# Draft: Exit from intergovernmental organizations - How domestic politics conditions international disintegration

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David Weyrauch, University of Mannheim

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**Abstract**

Are there conditioning commonalities between Brexit, the decision of the United States to pull out of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), or the Japanese decision to withdraw from the International Whaling Commission (IWC)? Case-study research has provided us with in-depth knowledge of these withdrawals, whereas emerging large-N time-series cross-sectional studies have unveiled that diverging preferences between individual states and the other members of an intergovernmental organization can be a driving force of withdrawal. While both approaches have clear advantages, they also deal with severe drawbacks. The former struggling with issues of external validity, the latter dealing with a large amount of 'excess zeros' - cases in which the preference divergence of states would predict a withdrawal, but a withdrawal does not occur. I argue that governmental expectations of domestic opposition to the decision to withdraw are a conditioning mechanism of withdrawal. Scholarship of coalition behavior in foreign policy-making has developed two conflicting hypotheses. One strand of literature suggests that coalition governments act more extreme, due to the ability of fringe parties in the coalition to hijack the government or the diffusion of blame across coalition partners. An opposing strand of the literature proposes that coalition governments are more restrained in their foreign policy behavior due to the veto capabilities of coalition partners. I analyze the conditioning effects of withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations. I compare first, the difference between coalition governments and their single party counterparts and subsequently analyze the role of

ideological fractionalization of coalition parties on the decision to withdraw from an intergovernmental organization. I further highlight the role of key ministers in the decision to exit an intergovernmental organization and assess their influence on exit in a cross-sectional time-series analysis.

## Introduction

In 2016, a majority of the population of the United Kingdom decided, via referendum, to withdraw from the European Union. In January 2017 the United States upended the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations and in 2019 Japan has withdrawn from the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Do these decisions of democracies to disengage from international cooperation follow a common pattern or can we understand them only in the case-specific context within which they had been made? What role do domestic polity and politics play in the decisions to withdraw? Ultimately, why do democracies withdraw from intergovernmental organizations?

Though Brexit and the US withdrawal from the TPP have been remarkable events in international relations, states' withdrawal from international cooperation is not an uncommon phenomenon. Helfer (2005) highlights that between 1975 and 2004, a state has withdrawn from a multilateral agreement once every 10 days on average. Further, between 1945 to 2004, he registered 1574 exits from multilateral organizations. Compared to global membership in intergovernmental organizations, withdrawal may be a *rare* but seemingly not an *infrequent* phenomenon. The prevalence of IGO-withdrawal highlights the necessity to analyze this "under-explored question" (Shi, 2018, p. 221) from a cross-national perspective to identify trends and causes that can lead to, or condition, the retreat from international cooperation and the exit from international organizations specifically.

Though questions of international disintegration receive and an increasing amount of attention (Jones, 2018), in comparison to the expansive field of scholarship on international integration our understanding of the causes of disintegration remains limited. Utilizing the inverse of established theories of international or regional integration to explain disintegration often falls short of the task (Vollaard 2014). An excellent overview of the shortcomings and benefits of various[1] theories

[1]He summarizes the explanatory power of realism, classical intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, historical

of international relations in the explanation of international disintegration is provided by Webber (2014). To give an example, take liberal intergovernmentalism Moravcsik (1997): the theory relies on the assumption that the economic preferences of key interest groups influence the behavior of governments and lead to variation in the socio-economic preferences of governments which ultimately determine the outcomes of states foreign policy decisions. However, Moravcsiks' approach may fall short in explaining phenomena of international disintegration such as Brexit. The motivation of former Prime Minister David Cameron to allow for a referendum over the withdrawal from the European Union in the first place, for example, can hardly be explained with an overwhelming desire of domestic interest groups for a withdrawal from the European Union. While the following is not a representative overview of interest group opinions the listed examples of surveys conducted in the UK before and after the Brexit referendum indicate that there had not been overwhelming support for Brexit by interest group representatives. The British Chamber of Commerce polled 2.200 of its members, 60 percent opposed Brexit whereas 30 percent saw it favorable (Elliott, 2016). The Confederation of the British Industry polled 773 of its members. 80 percent answered that remain would be the best option, 5 percent argued that leave would be the best option (Inman, 2016). Even across 500 executives in manufacturing companies, a survey by the EFF [manufacturing - added by author] has shown, 63 percent wanted to remain whereas only 5 percent wanted to exit (Macalister, 2016). Socio-economic arguments, it seems, increasingly fall short when we try to explain international cooperation or lack thereof (König, 2018).

The relative rarity of exits, compared to the total number of IGO membership years, may be one explanation why stand-alone arguments of international disintegration are still comparatively rare. As scholars have increasingly focused on questions of differentiated integration (see for example Leuffen et al. 2012 or Schimmefennig and Winzen 2019) theories of partial exit have been developed alongside (Bartolini, 2005). However, scholars are increasingly developing autonomous theories of international disintegration (see for example Vollaard, 2014 or Jones, 2018). Following Brexit, several of these theories have been developed against the backdrop of European integration. A common argument is that exit is a multi-causal phenomenon and single issues will fall short in its explanation. Jones (2018) and Vollaard (2014) have developed overarching models of disintegration

institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and comparative federalism on international disintegration

that account for both the intergovernmental as well as the national level. A core argument of Jones' (2018) model posits that "discrimination (or inequality of opportunity) lies at the root of the disintegrative process" (449). As states are isolated from the other members (e.g. Greece in summer 2015) or isolate themselves (e.g. the United Kingdom before Brexit) the isolation of these members, he argues, will ultimately result in the exit of single member-states.

Empirical studies of withdrawal from intergovernmental cooperation have assessed either single cases (e.g. Shi, 2018) or conducted time-series cross-sectional analyses (e.g. Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). Both strands of literature, case studies as well as time-series cross-sectional analyses, have unveiled that interstate preference divergence of participating states is a key determinant of withdrawal. Preference divergence corresponds here to what Jones (2018) called the isolation of individual states. Case studies, such as Mingtao Shi's (2018) study of Japan's withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission, have highlighted the importance of domestic political processes and how domestic actors reciprocally influence a government's decision to withdraw from an agreement. In this specific case, domestic actors' preference for whaling shaped the governments' position, which was opposed to that of the majority of other members in the IWC. However, case studies of IGO withdrawal often lack external validity. The cultural conflict that surrounds whaling, with its long tradition in Japan and an increasing international repudiation of the hunt, may explain Japan's withdrawal from this particular intergovernmental organization, but, in its specificity, it is hardly applicable to other instances of IGO withdrawal. Nevertheless, these case studies are indicative of the influences of IGO-exit - diverging preferences between individual states and the other members of an IGO.

In a first cross-sectional time-series analysis of withdrawals from intergovernmental organizations Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) have assessed potential reasons for withdrawal on an interstate and a domestic level. The authors tested whether nationalist governments are more likely to withdraw from intergovernmental cooperation or if it is the preference divergence between individual states and the other members that are the driver of withdrawal. The authors find support for the latter mechanism, but not the former. Their analysis has provided initial evidence that preference divergence among member-states is a cause of international disintegration broadened our understanding of the influences of withdrawal from intergovernmental cooperation and evaluated

the external validity of some of the hypotheses generated by case study research.

However, it is questionable whether diverging preferences between member states are a sufficient explanation of a government's decision to withdraw from intergovernmental cooperation. Other mechanisms may be simultaneously at play. Exits in one country could be, for example, contagious or deterring for the withdrawal efforts of voters in other countries, depending on the observed results of an exit Walter (2021). Ultimately, the mechanism the authors propose is incomplete, considering the extensive number of "non-exits" from intergovernmental organizations, though the diverging preferences of member-states would predict an exit. In their empirical models, the authors analyze between $\sim$ 150.000 and $\sim$ 420.000 observations. Accordingly, even though there exists empirical support for the hypothesis that diverging preferences will lead to IGO exit, we are still dealing with an excessive amount of unexplained non-exits. These findings, while convincing, raise two important questions: first, why do states withdraw from intergovernmental organizations if there is no incentive, and second, why do states not withdraw if they have an incentive? While a key determinant of withdrawal is the conflict on the international level, I argue that a key condition for withdrawal is conflict on a national level. Assessing the interplay of these two-level may aid to better capture the dynamics of withdrawal of democratic states from IGOs when there is no incentive to withdraw, and which explains why withdrawal may not occur even though there is an incentive.

## Theory

To improve our understanding of international disintegration it is necessary to gain an understanding of the conditioning effects of domestic polity and politics. Domestic preferences can therefore play a decisive role in the decision to withdraw from intergovernmental organizations. To develop a theory of exit that accommodates international incentive and domestic conditions of exit it may be helpful to conceive of the decision to withdraw from an IGO in a two-level game framework Putnam (1988). The two-level game is based on the notion that governments are engaged in negotiations both on an international as well as on a domestic level (Putnam, 1988). As actors at the national level (level II) are required to "ratify" decisions made on the international level (level

I), their role in the termination of membership in an intergovernmental organization should not be underestimated. Depending on the size of the domestic win-set, i.e. the number of ratifiable deals, a certain foreign policy decision becomes more or less likely. In the following sections, I will develop a theory of the interplay of IGO level and domestic level mechanisms that may lead to an exit of democracies or prevent it.

States design organizations in a way to overcome cooperation problems, to reduce uncertainty, or to resolve enforcement problems among participating states (Koremenos, 2016; Koremenos et al., 2001). Rather than being static, however, IGOs are subject to change. These changes may be institutional, such as reforms of the decision rule or policy scope. They may also be due to domestic factors. Either the preferences of domestic governments change, challenging the commitment to the IGO or past commitments no longer guarantee pay-offs preferable to the government. As single countries' preferences increasingly diverge from those of the other members, a government may no longer perceive the functional benefit of participation to outweigh the costs of the transfer of authority Jones (2018). States may be incentivized to revoke their membership. Exit, therefore, may be influenced by the expectation of diminishing pay-offs from continued participation in an intergovernmental organization (Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). A determinant of the expected pay-offs may be broadly conceptualized as preference divergence or heterogeneity among the members. Participation in an IGO is beneficial to a government if it expects outcomes that align with its preferences. With an increasing discrepancy between the interests of a single state and the other members of an IGO, the expected benefit of cooperation may diminish, creating an incentive to exit the organization (Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). However, the discrepancy of preferences is not a sufficient explanation of international disintegration as this should lead to withdrawals from intergovernmental organizations more frequently. Preference divergence has therefore been conceived of as an **incentive** of withdrawal. This incentive interacts with domestic politics.

If political conflict did not translate to foreign policy decision-making, and politics were to stop at the waters' edge (Gowa, 1998; Wagner et al., 2018), then international incentives would be a sufficient condition of withdrawal. However, recent scholarship (Oktay and Beasley, 2017 or Joly and Dandoy, 2018) has demonstrated that the preferences of national actors determine the size of the domestic win-set and accordingly the number of ratifiable deals in a two-level game (Putnam,

1988). Yet, the determinants of the win-set, as described by Putnam (1988), have remained rather opaque (Oppermann, 2008).

Additionally, the relevant actors and the determinants of their preferences vary greatly between democracies. Veto players can be "institutionally determined or they may arise endogenously through the political process" (Gehlbach, 2013, p. 73). Further, democracies, especially if governed by a coalition, emphasize the role of political parties in the decision-making process (Cox, 2006). As the growing literature on coalition foreign policy has shown, the expectation of the behavior of democratic coalition governments differs from that of single-party governments. Early studies of the influence of coalition polity and politics in international relations have focused on the institutional constraints of coalition governments. Key questions revolved around the role of junior partners (Kaarbo, 1996a, 1996b) and the effect of different types of coalitions on foreign policymaking (surplus, minority, etc.) (Oktay, 2014).

**Coalitions and foreign policy decision making**

Two diverging arguments regarding foreign policy making of coalition governments have been developed. One strand of research expects coalitions foreign policies to be more extreme (e.g. exiting an intergovernmental organization) because individual coalition members can diffuse responsibility across the entire coalition (Oktay, 2014). This assumption of blame diffusion in foreign policy decision making has its roots in, and has been corroborated by, scholars of comparative political science (Fisher & Hobolt, 2010; Hobolt & Karp, 2010; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Vowles, 2010). The inability of voters to punish parties for their foreign policy decisions can create incentives for political parties to pursue extreme foreign policies unilaterally - as blame will be shared in the coalition.

The second strand of research on coalition foreign policy decision-making suggests that coalitions are less likely to pursue extreme foreign policies than single-party governments. As the number of actors included in a coalition government increases, so does the number of veto players (Gehlbach, 2013). Tsebelis (1995, 2002) has pointed out that an increasing number of veto players depresses the size of the win-set and the likelihood of a change of the status quo. Accordingly, the repeated interactions of coalition partners keep one another in check because the sustained domestic deliberations will

have a moderating effect on foreign policy decision-making. This second mechanism is closely aligned with the original proposition of the two-level game by Putnam (1988) as an introduction of additional actors with the ability to veto a proposal reduces the size of the win-set - the number of agreements preferred by all actors over the status quo - therefore making change (or extreme behavior) less likely. This leads to a first hypothesis:

$H_1$: Coalition governments are more/less likely to withdraw from intergovernmental organizations than single-party governments.

Subsequently, I will take a closer look at coalition governments. Based on the argument above, we should expect more/less extreme behavior as the number of parties increases. In the former case, because blame is diffused among a greater number of parties, creating a greater incentive for individual parties to pursue their extreme policies. The latter may be true because a greater nominal number of parties also increases the number of nominal actors with veto power over a change of the status quo.

$H_2$: As the number of parties in government increases, the likelihood of withdrawal increases/decreases.

An implication of this argument is, that veto players arise if parties differ (Gehlbach, 2013). However, the ministries that are relevant for a policy change are often occupied by the same parties. The question arises whether all ministries matter equally, or if we should expect coalition governments to behave similarly to single-party governments if the ministries, relevant for a policy change, are occupied by the same party.

Assuming that ministers have some degree of discretion over their policy portfolio (Laver et al., 1996; Martin & Vanberg, 2014), this implies that ministers involved in international relations are (to a degree) autonomous from the other ministers of a coalition in their decision-making. Accordingly, if the "relevant" ministers originate from the same party, we should expect them to resemble single parties in their behavior (Goodhart, 2013). Accordingly, analyzing the difference between single-party governments and coalitions may be misleading. I assume that issue-dependent, specific members of the cabinet may play a more important role than others. These actors can be considered pivotal in the decision-making process over exiting an IGO. In coalition governments, it

may be the case that the pivotal actors originate from the same party. Under these circumstances, the coalition government should act similarly to a single-party government. I assume that there is a difference between governments in which these pivotal actors originate from the same party and governments in which they are from different parties. Further, I assume that the likelihood of withdrawal increases if these pivotal actors have different party backgrounds. However, there may exist coalitions in which the relevant pivotal actors are from the same party. In these instances I expect the government to act no different than if it were a single-party government.

$H_3$: The withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations is more/less likely if the pivotal actors originate from the same party.

### The importance of partisan preferences

What these arguments omit is the relative importance of ideological conflict (Clare, 2010; Oktay, 2014) to determine the foreign policy choices of coalition governments. Focusing on the partisan preferences of political parties has the benefit of specifying domestic veto-players based on their expressed preferences in their party manifestos, but also allows to be more explicit in the specification of the win-set of ratifiable deals.

Scholarship on coalition foreign policy decision making has again proposed two mechanisms linked to the ideological preferences of coalition partners and their influence on the outcomes of intra-coalition foreign policy deliberation. First, coalition members with extreme preferences may be able to hijack the foreign policy-making processes of coalition governments (Beasley & Kaarbo, 2014; Clare, 2010; Kaarbo, 1996a, 1996b). The threat to upend a coalition, unless a certain foreign policy demand is met, may shift the foreign policy of entire coalition governments. Second, the diverging preferences of coalition governments may gridlock the decision-making process (Clare, 2010; Martin & Vanberg, 2014; Oktay, 2014). As the distance between coalition partners, on issues of foreign policy increases, this may render the win-set empty and prevent the withdrawal from an intergovernmental organization. In conjunction with the diverging preferences of states on the international level, either mechanism may lend itself to explain why states don't withdraw if they have an incentive and why do withdraw if they do not have an incentive?

**Why do governments remain if they have an incentive to exit?**

Though "parties that join a governing coalition [...] typically acquire a veto over a policy change" (Gehlbach, 2013, p. 74), only if these parties have an interest in avoiding a change of the status-quo will they become additional veto players. Therefore, analyses of ideological cohesion of coalition governments have become increasingly relevant to unravel the puzzle surrounding the discrepant expectation of the diffusion of blame and veto-player theories developed by the coalition foreign-policy set of arguments (Oktay, 2017). If we apply this logic to the analysis of withdrawals from intergovernmental organizations, the withdrawal is incentivized by diverging preferences of member-states but it will be conditional on the ability of governments to "ratify" the withdrawal domestically. However, the context-specific ideological differences may be a key determinant of the likelihood of withdrawal.

Applying this theory to the example of exit, the conditioning element to the withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations is the probability of being vetoed by a party that is part of the coalition government. If the parties that comprise the government occupy different positions on international cooperation or foreign policy then the government will likely be impeded in its ability to withdraw from an IGO. To make this example more tangible, in a two-party coalition, if one party prefers cooperation in an intergovernmental organization over the withdrawal and one party favors the withdrawal over continued cooperation, we should not expect an exit, as the party preferring cooperation may threaten to upend the coalition. Based on this framework, it may be possible to answer the question of why states withdraw without an incentive and why they do not withdraw even though there is an incentive.

In line with Putnam's two-level game (1988), I argue that ideologically incongruent parties will have a more difficult time withdrawing when there is a motive to withdraw. In more substantive terms, the preference divergence of states in intergovernmental organizations conditions the decision to withdraw, and as domestic political veto players diverge strongly from one another, the withdrawal will become less likely. Ideologically incongruent political parties that comprise a governing coalition will be less able to make decisions due to their incompatibility of policy preferences.

$H_4$: The withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations becomes less likely as the preferences of

pivotal actors diverge more strongly if there is a preference divergence within the IGO.

**Why do governments exit if they don't have an incentive?**

The question remains, why states should withdraw if they do not have an incentive to do so. As Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) and Greene (2019) have argued coalition governments can be hijacked by some of the extreme members of their coalition, rather than being constrained by the diverging preferences of their members. I assume that if there is an incentive to withdraw, this is associated with a certain degree of saliency in the public discourse. Given this salience, the likelihood that coalition partners are hijacked may be diminished. In the absence of public scrutiny withdrawal from an IGO may not be determined by an incentive due to the conflict with other members of an IGO, but rather be determined by the ability of single members to hijack the coalition. In more substantive terms, the withdrawal from an IGO may be caused by the preference of a single party to do so and its ability to convince the other members of the coalition to withdraw, rather than by dynamics on the international level. When preferences between individual coalition parties diverge strongly, a withdrawal becomes increasingly likely, as single parties are likely to hijack the coalition.

$H_5$: The withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations becomes more likely as the preferences of pivotal actors diverge more strongly if there is no preference divergence within the IGO.

## Research Design

The basis of my analysis is the data collected by the Correlates of War project on IGO membership (Pevehouse et al., 2020). The authors have collected data on annual IGO membership since 1965. Initially, I exclude observations in which a country has never participated in an IGO. For states which participated in an IGO at some point in time, I observe all membership years between 1965 and 2014. Beyond recording the years in which a state has been a member of an IGO, the dataset also contains information on whether the IGO had been dissolved. I use this information to exclude "exits" due to a dissolution of the IGO. Based on the resulting data, if the membership status switched from 1 (membership = yes) to 0 (membership = no) I code this as a 1 (exit).

Subsequently, I append information on three main explanatory and control variables. I have coded a dummy variable for governments that include more than one party, a count variable for the number of parties in government, and a measure of the ideological fractionalization of the coalition. The first two variables are based on data collected by the WhoGov team (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). The authors of this data set have collected information on the ministers in 177 countries, including their party affiliation. I restrict my analysis to democracies as I am interested in the conditioning effect that political parties can have on the decision-making process of governments. A coalition dummy variable is coded as 1 if there are at least two parties that collectively form a government. Subsequently, I have included a count variable based on the number of parties that are included in government. To be able to assess the fractionalization of the coalition government, I have added information from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020), based on a comparison of party identifier variables. Specifically, I compared English party name identifiers included in both data sets. Though there were several cases where these party names matched, there were numerous cases in which they did not. In these cases, differences were hand-coded.[2] Often the party names varied only in minor details, such as spelling. However, in some cases, it was necessary to further identify differences and recode party names accordingly. In several cases, it was not possible to identify a match. Based on the combination of Manifesto data and WhoGov data I was able to calculate the distance between coaling parties.[3] I have multiplied the position of a party by the number of ministers in a coalition and divide the score by the total number of ministers in the coalition.[4] Beyond coalition fractionalization, I argue that some ministers will take a more central role in the decision over the withdrawal from an IGO. Nyrup and Bramwell (2020) have also included information on the policy portfolio of ministers. In include ministers whose first or second policy portfolio covers issues of foreign relations, foreign economic relations, or economic relations. Based on this specification of relevant actors I include the following variables: relevant ministers from different parties (dummy), the relevant number of ministers from different parties (count), and the ideological incongruence of relevant ministers (continuous).

[2]To receive the script in which party names were aligned, please contact me via e-mail to dweyrauc@mail.uni-mannheim.de.

[3]To identify countries' positions on international integration I rely on the following indicators from the manifesto project: per 107, per108, per 109, per110

[4]This is necessary as the number of ministers per government is not fixed and can vary considerably.

Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) have pointed to three key variables that may determine the withdrawal from an intergovernmental organization. First, the authors found that withdrawal may be contagious and that exits often occur collectively. To account for this I have added a variable that counts the total number of exits from an IGO in a given year. Second, the authors have argued that nationalism may be influential in the decision to withdraw from an intergovernmental organization. Though they do not find empirical evidence for this claim I have included a similar measure nevertheless. I include a measure of the average position of the government (or the relevant ministers respectively) on international cooperation. The measure is weighted by the number of ministers from a certain party - similarly to the measure of preference fractionalization above. Third, the authors have highlighted that diverging preferences between a country and the rest of the members of the IGO may incentivize withdrawal. I have created a binary variable of "incentive" based on preference divergence between states in an international organization. The variable is based on the vote decisions of states in the United Nations General Assembly. Based on the information collected by Bailey et al. (2015), I calculated the average preference per IGO (excluding the country under consideration) and subtracted the value of the country under consideration. This distance proxies for the distance in preference between an individual country and the rest of the IGO membership. If a country's score is more than one standard deviation from the mean position of the other members I have coded this variable as a 1, indicating that there is a preference divergence on an IGO level.

I rely on logit models as the dependent variable "exit" is binary and coded as 1 if a country has exited an intergovernmental organization in a given year. The models include varying intercepts for the IGO and the country. While I model the effect of incentive and coalition constraints separately to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I include an interaction term between international incentive and domestic preference divergence to test hypotheses 4 and 5. Table 1 summarizes the modeling strategies for each of the hypotheses specified above.

| Main explanatory variable | Hypothesis | Mechanism | Modelling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coalition (dummy) | $H_1$ | Additional veto players | Logit: varying intercepts |

| Main explanatory variable | Hypothesis | Mechanism | Modelling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of parties in coalition (integer-count) | $H_2$ | Number of veto players | Logit: varying intercepts |
| Relevant ministers or coalition government | $H_3$ | Specify veto players | Logit: varying intercepts |
| Distance between coalition parties and between relevant ministers | $H_4$ & $H_5$ | Ideological incongruence among veto players | Logit: interaction & varying intercepts |

Table 1: Modeling strategy for different hypotheses

## Analysis

In an initial step, I model the effect of single-party governments vs. coalition governments on withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations. Figure 1 [5] displays the results of the first two sets of models. It shows the coefficients including confidence intervals for all variables. The black dot is the point-estimate, the gray bar the 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 1a) present the results for the first model which includes a binary variable for coalition governments. Figure 1b) presents the same model, however, coalition governments only count as such if at least one of the relevant ministers originates from a different party than the other relevant ministers. If they originate from the same party they are counted as a single-party government. I find support for neither of the two strands of literature on coalition foreign policy decision-making. Coalition governments do not differ in their propensity to exit IGOs from their single-party counterparts. Institutional differences do not seem to influence intra-government deliberation over the decision

[5] Appendix B contains the results of the models presented here, including regression tables. Further, it includes results for models that vary only regarding the IGO, instead of the IGO and the country. I also present predicted probabilities for all models in Appendix B. I ran all models presented here also separately with varying intercepts for the IGO or the IGO, the country, and the year. These results can be found in the appendix.

to exit. This result is corroborated by the analysis of relevant ministers. Instead, across these and subsequent models, the number of exits in a given year from a given IGO has a large positive impact on exit. This corroborates the finding by Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) that withdrawal is contagious.




(a) Number of parties (b) Number of relevant ministers from different parties

Figure 1: Coalitions and relevant ministers

The effect is similar for the second set of models, in which, rather than a binary measure of the coalition, I included a term for the number of parties in government and the number of relevant minister that originate from different parties. Again the effect is not significant. The first set of hypotheses, therefore, does not find support. There is no difference between coalition governments and single-party governments and an increasing number of parties has neither a constraining nor an enabling effect on the exit from intergovernmental organizations. Instead, it is necessary to account for case-specific heterogeneity among different members and assess potential incentives in analyzing the remains for states' exit from IGOs. However, there seems to be tentative evidence that increasing the number of veto players may decrease the size of the domestic win-et and make withdrawals less likely.

To assess hypotheses 4 and 5 and go beyond the institutional comparison of coalition and single-party governments I zoom in on coalition governments and assess the ideological incongruence




(a) Coalition parties

(b) Relevant ministers

Figure 2: Number of coalitions parties and relevant ministers

of these parties. I include the distance among relevant ministers in a coalition government and interact this measure with the binary measure of preference divergence within the IGO. Figure 3 presents the results for the interaction of all parties in a coalition, Figure 4 present the results when restricting the analysis to the relevant ministers in a coalition government. The variable for preference divergence on the international level takes value 1 (= incentive to withdraw) if the revealed preference, based on voting patterns in the UNGA, is more than one standard deviation removed from the IGO average. Figures 3a) and 4a) show the model coefficients including 95% confidence intervals. To get an intuition of the substantive size of the effect I have calculated predicted probabilities based on all IGO-country combinations. For readability reasons Figures 3b) and 4b) show the average of these predicted probabilities. When including all actors in a coalition government I do not find a significant effect of ideological fractionalization. However, when focusing only on the relevant ministers the results point towards the hypothesized effects. As domestic preferences diverge and there is no international incentive, states become more likely to withdraw from an IGO. In line with proponents of the hijacking mechanism, coalitions seem to be responsive to the pressures of their extreme members. In comparison, if states have an incentive to withdraw, the withdrawal becomes less likely as the preferences of relevant ministers diverge more

strongly on issues of international cooperation. If a country is incentivized to exit, the exit must be deliberated within the coalition and relevant ministers must agree to exit. If there is no incentive, however, we observe exits more frequently when preferences deviate more strongly. It appears, that withdrawals that occur unincentivized may be due to the hijacking by extreme parties.




(a) Model coefficients (b) Predcited probability

Figure 3: Ideaological fractionalization of coalition parties

## Conclusion

Why do democracies exit intergovernmental organizations? This paper has contributed to two fields of scholarship. First to the analysis of international disintegration. While scholarship on international integration has identified and assessed the relative importance of international conflict for exits from IGOs, I have shown that domestic politics (rather than domestic polity) can have a conditioning influence on the exit from intergovernmental organizations. Embedding the analysis of exit in Putnam's (1988) two-level game model has allowed for the simultaneous analysis of international incentives and domestic conditions. The influence of pivotal domestic actors should not be underestimated. Second, I have contributed to the analysis of coalition foreign policy decision-making. The analysis has shown that coalition governments, per se, do not exit more or




(a) Model coefficients (b) Predcited probability

Figure 4: Ideaological fractionalization of relevant ministers

less frequently. Neither is an increase in the number of parties a predictor of withdrawal. Instead, the political position of parties in a coalition shape the behavior of the government. To show this, I interacted the measure of domestic political incongruence with a measure of preference divergence in the IGO. By embedding the conflicting assumptions of coalition foreign policy scholarship in the two-level game framework I was able to bridge the incompatible expectations of coalition government behavior. I have shown, that, given an incentive coalition governments will be caught in a deliberative process that moderates their behavior, while exits that appear "unprovoked" occur more frequently if the coalition government is highly fractionalized. The former case corresponds to the literature on moderation and gridlock of coalition governments in foreign policy decision-making. The latter case corresponds to the literature on hijacking by extreme parties. These results indicate that salience fosters deliberation whereas the absence of salience may lead to unilateral actions of extreme parties in government.

Beyond this theoretical contribution, I have shown that it is necessary to be precise in the assessment of who is a relevant actor in a coalition's foreign policy decision-making. I have argued that relevant ministers, due to a certain amount of ministerial autonomy (Martin & Vanberg, 2014), are a suitable unit of analysis for the assessment of coalition foreign policy decision making.

To further validate the results of this paper, the subsequent scholarship will have to provide three things. A more rigorous assessment of the international incentives that goes beyond the UN-based preference measure. Second, a more precise analysis of the conflict on the national level. Third, an assessment of intra-party conflict of single-party governments to assess the processes that shape the decision-making processes regarding IGO exit. Ideally, the initial results here will be corroborated by case-study research of withdrawal that assesses the withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations due to the conflict on a national and international level in more detail.

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# Appendix A

Data preparation and Codebook

## Codebooks

Appendix A contains two codebooks. As the calculation of the measures of ideological fractionalization differs it was necessary to create two different datasets. The first codebook corresponds to the data on an government-basis. The second dataset corresponds to the data on an "relevant-minister"-basis. An explanation of what the measures are based on can be found within each codebook. All **means** and **standard deviations** are rounded to the second digit after the comma.

### Codebook Dataset Governments

1. **ioname**

IGO name abbreviation. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: ACSSRB.

2. **orgname**

IGO name. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: Administrative Center for Soc Security for Rhine Boatmen.

3. **ionum**

IGO numeric identifier. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: ACSSRB.

4. **country**

Country name. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: belgium.

5. **cown**

Numeric country identifier. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: belgium.

6. **year**

Numeric year. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Range: 1965 to 2014.

7. **system_category**

Type of political system. Taken from Whogov (Change to Ref). A key assumption of this research is that political parties have considerable leeway in influencing the government. I, therefore, subset the data for systems that allow some degree of party influence.

8. **govern_name**

Name of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref).

9. **coalition**

Coalition government. Binary varaible, takes value 1 if more than one party is part of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Mean: 0.73; SD: 0.44.

10. **n_party**

Number of parties in government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Share: 2.81; SD: 1.87.

11. **single_party**

Single party government. Binary varaible, takes value 1 if only one party is part of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Share: 0.27; SD: 0.44.

12. **political**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with political issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.17; SD: 0.38.

13. **social**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with social issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.32; SD: 0.47.

14. **economic**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with economic issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.51; SD: 0.5.

15. **mem_size**

Membership size of an IGO. Calcualted as the annual number of members. Membership data retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Mean: 80.31; SD: 61.19.

16. **mem_duration**

Membership duration of a country in an IGO. Calculated as the cumulative number of years a country has been a member in an IGO. This variable is somewhat flawed as the annual data from the Correlates of War Project only begins in 1965. Membership data retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Mean: 22.59; SD: 14.09.

17. **last_year**

The last year of membership of a country in an IGO. This is a binary variable that takes value 1 if a country has been a member of an Intergovernmental Organization for at least 1 year and then is no longer a member of an Intergovernmental Organization. Observations in which an IGO is dissolved are excluded. Mean: 0; SD: 0.04.

18. **IdealPoint**

The idealpoint estimate from Bailey et al. (2015) based on UNGA votes. Mean: 3.16; SD:0.92

19. **IdealPoint.dist**

The ideal point distance to the average of the IGO. Voting in the UNGA can span two years. For example, session 46 took place in the years 1991 and 1992. In these instances, I remove duplicated observations for the year 1992 and only keep the year 1991. I prioritize the previous year in these instances because it is the year in which the UNGA session has started. Subsequently, I rescale the ideal point data so the smallest value is 0. Then I calculate the individual distances between countries and IGOs. I validate this data later. Mean: 0.99; SD: 0.77

20. **sd_IdealPoint.dist**

Standard deviation of the idealpoint distance. Mean: 0.99; SD: 0.77

21. **IdealPoint.dist_binary**

Summary varaible of ideal point distance. Takes value 1 if the distance is greater than 1 SD. Mean: 0.63; SD: 0.48

22. **IdealPoint.dist_binary2**

Summary varaible of ideal point distance. Takes value 2 if the distance is greater than 1 SD. Mean: 0.39; SD: 0.49

25. **mean_int_integ_gov_simple**

Average *unweighted* international integration score for government ministers. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per107-per109 and per108-per110 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: 4.24; SD: 3.64

26. **mean_int_integ_gov_weighted**

Average *weighted* international integration score for government ministers. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per107-per109 and per108-per110 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: 171.47; SD: 155.94

27. **mean_econ_integ_gov_simple**

Average *unweighted* economic integration score for government ministers. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per406-per407 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: -0.14; SD: 1.5

28. **mean_econ_integ_gov_weighted**

Average *weighted* economic integration score for government ministers. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per406-per407 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: -4.66; SD: 67.46

29. **euclid_dist_gov_simple**

Euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated and summed. Mean: 16.08; SD: 34.19

30. **euclid_dist_gov_weighted**

Euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated and summed. Mean: 505.35; SD: 1079.68

31. **euclid_dist_gov_simple_harmonized**

Euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 0.84; SD: 1.58

32. **euclid_dist_gov_weighted_harmonized**

Euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 26.13; SD: 47.94

33. **euclid_dist_gov_simple_harmonized_log**

Logged euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 0.41; SD: 0.56

34. **euclid_dist_gov_weighted_harmonized_log**

Logged euclidean distance of government ministers on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 1.63; SD: 1.95

35. **cold_war**

Dummy variable that takes value 1 for years 1990 and following. Mean: 0.3; SD: 0.46

## Codebook Dataset Relevant Ministries

1. **ioname**

IGO name abbreviation. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: ACSSRB.

2. **orgname**

IGO name. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: Administrative Center for Soc Security for Rhine Boatmen.

3. **ionum**

IGO numeric identifier. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: ACSSRB.

4. **country**

Country name. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: belgium.

5. **cown**

Numeric country identifier. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Example: belgium.

6. **year**

Numeric year. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Range: 1965 to 2014.

7. **system_category**

Type of political system. Taken from Whogov (Change to Ref). A key assumption of this research is that political parties have considerable leeway in influencing the government. I, therefore, subset the data for systems that allow some degree of party influence.

8. **govern_name**

Name of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref).

9. **coalition**

Coalition government. Binary varaible, takes value 1 if more than one party is part of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Mean: 0.73; SD: 0.44.

10. **n_party**

Number of parties in government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Share: 2.81; SD: 1.87.

11. **single_party**

Single party government. Binary varaible, takes value 1 if only one party is part of the government. Retrieved from Whogov (Change to Ref). Share: 0.27; SD: 0.44.

12. **political**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with political issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.17; SD: 0.38.

13. **social**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with social issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.32; SD: 0.47.

14. **economic**

Intergovernmental organization dealing with economic issues. Retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Share: 0.51; SD: 0.5.

15. **mem_size**

Membership size of an IGO. Calcualted as the annual number of members. Membership data retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Mean: 80.31; SD: 61.19.

16. **mem_duration**

Membership duration of a country in an IGO. Calculated as the cumulative number of years a country has been a member in an IGO. This variable is somewhat flawed as the annual data from the Correlates of War Project only begins in 1965. Membership data retrieved from the Correlates of War Project. Mean: 22.59; SD: 14.09.

17. **last_year**

The last year of membership of a country in an IGO. This is a binary variable that takes value 1 if a country has been a member of an Intergovernmental Organization for at least 1 year and then is no longer a member of an Intergovernmental Organization. Observations in which an IGO is dissolved are excluded. Mean: 0; SD: 0.04.

18. **IdealPoint**

The idealpoint estimate from Bailey et al. (2015) based on UNGA votes. Mean: 3.16; SD:0.92

19. **IdealPoint.dist**

The ideal point distance to the average of the IGO. Voting in the UNGA can span two years. For example, session 46 took place in the years 1991 and 1992. In these instances, I remove duplicated observations for the year 1992 and only keep the year 1991. I prioritize the previous year in these instances because it is the year in which the UNGA session has started. Subsequently, I rescale the ideal point data so the smallest value is 0. Then I calculate the individual distances between countries and IGOs. I validate this data later. Mean: 0.99; SD: 0.77

20. **sd_IdealPoint.dist**

Standard deviation of the idealpoint distance. Mean: 0.99; SD: 0.77

21. **IdealPoint.dist_binary**

Summary varaible of ideal point distance. Takes value 1 if the distance is greater than 1 SD. Mean: 0.63; SD: 0.48

22. **IdealPoint.dist_binary2**

Summary varaible of ideal point distance. Takes value 2 if the distance is greater than 1 SD. Mean: 0.39; SD: 0.49 25. **mean_int_integ_rm_simple**

Average *unweighted* international integration score for relevant ministries. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per107-per109 and per108-per110 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: 4.26; SD: 3.73

26. **mean_int_integ_rm_weighted**

Average *weighted* international integration score for relevant ministries. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per107-per109 and per108-per110 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: 169.82; SD: 154.5

27. **mean_econ_integ_rm_simple**

Average *unweighted* economic integration score for relevant ministries. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per406-per407 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: -0.09; SD: 1.44

28. **mean_econ_integ_rm_weighted**

Average *weighted* economic integration score for relevant ministries. This score is calculated as average of the sum of per406-per407 (for a description see the Manifesto Project Codebook). Mean: -3.57; SD: 63.56

29. **euclid_dist_rm_simple**

Euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated and summed. Mean: 2.83; SD: 6.65

30. **euclid_dist_rm_weighted**

Euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated and summed. Mean: 86.64; SD: 178.89

31. **euclid_dist_rm_simple_harmonized**

Euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 0.69; SD: 1.45

32. **euclid_dist_rm_weighted_harmonized**

Euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 22.37; SD: 46.03

33. **euclid_dist_rm_simple_harmonized_log**

Logged euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *unweighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 0.34; SD: 0.54

34. **euclid_dist_rm_weighted_harmonized_log**

Logged euclidean distance of relevant ministries on international and economic integration. Each actors distance to the *weighted* average is calculated, summed and divided by number of actors. Mean: 1.35; SD: 1.89

35. **cold_war**

Dummy variable that takes value 1 for years 1990 and following. Mean: 0.3; SD: 0.46

# Appendix B

Robustness Checks and addititional analyses

David Weyrauch, University of Mannheim

30 September, 2021

Appendix C contains all additional models that were run as robustness checks. The models presented include a random effect for the IGO and year, and for the IGO and country respectively.

For the sake of presentation, the figures and tables that are presented here are correspond to the Hypothesis as they are listed in the paper.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-9.88^{***}$ | $-11.21^{***}$ |
| | (0.91) | (1.16) |
| Incentive (binary) | 0.72 | 0.53 |
| | (0.45) | (0.48) |
| Coalition | $-0.44$ | $-0.32$ |
| | (0.28) | (0.37) |
| Number of IGO exits | $0.94^{***}$ | $1.00^{***}$ |
| | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| AIC | 744.75 | 735.88 |
| BIC | 796.54 | 796.31 |
| Log Likelihood | $-366.37$ | $-360.94$ |
| Num. obs. | 41481 | 41481 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 255 | 255 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 12.70 | 17.71 |
| Num. groups: country | | 40 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 0.92 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 1: Coalition Governments

**Hypothesis 1: Coalitions vs. single party governments.**

**RE: IGO**




(a) Coefficients




(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B1: Coalitions vs. single party

**RE: IGO, country**




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B2: Coalitions and relevant ministers

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-9.71^{***}$ | $-11.08^{***}$ |
| | (0.92) | (1.22) |
| Incentive (binary) | 0.73 | 0.51 |
| | (0.44) | (0.47) |
| Number of parties in coalition | $-0.20$ | $-0.13$ |
| | (0.14) | (0.19) |
| Number of IGO Exits | $0.94^{***}$ | $1.00^{***}$ |
| | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| AIC | 744.81 | 736.15 |
| BIC | 796.60 | 796.58 |
| Log Likelihood | $-366.40$ | $-361.07$ |
| Num. obs. | 41481 | 41481 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 255 | 255 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 12.60 | 17.47 |
| Num. groups: country | | 40 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 0.91 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 2: Number of parties in a coalition

## Hypothesis 2: Number of Parties

### RE: IGO




(a) Coefficients




(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B3: Coalitions vs. single party

**RE: IGO, country**




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B4: Coalitions and relevant ministers

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-9.72^{***}$ | $-10.85^{***}$ |
| | (0.83) | (1.06) |
| Incentive (binary) | $0.70^{*}$ | 0.64 |
| | (0.43) | (0.46) |
| Relevant ministers from different parties | $-0.60^{**}$ | $-0.64^{*}$ |
| | (0.30) | (0.37) |
| Average position on international cooperation | $-0.06$ | $-0.03$ |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Number of IGO exits | $0.90^{***}$ | $0.96^{***}$ |
| | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| AIC | 837.97 | 825.46 |
| BIC | 891.08 | 887.42 |
| Log Likelihood | $-412.98$ | $-405.73$ |
| Num. obs. | 51630 | 51630 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 258 | 258 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 10.69 | 14.44 |
| Num. groups: country | | 44 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 0.81 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 3: Relevant ministers from different parties

## Hypothesis 3: Relevant ministers and Number of relevant ministers

### RE: IGO




(a) Coefficients




(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B5: Coalitions vs. single party

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-9.36^{***}$ | $-10.58^{***}$ |
| | (0.90) | (1.14) |
| Incentive (binary) | 0.70 | 0.62 |
| | (0.43) | (0.46) |
| Number of relevant ministers from different parties | $-0.39$ | $-0.34$ |
| | (0.25) | (0.31) |
| Average position on international cooperation | $-0.06^{*}$ | $-0.03$ |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Number of IGO exits | $0.90^{***}$ | $0.95^{***}$ |
| | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| AIC | 839.73 | 827.39 |
| BIC | 892.84 | 889.36 |
| Log Likelihood | $-413.86$ | $-406.70$ |
| Num. obs. | 51630 | 51630 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 258 | 258 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 10.75 | 14.51 |
| Num. groups: country | | 44 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 0.82 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 4: Number of relevant ministers from different parties

**RE: IGO, country**

**RE: IGO**




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B6: Coalitions vs. single party

**RE: IGO, country**




(a) Coefficients




(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B7: Coalitions and relevant ministers

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-13.17^{***}$ | $-13.65^{***}$ |
| | (1.47) | (1.53) |
| Incentive (binary) | 1.36 | 1.20 |
| | (1.01) | (1.08) |
| Domestic Ideological Fractionalization | $0.50^{**}$ | $0.45^{*}$ |
| | (0.25) | (0.27) |
| Average position on international cooperation | 0.01 | $-0.02$ |
| | (0.06) | (0.08) |
| Interaction | $-0.51^{*}$ | $-0.53^{*}$ |
| | (0.29) | (0.31) |
| Number of IGO exits | $1.09^{***}$ | $1.15^{***}$ |
| | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| AIC | 313.40 | 310.24 |
| BIC | 368.99 | 373.77 |
| Log Likelihood | $-149.70$ | $-147.12$ |
| Num. obs. | 20772 | 20772 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 242 | 242 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 34.60 | 36.92 |
| Num. groups: country | | 35 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 1.38 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 5: Ideological fractionalization among coalition parties

## Hypothesis 4 & 5: Ideological fractionalization - Coalition parties

### RE: IGO




(a) Coefficients




(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B8: Coalitions vs. single party

**RE: IGO, country**




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B9: Coalitions and relevant ministers

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | $-13.23^{***}$ | $-14.10^{***}$ |
| | (1.30) | (1.46) |
| Incentive (binary) | 1.36 | $1.69^{*}$ |
| | (0.87) | (0.99) |
| Domestic Ideological Fractionalization | $0.58^{***}$ | $0.57^{**}$ |
| | (0.22) | (0.25) |
| Average position on international cooperation | $-0.03$ | $-0.03$ |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Interaction | $-0.59^{**}$ | $-0.68^{**}$ |
| | (0.27) | (0.30) |
| Number of IGO exits | $1.22^{***}$ | $1.28^{***}$ |
| | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| AIC | 388.08 | 382.44 |
| BIC | 446.45 | 449.15 |
| Log Likelihood | $-187.04$ | $-183.22$ |
| Num. obs. | 30921 | 30921 |
| Num. groups: ioname | 257 | 257 |
| Var: ioname (Intercept) | 35.35 | 37.17 |
| Num. groups: country | | 42 |
| Var: country (Intercept) | | 1.19 |

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 6: Ideological fractionalization among relevant ministers

## Hypothesis 4 & 5: Ideological fractionalization - relevant ministers

## RE: IGO




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B10: Coalitions vs. single party

**RE: IGO, country**




(a) Coefficients

(b) PP Population level




(c) Average PP Population level

Figure B11: Coalitions and relevant ministers