



# Who Wants to Work at a Transparent International Organization?

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
## RESEARCH QUESTION & ANSWER

- What explains the **declining** role of international bureaucrats in mediation?
- International bureaucrats **under increased transparency** strategically choose to remain passive in mediation.

## INTUITION

Transparency as an institutional design


- Helps member states hold IOs accountable
- Helps international bureaucrats to get credit and advance their careers
- Reveals the effort by international bureaucrats to close a negotiation**



## FORMAL MODEL SETUP

- Player:** Bureaucrat (**B**), Members states as a whole (**S**)
- Preference:** **B** wants success in its career whereas **S** wants closure of a negotiation *and* accountability to its people
- Sequence:** **B** chooses to work at an IO → **S** chooses the degree of transparency → **B** chooses its effort level
- Solution Concept:** Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

## COMPARATIVE STATICS



<b>b</b>	Bias
$\delta$	Career mindedness
<b>C</b>	Utility from closing a negotiation

## COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

	GATT	WTO
<b>Transparency</b>	Low	High
<b>Director General</b>	Eric Wyndham White	Supachai Panitchpakdi
<b>Mediation</b>	Aggressive	Passive