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## Institutional Autonomy and Donor Strategic Interest in Multilateral Foreign Aid: Rules vs. Informal Influence



#### Conventional Wisdom

- $\Box$  Power + influence  $\Longrightarrow$  aid flows
- $\hfill\square$  Agents have little autonomy, unless principals delegate/sanction it

#### Theory

- $\Box$  Bureaucrats' design contributions + external shocks have given agents autonomy  $\Longrightarrow$  aid flows
- $\hfill\square$  Longer time horizons also make principals' monitoring tasks difficult

# New Data (CPIA/CPA/CIPE)


□ Bureaucrat rankings of recipient countries' institutions at 4 IOs (WB, AfDB, AsDB & IADB)

## Results

- □ Bureaucratic rules matter more for lending
- $\square$  10/12 replications provide support in other areas
- □ Donor strategic interests moderate very little

### Conclusion

 $\hfill\square$  Bureaucrats/agents matter!



World Bank, African DB, Asian DB & Inter-American DB (Post-Cold War)