

LEADER VISITS AND UNSC MEMBERSHIP

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BACKGROUND

The Political Economy of the UNSC

Group A

- US, UK, France, Germany and Japan

Group B

- China, Russia

Countries in Group A proactively lobby UNSC member countries, whereas countries in Group B are considered content with their veto power and uninterested in actively lobbying other members.

LEADER VISITS AS A FAVOR

Disadvantages of Foreign Aid

- Focusing Exclusively on Aid as Favor
- Lack of Systematic Records

Advantages of Leader Visits

- Including Aid, Trade and Investment
- Offering Political Support to the Host
- Detailed Records of all Leader Visits

RESEARCH QUESTION

Are Chinese leaders more likely to visit UNSC member countries when they visit Africa?

MAIN RESULT: LEADER VISITS AND UNSC MEMBERSHIP


DV=Leader Visit	(1) Baseline	(2) UNSC	(3) Baseline	(4) UNSC
Log(Population)	0.648** (0.316)	0.721** (0.327)	-2.088 (8.711)	-1.732 (9.990)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.775** (0.322)	0.812** (0.330)	1.918* (1.115)	1.978* (1.143)
GDP Growth	0.015 (0.016)	0.017 (0.016)	0.038* (0.023)	0.040* (0.021)
Log(Imports to China)	0.173 (0.113)	0.167 (0.112)	0.086 (0.410)	-0.068 (0.410)
Log(Exports from China)	0.079 (0.256)	0.037 (0.274)	-0.140 (0.884)	-0.248 (0.879)
Resources	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.079 (0.063)	-0.070 (0.066)
Polity	0.021 (0.029)	0.027 (0.028)	-0.237 (0.252)	-0.229 (0.234)
UNGA Voting	-1.141 (2.197)	-0.820 (2.502)	-2.672 (4.962)	-5.048 (5.007)
Visit(t-1)	-3.072*** (0.802)	-3.982*** (0.842)	-4.544*** (1.087)	-5.617*** (1.167)
UNSC Membership		1.774*** (0.486)		2.019*** (0.647)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country F.E.	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	447	447	268	268
Pseudo R ²	0.281	0.310	0.312	0.343
Chi2(1)	-	13.32	-	9.74

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

ROBUSTNESS CHECK (A):

I test whether or not in the years immediately preceding and after their UNSC membership countries see a boost in Chinese leader visits. I observe no such boost.



DATA

- Chinese Leader Visits to African Countries between 2000 and 2018
- UN Security Council Membership for African Countries between 2000 and 2018

ROBUSTNESS CHECK (B)

I run similar regressions using the data set from Dreher et al. (2018). The data set covers the period between 2000 and 2013. I observe similar effects as in the main result.

DV=Leader Visit	UNSC	UNSC
UNSC Membership	2.104*** (0.682)	2.826** (1.283)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes
Country F.E.	No	Yes

CONCLUSION

- Existing literature on the UNSC has largely painted a quiet China content with its veto power and uninterested in actively lobbying other members.
- Leader visits might serve as a better proxy for favor than aid.
- Chinese leaders are substantially more likely to visit a UNSC member than a non-member when visiting Africa.
- China, just like the major Western powers, actively promotes its agenda amongst UNSC members.