Cooperation in the Shadow of Future Crisis: Coup Risk and Regional Organizations

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1 Abstract

How do leaders in coup-prone states leverage foreign policy strategies to boost their survival odds? This paper investigates the role that regional security cooperation plays in improving the tenure and post-tenure prospects of vulnerable leaders. The paper introduces a theoretical model of regional integration organizations as mutual insurance clubs that are of particular value to vulnerable leaders and leaders guilty of extensive human rights violations. I argue that member state leaders from coup-prone states consider their expected likelihood of requesting regional integration organizations' (RIO) assistance for regime stabilization in the future when deciding whether to contribute to regional security. Leaders also consider whether repressive tactics used to remain in power could force them to seek exile through co-members. Combined, this influences leaders to increase contributions to regional operations. With new data on security personnel contributions, I test the observable implication that vulnerable, culpable leaders should be more likely to contribute to co-members to generate goodwill. Across Africa-based RIOs, I find that at-risk leaders who have overseen significant human rights violations contribute more consistently to security and peacekeeping missions in their own neighborhood between 1990 and 2015.

2 Introduction

The premise that leaders focus primarily on political survival is often given as a starting point to explain domestic and foreign policy decision-making.[1] Considering the relative severity of external and internal threats, leaders decide upon domestic strategies to co-opt, appease, repress, or balance against elites, the military, and the masses.[2] However, institutional, rules-based strategies that succeed in higher income states often fail for vulnerable leaders from weakly consolidated competitive authoritarian regimes. Leaders from low-income states with factionalized militaries and uneven control of state territory are likely to rely on violence, leaving them vulnerable to future criminal proceedings. In this paper, I argue that such leaders respond to the inadequacy of domestic survival strategies by deepening regional cooperation with neighboring state leaders.

Paying into regional clubs for mutual insurance is rational for leaders whose neighbors would likely be "first responders" when domestic safeguards fail. Regional clubs can provide excludable benefits: regime-boosting assistance to combat domestic instability or asylum far from domestic courts in the event of crises. To remain entitled to benefits, regional organizations expect members to regularly make costly contributions and sacrifice time to the club.[3] For regional organizations, this entails contributing troops for regional security missions and quickly volunteering to mediate in neighboring states' crises. Those leaders who do not contribute to club goods are significantly less likely to receive favorable interventions or asylum during crisis.[4] This produces the observable implication that leaders who are most concerned about needing regional club members to intervene for their protection or provide asylum during future crises should be more likely to pay their dues. These leaders contribute security personnel to local missions to secure personal insurance. In other words, we must understand regional cooperation as a mutual insurance scheme to understand domestic

[1] Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); Kinne (2005); Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012).

[2] This is consistent with Escribà-Folch and Wright (2015).

[3] The theoretical insights here about mutual insurance clubs are inspired by Berman (2000).

[4] On economic theories of clubs and joint production of private security benefits among allies see Buchanan (1965); Olson and Zeckhauser (1966); Sandler and Hartley (2001).

political survival in politically unstable countries.

Which leaders are the most vulnerable to forceful removal and which are the most likely to require asylum after leaving office? A large literature on coup risk helps us identify vulnerable regimes where the military frequently intervenes in politics, often due to grievances over poor governance, inequality and poor pay.[5] Across these vulnerable regimes, I argue that leaders who oversee massive human rights violations are the most likely to face prosecution by successors upon removal. In the era of international justice and the ICC, most RIOs will not reinstate leaders committing atrocities, but will help them escape persecution by successors through asylum. However, many democratic states are no longer willing to offer asylum to culpable leaders. Even for rights-abusing states, harboring leaders who are wanted in court is costly. Culpable leaders will therefore only seek asylum in states where they have generated sufficient goodwill and are unlikely to be extradited to either domestic or international courts. For a leader to receive asylum, they must draw on a significant store of social capital. I argue that contributing to regional cooperation is a tactic used to generate this necessary social capital.

I apply this theory to explain how in recent years, regional economic integration organizations across Africa evolved to organize security cooperation where even many weak leaders contribute, rather than free ride. I examine a sample of 56 African and Middle Eastern states that are members of 12 regional integration organizations headquartered in Africa. I test whether leaders with the highest coup risk who also perpetrate extensive human rights violations (and therefore likely need external protections) are the most likely to contribute troops and police to regional organization co-members from 1990 to 2015.

To test the theory completely, we need to move beyond existing datasets on contributions to peacekeeping, incorporating all regional security cooperation. I build a new dataset by hand coding annual Military Balance Reports from the International Institute for Strategic Studies to capture additional contributions to non-peacekeeping multilateral security oper-

[5]See Besaw et al. (2019); Brooks (2019) for an overview.

ations. Rather than using an existing index of state fragility, I also generate a latent coup risk measure using Bayesian software. This method allows me to remain agnostic about how to weight the factors that contribute to coup risk. Using spatial logistic regression, I find evidence consistent with the claim that culpable leaders do manage coup risk by contributing more security personnel to regional organization co-members. These results are robust to several alternative mixed model specifications.

Evidence that vulnerable leaders contribute to regional cooperation in order to enhance their own survival contributes to the rich comparative politics literature on leaders' survival strategies. I suggest we should focus greater attention on weak state leaders' reliance on regional cooperation for protection. Therefore, this paper speaks to the growing literature on autocratic linkage,[6] with more emphasis on politically weak leaders. Second, this finding indicates why African leaders remain committed to regional integration organizations which have largely failed to achieve their original economic objectives. My work shows that these RIOs oftentimes provide important security boosts that vulnerable leaders value more than economic integration. Domestic threats to leaders' survival can therefore play an important role in the development and persistence of RIOs.[7] Finally, this paper provides an additional explanation as to why states contribute personnel for peacekeeping that has not already been explored in the peacekeeping literature.

3 Theory

We can say a leader is "insecure" when they face threats to their tenure in office *and* personal survival that they do not have sufficient resources to prevent or remedy. An insecure leader would like to focus on remaining in office but must also worry about whether they will

[6]Some in this vein argue authoritarian cooperation is mostly defensive (Libman and Obydenkova, 2018; Tansey, 2016; Tansey, Koehler and Schmotz, 2017; Obydenkova and Libman, 2019) whereas others claim autocratic leaders engage in "autocracy promotion" (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010; Kneuer et al., 2018; Vanderhill, 2013).

[7]Others make similar claims about the survival of underperforming African RIOs, largely relying on case studies eg Bach (2016); Palmateer and Clark (2018); Söderbaum (2004, 2010).

someday be identified as a threat and persecuted by successors, forcing them into exile. Cause for concern is greatest for leaders removed through coups d'etat, popular protest, or other irregular means.[8] Leaders who lose power through irregular means are at greater risk of ending up dead or imprisoned and blocked out of politics.[9] If an unpopular leader is removed through a coup, rather than stepping down voluntarily, they may also be in a weaker position to negotiate immunity from prosecution within their home country.[10] However, if they negotiate immunity in exchange for leaving office, they must worry about successors reneging and initiating criminal trials. Fear of prosecution upon leaving office helps to explain the tenacity of some "sit-tight" presidents from autocracies and illiberal democracies who will only leave if they have credible guarantees of safety in exile.[11] These guarantees are increasingly hard to come by in the era of international justice.[12]

Leaders consider the relative threat represented by internal and external actors before choosing an optimal portfolio of domestic and foreign policy tools to boost their survival prospects in office and afterwards. The most serious threats to insecure incumbents are typically domestic threats from coup plotters or rebels in range of the capital. Leaders also consider whether their neighbors are friends or rivals who may join domestic actors in supporting rebels and coup plotters. The source of a leader's insecurity, whether mostly from the military, non-state actors or rival leaders, has implications for the strategies leaders are likely to pursue in order to reduce their insecurity.

[8]I follow the definition of irregular turnover from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009): "A loss of office is considered irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions. Most irregular removals from office are the result of the threat or use of force as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts, and assassinations...and occur at the hands of domestic opponents" (pp 273).

[9]Goemans (2008); Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009). Post-1990, leaders of democracies and non-democracies faced an equal probability of coup initiation (12%), and coups were the top cause for autocratic regimes ending (35%). Other causes of autocratic regime termination were elections (26%), popular uprisings (17%), insurgency (8%), insider rule change (8%), foreign imposition (4%) and state dissolution (2%) (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018; Derpanopoulos et al., 2016).

[10]See Escribà-Folch and Wright (2015) on how this calculus varies by autocratic regime type.

[11]See Kiwuwa (2013) regarding African "sit tight" presidents. For a more global treatment of the topic, see Baturo (2010); Krcmaric (2018); Radtke (2019).

[12]Krcmaric (2018).

3.1 Shortcomings of domestic survival strategies

Using domestic tactics for survival vis-a-vis internal and external challengers requires cooperation from the very actors who are most capable of posing an existential threat to leaders: members of the military. Leaders directly rely on the military to use violence against opponents, but they also rely on a minimal level of acceptance and non-interference by the military. This is critical as they distribute rents to co-opt potential threats and maintain supporters. Leaders face a "guardianship dilemma" where they struggle to strike a balance between keeping security apparatuses strong enough to deter threats but factionalized enough to prevent military interference and coordination of an officer-led coup.[13] Either providing the military with more influence over policy and resource distribution or weakening the military could also backfire if these strategies anger establishment elites.[14]

The domestic strategies leaders adopt amidst their guardianship dilemma– and the shortcomings of these strategies– are relatively well-studied. The literature on "coup proofing" covers domestic survival strategies focused on a country's rules for succession,[15] disabling coordination among actors in the security forces,[16] distributing rents to supporters,[17] and repressing or coopting possible opponents who could ally with the military against the leader.[18] However, there is growing recognition that domestic coup-proofing strategies backfire when anticipated by the military.[19] Leaders in the military also cannot credibly promise to prevent

[13]For McMahon and Slantchev (2015), leaders' struggles to balance in the guardianship dilemma owe partly to asymmetric information. Members of the military are better informed about how much resources they need to repel rivals compared to the leader, who does not want to over- or under- provide resources to the military.

[14]Reuter and Szakonyi (2019); Powell (2014*b*). See Roessler (2016) for further discussion of political exclusion and what Roessler terms "the coup-civil war trap".

[15]Frantz and Stein (2017); Konrad and Mui (2017)

[16]In various circumstances, leaders complicate the chain of command, create militias or rival units to balance against the army (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt and Pilster, 2019; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018; Powell, 2012), and stack the presidential guard with co-ethnics or foreign mercenaries to reduce the likelihood of a military coup (Harkness, 2018; Roessler, 2016).

[17]Arriola (2009)

[18]Leaders strategically manipulate access to political institutions to neutralize would-be opponents (Svolik, 2012; Gandhi, 2008; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2016). Leaders also consider whether it is more essential to co-opt urban or rural elites (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky, 2017).

[19]Sudduth (2017)

a coup in exchange for power sharing in the many cases where they are factionalized, and some officers or subordinates remain eager to disregard their superiors and oust the leader.[20]

Escalating repression using a subset of the military or presidential guard is a common solution for leaders who run out of means to co-opt potential threats. However, escalating repression while in power raises the stakes associated with leaving office. If a culpable leader is forced from office and remains within their home state, they will be at the mercy of the military, their successors, and a population with accumulated grievances. Their culpability may make asylum impossible in many states which now promote human rights protections and accede to warrants for the arrest of rights abusing leaders. Repressive tactics also jeopardize international goodwill and place leaders at risk of sanctions from donors, potentially decreasing their survival odds.

3.2 Foreign policy strategies

Vulnerable leaders faced with insufficient domestic survival tactics are able to supplement through their foreign policies.[21] There is substantial work on how leaders cooperate with donor states in exchange for regime-boosting assistance. Many use military aid and economic windfalls from "patron" or donor states to survive in office.[22] With respect to neighbors, some anticipate that vulnerable leaders are likely to engage in diversionary wars[23] that distract soldiers who might otherwise cause trouble at home. However, while tactics to covertly undermine rivals persist, cooperation seems to predominate over conflict among many leaders in Africa.

3.2.1 Regional cooperation

Cooperation prevails partly because one of the best ways to reduce the incidence of coups is through solidarity. If incumbents can promise to retaliate against those who carry out a

[20] Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018)
[21] On implications for alliance formation see David (1991).
[22] See, for example, Yuichi Kono and Montinola (2009); Licht (2010).
[23] Miller and Elgün (2011). See Powell (2014*a*) on conditions where this is a likely response to coup risk.

coup in each of their respective countries, military leaders must expect to take on numerous rivals.[24] Leaders decrease the expected value to the military of staging a coup, so long as their commitments are seen by the military to be credible.[25] Maintaining solidarity is also one of the best ways to pervent extradition of culpable leaders who seek asylum in the wake of successful coups.

How, then, can vulnerable leaders commit to cooperate against coup plotters and to offer asylum if co-members are deposed? I argue that leaders with similar domestic challenges can collude through regional organizations to create mutual assistance pacts with neighbors. Co-members in regional organizations maintain cooperation by emphasizing shared responsiblity and reciprocity.[26] When leaders anticipate that they will interact with their neighbors repeatedly over time, they have incentives to reward positive contributions made by their neighbors and punish neighbors who detract from regional goods.[27] It is mutually beneficial to band together in these clubs that incentivize members to provide insurance so long as the anticipated benefits of contributing outweigh the costs on average. To the extent that neighboring leaders share the mentality of political insiders facing similar threats, camaraderie may develop to strengthen security ties. Regional organizations also strengthen the club mentality by convening regular summits among heads of states.

Cooperating through regional integration organizations provides the following survival advantages: RIOs can reframe threats to individual leaders' tenures as threats to regional stability; establish anti-coup norms; coordinate crisis assistance; mediate in conflicts to protect incumbents; increase donors' willingness to provide funding and military assistance;

[24]On how the number of rivals impacts coup plotters' calculations, see McMahon and Slantchev (2015).

[25]Another observable implication: The deterrent effect can even give leaders greater leeway to engage in domestic counter-balancing tactics, decreasing the desire and ability of members of the military to stage a coup. Boutton (2019) finds leaders are more willing to purge the military when they anticipate allied support. On authoritarian cooperation motivated by political survival more broadly, see Mattes and Rodríguez (2014); Odinius and Kuntz (2015).

[26]I am using reciprocity here to mean both 1. specific reciprocity: responding proportionately in kind to a partner's behavior in an interaction or exchange and 2. diffuse reciprocity: conforming to generally accepted standards of behavior, both as defined in Keohane (1986). Both forms of reciprocity are essential to sustaining cooperation over time in international politics.

[27]Axelrod (1984) is credited for the foundational insight that leaders use tit-for-tat strategies to sustain cooperation over time.

help professionalize members' militaries using donor funds; and facilitate safe passage into exile when remaining in office is untenable and guilty leaders would otherwise face arrest. The regional insurance pact often pays out through military interventions in the wake of coups, as regional organization co-members refuse to recognize the authority of coup leaders and deploy troops to reinstate the incumbent or facilitate their safe exit.[28] RIOs often claim their motive in pro-incumbent interventions is simply to maintain regional stability- a framing which coincides with the stated objectives of donor states.[29] The military interventions conducted by RIOS to support governments under attack from within make the term "solidarity deployment" more appropriate than peace operation or democracy restoration mission in many cases.[30] However, RIOs whose technocratic staff occasionally push member state leaders on democracy promotion counterintuitively gain sufficient moral authority to frame deployments that protect incumbents with mixed records in terms of peacekeeping and stabilization.[31] By demonstrating their willingness to intervene and refusal to recognize military coup leaders, the group lowers the expected benefits of staging a coup, detering coup plotters. However, vulnerable leaders selectively protect co-members in the wake of coups; some leaders are not reinstated by regional organizations after being deposed. We can therefore ask why leaders intervene on behalf of some co-members but not others.

In part, leaders intervene because military takeovers produce instability and externalities. Neighbors want to avoid spillover of refugees and combattants. Nonetheless, neighbors sometimes choose not to protect co-members after irregular removal. I argue that the logics of mutual insurance clubs also shed light on how groups of leaders determine which of their fellows are "worth saving." As with other insurance assessors, the group of incumbents

[28]Dersso (2017); Omorogbe (2011); Williams (2007).

[29]On leaders strategically positioning themselves as regional security providers to gain international goodwill see Söderbaum (2004, 2010); Coleman (2011); Warner (2018); Jourde (2007); Stoddard (2017); Victor (2010).

[30]Coleman (2011)

[31]This is an international analog to the domestic strategy employed by Uganda's President Museveni with respect to the autonomy of economic technocrats within his country: Museveni tolerates some public pushback from his government's economic managers because their credibility is instrumental to his regime's legitimacy and access to credit (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2016).

considers the behavioral record of the leader calling for help before bearing the costs of intervention. They consider whether the leader in crisis paid their dues during good times and remained in good standing, or whether that leader assumed excessive risks and threatened regional security.[32]

Regional organizations' rules and established norms set expectations for how leaders must behave and what they must contribute to remain in good standing. They rely on members' contributions and adherence to norms to realize benefits for the group.[33] In the context of regional organizations, members are expected to contribute troops, money, or mediation efforts. These contributions increase the ability of all members to enjoy insurance. At the same time, security and prestige benefits are excludable because only leaders who formally join the club and follow the rules to maintain themselves in good standing can directly benefit from personalized interventions in times of need. Members in good standing are more likely to receive protection.[34] Keeping up this punishment and reward system sustains cooperation and deters extreme risk-taking by leaders, leaving the collective more secure than it would be otherwise.

Leaders who are more concerned about future protection should be the most motivated to remain in good standing with the regional organization. This leads to the observable implication that leaders vulnerable to irregular removal who have few peaceful exit options should contribute consistently to regional security cooperation. The subset of leaders who face high coup risk and are guilty of crimes serious enough to warrant seeking exile will be more consistent contributors to club goods.[35]

[32]In some cases, norms of non-interference explained reluctance to intervene against coups. Leaders who came to power in coups also may be unwilling to act due to uneven internalization of the anti-coup norm or a desire to avoid looking hypocritical. This explanation is unsatisfying if we assume that those military leaders hold political survival as their paramount goal and want to deter coups from their own domestic challengers.

[33]This discussion of the rational response of groups which cannot rely on markets or governments to provide the local public goods they desire is inspired by the discussion of religious sects and club goods in Berman and Laitin (2008).

[34]Buchanan (1965); Olson and Zeckhauser (1966)

[35]Of course, defection is a major concern when leaders have a short time horizon, or place a reduced value on future cooperation in favor of short term survival calculus. We might expect that coup risk shortens a leader's time horizon such that they value long term cooperation much less than short-sighted tactics to

3.2.2 Sustaining cooperation

In sum, vulnerable leaders diversify their survival strategies by incorporating international cooperation and alliance formation, reducing their risk of personal harm. They can choose to increase their participation in regional organizations with mutual defense pacts and with anti-coup clauses. The decision about whether to remain in good standing by contributing to club goods, such as by sending troops and police for local security missions or paying annual dues, occurs in this context of strategic interactions between African leaders and their RIO co-members. Leaders are cognizant of the costs and benefits that co-members might impose on them in the present and the near future in response to their choice to free ride on regional security. How do leaders behave in light of the fact that regional co-member states can provide powerful personal protection and supplementary coup-proofing, but that this protection is conditional? Vulnerable, culpable leaders who are more dependent on club members' good will for their personal survival have the strongest incentives to pay their dues by contributing security personnel. Two hypotheses follow:

Hypothesis 1: *Countries with higher coup risk will be more likely to send security personnel to regional organization co-member states.*

Hypothesis one should be moderated at the highest levels of coup risk, where a state's military is so under-professionalized that its troops do not qualify to deploy in international missions. The highest levels of coup risk also often correspond with cases of civil war or state failure, where a state cannot spare any of its armed forces for external deployments.

Hypothesis 1a: *The relationship between coup risk and sending security personnel will be stronger when leaders have committed attrocities.*

While I expect that coup risk independently effects the likelihood of contributions, I

remain in power. If this is the case, they would be more likely to renege on promises to help neighbors. However, the insecure leader's concern for their fate if they *are* deposed should actually lengthen their time horizons with respect to neighboring leaders. After all, if they are forced to step down and flee from their country, leaders often get away with the help of allies and make their first stop in friendly neighboring states. Failing to assist neighbors in the present could reduce the inclination of neighbors to help a leader if they are forced to seek asylum.

expect that the effect is even stronger for culpable leaders.

Security contributions not only stem spillovers, but are likely to pay off through reciprocal rapid assistance in future crises. Establishing good will among one's neighbors increases the odds of receiving assistance or asylum and reduces the likelihood that neighboring leaders will assist exiled rebels or internal dissenters seeking their support. In regions where numerous leaders face high coup risk, they have strong incentives to utilize clubs that encourage positive reciprocity among leaders.

4 Research Design

4.1 African RIO sample

Table 1: Major Regional Integration Organizations in Africa

RIO name	Year founded	No. of members	Avg GDP/ capita
Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD)	1998	29	1,335
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	1996	8	564
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	1989	5	3,106
Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)	1976	3	981
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	1983	10	307
Mano River Union (MRU)	1973	4	795
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	1994	19	758
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)	1994	6	1,499
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975	16	1,235
East African Community (EAC)	2000	6	626
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)	1981	15	1,715
League of Arab States (LAS)	1948	22	4,265

While they were created to promote economic integration, African leaders adapted regional organizations to focus much of their efforts on political and security cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, African regional integration organizations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and ECCAS increasingly coordinate not only peacekeeping, but also conflict mediation, disaster response efforts and election security missions. This is partly out of necessity, as the US and other patron states proved increasingly reluctant to place boots on the ground

across the continent.[36] These regional clubs are preferred to the continent-wide African Union by many leaders partly because of what Padoan (1997) refers to as the "costs for cohesion management," which increase as distant states with diverse needs and preferences are added to a regional club.

In recent years, African subregional integration organizations (RIOs) moved to the forefront of the fight to deter coups, promulgating rules to sanction and isolate leaders who come to power through irregular means. The basic premise that regional integration organizations are used for regime-boosting is not new to scholars of African regional politics, though it is sometimes presented exclusively as a strategy of autocrats.[37] However, African leaders' willingness to stick their necks out for their counterparts is far from guaranteed. While African regional organizations often intervene to protect leaders from the worst fates, they do not protect- and occasionally even remove- leaders such as Charles Taylor who did not contribute to club goods and who repeatedly threatened regional stability.[38] Protection is only extended for leaders in good standing.

If the theory is plausible, we would most expect it to bear out in Africa, where coup incidence is high relative to other regions and former heads of state have faced prosecution for human rights violations.[39] To test implications of the theory, I construct a sample consisting of 56 members of the twelve major regional organizations with African and Middle Eastern members. Eleven of these organizations include exclusively states located in Africa, while the twelfth, the League of Arab States is split between African and Middle Eastern members. Because the League of Arab States has been active in peacekeeping and security cooperation on the African continent, I include its Middle Eastern members in my cross-country analysis. Small island states such as the Seychelles and Comoros are excluded due

[36]Williams (2010). France has proved an exception here in terms of rapid intervention when its interests were at stake.

[37]Söderbaum (2004, 2010); Stoddard (2017); Herbst (2007)

[38]Attempting to support leaders who openly disregard their countries' term limits, for example, would harm the legitimacy of the organizations as partners for Western assistance.

[39]Hissène Habré of Chad, Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire, and Charles Taylor of Liberia are notable examples of African leaders taken to trial for human rights violations.

to limited data availability.

4.2 Dependent Variable

To assess whether a member state contributes to regional security, I examine deployments of security personnel. Data on security personnel deployments comes from annual reports from the International Institute for Strategic Studies *Military Balance* spanning 1990 to 2018. I include all consensual deployments, whether bilateral or part of multilateral missions, as well as police and observers deployed for peacekeeping missions by the 56 states in my sample to any destination globally. As it is harder to accurately keep track of military advisors exchanged between states, I exclude these. I also exclude hostile deployments for inter-state wars and border conflicts. The binary dependent variable *troops to co-members* indicates whether or not a leader sent personnel to any RIO co-members in a particular country-year.

Figure 1 presents counts of states according to the proportion of years in the post-Cold War era when they contributed troops or police to within-region security or peacekeeping missions based on their RIO memberships. There is a great deal of variation; some states almost never contribute security personnel to co-members and others almost always do. Between 1990 and 2017, the average African or MENA state sent troops or police to co-members in about 39 percent of years. The proportion of personnel contributed to peacekeeping and security missions by "neighborhood" or directly contiguous states has increased in the last ten years.[40]

4.3 Measuring Coup Risk

Though we can observe when a country experiences a coup, each country's underlying coup risk is a latent unobservable variable. I conceptualize coup risk factors as variables that shape the likelihood soldiers will have sufficient motive and capacity to stage a coup. Typically, sol-

[40]Williams and Nguyen (2018)



Figure 1: Distribution of the proportion of years where African and MENA states sent troops to co-members, 1990-2017

diers are more motivated to stage a coup when they are underfunded by the current regime[41] and when they believe that they will have public support. Plotters anticipate support when both the army and the public are broadly dissatisfied with the government's performance on economics and rights issues.[42] The odds of public support and coup success matter a great deal to coup plotters, as failure often results in imprisonment or death for members of the military who choose the wrong side.[43] Because coup plotters consider satisfaction with the incumbent regime, economic contraction and low average standards of living should generate coup risk.[44] I include the annual percentage change of GDP and the country's infant mortality probability to capture these factors. In addition to infant mortality and economic contractions, population size significantly predicts coup attempts in African states.[45] Smaller states with higher infant mortality are at greater risk of coup attempts.

Leaders who share policymaking power with military officers are more likely than other leaders to have come into office through coups and are more likely to also be removed through coups. I therefore account for whether a country is under military dictatorship. In general, researchers find that there is a "coup trap" effect, where countries that experienced coups previously are more susceptible to future coups.[46] Therefore, the model includes whether a coup ocurred in the last five years.[47]

[41]Dwyer (2015) finds that West African coup plotters and mutineers were motivated in numerous instances by their deprivation relative to troops from other states. Albrecht and Eibl (2018) also observe a negative correlation between military spending and coup attempts.

[42]Powell (2012); Lindberg and Clark (2008).

[43]Singh (2014). The country's political institutions are clearly relevant but the role of democracy is not always clear-cut. Soldiers may be less likely to face backlash when they remove undemocratically selected leaders from office, whereas citizens and outside actors are more likely to protest coup efforts against "legitimate" democracies (Lindberg and Clark, 2008). See Thyne et al. (2017) regarding reactions of the international community to coups against democracies and see Johnson and Thyne (2018) on the role of public protests in coups. Bell (2016), however, finds that coups are more likely to succeed against democracies once initiated.

[44]Londregan and Poole (1990) found associations between poor economic performance, history of coups, and likelihood of future coups. Albrecht and Eibl (2018) find that increasing standards of living reduces coup risk.

[45]Besaw et al. (2019)

[46]Londregan and Poole (1990); Goemans (2008).

[47]Aside from economic performance and regime type, relevant considerations for coup risk include the characteristics of a state's military (Powell, 2012), and deliberate efforts leaders make to "coup proof" that cause preemptive coups (Sudduth, 2017).

While the literature on coup susceptibility is large, it is nonetheless difficult to predict which motive and opportunity variables matter more than others for coup risk. Creating one's own additive or multiplicative index of coup risk could incorrectly represent the contributions of each motive and opportunity variable. Therefore, I use a Bayesian method that allows me to remain agnostic ex-ante about the relative importance of each coup risk predictor. Roughly following the method of Sudduth (2017), I use *Jags* software to implement a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. My statistical model generates latent coup risk parameters for each country-year by aggregating the effects of variables measuring the motive and capacity for military actors to stage a coup. The measurement model from (Sudduth, 2017) is as follows:

$$y_{it} \sim Bernoulli(q_{it})$$

$$log_{it}(q_{it}) = dz_{it}$$

where there are i=1...n countries and t=1...m years. I use data on 56 African and Middle Eastern countries covering 1990-2015. y_{it} is a binary *Observed coup* variable which equals 1 if a country experiences at least one coup attempt in a year and 0 otherwise. Coup data used to construct the binary coup event indicator is from the Center for Systemic Peace [48]. The model assumes that coup risk fits a Bernoulli distribution with latent distribution q_{it} and that we observe a coup attempt with probability q_{it} each country-year.

I then model the logit of latent coup risk $log_{it}(q_{it})$ as a linear function of motive and capacity indicators z_{it}. The model's estimated parameters d indicate how much each variable related to the military's motive and capacity to stage a coup actually contributes to coup risk. z_{it} includes *% Change GDP*, *Population size*, *Infant mortality odds*, *Government expenditure on the military*, a *Military dictator* dummy and a *Coup in last 5 years* dummy. Data on GDP per capita changes, population size, and government expenditure on the military

[48] Marshall and Marshall (2018).

come from the World Bank (2019) and data on regime type used to create dummy variables indicating whether a country is under military dictatorship comes from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)'s regime data. Infant mortality odds is calculated by the World Health Organization as the probability of dying between birth and age one per one thousand live births (World Health Organization, 2019). Details on the output from the coup risk models is presented in Appendix A.

I save the predicted coup risk q generated in each of 3000 simulations for each country year. Figure 2 presents the distribution of countries' average coup risk over 1990 to 2015. As coups are rare events, the average coup risk for countries in my sample was approximately 4 percent. The median average country risk was 1.4 percent, as represented by a dashed line on Figure 2.

Figure 2: Distribution of average coup risk among 60 African and Middle Eastern States, 1990-2017



4.4 Leader Culpability

While the coup risk measure captures the likelihood that a leader will face attempts to remove them from power prematurely, it does not necessarily indicate their likely fate upon removal. For example, a leader who is removed after a spell of incompetent governance is likely to be treated differently than a leader who is removed after overseeing extensive human rights violations. The former may have to leave the country for a period of time but, if they have not committed major crimes, they can expect to receive asylum in their choice of locations and return to their home country in the future. The latter must also leave in the short term, but faces much greater odds of prosecution should they ever attempt to return. This culpable leader needs longer term asylum but, due to rights violations, they are likely to be viewed as a pariah by much of the international community. Therefore, their options for asylum would be limited. Rational leaders facing criticism for human rights abuses understand this, and we should expect them to hedge against future crises by improving their social capital with neighbors. Leaders can contribute to regional club goods in many ways, but providing troops and police for security operations is one of the most valued and visible means to do so. We should expect culpable leaders from unstable states to increase their contributions to regional security operations. I use a binary leader culpability variable created by Krcmaric (2018) that equals one in a country year if the leader currently in office has in any year caused the deaths of at least 1000 people in his or her country. Krcmaric (2018) uses data on mass atrocities from Ulfelder and Valentino (2012) which ends in 2010. Following the same coding convention, I extend the culpability variable through 2015 using data on mass killings from Marshall, Gurr and Harff (2019).

4.5 Control variables

In some regions, incumbents or their predecessors have undermined neighboring governments' political stability, such as by allowing citizens to smuggle weapons and other goods across borders, providing safehaven to rebels, expelling refugees into neighboring states, or

disputing territorial borders. Leaders consider their neighbors' prior destabilizing actions when deciding whether to cooperate. In regions where a number of leaders have undermined each others' security, willingness to cooperate should be lower. This is particularly true for sensitive security operations. If, as I assert, leaders emphasize reciprocity in their dealings, they will be less inclined to send troops to help leaders who previously undermined their security. Leaders would prefer to send troops to assist leaders whose cooperation they can more reasonably expect to rely on in the future. I expect that leaders' propensity to self-insure through regional cooperation in general is conditioned by the extent to which they view their neighbors as rivals on average, and control for this baseline willingness to cooperate.

To measure rivalries, I use data from Diehl, Goertz and Gallegos (2019).[49] The "peace score" in Diehl, Goertz and Gallegos (2019) can take a value of 0 (serious rivalry), .25 (lesser rivalry), .50 (negative peace), .75 (warm peace), and 1.0 (security community). I construct a regional-level variable that is the annual average of rivalry scores with all of a state's co-members. Higher scores of this *non-rivalrious* variable indicate less rivalry.

The regional insurance theory presented above complements existing work on leaders motives for contributing to regional security operations and peacekeeping. Bellamy and Williams (2013) highlight political prestige, economic incentives, security spillover, domestic civil-military relations, bureaucratic or policy standpoints, and normative or cultural concerns alongside the less predictable aspect of contemporaneous political contexts as factors that matter to varying degrees for peacekeeper contributing states.[50] Poor states' desires to profit from contributing security personnel is often cited in the literature on coalition building and peacekeeping.[51] This motive is weaker for non-UN missions, where contributing states are seldom reimbursed for their contributions by regional organizations in a timely fashion,

[49]See also Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016). The version of the dataset used in this paper is 2.01.

[50]See also Beswick (2010) on prestige, Uzonyi (2015) on spillover, Passmore, Shannon and Hart (2018) on the role of economic ties with affected states, Bove and Elia (2011) on profit motive, Fisher (2012) on currying favor with donors and creditors, Boutton (2019) on trading troop contributions for foreign aid, and Ward and Dorussen (2016) on solidarity among states with similar foreign policy preferences.

[51]See Williams and Nguyen (2018); Coleman and Nyblade (2018); Henke (2016, 2019) for further discussion.

but yet they are nonetheless quick to pledge personnel in many instances.[52] Given that my sample includes UN as well as non-UN missions, I control for GDP (PPP) to capture the possibility that poor states are contributing more personnel due to the profit motive.[53]

African and MENA states concerned with crisis escalation and security spillovers have certainly had little choice but to increase their contributions overall in the last two decades as Western states withdrew their own peacekeepers from riskier missions and paid soldiers from lower income states to take their places.[54] I control for the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions in a state's co-members to account for the possibility that states surrounded by more missions will be more concerned about spillover and, therefore, more likely to contribute. I use data on UN and non-UN peace operations from the Milinda data set.[55]

International relations scholars find that democracies are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior in general, including security cooperation. Democracies may also be more motivated to contribute to peacekeeping for normative reasons.[56] Accordingly, I control for the contributing state's quality of democracy, as measured by the Polity II score.[57] Because democracies are more likely to cooperate with and fight alongside other democracies, in robustness checks presented in the appendix I control for *Spatial democracy*: the proportion of a state's contiguous neighbors that are democratic. The spatial democracy measure is calculated using binary indicators of whether states meet the basic procedural definitions of democracy.[58]

It seems reasonable that states which are currently fighting their own wars (whether intra- or interstate) will be less able to contribute troops for peacekeeping or security missions in other states. I create the *At war* dummy variable using conflict data from UCDP/PRIO[59], coding a 1 if a state is participating in at least one war either domestically or internationally

[52](Interview, ECOWAS official, Abuja, 30 August 2018)
[53]GDP data measured in constant 2011 PPP comes from the World Bank (World Bank, 2019).
[54]See Williams and Nguyen (2018); Coleman and Nyblade (2018); Henke (2016, 2019).
[55]Jetschke and Schlipphak (2019).
[56]Lebovic (2004)
[57]Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2018)
[58]This variable is created by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) according to their coding of democracy.
[59]Gleditsch et al. (2002); Pettersson and Eck (2018)

in a given year, and 0 otherwise.

Gaibulloev et al. (2015) find that leaders take into account the number of states already contributing to peacekeeping in their neighborhood when deciding whether or not to contribute. They detect a positive spill-in effect for states' willingness to contribute to non-UN peacekeeping, and a conditional negative effect for UN peacekeeping that they attribute to free riding (Gaibulloev et al., 2015). To account for these spatial dynamics, I control for the inverse-distance weighted sum of contributions by other states to co-members for each year.

Finally, African foreign policy practitioners note the heavy influence that France continues to exert over the foreign policies of its former colonies, particularly in West Africa.[60] To capture the possibility that francophone states contribute within their neighborhoods at a disproportionate rate due to side payments from France, I include a French colony dummy in the appendix.

Lundgren (2018) and Kathman and Melin (2017) do draw links between coup risk and leaders' motives to contribute to peacekeeping, arguing respectively that militaries which are compensated by the UN for peacekeeping avoid engaging in acts of insubordination which could jeopardize their UN wages and that UN support eases leaders' guns-versus-butter tradeoff. These links between leaders' contributions to peacekeeping and lower coup risk are different and likely coexist with the causal link I offer for most cases. However, Lundgren (2018) and Kathman and Melin (2017)'s theories do not offer reason to believe that we should see a difference between culpable and non-culpable leaders.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Personnel to co-members	935	0.376	0.485	0	1
Culpable dummy	935	0.247	0.432	0	1
Co-member non-rivalry score	935	1.429	0.073	1.125	1.487
Polity score	914	−1.232	5.869	−10	10
French colony	935	0.367	0.482	0	1
At war	935	0.197	0.398	0	1
GDP (PPP cons. 2011)	917	102.06 b	191.81 b	535.918 m	1.245 t
No. missions in co-members	935	1.839	0.943	0	4
Spatial democracy %	935	0.232	0.230	0	1
Distance-weighted contributions of other states (lag)	935	0.008	0.005	0.001	0.023

4.6 Modeling Contributions to Co-Members

The main model used to test hypotheses 1 and 1a is specified as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \lambda E_{it} * C_{it} + \tau E_{it} + \kappa C_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \gamma T + u_{it}$$

where the dependent variable Y_{it} is a binary variable indicating whether or not state i contributed security personnel to at least one co-member state in year t, α is a constant, $E_{it} * C_{it}$ is the interaction of coup risk and leader culpability, X_{it} is a vector of covariates, T is a linear time trend, and u_{it} is the error term. The coefficients of the interaction term, the other covariates, and the time trend are labeled λ, β and γ respectively. The choice of an interactive explanatory variable reflects the theory that leaders contribute not only because they are currently vulernable, but also because they fear consequences of culpability for massive rights violations.

Because contributions to co-members is a binary variable, I use logistic regression. My

[60]Interview with diplomat in Abuja, Nigeria in August 2018; Interviews with military leaders in Abuja, Nigeria in January, 2020.

data certainly violate the assumption of independence of observations, and there is good reason to believe that temporal autocorrelation is present. Once a country sends troops, those troops are likely to remain deployed for multiple years, impacting the independence of observations over time. The proportion of troops contributed by countries in the Global South, and particularly Africa, for peackeeping operations has also been increasing steadily over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. These tendencies will cause inaccurate measurement of betas and standard errors for regression coefficients. I deal with this in several ways, including adding a linear time trend and country-cluster robust standard errors in the main specifications. I also examine within-country variations using a country fixed effects model. There is, however, greater variation across countries with generally lower or higher coup risk, as most countries don't switch between these types. A number of countries in the sample also have low or zero variance in their rivalries during the time period under observation. To capture cross-country variations I also present the main results with random effects.

The coup risk variable was estimated 3,000 times in 3,000 simulations per country-year, rather than being directly observed annually. Simply averaging the predicted country-year coup risk outputs from the 3,000 simulations would not adequately account for uncertainty introduced through the estimation process. Therefore, I run each model specification 3,000 times using each of the predicted coup risk measures separately. I subsequently average the betas and standard errors of these 3,000 logistic regression outputs. All coefficients are standardized due to variable measurement on different scales.

5 Results

The results presented in Tables 3 broadly support hypothesis 1a. Leaders facing high coup risk who are culpable are more likely to contribute troops or police to regional organization co-member states. There is also evidence of spatial "spill in" effects, as states are more likely to contribute to co-members if other nearby states do, but the main results are largely

Table 3: Logistic Regression Output

	Dependent variable:	
	Personnel to co-members	
	(1)	(2)
Coup risk x Culpable	0.799**	0.636***
	(0.323)	(0.161)
Coup risk	−0.852	−0.651**
	(0.569)	(0.274)
Culpable	0.366	0.269
	(0.308)	(0.207)
Non-Rivalrous	0.468	0.540*
	(0.705)	(0.283)
Polity score	−0.047	0.041
	(0.325)	(0.200)
At war	0.144	0.095
	(0.170)	(0.158)
GDP (PPP)	−0.157	0.031
	(1.610)	(0.353)
Number missions in co-members	0.166	0.222
	(0.491)	(0.254)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.894**	0.834***
	(0.379)	(0.259)
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No
Country fixed effects	Yes	No
Random effects	No	Yes
Observations	934	934
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

unchanged by the spatial term. The substantive effect of the main interaction term is easiest to see in Figure 3. Coup risk is positively related to the likelihood that a country will deploy troops for countries with a culpable leader. However, it is surprising that the effect of coup risk is negative. This could be due to non-linearity in the effect of coup risk. To test this, I alter the original specification to control for coup risk squared. Results presented in Table 4 indicate that there is, in fact, a non-linear effect of coup risk on the likelihood of contributing troops or police to co-members.

The results in Table 4 indicate that the positive relationship between coup risk and personnel contributions increases at higher levels of coup risk. This should be interpretted modestly given that most countries have low to moderate coup risk. Based on the theory's predictions, it is unsurprising that leaders facing low coup risk anticipate less need for club insurance functions, and may be less motivated to deploy troops to co-members.

Interestingly, being a more liberal democracy is not associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to regional security across states in the sample. The results do not indicate that being surrounded by states that are at least nominally democratic, rather than autocracies, is associated with higher likelihood of contributing to regional security. Other variables considered to be relevant, such as a country's income level, are not significant on their own.

The results presented here are consistent with another story: that coup prone states send troops abroad for peacekeeping and other multilateral security operations in order to reduce their ability or inclination to stage coups.[61] While there is evidence that leaders attempt to deploy potential troublemakers,[62] it is not clear why, as the results presented here indicate, this would primarily be a phenomenon among culpable leaders.

[61]Kathman and Melin (2017). Lundgren (2018) finds evidence suggesting this can be successful.

[62]The United States and European Union sometimes veto leaders' attempts to deploy troublemakers. This happened to Obasanjo when he tried to deploy troops who committed a massacre in the South of Nigeria for peacekeeping.

Table 4: Logistic Regression Output

	Dependent variable:	
	Personnel to co-members	
	(1)	(2)
Coup risk^2	1.243**	1.161***
	(0.497)	(0.310)
Coup risk	−1.162	−1.11**
	(0.616)	(0.365)
Culpable	0.329	0.274
	(0.308)	(0.201)
Non-Rivalrous	0.487	0.589**
	(0.687)	(0.280)
Polity score	−0.114	−0.019
	(0.322)	(0.197)
At war	0.195	0.117
	(0.184)	(0.161)
GDP (PPP)	−0.058	−0.009
	(1.699)	(0.342)
Number missions in co-members	0.078	0.209
	(0.544)	(0.256)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.736**	0.721***
	(0.374)	(0.255)
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No
Country fixed effects	Yes	No
Random effects	No	Yes
Observations	934	934
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure 3: Interaction plot



6 Conclusion

Considering the regional dimension of leaders' survival strategies contributes to our understanding of leaders' motives for security cooperation. In particular, this article examined how leaders most vulnerable to irregular turnover deepended their cooperation with their neighbors in the post-Cold War era and positioned themselves as vital providers of regional security to enhance their personal survival prospects. Given that countries from the Global North are generally disinterested in intervening to protect deposed leaders from Africa or the Middle East, leaders invest in generating good will and emphasizing reciprocity with neighbors who are much more likely to be pro-active "first responders" and mediators. Applying club theories of mutual insurance provision to RIOs can help us understand how and when cooperation survives.

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Appendix

A. Results from Coup Risk Model

Table 5: Posterior summaries of coup risk model

Variable	Coup Attempt
GDP growth	−0.0596
	(−0.0603, −0.0588)
Military expenditure	−0.0634
	(−0.0661, −0.0607)
Military dictator	0.5882
	(0.5766, 0.5997)
Coup in last 5 years	1.7046
	(1.6889, 1.7203)
Infant mortality odds	0.0232
	(0.0228, 0.0236)
Population	−0.0
	(−0.0, −0.0)
N	2,199

Estimates are posterior means. 95% Bayesian credibility intervals are presented below estimates.

Table 4 presents the average coefficients on each coup risk predictor across the 3000 simulations. As anticipated, higher income countries are less susceptible to coups. In my

African and Middle Eastern sample, both democracies and military dictatorships are associated with higher coup risk relative to personalist autocracies, autocracies under single parties, and multiparty autocracies. The positive coefficient on democracy contrasts with results in Lindberg and Clark (2008) regarding Africa and Johnson and Thyne (2018)'s global sample but comports with results from Bell (2016). This could be due to the geographic scope or more recent temporal scope of my study. We also see that the strongest predictor of whether a country will experience a coup in any given year is whether that country has had a coup in the previous 10 years.

B. Robustness checks

In the robustness checks presented in Table 5 I demonstrate that the results are not changed by adding a dummy to indicate whether a state was a French colony. The results are also not impacted by controling for the level of democracy in a state's neighbors. Model 5 in Table 5 presents the results of a fixed effects model without any interaction terms between the main explanatory variables, coup risk and culpability.

The results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that the results are robust to usage of an alternative measure of regional rivalry. Instead of the average regional rivalry score (which increased as average rivalry decreased), I use the number of co-member rivals that a country has each year.

Table 6: Logistic Regression Output

	Dependent variable:				
	Personnel to co-members				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup risk x Culpable	0.467*		0.723***	0.862***	
	(0.274)		(0.170)	(0.295)	
Coup risk^2		1.25**			
		(0.520)			
Coup risk	−0.729	−1.15	−0.685**	−0.858*	0.404
	(0.478)	(0.623)	(0.289)	(0.494)	(0.309)
Culpable	0.464**	0.329	−0.685**	−0.858*	0.245
	(0.232)	(0.333)	(0.289)	(0.494)	(0.290)
Non-Rivalrous	0.655***	0.485	0.539*	0.400	0.380
	(0.252)	(0.681)	(0.281)	(0.641)	(0.627)
Polity score	0.224	−0.100	0.081	0.008	−0.123
	(0.192)	(0.346)	(0.196)	(0.335)	(0.350)
At war	−0.166	0.195	0.108	0.172	0.260
	(0.157)	(0.183)	(0.157)	(0.174)	(0.197)
GDP (PPP)	0.279	0.029	0.192	0.129	−0.007
	(0.239)	(1.775)	(0.353)	(1.716)	(1.711)
French colony	0.094	0.541	0.307	0.444	1.255
	(0.212)	(1.617)	(0.395)	(1.509)	(1.437)
Number missions in co-members	0.221	0.023	0.099	0.033	0.012
	(0.201)	(0.545)	(0.261)	(0.549)	(0.545)
Spatial democracy	0.226	0.172	0.182	0.117	0.139
	(0.203)	(0.347)	(0.172)	(0.364)	(0.332)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.621**	0.776*	0.821**	0.885**	0.736**
	(0.284)	(0.402)	(0.257)	(0.395)	(0.352)
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered standard errors	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Random effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	914	914	914	914	914

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Logistic Regression Output

	Dependent variable:				
	Personnel to co-members				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup risk x Culpable	0.786**		0.609***		
	(0.750)				
Coup risk^2		1.194**		1.078***	
		(0.490)		(0.307)	
Coup risk	−0.822	−1.094	−0.587**	−0.991**	0.304
	(0.581)	(0.610)	(0.273)	(0.362)	(0.290)
Culpable	0.338	0.290	0.234	0.227	0.269
	(0.309)	(0.334)	(0.204)	(0.198)	(0.302)
Number of rivals	0.224	0.202	0.395*	0.404*	0.338
	(0.427)	(0.442)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.435)
Polity score	−0.059	−0.120	0.011	−0.047	−0.164
	(0.338)	(0.336)	(0.203)	(0.200)	(0.353)
At war	0.135	0.187	0.076	0.099	0.208
	(0.167)	(0.184)	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.172)
GDP (PPP)	0.051	0.189	0.084	0.047	−0.041
	(1.559)	(1.657)	(0.355)	(0.344)	(1.578)
Number missions in co-members	0.198	0.114	0.194	0.175	0.138
	(0.519)	(0.571)	(0.253)	(0.255)	(0.522)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.847**	0.687*	0.793***	0.680***	0.740*
	(0.405)	(0.397)	(0.257)	(0.254)	(0.379)
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered standard errors	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Random effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	935	914	914	914	914
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Logistic Regression Output: Only Culpable Leaders

	Dependent variable:	
	Personnel to co-members	
	(Country Fixed Effects)	(Random Effects)
Coup risk	1.192**	0.662**
	(0.487)	(0.239)
Non-Rivalrous	−0.902	1.117*
	(1.072)	(0.613)
Polity score	0.019	−0.304
	(0.387)	(0.259)
At war	0.386	−0.098
	(0.303)	(0.249)
GDP (PPP)	−2.190*	0.921*
	(1.059)	(0.548)
French colony	1.545	−0.221
	(1.689)	(0.451)
Number missions in co-members	0.613	−0.115
	(1.017)	(0.331)
Spatial democracy	0.048	0.235
	(0.394)	(0.239)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.815	0.681
	(0.559)	(0.459)
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes
Clustered standard errors	Yes	No
Observations	244	244
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01