Reconsidering Bureaucratic Capacity and Treaty Compliance

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February 7, 2021

Abstract

Why do some states comply with international commitments while others flout them? In this paper, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: domestic bureaucratic structure. I argue that when a state provides policymaking authority to bureaucracies whose interests do not coincide with an international agreement, those bureaucracies can undermine the state's compliance. I examine this theory through a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is "tied" to the purchase of donor-state products and services—a practice that is popular among certain special interests but known to decrease the effectiveness of foreign aid. Using cross-national evidence from a newly coded bureaucracy-level aid dataset, I find variation in states' and bureaucracies' foreign aid tying practices following the 2001 agreement. Non-development-oriented bureaucracies such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply than traditional development bureaucracies. This was especially pronounced in states with many distinct agencies carrying out foreign aid policy, while states with streamlined foreign aid bureaucracies were more likely to comply. I argue that forum shopping by interest groups incentivized bureaucracies with domestic ties to continue tying aid contracts to benefit those interests.

*The author owes special thanks to Sarah Bermeo, Daniela Donno, Desha Girod, Alice Iannantuoni, Helen Milner, Bernhard Reinsberg, Aaron Shreve, Kendall Snyder, Jen Tobin, and Joe Wright.

1 Introduction

Recent attacks on international institutions have led some to question their efficacy in guiding state behavior. Many institutions, in such diverse issue areas as the environment, human rights, trade, and security, provide little in the way of monitoring and enforcement. Yet many states expend resources and effort complying with apparently toothless international agreements. Just as puzzling, many states *fail* to comply with international agreements that they joined voluntarily. Scholars have long found that domestic institutions play a role in state compliance (Von Stein 2016; Cole 2015; Simmons 2009). Consolidated democracies, where "the judiciary, media, and political parties are free to operate independent of the executive," are significantly more likely to adhere to their international commitments due to those strong domestic institutions (Hathaway 2005, page 520). While it is clear that strong institutions make democracies more compliant than non-democracies, previous work has stopped short of explaining much variation *between* developed democracies with strong institutional capacity. To what extent can we credit domestic institutions for enforcing international law? Is it only large-scale institutional differences—such as regime type—that matter, or can smaller-scale differences also play a role?

In this paper, I consider the role of an often-ignored institution: the bureaucracy. I argue that variation in states' bureaucratic structures shapes the ability of even the most consolidated democracies to comply with international agreements. Specifically, I consider the centralization of the bureaucracy. In contrast to states with centralized bureaucratic control, some states disperse policy control among a broad variety of domestic actors. Such states are less likely to adhere to international commitments. Many agreements are neither agreed to nor carried out by national leaders (Simmons 2010), but are instead the realm of bureaucrats. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that considers compliance with international agreements at the domestic bureaucratic level.

I argue that the presence of multiple, specialized bureaucracies within a state provides an opportunity for domestic actors to insulate certain bureaucracies from pro-compliance interests. International agreements create a positive shock in the resolve of domestic interests that staked their reputations on those agreements. However, the more insulated the bureaucracy is from those domestic interests, the less likely the state will be to comply with the agreement. The less centralized the bureaucracy, the easier it is for anti-compliance interests to insulate some bureaucracies from pro-compliance interests and state leaders, decrease overall compliance.

I test this theory, from two separate angles, using new data from a 2001 OECD foreign aid agreement. In 2001, 25 countries within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed to restrict the practice of aid "tying," a practice in which donors require that foreign aid funds be spent on donor-state products and services. Aid tying can be useful in domestic politics, as it provides an opportunity to offer side payments to domestic constituencies (Easterly and Pfutze 2008). However, it decreases the effectiveness of foreign aid by up to 15-30% (Radelet 2006). Aid tying therefore tends to be popular among economic interest groups but unpopular within the aid community. In a 2001 "High-Level Meeting," DAC members agreed to discontinue aid tying to the least-developed countries (LDCs), beginning in 2002. As promised, aid tying to LDCs plummeted from nearly 13% of all aid in 2001 to 5% by 2004. However, after a few years of success, rates of aid tying began to creep up, once again hitting 16% worldwide by 2010. Why did states back down from their promises to untie aid after only a few years of compliance? And why did they bother initially complying at all?

I answer these questions by employing a novel dataset matching records from OECD meeting minutes to a novel coding of agency-level aid spending data. I find that the increase in aid tying following the 2001 agreement was disproportionately driven by non-development foreign aid bureaucracies. Development-oriented bureaucracies, whose leaders were present at the meeting, continued to decrease their rates of aid tying well into the 21st century. In contrast, bureaucracies with domestic agendas, such as departments of agriculture, labor ministries, and interior departments, slowly gained a larger share of the foreign aid budget and increased their rates of tied aid to make up the difference. Although the sub-state actors who agreed to the 2001 compact did not break their promises, other sub-state actors were empowered to violate the agreement instead.

This bureaucratic variation led to systematic variation in compliance at the state level. A state's pattern of aid tying following the 2001 commitment depends upon the structure of its foreign aid bureaucracy. Countries with few bureaucracies, usually with development mandates, continued to comply with the agreement. However, states with many non-development-oriented foreign aid bureaucracies were less likely to comply. The global increase in aid tying after 2004 is driven almost entirely by non-development foreign aid agencies in states with a fragmented bureaucracy.

This phenomenon is almost certainly not unique to foreign aid. Many international agreements rely on voluntary compliance, and many policy domains are split between competing interests and bureaucracies. For example, trade agreements is often relevant to many unique regulatory agencies, which are tasked to ensure that environmental, labor, health, and other standards are in compliance with the agreement. Environmental treaties often rely upon technocrats and politicians in many parts of the government, whose expertise and interests may not align (Alcañiz 2016). Soft-law international agreements tend to rely heavily on domestic enforcement (Hathaway 2005), and therefore may provide incentives for domestic spoilers to take policy in their own hands.

This work speaks to a long literature on compliance with international agreements. Many scholars before me have noted the clear effects of legislative, judiciary, and bureaucratic institutions on states' compliance with international commitments of all types.[1] Scholars of international organizations have long debated whether compliance is driven by state capac-

[1] Much of this work falls in the realm of human rights agreements, due to the difficulty of enforcing them through reciprocity and other transnational mechanisms (see Conrad and Ritter 2019; Cole 2015; Lupu 2015; Conrad 2014; Neumayer 2013; Simmons 2009; Powell and Staton 2009; Vreeland 2008; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Landman 2005; Neumayer 2005; Moravcsik 2000). However, scholars have also noted the role of domestic institutions in financial, trade, environmental, and other types of agreements (e.g. Honig and Weaver 2019; Fjelstul and Carrubba 2018; Karreth and Tir 2018; Rickard 2010; Leeds et al. 2009; Hathaway 2005; Leeds 2003; Simmons 2000; Chayes and Chayes 1993).

ity (Chayes and Chayes 1993) or strategy (Downs et al. 1996). However, little work has attempted to distinguish between states with similar levels of capacity, such as established democracies with strong judicial systems and well functioning bureaucracies. I find that even internally stable states can vary in their capacity to adhere to international commitments, due to differences in their bureaucratic structure.

This work also contributes to the more general literature on bureaucratic politics in foreign policy. Much of this literature begins with a single-country perspective and attempts to explain the causes and effects of bureaucratic infighting and policy choices (e.g. Allison 1969; Zegart 1999). More generalized work on foreign policy bureaucracies has considered the role of delegation constraints (Arel-Bundock et al. 2015), ability to exercise judgment (Honig 2018), and bureaucratic mission (Allison 1969). Much of this work highlights the role of development-oriented foreign policy bureaucracies, such as foreign ministries, defense departments, and foreign aid bureaus. However, globalization has witnessed a recent expansion of foreign policy roles into non-development foreign policy bureaucracies, such as labor, health, and finance ministries. The impact of these non-development agencies remains unclear, and this paper begins to uncover variation between aid agencies within the state.

In the following sections, I first describe the case that I will be using to test the theory, a non-binding 2001 aid-tying agreement. I describe the importance of tied aid and the reasoning behind an international agreement to curtail the practice. Next, I explain the theory in depth and draw two hypotheses regarding bureaucratic structure and compliance with international agreements. I describe the data and methods that I am using to test these hypotheses and, finally, I present the statistical results. I find evidence that bureaucracies differ in their adherence to international commitments, which in turn shapes state compliance. I conclude with a consideration of the external validity and limitations of this work and areas for future research and policy.

2 The 2001 DAC Recommendation to Untie Aid

Throughout this paper, I focus on a 2001 agreement among members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. This case is a useful venue to study the question of bureaucratic-level compliance for two reasons. First, the OECD agreement is not binding and required no ratification or enforcement. It is therefore a classic example of so-called soft international law (Abbott and Snidal 2000), and states' compliance with the agreement is even more puzzling given its laxity. Much of the existing work on domestic institutions has considered the puzzle of non-binding international law due to the puzzling nature of state compliance (Hathaway 2005). When the international community is not able to create strong sanctions, states must rely on less concrete motivations, such as reciprocity and reputation, to ensure compliance. Testing the theory on a form of soft law allows for a hard test of the impact of international institutions.

A second advantage of using the DAC case is the availability of bureaucracy-level data. While multiple domestic actors play a role in many areas of foreign policy,[2] foreign aid policy is one of the easiest to measure precisely. Unlike other policy types, foreign aid data provides a clear delineation of the activities of bureaucracies themselves and a more satisfying test of the theoretical mechanisms. Below, I describe the case in further detail and provide an initial glimpse of the data.

Aid-tying is important to policymakers due to its perceived wastefulness and trade distortions (see, e.g. Radelet 2006, Jepma 1991). Economists estimate that at least 15-30% of aid money is lost to aid tying (Clay et al. 2008).[3] Aside from the development implications, tied aid is also important in its role as a non-tariff trade barrier (La Chimia and Arrowsmith 2009). The decrease of trade barriers following the implementation of the GATT/WTO led many countries to new, creative means of protecting their domestic industries. One common

[2] See, for example, work by Stanescu et al. (2020) on trade bureaucracies, Zegart (1999) on intelligence agencies, and Tan (2017) on Chinese agencies' responses to the WTO.

[3] Although economists have carried out large-scale studies of the effects of tied aid, little systemic work has been done on the effects of *un-tying* aid. For a recent exception, see Ganga and Girod (nd).

solution was to "tie" foreign aid by requiring that aid dollars be spent on donor-state products and services (Hall 2011). As the practice of aid tying became increasingly prevalent throughout the 1960s and 70s, governments began complaining about trade distortions that arose from the practice. In 1991, the OECD negotiated the Helsinki Disciplines, a "gentlemen's agreement" prohibiting tied aid for the wealthiest recipients, beginning an incremental process of untying by states (OECD 1991). However, aid tying continued to distort trade and, more concerning to many aid advocates, decrease the effectiveness of foreign aid.

In 1998, the DAC mandated the creation of a set of recommendations for untying aid. Finally, in 2001, the OECD DAC held an annual "High-Level Meeting," which included the heads of major development bureaucracies in each state. The group jointly decided on an unprecedented plan to untie nearly all foreign aid to least-developed countries beginning in 2002.[4] Implementation was voluntary, but leaders, and especially development professionals, faced social pressure to adhere to their commitments.

DAC participants tend to vary in their levels of compliance. The DAC is a working group within the OECD that comprises representatives from several industrialized states and is dedicated to maintaining global cooperation among major foreign aid donors. It is usually chaired by a member of the aid community, usually appointed by the United States.[5] DAC member states have discretion in choosing their own representatives. Most states do not choose members of the aid community but rather send career diplomats who are concurrently working as representatives in other OECD committees.[6] DAC High-Level Meetings occur annually and involve the heads of aid agencies from the member states. The 2001 agreement was negotiated at a senior-level meeting, which included DAC representatives as well as representatives from various other agencies.

[4]The original mandate required that states "untie their ODA to the countries and territories covered by the Recommendation to the greatest extent possible" (page 2). The full agreement text is available at `https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/140/140.en.pdf`.

[5]The DAC Chairman in 2001 was the first non-American chair, but like all chairs, he was approved and chosen by the head of USAID.

[6]In 2001, the only states that sent dedicated DAC representatives from the aid community were the US, Australia, and Canada (Kammerer 2016).

As promised, aid tying to LDCs decreased following the 2001 agreement. Figure 1 shows the extent of the initial decrease. Just as clear, however, is the relatively short duration of that drop. Within a decade, aggregate tied aid was back to its pre-2001 levels. Although donor states initially complied with the agreement, their behavior quickly reverted.



Figure 1: Mean percentage of tied aid to LDCs by major donors. Note the decreases in aid tying following the 1991 Helsinki Disciplines and the 1998 and 2001 OECD DAC agreements. Aid tying decreased after the agreements, but compliance began drifting within a few years, as is evident from the return to higher levels of aid tying. Source: AidData.

Why did states begin tying their aid again so quickly after the 2001 agreement? A closer look at the data provides a clue. Instead of aggregating all DAC members, Figure 2 provides separate trend lines for two types of states. The red line tracks aid tying for states with only a single foreign aid bureuacracy, and the blue line tracks the trend for states with more than one bureaucracy. The aid tying trajectories of these two groups begin to differ around 2006.

At this point, states with bureaucracies that are authorized to deliver foreign aid but not responsible for development mandates increased their aid tying. States with only a single development-oriented bureaucracy kept aid tying at low levels throughout the post-2001 time period.



Figure 2: Disaggregated LDC aid tying percentages for states containing one versus many foreign aid bureaucracies. States with only a single aid agency, the red line, kept LDC aid tying to a minimal amount well after the 2001. In contrast, states with many agencies increased their aid tying in the second half of the decade.

How do we know that this is due to bureaucracies, and not states or leaders themselves? Figure 3 provides a better understanding of the mechanisms at play by disaggregating the data to the bureaucracy level. Not all bureaucracies responded identically to the 2001 agreement. Agencies that served as their state's primary aid delivery agency decreased their aid tying and kept it at low levels.[7] In contrast, other agencies, whose mandates often include diverse policies such as defense, agriculture, environment, and health, did not maintain low levels of aid tying. Instead, these agencies appear to be responsible for the increase in tied aid in the years following the 2001 agreement.



Figure 3: Mean percentage of LDC tied aid by major DAC donors' bureaucracies, disaggregated by agency type. Agencies coded as their state's primary aid delivery agency decreased their tied aid following the 1998 and 2001 agreements and remained at low levels, while other agencies' tied aid levels crept up through the late 2000s. Source: Self-coding of AidData.

The overall increase in aid tying in the late 2000s can be largely attributed to states increasingly allocating more funding to their non-primary foreign aid agencies, which con-

[7] States' primary aid delivery agencies differ by state. Some states have agencies whose primary purpose is to deliver development aid; other states primarily send foreign aid through their foreign minstries. See the Appendix for a coding of each state's primary agency.

tinued to tie aid at pre-2001 rates. A deeper dive into this case requires more sophisticated data analysis. The analyses in this paper focus on state and bureaucracy behavior following the 2001 tied aid agreement. But first, I provide a more detailed theory of the bureaucratic processes at work.

3 Theory

States, and the bureaucracies within them, vary in their adherence to international commitments. In order to understand this variation, I first explore the micro-mechanisms of compliance at the individual and bureaucratic level. I then move up to the state level, determining how the make-up of a state's bureaucracy affects state behavior. In short, a state's compliance with international agreements depends upon its bureaucratic structure. When just a few bureaucracies have more control over policy, states will adhere to agreements in support of national goals. This is because the domestic interests that benefit from the goals being realized are able to exert control over those few bureaucracies. However, as the number of bureaucracies controlling a policy increases, states will become less responsive to international agreements. This is because the domestic interests opposed to compliance will be able to insulate some bureaucracies from the influence of pro-compliance interests. A fragmented bureaucratic structure provides more openings for societal actors who oppose the terms of an international agreement. The less centralized the bureaucracy, the more difficult it will be pro-compliance actors to enforce compliance.

While this theory is generalizable to many policy domains, I develop it below with a focus on foreign aid. I suggest that an increase in the number of agencies empowered to carry out foreign aid policy dilutes the influence of pro-compliance interests, decreasing their ability to enforce compliance. In the following sections, I develop this theory from the bottom up: I begin by considering bureaucracy-level incentives to adhere to international commitments, and then I move upward to the state level. First, however, I summarize the theoretical mechanisms below.

Figure 4: Summary of theoretical mechanisms for states with a single aid agency. Domestic interests (the development and business communities) disagree on the optimal level of aid tying. They lobby the government and, through direct employment and social/professional ties, the bureaucracy. After an aid-tying agreement, the *relative resolve* of the development community increases, which decreases the resulting level of tied aid.



An overview of the theoretical mechanisms is depicted in Figure 4. First, competing domestic constituencies lobby the government for their preferred foreign aid policy. One area in which the two competing interests clash the most is in aid tying. What the development community prefers—aid untying—the business community disfavors. This oppositional lobbying by the two groups leads to some preferred level of tied aid for the government. The government then delegates aid authority to the bureaucracy, requesting a preferred level of tying.

Crucially, the government is not the only entity interacting with the bureaucracy. Both the development community and the business community directly lobby the bureaucracy as well. This can be done through bureaucrats themselves (bureaucrats may be a part of either the development or the business community), or indirectly through personal and professional relationships.[8] In the example from Figure 4, these constituencies' preferences both have sway within the bureaucracy.

When the state enters into a tied aid agreement, the relative pull of the constituencies change, at least on the topic of aid tying. The development community becomes relatively *more resolved* to lobby both the government and bureaucracy to untie aid. In contrast, the motivation of the business community is not affected by the aid-tying agreement. Therefore, in the case of a single bureaucracy, as in Figure 4, aid tying will decrease after the aid agreement is reached. Again, this change is due to the increased resolve of the aid community.

Figure 5: Summary of theoretical mechanisms in states with multiple aid bureaucracies. In this case, the development community and business community focus their lobbying efforts on specific bureaucracies, thus insulating the bureaucracies from opposing interests. As the development community's resolve increases, more business-community lobbyists will begin to focus their attentions on their preferred bureaucracies. The specialization insulates business-oriented bureaucracies from influence from the development community.



This situation changes when the government delegates to more than one bureaucracy. Figure 5 depicts this change. In this case, the domestic interests both lobby the government as before. And as in the previous case, an aid-tying agreement creates a positive shock in the

[8] Bureaucratic motivations are laid out in greater detail in the next section.

development community's resolve. However, the existence of multiple bureaucracies allows business interests to *insulate* a portion of the bureaucracy. Rather than attempt to compete directly with the more-resolved development community, the business community can focus its personnel and direct lobbying efforts on a second bureaucracy. Specifically, the business community can shift its lobbying efforts to domestically oriented agencies with traditional ties to business actors. Although the development community is more resolved to decrease aid tying, this resolve will only affect half of the bureaucracy, and therefore, half of overall government policy.

As the two competing interests lobby their bureaucratic partners, bureaucracies will part ways in their aid practices. Development-oriented bureaucracies—those with ties to the development community—will untie their aid in accordance with the development community's preferences. In contrast, bureaucracies with ties to commercial domestic constituencies will be insulated from pro-aid interests. If anything, in fact, they will increase their aid tying, as more of the business community focuses its efforts on those bureaucracies.

When specialized bureaucracies exist within a state, the relative resolve of the aid community will not matter. The aid community has few ties and little ability to lobby bureaucracies that are not development-oriented. The effects of the aid tying agreement will be weaker as a major mechanism of compliance is diluted.

3.1 Bureaucratic Incentives: Costs and Benefits of Compliance

Treaty compliance begins with a cost-benefit analysis (Keohane 1984). This is no less true at the sub-state level. As political science and international law scholars have noted, domestic institutions are powerful factors in enforcing soft international law. Hathaway (2005) suggests that a strong rule of law or powerful court system can enforce compliance even if state leaders prefer not to comply. I argue that this is true of bureaucratic actors as well.

Domestic actors vary in their willingness to pay the costs necessary to adhere to international commitments. In the decision to tie foreign aid, actors face a familiar trade-off: they must balance the international reputation costs of violating an agreement against pressure from domestic interests (Simmons 2000). Many domestic interest groups benefit from aid tying, especially the ones winning aid contracts that are tied to domestic products and services. Failing to tie aid, therefore, is costly for domestic actors dependent on those transactions. For example, untying food aid may be detrimental to farmers who are accustomed to selling their crops to the government as a source of aid. In turn, governmental actors with strong ties to the agricultural industry might averse to untying food aid. Suzuki (2020) provides an illuminating case from the health sector, in which more independent development-oriented bureaucracies were more willing to break with the pharmaceutical industry in their foreign aid decisions.

On the other hand, the practice of aid tying creates its own costs. First, it decreases the effectiveness of foreign aid. Second, breaking an international agreement to untie aid makes a state seem less trustworthy on a global level. This can be harmful to sub-state actors who value reputation. However, a state's "reputation" is not a monolith. Reputation costs are most important to domestic actors with a stake in the policy in question (Downs and Jones 2002)—in this case, international development. Tying aid in defiance of an international agreement, therefore, creates disproportionate reputation costs for sub-state actors who traditionally work in the field of foreign aid and development.

Crucially, the domestic bureaucracies paying the *costs* of treaty compliance are often not the same ones who reap the *benefits*. In aid tying, the actors benefiting from compliance are often bureaucrats working in aid agencies, whose professional reputations require a commitment to development and international cooperation.[9] Additionally, these bureaucrats are the most likely to be present at the international meetings where aid agreements are ironed out, and elites are uncomfortable agreeing to commitments they have no intention of honoring (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).[10] Finally, aid bureaucrats are often either selected or socialized

[9] As in many fields, the professional reputation for aid bureaucrats can be driven by the "private, public, or semi-public sectors" (Alcañiz 2016, page 8). Bureaucracy is not the final career trajectory for every bureaucrat, and aid bureaucrats with a strong reputation have many career options within the aid community.

[10] An alternative explanation is also consistent with the theory. The actors present at a treaty's signing are

to believe in the norms of global development (Honig and Weaver 2019), leading them to support practices that maximize those goals. In fact, bureaucrats' concern for compliance may even be so strong that they will not enter an agreement to begin with if they doubt their state's ability to comply (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).[11]

In contrast, bureaucrats in traditionally domestic agencies, such as agricultural, labor, and transportation ministries, may be more concerned about the costs—to domestic industries—of complying with an aid-tying agreement. For example, agricultural ministries often serve a supporting role to a country's agricultural industry. They create foreign aid programs that directly help the industry, such as in-kind food aid that allows agricultural interests to sell off excess food stock (Ahmed et al. 2016). Similarly, trade bureaus tend to favor foreign aid that also boosts trade (Lankester 2013). If donors begin banning aid tying, the industries that rely on these domestic subsidies will suffer, as will the bureaucracies that support those industries. At the very least, the career incentives, socialization, and knowledge base of those who work in domestic-oriented agencies do not as directly reflect the goal of international development. Additionally, bureaucrats from non-development agencies are less likely to have been present during the treaty negotiation. Therefore, the leaders of domestic-oriented agencies are less likely to respond to an international aid-tying agreement.

All this suggests that agencies serving as their state's primary aid-delivery tool should be more likely to adhere to an aid tying agreement than other types of bureaucracies, which often have domestic agendas.

Hypothesis 1: A state's primary aid agency will decrease aid-tying following an international agreement more than other bureaucracies.

almost certainly more likely to have had input in the agreement itself. Some literature suggests that states only sign on to agreements that they would have pursued anyway (e.g. Downs et al. 1996, Mearsheimer 1994). That should also be true at the bureaucratic level. Bureaucracies who were present at a treaty's signing were more likely to have agreed with that treaty in the first place. However, this is not necessarily true of bureaucrats who were not present at the negotiation stage.

[11] Another intriguing idea is that bureaucrats with an interest in compliance will be likely to enter into an agreement in order to tie the hands of competing bureaucracies. The bureaucratic-level determinants of entering into an agreement are worth considering in future research.

3.2 Bureaucratic Structure and State Behavior

How do these bureaucratic incentives aggregate to state behavior? As outlined above, the answer lies in the structure of states' foreign aid bureaucracies. Aid donors vary greatly in the number and function of bureaucracies to which they allocate foreign aid authority. Some donor states empower just one or two agencies, which specialize in foreign aid delivery. Others delegate aid authority broadly, providing many distinct bureaucracies, with many distinct interests, with a piece of the aid budget. When a state's foreign aid authority is mainly concentrated within a small number of bureaucracies with development mandates, states should be more successful in untying aid after an international agreement. In contrast, states with many different bureaucracies carrying out foreign aid provide ample opportunity for societal actors to insert themselves into the policy process. This provides the second hypothesis I will be testing, this one measured at the state level.

Hypothesis 2: States with few foreign aid bureaucracies should decrease their use of tied aid following an international agreement more than states with many aid bureaucracies.

Note that the theory is agnostic about the *determinants* of bureaucratic structure. It is possible that leaders purposefully fragment their own bureaucracies in order to allow more points of entry for special interests. Such behavior would be consistent with my theory: regardless of the reasons for bureaucratic structure, I expect that it should play a role in state behavior.

These two hypotheses—one at the country level and one at the bureaucracy level—require two levels of data. However, in each hypothesis the dependent variable is the same: the country's or agency's change in aid-tying behavior following the 2001 OECD framework. Together, patterns of between-country and within-country variation provide insight into the process of a state's compliance with international agreements.

4 Data and Methods

I test the hypotheses on statistical models that include all states involved in the 2001 DAC High-Level Meeting. The dependent variable in all tests is the percentage of aid to LDCs that is tied. To determine the states and the agencies involved in negotiations, I tracked down meeting minutes from OECD archives and recorded the names and affiliations of participants (OECD 2001). Twenty-five states were present at the negotiations of the agreement, with a total of 34 domestic bureaucracies sending representatives. The 25 states involved in the agreement make up my sample.

The country-level hypotheses require a count of foreign aid agencies in a given country-year.[12] I developed this variable using AidData, which reports agency-level expenditures for every donor state (Tierney et al. 2011). The number of agencies varies from 1 to 22. Spain had the largest mean number of agencies in this time period, at 14.97, while Romania had the smallest, just one. Figure 6 reports the mean number of agencies throughout the time period for each donor state in the dataset.

The number of agencies is not normally distributed: there are many more country-years with small numbers of agencies and a few very large ones. For the purposes of the analysis, I calculated the natural log of the number of agencies. This is because I expect an increase in the number of aid agencies to have a much larger impact at small numbers than at large ones. Moving from one aid agency to two makes a large difference in the ability of special interests to forum-shop. However, moving form 21 agencies to 22 should not have as strong of an impact. The logged number of agencies allows me to study differences in states without assuming linear trends.[13]

[12] Additional tests, reported in the Appendix, also require a count of agencies that were absent from the 2001 negotiations as well as agency types.

[13] In the Appendix, I replicate the results using several other measures, including the raw number of aid agencies.



Figure 6: Mean number of aid agencies reporting in AidData, by donor country.

I then disaggregated the same dataset to the bureaucracy-year level. For each foreign aid bureaucracy, I coded whether or not its representatives were present at negotiations for the 2001 agreement, according to the archived minutes. I also coded bureaucracy "types," noted each state's primary aid delivery agency, and calculated bureaucracy-year budget data. Bureaucracy-level controls included the percentage of a bureaucracy's foreign aid funding that was delivered to least-developed countries (LDCs) in a given year, a dummy for whether or not the bureaucracy sent a representative to the OECD meetings, the total agency aid budget in a given year, and state-level economic controls such as GDP and GDP per capita. Because foreign aid practices have often been linked to ideology and other political factors (see, e.g. Greene and Licht 2018; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Milner and Tingley 2010; Tingley 2010), I include legislative controls. These include a measure of legislative ideology (coded -1 if liberal, 0 if centrist, and 1 if conservative); a dummy variable for presidential institutions, government and opposition vote-shares; and dummies for both legislative and executive election years. These variables are drawn from Cruz et al. (2018). Finally, following Dietrich (2016), I include a dummy for liberal market economies (LMEs), where it is typical for the government to rely more on markets for economic decisions.

At the state level of analysis, I included the same economic and political controls, including a measure of the state's total foreign aid budget. I also included a measure of the percentage of a state's foreign aid that is sent to LDCs, because the 2001 agreement was only relevant for LDC aid. I also control for conventional measures of bureaucratic effectiveness used in the IO literature (e.g. Cole 2015). This measure is drawn from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ((ICRG) 2013). The variables of interest in the analysis, including the control variables, are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of the independent and control variables in state-level and bureaucracy-level models.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Bureaucracy-Level Variables							
Development Agency	2,166	0.29	0.45	0	0	1	1
Aid Budget (bil USD)	2,166	0.26	0.55	0.0000	0.01	0.30	8.20
Attended Meetings	2,166	0.36	0.48	0	0	1	1
State-Level Variables							
Log. Num. of Agencies	695	0.79	0.75	0.00	0.00	1.39	2.89
Post-2001	695	0.34	0.47	0	0	1	1
GDP (bil USD)	668	1.52	2.58	0.04	0.26	1.60	15.57
GDP/cap (100,000)	668	0.40	0.16	0.12	0.30	0.47	1.12
Aid Budget (bil USD)	695	3.94	8.09	0.0002	0.37	3.13	73.65
Pct. To LDCs	668	0.22	0.18	0.00	0.08	0.32	1.00
Conservatism	655	0.05	0.95	−1.00	−1.00	1.00	1.00
Pres. System	668	0.06	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Gov. Vote-share	643	35.79	9.71	11.10	28.44	43.18	55.54
Opp. Vote-share	642	28.54	11.02	2.70	21.90	35.72	57.10
Leg. Election	668	0.30	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Exec. Election	668	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Liberal Market Econ.	695	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
Bur. Effectiveness	537	3.80	0.43	1.83	4.00	4.00	4.00

4.1 Statistical Models

Because I am investigating the impact of a discrete event, I employ an interaction model. All empirical tests use ordinary least squares regression clustering standard errors at the year level. The estimating equations for each hypothesis are below.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that some bureaucracies (those that traditionally deliver foreign aid) will respond to a treatment (the 2001 agreement) differently from other bureaucracies (those with traditionally domestic agendas). This is a standard set-up for a difference-in-differences approach. I therefore model the interaction between the treatment (presence at the 2001 negotiations) and the time of treatment. Essentially, I am measuring the difference between pre-treatment and post-treatment differences in the treatment and control groups.

The estimating equations are below. The dependent variable of interest is $Tied.Aid_{b,t}$, a measure of the percentage of LDC aid tied by a given bureaucracy (b) in a given year (t). The coefficient of interest is β_3, which represents the post-2001 change in aid tying for bureaucracies that serve as a state's primary aid delivery vehicle. I expect it to be negative: traditional aid agencies should be less likely to tie their aid following 2001. In contrast, I expect agencies that do *not* serve as their state's primary aid agency, represented by β_2, to either maintain or increase their levels of tied aid to make up for the decrease as business groups specialize. The model includes fixed effects for year and bureaucracy, as well as bureaucracy and country-level controls in some models.

$$\begin{aligned} Tied.Aid_{b,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Development_b + \beta_2 Post - 2001_t \\ + \beta_3 Development_b * Post - 2001_t + \beta_3 Controls_{b,t} + Year_t + Bureaucracy_b + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

The second set of models tests the country-level hypothesis, that states' compliance with the 2001 agreement should depend on the structure of their foreign aid bureaucracy. Rather than splitting countries into two groups as a classic difference-in-difference model would do, I model the interaction between a discrete event (the 2001 agreement) and a numeric variable (the logged number of a state's foreign aid bureaucracies). I expect that an increase in the number of bureaucracies will decrease a country's compliance with the agreement.

The estimating equation is below. Once again, the dependent variable of interest is the percentage of LDC aid that is tied for a given country (i) in a given year (t). The coefficients of greatest interest are β_2 and β_3. The first, β_2, represents the post-2001 change in aid tying for states with only a single foreign aid bureaucracy.[14] I expect this coefficient to be negative: states with a streamlined foreign aid bureaucracy should be likely to decrease aid tying after the agreement.[15] β_3 represents changes in the post-2001 change in aid tying as a state's number of bureaucracies increases. I expect that to be positive: as the aid bureaucracy becomes more complex, interests that benefit from aid tying have more opportunities to insert themselves in the policy process.

$$Tied.Aid_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Log(Number.of.Agencies)_i + \beta_2 Post - 2001_t$$
$$+ \beta_3 Log(Number.of.Agencies)_i * Post - 2001_t + \beta_4 Controls_{i,t} + Year_t + Country_i + \epsilon$$

The state-level models include fixed effects for the state and year, along with country-year-varying economic controls. I also control for a common measure of bureaucratic effectiveness, which previous literature has often used to predict state compliance. This ensures that the structure, rather than the overall quality, of the bureaucracy is the important factor.[16]

[14] Recall that the natural log of 1 is 0. The coefficient on β_2 represents the relationship between the agreement and aid tying in states for whom log(number of agencies) = 0. Therefore, it represents states with only one aid agency.

[15] In the Appendix, I test other measures of bureaucratic structure, including a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of aid funding, the percentage of foreign aid that is delivered through traditional development channels and the raw number of aid agencies. The results are robust to all measures.

[16] In the Appendix, I restrict the sample to ensure that other global changes in 2001 are not driving results.

5 Empirical Findings

As a whole, the empirical findings align with the hypothesized trends. Bureaucratic infrastructure matters, and it largely matters because of differences between bureaucracies themselves. This is true regardless of many other factors that may be important in determining foreign aid practices. As I did in the theory section, I begin by explaining the bureaucracy-level outcomes and then move on to the state-level models.

5.1 Bureaucracy-Level Outcomes

Table 2 displays the statistical results from the bureaucracy-level models. As expected, development-oriented bureaucracies were more likely to untie foreign aid following the 2001 agreement. First, Model 1 shows the coefficients without the interaction term. The high standard error on *Post-2001* indicates that the 2001 aid tying agreement did not have much overall effect on foreign aid bureaucracies. The other models, however, show differing trends between different types of bureaucracies.

Models 2-5 consistently show that bureaucracies that served as their state's primary aid agency decreased their rate of aid tying following the 2001 commitment. This is even true controlling for attendance at negotiations: regardless of their presence at the 2001 OECD meeting, development bureaucracies complied with the agreement. This suggests that some inherent trait of the bureaucracies themselves is driving this relationship. In contrast, other types of bureaucracies were, if anything, *more* likely to tie their aid after 2001; however, those results are not robust to all models.

A few control variables stand out with interesting, albeit inconclusive, results. The only control variables that are robust to all models have to do with budget size. Smaller agencies—those with lower foreign aid budgets—tend to tie a higher percentage of their aid. This fits this theory, suggesting the bureaucracies whose primary agenda is foreign aid are *less* likely to tie it. In contrast, countries with higher foreign aid budgets tend to tie a

Table 2: Results from OLS regressions with standard errors clustered on the year. Sample includes bureaucracies in all states present at DAC meetings. The coefficient of interest is the interaction between a bureaucracy's development orientation and post-2001. A negative coefficient suggests that development bureaucracies decreased their aid tying after the 2001 agreement. Not all bureaucracies did so.

	Dependent variable: Percent LDC Aid Tied				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Primary Agency	−0.02	0.07***	0.07***	0.02	0.19*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Post-2001	0.01	0.06	−0.03	0.44***	0.60***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Primary		−0.20***	−0.12***	−0.09***	−0.07***
x Post-2001		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
GDP (tril USD)			−0.04***	0.01	0.004
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP/cap (100,000)			−84.19	−1,042.01***	−1,226.22***
			(75.25)	(255.66)	(280.65)
Agency Aid Budget			−0.03**	−0.03***	−0.09***
(bil USD)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Donor Aid Budget			0.06**	0.04	0.06**
(bil USD)			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Attended Meetings			−0.002	0.08***	–
			(0.02)	(0.02)	–
Conservatism			−0.003	−0.03**	−0.03**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pres. System			0.30***	–	–
			(0.10)	–	–
Gov. Vote-share			0.002**	−0.002	−0.004**
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Opp. Vote-share			0.001	−0.0004	−0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Leg. Election			0.04	0.04*	0.04*
			(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Exec. Election			−0.02	−0.05	−0.04
			(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Lib. Market Econ.			−0.07***	–	–
			(0.01)	–	–
Constant	0.20***	0.17***	0.19**	0.59***	0.55***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Fixed Effects			Type	Donor, Type, Year	Agency, Year
Observations	2,166	2,166	1,850	1,850	1,850
R^2	0.001	0.018	0.124	0.342	0.547
Adjusted R^2	0.00003	0.016	0.110	0.310	0.486
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 7: Graphical representation of the main results in Model 3. Before the 2001 agreement on tied aid, all agencies tied similar levels of aid, around 40%. However, bureaucracies that served as their state's primary aid delivery tool changed their behavior after 2001, decreasin their tied aid. Other bureaucracies did not significantly change their behavior.

greater percentage of their aid. This suggests there might be a trade-off between budget size and willingness to tie aid. Additionally, the models provide less robust evidence that conservative governments may be less likely to tie aid, and that legislators facing reelection are more likely to do so.

Because coefficients on interaction models are difficult to interpret in a vacuum, Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of Model 3. It shows separate trends for development and non-development bureaucracies. Prior to the 2001 agreement, all agencies were relatively similar in their levels of aid tying, at around 40%.[17] After the 2001 agreement, however, the agency types diverged. Bureaucracies that served as their state's primary aid delivery tool only tied an average of 27% of their foreign aid, while other agencies continued to tie 35% of their aid budgets.

[17]If anything, development bureaucracies may have been slightly *more* likely to tie their aid before 2001, possibly because they were more likely to be in existence long before aid tying was controversial.

Another way to cut the data is to consider variation between all agency types. Figure 8 breaks the data down in this way. The data show some clear trends in agency-level aid tying before and after the 2001 agreement. As expected, development-oriented bureaucracies tied their aid at much lower rates after the agreement than before. Development finance institutions (DFIs) and regional organizations (which usually also have development orientations) also decreased aid tying. In contrast, some agencies that had not employed aid tying before 2001 began doing so after 2001. Defense, health, and foreign ministries are examples of this. Additionally, many agencies with traditionally domestic agendas, such as energy and labor increased their use of tied aid following the 2001 agreement.



Figure 8: Levels of tied aid for various agency "types" before and after the 2001 agreement. Much of the change in tied aid levels for non-development bureaucracies appears to be driven by energy ministries and those with other domestic agendas. Development agencies, DFIs, and regional agencies stand out in being less likely to tie their foreign aid following the 2001 agreement.

Although bureaucracy-level variation is interesting and important to on-the-ground foreign policy outcomes, the literature tends to focus on the state level. If states are able to overcome their bureaucracies' preferences, then it shouldn't particularly matter what bureaucracies are doing. I evaluate the state-level hypothesis next.

5.2 Country-Level Outcomes

Does bureaucratic behavior affect states' foreign aid activity? Table 3 suggests that it does. Unlike the bureaucracy-level models, Model 1 shows an overall impact of the 2001 agreement on states' willingness to untie aid. This provides some preliminary evidence, at least at the state level, that more states decreased aid tying after 2001 than increased it. However, the overall impact of the 2001 agreement varies between states, as the rest of the models show.

Models 2-4 are somewhat consistent in showing a negative coefficient on the post-2001 time period for states with only one foreign aid bureaucracy. All three models also agree that as a state's number of bureaucracies increases, compliance with the 2001 agreement decreases. That is, states with a more complex bureaucratic structure were more likely to tie their aid after 2001. This provides further evidence that aid tying is a product of bureaucratic behavior.

The impact of some of the control variables is also worth noting. When donors are wealthier, as measured by GDP per capita, they are less likely to tie aid. This could be because strong economies do not have as much need to provide side payments to special interests in the form of aid contracts. States that send more of their budget to LDCs are also less likely to tie their aid, suggesting that good aid practices are correlated. The only political variables with consistent results is the finding that presidential systems are more likely to tie foreign aid. The reasons for this are worth exploring in other work but might be related to the propensity for earmarking in different types of states.

Table 3

	Dependent variable:			
	Percent LDC Aid Tied			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log. Num. of Agencies	0.02	−0.01	-0.13^{***}	-0.17^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Post-2001	-0.12^{***}	-0.16^{***}	-0.35^{***}	-0.22^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Agency Num x Post-2001		0.04^{**}	0.15^{***}	0.08^{***}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
GDP (bil USD)			-0.02^{**}	-0.05^{***}
			(0.01)	(0.02)
GDP/cap (100,000)			-0.35^{***}	-0.94^{*}
			(0.07)	(0.51)
Aid Budget (bil USD)			-0.01^{***}	0.001
			(0.003)	(0.002)
Pct. To LDCs			-0.50^{***}	-0.31^{***}
			(0.09)	(0.11)
Conservatism			0.01	-0.03^{***}
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Pres. System			0.58^{***}	–
			(0.06)	–
Gov. Vote-share			0.003^{***}	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Opp. Vote-share			0.001	0.0005
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Leg. Election			0.03	0.02
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Exec. Election			−0.02	−0.003
			(0.07)	(0.06)
Liberal Market Econ.			0.02	–
			(0.03)	–
Bur. Effectiveness			-0.07^{*}	0.20^{***}
			(0.04)	(0.06)
Constant	0.21^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.82^{***}	0.35
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Fixed Effects				Donor, Year
Observations	695	695	511	511
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.039	0.350	0.606

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 9: The marginal effect of the 2001 DAC Agreement depends on a state's bureaucratic architecture. States with few foreign aid bureaucracies decreased their aid tying following the agreement, while states with five or more aid bureaucracies displayed no discernible change in behavior.

Once again, in order to better interpret the coefficients Figure 9 displays the marginal effects of the 2001 agreement, using Model 3. The figure shows that states with only one aid bureaucracy (recall that the natural log of one is zero) complied with the agreement by decreasing the percentage of their tied aid by as much as 35 percentage points. The mean percentage of tied aid in the dataset is 17.6%, so this represents a huge substantive change. States with a few bureaucracies were slightly less compliant, but they complied to some degree. However, once states reached about five foreign aid bureaucracies,[18] their aid tying after 2001 was statistically identical to aid-tying before the agreement. They did not comply with the agreement to much extent—the error bars suggest that these states did not change their practices much at all.

[18] The natural log of 5 is approximately 1.6.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I find evidence that compliance with international agreements is not only up to the state—substate actors such as special interests and bureaucracies also play a role in determining foreign policy behavior. This paper opens up a new set of questions about the role of sub-state actors in international agreements. As globalization increases, international agreements have become especially crucial tools of international cooperation. They have also become increasingly questioned with recent nationalist movements around the world. Maximizing state compliance with these agreements is a necessary step for mutual cooperation in war and peace. There are many factors that impact compliance that states cannot control or predict. However, bureaucratic structure, and the negotiating roles of bureaucracies themselves, are things that states can influence to maximize international compliance.

One weakness of this theory is the implicit assumption that bureaucratic structure is exogenously determined. It is possible that the structure of the bureaucracy is endogenous to a state's willingness to tie aid, as (Carcelli (2018)) would suggest. Future work should consider the role of bureaucratic structure in governments' willingness to engage in international agreements, as well as the role of the development community in governments' bureaucratic structure. The relationship between special interests and bureaucracy could go deeper than this paper suggests.

This research is not only relevant to foreign aid agreements. There are many facets of foreign policy that are influenced by several distinct bureaucracies and important to global cooperation. For example, international environmental cooperation often involves a complex combination of scientific and technical agencies as well as industry actors (Alcañiz 2016). Trade policy is also influenced by several bureaucracies, from commerce and agriculture departments to state and treasury ministries and regulatory bureaus. Even the high-stakes realm of weapons agreements can involve several branches of military and technology agencies, many of whom use similar technology differently. A more general understanding of when bureaucracies matter more versus less would be an important contribution to the literature on all of these agreements.

The policy implications of this paper are not as simple as they may seem at first glance. While it may be obvious to conclude that international compliance would increase if all relevant bureaucracies were sent to negotiations, there may be some trade-off. Research has suggested that including too many actors in international negotiations can both delay the completion of agreements and make it more difficult to come to any agreement at all (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014). Bringing more bureaucracies into negotiations may not be the answer. The correct placement of a quantity-quality trade-off of international agreements is for other scholars to debate. However, the role of bureaucracy heads in determining state compliance with international agreements may be a point in favor of quantity over quality.

Future research might also begin to examine the role that interagency cooperation, on a domestic level, may play in determining state compliance. In foreign aid, for example, many states allocate to several bureaucracies but choose one to serve as a bureaucratic leader, with the authority to punish and reward other agencies that misbehave. The usefulness of this model for improving compliance is up for question. Additionally, many states imbue a legislative branch with strong oversight power. Whether legislative oversight matters in constraining wayward bureaucracies is unclear. Which *direction* that oversight might take—either toward or away from compliance—is another interesting question.

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Appendix

6.1 Robustness Tests

6.1.1 Bureaucracy-Level Analysis: Other Measures of Bureaucratic Preferences

In addition to the development-orientation of the agencies, bureaucratic presence at the negotiations leading up to an agreement could play a role in compliance. Below I replicate the agency-level findings using bureaucratic attendance as an alternative measure of bureaucratic motivations. Once again, I find that bureaucracies that are motivated to comply with a treaty are more likely to comply, regardless of which state they represent.

Table 4

	Dependent variable:			
	Percent Tied Aid			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Attended 2001 Meeting	−0.015	0.072***	0.129***	0.240
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.211)
Post-2001	−0.006	0.054***	−0.001	0.469***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.089)
Attended Meeting x Post-2001		−0.175***	−0.125***	−0.115***
		(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
GDP			0.003	0.020**
			(0.007)	(0.009)
GDP/cap			−0.167*	−0.910***
			(0.095)	(0.249)
Total Aid (Agency)			0.028***	0.015**
			(0.007)	(0.006)
Total Aid (State)			−0.019	−0.060***
			(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	0.190***	0.158***	0.260***	0.152
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.187)
Agency Type FE			Y	
Year FE				Y
Agency FE				Y
Observations	2,467	2,467	2,418	2,418
Log Likelihood	−767.238	−750.654	−704.773	−333.752
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,544.476	1,513.308	1,457.546	1,177.504
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,573.530	1,548.172	1,596.523	2,654.131
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

6.1.2 Country-Level Analysis: Other Measures of Bureaucratic Structure

The total number of foreign aid bureaucracies within a donor state is not the only potentially important factor in determining compliance. Below I replicate the country-level analysis using three other measures of bureaucratic structure. First, in Table 5, I look at the percentage of foreign aid funding that is spent through development-oriented bureaucracies. I find that states with a higher percentage of funding through development bureaucracies are more likely to comply. Second, in Table 6, I calculate the Herfindahl-Herschman Index (HHI) of a state's foreign aid funding among its bureaucracies. I find that states with a higher HHI—meaning they fragment their foreign aid funding more thinly to a greater number of bureaucracies—are less likely to comply with an agreement.

Finally, Table **??** uses the same measure as a main articles but makes it binary. In this model, states with only one aid agency are labeled with a zero, and states with more than one foreign aid agency are coded as one. The results suggest that states with only one aid agency are more likely to untie their aid after 2001.

Table 5

	Dependent variable:			
	Percent LDC Aid Tied			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% to Development	0.050**	0.080***	0.183***	0.113
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.108)
Post-2001	−0.119***	−0.050	0.008	0.017
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.130)
% to Development x Post-2001		−0.095**	−0.277***	−0.178***
		(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.066)
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.130)
GDP			0.0001***	−0.00004*
			(0.00001)	(0.00002)
GDP/cap			−0.412***	−1.411**
			(0.076)	(0.654)
Total Aid			−0.043***	−0.003
			(0.008)	(0.007)
Bur. Effectiveness			0.008	0.279***
			(0.030)	(0.080)
% to LDC			−0.413***	−0.244**
			(0.084)	(0.115)
Constant	0.193***	0.171***	0.450***	−0.091
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.114)	(0.353)
Donor FE				Y
Year FE				Y

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6

	Dependent variable:			
	Percent LDC Aid Tied			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HHI	−0.012	−0.039	0.141	0.232**
	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.108)	(0.095)
Post-2001	−0.103***	−0.129***	−0.135***	−0.061
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.092)
HHI x Post-2001		0.143	−0.223*	−0.144
		(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.109)
GDP			0.0001***	−0.00005**
			(0.00001)	(0.00002)
GDP/cap			−0.286***	−1.401***
			(0.058)	(0.471)
Total Aid			−0.049***	0.001
			(0.008)	(0.006)
Bur. Effectiveness			0.009	0.191**
			(0.037)	(0.075)
% to LDC			−0.349***	−0.306***
			(0.081)	(0.084)
Constant	0.213***	0.220***	0.457***	0.268
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.150)	(0.239)
Donor FE				Y
Year FE				Y
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7

	Dependent variable:			
	Percent LDC Aid Tied			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
> 1 Agency	0.01	−0.01	−0.11***	−0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Post-2001	−0.12***	−0.16***	−0.34***	−0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)
> 1 Agency x Post-2001		0.07**	0.18***	0.10**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GDP (bil USD)			−0.03***	−0.07***
			(0.01)	(0.02)
GDP/cap (100,000)			−0.35***	−0.95*
			(0.07)	(0.54)
Aid Budget (bil USD)			−0.01***	0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Pct. To LDCs			−0.45***	−0.36***
			(0.09)	(0.12)
Conservatism			0.01	−0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Pres. System			0.61***	1.20***
			(0.06)	(0.24)
Gov. Vote-share			0.003***	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Opp. Vote-share			0.0002	−0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Leg. Election			0.04	0.03
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Exec. Election			−0.02	−0.01
			(0.07)	(0.06)
Liberal Market Econ.			0.03	−0.26***
			(0.03)	(0.08)
Bur. Effectiveness			−0.06	0.16**
			(0.04)	(0.07)
Constant	0.21***	0.22***	0.79***	0.47
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.29)
Fixed Effects				Donor, Year
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.1.3 Country-Level Analysis: Excluding United States

It is possible that other international changes, especially the advent of 9-11 and the resulting conflicts, played a role in states' aid practices. This is especially likely for the United States, the donor most affected by 9-11. I therefore replicate the country-level results using a sample that omits the US in Table 8. The results are nearly identical.

Table 8

	Dependent variable:			
	Tied Aid Percent			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log. Num. of Agencies	−0.003	−0.03	−0.13***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Post-2001	−0.11***	−0.15***	−0.34***	−0.27**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Agency Num x Post-2001	0.20***	0.22***	0.86***	0.35
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.28)
GDP (bil USD)			−0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.05)
GDP/cap (100,000)			−0.33***	−0.89*
			(0.07)	(0.52)
Aid Budget (bil USD)			−0.01***	−0.0003
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Pct. To LDCs			−0.48***	−0.32***
			(0.09)	(0.11)
Conservatism			0.004	−0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Pres. System			0.002***	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Gov. Vote-share			0.0002	−0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Opp. Vote-share			0.03	0.03
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Leg. Election			−0.02	0.03
			(0.09)	(0.08)
Exec. Election			0.03	−0.36***
			(0.03)	(0.08)
Liberal Market Econ.			−0.08*	0.20***
			(0.04)	(0.06)
Bur. Effectiveness		0.06**	0.15***	0.07**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Fixed Effects				Donor, Year
Observations	655	655	488	488
R^2	0.038	0.044	0.310	0.624
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.039	0.290	0.571
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.2 Data: Foreign Aid Bureaucracies

A list of bureaucracies that I coded for this project, along with their countries and the "types" that I assigned them, is below.

Agriculture	Australia	
Agriculture	Austria	Ministry for Agriculture; Forestry; Environment and Water Mar
Agriculture	Czech Republic	Ministry of Agriculture
Agriculture	France	Ministry of Agriculture
Agriculture	Greece	Ministry of Agriculture
Agriculture	Greece	Ministry of Agriculture
Agriculture	Ireland	Department of Agriculture; Food and the Marine
Agriculture	Italy	Agricultural Dispensing Agency
Agriculture	Japan	Ministry of Agriculture; Forestry and Fisheries
Agriculture	Spain	Ministry of Agriculture; Fisheries; and Food
Agriculture	United Kingdom	Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
Agriculture	United States	Department of Agriculture
Defense	Austria	Ministry of Defense and Sports
Defense	Canada	Department of National Defence
Defense	Czech Republic	Ministry of Defence
Defense	Czech Republic	Ministry of Defence
Defense	France	
Defense	France	Ministère de l'Équipement
Defense	Greece	Ministry of Citizen Protection
Defense	Greece	Ministry of National Defence
Defense	Greece	Ministry of Merchant Marine
Defense	Greece	Ministry of National Defence
Defense	Slovenia	Ministry of Defence
Defense	Spain	Ministry of Defense
Defense	Switzerland	Federal Department for Defence; Civil Protection and Sports
Defense	United Kingdom	Ministry of Defence
Defense	United States	Department of Defense
Developmen	Australia	Australian Aid
Developmen	Australia	Australian Aid
Developmen	Austria	Austrian Development Agency
Developmen	Austria	Federal Government of Austria
Developmen	Belgium	Administration Generale de la Cooperation au Developpement
Developmen	Belgium	Directorate General for Co-operation and Development
Developmen	Canada	Canadian International Development Agency
Developmen	Canada	International Development Research Centre
Developmen	Cyprus	
Developmen	Czech Republic	Czech Development Agency
Developmen	Denmark	Danish International Development Agency
Developmen	Estonia	Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Developmen	Estonia	Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Developmen	Finland	Finnish Government
Developmen	Finland	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Developmen	France	French Development Agency
Developmen	France	Government
Developmen	Germany	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und E
Developmen	Germany	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
Developmen	Germany	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Developmen	Hungary	Ministry of International Development
Developmen	Hungary	Ministry of International Development
Developmen	Hungary	Ministry of International Development
Developmen	Hungary	Ministry of International Development
Developmen	Iceland	Icelandic International Development Agency
Developmen	Italy	Central administration
Developmen	Italy	Directorate General for Development Cooperation
Developmen	Japan	
Developmen	Japan	Japanese International Co-operation Agency
Developmen	Japan	Japan Overseas Development Co-operation
Developmen	Korea	Korea International Cooperation Agency
Developmen	Korea	Korea International Cooperation Agency
Developmen	Luxembourg	Lux-Development
Developmen	New Zealand	New Zealand International Aid and Development Agency
Developmen	Norway	Norec
Developmen	Norway	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
Developmen	Norway	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
Developmen	Norway	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
Developmen	Poland	
Developmen	Portugal	Portuguese Government
Developmen	Portugal	Indicative Cooperation Programme
Developmen	Portugal	Portuguese Institute for Development Support
Developmen	Romania	Development Assistance Unit
Developmen	Slovak Republic	Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation
Developmen	South Africa	African Renaissance and International Co-Operation Fund
Developmen	Spain	Spanish Agency for International Development Co-operation
Developmen	Sweden	Agency for International Technical and Economic Cooperation
Developmen	Sweden	Swedish International Development Authority
Developmen	Sweden	Swedish International Development Authority
Developmen	Sweden	Swedish International Development Authority
Developmen	Switzerland	DCT
Developmen	Switzerland	Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation
Developmen	Taiwan	International Cooperation and Devlopment Fund
Developmen	United Kingdom	Department for International Development
Developmen	United Kingdom	Ministry of Overseas Development
Developmen	United States	African Development Foundation
Developmen	United States	Agency for International Development

Developmen	United States	DST
Developmen	United States	Inter-American Development Foundation
Developmen	United States	Millennium Challenge Corporation
Developmen	United States	Peace Corps
DFI	Austria	Austrian Development Bank
DFI	Belgium	Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries
DFI	Czech Republic	Czech National Bank
DFI	Finland	FinnFund
DFI	Germany	German Investment and Development Company
DFI	Germany	Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG
DFI	Germany	Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG
DFI	Germany	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
DFI	Germany	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
DFI	Italy	Mediocredito Centrale
DFI	Japan	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
DFI	Japan	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
DFI	Netherlands	NLD Gov. through NLD Inv Bank for Developing Countries
DFI	Netherlands	NLD Gov. through NLD Inv Bank for Developing Countries
DFI	Netherlands	NLD Gov. through NLD Inv Bank for Developing Countries
DFI	Netherlands	NLD Gov. through NLD Inv Bank for Developing Countries
DFI	Norway	Norfund
DFI	Portugal	Society for Development Financing
DFI	Spain	Instituto de Credito Oficial
DFI	Sweden	SwedFund
DFI	United Kingdom	CDC Capital Partners PLC
DFI	United States	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
DFI	United States	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Culture
Domestic	Austria	Ministry for Education; Arts and Culture
Domestic	Austria	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	Canada	Royal Canadian Mounted Police of Canada
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Education; Youth; Sports
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Industry and Trade
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of the Interior
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Industry and Trade
Domestic	Czech Republic	Ministry of the Interior
Domestic	Czech Republic	Police
Domestic	France	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	France	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	France	
Domestic	France	Postes; télégraphes et téléphones
Domestic	Greece	Ministry of Employment and Social Security

Domestic	Greece	Ministry of the Interior; Public Administration and Decentralisa
Domestic	Greece	Ministry of Infrastructure; Transport and Networks
Domestic	Greece	Ministry of the Interior; Public Administration and Decentralisa
Domestic	Norway	Office of the Auditor General
Domestic	Poland	Ministry of Culture and National HeritAgriculturee
Domestic	Slovenia	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	Slovenia	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	Slovenia	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	Slovenia	Ministry of Transport
Domestic	Spain	Ministry of Interior
Domestic	Spain	Ministry of Public Administration
Domestic	Spain	Ministry of Public Works
Domestic	United Kingdom	Department for Culture; Media and Sports
Domestic	United Kingdom	Home Office
Domestic	United States	Department of Homeland Security
Domestic	United States	Department of Transportation
Domestic	United States	Department of the Interior
Domestic	United States	Department of Justice
Economic	Austria	
Economic	Belgium	Official Federal Service of Finance
Economic	Canada	Department of Finance Canada
Economic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Finance
Economic	Czech Republic	Ministry of Finance
Economic	France	
Economic	France	Ministry of Economy; Finance and Industry
Economic	France	TRESOR
Economic	Germany	Federal Ministry of Finance
Economic	Germany	
Economic	Greece	Ministry of Development; Competitiveness; and Shipping
Economic	Greece	Ministry of Finance
Economic	Greece	Ministry of National Economy
Economic	Japan	Public Corporations
Economic	Korea	Ministry of Strategy and Finance
Economic	Slovak Republic	Ministry of Finance
Economic	Slovenia	Ministry of Finance
Economic	Slovenia	Ministry of Finance
Economic	Spain	Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Economic	Switzerland	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Economic	Switzerland	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Economic	United Kingdom	Department for Business; Innovation and Skills
Economic	United States	Department of Commerce
Economic	United States	Department of Treasury

Economic	United States	Federal Trade Commission
Energy	Czech Republic	State Office for Nuclear Saftey
Energy	Czech Republic	State Office for Nuclear Safety
Energy	Spain	Ministry of Industry and Energy
Energy	United States	Department of Energy
Energy	United States	Department of Energy
Environment	Canada	Parks Canada
Environment	Czech Republic	Ministry of Environment
Environment	Czech Republic	Ministry of Environment
Environment	Germany	Federal Min. for the Env.; Nature Conservation; Building and N
Environment	Greece	Ministry of the Environment
Environment	Greece	Ministry of the Environment
Environment	Japan	Overseas Fishery Co-operation Foundation
Environment	Slovenia	Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning
Environment	Spain	Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Environs
Environment	Spain	Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Environs
Environment	Switzerland	Swiss Agency for the Environment; Forests and Landscape
Environment	United Kingdom	Department of Energy and Climate Change
Environment	United States	Environmental Protection Agency
ExportBank	Austria	Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG
ExportBank	Belgium	Ducroire National Office
ExportBank	Canada	Export Development Canada
ExportBank	Italy	Artigiancassa
ExportBank	Italy	Italian Export Credit Agency
ExportBank	Japan	Japan Export-Import Bank
ExportBank	Japan	Japan Export-Import Bank
ExportBank	Japan	Nippon Export and Investment Insurance
ExportBank	Korea	Export-Import Bank of Korea
ExportBank	Sweden	Swedish Export Credits Guarantee Board
ExportBank	United Kingdom	Export Credit Guarantee Department
ExportBank	United States	Export Import Bank
ExportBank	United States	Trade and Development Agency
Foreign	Austria	Bundesministerium für Europa; Integration und Äußeres
Foreign	Austria	Bundesministerium für Europa; Integration und Äußeres
Foreign	Belgium	Other Official Federal Services
Foreign	Belgium	Official Federal Service of Foreign Affaires (excl. DGCD)
Foreign	Canada	
Foreign	Canada	Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Foreign	Canada	Department of Foreign Affairs; Trade and Development
Foreign	Czech Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Czech Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Denmark	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Foreign	France	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	France	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	France	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	France	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	France	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Germany	Foreign Office
Foreign	Germany	Foreign Office
Foreign	Greece	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Greece	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Greece	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Hungary	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Foreign	Iceland	Iceland Crisis Response Unit
Foreign	Iceland	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Ireland	Department of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Japan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Korea	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Foreign	Latvia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Lithuania	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Luxembourg	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Netherlands	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS)
Foreign	New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Foreign	Norway	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Poland	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Portugal	Camões-Institute for Cooperation and Language
Foreign	Slovak Republic	Bratislava-Belgrade Fund
Foreign	Slovak Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Slovak Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Slovenia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Slovenia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Spain	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation
Foreign	Sweden	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Switzerland	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Foreign	Switzerland	Federal Office for Migration
Foreign	Taiwan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Republic of China (Taiwan)
Foreign	United Kingdom	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Foreign	United States	State Department
Foreign	United States	US Information Agency
Health	Czech Republic	Ministry of Health
Health	Czech Republic	Ministry of Health
Health	France	Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé
Health	Greece	Ministry of Health
Health	Greece	Ministry of Health

Health	Spain	Ministry of Health
Health	United States	Department of Health and Human Services
Labor	Czech Republic	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Labor	Czech Republic	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Labor	France	Ministère du Travail
Labor	Spain	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Labor	United States	Department of Labor
Regional	Austria	Provincial governments; local communities
Regional	Belgium	provinces/municipalities
Regional	Belgium	Brussels Official Regional Ministries
Regional	Belgium	Flanders Official Regional Ministries
Regional	Belgium	German speaking Official Regional Ministries
Regional	Belgium	Walloon Official Regional Ministries
Regional	Canada	Provincial Governments and municipalities
Regional	Czech Republic	
Regional	Germany	Foundations/Societies/Misc. (non federal)
Regional	Germany	Federal States and Local Governments
Regional	Hungary	Democratic Coalition
Regional	Italy	Local administration
Regional	Japan	Ordinance-designed Cities
Regional	Japan	Prefectures
Regional	Portugal	Municipalities
Regional	Slovenia	Government Office for Local Self-Government and Regional Po
Regional	Spain	Autonomous Governments
Regional	Spain	Municipalities
Regional	Switzerland	Municipalities
Regional	United Kingdom	Scottish Government
Regional	United Kingdom	Welsh Assembly Government
Science/Educ	Austria	Education and Science Ministry
Science/Educ	Austria	Ministry for Science; Research and Economy
Science/Educ	Canada	Fisheries and Oceans Canada
Science/Educ	Czech Republic	Ministry of Education; Youth and Sport of the Czech Republic
Science/Educ	Czech Republic	
Science/Educ	Denmark	Danish National Research Foundation
Science/Educ	France	Ministry of Education; Higher education and Research
Science/Educ	France	Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française
Science/Educ	France	
Science/Educ	Greece	Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs
Science/Educ	Greece	Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs
Science/Educ	Italy	MGI
Science/Educ	Poland	Ministry of National Education
Science/Educ	Poland	Ministry of Science and Higher Education

Science/Educ	Slovak Republic	Ministry of Education; Science; Research and Sport
Science/Educ	Slovenia	Ministry of Higher Education; Science and Technology
Science/Educ	Spain	Ministry of Education; Culture and Sports
Science/Educ	Spain	Ministry of Science and Technology
Science/Educ	Spain	Public Universities
Science/Educ	Sweden	Department for Research Cooperation
Science/Educ	Switzerland	State Secretariat for Education and Research