

The Role of Foreign Aid in Procuring and Sustaining Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping

Johannes Karreth

Ursinus College
jkarreth@ursinus.edu

Tim Passmore

Virginia Military Institute
passmoretj@vmi.edu

Jaroslav Tir

University of Colorado Boulder
jtir@colorado.edu

Motivation

Civil war peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have grown in numbers, with wide-ranging positive effects.

The challenge

Consent facilitates PKO success, but not all civil war parties give consent, and consent can break down subsequently.

Our research question


Why do civil war participants grant unrestricted consent to PKOs after some conflicts, but not others?

Theoretical argument in brief


- Consenting to PKOs can be costly and requires conflict parties to overcome a commitment problem.
 - When conflict parties can credibly expect future outside resources, cooperating with PKOs and giving consent becomes a more attractive choice.
 - A recent track record of foreign aid commitments to a civil war country raises expectations for future aid.
- Hypothesis:** Unrestricted consent to PKOs is more likely in countries exposed to more foreign aid.

Data (1947-2011)

- 163 ceasefires (Fortna; Yuen)
- Unrestricted vs. limited/no consent
- Foreign aid before ceasefire (AidData)
- Regressions control for GDP & others



Findings (logit with controls)



Robust to post-1990 sample, ordinal measures of consent

Implications

Economic support from third parties can mitigate hard commitment problems and facilitate consent to PKOs.

Next: Does this dynamic apply to consent during PKOs?