Paper prepared for the Political Economy of International Organization (PEIO) online seminar, February 9, 2021.

International Authority, Democracies, and Exit from International Organizations

Benjamin Daßler
LMU Munich
benjamin.dassler@gsi.lmu.de

Tim Heinkelmann-Wild
LMU Munich
tim.heinkelmann-wild@gsi.lmu.de

Abstract:

Why do states withdrawal from international organizations (IOs)? Why recent withdrawals are explained by domestic backlash against IO authority, geopolitics are seen as the drivers of earlier withdrawals. We argue that IO authority has always had an effect on member states' decision to withdrawal. This authority effect is not limited to the recent past, and it is also not limited to Western democracies. We first suggest that international authority, i.e., the pooling of decision-making within IOs and the delegation of tasks to supranational bureaucracies, drives states' withdrawal. We then argue that the effect of international authority on IO exit is particularly strong for democracies, as their domestic political institutions render governments more vulnerable to audience costs once sovereignty is relinquished. Drawing on longitudinal data combining information on IO design characteristics and IO withdrawals from 1945 through 2014, a Firth logistic regression analysis corroborates our expectation that the pooling and delegation of authority within IOs drives exit, particularly of democracies. We further show that these effects are stronger from democratic as compared to autocratic states, especially in institutional settings where the average preferences of other members strongly diverge and in IOs with an on average more autocratic than democratic membership. Our results yield implications for the recent debate about the future of the liberal international order (LIO): the exit of democracies from IOs is not a new phenomenon and seems to be particularly linked to sovereignty costs.

Keywords:

Authority; Decision-making; Delegation; Democracies; Exit; Institutional Organizations; Pooling; Withdrawal.

1 Introduction

The recent years witnessed numerous withdrawals of states from international organizations (IOs). These withdrawals stem not from authoritarian governments but established Western democracies and they do not (only) target small, insignificant entities but pillars of the current Liberal International Order (LIO) (Lake et al. 2020). The United Kingdom (UK) terminated its membership in the European Union (EU). Under the Trump Administration, the United States (US) exited from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). States' withdrawal from IOs can be highly consequential. Withdrawals deprive IOs from material capacities central for their performance, including resource contributions and staff. Moreover, withdrawals have the potential to de-legitimate IOs as they imply their principled rejection (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).

A nascent literature regards these recent IO withdrawals as a product of domestic politics. Populist-nationalist politicians reject IOs due to their alleged intrusion in national self-determination.[1] The domestic contestation of IOs is seen as the endogenous product of IOs' increasing authority since the 1990s, when they became a bone of contention in party politics across Western democracies (Börzel & Zürn, 2020; Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019a; Zürn, 2018; see also, de Vries et a. 2020). Historically, by contrast, a first systematic study of 188 IO withdrawals from 1945 to 2014 by von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) points to geopolitics as the main driver of IO membership termination (see also, Keohane 2020).

In this paper, we draw on and extend insights of the first strand of literature on IO authority and member state withdrawal (Börzel & Zürn, 2020; Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019a; Zürn, 2018). We argue that IO authority has always had an effect on member states' decision to withdrawal. This authority effect is not limited to the recent past, and it is also not limited to Western democracies. By pooling decision-making within IOs or delegating tasks to supranational bureaucracies, member states hand over sovereignty to IOs. This increases the risk of losing control over IO policies. When states cannot counter dissatisfying policies within IOs, they are incentivized to withdrawal. While we hold that this authority effect is not limited to Western

1 Bisbee, Mosley, Pepinsky, and Rosendorff, 2019; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019; Habib and Howard; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks, 2019b; Musgrave, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2020; Foa, 2016; Snyder, 2019; Fukuyama, 2016; Blyth, 2017; Norrlof, 2018; Freedman, 2020; Spencer and Oppermann, 2020; Schmidt, 2020.

democracies, we expect them to be more affected (see also, Keohane 2020). As democratic governments are more likely to be held accountable by their constituencies for dissatisfying IO policies, they tend to withdraw from authoritative IOs more frequently than autocrats.

Our paper thereby contributes to the nascent scholarship on IO withdrawals by demonstrating the general importance of IO authority beyond the recent national-populist backlash in Western democracies. Since 1945, the pooling and delegation of authority in IOs have always entailed a higher probability of tensions with national sovereignty, and democracies have always been more vulnerable to respective societal concerns. The reinforcing interaction among IO authority and democracy might also shed some light on why, historically, traditional, liberal democracies such as Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US are among the most frequent quitters of IOs (Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). With regards to the future of the LIO, these findings suggest a pessimistic view: As IOs today command more authority than ever before (Börzel & Zürn, 2020; Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019a; Zürn, 2018), democracies will continue to be driven away from IOs by domestic audiences concerned with sovereignty costs, hollowing out the LIO from within.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops our theory of IO exits. We first argue that IO authority generally increases the likelihood of withdrawal and then specify why the authority effect is stronger for democracies than autocracies. Section 3 presents our research design. We test our hypotheses by drawing on longitudinal data covering IOs' institutional design and member states' withdrawals from 1945 through 2014. Section 4 then discusses the results, which support our theoretical expectations and hold against a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the implications for the future of the LIO.

2 IO authority and member state withdrawal

We start from the assumption that governments are bounded rational actors who are sensitive to the costs and benefits of staying within or withdrawing from an IO. Accordingly, they will opt to continue participation in IOs or to exit them based on the expected cost-benefit ratio they expect them to entail. We therefore expect states to make informed choices whether the expected gains from withdrawing an IO outweigh the expected costs thereof. We argue that governments' cost-benefit calculation to remain or withdraw form an IO are crucially shaped by its authority and conditioned by their countries' regime type.

2.1 States' sovereignty and IO authority

States can transfer authority to IOs by delegation or pooling. Seizing authority to IOs in both dimensions can constrain states' self-determination, thus increasing the risk of withdrawal. First, member states can *pool authority* amongst themselves within an IO. Specifically, pooling designates "the transfer of authority from individual member states to a collective IO member state body in which individual states cede their capacity to block decisions" (Hooghe & Marks, 2015, p. 315; see also Keohane & Hoffmann; A. Moravcsik, 1998; B. Rittberger, 2005). The pooling of authority within IOs provides governments incentives to withdrawal. Institutional rules shape member states' control over the decision-making process in IOs (Jupille, Mattli, & Snidal, 2013; Barbara Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001; Stone, 2011a; Zürn, 2018). Institutions grant states more or less opportunities to prevent undesired institutional outcomes (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Cox & Jacobson, 1974, p. 13; Rus, 1980, p. 3). Governments lack the (formal) veto power to shield themselves from dissatisfying IO decisions (see Lake, 2007): "[T]he strategic problem in pooling authority is that of collective decision making where a member state may be outvoted under majoritarian decision making." (Hooghe & Marks, 2015, p. 308) When obligatory decisions are taken by majority voting, governments are unable to block dissatisfying decisions on their own. This increases the risk that governments are confronted with policies that they cannot change within the IO. Take as an example the UK's decision to exit UNESCO in 1985. After several attempts by the British delegation to change the financing procedure and distribution of projects, Timothy Raison, then Minister for Overseas Development, stated the UNESCO did not "represent good value for money […] for us [the British people]" (Raison 1985). As a majority of member states rejected these reform proposals, the UK's "comprehensive attempt to set the organization to rights" (Raison 1985) failed and gave rise to its withdrawal.

Second, member states can *delegate authority* to an IO by transferring enforcement, dispute settlement, or monitoring tasks to an independent secretariat (Brown, 2010; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney, 2006; Hooghe & Marks, 2015; Barbara Koremenos, 2008; see also Lake, 2007, p. 231; Pollack, 1997, 2003; Tallberg, 2002). The delegation of authority to supranational IO bodies also incentivizes governments to withdrawal as these acts are associated with a loss of control. When tasks are delegated to independent, supranational actors, governments give up some control over policy making and/or implementation. They become vulnerable to agency slack (Hawkins et al., 2006) or the collusion of powerful states with the IO bureaucracy (Dijkstra, 2017). Importantly, faced with an independent IO bureaucracy, member states will find it more difficult to resist or even change dissatisfying policies. Take as an example the

International Criminal Court (ICC), to which member states delegated considerable independent power. As the ICC Prosecutor's exercise of authority was increasingly regarded as unfair and intruding in national sovereignty, several African proclaimed their intend to withdrawal and Burundi finally terminated its membership in 2017 (Deitelhoff 2019). Overall, we hypothesize:

H_{1a}: *Governments are more likely to exit IOs with pooled authority as compared to IOs without pooled authority.*

H_{1b}: *Governments are more likely to exit IOs where authority is delegated as compared to IOs where authority is not delegated.*

2.2 Domestic institutions: regime types and societal demands

We further argue that the effect of IO authority on member states' exits is not uniform but varies across regime types. Domestic institutions shape governments' behavior on the international level (Lai & Reiter, 2000; Mansfield et al., 2000; Mattes & Rodríguez, 2014; A. Moravcsik, 1997; Jon C. Pevehouse, 2002; Remmer, 1998). First, the public in democratic states is better informed about international politics compared to societies in autocratic states (Baum & Zhukov, 2015; Fearon, 1994; Guriev & Treisman, 2020; Stier, 2015). Second, governments of democratic states are more attentive to societal demands as they are more vulnerable to domestic audience costs than autocracies (Fearon, 1994; Kurizaki & Whang, 2015; Slantchev, 2006; Tomz, 2007). As elected politicians fear to be punished by voters for their actions on the international level, democratic governments have a greater need to satisfy domestic demands than autocrats (Fang & Owen, 2011; Milner & Rosendorff, 1997). By contrast, autocrats are less reliant on the domestic public opinion to stay in power than democratic governments and thus less sensitive to domestic audience costs.

When IO authority is low, the risk that IO policies give rise to domestic audience costs is generally minor. Governments of both autocratic and democratic states retain the right to block any dissatisfying IO decisions. They can even claim credit for protecting their societies from undesired IO policies, thereby bolstering their domestic support (see Schneider, 2020). Governments of both autocracies and democracies are thus in a good position to protect their constituencies' demands from undesired IO policies. Moreover, IOs without international authority might be considered more legitimate by the societies of democratic and autocratic states as they confirm with the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty (Rixen & Zangl, 2013).

When authority is pooled within or delegated to IOs, by contrast, its effect on member states' exits is stronger for democracies than autocracies. Autocrats, due to their comparatively lower vulnerability to audience costs, will be less afraid of domestic societal dissatisfaction when accepting (potentially dissatisfying) decisions taken by the majority of member states or a supranational bureaucracy. For autocrats, there might even be victory in "defeat": even when IO policies pursue liberal goals, autocrats can use their continued participation in such IOs to signal their commitment to liberal norms and democratic procedures (Carvalho Pinto, 2019; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hertog, 2017; Stobb, 2019), thereby accommodating domestic demands by civil society (Fang & Owen, 2011) or political opponents (Vreeland, 2008); and bolstering their status within international society (Debre, 2020). Democratic governments that are member in an IO with delegated or pooled authority are in a riskier position compared to autocracies. As it is harder to block (potentially dissatisfying) IO policies, they are more likely to face harmful domestic backlash against sacrificing national sovereignty to IOs.[2] Take the case of Brexit as an example, where populist-nationalist concerns about policy decisions taken against British interests and technocratic elites intruding in their national sovereignty pressured the Conservative government into holding a referendum on EU membership (Schmidt, 2020). Overall, we therefore hypothesize:

H_{2a}: The effect of delegated authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies than autocracies.

H_{2b}: The effect of pooled authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies than autocracies.

We can further specify two institutional configurations in IOs with pooled and delegated authority that render democratic governments' exit particularly likely. Dissatisfaction from democratic societies can stem from two types of gaps between societal demands and an IO's policies. First, an *'interest gap'* opens up when an IO's policies diverge from the interests of key government constituencies. We assume that democratic societies assess their membership in IOs based on the material benefits it provides them. IOs are evaluated in terms of their perceived performance (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). IOs that cater the

2 To be sure, domestic contestation of IOs and their policies might not always precede exit. However, as the withdrawal from any IOs is a major decision, governments of democratic states will publicly justify this step and, at least at this point, the public will learn about the IO and its policies. As they are sensitive to audience costs, governments of democratic states will therefore anticipate domestic demands. After all, when announcing exit, they can then claim credit in front of their constituencies that are dissatisfied with an IO.

demands of key societal groups will therefore be supported, while those that fall short of their preferences will be contested. When democratic governments have to follow IO policies that diverge from their constituencies' preferences, they therefore find themselves between a rock and a hard place. As changing the dissatisfying policy is hampered by pooled decision-making and a majority that supported the policy, democratic governments have three options: When they implement dissatisfying IO policies, they will not only be held responsible by domestic opposition parties and the broader public (Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, & Rittberger, 2020; B. Rittberger, Schwarzenbeck, & Zangl, 2017), but implementing unpopular international decision might even drive a wedge through governing parties (Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, Rittberger, & Zangl, 2020). When democratic governments instead refuse to comply with obligatory international law, they will likely face other domestic constituencies that insist on following the rule of law principles (Kriegmair, Rittberger, Zangl, & Heinkelmann-Wild, 2020). And when democratic governments try to shift the blame for dissatisfying policies onto the IO (Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, & Rittberger, 2020; Heinkelmann-Wild & Zangl, 2019), they will thereby fuel public discontent with the IO itself (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017). Overall, as the pathway of changing the dissatisfying policy within the IO is blocked, domestic demands to reject the IO itself will grow (Kreuder-Sonnen & Rittberger, 2020; Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl, 2020).

The US withdrawal from the United Nations Industrial and Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1995 constitutes an example for how the 'interest gap' drives exit. The US government had ratified UNIDO's constitution in expectation that, as a major donor, it would be able to shape its agenda in line with its economic interests. However, both majority of member states and UNIDO's international administration resisted US demands. With the pathway to policy change blocked and confronted with increasing criticism from domestic economic interest groups, the US government decided to withdraw from the organization, which it accused of "unsound financial management, ineffectiveness, anti-market economic policy recommendations, and poorly performing projects" (Schaefer 2014).

Second, an *'identity gap'* arises when an IO does not reflect the normative standards hold by democratic societies. Besides material benefits, democratic societies make their support for IOs contingent on their fit with widely shared norms of legitimate governance. The pooling of authority in IOs generally falls short of the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty and might thus in itself provoke resistance (Kreuder-Sonnen & Rittberger, 2020; Rixen & Zangl, 2013). Moreover, we assume that democratic societies will assess IOs legitimacy based not only on the quality of organizational procedures (Bernauer, Mohrenberg, & Koubi, 2020; Dellmuth,

Scholte, & Tallberg, 2019; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019), but also based on whether their membership confirms with their norm of democratic governance and the rule of law (E. M. Hafner-Burton & Schneider, 2019; Kaoutzanis, Poast, & Urpelainen, 2016; Johnson 2011). IOs with democratic membership confirm better with this norm, while those with largely autocratic membership are more likely to be considered deficient. As democratic societies disapprove the lack of societal representation by autocratic governments, these are perceived as less worthy and trustful cooperation partners (E. M. Hafner-Burton et al., 2008; E. M. Hafner-Burton & Schneider, 2019; Mansfield et al., 2002; Johnson 2011). Moreover, the policies preferred by autocratic governments will likely fall short of liberal-democratic values such as rule of law and human rights protection (see Tallberg, Lundgren, Sommerer, & Squatrito, 2020).

A prime example for the 'identity gap' is the withdrawal of the US from the UNHRC in 2018. Members of the Trump Administration complained that the institution was "hijacked" by autocratic states with no serious interest in the protection of human rights abusing the organization for "shielding egregious human rights abusers while bashing America and its many friends [in particular Israel]" (The White House, 2018). As such, the US government accused the UNHRC of promoting the illiberal interests of autocratic regimes by representing "[…] a forum for politics, hypocrisy, and […] a place for political manipulation, rather than the promotion of universal values" (Haley 2018). This perceived dominance of authoritarian regimes within the UNHRC combined with the inability to fend of its undesired policies drove the US decision to withdraw.

We therefore not only expect that this *authority effect* on governments' exit is generally stronger for democracies than autocracies, due to their diverging vulnerability to audience costs, but we can further specify two institutional configurations in IOs with pooled authority where democratic governments face a particularly high risk of suffering domestic backlash for IO membership as gaps between societal demands and an IO's policies open up. First, we expect that 'interest gap's will be particularly pronounced in IOs with pooled authority that are dominated by member states whose preferences strongly diverge from a state's own preferences. Hence, we hypothesize that the pooling effect is particularly strong when democracies are faced with a majority of member states with diverging preferences in IOs with pooled authority. Second, we expect that 'identity gap's will be particularly pronounced in IOs with pooled authority that are dominated by autocratic member states. Hence, we expect that the pooling effect is particularly strong when democracies are faced with an autocratic majority in IOs with pooled authority. We therefore hypothesize:

H_{2c}: *The effect of pooled authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies in IOs that are dominated by member states with divergent preferences than in IOs dominated by states with convergent preferences.*

H_{2d}: *The effect of pooled authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies in IOs that are dominated by autocracies than in IOs dominated by democracies.*

3 Research design

To test our theoretical argument, we employ the dataset on IO membership termination compiled by von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019). It is based on the COW IGO dataset (Jon C. W. Pevehouse, Nordstrom, McManus, & Jamison, 2020) and includes information on 493 IOs from 1945 through 2014. Our *dependent variable* measures the occurrence of state membership withdrawal from IOs. As our interest is on how country and organizational characteristics shape exit, the unit of analysis is the IO-member state-year. Following Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 351), the depended variable "is coded 1 if member state m decided to withdraw from IGO i in year t, and 0 otherwise." Specifically, the year of exit announcement is coded as 1, even when IOs have a waiting period for membership withdrawal. In the dataset, 188 IO-member state-year dyads are coded as withdrawal. As IO exit thus constitutes a comparatively rare event, we run a *Firth logistic regression analysis* using the IO withdrawal dummy as dependent variable. This method of analysis has proven to be a reliable estimation technique in cases of rare event data as it produces unbiased estimates especially when the values of the binary dependent variable are strongly unevenly distributed (Firth, 1993; Leitgöb, 2013; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016, p. 1110).

Turning to the *independent variables*, we suggest two indexes for pooling and delegation. The literature on international authority has developed rich datasets: the Measuring International Authority (MIA) database (Hooghe et al., 2017) as well as the International Authority Database (IAD) (Zürn, Michael, Tokhi, Alexandros & Binder, 2020). However, as these datasets cover a limited number of IOs and IO withdrawals are a rare event, we developed our own measurement for delegation and pooling by drawing on the definitions suggested by this literature. To measure *pooling*, we included a binary variable that takes the value "1" if an IOs' decisions are obligatory *and* if it adopts these decisions via majority voting. To the contrary, the variable takes the value "0" whenever one of these two institutional features are *not* present. We derived the data on majority voting from Blake and Payton (2015) and data on obligation from

Reinsberg and Westerwinter (2019). To measure *delegation*, we constructed a weighted additive index which comprises, on the one hand, whether an IO's secretariat is independent (which we weighted by the factor 3) and, on the other hand, whether the IO is tasked with enforcement, dispute settlement, or monitoring.[3] Our delegation variable can therefore take 6 values, ranging from 0 (no delegation feature present) to 6 (indicating that all delegation features are present simultaneously). The rationale to weigh the existence of an independent secretariat more strongly was that delegation essentially requires that an IO must have a strong secretariat and that its authority grows the more competences this autonomous secretariat possesses. We derived the respective data on an IO secretariat's independence and on the presence of enforcement, monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms from Reinsberg and Westerwinter (2019). To check whether our indicators approximate the MIA data on pooling and delegation, we calculated their correlation (see Appendix Section A.2). As our indices are strongly and significantly correlated with those sourced from the MIA dataset, we are confident that our measurement is a rough but valid approximation of pooling and delegation (see Appendix Table A.2).

We also theorized that the effect of pooling on governments' withdrawal is conditioned by domestic institutions and institutional configurations. First, a state's *diverging preferences* from the average preferences of all member states can impact IO exit. As a proxy for states' preferences, we draw on data of Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017) on state's voting in the UN General Assembly. Moreover, we expect that the overall democracy score of an IO shapes governments' withdrawal. The variable *average democracy score* follows the calculation of Jon C. Pevehouse (2002) and indicates how many members of an IO were democracies in the previous year. Finally, we measure *democracy* by drawing on states' polity2 scores in the previous year sourced from the polity4 dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2010) ranging from a minimum score of -10 to a maximum score of 10, representing the highest level of state democracy.

To account for the claim in the literature that *geo-political factors* are the main drivers of IO withdrawals, we included two control variables (besides diverging preferences from the average preferences of all IO member states). As previous studies found evidence of a contagion effect of the withdrawal by the leading state in an IO, we include a variable, sourced from von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019), that indicates whether the largest economic power in an IO

3 The independent secretariat indicator is not to be confused with the mere existence of a secretariat, which is integral part of the definition of an IO and thus a constant across our sample (Jon C. W. Pevehouse et al., 2020).

has withdrawn from the organization in the year before, or not. We also include the variable *state power change*, compiled by von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) based on data from Greig and Enterline (2017) and Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), which comprises the differences in national military capabilities between the present and the previous year.

To account for the other prominent claim in the literature, namely that domestic factors drive IO withdrawals, we also included two variables. As changes in *government orientation* might impact a state's policy vis-à-vis IOs and thus its withdrawal decisions, we included a binary variable, sourced from von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019), that indicates whether a state's government orientation changed between left, right, and center or not. Moreover, we include a variable that measures *nationalism* as another potential driver of IO withdrawals. We include a dummy variable, coded by Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) based on information of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), that indicates whether any party in a country emphasizes national or ethnic identity.

We also included further confounders emphasized by the literature (see von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019, pp. 354–355). First, the *issue area* might affect states choice to withdrawal as some issue areas might be more prone to exit than others. Specifically, states might be less likely to leave security institutions as the costs directly related to their survival. We thus account for whether an IO focusses on political, economic, or security issues by drawing on information from the COW IGO dataset. We include two dummy variables for political and economic issues, while security constitutes the reference category. Second, the *length of membership* might be correlated with the mismatch between a states' (current) preferences and the IOs' policies, its overall authority, as well as the democracy score over time. This variable constitutes the (logged) number of years a specific state has been a member of an IO in the previous year. Finally, we included *IO size* as it might be correlated with preference divergence, democratic density, as well as the pooling and delegation of authority (see Hooghe & Marks, 2015). The variable measures the (logged) number of other IO member states in the IO in the year before.

4 Empirical analysis

To evaluate our theoretical argument, we first estimate the effects of the main explanatory factors on the probability of withdrawal. This helps us to assess our pooling thesis (H_{1a}) as well as our delegation thesis (H_{1b}). We then turn from main effects to conditional effects and examine the pooling effect on IO exit across regime types and institutional configurations. This helps us to assess our expectations about the conditional effect of delegation on democracies

(H_{2a}) and pooling on democracies (H_{2b}) as well as our 'interest gap' thesis (H_{2c}), as well as our 'identity gap' thesis (H_{2d}). We then check the robustness of our findings.

4.1 Assessing the effects of pooling and delegation on IO exit

We run three Firth logistic regression models of IO exit (see Table 1): Model 1 comprises all variables and their main effects. Moreover, we ran separate models for the period 1945-1989 (Model 2) and the period 1990-2014 (Model 3) to check whether our results change during and after the Cold War as the intrusiveness of IO authority experienced a significant surge since the 1990s and thus became salient in party politics (Börzel & Zürn, 2020; Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019a; Zürn, 2018).

All three models corroborate our expectations about the main effects of pooling and delegation. First, our pooling thesis states that governments are more likely to exit IOs with pooled authority than IOs without pooled authority (H1a). As the positive coefficient of our main Model 1 indicates, pooling has an independent and highly significant effect on states' probability to withdraw (99% confidence interval). The pooling of authority in a certain IO is associated with a significantly higher probability of withdrawal from that very IO. Second, our delegation thesis claims that governments are more likely to exit IOs where authority is delegated as compared to IOs where authority is not delegated (H1b). As indicated by the positive coefficient of our main Model 1, also delegation has an independent and significant effect on states' probability to withdraw (95% confidence interval). The higher the degree of delegation within a certain IO, the higher the probability of state withdrawal.

We further find that a member states' preference divergence from an IO's average as well as its democracy score have an independent and statistically significant effect on their probability to withdraw. The higher the level of democracy, the more likely a state is to withdraw. And the higher a state's preferences diverge from an IO's average, the more likely it is to exit. We further find that IOs with higher average democracy scores among their members are less likely to face state withdrawals as compared to IOs with an on average rather undemocratic membership. Preference divergence and contagion through the withdrawal of leading states both increase the likelihood of withdrawals significantly, while power shifts do not have a significant effect. We also find no evidence that changes in a states' government nationalism drove exit in the examined period. Finally, two of the other control variables have a statistically significant effect on IO withdrawals: IO size decreases the likelihood of exit while IOs that

cover economic issues are more likely to experience withdrawals. The other remaining control variable – political issue – is not statistically relevant.

Table 1: Three Firth logistic regression models of IO exit.

	Main Model 1	**Model 2 During Cold War (1945-1989)**	**Model 3 After Cold War (1990-2014)**
Delegation	0.168**	0.00422	0.240**
	(0.0743)	(0.124)	(0.0963)
Pooling	0.782***	1.139***	0.631**
	(0.255)	(0.442)	(0.319)
Level of Democracy	0.0597**	0.700**	1.211***
	(0.0242)	(0.319)	(0.188)
Preference Diversion	1.067***	0.0409	0.0758*
	(0.167)	(0.0323)	(0.0395)
IO Average Democracy Score	-0.0589*	-0.0949*	-0.0693
	(0.0314)	(0.0559)	(0.0464)
Government Orientation Change	0.365	0.445	0.372
	(0.338)	(0.589)	(0.401)
Nationalism	0.318	-0.0708	0.372
	(0.336)	(0.723)	(0.376)
IO issue Politics	-0.133	-0.980	0.211
	(0.612)	(1.499)	(0.654)
IO issue Economy	0.937***	0.693	0.992**
	(0.314)	(0.517)	(0.402)
Contagion	3.041***	3.431***	3.030***
	(0.562)	(0.907)	(0.671)
State Power Change	-1.203	-2.255	-0.806
	(0.867)	(1.658)	(0.939)
IO Membership Duration	-0.198	-0.280	-0.172
	(0.131)	(0.240)	(0.156)
IO Size	-0.873***	-0.689***	-0.988***
	(0.126)	(0.231)	(0.151)
Constant	-6.333***	-5.755***	-6.340***
	(0.639)	(1.059)	(0.836)
AIC	1118.527	360.747	748.379
BIC	1258.473	483.810	883.344
Observations	162,127	48,541	113,586

*Note: Dependent variable IO withdrawal; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Model 2 and Model 3 point to interesting differences regarding the effect of IO authority on state withdrawals between the periods 1945-1990 and 1990- 2014. Model 2 shows that while the pooling variable is highly significant and positively correlated with withdrawal during *and* after the Cold War, the delegation variable fails to reach statistical significance in the Cold War period. However, the results of Model 3 suggest that both pooling and delegation are significantly and positively associated with withdrawal in the period after the Cold War. This is an interesting finding as pooling therefore appears to be a robust predictor of withdrawal and

particularly during the Cold War, while delegation is only associated with exit after throughout the period after the Cold War. An interpretation in line with our theory could be that, as IO authority has become ever more intrusive since the 1990s, international bureaucracies increasingly impacted states' self-determination and thus drove their withdrawals.

Pooling and delegation are not only statistically significant but also substantially relevant. With regards to the *pooling* variable, we calculated the predicted probability of withdrawal at both of its values while holding all other variables of our main Model 1 at their means. In this constellation, the pooling of authority makes exit on average more than twice times more likely as compared to the same constellation but that there is no pooling authority. With regard to our *delegation* variable, we find a similar difference in the predicted probabilities to withdrawal. The highest value of our delegation variable, i.e. when all delegation indicators are present, is associated with an on average almost four times higher probability to withdraw as compared to the lowest degree of our delegation variable, i.e. when there is no delegation at all (and all other variables at their means). To be sure, the absolute changes in probability are low. Nevertheless, as compared to the also very low baseline probability of exit due to the rareness of this event in the data (188 instances across more than 160.000 observations), the substantive effects of pooling and delegation are not only significant but also comparably strong.

Figure 1: Predicted probability of withdrawal at all levels of pooling and delegation.



Note: 95% confidence intervals. All other variables of Model 1 held at their means.

4.2 Assessing the conditional effect of institutional authority across regime types and institutional configurations on IO exit

Beyond the claim that pooling as well as delegation drive IO member states' exit, our theory supposes that the effects of delegation (H_{2a}) as well as pooling (H_{2b}) are particularly strong for democracies in general and within authoritative IOs dominated either by member with diverging preferences (H_{2c}) or by autocracies (H_{2d}) in particular. More precisely, we would expect the effect of pooling and delegation on democracies' withdrawal to be substantially higher in institutional configurations where the IO average democracy is low as compared to institutional settings where the IO average democracy is high. And we further would expect that the effect of pooling and delegation on democracies' withdrawal to be substantially higher in institutional configurations where the preferences of other IO members strongly diverge as compared to settings where preferences are in line with their own. The conditional marginal effects of our pooling and delegation variable at different level of state democracy as well as the two distinct institutional configurations support our expectations.

We first calculated the conditional marginal effects of our pooling and delegation variable over all values of state democracy-level while holding all other variables of our main Model 1 at their means. Our *democracy hypothesis* claims that democracies – as compared to autocracies – should be more likely to withdraw from authoritative IOs as compared to IOs with low levels of pooling and delegation (H_{2a}). We should thus observe varying effects of pooling and delegation across states' democracy-levels. Figure 2 graphs the average changes in a states' probability to exit for a one-unit increase of our pooling variable and delegation variable at specific levels of state democracy. In line with our democracy hypothesis, the strength of the pooling effect on governments' probability to withdraw increases with states' democracy-level. While pooling has the lowest effect on states' probability to withdraw showing low democracy-levels, it has the highest effect on the most democratic states' probability to withdraw. The same holds true for the effect of delegation which simultaneously increases substantially with increasing levels of state democracy. Most importantly, Figure 2 demonstrates that pooling as well as delegation have substantially smaller effects on the probability to withdrawal which are not significantly different from zero (at the 95% confidence interval) for states with low levels of democracy, these effects are substantially larger and significantly different from zero for states with higher levels of democracy.

Figure 2: Conditional marginal effects of pooling and delegation for varying state levels of democracy.



Note: average marginal effects of Pooling and Delegation with 95% confidence intervales; all other variables at their means.

Second, our *'interest gap' hypothesis* claims that the effect of pooled and delegated authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies in IOs that are dominated by member states with divergent preferences than in IOs dominated by states with convergent preferences (H_{2b}). We should therefore see the highest probability changes in favor of democratic exit in institutional configurations where the average member state preferences in an authoritative IO strongly diverge from a states' own. To test this proposition, we calculated the conditional marginal effects of our pooling as well as delegation variable for different democracy-levels as well as low, medium and high state preference divergences from the IO average. As Figure 3 shows, while pooling and delegation have almost no effect on governments' probability to withdrawal across all democracy-levels in IOs where preference divergence is low, the effects of pooling and delegation steeply increase the higher a state's democracy-level and the stronger its preferences diverge from an IO's average. Moreover, the effect of pooling as well as delegation on autocracies in IOs with a high preference divergence is clearly not significantly different from zero. This lends support to our theoretical expectations that when authority is pooled and the other IO member states' preferences strongly diverge from one's own, democratic governments face an 'interest gap' between the demands of domestic constituencies and IO policies that drives withdrawals. For autocracies, to the contrary, this gap does not affect their probability to withdraw.

Figure 3: Conditional marginal effect of pooling and delegation on states' probability to withdraw for different levels of state democracy scores and the highest and lowest degrees of preference diversion from the IO average.



Note: average marginal effects of Pooling and Delegation with 95% confidence intervales; all other variables at their means.

Finally, our *'identity gap' hypothesis* suggests that the effect of pooled and delegated authority on governments' probability to exit IOs is stronger for democracies in IOs that are dominated by autocracies than in IOs dominated by democracies (H_{2c}). We should therefore see the highest probabilities of democratic exit in institutional configurations where the average democracy-level of an authoritative IO is low. We thus calculated the marginal effects of pooling and delegation for different democracy-levels and manipulated the average IO democracy-level. All the other variables are again held at their means. Figure 4 shows that the highest changes in probability due to a one-unit increase in pooling and delegation respectively are associated with high levels of state democracy and low levels of IO average democracy. While pooling and delegation have only weak effects on autocracies' probability to withdrawal in both, predominantly democratic and predominantly non-democratic IOs, these effects are substantially stronger for democracies in IOs with low average democracies score.

Figure 4: Marginal effect of pooling and delegation on states' probability to withdraw for different levels of state democracy scores and the highest and lowest IO average democracy scores.



Note: average marginal effects of Pooling and Delegation with 95% confidence intervales; all other variables at their means.

4.3 Robustness

The results are generally robust to several robustness tests. First of all, we calculated our model without any control variables as well as with *additional potential confounders*: a member state's power, IO withdrawal clause, political backsliding, as well as UN agencies (see Appendix Section A.3). First, a member state's capabilities might matter for withdrawals out of several reasons: Powerful states might influence IO policies even beyond formal rules (Gruber, 2000; Johnson, 2014; Stone, 2011b). Powerful states might also be more likely to be democracies, potentially confounding the relationship between our democracy variable – as well as other domestic variables – and exit. As powerful states are also in a better position to 'go it alone', they might be both more prone to withdrawal (see Vries, 2018) and more prone to stay as they can issue credible exit threats and get accommodated by IOs (Lipscy, 2017; Morse & Keohane, 2014). We calculated two models, one including a states' GDP and one comprising the power indicator developed by Milewicz and Snidal (Milewicz & Snidal, 2016). Second, we also included whether an IO constitution comprised a withdrawal clause as the existence of a clear, negotiated procedure might affect the likelihood of exit (Helfer, 2005; Barabara Koremenos & Nau, 2010). Precise withdrawal clauses might also be associated with higher IO authority, as more institutionalization. We sourced this information from von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 360) whose dataset contains "a binary variable indicating whether the IGO charter or founding covenant contains a withdrawal clause." Third, we calculated a model containing political backsliding. Sates experiencing political backsliding might be more likely to exit to

avoid sanctions form the IO. Political backsliding is also associated with a country's democracy-level and the government change variable. We, again, draw von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, pp. 360–361) whose dataset comprises political backsliding as "a binary variable coded 1 if any of the following apply: a two-point or larger reduction in human rights or Polity2 scores compared to the prior year, a successful coup d'état, or serious election irregularities (unacceptable election quality, major election problems, and government harassment of the opposition) and 0 otherwise." We also ran one model without any control variables. Finally, as our dataset comprises both stand-alone IOs as well as UN agencies, we checked whether the inclusion of the latter drove our results. Again, the effect of pooling and delegation remain robust. The results for all models remain unchanged (see Appendix Table A.1).

With regards to *operationalization*, the results remain robust for different specifications of our pooling index (see Appendix Section A.4) and our delegation index (see Appendix Section A.5). We ran models comprising the indexes with changed aggregation rules and disaggregated the indexes into their components. With regards to pooling, we find that both obligation and majority voting inhibit an independent and significant effect on states' exit. Moreover, aggregating them into a three-scale variable instead of a dummy variable does not change their impact on withdrawal (see Appendix Table A.2). With regards to delegation, we find that the independent secretariat indicator is highly significant and positively correlated with member state withdrawal while the other indictors – monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settlement – do not reach statistical significance. Moreover, using an alternative delegation index that does not weight independent secretariat fails to reach statistical significance (see Appendix Table A.3). This suggests that independent secretariat is the main driver of the observed effect of our delegation index. We interpret this as support for our decision to weight the independent secretariat indicator as it is in line with our theory, which claims that, in the absence of an independent secretariat, monitoring, enforcement, or dispute settlement might not have a constraining effect on member states.

In addition, we also re-ran our main model using the MIA dataset on IO authority (Hooghe et al., 2017). While using this alternative source decreases the number of observations considerably (from 162,127 to 72,279), it allows us to check whether our results hold using more fine-grained, time-variant data on pooling and delegation (see Appendix, Section A.6). While the effect of pooling on exit remains highly significant, the delegation variable has no significant effect on withdrawal. However, given that using the MIA dataset came with dropping more than half of our observations, and exit being a rare event, these findings might

be strongly biased. Finally, we plan to run a model with a different operationalization of the democracy-level that we sourced from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010) (see Appendix Section A.7).

The results also remain robust in *different samples*. Including the government orientation change variable restricted our analysis to the period from 1975 to 2014. By dropping the government orientation change variable from the model, we checked whether our model holds in the period from 1945 through 2014 (see Appendix Section A.8). The results also remain robust across the full period (see Appendix Table A.5).

We also ran our analysis with *alternative estimation methods*. First, we used to ordinary logit models to include cluster standard errors on IOs as well as countries (see Appendix Section A.9). Both do not change our results (see Appendix Table A.6). Moreover, we re-run our main model using rare event logistic regression as proposed by King and Zeng (2001) and used by von Borzyskowski and Vsabulas (2019) (see Appendix Section A.10). Since the estimated coefficients of our model are robust and significant across all estimation techniques, we are ensured that our findings are not driven by our methodological choice in favor of Firth logit models (see Appendix Table A.7). Finally, we re-ran our model using the conditional logit method to account for potential hidden unit heterogeneity across countries (see Appendix Section A.11). The results remain robust when including country fixed effects (see Appendix Table A.8).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we theoretically developed and empirically tested a theory of IO withdrawals. The analysis of member states' withdrawal from IOs from 1945 through 2014 corroborated our theoretical expectation that the pooling and delegation of authority in IOs affects exits. This authority effect is stronger for democracies than autocracies and particularly pronounced when democracies in authoritative IOs are confronted with a majority of member states that a either autocratic or strongly diverge in their preferences. Overall, our results imply that scholarship on IO withdrawals should consider domestic and international institutions that moderate the effects of power and domestic politics.

While the large-n analysis from 1945 through 2014 lends support to our theory, two caveats are in order. First, while the pooling of authority is a robust predictor of withdrawal, the delegation of authority is only associated with exit after the end of the Cold War. This finding suggests, as IO authority became more intrusive since the 1990s (Börzel & Zürn, 2020; Hooghe, Lenz, &

Marks, 2019a; Zürn, 2018), international bureaucracies are also increasingly driving withdrawals. We therefore hold that IO authority does not only account for IO withdrawals in the recent and not so recent past but will continue to be an important driver of exit in the future. Second, while our regression analysis demonstrated that IO authority is associated with exit across case, process tracing analysis is required to uncover whether IO authority and regime types translate into the theorized mechanisms cumulating into the outcome as expected. Future research should therefore examine whether our theorized mechanisms were present in recent cases such as Brexit or the Trump Administration's withdrawal from numerous IOs in within-case studies (see, e.g., Daßler et al., 2019).

While scholarship for a long time was concerned with the power shift to autocratic states, our results imply that exit as a fundamental challenge for IOs also predominantly stemmed from democracies. Moreover, our findings also imply that withdrawal from IOs might not only be a consequence of populist-nationalist parties, but a broader phenomenon connected to democracies' general responsiveness to public opinion. This points to a problematic tension between democracies and multilateral cooperation, which one could call the 'democracy paradox' of the LIO. While democracies often created IOs in the first place, they have always been – and continue to be – among their fiercest critics. As IOs succeed and attract members with heterogenous preferences and political systems, democracies tend to be more and more cautious about multilateral cooperation. Due to their sensitivity to societal demands, it is particularly democratic governments who break with IOs when they face the risk of being overruled and forced to implement undesired IO policies. The very success of their creations fuels democracies' withdrawals from IOs. The current rise of authoritarianism risks to drive democracies away from IOs, hollowing out the LIO and allowing authoritarian governments, such as China or India, to fill the gap.

References

Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(2), 430–456. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595700

Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization*, *59*(01). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050010

Baum, M. A., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2015). Filtering revolution. *Journal of Peace Research*, *52*(3), 384–400. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314554791

Bearce, D. H., & Jolliff Scott, B. J. (2019). Popular non-support for international organizations: How extensive and what does this represent? *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(2), 187–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09351-3

Bernauer, T., Mohrenberg, S., & Koubi, V. (2020). Do citizens evaluate international cooperation based on information about procedural and outcome quality? *The Review of International Organizations*, *15*(2), 505–529. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09354-0

Bisbee, J., Mosley, L., Pepinsky, T. B., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2019). Decompensating domestically: the political economy of anti-globalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678662

Blake, D. J., & Payton, A. L. (2015). Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, *10*(3), 377–402. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9201-9

Blyth, M. (2017). Global Trumpism: Why Trump's victory was 30 years in the making and why it Won't stop Here. *Foreign Affairs Anthology*. (15).

Börzel, T. A., & Zürn, M. (2020). *Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism*. SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 3.

Borzyskowski, I. von, & Vabulas, F. (2019). Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations? *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(2), 335–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09352-2

Brown, R. L. (2010). Measuring Delegation. *The Review of International Organizations*, *5*(2), 141–175. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9076-3

Carvalho Pinto, V. (2019). Signalling for Status: UAE and Women's Rights. *Contexto Internacional*, *41*(2), 345–363. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2019410200006

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*, *143*(1-2), 67–101. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2

Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). Global Competition and Brexit. *American Political Science Review*, *112*(2), 201–218. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000685

Cooley, A., & Nexon, D. H. (2020). *Exit from hegemony: The unraveling of the American global order*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Copelovitch, M., & Pevehouse, J. C. W. [Jon C. W.] (2019). International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism. *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(2), 169–186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09353-1

Cox, R., & Jacobson, H. (1974). *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations*. New Haven, London, England: Yale University Press.

Daßler, B., Heinkelmann-Wild, T., & Kruck, A. (2019). *When Does the Barking Dog Bite?: Hegemonic Decline, the Trump Administration and Varieties of Contestation of Multilateral Institutions*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Science Section of the German Society for American Studies. "The Corrosion of the Liberal Democratic Order? Transatlantic Perspectives in Perilous Times", November 2019. Heidelberg.

De Vries, Catherine E., Hobolt, Sara and Walter, Stefanie (2020). Politicizing international cooperation: The mass public, political entrepreneurs and political opportunity structures. *International Organization*.

Debre, M. J. (2020). The dark side of regionalism: how regional organizations help authoritarian regimes to boost survival. *Democratization*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1823970
Deitelhoff, N. (2020). What's in a name? Contestation and backlash against international norms and institutions. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *22*(4), 715–727. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120945906
Dellmuth, L. M., Scholte, J. A., & Tallberg, J. (2019). Institutional sources of legitimacy for international organisations: Beyond procedure versus performance. *Review of International Studies*, *45*(04), 627–646. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051900007X
Dellmuth, L. M., & Tallberg, J. (2015). The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation in the United Nations. *Review of International Studies*, *41*(3), 451–475. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000230
Dijkstra, H. (2017). Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, *23*(4), 601–619. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02304006
Fang, S., & Owen, E. (2011). International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies. *The Review of International Organizations*, *6*(2), 141–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9102-0
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*, *88*(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796
Firth, M. (1993). Price setting and the value of a strong brand name. *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, *10*(4), 381–386. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-8116(93)90020-Y
Foa, S. (2016). Its the globalization, stupid. *Foreign Policy*. (12/6).
Freedman, J. (2020). Back of the queue: Brexit, status loss, and the politics of backlash. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *22*(4), 631–643. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120949824
Frosini, J. O., & Gilbert, M. F. (2020). The Brexit car crash: using E.H. Carr to explain Britain's choice to leave the European Union in 2016. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *27*(5), 761–778. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1676820
Fukuyama, F. (2016, November 11). US against the world?: Trump's America and the new global order'. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/6a43cf54-a75d-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1
Gartzke, E. (2007). The Capitalist Peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, *51*(1), 166–191. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x
Gartzke, E., & Hewitt, J. J. (2010). International Crises and the Capitalist Peace. *International Interactions*, *36*(2), 115–145. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050621003784846
Greig, M., & Enterline, A. (2017). COW National Material Capabilities (NMC) data documentation, Version 5.
Gruber, L. (2000). *Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Guriev, S. M., & Treisman, D. (2020). A Theory of Informational Autocracy. *Journal of Public Economics.* Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426238
Habib, J., & Howard, M. The Political Economy of Donald J. Trump. In *Reading Donald Trump* (103–125).
Hafner-Burton, E. M., Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008). Democratization and human rights regimes. *Available at SSRN 1123771*.
Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Schneider, C. J. (2019). The Company You Keep: International Organizations and the Reputational Effects of Membership. *AJIL Unbound*, *113*, 242–246. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.55

Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2005). Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. *American Journal of Sociology*, *110*(5), 1373–1411. https://doi.org/10.1086/428442

Hanrieder, T. (2014). Gradual Change in International Organisations: Agency Theory and Historical Institutionalism. *Politics*, *34*(4), 324–333. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12050

Hasenclever, A., & Weiffen, B. (2006). International institutions are the key:: a new perspective on the democratic peace. *Review of International Studies*, 563–585.

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368

Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., & Rittberger, B. (2020). The EU Multi-level System and the Europeanization of Domestic Blame Games. *Politics and Governance*, *8*(1), 85–94.

Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B., & Zangl, B. (2020). Divided they fail: the politics of wedge issues and Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *27*(5), 723–741. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1683058

Heinkelmann-Wild, T., & Zangl, B. (2019). Multilevel blame games: Blame-shifting in the European Union. *Governance.* Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12459

Helfer, L. R. (2005). Exiting treaties. *Virginia Law Review*. (91), 1579–1648.

Hertog, S. (2017). *A quest for significance: Gulf oil monarchies' international 'soft power' strategies and their local urban dimensions* (LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series No. 42). London, United Kingdom. Retrieved from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library website: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:69883

Hooghe, L. [Liesbet], Lenz, T., & Marks, G. [Gary] (2019a). Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance. *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(4), 731–743. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9334-3

Hooghe, L. [Liesbet], Lenz, T., & Marks, G. [Gary] (2019b). *A theory of international organization* (First edition). *A postfunctionalist theory of governance.*

Hooghe, L. [Liesbet], & Marks, G. [Gary] (2015). Delegation and pooling in international organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, *10*(3), 305–328. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9194-4

Hooghe, L. [Liesbet], Marks, G. [Gary], Lenz, T., Bezuijen, J., Ceka, B., & Derderyan, S. (2017). *Measuring international authority: A postfunctionalist theory of governance* (First edition). *Transformations in governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724490.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724490.001.0001

Hühne, P., Meyer, B., Nunnenkamp, P., & Roy, M. (2016). Democracies cooperate more: even where it threatens to bite? *Applied Economics Letters*, *23*(11), 812–815. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1111979

Imber, M. F. (1989). *The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and withdrawal in the specialized agencies*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Johnson, T. (2014). *Organizational progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance*. *Transformations in governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jupille, J., Mattli, W., & Snidal, D. (2013). *Institutional Choice and Global Commerce*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139855990

Kaoutzanis, C., Poast, P., & Urpelainen, J. (2016). Not letting 'bad apples' spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules. *The Review of International Organizations*, *11*(4), 399–418. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9237-5

Keohane, R. O., & Hoffmann, S. Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s. In *The European Union* (pp. 237–255). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23984-9_21
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001). Logistic regression in rare events data. *Political Analysis*. (9/2), 137–163.
Koremenos, B. [Barabara], & Nau, A. (2010). Exit, no exit. *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, *21*(81), 81–119.
Koremenos, B. [Barbara] (2008). When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate? *Law and Contemporary Problems*. (71), 151–192.
Koremenos, B. [Barbara], Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, *55*(4), 761–799. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193592
Kreuder-Sonnen, C., & Rittberger, B. (2020). *The LIOn's Share: How the Liberal International Order Contributes to its Own Legitimacy Crisis*. CES Open Forum Series 2019-2020. Cambridge.
Kreuder-Sonnen, C., & Zangl, B. (2020). Zwischen Hoffen und Bangen: Zum Verhältnis von Autorität, Politisierung und Demokratisierung in internationalen Organisationen. *Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen*, *27*(1), 5–36. https://doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2020-1-5
Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Heinkelmann-Wild, T. (2020). *Dolce far niente?: Analysing non-compliance as a blame avoidance strategy.*
Kurizaki, S., & Whang, T. (2015). Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes. *International Organization*, *69*(4), 949–980. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000211
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *44*(2), 203–227. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044002003
Lake, D. A. (2007). Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. *The Review of International Organizations*, *2*(3), 219–237. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-007-9012-3
Lall, R. (2017). Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. *International Organization*.
Layne, C. (2018). The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana. *International Affairs*, *94*(1), 89–111. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix249
Leitgöb, H. (2013). The problem of modeling rare events in ML-based logistic regression. *European Survey Research Association. Ljubljana.*
Lenz, T., Bezuijen, J., Hooghe, L. [Liesbet], & Marks, G. [Gary] (2015). Patterns of International Organization: Task Specific vs. General Purpose. In E. d. Conceição-Heldt, M. Koch, & A. Liese (Eds.), *Internationale Organisationen* (pp. 136–161). Nomos. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-136
Lipscy, P. Y. (2017). *Renegotiating the World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316570463
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2000). Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review*, *94*(2), 305–321. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586014
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, *56*(3), 477–513. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199863
Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. [Jon C.] (2006). Democratization and International Organizations. *International Organization*, *60*(01). https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830606005X
Marks, G. [G.], Hooghe, L. [L.], & Blank, K. (1996). European integration and the state: multi-level vs. state centric governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *34/3*, 341-378.

Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. (2010). Polity IV project: Characteristics and transitions, 1800–2009. Dataset Users' Manual. *Center for Systemic Peace*.
Mattes, M., & Rodríguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly*, *58*(3), 527–538. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12107
Milewicz, K. M., & Snidal, D. (2016). Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers. *International Organization*, *70*(4), 823–844. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831600031X
Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (1997). Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(1), 117–146. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041001006
Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, *51*(4), 513–553. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447
Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. *Cornell studies in political economy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. Retrieved from http://www.h-net.org/review/hrev-a0b7p6-aa
Moravcsik, A. M. (1993). *Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach.*
Morse, J. C., & Keohane, R. O. (2014). Contested multilateralism. *The Review of International Organizations*, *9*(4), 385–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9188-2
Mousseau, M. (2013). The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It's the Economy 1. *International Studies Quarterly*, *57*(1), 186–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12003
Musgrave, P. (2019). International Hegemony Meets Domestic Politics: Why Liberals can be Pessimists. *Security Studies*, *28*(3), 451–478. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604983
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norrlof, C. (2018). Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook. *International Affairs*, *94*(1), 63–88. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix262
Pevehouse, J. C. [Jon C.] (2002). With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, *46*(3), 611. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088403
Pevehouse, J. C. W. [Jon C. W.], Nordstrom, T., McManus, R. W., & Jamison, A. S. (2020). Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets. *Journal of Peace Research*, *57*(3), 492–503. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319881175
Poast, P., & Urpelainen, J. (2018). *Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist New Democracies*. *Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Polachek, S. W. (1997). Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation. *Review of International Economics*, *5*(3), 295–309. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00058
Pollack, M. A. (1997). *Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community.*
Pollack, M. A. (2003). *The engines of European integration: Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199251177.001.0001
Rauh, C., & Zürn, M. (2020). Authority, politicization, and alternative justifications: endogenous legitimation dynamics in global economic governance 1. *Review of International Political Economy*, *27*(3), 583–611. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1650796
Reinsberg, B., & Westerwinter, O. (2019). The global governance of international development:: Documenting the rise of multi-stakeholder partnerships and identifying

underlying theoretical explanations. *The Review of International Organizations.* Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09362-0
Remmer, K. L. (1998). Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region. *International Studies Quarterly*, *42*(1), 25–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00068
Rittberger, B. (2005). *Building Europe's parliament: Democratic representation beyond the nation-state*. Oxford, New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0638/2005298094-d.html
Rittberger, B., Schwarzenbeck, H., & Zangl, B. (2017). Where Does the Buck Stop?: Explaining Public Responsibility Attributions in Complex International Institutions. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *55*(4), 909–924. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12524
Rittberger, V. (Ed.) (1995). *Anpassung oder Austritt: Industriestaaten in der UNESCO-Krise: Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Aussenpolitikforschung*. Berlin: Ed. Sigma.
Rivera, L. A., & Tilcsik, A. (2016). Class Advantage, Commitment Penalty. *American Sociological Review*, *81*(6), 1097–1131. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416668154
Rixen, T., & Zangl, B. (2013). The politicization of international economic institutions in US public debates. *The Review of International Organizations*, *8*(3), 363–387. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9158-5
Rus, V. (1980). Positive and Negative Power: Thoughts on the Dialectics of Power. *Organization Studies*, *1*(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/017084068000100102
Schlipphak, B., & Treib, O. (2017). Playing the blame game on Brussels: the domestic political effects of EU interventions against democratic backsliding. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *24*(3), 352–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229359
Schmidt, S. K. (2020). No match made in heaven. Parliamentary sovereignty, EU over-constitutionalization and Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *27*(5), 779–794. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1733635
Schneider, C. J. (2020). Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union. *The Journal of Politics*, *82*(1), 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1086/705924
Singer, J. D., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. In B. M. Russett (Ed.), *Peace, war and numbers* (19(48)). Sage Publications.
Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly*. (50(2)), 445–477.
Snyder, J. (2019). The broken bargain. *Foreign Affairs*. (3/4), 54–60.
Spencer, A., & Oppermann, K. (2020). Narrative genres of Brexit: the Leave campaign and the success of romance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *27*(5), 666–684. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1662828
Stier, S. (2015). Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom. *Democratization*, *22*(7), 1273–1295. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.964643
Stobb, M. (2019). A shield in battle: the contingent value of human rights treaties to INGOs in autocracies. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, *23*(4), 555–574. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2018.1513401
Stone, R. W. (2011a). *Controlling Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943
Stone, R. W. (2011b). *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy* (1. publ). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10469103 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943
Tallberg, J. (2002). Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences? *West European Politics*, *25*(1), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601584

Tallberg, J., Lundgren, M., Sommerer, T., & Squatrito, T. (2020). Why International Organizations Commit to Liberal Norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, *64*(3), 626–640. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa046

Tallberg, J., & Zürn, M. (2019). The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations: introduction and framework. *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(4), 581–606. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9330-7

Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization*, *61*(04). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282

Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization*, *62*(01), 871. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830808003X

Vries, C. E. d. (2018). *Euroscepticism and the future of European integration* (1st edition). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Zürn, M. (2018). *A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zürn, M., Binder, M., & Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2012). International authority and its politicization. *International Theory*, *4*(1), 69–106. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971912000012

Zürn, Michael, Tokhi, Alexandros, & Binder, M. (2020). *The International Authority Database (IAD).*

Appendix

In this Appendix, we provide descriptive statistics and a series of additional analyses that complement and further support the main article's findings. These include the following sections:

A.1. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis
A.2. Comparing the pooling and delegation indicators with the MIA dataset
A.3. Firth logit models with no and additional control variables
A.4. Firth logit model with alternative coding of the independent variable – the pooling index
A.5. Firth logit model with alternative coding of the independent variable – the delegation index
A.6. Firth logit model with alternative source for pooling and delegation – the MIA dataset
A.7. Firth logit model with alternative source for democracy – the DD Dataset
A.8. Firth logit models with different samples
A.9. Standard logit models with clustered standard errors on IO and countries
A.10. Rare event logit model
A.11. Conditional logit model using country fixed effects

A.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables used in the analysis

Table A.1 Summary statistics for all variables used in the main empirical analysis.

	Obs	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Withdrawal	486498	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.000	1.000
Delegation	412080	3.117	1.848	4.000	0.000	6.000
Pooling	487827	0.257	0.437	0.000	0.000	1.000
Preference Diversion	432166	0.623	0.556	0.467	0.000	3.979
Democracy	444024	2.215	7.362	5.000	-10.000	10.000
IO Average Democracy Score	444005	2.215	3.807	2.564	-10.000	10.000
Government Orientation Change	228444	0.101	0.301	0.000	0.000	1.000
Nationalism	361820	0.174	0.379	0.000	0.000	1.000
IO Issue Politics	486498	0.152	0.359	0.000	0.000	1.000
IO issue Economy	486498	0.513	0.500	1.000	0.000	1.000
Contagion	486498	0.002	0.041	0.000	0.000	1.000
State Power Change	456579	-0.003	0.161	0.000	-5.634	3.921
IO Membership Duration	470020	2.890	0.928	2.996	0.693	5.088
IO Size	486498	4.039	0.991	4.205	0.000	5.268

A.2 Comparing the pooling and delegation indicators with the MIA dataset

To check the robustness of our measurement of pooling and delegation, we calculated simple linear regression models with the delegation and pooling variables retrieved from the MIA dataset compiled by Hooghe et al. (2017) as the dependent variables and our Pooling and Delegation Indices as independent variables. The following table shows that in both cases they are positively correlated and this correlation is further highly significant**.**

Table A.2 OLS regression predicting pooling and delegation with our indicators.

	Pooling (MIA)	Delegation (MIA)
Pooling	0.159***	
	(0.000687)	
Delegation		0.0100***
		(0.000184)
Constant	0.358***	0.183***
	(0.000427)	(0.000809)
Observations	180,543	149,967
R-squared	0.228	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Figure A.1 further shows that high values in the pooling and delegation variables taken from MIA are well approximated by our indicators for pooling and delegation with some rare exceptions.

Figure A.1 Correlation between MIA indicators vis-à-vis our indicators for (1) pooling and (2) delegation.



A.3 Firth logit models with no and additional control variables

In Model A.1.1, we drop all controls and regress withdrawal only on the theoretically interesting independent variables as including controls may bias our results. In models A.1.2-A.1.7, we added several potential confounders: a member state's power, IO withdrawal clause, and political backsliding, and UN agencies.

First of all, we account for a member state's capabilities. A states' power might matter for withdrawals out of several reasons: Powerful states might influence IO policies even beyond formal rules (Gruber, 2000; Johnson, 2014; Stone, 2011). Powerful states might also be more likely to be democracies, potentially confounding the relationship between our democracy variable – as well as other domestic variables – and exit. As powerful states are also in a better position to 'go it alone', they might be both more prone to withdrawal (see Vries, 2018) and more prone to stay as they can issue credible exit threats and get accommodated by IOs (Lipscy,

2017; Morse & Keohane, 2014). We calculated two models: Model A.1.2 includes a states' GDP. Model A.1.3 uses the power index developed by Milewicz and Snidal (2016).

Model A.1.4 comprises information on whether an IO constitution comprised a withdrawal clause as the existence of a clear, negotiated procedure might affect the likelihood of exit (Helfer, 2005; Koremenos & Nau, 2010). Precise withdrawal clauses might also be associated with higher IO authority, as more institutionalization. We sourced this information from von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) whose dataset contains "a binary variable indicating whether the IGO charter or founding covenant contains a withdrawal clause."

Model A.1.5 includes information on political backsliding. Sates experiencing political backsliding might be more likely to exit to avoid sanctions form the IO. Political backsliding is also associated with a country's democracy-level and the government change variable. We, again, draw von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) whose dataset comprises political backsliding as "a binary variable coded 1 if any of the following apply: a two-point or larger reduction in human rights or Polity2 scores compared to the prior year, a successful coup d'état, or serious election irregularities (unacceptable election quality, major election problems, and government harassment of the opposition) and 0 otherwise."

Model A.1.6 includes a dummy variable for UN agencies as our dataset comprises both IGOs and their emanations, particularly from the UN system. The results remain largely unchanged when accounting for these potential confounders (see Table A.1). Only in model A.1.2., where we included the GDP to our main model, while the pooling variable remains significant (on the 95% level) our delegation variable, albeit pointing into the expected direction, is no longer significant.

Table A.1 Firth Logit Models including Pooling and Delegation as well as different constellations of other important control variables.

VARIABLES	(A.1.1) No controls	(A.1.2) GDP	(A.1.3) Power index	(A.1.4) Withdraw clause	(A.1.5) Back-sliding	(A.1.6) UN agency
Delegation	0.0900**	0.126	0.145*	0.156**	0.168**	0.146*
	(0.0441)	(0.0802)	(0.0800)	(0.0762)	(0.0743)	(0.0771)
Pooling	0.982***	0.688**	0.651**	0.726***	0.782***	0.673**
	(0.155)	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.265)
Preference Diversion		1.025***	0.855***	1.065***	1.061***	1.087***
		(0.233)	(0.248)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.167)
Level of Democracy		0.0500*	0.0380	0.0585**	0.0704**	0.0608**
		(0.0299)	(0.0262)	(0.0241)	(0.0312)	(0.0241)
IO Average Democracy		-0.0651*	-0.0600*	-0.0676**	-0.0592*	-0.0463
		(0.0350)	(0.0336)	(0.0317)	(0.0313)	(0.0319)
Government Orientation Change		0.217	0.0669	0.362	0.369	0.330
		(0.395)	(0.420)	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.336)
Nationalist		0.538	0.485	0.311	0.321	-0.103
		(0.349)	(0.350)	(0.337)	(0.336)	(0.612)
IO Issue Politics		0.159	-0.00361	-0.0944	-0.131	0.892***
		(0.641)	(0.624)	(0.612)	(0.612)	(0.315)
IO issue Economic		1.092***	0.877**	0.828***	0.937***	2.850***
		(0.374)	(0.344)	(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.569)
Contagion		3.250***	3.235***	3.020***	3.040***	-1.173
		(0.571)	(0.571)	(0.560)	(0.562)	(0.860)
State Power Change		-1.093	-0.903	-1.185	-1.222	-0.228*
		(0.980)	(0.834)	(0.859)	(0.872)	(0.131)
IO Membership Duration		-0.265*	-0.210	-0.188	-0.200	0.363
		(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.338)
IO Size		-0.941***	-0.874***	-0.902***	-0.870***	-1.061***
		(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.159)
GDP current USD		0.0162	-	-	-	-
		(0.0775)				
Power index		-	0.833	-	-	-
			(0.661)			
Withdrawal Clause		-	-	0.579*	-	-
				(0.307)		
Domestic Political Backsliding		-	-	-	0.232	-
					(0.407)	
UN agency		-	-	-	-	0.864**
						(0.405)
Constant	-8.454***	-5.989***	-7.074***	-6.500***	-6.438***	-5.666***
	(0.181)	(0.968)	(1.140)	(0.655)	(0.673)	(0.700)
Observations	412,080	133,620	126,606	162,127	162,127	162,127

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

A.4. Firth logit model with alternative coding of the independent variable – the pooling index

In our main analysis, we approximate pooling by a binary index comprising indicators for majority voting and obligation. It assumes 0 when both majority voting and obligation are absent and 1 when both indicators are present. While we justify this operationalization in the paper, and demonstrate its validity compared to the MIA dataset above, this section also checks the robustness of decision. First, we ran a model in which our pooling index was disaggregated into its main indicators, i.e., majority voting and obligation. Second, we also ran a model where we changed the aggregation rule of our pooling index. We constructed a three-scale variable that assumes 0 in the absence of both majority voting and obligation, 1 if either majority voting or obligation is present, and 2 if both majority voting and obligation are present in an IO.

The results are presented in Table A.2 and corroborate our expectations. Model A.4.1 shows that both obligation and majority voting are significant and positively associated with withdrawal. Hence, both indicators inhibit an independent and significant effect on states' exit. Moreover, Model A.4.2 demonstrates that effect of pooling on withdrawal remains significant and positive when using another aggregation rule.

Table A.2 Model with disaggregated Pooling Indicators (Obligation and Majority) (1) and 3-scaled Pooling Indicator (2).

VARIABLES	(A.2.1) Withdrawal	(A.2.2) Withdrawal
Delegation	0.171**	0.166**
	(0.0750)	(0.0734)
Pooling	-	0.811***
		(0.167)
Majority	0.879***	-
	(0.260)	
Obligation	0.715**	-
	(0.302)	
Preference Diversion from IO average	1.103***	1.108***
	(0.164)	(0.164)
IO Average Democracy Score	-0.0282	-0.0284
	(0.0288)	(0.0288)
Government Orientation Change	0.499	0.499
	(0.337)	(0.337)
Nationalism	0.199	0.194
	(0.333)	(0.332)
IO issue Politics	-0.0906	-0.108
	(0.613)	(0.611)
IO issue Economic	1.020***	1.009***
	(0.318)	(0.315)
Contagion	2.943***	2.945***
	(0.563)	(0.563)
State Power Change	-1.464*	-1.456*
	(0.859)	(0.858)
IO Membership Duration	-0.160	-0.164
	(0.133)	(0.133)
IO size	-0.897***	-0.893***
	(0.125)	(0.124)
Constant	-6.786***	-6.811***
	(0.664)	(0.666)
Observations	162,127	162,127

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

A.5 Firth logit model with alternative coding of the independent variable – the delegation index

In our main analysis, we measure delegation by constructing a weighted additive index which comprises, on the one hand, the existence of an independent secretariat (which we weighted by the factor 3) and, on the other hand, enforcement, dispute settlement or monitoring mechanisms. Our delegation variable can therefore take 6 values, ranging from 0 (no delegation feature present) to 6 (indicating that all delegation features are present simultaneously). While we justify this operationalization in the paper, and demonstrate its validity compared with the MIA dataset above, this section also checks the robustness of our decision. First, we ran a model in which our delegation index was disaggregated into its main indicators, i.e., enforcement, monitoring, dispute settlement, and independent secretariat. Second, we also ran a model where we did not weight the independent secretariat indicator. As it is a simple, additive index, it ranges from 0 (no delegation feature present) to 4 (indicating that all delegation features are present simultaneously).

Table A.3 Model with disaggregated Delegation Indicators (1) and additive Delegation Index (2).

VARIABLES	(A.3.1) Withdrawal	(A.3.2) Withdrawal
Enforcement	-0.227	-
	(0.374)	
Monitoring	-0.230	-
	(0.299)	
Independent Secretariat	1.152***	-
	(0.337)	
Dispute Settlement	-0.121	-
	(0.246)	
Pooling	0.759***	0.768***
	(0.257)	(0.256)
Preference Diversion	1.074***	1.068***
	(0.163)	(0.163)
IO Average Democracy Score	-0.0280	-0.0314
	(0.0298)	(0.0289)
Governement Orientation Change	0.501	0.497
	(0.336)	(0.336)
Nationalism	0.174	0.177
	(0.332)	(0.332)
IO issue Politics	-0.0975	-0.163
	(0.613)	(0.610)
IO issue Economy	0.991***	0.952***
	(0.315)	(0.314)
Contagion	2.906***	3.108***
	(0.567)	(0.561)
State Power Change	-1.416*	-1.449*
	(0.842)	(0.855)
IO Membership Duration	-0.162	-0.178
	(0.131)	(0.130)
IO size	-0.808***	-0.806***
	(0.130)	(0.130)
Delegation Index Additive		0.0737
		(0.115)
Constant	-6.630***	-5.954***
	(0.665)	(0.617)
Observations	162,127	162,127

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The results are presented in Table A.3 and corroborate our expectations. Model A.2.1 shows that the independent secretariat indicator is highly significant and positively correlated with member state withdrawal. The other indictors – monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settlement – do not reach statistical significance. Model A.2.2 demonstrates that the alternative additive delegation index fails to reach statistical significance. This suggests that independent secretariat is the main driver of the observed effect of our delegation index. We interpret this as support for our decision to weight the independent secretariat indicator as it is in line with our theory, which claims that, in the absence of an independent secretariat, monitoring, enforcement, or dispute settlement might not have a constraining effect on member states.

A.6 Firth logit model with alternative source for pooling and delegation – the MIA dataset

In our main analysis, we decided against using the delegation and pooling indicators from the MIA dataset (Hooghe et al., 2017) as including them would have decreased the number of observations considerably (from 162,127 to 72,279). However, as the measurement of these indicators is more precise than ours and varies over time, we re-ran our model as a robustness check using the MIA data as source. While the *pooling (MIA)* and *delegation (MIA)* variables are taken from this alternative dataset, the other variables remain the same as in our main analysis.

Table A.4 Firth logit model with MIA indicators for delegation and pooling.

VARIABLES	(A.4.1) Withdrawal
Pooling (MIA)	4.558***
	(1.480)
Delegation (MIA)	-1.106
	(1.523)
Preference Diversion from IO Average	0.818***
	(0.246)
Democracy	0.0478*
	(0.0282)
IO average democracy score	-0.134***
	(0.0430)
Government Orientation Change	0.143
	(0.510)
Nationalism	0.225
	(0.416)
IO issue Politics	0.480
	(0.750)
IO issue Economy	1.501***
	(0.524)
Contagion	2.512***
	(0.675)
State Power Change	-0.757
	(2.044)
IO Membership Duration	-0.454***
	(0.167)
IO size	-1.417***
	(0.224)
Constant	-3.501***
	(0.902)
Observations	72,279

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

As Table A.4 shows, the results of this Model A.4.1. are generally consistent with our main model from the paper. Importantly, the *pooling_MIA* variable is highly significant and positively correlated with IO withdrawal. Moreover, a state's democracy-level is also significantly correlated with its likelihood to exit. The main difference is the *delegation_MIA* variable, that has no significant effect on withdrawal. Still, the results in this model have to be interpreted cautiously as we have much less observations for these two variables and therefore these findings might be strongly biased, in particular regarding the rarity of events.

A.7 Firth logit model with alternative source for democracy – The DD Dataset

We also plan to run a model with using a different operationalization of the democracy-level, sourced from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010).

A.8 Firth logit models with different samples

The results also remain robust in different samples. First, as including the government orientation change variable restricted our analysis to the period from 1975 to 2014, we re-run our main model while dropping the government orientation change. The results presented in Table A.5 demonstrate that our model is robust in the extended period from 1945 through 2014. Importantly, Model A.5.1 supports our hypotheses about the main effects of pooling and delegation.

Table A.5 Firth logit model without Government orientation change (1945-2014).

VARIABLES	(A.5.1) Main model w/o Gov orientation change
Delegation	0.142**
	(0.0621)
Pooling	1.026***
	(0.214)
Preference Diversion from IO average	1.059***
	(0.143)
Democracy	0.0474***
	(0.0171)
IO average democracy score	-0.0188
	(0.0263)
Nationalism	0.224
	(0.276)
IO issue Politics	0.345
	(0.483)
IO issue Economy	1.165***
	(0.296)
Contagion	2.752***
	(0.555)
State Power Change	-0.997**
	(0.435)
IO Membership Duration	-0.144
	(0.113)
Government Orientation Change	-
IO Size	-0.884***
	(0.106)
Constant	-6.596***
	(0.554)
Observations	257,379

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

A.9 Standard logit models with clustered standard errors on IO and countries

As Firth logit models do not allow for clustered standard errors, we re-ran our main model used ordinary logit models. Model A.9.1 includes cluster standard errors on IOs, while Model A.9.2 comprises cluster standard errors on countries. As Table A.6 shows, the results remain robust.

Table A.6 Ordinary logistic regression models using clustered standard errors on IOs (1) and countries (2).

VARIABLES	(A.6.1) Withdrawal	(A.6.2) Withdrawal
Delegation	0.174*	0.174***
	(0.0891)	(0.0571)
Pooling	0.794*	0.794***
	(0.432)	(0.201)
Preference Diversion	1.074***	1.074***
	(0.173)	(0.132)
IO average democracy score	-0.0281	-0.0281
	(0.0412)	(0.0266)
Governement Orientation Change	0.463	0.463
	(0.315)	(0.379)
Nationalism	0.141	0.141
	(0.545)	(0.314)
IO issue Politics	-0.199	-0.199
	(0.701)	(0.691)
IO issue Economy	0.999**	0.999***
	(0.436)	(0.293)
Contagion	2.934***	2.934***
	(0.477)	(0.607)
State Power Change	-1.353	-1.353***
	(0.952)	(0.396)
IO Membership Duration	-0.163	-0.163
	(0.164)	(0.126)
IO Size	-0.847***	-0.847***
	(0.174)	(0.0856)
Constant	-6.402***	-6.402***
	(0.841)	(0.448)
Observations	162,127	162,127

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

A.10 Rare event logit model

In our main analysis, we used the conventional Firth logit models to account for the rarity of our dependent variable. To increase confidence in results, we re-run our main model using *rare event logistic regression* as proposed by King and Zeng (2001) and used by von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019). Model A.7.1 includes cluster standard errors on IOs, while Model A.7.2 comprises cluster standard errors on countries. Table A.7 shows that the estimated coefficients of our model are consistent with our main model as they are similar across both estimation techniques. We are thus confident that our findings are not driven by our methodological choice.

Table A.7 Rare Event logit model using clustered standard errors on countries (1) and IOs (2).

VARIABLES	(A.7.1) Withdrawal	(A.7.2) Withdrawal
Delegation	0.172***	0.172*
	(0.0571)	(0.0891)
Pooling	0.795***	0.795*
	(0.201)	(0.432)
Pref Diversion From IO	1.085***	1.085***
	(0.132)	(0.173)
IO average Dem Score	-0.0288	-0.0288
	(0.0266)	(0.0412)
Gouvernement Orientation Change	0.501	0.501
	(0.379)	(0.315)
Nationalist	0.175	0.175
	(0.314)	(0.545)
IO issue Politics	-0.0780	-0.0780
	(0.691)	(0.701)
IO issue Economy	0.963***	0.963**
	(0.293)	(0.436)
Contagion	3.075***	3.075***
	(0.607)	(0.477)
State Power Change	-1.427***	-1.427
	(0.396)	(0.952)
IO Membership Duration	-0.167	-0.167
	(0.126)	(0.164)
IO size	-0.852***	-0.852***
	(0.0856)	(0.174)
Constant	-6.280***	-6.280***
	(0.448)	(0.841)
Observations	162,127	162,127

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

A.11 Conditional logit model using country fixed effects

Firth logit estimation used for the main analysis does not allow to include fixed effects. As this might still be important due to unobserved heterogeneity which is not covered by the control variables used in our main model, we re-ran our model using the conditional logit method accounting for such potentially hidden unit heterogeneity across countries. Model A.8.1 shows that our results remain robust when including country fixed effects.

Table A.8 Conditional logit models including country fixed effects.

VARIABLES	(Model A.8.1) Withdrawal
Pooling	0.796***
	(0.263)
Delegation	0.155**
	(0.0777)
Preference Diversion	1.127***
	(0.298)
Democracy	0.0150
	(0.0457)
IO average democracy score	-0.0658*
	(0.0390)
Nationalism	0.747
	(0.520)
IO issue Politics	-0.308
	(0.654)
IO issue Economy	0.932***
	(0.324)
Contagion	2.933***
	(0.626)
State Power Change	-1.042
	(0.819)
IO Membership Duration	-0.191
	(0.136)
Government Orientation Change	0.376
	(0.353)
IO size	-0.843***
	(0.134)
Observations	69,816

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

References

Börzel, T. A., & Zürn, M. (2020). *Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism*. SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 3.

Borzyskowski, I. von, & Vabulas, F. (2019). Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations? *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(2), 335–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09352-2

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*, *143*(1-2), 67–101. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2

Gruber, L. (2000). *Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Helfer, L. R. (2005). Exiting treaties. *Virginia Law Review*. (91), 1579–1648.

Hooghe, L., Lenz, T., & Marks, G. (2019). Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance. *The Review of International Organizations*, *14*(4), 731–743. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9334-3

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Lenz, T., Bezuijen, J., Ceka, B., & Derderyan, S. (2017). *Measuring international authority: A postfunctionalist theory of governance* (First edition). *Transformations in governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724490.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724490.001.0001

Johnson, T. (2014). *Organizational progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance*. *Transformations in governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001). Logistic regression in rare events data. *Political Analysis*. (9/2), 137–163.

Koremenos, B., & Nau, A. (2010). Exit, no exit. *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, *21*(81), 81–119.

Lipscy, P. Y. (2017). *Renegotiating the World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316570463

Milewicz, K. M., & Snidal, D. (2016). Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers. *International Organization*, *70*(4), 823–844. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831600031X

Morse, J. C., & Keohane, R. O. (2014). Contested multilateralism. *The Review of International Organizations*, *9*(4), 385–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9188-2

Stone, R. W. (2011). *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy* (1. publ). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10469103 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943

Vries, C. E. d. (2018). *Euroscepticism and the future of European integration* (1st edition). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Zürn, M. (2018). *A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.