesses both a tangible and potent incentive to want to return to peace. It thus has a self-interest in consenting to a PKO and seeing the mission through to its end – so that it can return to peace, normalcy, and to benefiting economically. But beyond motivating the state to resolve its internal conflict via a means such a PKO, trade ties are also useful as a potential credible signal of such intent to external actors. When PKO-sending organizations are contemplating which civil war countries represent better investments of their scarce resources, an important consideration is that the potential mission succeeds. As noted above, mission failure not only makes the organization look bad and ineffective, but it also brings up the moral dilemma of if those resources could have been used with a better effect elsewhere.

Among other considerations, PKO-sending organizations, we argue, pay attention to how motivated the civil war state itself may be to want to resolve the conflict and return to peace and normalcy. Trade ties have the potential to provide such a signal, and credibly so.

Second, a broad literature points to the benefits of international organizations for deterring and resolving conflict. Beyond the research specific to peacekeeping discussed above, other studies consider the indirect effect of such organizations, typically focusing on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). It therefore stands to reason that peacekeeping organizations would seek to leverage this effect in where and how they conduct their peacekeeping activities to better promote successful outcomes. Early discoveries in this research agenda have found that countries with greater shared IGO ties are less likely to engage in militarized disputes (Russett et al. 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001). Further studies corroborate this general finding, where more institutionalized IGOs are able to reduce conflict escalation (Tir and Karreth 2018), settle disputes (Bearce and Omori 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006) and shorten the duration of ongoing conflicts (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). This research agenda generally posits that some IGOs are more effective at conflict reduction than others. Boehmer et al. (2004) find that membership in “institutionalized” IGOs - those that possess mechanisms for conflict mediation, arbitration, or adjudication, as well as ways to coerce or incentivize state behavior through finances and sanctions - reduces the risk of conflict, but that other kinds of IGOs have no such effect. Later adaptations of this list of IGOs find similar results (Ingram et al. 2005; Tir and Karreth 2018; Karreth 2018). Not only can such IGOs influence the behavior of member states, but they are typically sufficiently autonomous from member state interests such that they can act independently to pursue their own agenda. This is important since domestic stability and peace are central to the successful operation of many IGOs. Such instability can interfere with matters such as economic development and international trade (Barro 1991; Alesina et al. 1996; Bayer and Rupert 2004; Martin et al. 2008; Blattman and Miguel 2010) and even spillover into surrounding countries through economic impact (Murdoch and Sandler 2002) or refugee flows (Moore and Shellman 2004, 2007; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2007). IGOs therefore have a strong incentive to procure and maintain peace in their member countries. We consider a narrow subset of IGOs that have

been identified as having a high degree of leverage over their member states, which we refer to as “high leverage IGOs” (HLIGOs; see Karreth 2018).

The primary mechanism behind HLIGOs’ ability to prevent and reduce conflict within and among member states relates to the commitment problem discussed previously. Specifically, their independence from member state interests and the leverage they possess over members gives them the ability to both initially elicit and then reinforce commitments to peace between warring parties. This is the case with HLIGOs like the World Bank and the IMF, whereas non-HLIGOs such as the UN Security Council or ASEAN are prone to strong influence in decision-making by member states. In terms of the leverage over member states, HLIGOs can use various material benefits of membership in the organization (e.g. loans, development aid, market access, investments) as a means to effect change in the state’s preferences and behavior. This may be through incentivization, such as the promise of post-conflict development aid, or through the threat of sanctions, such as the denial of promised aid, loans, access to markets, or other economic or political benefits. The high institutionalization of HLIGOs further indicates to the conflict parties that such actions can be taken swiftly and effectively, and that violating states should anticipate consequences in the face of violating HLIGOs’ expectations of their behavior. Thus, HLIGOs can reduce the commitment problem between warring parties by clearly signaling a willingness to impose sanctions that will be costly to one or both parties. As a result, the costs of continued fighting increase for the parties and the incentives to achieve and adhere to a settlement grow stronger.

While theories of commitment problems typically refer to governments and rebels fighting one another, the concept of consent to peacekeeping suggests an additional commitment problem exists between the parties and peacekeeping organizations such as the UN, whereby neither belligerent can credibly commit to upholding the agreement to consent, which may subsequently break down and threaten the viability of the mission. Therefore, just as IGOs can serve to resolve this commitment problem between conflict parties, it stands to reason that they can also reduce the problem as it exists between the parties and the peacekeeping organization, so long as they have a degree of leverage over one

or both conflict parties. Unlike such high leverage IGOs, peacekeeping organizations like the UN may ironically not be in a position to resolve the problem of its own accord. Evidence shows that UN peacekeeping is an effective means of solving the problem between warring parties by placing sufficient peacekeepers in the environment to give both parties (and particularly the rebels) the confidence to lay down their weapons and pursue peace (Walter 1997). Yet outside of peacekeeping, the UN has little leverage of its own with which to support such commitments to peace due to the fact that it cannot act independent of its members in the way that HLIGOs can, and has little in terms of leverage over states that does not ultimately reduce to bilateral state leverage (i.e. the members of the Security Council). Not being considered an HLIGO, then, the UN is incapable of enforcing consent given by conflict parties to a peacekeeping mission.

Since HLIGOs can both induce conflict parties to act through the conditional provision of benefits and threat of sanctioning -- and can sustain that commitment through continued use of such leverage -- they likely play a dual role in consent to peacekeeping. First, states that belong to more HLIGOs will be more strongly driven to give consent to a peacekeeping mission, lest they forego or lose a multitude of benefits or suffer sanctions across their HLIGO portfolios. This was true of Cote d'Ivoire prior to accepting the UNOCI mission, where the World Bank canceled all standing loan programs until the government was willing to accept conflict mediation, part of which included a peacekeeping mission. Moreover, although HLIGOs have less leverage over rebels than over governments, their influence may extend to the former if the benefits of those HLIGOs, such as development funds, are received by the rebels or their supporters. Second, HLIGO influence signals to the peacekeeping organization that initial consent will likely be sustained for a prolonged period, giving it more hope of conducting a successful mission. The latent threat of punishment by HLIGOs for withdrawing or reducing consent will signal that initial consent is both genuine and likely to be sustained over time.

## **Hypotheses**

We offer the following hypotheses to test the above argument.

- H1: (More robust) PKO consent is more likely to be given by those civil war states with greater economic and/or institutional ties to the international community.
- H2: 3rd parties are more likely to deploy (more robust) PKOs to those civil war states with greater economic and/or institutional ties to the international community.
- [A future direction. H3: Once a PKO is deployed, (robust) consent is more likely to be sustained in those civil war states with greater economic and/or institutional ties to the international community.]

## **Research Design**

We test the effect of trade and HLIGO memberships on consent to, and deployment of, peacekeeping operations to civil wars occurring between 1947 and 2011. Specifically, we use Fortna's (2008) data as updated by Yuen (2019) identifying ceasefires in civil conflicts that have lasted at least one month. This gives a total of 206 observations, where a number of ceasefires deemed ineligible for peacekeeping are excluded (Yuen 2019: 5).

### ***Consent***

We test the presence and degree of consent using logistic regression analysis. Yuen (2019) codes consent given by belligerents to peacekeeping in each of the aforementioned ceasefires using a variety of primary documents. We first use a binary indicator of whether or not any consent is given by either party. Yuen also identifies whether restrictions were placed on that consent, such as limiting the tasks, geographic access, or deployment size of the operation. If not, we refer to this as *unrestricted* consent.

### ***Peacekeeping***

We use Fortna's (2008) measures of whether or not peacekeeping is deployed and what type of operation is sent. Fortna identifies the following sources of peacekeeping: the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or NATO, and ad hoc missions led by a global or regional power. We test the role of HLIGOs on all types of peacekeeping deployment. Excluding the so-called "enforcement missions," which are typically deployed without the consent of the conflict parties, we employ a binary measure of consent restricted to cases of consent-based peacekeeping. Furthermore, we use Fortna's



categorization of peacekeeping operations, which includes *no mission*, *political mission*, *monitoring mission*, *interpositional mission*, *multidimensional mission*, and *enforcement mission*.<sup>1</sup> We label the multidimensional and enforcement missions as *robust* PKOs.

### ***Trade***

We measure the extent of influence international trade has over a civil war state by considering what portion of the state's GDP is accounted for by trade. This trade/GDP measure is often referred to as trade openness. The data source are the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al. 2015).

### ***IGO memberships***

Our other main explanatory variable is a count of the number of memberships in high-leverage IGOs held by the conflict country in the year prior to the conflict initiation, using data collected by Karreth (2018). The list of relevant HLIGOs can be found in the Appendix. To help identify the specific role of HLIGOs, (1) the Appendix also shows that conflict experience is not a predictor of HLIGO memberships. HLIGOs in other words do not somehow screen out countries that are likely to be conflict-prone in the future, while only admitting countries that are going to be peaceful. (2) In our analyses, we also include counts of membership in other types of IGOs.

### ***Control Variables***

We include a number of variables likely to influence both the decision to give consent to peacekeeping and that to establish a peacekeeping operation, thus reflecting both demand and supply-side factors (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015; Yuen 2019). *Intensity* is a measure of the total civilian and battlefield casualties occurring in the conflict (Fortna 20098; Yuen 2019). From a demand perspective, higher losses may evoke greater desire from the combatants to pursue peace and thus invite peacekeepers in. From the supply side, research systematically finds that peacekeeping missions are sent where violence has incurred greater costs (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). We

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<sup>1</sup> For a full discussion of each type of mission see Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2008).

employ the natural log of this count. *Government army size* is the natural log of the number of military personnel in the conflict state, taken from Yuen (2019) and coded from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities data (2010) and also from SIPRI (2009). A larger military will likely make rebel actors more reluctant to lay down arms and the government less open to outside interference, reducing the likelihood of consent to peacekeeping. Extant studies find that peacekeeping organizations are less likely to send missions to such countries (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015).

Two factors commonly associated with peaceful outcomes of civil war are whether or not the conflict ended with outright victory for one party or instead with a negotiated settlement. Victory may lead to a more durable peace since one side dominates the post-war environment (Fortna 2008). Alternately, the procurement of a treaty may indicate a willingness to pursue peace based on information about the continued costs of fighting. Both *victory* and *treaty* are taken from Yuen (2019) and are compared to the baseline category of truces, where fighting has stopped but there is no clear path towards a durable settlement. Peacekeeping studies find that missions are generally sent where neither side has won an outright victory and, counterintuitively, where no treaty has been achieved (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003).

We include two variables to account for the parties to the conflict. *Factions* is a dichotomous measure taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000), where 0 reflects two parties and 1 reflects three or more. A larger number of groups involved not only reduces the likelihood of consent being given by all, but also indicates more parties to be placated and a higher likelihood of returning to violence. Peacekeeping organizations may therefore be more reluctant to intervene. *Major power* is a binary indicator of the presence of a major third party state in the civil war (Yuen 2019). Such a presence might deter peacekeeping operations. Moreover, this addresses the possible argument that HLIGOs are not the primary third party driving consent and may even be proxying for other states' interests.

*Polity* measures the level of democracy using Marshall et al.'s (2016) Polity IV scale. The UN may more readily intervene in conflicts to protect fragile democratic institutions or believe that such a system may be more ripe for the establishment of peace. Similarly, a state with more democratic

institutions may be more inclined or better structured to undergo a peace process. We include the natural log of the country's GDP to indicate its general global economic influence, taken from Gleditsch (2002). This controls for the possibility that peacekeeping operations are sent to protect economic interests (Stojek and Tir 2015), and also that memberships in IGOs are simply a proxy for the state's embeddedness in the global economy. Finally, we include *duration*, a measure of the length of the conflict in days as a proportion of an entire year (Yuen 2019). Longer conflicts may reflect their intractable nature, or may alternately indicate a greater desire among participants to seek a permanent resolution. Yuen (2019) finds an inconclusive relationship between conflict duration and consent, while peacekeeping is generally more likely to be deployed when a conflict has raged for longer (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Since some conflicts have multiple episodes that each take on an individual observation, we cluster standard errors on the conflict to account for correlated errors.

## Results

Table 1: Logistic regression estimates of **consent to peacekeeping missions** in civil wars, 1947-2011.

	All PKOs	All PKOs	Impartial PKOs	Impartial PKOs	UN PKOs	UN PKOs
Intercept	-0.84*	0.77	-1.13*	-1.07	-1.39*	-1.53
	(0.43)	(1.69)	(0.46)	(1.97)	(0.49)	(2.17)
<b>IGOs with high economic leverage</b>	0.41*	0.35*	0.45*	0.43*	0.42*	0.46*
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.21)
IGOs with medium structure	-0.21*	-0.17	-0.20*	-0.22	-0.22*	-0.24
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.15)
IGOs with low structure	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
All other IGOs	0.04	-0.05	0.06	-0.02	0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
War ended in victory		-1.80*		-1.77*		-1.66*
		(0.52)		(0.57)		(0.62)
Settlement/Treaty		0.31		0.50		0.48
		(0.58)		(0.64)		(0.68)
War deaths (logged)		0.10		0.16		0.17
		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.13)
Government army size (logged)		-0.32*		-0.48*		-0.56*
		(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.22)
More than two factions		0.41		0.24		0.51
		(0.44)		(0.49)		(0.53)
Neighboring state intervened		0.99*		0.79*		0.91*
		(0.44)		(0.48)		(0.51)
War duration		-0.03		-0.04		-0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Major power involved in war		0.67		0.51		0.36
		(0.44)		(0.48)		(0.51)
Polity score		-0.00		-0.01		-0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)
GDP (logged)		-0.13		0.06		0.09
		(0.19)		(0.20)		(0.22)
AIC	253.38	206.05	221.77	181.10	196.97	160.15
BIC	269.61	254.44	237.51	227.96	212.16	205.31
Log Likelihood	-121.69	-88.03	-105.89	-75.55	-93.49	-65.08
Deviance	243.38	176.05	211.77	151.10	186.97	130.15
Num. obs.	190	186	172	168	154	150

\*p < 0.1, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses

Figure 3: Probability of consent (estimated based on Table 2, Model 2)




Table 2: Logistic regression estimates of **deployment of peacekeeping missions**  
in civil wars, 1952-2011.

	All PKOs	All PKOs	Robust PKOs	Robust PKOs
Intercept	0.06 (0.30)	0.27 (1.39)	-0.89* (0.36)	-4.15* (1.86)
<b>Trade openness</b> <b>(% of trade/GDP, logged, average over past 3 years)</b>	0.19 (0.15)	0.11 (0.20)	0.24 (0.18)	0.42* (0.22)
War ended in victory		-1.59* (0.54)		0.45 (0.64)
Settlement/Treaty		0.23 (0.52)		1.35* (0.63)
War deaths (logged)		0.10 (0.11)		0.02 (0.13)
Government army size (logged)		-0.30* (0.17)		-0.19 (0.19)
More than two factions		1.26* (0.46)		2.10* (0.69)
Neighboring state intervened		0.47 (0.42)		0.39 (0.50)
War duration		-0.04 (0.03)		0.03 (0.03)
Major power involved in war		0.43 (0.41)		-0.25 (0.46)
Polity score		-0.03 (0.04)		-0.10* (0.05)
GDP (logged)		-0.06 (0.15)		0.14 (0.16)
AIC	240.21	194.30	182.26	165.26
BIC	246.53	231.93	188.58	202.88
Log Likelihood	-118.10	-85.15	-89.13	-70.63
Deviance	236.21	170.30	178.26	141.26
Num. obs.	174	170	174	170


\*p < 0.1, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses

Table 3: Logistic regression estimates of **deployment of peacekeeping missions**  
in civil wars, 1952-2011.

	All PKOs	All PKOs	Robust PKOs	Robust PKOs
Intercept	-0.34 (0.37)	-0.93 (1.72)	-1.64* (0.48)	-5.74* (2.09)
<b>Trade openness</b> <b>(% of trade/GDP, logged, average over past 3 years)</b>	0.20 (0.18)	0.23 (0.25)	0.02 (0.22)	0.15 (0.28)
Unrestricted consent	1.78* (0.90)	2.43 (1.91)	2.41* (0.89)	3.16* (1.18)
<b>Trade openness x</b> <b>unrestricted consent</b>	-0.23 (0.44)	0.05 (1.04)	0.62 (0.46)	1.10* (0.57)
War ended in victory		-1.59* (0.61)		0.74 (0.73)
Settlement/Treaty		0.42 (0.62)		1.80* (0.71)
War deaths (logged)		0.14 (0.14)		0.09 (0.14)
Government army size (logged)		-0.22 (0.21)		-0.27 (0.24)
More than two factions		1.99* (0.58)		2.11* (0.72)
Neighboring state intervened		0.62 (0.49)		0.12 (0.54)
War duration		-0.05 (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)
Major power involved in war		0.93* (0.51)		-0.33 (0.52)
Polity score		-0.06 (0.05)		-0.10 (0.06)
GDP (logged)		-0.12 (0.18)		0.17 (0.19)
AIC	196.53	151.43	161.74	145.52
BIC	208.81	194.04	174.02	188.13
Log Likelihood	-94.27	-61.71	-76.87	-58.76
Deviance	188.53	123.43	153.74	117.52
Num. obs.	159	155	159	155

\*p < 0.1, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses

Figure 4: Probability of robust PKOs (estimated based on Table 3, Model 4)



Probabilities (with 90% confidence intervals) are estimated for typical civil war cases with trade openness set to low, median, and high values. Estimates based on a logit model containing an interaction term of consent and openness.



Table 4: Logistic regression estimates of **deployment of peacekeeping missions**  
in civil wars, 1947-2011.

	All PKOs	All PKOs	Robust PKOs	Robust PKOs
Intercept	-1.04*	-0.34	-2.63*	-7.41*
	(0.43)	(1.64)	(0.58)	(2.40)
<b>IGOs with high economic leverage</b>	0.31*	0.15	0.29*	0.39*
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)
IGOs with medium structure	-0.16*	-0.09	-0.25*	-0.26*
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)
IGOs with low structure	-0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
All other IGOs	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
War ended in victory		-1.80*		0.39
		(0.51)		(0.63)
Settlement/Treaty		0.01		1.06
		(0.54)		(0.65)
War deaths (logged)		0.13		0.03
		(0.11)		(0.13)
Government army size (logged)		-0.36*		-0.25
		(0.18)		(0.20)
More than two factions		0.98*		2.12*
		(0.43)		(0.70)
Neighboring state intervened		0.57		0.40
		(0.41)		(0.50)
War duration		-0.04		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Major power involved in war		0.50		0.25
		(0.40)		(0.48)
Polity score		-0.03		-0.08*
		(0.04)		(0.05)
GDP (logged)		-0.10		0.25
		(0.16)		(0.18)
AIC	276.40	227.57	204.45	187.59
BIC	293.04	277.19	221.09	237.21
Log Likelihood	-133.20	-98.78	-97.22	-78.79
Deviance	266.40	197.57	194.45	157.59
Num. obs.	206	202	206	202

\*p < 0.1, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses

Figure 4: Probability of PKOs (estimated based on Table 4, Model 2)





Figure 5: Probability of robust PKOs (estimated based on Table 4, Model 4)



## **Conclusion**

Seeking successful outcomes in peacekeeping while using resources efficiently has become more important for peacekeeping in recent years as increased demand has been placed on those resources and growing scrutiny of peacekeeping has developed. Despite being a perennial problem for PKOs, lacking or weak consent from the conflict parties has been given little consideration in broader conversations about the efficacy of peacekeeping. How the UN and others can overcome this problem is of paramount importance to the venture and may even surpass other characteristics of the mission such as how many peacekeepers are deployed, where they come from, and what functions they perform. We have found evidence that consent is more likely to be given to peacekeeping where the conflict parties are more susceptible to pressures from international organizations and economic partners. Consequently, this consent is deemed credible by PKO providers, who are more inclined to deploy a PKO to that conflict. This highlights the importance of third parties beyond the UN and other peacekeeping organizations in peacekeeping intervention and supports the idea that conflict resolution is often a complex process involving a broad category of actors.

These findings suggest that providers of peacekeeping and high leverage IGOs can and should work together to pursue strategies for successful conflict interventions. Such strategies must be carefully designed so as to not push the conflict parties, and particularly the potential host government, away from both the peacekeepers and the HLIGOs. In some instances, the perceived costs of peacekeeping to the conflict parties will outweigh the expected losses of disobeying the HLIGOs. Alternately, the leaders may be unresponsive to those pressures and instead see the interference of both the peacekeeping organization and the HLIGOs as a threat to their legitimacy and autonomy, effectively breaking off those relationships and dissolving whatever leverage they had over the parties. Future academic and policy investigation should therefore consider how negotiation among these various actors can most effectively alter preferences to pursue conflict resolution.

Beyond this study, further investigation is required to fully understand the causal process underlying the proposed relationship here. Aside from reports from the field, little systematic knowledge

exists as to how consent varies within and across missions. We have identified the first step in the chain, but more must be understood as to how HLIGO leverage affects the behavior of combatants, both towards one another and in cooperating with the UN mission. This might involve collecting both qualitative and quantitative data on the “permissiveness” of the peacekeeping environment, looking at outcomes such as attacks on peacekeepers and installations, interruptions to PKOs such as protecting humanitarian convoys, accessing certain areas, or transporting peacekeepers from one location to another, or even more vague methods of obstructing peace and the PKO’s mission such as taxing peacekeepers or denying or delaying of visas. Much, therefore, remains to be understood about the fluctuating relationship between peacekeepers and conflict parties as a mission proceeds, and how external actors such as HLIGOs can mitigate that uncertainty.

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## Appendix

Table A1: List of IGOs with high leverage emanating from a combination of (1) economic leverage and (2) institutional prerequisites. Reproduced from Karreth (2018).

IGO	Economic leverage: Issues covered <sup>1</sup>	Institutional prerequisites: tools available <sup>2</sup>
African Development Bank	1	5
Asian Development Bank	4	4
Caribbean Community	3	3
Common Southern Market	1	1
Commonwealth Secretariat	1	5
Economic Community of West African States	3	4
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2	5
European Economic Community	2	5
European Investment Bank	2	4
European Union	3	4
World Bank	1	5
International Coffee Organization	4	2
International Fund for Agricultural Development	2	2
International Monetary Fund	1	5
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1	4
Southern African Development Community	2	4
West African Economic and Monetary Union	3	4

<sup>1</sup> Numbers: sum of issues covered by the IGO (Trade, Currency, Development, Investment, Production, Resources).

<sup>2</sup> Numbers: features available to the IGO (Financial authority, Decision-making, Bureaucracy, Independence, Use of carrots & sticks).

Table A2: Types of peacekeeping mission established by different actors. Source: Yuen (2019).

	No mission	Political	Monitoring	Interpositional	Multi-dimensional	Enforcement
UN	-	6	14	10	11	15
Regional Orgs	-	2	6	5	0	6
Ad hoc	-	1	1	3	0	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>30</b>




Figure A1: Distribution of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, distinguishing by whether countries experience domestic armed conflict in a given year or not. Source: Tir et al. (n.d.)




Figure A2: Average number of state memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage in countries with armed conflicts and those without, 1989-2011. Source: Tir et al. (n.d.)