The Role of Foreign Aid in Procuring and Sustaining Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping

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This version: February 28, 2021.*

This draft is circulated for discussion at the 2021 PEIO Seminar series.
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*We thank Anna Gray for research assistance.

Abstract: The success of peacekeeping operations relies heavily on genuine and unrestricted consent being given by the conflict parties to the intervention and associated peace process. However, consent is often withheld or limited by one or both parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than continued fighting. Such restrictions challenge the assumption that peacekeeping costs are exogenous, since the conflict parties can determine the presence and operational scope of peacekeeping according to their desire for the operation and expectations of the outcome. We theorize that tangible financial incentives from international third parties can help address the problems that prevent conflict parties from granting unrestricted consent and sustaining that consent throughout the life of the mission. Such incentives, in the form of credible prospects of future aid, help overcome commitment problems and outweigh concerns about sovereignty. Empirical analyses of up to 163 conflicts between 1947–2011 (and a post-Cold War subsample) and development aid commitments show evidence consistent with this argument. The findings have implications for the literature on international influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the prospects of successful peacekeeping operations. Altogether, the study also suggests that incentives based on development-oriented aid can facilitate the type of peacekeeping operations that are most likely to enhance human security.

Introduction

In September 2007, amid widespread armed attacks by rebel groups against civilians in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, MINURCAT, aimed at curbing the violence and strengthening the rule of law. Significant UN resources were directed toward the mission, including an authorized strength of over 6,000 uniformed and civilian personnel, and total estimated expenses amounting to US$1.39 billion (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2019). Yet, after less than three years, the government of Chad indicated its desire for the UN to completely withdraw, which was completed by the end of 2010. From the perspective of the UN and the international community, the mission was considered a failure, where only limited successes were achieved in carrying out the mission's mandate. While the government of Chad had agreed to the mission at the outset, closer analysis indicates that it was never completely on board with the operation and subsequently sought to restrict the capacity of the mission to deliver peace. Specifically, the lack of a clear political process attached to the mission's mandate compromised the likelihood of its success from the beginning, and even led to the initial desire of the Security Council not to deploy the mission at all (Johnstone 2011, 171).

The mission to Chad is just one example of a difficult and common problem faced by the UN and other intergovernmental peacekeeping organizations when seeking to intervene in conflicts: gaining the consent of the warring parties to third-party peacekeeping interventions to oversee and support the implementation of a peace process. Consent to peacekeeping has been identified as critical to mission success, where an absence of consent leads either to no peacekeeping or operations that face significant challenges. Moreover, consent to peacekeeping is an ongoing process rather than just an initial declaration. This creates a dilemma for the peacekeepers, since consent can break down at any point during the operation, whether completely or just partially. Such has been the case in a number of missions, including those in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and Sudan. Losing the consent of the parties, whether fully or par-

tially, may lead to major obstructions to the fulfillment of the mandate, or a demand for complete withdrawal, as occurred in Chad. Such outcomes pose major threats to the UN, where mission objectives are thwarted, peacekeepers are put at risk, and the mission is drawn into a long and expensive deployment with no clear exit strategy (Sebastián and Gorur 2018, 5). Beyond this, the reputation of the UN is challenged, seen as ineffective at addressing global conflicts and humanitarian crises.

Consent to peacekeeping therefore involves two commitment problems. The first exists between the warring parties and reflects the hesitation to agree to any intervention that may be subsequently detrimental to that party. Since peace operations and associated negotiations typically require rebels to lay down arms and demobilize, the government struggles to credibly commit to not violating the process and taking advantage of its position of advantage. Thus, consent from all parties, and particularly rebels, may be difficult to achieve. Other incentives to withhold consent exist, also. In particular, the government may be resistant to outside interference that threatens to restrict its freedom to conduct counterinsurgency operations, or that infringes upon its sovereignty in other ways.

A second commitment problem exists between the conflict parties and the peacekeeping entity itself, and relates to the ongoing nature of consent once the mission has begun. Since consent can be compromised or withdrawn at any moment, the warring parties cannot credibly commit to maintaining ongoing consent of the mission and peace process. This is problematic for the organization, which must make assessments as to the likelihood of cooperation, but cannot guarantee that such cooperation will persist. The organization therefore faces a dilemma as to where peacekeeping missions face the greatest likelihood of success, and therefore where the limited resources of the UN should be devoted in seeking to address conflict.

While prior work has highlighted the importance of consent (Duursma 2020; Yuen 2020), our study focuses on how international third parties can solve the problem of getting conflict parties to provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping operations. Our argument highlights in particular the role of international economic incentives in overcoming crucial hurdles to the provision of

unrestricted consent, an important domestic policy decision involving both the state and non-state actors. Our study of the role of international incentives speaks to broader debates about the primacy of interests, ideas, or institutions, especially in shaping the behavior of state and non-state actors that may otherwise be hard to constrain. Empirically, we analyze up to 163 civil wars in the post-Cold War era. Our findings show that during this period, international incentives in the form of tangible foreign aid made unrestricted consent more likely.

Consent in peacekeeping

The study of peacekeeping has produced a wealth of insights in recent years regarding two issues in particular: first, where peacekeeping is most likely to occur (e.g., Aydin 2010; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Walter 2009; Stojek and Tir 2015), and second, how effective peacekeeping is (e.g., Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2014; Beardsley 2011). Much of this research has, however, focused heavily on the organizational and structural aspects of peacekeeping, treating the creation and implementation of such operations as largely exogenous to the conflict parties themselves. Although various case studies have shed light on how the interaction of peacekeepers and belligerents shapes operational outcomes, we have little systematic understanding of the ways in which conflict parties elicit the deployment of peacekeeping in the first place, and subsequently impact the effectiveness of peacekeepers from day-to-day.

Critical to these outcomes is consent: whether or not (and the extent to which) the conflict parties accept the presence of a peacekeeping intervention and allow it to perform its mandated tasks. Consent from conflict parties is considered a prerequisite for effective peacekeeping, so much so that it has been one of the three pillars of UN peacekeeping since its inception (alongside impartiality and the limited use of force). Since consent to peacekeeping was secured for the first mission, UNEF I in 1956, the UN has reaffirmed its importance in subsequent operations and peacekeeping strategies such as the 1992 Agenda for Peace and the 2000 Brahimi Report. Empirical findings largely support the emphasis placed on consent for successful operations, where some have argued it is the most critical factor (Howard 2008, 10). Fortna (2008) finds that smaller operations

without a mandate to use force but which achieve consent are no less effective at procuring lasting peace than robust enforcement missions. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find that consent-based missions are more effective at creating self-sustaining peace after civil wars than enforcement missions without consent. Yuen (2020) finds further that consent is crucial to enduring peace, but only when it is given fully by the belligerents. The latter finding emphasizes the non-binary nature of consent, whereby it is often not given by all parties to the conflict, or is given but with limitations. Consent has been identified as central to peacekeeping successes in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Conversely, failure to secure consent, and especially robust consent, or a deterioration of consent during an operation, has been cited as a cause of failure in missions such as Chad, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (Johnstone 2011, 168). In recent years, UN peacekeeping has increasingly had to rely on enforcement mandates when consent is not forthcoming or is highly tenuous. However, consent remains a priority for organizations like the UN that provide peacekeeping. According to the UN Department of Peace Operations, "In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict, and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018).

While the peacekeeping literature has largely addressed consent as a feature of the initial deployment of a PKO, we identify the importance of conceiving of consent as a dynamic feature of missions that is often measured in deed rather than word. Successful peacekeeping relies heavily on the cooperation of the combatants throughout its deployment, a breakdown of which can be severely detrimental to the mission.

Initial consent: A commitment problem between belligerents

Consent to peacekeeping may be conceived in two ways: that given at the outset to allow an operation in, and the subsequent approval of, and cooperation with, the mission once it has been established. The former is more easily identified and has been the subject of most existing research

on peacekeeping consent, finding that unrestricted initial consent is key to successful peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Yuen 2020). Initial consent allows the peacekeeping entity, such as the UN, to set up the mission parameters, goals, scope, and size in ways that best match the needs on the ground. Restrictions on consent, in contrast, handicap missions, lowering their chances of success, while withholding consent altogether more than likely leads to no intervention at all.

Securing consent from all parties and without restrictions is often difficult, though, because it can generate political, military, strategic, and other costs for the government and the rebels. This tension typically reflects the perceived power position or expected gains of the conflict parties at the time of negotiating the intervention. Governments in conflict countries must not only relinquish a degree of sovereignty by permitting an outside intervention, but may also be restricted from carrying out counterinsurgency operations as they wish. Furthermore, governments may be concerned that peacekeeping may serve to freeze the current status quo and thereby solidify rebel gains, such as territorial holdings. A government believing it will lose more by allowing a PKO will be reluctant to offer consent, or will negotiate a much less robust mission. Such was the case with Indonesia's conflict with the GAM separatist rebel movement in the Aceh region, where the Indonesian government made clear early on that it had no desire to accept a PKO for fear of losing more of its sovereign territory, as had occurred with the UN's presence in East Timor several years earlier. Consent to a mission was therefore a nonstarter, and the conflict's resolution relied on other third-party mediation mechanisms instead. In the latter instance – giving limited consent to a mission, Chad – serves as an example. Despite the UN's desire to implement a political mission, the Chad government insisted that the rebels were mere "mercenaries" and that there was no political solution at which to arrive. Rather, the government saw the main problem as a humanitarian one, leaving the UN with a mandate limited to protection of civilians as fighting continued between government and rebel forces (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 459). This would later lead to the government withdrawing its consent altogether.

Even if the government can be convinced to assent to a peacekeeping intervention, it will

struggle to convince the rebels that it will not subsequently change strategies to take advantage of the situation. Since peacekeeping interventions - and especially those in the presence of a potential peace agreement - typically require rebels to lay down their arms and demobilize, such rebels will fear that the government will resume combat strategies with its newfound advantage. The rebels will therefore be reticent to consent to peacekeeping. Walter (1997; 2002) identifies this problem, arguing that such a commitment problem can be overcome with sufficient peacekeeping resources to guarantee no resumption of violence. However, the frequent problems associated with peacekeeping, such as insufficient resources or an inability to prevent violence if a peace agreement breaks down, may leave the rebels with little confidence that even robust deployments will protect their interests.

Ongoing consent: A commitment problem between belligerents and peacekeepers

A second aspect of consent to peacekeeping concerns the degree to which it is sustained throughout the life of the mission. Consent may be given initially, but once the mission commences, the parties then decide whether or not to uphold that consent. Two components feeding into this decision are shifting relative power and inaccurate expectations. With shifting relative power, one or both warring parties may see the presence of a PKO as beneficial for its cause. For the government, this may be providing support to and legitimation of the regime against rebel encroachment. For the rebels, it could be offering them a seat at the negotiating table or preventing government assaults on rebel-held communities. Whatever the reason, the presence of the mission will be seen as a way to improve the current position of the respective party. Consent becomes unstable as these relative power positions shift. As Fearon (1995) argues, actors cannot credibly commit to conflict avoidance since a change in their relative power position down the road may alter their perceived payoffs from conflict, and thus reignite fighting. In the case of a peacekeeping mission, a conflict party may gain from the presence of the mission (or due to unrelated circumstances), at which point it will no longer perceive the benefits of the mission's presence and either reduce or completely withdraw its consent for the mission. Moreover, the PKO providers often have little bargaining

power with which to sustain conflict party consent. As one party's relative power position increases in a way that threatens the prospect of peace, any attempts by the peacekeeping organization to challenge the non-cooperation of that actor may incite rejection of the mission altogether. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when Joseph Kabila's presidency was legitimized through the 2006 presidential election, he began to consolidate his power. He thus saw the presence of the UN's MONUC mission as an obstacle to his strategy. However, his increasing control of government and popular support left the UN reluctant to challenge him on counts of increasing use of widespread violence against civilians for fear of being sidelined or pushed out altogether (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 462-463).

A second factor influencing shifting consent is inaccurate expectations held by the parties. They may anticipate the presence of a PKO to be in their favor, only to discover that the mission hampers its strategies or impedes its ability to acquire more relative power. As discussed previously, this occurred in Chad, where the government incorrectly expected MINURCAT to reinforce its sovereign authority and repel opposition violence. Once this understanding of the mission's contribution was rectified, the government became much more hostile to its presence and pushed for its exit in 2010.

Consent should therefore be thought of as a complex and dynamic feature of a peacekeeping intervention. As such, conflict parties can retract consent at any time of their choosing. Moreover, such a retraction does not need to be explicit and total. Rather, the parties have a range of options for withdrawing or reducing consent. Most obvious is an explicit statement that it no longer desires the mission's presence in the conflict. This has occurred in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Eritrea. More common are incremental and implicit retractions of consent through small and repeated obstructions to the mission's completion of its mandate. This might include preventing the movement of supplies, delaying or blocking visas for senior mission personnel, failure to protect peacekeeping personnel and property, or even direct attacks on peacekeepers (Sebastián and Gorur 2018, 23-24). At a higher level, the mission might gradually be excluded from negotiations and limited to an assistance role. In Côte d'Ivoire, as President Laurent Gbagbo became more

skeptical of the interposition of the UN in its civil war, he sought to move it to the sidelines in favor of a domestically-driven peace process. UNOCI's role was subsequently reduced to one of merely providing financial and technical support to the peace process and the elections (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 455).

Conceptualizing consent as this more fluid notion illuminates more accurately the challenges faced by the providers of peacekeeping, which go beyond merely negotiating with the parties in the initial stages. Having the consent of the warring parties is not only a foundational premise of peacekeeping, but is also considered a major predictor of the success of a mission, alongside having the requisite capacity to fulfill the mandate (Langholtz 2010, 32). Lacking such consent therefore risks partial or monumental failure of the mission. Thus, for peacekeeping to be effective and successful, it is vitally important to not only secure consent, but to do so with the knowledge that that consent is likely to be sustained throughout the mission. Yet, since the UN and other peacekeeping organizations have few internal mechanisms to sustain credible consent from the conflict parties, they must find an alternative way to do so or expect to have only a limited impact in civil conflicts at great expense to themselves and their member states.

A breakdown in consent can be severely costly for peacekeeping providers. The increasing demand for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has placed considerable constraints on the UN and other providers of peacekeeping such as the African Union, NATO, and ECOWAS, which regularly struggle to obtain the finances and personnel required for their operations (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). Such organizations, and the UN in particular, are therefore under increasing pressure to use their peacekeeping resources both efficiently and effectively. This pressure has been borne out in peacekeeping deployment decisions. Fortna (2008) reports that of 115 civil wars between 1944 and 1997, only 30 received a UN mission, and only 5 of these occurred before the end of the Cold War (277). The 2015 report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations asserted that "[T]he proliferation of conflict is outpacing our efforts" (2). With limited resources, and facing the critical oversight of the international community, an inability to obtain and maintain consent may threaten the very viability of international peacekeeping.

Foreign aid as an incentive for consent

We argue that certain factors external to the conflict country may serve to overcome the problems associated with gaining and keeping consent to peacekeeping. The international dimension of expected benefits of peace is important to examine: it can help tip the scales in favor of unrestricted consent. This argument aligns with a literature showing how international third parties can credibly address fundamentally domestic collaboration problems (e.g., Matanock 2020; Tir and Karreth 2018). The specific solution highlighted in this study relies on tangible ties between a civil war state and international third parties. We maintain that the such ties will increase the likelihood that the civil war parties will provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions meant to manage and resolve the conflict. Zeroing in on economic resources such as foreign aid or IMF programs, we argue that such ties create a heightened interest in resolving the conflict for both the belligerents (and primarily the state) and international third parties. Past resources provided to the civil war state via such channels constitute investments, but protracted conflict hinders these investments from achieving their goal. International third parties have a vested interest in seeing the conflict resolved so that their projects and development agendas can resume and show positive measurable results (e.g., Gulrajani and Honig 2016; Tir and Karreth 2018). This in turn means that the civil war state's government has a credible reason to believe that resolving the conflict will prompt an influx of further resources. This expectation of future resources incentivizes the government to cooperate with international efforts to resolve the conflict, such as providing unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions on its territory and refraining from obstructing the mission thereafter. Not following the cooperative path would instead create mounting opportunity costs for the government as international development programs and aid are unlikely to resume should the conflict continue (e.g., Balla and Reinhardt 2008).

The expectation of future economic gains can help overcome not only the internal sovereignty costs of unrestricted consent, but also alter the government's very calculus when it comes to fighting the rebels. Ideally, the government may want to score a military victory, vanquishing the rebels

and not having to engage in making compromises that would call for the sharing of power and resources in the country. Yet, the odds of such a scenario actually transpiring are low. Fewer than half of the internal armed conflicts, according to Sullivan and Karreth (2019), end with the government's military victory over insurgents. Governments facing a military insurgency typically face a choice between compromising with the rebels or engaging in a prolonged and costly fight with an uncertain outcome. The expectation of future economic gains derived from international third parties can help tip this calculus toward compromise, especially if such a compromise involves the support of peacekeeping operations. If the expected economic gains are sizeable enough, they can help outweigh the costs of compromising with the rebels. In contrast, rejecting peacekeeping or constraining it substantially would risk foregoing future economic gains from international third parties. The government would face both the costs of continued fighting and opportunity costs of not receiving the economic assistance from international third parties, or considerably less of it. In other words, though compromising with the rebels will be costly for the government, these costs can be outweighed by the expected near-term economic gains from resumed aid and development programs (Carnahan, Gilmore, and Durch 2007).[1]

This incentive structure has implications for the rebel side as well, though of course it is not necessarily tied directly and formally to international third parties. The odds of rebels scoring a military victory against the government are even lower, at one in four cases per Sullivan and Karreth (2019). Additionally, even if a conflict-ending compromise could be struck, the rebels would be particularly vulnerable to the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997; 1999). Peace plans often call for the rebels to disarm or integrate because a country cannot have two competing military forces. This would put the rebels in a dangerous position. Fearing for their safety, they may not want to to pursue a peace plan in the first place. But if the government is subject to incentive-based constraints from international third parties, the rebels can expect that the government has

[1]Note that other studies show such gains to be immediate but potentially also short-lived (Aning and Edu-Afful 2013; Bove and Elia 2017; Beber, Gilligan, Guardado, and Karim 2019). This is consistent with governments pursuing short-term benefits that can be associated with clientelist policies by both governments and rebels, touting peacekeeping-related growth as a function of purposive policies by those in power at the national and local level. Nevertheless, because immediate gains are desirable, international incentives are particularly important to overcome the hurdles for consenting to, and deploying, peacekeeping operations.

self-interested stakes in pursuing peace and not harming the rebels after they disarm; otherwise, the international third party aid and programs would either not materialize or be quickly suspended (Matanock 2020). In addition, rebels can also assume that existing international ties (e.g. through aid) come with stronger international exposure. Such exposure heightens rebels' concerns about their international reputation and recognition, which are known to drive cooperative behavior of rebel groups (Jo 2015; Stanton 2016; Huang 2016; Gleditsch, Hug, Schubiger, and Wucherpfennig 2018; Fazal and Konaev 2019; Stanton 2020).

This conditionality—future resources in exchange for pursuing peace—is critical to the resolution of the credible commitment problem precluding unrestricted consent. Foreign aid and lending programs can serve as a conditional incentive. Rarely do third parties provide all the promised resources at once. Rather, they are disbursed piecemeal over time. There is also the potential for program renewals or broadening further into the future. This piecemeal approach allows not only for the monitoring of how the money is spent and whether various program benchmarks are being met, but also for the remaining promised funds to be withheld should there be backpedaling conflict resolution-wise. Among other outcomes, this threat serves as an incentive to provide unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions.

In scenarios where the government can expect sizeable international assistance post-conflict, the rebels have more of a reason to believe that the the government can credibly commit to peace. Both parties therefore should be willing to accept peacekeepers with broad mandates. Rebel resistance to peace and peacekeepers can be reduced even further if the expected international third party resources can be used in part on rebel areas or on issues important to the rebels. The extent of the expected international third party assistance will be critical in helping tip the scales away from continued fighting and toward a path toward peace that involves providing unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions. Not all civil war countries will therefore be equally incentivized to provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping.

> H1: Conflict parties are more likely to give unrestricted consent to peacekeeping operations in countries exposed to larger volumes of international incentives, compared

to those in countries with fewer or no international incentives in the recent past.

We further argue that such financial incentives will reduce the likelihood that consent will break down as the mission proceeds, as the conflict parties will similarly fear losing access to such resources if they are deemed to be non-compliant with the mission. We therefore expect that the financial incentives play a role beyond the initial procurement of consent to help sustain it thereafter.

> H2: Obstruction of a peacekeeping operation will be lower in countries exposed to larger volumes of international incentives, compared to those in countries with fewer or no international incentives in the recent past.

We are still in the process of gathering data for testing Hypothesis 2. The below analyses relate only to Hypothesis 1 at this time.

Empirical analyses of consent

The following sections present evidence on consent, based on analyzing data on ceasefires in civil conflicts that have lasted at least one month. The data were initially collected by Fortna (2008) and updated by Yuen (2020).

Research design

Outcome Our hypothesis focuses on conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation. We use data by Fortna to define the sample of cases for our analysis. Fortna (2008) identifies the following sources of peacekeeping: the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or NATO, and ad-hoc missions led by a global or regional power. Yuen (2020) identifies whether restrictions were placed on consent to such an operation, such as limiting the tasks, geographic access, or deployment size of the operation. If conflict parties imposed no such restrictions, and if all conflict parties consented to the operation, we refer to this as unrestricted consent. Conflict parties gave unrestricted consent in roughly one out of four cases (42

out of 163 in our analyses data). In alternative analyses, we use more nuanced, ordinal measures of consent, where unrestricted consent is the highest level of consent, restricted and partial consent are intermediate categories, and no consent is the lowest category.

Unit of analysis and time period We analyze internal armed conflicts, as defined in Fortna (2008) and updated by Yuen (2020). Like Fortna and Yuen, we analyze conflicts after they reached ceasefires that lasted at least one month. Fortna's sample stretches from 1947 to 2011. We also consider the subset of conflicts between 1990 to 2011 in separate estimates because the frequency and nature of peacekeeeping changed after 1990 (e.g., Malone and Wermester 2000) and much current empirical work on peacekeeping has focused on the post-Cold War period. Among peacekeeping missions, those led by the United Nations under Chapter VII, Article 42, are distinct in that they may not *require* consent. However, Chapter VII missions typically seek consent, and usually receive it in some format. The Chapter VII authorization gives the UN the option to switch to enforcement if necessary, such as when consent breaks down. Our analyses therefore separate between two samples: one without Chapter VII missions (because it can be argued that they do not require consent) and one with these missions and an indicator for them (because they typically do seek consent).

Operationalizing international incentives

Our argument suggests that conflict parties are more likely to grant unrestricted consent in countries exposed to larger volumes of international incentives. As proxy for these incentives, we rely on measures of engagement with bilateral and multilateral donors. Economic aid from donors can be a crucial resource especially in post-conflict recoveries (Girod 2012; 2015; Findley 2018; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009). To "induce" (Matanock 2020, 366) conflict parties toward consent, incentives must be credible, sizeable, and accessible to all conflict parties. To match these conditions, we rely on immediate past foreign aid to conflict countries. Countries that have already received assistance have established channels with donors that can serve as conduits for

future aid. Existing aid can also have reached different parts of the country and different levels of government, making it more likely that actors beyond the central government can benefit from it. Donors can also leverage incentives if they have established delivery mechanisms, rather than having to promise to set up such channels upon the target pursuing a desired policy (such as providing unrestricted consent). Having established connections also allows for a faster disbursement of resources—a factor that is important to the conflict parties and that renders future resources more concrete and tangible. Both helps overcome the hesitation against PKOs that are rooted in commitment problems and concerns about internal sovereignty (for the government) and safety (for the rebels).

International incentives in the form of aid can only overcome the problems associated with consent and deployment of PKOs if donors can make these incentives conditional on the "desired behavior". In the context of peacekeeping operations, shirking from the "desired behavior" would imply refusal to provide unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation or to otherwise set up roadblocks for an available PKO. The term "conditions" here does not suggest that specific aid programs or related resources explicitly feature a demand for unrestricted consent. However, donors' preferences toward peace and stability have been clearly shown (Campbell and Spilker 2020). Operational rules and program design usually prevent aid programs from continuing in fragile conditions. While PKOs provide some degree of stability, *rejecting* a PKO or otherwise hindering it also endangers the continuation of existing aid programs. In sum, established aid channels are a feasible proxy for incentives that international actors can provide to conflict parties with the goal of inducing actions that will stabilize the post-conflict country.

We rely on past aid as a proxy for incentives that foreign actors can credibly and quickly use toward conflict parties. Our measure focuses on the time period before the ceasefire. This time choice is a compromise: it captures aid that is promised or disbursed before the ceasefire, and therefore is not endogenous to, and thus a rewards for, the ceasefire itself. On the other hand, because donors often reduce or suspend aid during violent conflict, this measure may underestimate the amount of engagement by foreign actors in a country—and thus underestimate the incentives they

may leverage toward conflict parties' support of a PKO. Improving upon more general measures that capture primarily the *potential* for future benefits (for instance existing connections to international organizations that administer such benefits (e.g., Tir and Karreth 2018; Karreth 2018)), this study relies on the volume of *existing* (i.e., "real") benefits as a proxy for credible incentives. These aid measures capture international "investment" (not in narrow sense of FDI) in the conflict country. Some of these benefits have already been disbursed, some are committed and thus should be disbursed. Both connect to our argument about tangible incentives to consent and to avoid obstructing robust PKOs.

Official development aid also differs from other potential international influences such as trade or FDI in that it can directly reach central or local governments. Trade and FDI may also take longer to generate revenue for governments, making the tangible incentives look more uncertain and remote. From a cynical perspective, it is easier for governments to siphon off aid, which in turn makes governments more susceptible to aid as an incentive. The same can be applied to rebels, especially when they have, or legitimate prospects of gaining, control over territory and local bureaucracies. Aid is also *comparatively* more likely than private profit-oriented capital to target areas of need such as rebel-controlled territories, which tend to be more geographically remote and may have suffered (infrastructure) damage during the war.

To capture these dynamics, we measure foreign aid *commitments*, based on AidData (Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Roberts, Findley, Powers, Parks, Wilson, and Hicks 2011; AidData 2017). As alternative measures for robustness tests (available from the authors), we rely on data from the OECD covering OECD/DAC donors (OECD 2020) on actual flows of aid-related capital: total foreign aid from OECD/DAC donors (OECD 2020), total official aid flows (OECD 2020), and use of IMF credit (World Bank 2021).

Our argument suggests that more exposure to larger incentives will influence the behavior of conflict parties. We operationalize "more" and "larger" by capturing the raw volume of prior aid-related commitments, and by accounting for the size of a country's economy by including the (logged) raw GDP of that country as a control variable. The latter also serves to account for the fact

that not all countries can be equally incentivized, and that aid may matter more to some countries than others.

Control variables for regression adjustment

Conflict parties likely have several other reasons to consent to a PKO, or refuse to do so. Donors may also allocate aid strategically and engage more in countries that they perceive more likely to return to peace quickly. Our quantitative estimates of the role of incentives address both of these points by using a number of variables accounting for the characteristics of the conflict, of the conflict country, and its relations with powerful states. Detailed information on these variables can be found in the supporting information.

Outright victory for one party may lead to a more durable peace since one side dominates the post-war environment (Fortna 2008). Alternately, the procurement of a treaty may indicate a willingness to pursue peace based on information about the continued costs of fighting. Both victory and treaty indicators are taken from Yuen (2020) and are compared to the baseline category of truces, where fighting has stopped but there is no clear path towards a durable settlement. Peacekeeping studies find that missions are generally sent where neither side has won an outright victory and, counterintuitively, where no treaty has been achieved (Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003).

Because our argument is about economic incentives, we keep the wealth of the conflict country constant by including GDP per capita as a control variable. This avoids scenarios where wealth-related factors may drive conflict parties' behavior toward PKOs. For analyses where international incentives are measured in raw volume, we also include the size of the economy as a control variable. Both measures are taken from World Bank (2015); Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Graham and Tucker (2019).

From a demand perspective, higher losses may evoke greater desire from the combatants to pursue peace and thus invite peacekeepers in. From the supply side, research systematically finds that peacekeeping missions are sent where violence has incurred greater costs. We therefore use

conflict intensity as a measure of the total civilian and battlefield casualties occurring in the conflict (Fortna 2008; Yuen 2020).

Longer conflicts may reflect their intractable nature, or may alternately indicate a greater desire among participants to seek a permanent resolution. Yuen (2020) finds an inconclusive relationship between conflict duration and consent, while peacekeeping is generally more likely to be deployed when a conflict has raged for longer (Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). We include duration, a measure of the length of the conflict in days as a proportion of an entire year (Yuen 2020).

A more lopsided balance of forces in the form of a larger government military will likely make rebel actors more reluctant to lay down arms and the government less open to outside interference, reducing the likelihood of consent to peacekeeping. Extant studies find that PKOs are less likely to send missions to such countries (Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015). Government army size is the natural log of the number of military personnel in the conflict state, taken from Yuen (2020) and coded from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities data (2010) and also from SIPRI (2009).

A larger number of groups involved not only reduces the likelihood of consent being given by all, but also indicates more parties to be placated and a higher likelihood of returning to violence. Peacekeeping organizations may therefore be more reluctant to intervene. We include two variables to account for the parties to the conflict. Factions is a dichotomous measure taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000), where 0 reflects two parties and 1 reflects three or more. Major power is a binary indicator of the presence of a major third party state in the civil war (Yuen 2020). Such a presence might deter peacekeeping operations.

States with more democratic institutions may be more open to external involvement and provide more channels bolstering consent. Our analyses include the median polity IV score during the three years prior to the ceasefire (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Lastly, to account for potential strategic interests of major powers, we follow Yuen (2020) and include ideal point measures relative to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).

Statistical method

We analyze the relationship between international incentives and the granting of unrestricted consent using logistic regression. Because of the small number of cases, we turn to Bayesian estimation (Albert and Chib 1993; Karreth 2018) and use student-t priors (mean 0, standard deviation 2.5, 5 degrees of freedom) following Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, and Su (2008). These priors insert a small amount of information that pulls the estimates toward 0, i.e. they represent a more conservative approach than using uninformative priors or frequentist regression modeling. The results in this paper summarize posterior distributions of logit coefficients.[2] We also estimated all specifications below without control variables and obtain similar findings for the variables capturing international incentives. In the results below, all of the numerical measures of international incentives are standardized within the sample so that a one-unit increase in the standardized measure corresponds to an increase of two standard deviations on the original scale (Gelman 2008).

Results

Across the board, the data suggest that conflict parties in countries with exposure to more international incentives provided unrestricted consent at considerably higher rates. This pattern obtains for both time periods we use, 1947-2011 and 1990-2011. As a rough estimate across measures, a country that had received two more standard deviations of foreign aid commitments before the ceasefire was about 40–50% more likely to grant unrestricted consent. The associations are also robust if Chapter VII missions are included or excluded from the sample. Examples of conflict parties granting unrestricted consent at high exposure to international incentives include two missions in Indonesia (related to East Timor) in 1999 and 2006 (over two standard deviations above the mean across most aid measures) and (South) Sudan in 2011 (over one standard deviation above the mean across most aid measures). As four in five cases did *not* grant consent, examples consis-

[2] All posterior distributions are based on four parallel chains with 1,000 iterations each (after discarding 1,000 initial warm-up iterations), obtained by using `rstanarm` (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, and Brilleman 2020). Convergence diagnostics suggest no divergent chains. We evaluate posterior distributions by printing the 90% highest posterior density interval and noting whether that interval includes zero or not.

tent with our argument are plentiful; these are cases with little or no ties to previous international incentives, i.e. that received little or no aid. Instead, we briefly discuss cases that do not fit our theory: countries that were exposed to considerable incentives, yet did not grant unrestricted consent. Focusing on the raw volume of aid suggests Russia (Chechnya 1996), India (various conflicts in the 1990s), and Turkey (in the Kurdish areas in the 1990s) as cases where the leverage derived from recent aid did not convert to unrestricted consent. These countries all have major strategic interests and powerful militaries, possibly increasing concerns about sovereignty. Our control variables (especially GDP, GDP per capita, UNGA ideal point distance, government army size) measure these other influences well. This results in relatively accurate predictions of *no* unrestricted consent with the estimated probability of unrestricted consent below 0.2 in each of these cases. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with a narrative that previous exposure to international incentives in the form of aid and loans boosts the willingness of conflict parties to consent to peacekeeping missions. Established channels enhance the credibility of international promises to support the economic recovery of the conflict country during and after a PKO. Such support can translate into material gains for the conflict parties themselves, thus serving as a credible incentive to overcome commitment and other problems that might block consent.

Measuring consent on a more granular, ordinal scale returns similar results. Here, we distinguish between full consent, restricted consent (where conflict parties put restrictions on the PKO), partial consent (where not all parties gave full consent to the PKO), and no consent. Tables A2, A3, A4, and A5 all suggest that regardless of how we group the middle categories between no and full consent, countries that had received higher volumes of foreign aid before the ceasefire were more likely to see a higher level of consent.

We are still in the process of gathering data for testing Hypothesis 2 on the breakdown of consent and obstruction of peacekeeping missions

Table 1: Determinants of unrestricted consent, with consent measured as binary variable (unrestricted consent (1), restricted, partial, or no consent (0)). Cell entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns represent four different samples.

	1947-2011, w/ Ch7	1947-2011, no Ch7	1990-2011, w/ Ch7	1990-2011, no Ch7
Foreign aid	1.67*	1.88*	1.89*	2.45*
	[0.64; 2.61]	[0.56; 3.22]	[0.80; 3.04]	[0.85; 3.88]
GDP	−0.28	−0.57	−0.42	−1.03*
	[−0.74; 0.20]	[−1.15; 0.01]	[−0.96; 0.12]	[−1.79; −0.27]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.14	0.08	0.34	0.50
	[−0.41; 0.74]	[−0.61; 0.75]	[−0.28; 1.06]	[−0.33; 1.43]
Victory	−0.91	−1.26	−0.28	−0.81
	[−2.18; 0.21]	[−2.60; 0.09]	[−1.65; 1.08]	[−2.58; 0.80]
Settlement	0.63	0.49	0.31	−0.08
	[−0.35; 1.54]	[−0.60; 1.59]	[−0.72; 1.35]	[−1.32; 1.12]
Total war deaths	−0.17	−0.14	−0.08	0.02
	[−0.40; 0.05]	[−0.41; 0.13]	[−0.33; 0.17]	[−0.30; 0.33]
Gov't army size	−0.80*	−0.74*	−1.03*	−0.90*
	[−1.22; −0.36]	[−1.24; −0.28]	[−1.63; −0.51]	[−1.61; −0.29]
More than 2 factions	−0.11	0.02	0.21	0.43
	[−1.07; 0.79]	[−0.98; 1.02]	[−0.82; 1.27]	[−0.72; 1.68]
Neighbor intervened	0.63	0.73	0.02	−0.05
	[−0.25; 1.56]	[−0.26; 1.81]	[−0.96; 1.03]	[−1.44; 1.17]
War duration	0.08*	0.11*	0.10*	0.14*
	[0.03; 0.15]	[0.04; 0.18]	[0.03; 0.16]	[0.05; 0.22]
Major power involved in war	−0.10	−0.31	−0.09	−0.25
	[−1.00; 0.79]	[−1.36; 0.77]	[−1.16; 0.92]	[−1.49; 0.95]
Democracy	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.12
	[−0.07; 0.09]	[−0.04; 0.14]	[−0.04; 0.15]	[−0.00; 0.24]
Distance to closest P5 member	0.92	0.78	1.41	1.24
	[−0.32; 2.24]	[−0.75; 2.28]	[−0.12; 2.89]	[−0.44; 3.18]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.60	−0.69	−0.78	−0.91
	[−1.43; 0.19]	[−1.79; 0.30]	[−1.78; 0.25]	[−2.25; 0.50]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.87	−1.19	−1.14	−0.83
	[−7.16; 2.38]	[−5.89; 3.28]	[−6.83; 3.47]	[−6.23; 4.25]
Chapter VII mission	0.93*		1.03*	
	[0.00; 1.86]		[0.06; 2.08]	
Intercept	9.83*	16.47*	11.90*	23.42*
	[1.40; 17.36]	[6.13; 26.91]	[2.91; 21.32]	[10.36; 37.08]
Observations	163	134	119	91

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Addressing potential threats to Inference

The analyses above show a robust and sizeable correlation between what we term international incentives (foreign aid before the end of a conflict) and a key outcome for post-conflict societies: conflict parties' consent to peacekeeping operations. This is consistent with our argument that the prospect of further aid and support after the end of a conflict incentivizes conflict parties to clear the way for peacekeeping operations. To assess this evidence, we briefly discuss potential alternative explanations for this finding and why they are unlikely.

Aid and PKOs all go to "easier" cases. This view suggests that higher aid indicates an "easier" case, where donors are more likely to be active and the conditions for conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations are more favorable. In this scenario, aid is endogenous to other international support (such as peacekeeping) but not a driver of any behavior that facilitates peacekeeping.

Our analyses suggest that this is unlikely. We use several control variables to account for "easier" and "harder" cases: whether there was a settlement, the number of war deaths, the number of factions, the duration of the war, and whether neighbors or major powers were involved in the war. All these variables cover the features commonly associated with "hard" cases. The estimate of the correlation between international incentives and consent/PKOs should therefore be free from bias related to easier or harder cases. Other potential approaches to reducing or eliminating this bias are not available given the data structure at the conflict/operation level. We cannot rely on within-country differences in aid (using a fixed effects approach) because our outcomes of interest do not vary within cases. In addition, within-country changes in aid could well be related to other factors indicating easier or harder cases—and we already account for such known factors already. Lastly, common instrumental variables for foreign aid (such as countries' current or future temporary membership on the UN Security Council) are also clearly related to our outcomes of interest. The best alternative, and the approach we choose, is therefore to account for all known characteristics that might distinguish harder from easier cases.

Aid is a proxy for major power interests. A common theme in the aid literature is that donors give foreign aid for strategic purposes (Alesina and Dollar 2000). If this is universally the case, our findings might imply that countries receiving more aid are strategically more important to donors. Conflict parties are then more likely to consent to a PKO, knowing that the odds for a PKO are favorable; contributing countries are then also more likely to send a robust mission, knowing that powerful countries are supporting it.

Our analyses aim to address this possibility as well and, as a result, we do not believe that our findings simply represent stronger influence of strategic donors. First, we again control for indicators that would capture such major power interest: whether a major power intervened during the war, and the ideal point distance to the closest and farthest member of the UN Security Council, as well as variation in ideal points between UNSC members. Prior intervention by a major power is a strong indicator for major power interest. Close ideal points to a P5 member also measures such interest.

In additional analyses (not reported here), we also directly measured strategic interest of major powers using trade volume with the rest of the world, with the P5 members, and with the P5 members plus Germany and Japan. None of these variables exhibited a clear relationship with consent or robust PKOs.

Lastly, we point to research suggesting that major power dominance in aid allocation, especially in fragile contexts, may be less prominent in the post-Cold War era (Bermeo 2017; Bearce and Tirone 2010). Because our results are consistent across the full post-World War II and post-Cold War eras, that finding strengthens our confidence that major power behavior is not driving these results.

Aid targets issues unrelated to conflict. A more fundamental concern might be that aid is allocated based on concerns about development or other issues, and unrelated to conflict. If so, it would be hard to see why conflict parties might respond differently to the prospect of a PKO in a country that receives more or less aid.

Several points may address this. First, our argument and evidence do not suggest direct conditionality whereby donors send aid "only if conflict parties consent to a PKO". Instead, we build on prior work that emphasizes that the realistic prospect of aid and support can function as an incentive if it is clear that ending a conflict (and facilitating a PKO) will create conditions for further international engagement and the resulting benefits (Karreth and Tir 2013; Tir and Karreth 2018; Matanock 2020). Second, from other work (Balla and Reinhardt 2008; Campbell and Spilker 2020) and from practitioners' perspectives it is clear that donors do hesitate to engage in fragile areas. This is well known to governments and insurgents alike. Therefore, past aid is a meaningful indicator for the likelihood of future donor engagement—but the engagement itself and its benefits are considerably more likely if PKOs are established (see, e.g., Beber et al. 2019).

Conclusion

Seeking successful outcomes in peacekeeping while using resources efficiently has become increasingly important for peacekeeping in recent years as both demand for those resources and scrutiny of peacekeeping have grown. Despite being a perennial problem for PKOs, lacking or weak consent from the conflict parties has been given little consideration in broader conversations about the efficacy of peacekeeping. How the UN and other peacekeeping providers can overcome this problem is of paramount importance to the venture and may even surpass other characteristics of the mission such as how many peacekeepers are deployed, where they come from, and what functions they perform. We argue and find evidence that consent was more likely to be given to peacekeeping where the conflict parties are more exposed to incentives from international third parties. We measure these incentives as the prior commitments of foreign aid to a conflict country.

Unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation means that a government cedes some internal sovereignty to the PKO. Similarly, rebels give up some protection by surrendering or limiting their use of arms. Giving this consent is a difficult policy decision with stark consequences. Our study shows that international third parties can facilitate this decision through material incentives. This finding adds to a literature on international actors facilitating and enforcing domestic policies by

aligning domestic actors' interests (e.g., Matanock 2020).

Our study suggests that peacekeeping providers and governments and IGOs pursuing conflict resolution should continue to rely strategically on existing incentive structures. Such strategies must be carefully designed so as to not push the conflict parties, and particularly the potential host government, away from peacekeepers. In some instances, the perceived costs of peacekeeping to the conflict parties will outweigh the expected gains from international third parties' aid and subsequent economic benefits. Alternately, leaders may be unresponsive to those incentives and instead see the interference of from PKOs and donors as a threat to their legitimacy and autonomy, effectively breaking off those relationships and dissolving whatever leverage they had over the conflict parties. Future academic and policy research should therefore consider how third-party based incentives during negotiations among these various actors can most effectively nudge preferences to agree to stabilizing peacekeeping measures.

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Supporting Information

This supplementary document contains:

- Summary statistics for the data used in the analyses in the main text
- Alternative analyses of consent, based on ordinal consent measures

Summary statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics for analyses of unrestricted consent. Note: Economic variables displayed in original values (and in million USD, unless transformed); analyses use standardized values (original values divided by two standard deviations). Economic variables and democracy scores are measured in the year before the ceasefire that makes conflicts eligible for peacekeeping operations.

Variable	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	Observations	Source
Unrestricted consent to PKO	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.0	190	Yuen (2020)
Foreign aid commitments from all donors (AidData)	1065.6	251.0	2352.5	0.0	14600.2	201	AidData
GDP (logged)	23.3	23.2	1.8	19.4	28.2	189	WDI & PWT
GDP per capita (logged)	7.0	7.0	1.1	4.8	10.4	189	WDI & PWT
Victory	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)
Settlement	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)
Total war deaths	10.4	10.5	2.2	6.2	14.9	204	Yuen (2020)
Gov't army size	4.4	4.2	1.5	0.0	8.3	204	Yuen (2020)
More than 2 factions	0.6	1.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)
Neighbor intervened	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)
War duration	7.1	4.0	7.7	0.0	35.0	206	Yuen (2020)
Major power involved in war	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)
Democracy	-0.8	-1.0	5.7	-10.0	10.0	201	Polity
Distance to closest P5 member	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.0	1.8	205	Yuen (2020)
Distance to farthest P5 member	3.2	3.2	0.6	1.8	4.4	205	Yuen (2020)
Coef of Var on ideal points	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	204	Yuen (2020)
Chapter VII mission	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.0	206	Yuen (2020)

Alternative analyses of consent

Table A2: Determinants of consent, with consent measured as ordinal variable (full (3), restricted (2), partial (1), none (0)). Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns represent four different samples.

	1947-2011, w/ Ch7	1947-2011, no Ch7	1990-2011, w/ Ch7	1990-2011, no Ch7
Foreign aid	0.77*	0.76	1.18*	1.65*
	(0.45)	(0.60)	(0.50)	(0.71)
GDP	−0.30	−0.38	−0.57*	−0.90*
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.33)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.45*	0.31	0.81*	0.83*
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.39)
Victory	−0.82*	−1.14*	−0.71	−1.41*
	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.77)
Settlement	0.54	0.48	0.10	−0.23
	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.59)
Total war deaths	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.17
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Gov't army size	−0.48*	−0.50*	−0.62*	−0.68*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.27)
More than 2 factions	0.01	−0.05	0.33	0.40
	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.56)
Neighbor intervened	0.70*	0.72*	0.35	0.27
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.54)
War duration	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Major power involved in war	0.13	−0.18	0.25	−0.23
	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.59)
Democracy	−0.00	0.02	0.04	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Distance to closest P5 member	0.43	0.22	1.30	1.31
	(0.62)	(0.71)	(0.80)	(1.01)
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.40	−0.56	−0.20	−0.39
	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.59)
Coef of Var on ideal points	−8.80*	−6.58	−14.34	−10.97
	(4.00)	(4.33)	(9.02)	(10.75)
Chapter VII mission	1.25*		1.51*	
	(0.43)		(0.49)	
AIC	370.17	283.29	297.40	210.07
BIC	428.95	335.45	350.20	255.27
Log Likelihood	−166.09	−123.65	−129.70	−87.04
Deviance	332.17	247.29	259.40	174.07
Num. obs.	163	134	119	91

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% confidence interval.

Table A3: Determinants of consent, with consent measured as ordinal variable (full (2), restricted or partial (1), none (0)). Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns represent four different samples.

	1947-2011, w/ Ch7	1947-2011, no Ch7	1990-2011, w/ Ch7	1990-2011, no Ch7
Foreign aid	0.79*	0.78	1.26*	1.72*
	(0.46)	(0.60)	(0.52)	(0.73)
GDP	−0.34	−0.39	−0.66*	−0.95*
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.34)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.41	0.28	0.84*	0.84*
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.40)
Victory	−0.68	−1.00*	−0.54	−1.25
	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.78)
Settlement	0.47	0.52	−0.04	−0.23
	(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.60)
Total war deaths	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.20
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Gov't army size	−0.48*	−0.50*	−0.65*	−0.71*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.28)
More than 2 factions	−0.02	−0.09	0.28	0.34
	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.56)
Neighbor intervened	0.64	0.65	0.29	0.19
	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.55)
War duration	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Major power involved in war	0.13	−0.17	0.17	−0.30
	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.60)
Democracy	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Distance to closest P5 member	0.41	0.18	1.29	1.27
	(0.63)	(0.71)	(0.83)	(1.03)
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.38	−0.55	−0.18	−0.41
	(0.34)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.59)
Coef of Var on ideal points	−8.29*	−6.51	−12.66	−9.63
	(4.06)	(4.37)	(9.30)	(10.89)
Chapter VII mission	1.51*		1.80*	
	(0.45)		(0.52)	
AIC	303.88	245.80	238.98	181.61
BIC	359.56	295.06	289.00	224.29
Log Likelihood	−133.94	−105.90	−101.49	−73.81
Deviance	267.88	211.80	202.98	147.61
Num. obs.	163	134	119	91

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% confidence interval.

Table A4: Determinants of consent, with consent measured as ordinal variable (full (2), partial (1), restricted or none (0)). Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns represent four different samples.

	1947-2011, w/ Ch7	1947-2011, no Ch7	1990-2011, w/ Ch7	1990-2011, no Ch7
Foreign aid	0.81*	1.05*	1.29*	2.75*
	(0.49)	(0.64)	(0.60)	(1.00)
GDP	−0.33	−0.44	−0.66*	−1.11*
	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.44)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.14	−0.01	0.63*	0.50
	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Victory	0.03	−0.16	0.20	−0.41
	(0.55)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.96)
Settlement	0.42	0.61	−0.14	−0.32
	(0.50)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.75)
Total war deaths	−0.02	0.00	0.05	0.11
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Gov't army size	−0.37*	−0.42*	−0.63*	−1.09*
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.45)
More than 2 factions	−0.15	−0.22	0.26	0.17
	(0.47)	(0.51)	(0.57)	(0.71)
Neighbor intervened	0.39	0.35	−0.07	−0.72
	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.78)
War duration	0.04	0.05	0.08*	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Major power involved in war	0.21	0.00	0.23	−0.24
	(0.44)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.74)
Democracy	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Distance to closest P5 member	0.29	0.14	1.23	2.52*
	(0.66)	(0.78)	(0.90)	(1.38)
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.25	−0.57	0.00	−1.04
	(0.38)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.88)
Coef of Var on ideal points	−4.35	−3.60	−10.94	−20.27
	(4.42)	(5.05)	(10.56)	(14.86)
Chapter VII mission	1.37*		1.71*	
	(0.46)		(0.55)	
AIC	279.91	203.14	217.25	137.01
BIC	335.60	252.40	267.27	179.70
Log Likelihood	−121.96	−84.57	−90.62	−51.51
Deviance	243.91	169.14	181.25	103.01
Num. obs.	163	134	119	91

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% confidence interval.

Table A5: Determinants of consent, with consent measured as ordinal variable (full (2), restricted (1), partial or none (0)). Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns represent four different samples.

	1947-2011, w/ Ch7	1947-2011, no Ch7	1990-2011, w/ Ch7	1990-2011, no Ch7
Foreign aid	1.18*	1.29*	1.34*	1.62*
	(0.48)	(0.62)	(0.53)	(0.70)
GDP	−0.26	−0.47*	−0.37	−0.79*
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.32)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.43	0.42	0.56*	0.72*
	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.39)
Victory	−1.23*	−1.74*	−1.10	−1.66*
	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.67)	(0.84)
Settlement	0.60	0.33	0.20	−0.24
	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.60)
Total war deaths	−0.06	0.00	0.00	0.12
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Gov't army size	−0.64*	−0.63*	−0.74*	−0.65*
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.27)
More than 2 factions	0.06	0.19	0.21	0.43
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.55)
Neighbor intervened	0.69	0.79	0.28	0.29
	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.56)
War duration	0.04	0.05*	0.04	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Major power involved in war	−0.02	−0.28	0.15	−0.16
	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.59)
Democracy	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Distance to closest P5 member	0.91	0.73	1.67*	1.34
	(0.70)	(0.79)	(0.85)	(1.01)
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.59	−0.56	−0.53	−0.40
	(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.59)
Coef of Var on ideal points	−11.07*	−8.41*	−18.15*	−12.30
	(4.79)	(5.09)	(9.49)	(10.78)
Chapter VII mission	0.80*		1.08*	
	(0.48)		(0.51)	
AIC	279.23	218.47	242.86	182.53
BIC	334.92	267.73	292.89	225.22
Log Likelihood	−121.62	−92.23	−103.43	−74.27
Deviance	243.23	184.47	206.86	148.53
Num. obs.	163	134	119	91

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% confidence interval.