Effects of Institutional Legitimation in International Organizations on Popular Legitimacy

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Abstract

When does institutional legitimation successfully strengthen international organization (IO) legitimacy? While it has become increasingly fashionable to cite the growing power of IOs as a source of popular backlash, we still know little about the impact of institutional legitimation by IOs on citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. In this paper, we develop and test original hypotheses about IOs' institutional legitimation practices on citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Using a conjoint experiment conducted online among nationally representative samples of German and US American respondents in May 2019, we examine how variation in institutional authority and purpose affect legitimacy beliefs. We find authority and purpose to shape legitimacy beliefs in both countries. In the US, citizens' political priors are found to influence how authority and purpose affect legitimacy beliefs. We sketch the broader implications in the context of ongoing debates about IO legitimacy and the recent backlash against IOs in world politics.

A growing scholarly literature explores the attempts of international organizations (IOs) to gain legitimacy given increased public debate, but the consequences of such self-legitimation for legitimacy remain poorly understood. That citizens consider IOs to be legitimate is important from a democratic perspective, as IOs wield extensive power in world politics, often supplanting national decision-making. In addition, IOs, like all organizations, are more likely to govern effectively when they enjoy legitimacy. Popular legitimacy affects whether IOs remain relevant as political arenas for states' efforts to solve problems. Legitimacy in society also makes it easier for IOs to gain political support for ambitious new policies. Finally, popular legitimacy influences IOs' ability to secure compliance with international norms and rules.

Given the importance of popular legitimacy, we contribute new theoretical and empirical insights to the debate about legitimacy and legitimation of IOs. IOs engage in discursive, institutional and behavioral legitimation practices (Bäckstrand and Söderbaum 2018), and in this paper we are interested in the effects of institutional legitimation on popular legitimacy. We refer to popular legitimacy as citizen legitimacy beliefs that an IO has the right to rule and exercises that authority appropriately. We conceive of legitimation as the ways in which IO representatives seek to enhance the beliefs of relevant audiences in an IO's legitimacy (Hurd 1999; Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

In this paper, we specifically explore the effects of IO legitimation invoking two types of institutional features: authority and purpose. The authority of IOs is frequently cited when critics accuse IOs of undermining state sovereignty, or when supporters praise IOs as arenas for transnational problem-solving. Consider the slogan of the Leave campaign in the run-up to the British referendum on EU membership – "Take back control!" – which accuses the EU of being too powerful and urges the UK to resurrect its national sovereignty. Conversely, others, like Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian Member of the European Parliament, call for more authority to the EU in the fight against the Coronavirus (Express, 8 April, 2020). Similarly, the social purpose

of an IO is an integral part of the message when elites express concern or support for the policy goals of an organization. Consider how Nikki Haley, US Ambassador to the UN, accuses the UN Human Rights Council of betraying its purpose to promote human rights, when justifying the US decision to withdraw from the body (NPR, 19 June, 2018). In contrast, the UN itself invokes human rights as one of its principal aims and purposes (UN 2021). It is the authority and purpose of an IO that make it an inherently *political* institution – not only in terms of a machinery for political decision-making, but also in terms of the room for maneuver of the organization to engage in institutional self-legitimation.

Moreover, we test alternative sources of legitimacy residing with the procedures and performances of IOs. While IOs can use factors in both categories, it is an open question whether IOs' procedures or performances are the most effective in swaying citizens' legitimacy beliefs. The past two decades have seen the emergence of a growing literature on whether IOs' procedures or performances matters most to people (e.g., Scharpf 1999; Hurd 2007; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Bernauer et al. 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). For advocates of IO procedure, legitimacy beliefs are driven by the way the organization functions, irrespective of the effects of its policies. For advocates of IO performance, legitimacy beliefs are shaped by the consequences of the organization, irrespective of how the IO formulated the relevant policy. Recent research offers numerous examples of both types of accounts, as well as emergent efforts to assess the relative importance of procedure and performance.

Although this literature provides valuable insights, we know little about the effects on popular legitimacy of elites invoking the authority and purposes of IOs in their communication about these organizations. While earlier research presents expectations that authority (Zürn et al. 2012; Zürn 2018) and purpose (Barnett 1997; Lenz and Viola 2017) may matter for the legitimacy of IOs, it has not subjected these claims to systematic analysis.

To fill these gaps, this paper assesses the causal effect on popular legitimacy beliefs of information about institutional legitimation related to authority, purpose, procedure, and performance. We develop hypotheses about the effects of institutional legitimation on IO legitimacy as rooted in these four aspects, and look at the variation within each on the intuition that these categories are by themselves too crude to identify the specific institutional features that citizens care about. A starting assumption that people are sensitive to information about an IO's institutional practices.

We test the hypotheses through a population-based survey experiment. We adopt a conjoint experimental design, specifically developed to assess how a particular dimension of an object matters relative to other dimensions when their impact is assessed simultaneously (cf. Hainmueller et al. 2014). To increase the generalizability of the findings, the survey experiment was conducted in Germany and the US. While both are advanced industrialized democracies with federal political systems, these two countries differ in two factors that we expect could moderate the impact of authority and purpose, respectively: internationalist attitudes and political ideology. The conjoint experiment confronts respondents with a choice between hypothetical IOs that vary in terms of the four examined institutional qualities. This design allows us to estimate the causal effect of institutional legitimation on legitimacy beliefs, while simultaneously taking into consideration the impact of the other institutional features.

The main findings are three-fold. First, communication about both the authority and the purpose of IOs matters for legitimacy beliefs. When IOs are presented as having extensive authority over member states, when compared to limited authority, this results in less confidence in these organizations. Similarly, the social purposes of IOs have an independent impact on legitimacy beliefs. For instance, promoting free trade has a negative effect on the perceived legitimacy of an IO, compared to ensuring peace and security. Second, the strength of these effects depends on citizens' attitudes toward international cooperation and their

political beliefs in the US but not in Germany, suggesting that IOs' substantive goals can be a boost or a drag on their legitimacy, depending on people's ideological priors and the country. Third, procedure and performance remain influential as sources of legitimacy when the effects of all four institutional features are assessed simultaneously in a conjoint design. In fact, communication about an IO's procedures and performance has larger effects than information about its authority and purpose.

Thus, our contribution is twofold. First, we extend the analysis from an exclusive focus on procedure and performance to also consider the impact of change in authority and purpose on citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. We thereby offer the first systematic analysis of organizational authority and purpose, as well as the most comprehensive assessment of how information on change in multiple qualities of IOs affects popular legitimacy. Second, we take up the challenge to consider the impact of institutional qualities *in combination,* while previous research tends to focus on the impacts of specific institutional qualities on legitimacy beliefs toward IOs (Dellmuth et al. 2019).

The paper proceeds in four steps. The second section lays out the theoretical argument. Third, we explain the survey experimental design, discussing the merits of conjoint experiments, the execution of the survey, and the design of the experimental component. Fourth, we present the empirical results. Fifth, in a broader discussion of the findings, we consider different interpretations and relate these results to earlier research. Sixth, the paper concludes by discussing the broader implications of our findings.

Theory and Hypotheses

To what extent and in what ways are citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of IOs sensitive to institutional self-legitimation of these organizations? Recent years have witnessed increasing efforts to identify institutional practices of IOs which may matter for legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. The starting point for most of this literature has been the distinction between input- and output-based legitimacy, first introduced by Scharpf (1999). While originally intended as a way to capture two alternative *normative* grounds for justifying the authority of the European Union (EU), this distinction was picked up by researchers interested in establishing institutional sources of *sociological* legitimacy for IOs generally. Over the past decade, a growing literature has distinguished between procedure (input) and performance (output) as two generic institutional sources of legitimacy for regional and global IOs (e.g., Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

While this body of research has expanded our understanding of how institutional features of IOs may affect people's legitimacy perceptions, it suffers from five key limitations. First, the evidence on the causal significance of information regarding procedure and performance practices for legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis IOs is inconclusive. Exceptions assessing causal effects include Bernauer et al. (2019) and Dellmuth et al. (2019). Reliance in earlier work on textual analysis or cross-sectional public opinion surveys has not allowed for isolating the causal effects of these two institutional dimensions. Second, the focus on procedure-versus-performance masks the deeper question of what, more specifically, in these features of IO policy-making generates legitimacy beliefs. Each of the two categories hosts a range of particular practices that may be important for legitimacy perceptions. Yet existing research has not systematically assessed effects of several institutional features at the same time, implying

that we know little about their relative importance. Third, comparative analyses of institutional sources of legitimacy across IOs are in short supply. Most existing contributions focus on a single organization (e.g., Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). Fourth, we have very little knowledge about effects of IO authority and purpose on legitimacy beliefs. Whether and how institutional legitimation pertaining to authority, purpose, procedures and performance affects popular legitimacy across IOs, issue areas, and countries, remains an open question. Fifth, existing research analytically often misses that effects occur due to *information* about institutional practices, but rather assume away the link between institutional practices and legitimacy beliefs.

In the following, we develop expectations regarding legitimation invoking the procedures, performance, authority, and purpose of an IO.

Procedure

The premise of procedural accounts is that process criteria are important for perceptions of IO legitimacy. On this argument, actors support an institution's exercise of authority because of how it is set up and operates. Procedural accounts have an early antecedent in Weber's (1922/1978) notion of legal-rational sources of legitimacy. On these lines, governance is regarded as appropriate because properly appointed authorities follow properly formulated decision-taking processes. So, for example, audiences might accord legitimacy to the UNFCCC because its policy-making is perceived to involve a broad range of stakeholders. Alternatively, actors might deny legitimacy to the IMF because its decision-making process is seen to give some states disproportionate weight. For procedural accounts, the legitimacy of an IO derives from the way that the institution functions, irrespective of the consequences of its policies.

Recent research offers several examples of procedural accounts. For instance, Bernauer and Gampfer (2013) focus on whether procedures that allow for greater civil society involvement also translate into greater legitimacy for global environmental governance. They find this to be the case: citizens tend to favor civil society engagement and, therefore, procedures that provide for such participation are rewarded with higher legitimacy. Similarly, Johnson (2011) studies how procedures giving certain states particular advantages (e.g., through vetoes) influence the legitimacy of IOs. She finds that IOs which grant major states such as the US and Russia a special say in decision-making suffer in terms of perceived legitimacy.

H1: Citizens' legitimacy perceptions are responsive to information about an IO's procedures.

Performance

In contrast, other accounts emphasize performance as an institutional source of legitimacy. On these lines, legitimacy beliefs derive from audience evaluations of a governing institution's outcomes. With a focus on performance, IOs might gain or lose legitimacy depending on whether audiences see them as enhancing or undermining desired conditions in society. For example, the WHO might gain legitimacy if actors perceive that it effectively prevents epidemics. Meanwhile, the World Bank might lose legitimacy if subjects believe that this institution fails to reduce poverty. For performance approaches, the legitimacy of an IO derives from its impacts, irrespective of how the institution formulated and executed the relevant policy.

Existing research provides many examples of this type of argument. Multiple studies of public opinion toward the EU highlight the importance of policy-making outcomes for people's legitimacy beliefs. These investigations show that citizens evaluate the EU's legitimacy in

relation to costs and benefits, both for their personal well-being and for their country (Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010). Edwards (2009) advances a similar argument to explain public opinion toward the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. He finds that people's legitimacy beliefs toward these IOs are primarily driven by the perceived implications of these organizations for their country's economy.

H2: Citizens' legitimacy perceptions are responsive to information about an IO's performance.

Authority

We conceptualize authority and legitimacy as distinct but related entities. Whereas authority refers to the recognition that an organization has the right to make decisions within a particular area, legitimacy refers to the perception that these rights are appropriately exercised (Tallberg and Zürn 2019, 586). For instance, a person may recognize the authority of the WTO as the principal forum for developing international trade law, but have little confidence in the exercise of this authority, because of how decisions are made or how they impact specific communities. This analytical separation of legitimacy from authority is well anchored in parts of social theory.[1] Weber (1922/1978, 213), for instance, speaks of how every system of authority "attempts to establish and to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy." At the same time, authority and legitimacy are related, in so far as legitimacy only becomes an issue once an institution possesses authority. In the absence of authority, the question of legitimacy becomes uninteresting.

Empirically, the authority of IOs is captured by three components (Lake 2007; Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn et al. 2020). First, IOs enjoy greater authority when they have been conferred

[1] On an alternative view, legitimacy is a prerequisite for authority (see Hurd 2007, 60-61; Lake 2007).

greater policy-making competences in issue domains that previously were regulated at the domestic level or not at all (Zürn et al. 2012). Second, IOs enjoy greater authority when the member states move away from intergovernmental cooperation by delegating increasing power to autonomous supranational bodies (Tallberg 2002; Hawkins et al. 2006). Third, IOs have greater authority when the member states pool power within intergovernmental bodies by shifting toward forms of majority voting that remove each state's veto over decisions (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1998).

By these criteria, the authority of IOs has expanded considerably over recent decades (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn et al. 2020). States have empowered IOs with authority in more policy domains, delegated more authority to supranational bodies, and pooled more authority in collective decision-making. The growth in IO authority is particularly notable after the end of the Cold War. That said, IOs continue to vary in the authority they possess, ranging from greatly empowered organizations such as the EU, which scores high on all three components, to less empowered organizations such as NAFTA (and its successor, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA), which scores low on all components.

We expect information about the authority of IOs to matter for citizens' legitimacy beliefs. Specifically, we anticipate that IOs with greater authority will have a harder time securing legitimacy from citizens, all else equal (Zürn 2018; Anderson et al. 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). When IOs enjoy extensive authority, they also have to meet demanding procedural and performance standards, or they will suffer from legitimacy deficits. When IOs enjoy less authority, the procedural and performance requirements they have to meet to be deemed legitimate are less demanding.

The EU is often said to offer an illustration of this logic (Banchoff and Smith 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). The greater the authority of the EU, the higher the demands on the organization to take decisions democratically and to solve problems

effectively. As the EU often has fallen short of these expectations, despite more democratic procedures and effective performance than most IOs, legitimacy problems have arisen, reflected in low turnouts in European elections, rejections of new EU treaties in national referenda, and a decision on the part of the UK to leave the organization.

There is to date no systematic empirical evidence for a negative authority-legitimacy linkage, as the only empirical study so far on the relationship between authority and legitimacy finds no effect in either negative or positive direction. As Anderson et al. (2019, 663) conclude, based on a survey experiment in the context of global environmental governance: "[E]ven important shifts of authority from the national to the global level, such as majority decision making at the international level and automatic implementation of international decisions domestically, do not significantly affect citizens' legitimacy perceptions on average."

However, given that greater authority should set the bar higher for IOs to fare well in peoples' perceptions, we expect a negative relationship between IO authority and legitimacy beliefs. In addition, we expect this negative relationship to be moderated by the degree to which citizens hold internationalist attitudes. When citizens are more positive toward international cooperation in general terms, we expect the negative effect of authority on legitimacy to be weaker. Conversely, when citizens are more negative toward international cooperation in general terms, we expect this attitude to strengthen the negative effect of IO authority on legitimacy beliefs.

We advance two hypotheses on the basis of this argument. First, we formulate a general expectation about the effect of IO authority on people's legitimacy beliefs. Second, we formulate a conditional expectation about heterogeneity in effects depending on the degree to which citizens hold internationalist attitudes.

H3a: Citizens' legitimacy perceptions are responsive to information about an IO's level of authority.

H3b: The effect of information about an IO's level of authority on legitimacy beliefs (*H1a*) is conditioned by people's attitudes toward international cooperation.

Purpose

The notion that an organization's social purpose would affect perceptions of its legitimacy is not novel, even if the logic has never been fully theorized or tested. The earliest considerations of purpose hark back to pioneers in the general study of political legitimacy. Easton (1975, 452), for instance, argued that political institutions may obtain legitimacy on the grounds of people's ideological beliefs or moral convictions, next to their beliefs in the appropriateness of institutions and the personal qualities of rulers. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, 126), in another seminal account, distinguished between the operation, output, and "the goals or domain of activity" of the organization as three sources of legitimacy. Scott (1991, 169), similarly, speaks of how legitimacy for an institution may derive primarily from "societal evaluations of organizational goals." In the study of global governance, Barnett (1997, 539) offers an early discussion of the "substantive legitimacy" of IOs, understood as the "ends that are considered desirable," to be distinguished from procedural legitimacy, or how IOs make decisions to reach those ends. Yet, despite these attempts, the idea of social purpose as an additional institutional source of legitimacy never truly took off. Possibly, such a development was stymied by Scharpf's (1999) influential dichotomy between input (procedure) and output (performance).

In recent years, a number of contributions have again suggested that organizational purpose may present a driver of legitimacy beliefs in global governance. These accounts

typically conceive of social purpose as an institutional quality on par with procedure and performance. Scholte and Tallberg (2018, 64) acknowledge that the common distinction between procedure and performance misses potential "substance-grounded" legitimacy beliefs. Lenz and Viola (2017) explicitly speak of procedure, performance, and purpose as the three central organizational features of IOs that feed into assessments of their legitimacy. Nielson et al. (2019, 692) suggest that "actors may assess organizations not merely on how they operate and whether they accomplish their goals, but on what the goals themselves are and whether these are normatively desirable." Taken together, these contributions suggest that citizens would be sensitive to information about an IO's social purpose when forming legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis IOs.

Developing this intuition further, we expect the communicated purposes of IOs to matter for legitimacy beliefs because of how they activate citizens' ideological priors. Political ideologies are systems of normative ideas that bundle ideological content in ways that help people to orient themselves on the political spectrum and to arrive at political choices (Hamill et al. 1985; Sniderman et al. 1986). When citizens hold a particular ideological orientation, this offers them a shortcut to political positions on a whole range of issues interpretable in ideological terms (Jost et al. 2013).

We suggest that an IO's social purpose often is perceived as inherently political or normative. Promoting free trade, combatting poverty or protecting human rights may not be regarded by citizens as neutral exercises of international problem-solving, but as associated with the furthering of certain political ideals rather than others. In some cases, these ideals are closely linked to traditional political ideologies and cleavages in society, such as the left-right dimension. For instance, free trade and deregulation are often associated with market liberalism, while redistribution and social rights are associated with socialism or social democracy. When IOs promote purposes that are interpreted by citizens as political, we would expect citizens to

use information about purpose when forming opinions about IOs. Organizations with purposes that accord more with a person's political priors are more likely to be regarded as legitimate, while IOs that promote goals which diverge from a person's ideological leanings are less likely to be seen as legitimate.

We advance two hypotheses on the basis of this argument. First, we formulate a general expectation about the effect of social purpose on people's legitimacy beliefs. Second, we formulate a conditional expectation about heterogeneity in effects depending on people's political priors.

H4a: Citizens' legitimacy perceptions are responsive to information about an IO's social purpose.

H4b: The effect of information about an IO's social purpose on legitimacy beliefs (*H2a*) is conditioned by people's political ideology.

Research Design

The conjoint experiment exposes participants to hypothetical IOs that differ with respect to institutional legitimation as operationalized through authority, purpose, and other institutional practices. Its primary objective is to test hypotheses about how important communicated levels of authority and social purposes are for citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, and how internationalist attitudes and political ideology affects these relationships.

Survey Design

The experiment is embedded in an online survey with nationally representative samples of German (N=2,044) and American respondents (N=2,048).[2] This cross-country design is novel as it complements prior experimental studies on effects of institutional legitimation practices on legitimacy beliefs that have focused on a single country—the US (cf. Anderson et al. 2019). An important rationale for selecting Germany and the US are the general differences between the two countries in our moderating factors – political ideology and internationalist attitudes. The US is a liberal market economy with a two-party system and strong public opinion polarization, as well as an ambivalent approach to international cooperation, alternating between isolationism and internationalism. Germany is a coordinated market economy with a multi-party system and less polarized public opinion, as well as a strong commitment to international cooperation. At the same time, the two countries are similar across several important contextual conditions, including their federal political systems their high levels of economic development, and their political centrality in most IOs of which they are members, allowing us to hold potentially confounding context factors constant. The survey was implemented by YouGov during May 2019 (Appendix A).

Experimental Design

We use a conjoint experiment to test our hypotheses about an effect of communication about an IO's authority and purpose, respectively, on legitimacy beliefs. Conjoint analysis methods were developed in psychology and marketing, and have become increasingly common in political science in recent years (Hainmueller et al. 2014). In a conjoint experiment, respondents

[2] The experiment is pre-registered with EGAP (No. 20190507AA). See: http://egap.org/registration/5711.

typically receive two alternative descriptions of cases, and are then asked to rank or rate these two hypothetical alternatives. These two alternative cases have multiple attributes with differing values. By systematically varying how these cases are described, analysts can estimate the importance of each attribute on respondents' combined choices. In the context of global governance, scholars have used conjoint experiments to assess, for instance, which institutional practices generate public support for international environmental agreements (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Bernauer et al. 2019).

We devised a conjoint experiment in which each respondent is shown screens with two hypothetical IOs in comparison. Each IO has a set of distinct attributes. Respondents are then asked rate their confidence in each IO. This design allows us to assess how information about different institutional features of IOs affects respondents' legitimacy beliefs. Using hypothetical IOs allows us to estimate the effects of communicated IO attributes systematically and with great precision. While using real-world IOs would have added an element of realism to the experiment, it would have made it impossible to vary IO attributes systematically in the comparisons in such a way that effects could be established confidently. In addition, respondents may have been influenced by pre-existing beliefs and knowledge about IOs when asked to choose between them.

This experimental component of the survey was introduced through a text providing context and instructions (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Example screen with survey instructions

After this introductory screen, each respondent received four randomly allocated screens. Each of these four screens compared two hypothetical IOs and asked the respondent to choose between them and to indicate its level of confidence in them. This comparison worked as follows. The *order* of the institutional legitimation practices of the two IOs was randomly assigned across respondents, but consistent across the four binary comparisons for each respondent to avoid confusion. The *values* of the institutional practices were fully randomized, with two exceptions. First, respondents were never given the same value on an institutional practices in a comparison across two IOs. Second, respondents were never confronted with the same screen twice.

Authority is operationalized through a categorical variable capturing the power an IO exerts over member states. This measure includes both formal—codified—and informal—social—power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). We focus on IO authority as degrees of power of member states, partly because this conceptualization captures the implications of delegation and pooling for individual states (Hooghe and Marks 2015) and partly because it captures how IO authority typically is expressed in elite communication. Purpose is measured using descriptions of hypothetical core mandates of IOs that are relevant in global governance, such

as the protection of human rights or poverty reduction. This measure captures the moral dimension of purpose (cf. Lenz and Viola 2017). When measuring procedures, we highlight two central aspects of IOs—transparency and participation. While we could have selected other procedural features, such as accountability and fairness, transparency and participation are two central procedural dimensions that have received much attention in prior IR studies. Similarly, we select two central aspects of performance—fair outcomes and problem-solving capacity (cf. Scholte and Tallberg 2018). Table 1 summarizes the institutional features varied in the conjoint design. Figure 2 offers an example of what such a screen might look like.

The two outcome variables of interest tap into individuals' confidence in IOs. Our preferred measure of legitimacy beliefs is the degree of confidence on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (no confidence at all) to 9 (complete confidence) (Figure 2). While legitimacy perceptions are a complex phenomenon, confidence has several advantages as an indicator. First, it aligns well with our conceptualization of legitimacy as the belief that an institution has the right to rule. Like trust, confidence picks up on a sense of institutional attachment and on a willingness to put one's judgment in the hands of that institution (Gibson et al. 2003, 361). Second, it does not integrate into the measure either potential institutional sources of legitimacy (such as the perceived fairness or effectiveness of an institution), or potential consequences of legitimacy (such as compliance with an institution's rules). While some studies use a multi-item measure with the aim to capture various complexities of legitimacy as a concept, these studies usually invoke a broader conceptualization of legitimacy, incorporating normative standards to be met by an institution and/or acceptance of the rules of an institution (e.g., Gilley 2006). Third, the confidence measure allows us to relate our findings to the large literature on public opinion that also employs confidence or trust as an indicator of legitimacy perceptions (e.g., Caldeira 1986; Newton and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2009; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

For the purpose of robustness checks and to assess the sensitivity of experimental results across subgroups, we also ask respondents to indicate which of the two hypothetical IOs they would prefer. Answering this latter question only requires choosing between two, which is cognitively less demanding for respondents than indicating their confidence in either IO.

Table 1. Institutional legitimation practices varied in the experiment

Institutional legitimation practice	Values
Authority	
The organization…	- has limited power over member countries - has some power over member countries - has extensive power over member countries
Purpose	
The organization works to…	- protect human rights - promote public health - reduce poverty - promote free trade - ensure peace and security - combat climate change
Procedures	
(i) Transparency: Information about the organization's decision-making…	- is public - is partially public - is confidential
(ii) Participation: In the organization's decision-making…	- citizens have a say - NGOs have a say - all countries have an equal say - only the powerful countries have a say
Performance	
(i) Fair outcome: The decisions of the organization…	- benefit all countries equally - benefit some countries more than others
(ii) Problem-solving: The decisions of the organization…	- solve most important problems - solve some important problems - solve few important problems



Figure 2. Example screen with conjoint experiment

The experimental component is followed by an attention check. We measured attention by asking individuals the following question after they had completed about 70 percent of the survey: "We are interested in learning about your preferences on a variety of topics, including colors. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options. What is your favorite color?" Correct answers were coded as one and incorrect answers as zero (Bechtel and Scheve 2013). We use this information to limit the sample to those who can be assumed to have read the instructions when answering

the experimental questions. There are small differences in attentiveness between the samples. About 66 percent of US respondents were attentive, while only 54 percent of German respondents were attentive. Below we test the robustness of the experimental results using the full sample including the non-attentive respondents, and find fewer treatment effects, as expected.

The experiment was preceded by indicators for the purpose of balance tests and additional robustness checks: intentional media consumption, cognitive mobilization, generalized trust, confidence in domestic government, and knowledge about global governance. YouGov also provides demographic and political data on the respondents as background information, such as information on gender, age, education, and geographical region (see Appendix B for the entire questionnaire in English and German).

Measuring Internationalist Attitudes and Political Ideology

To explore H1b and H2b about a conditioning effect of attitudes toward international cooperation and political ideology on treatment effects, the survey assessed respondents' opinions on international cooperation and partisan identification. The first indicator asked respondents to indicate if they think that international cooperation is a "good thing," a "bad thing," or "neither good nor bad." The answers to this question reveal that similarly high shares of the population in both countries (between 71 and 74 percent) indicate that they think international cooperation is a good thing (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Internationalist attitudes in Germany and the US

Notes: Analysis uses design weights. Weighted percentage of those thinking that international cooperation is a bad thing, neither good nor bad, or a good thing.

The indicator for partisan identification is created based on a standard question about whether there is a particular political party they feel closer to than all the other parties. Partisan identification differs between Germany and the US. US public opinion is more polarized, since only about 18 percent of US citizens are estimated to be independents and the rest are either Democrats or Republicans. In Germany, about 22 percent are independents and the rest identify with a much larger number of political parties (Figure 4). That US opinion is more polarized than German public opinion can also be seen when looking at the distribution of left-right ideology (Appendix C).



Figure 4. Internationalist attitudes in Germany and the US

Notes: Analysis uses design weights. Weighted percentage of those thinking that international cooperation is a bad thing, neither good nor bad, or a good thing.

Results

We begin by presenting the effects of communication about authority and purpose, and then turn to an analysis of the conditioning impact of internationalist attitudes and partisanship on these effects. We then provide a range of validity and robustness checks.

Effects of Information about Authority and Purpose

Figures 5 and 6 show our estimates of authority and purpose as well as the other institutional practices on confidence. The dots represent the estimated average marginal component effects

(AMCEs) of a given value for each practice on individual confidence toward the packaged IO profile, relative to a reference category or baseline. In other words, the AMCEs express the degree to which an IO feature increases (or decreases) citizen confidence in an IO. The bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, and the points without bars indicate the baseline for a given value of an institutional practice. The interpretation of each estimate is relative to the baseline for that dimension.

To examine if authority and purpose matter, we need to decide on a baseline for each indicator. For all indicators except purpose, we use the lowest category as a baseline. That is, unlike in other experiments such as vignette experiments, there is no control group but a baseline. For example, for authority, we compare effects of "some" and "extensive" power over member states to "limited" power. For purpose, this logic is not applicable and we need another motivation. Here we assume that there may be different understandings of social purpose among citizens, where ensuring peace and security arguable is one of the least contentious purposes of an IO. We thus use the protection of peace and security as a baseline.

The results clearly show that authority matters. Moving from an IO with limited power over its member states to one with extensive power over its member states decreases legitimacy beliefs by 0.221 in the US (p<0.000, Figure 5) and 0.182 points in Germany (p<0.000, Figure 6) on the 1-9 confidence scale. By contrast, moving from limited to some power does not have any effect on confidence. This finding suggests that respondents react to the formulation "extensive power," and not "some power," thereby supporting H1a in both Germany and the US.

In addition, the results indicate that communicated social purpose matters. In the US (Figure 5), a purpose of combating climate change leads to a 0.309 point decrease on the confidence scale (p<0.000). This is the strongest purpose effect on legitimacy beliefs when compared to the baseline of ensuring peace and security. We also find that moving from the

baseline to a purpose of promoting free trade leads to a 0.177 point decrease ($p<0.007$) – the second strongest effect.

In Germany, two effects are significant (Figure 6). The strongest effect is recorded for free trade. Moving from the baseline to a promotion of free trade represents a 0.401 point decrease on the confidence scale ($p<0.000$). Similarly, moving from the baseline to a promotion of public health leads to a decrease of 0.267 points ($p<0.000$). Taken together, these findings suggest similar results for Germany and the US in the sense that social purpose matters for legitimacy beliefs (H2a).

Information about other institutional practices also matters for legitimacy beliefs. The effects are very similar in the two countries. We start with procedure-related practices. In the case of transparency, moving from the baseline of a confidential organization to one that is public increases confidence by about 0.457 points ($p<0.000$) in both the US and Germany. In the case of participation, moving from the baseline of an IO in which only powerful countries have a say to an IO in which citizens have a say increases confidence by an estimated 0.554 points in the US ($p<0.000$) and 0.634 in Germany ($p<0.000$). We then turn to performance-related practices. In the case of fair outcomes, moving from the baseline of an IO that benefits some countries more than others, to an IO that benefits all members equally, raises confidence by 0.316 points ($p<0.000$) in the US and 0.374 points ($p<0.000$) in Germany. Finally, in the case of problem-solving, moving from the baseline of an IO that solves few important problems to an IO that solves most important problems increases confidence by 0.293 points ($p<0.000$) in the US and 0.393 points ($p<0.000$) in Germany.

Can we expect these changes in authority and purpose to lead to substantial shifts in confidence in IOs in the real world? We examine this by predicting levels of confidence for two hypothetical IOs (cf. Bechtel and Scheve 2013). By prediction we mean computation of levels of confidence for each of the hypothetical IOs based on 1000 country-specific simulations using

the results of respondents' confidence ratings (see King 2000, for a discussion of the methodology). The first IO is one that has unattractive characteristics based on our experimental results: its purpose is to combat climate change in the US (and promote free trade in Germany), it has extensive power over member states, it solves few important problems, it yields benefits for specific countries at the expense of others, it provides only powerful states with a say, and it is confidential. The second IO has all the features of an attractive design based on our experimental results: its mandate is to ensure peace and security, it has limited power over member states, it solves most important problems, it yields equal benefits for all countries, it provides citizens with a say, and it is public.

This additional analysis suggests that information on how IOs are designed, from the most unpopular design to the most popular, may lead to noteworthy shifts in legitimacy beliefs. In Germany, average confidence is predicted to be 3.2 for an IO with an unattractive design on the 1-9 confidence scale, but as much as 4.9 in the case of an IO with popular design features. Similar results are found for the US, where we predict an average confidence level of about 3.3 for the unattractive IO design and about 5 for the attractive IO design.

xx



Figure 5. Effects of institutional legitimation practices on confidence in IOs, US

Notes: Analysis uses design weights. Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Vignette descriptions shortened for the sake of presentation.



Figure 6. Effects of institutional legitimation practice on confidence in IOs, Germany

Notes: Analysis uses design weights. Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Vignette descriptions shortened for the sake of presentation.

Interaction Analysis

Next, we examine H1b and H2b, which predict that the effects of authority and purpose on legitimacy beliefs are moderated by people's pre-existing political beliefs. To test H1b, we focus on attitudes toward international cooperation as a potential moderating factor. To test H2b, we concentrate on partisan identification.

For this analysis, we use a different way of calculating and comparing treatment effects, since each subgroup will have a different average value on the baseline practiceused to identify effect strength. We therefore complement AMCEs (used to infer differences in causal effects within subgroups) with marginal means (MMs) (used to infer if subgroups differ in how they value specific institutional practices) (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Leeper et al. 2020). MMs express the preferences of respondents for all institutional features; these quantities are column and row mean outcomes for each institutional feature level, averaging across all other features. We calculate differences between MMs to check whether observed differences between MMs of two subgroups are statistically significant with regard to a specific institutional feature. If they are, then that feature can be assumed to shape confidence more in a particular subgroup than in another. As suggested by Leeper et al. (2020), we use the discrete choice outcome variable to estimate AMCEs for each institutional feature separately and then compare those estimates to MMs to ascertain the sensitivity of the analysis.

Figure 7 shows the results for H1b in the US. We find that attitudes toward international cooperation indeed moderate the effects of authority on IO legitimacy beliefs. The AMCEs suggest that Americans with positive or indifferent attitudes toward international cooperation react with weaker confidence to information that IOs have extensive power compared to the baseline of limited power, whereas this negative effect is not found among citizens with more

nationalist attitudes. The MMs indicate that this negative effect on confidence is weaker among the internationalists than among those indifferent toward international cooperation ($p<0.023$).

Figure 8 shows the corresponding results for Germany, where we do not find that internationalist attitudes systematically condition the relationship between authority and confidence. The negative effect of an IO having extensive authority is only found only among those indifferent toward international cooperation. However, differences in MMs among subgroups are not statistically significant, indicating that the three subgroups do not hold different preferences regarding the authority of IOs.

Next, we are interested in whether partisan identification moderates the effects of an IO's social purpose on citizens' confidence in this organization (H2b). The results for the US are in line with this hypothesis (Figure 9). The AMCEs indicate that Democrats respond with greater confidence when informed that an IO engages in poverty alleviation compared to the baseline of ensuring peace and security, and with weaker confidence when the IO promotes free trade. Republicans, on the hand, respond negatively to information about IOs fighting poverty and climate change compared to the baseline. The differences in MMs between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (except in the area of public health), indicating that partisan identification systematically moderates the effects of different social purposes on IO confidence.



Figure 7. Effects of authority on confidence in IOs, by attitudes toward international cooperation, US

Notes: Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs and MMs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Weighted data. Answers to the question: "Do you think international cooperation is: a bad thing, a good thing, or neither good nor bad?". Dependent variable: Discrete choice between two organizations. See Appendix Table D1 for detailed results.



Figure 8. Effects of authority on confidence in IOs, by attitudes toward international cooperation, Germany

Notes: Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs and MMs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Weighted data. Answers to the question: "Do you think international cooperation is: a bad thing, a good thing, or neither good nor bad?". Dependent variable: Discrete choice between two organizations. See Appendix Table D2 for detailed results.



Figure 9. Effects of social purpose on confidence in IOs, by partisan identification, US

Notes: Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs and MMs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Weighted data. Answers to the question: "Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all

the other parties?". Dependent variable: Discrete choice between two organizations. See Appendix Table D3 for detailed results.



Figure 10. Effects of social purpose on confidence in IOs, by partisan identification, Germany
Notes: Sample includes attentive respondents only. AMCEs and MMs with their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Weighted data. Answers to the question: "Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?". Dependent variable: Discrete choice between two organizations. See Appendix Table D4 for detailed results.

In Germany, we examine H2b across partisans of the historically two largest parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD, which also featured in Chapter 5, to make the analysis more comparable to the one of the US. The results do not support H2b (Figure 10). The AMCEs show that the effects of social purpose on confidence are quite similar across all subgroups, largely reflecting the aggregate pattern in Figure 5. The exception is the group of partisans who are neither SPD nor CDU/CSU, which appear to be more easily affected by an IO's social purpose. In this group, all purposes except poverty alleviation lead to lower IO confidence compared to the baseline purpose of ensuring peace and security. However, the MMs for each purpose are not statistically different from each other across subgroups, suggesting that different groups of partisans in Germany do not have different preferences regarding the social purposes of IOs.

Validity and Robustness Checks

We perform several validity and robustness checks, which corroborate our findings about effects of communicated authority and purpose on legitimacy beliefs (Figures 5 and 6). First, we conduct balance checks to assess whether the randomization produced well-balanced experimental groups (cf. Hainmueller et al. 2014), which indicate that the attributes are jointly balanced (Appendix Tables E1-E2).

Second, we replicate the analyses using the alternative dependent variable indicating whether respondents chose organization 1 or 2. Respondents were asked to make this discrete choice right after they were presented the different institutional practices, as described above. Respondents tended to be consistent in indicating relatively high levels of confidence in the organization they chose, and lower levels of confidence in the organization they did not choose. Interestingly, in Germany, a larger number of social purpose cues have effects when examining organization choice than when examining confidence in an IO, potentially because it is an easier

task to choose between two organizations than to rate confidence in both. The social purposes of human rights, free trade, climate change, and public health all make an organization less likely to be chosen compared to the baseline security IO (Appendix Figure D1).

Third, we checked whether our results in Figures 5 and 6 are conditional upon other individual characteristics than those we hypothesized, such as confidence in government. For this purpose, we use responses to a question about a respondent's confidence in government on a scale from no confidence at all (0) to complete confidence (10). Results suggest that there are no differences in AMCEs at different levels of confidence in government, so we do not investigate this further through MMs (Appendix Figure D2).

Fourth, we run the analysis from Figures 5 and 6 by including both attentive and non-attentive respondents. As expected, results vary slightly. It can be seen that in the US, free trade cues do not work when including non-attentive respondents as well; however, climate change IOs remain less popular than the baseline security IO. In Germany, the main results remain robust, but with the in addition that also human rights IOs are less popular than the baseline security IO (Figure D3).

Finally, we are interested in whether the findings on authority and purpose depend on respondents' level of political awareness. To this end, we examine differences in effect sizes for subgroups that differ in their level of education and knowledge about global governance, respectively. Looking at differences in AMCEs, we do not find any systematic moderating effects of either indicator on authority and purpose effects (Appendix Figures D4 and D5).

Discussion

The analysis supports our expectation that IO institutional legitimation practices affect citizen legitimacy beliefs. First, the findings suggest that authority shapes legitimacy beliefs in the sense that IOs presented as having extensive power over member states are perceived as less legitimate than IOs with limited power over member states. This finding is robust in both Germany and the US, and consistent with previously untested expectations that authority breeds contestation and legitimacy deficits (Zürn et al. 2012; Zürn 2018). However, it is only in the US that authority has a weaker negative effect on legitimacy beliefs among citizens more in favor of international cooperation, as we expected.

Second, the evidence strongly suggests that information about an IO's social purpose matters for legitimacy beliefs. This finding supports the supposition that an organization's social purpose is important in and of itself – irrespective other institutional practices (Scott 1991; Barnett 1997; Lenz and Viola 2017). In both countries, free trade cues stand out as having particularly strong effects. In addition, in the US, presenting an IOs as involved in climate change decreases perceptions of IO legitimacy, while, in Germany, the same effect results when presenting an IO as involved in health. Political ideology conditions the effects of social purpose in predictable ways in the US, with Democrats being positively affected, and Republicans negatively affected, by a poverty alleviation purpose.

Third, these findings establish effects of procedure and performance, which have been established in previous studies, also when assessing them simultaneously with each other and with effects of authority and purpose. The results demonstrate that people are more sensitive to information about an IO's procedure and performance when forming legitimacy beliefs compared to information about its authority and purpose. While both procedure and

performance have strong effects, procedure-related legitimation practices appear particularly important in both countries.

Taken together, these results suggest that citizens care about the inherently political nature of IOs manifested in their practices of power and purpose. When forming beliefs about the legitimacy of IOs, citizens do not only consider how IOs take decisions and whether those decisions are effective, but also if IOs pursue social aims citizens agree with and whether the authority of these organizations clashes with state autonomy. Whether and to what extent the authority and purpose of IOs function as a boost or a drag on legitimacy depends on citizens political priors.

While our findings are reasonably similar across the two countries, there is also some variation in effects, which calls for interpretation. First, we observe that internationalist attitudes condition the negative effects of authority on legitimacy beliefs in the US but not in Germany. One explanation for the absence of a moderating effect of internationalist attitudes in Germany might be due to citizens in this country already being accustomed to an IO with high levels of authority (the EU), which potentially could reduce the differences across subgroups.

Second, we observe that the specific purposes of IOs which matter for citizens' legitimacy beliefs partly vary between the two country settings. In order to understand this variation, we need to consider how these issues unite and divide citizens differently in the two countries. In this respect, the aggregate effects at the country level hide partisan dynamics that are quite different in the US and Germany. In the US, the purposes of IOs divide citizens along partisan lines: while climate change and poverty mandates have negative effects on legitimacy beliefs among Republicans compared to a baseline of ensuring peace and security, a poverty mandate has a positive effect and a free trade purpose a negative effect among Democrats. In Germany, systematic partisan divisions are not found: CDU/CSU and SPD partisans respond in very

similar ways to communication about purpose. We suspect that these differences reflect the varying degrees of partisan polarization in the US and Germany.

This combination of extensive similarities and some variations in effects underlines the importance of examining the effects of authority and purpose in a comparative setting. Our findings confirm that these effects are not specific for a single country, but also suggest that country context may shape their exact nature. Future studies could fruitfully build on our study of the US and Germany to examine how IO authority and purpose matter in a broader sample of IOs and countries. Likewise, future research could usefully extend the range of social purposes examined to other issues salient in public debate, such as migration.

These findings suggest two broader implications. First, they indicate that information invoking the authority and purpose of IOs when communicating about these organizations are hitting home. This has consequences for the likely effects of elite communication providing such information. When Boris Johnson calls on the UK to take back control from the EU, or when Guy Verhofstadt explains that the EU needs more power to fight the Covid-19 pandemic, they may thus tap into concerns that people care about. Likewise, the way in which information about the social purposes of IOs is presented has predictable effects of people's perceptions of these organizations because of their political priors. While, for sure, elites cannot stray too far from IOs' actual authority and purpose, their communication can frame these features of IOs in ways that make people more or less positive toward them. Do IOs control member states or have the authority to tackle joint cross-border problems? Are IOs seeking to ensure peace and security or are they engaged in military interventions? Recent mobilization of public opinion against IOs by anti-globalist elites successfully exploits people's concerns with these highly political features of IOs and the scope for communication to shape attitudes (De Vries et al. 2020).

Second, this paper's examination of authority and purpose exemplifies how research on politics in the global realm can take us into novel territory in scholarship on the sources of political legitimacy. Studies in comparative politics typically take the authority of governments as given and do not consider purpose, since governments by nature have general-purpose orientations. In contrast, task-specific orientations are more common in global governance (Lenz et al. 2015; Hooghe et al. 2019). With the exception of the UN and a number of regional IOs, which approximate general-purpose organizations, other IOs are specialized vehicles for the advancement of particular political goals. Consider the WTO (free trade), ILO (labor rights), IMF (financial stability), UNFCCC (climate sustainability), and UN Women (female empowerment). These organizations not only present arenas for dealing with the specific policy problems, but usually also have these goals inscribed into their mandates and are known to actively "teach" these norms to state and non-state audiences (Finnemore 1993). By exploiting variation that exists in the global realm, we can thus contribute novel knowledge about the importance of organizational purpose for legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

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Online Appendix

Appendix A: YouGov methodology

To conduct the survey experiments, we relied on samples from the YouGov online panel, a well-reputed global survey company very frequently used by social scientists and known for its high-quality panels (Berinsky et al. 2012).

YouGov employs a carefully executed opt-in panel together with matched sampling to approximate a random sample of the adult population. Matched sampling involves taking a stratified random sample of the target population and then matching available internet respondents to the target sample. More specifically, YouGov relies on targeted quota sampling with the aim to achieve representative samples at the end of the fieldwork. The samples for our survey were matched to the full populations of the three countries using age, education, gender, and party identification, and are therefore generalizable to the populations of these countries. For a detailed discussion of the sampling procedure for the YouGov online panel, see Ansolabehere et al. (2014). The age span of included participants in our study is 18-74 years in Germany and the UK, and 18-89 years in the US for methodological reasons. Furthermore, an additional criterion to match the sample to the full population in the US is ethnicity.

While the sample thus should be generalizable to the populations of these countries, the YouGov online panel is self-recruited, which may introduce motivational factors. Participants receive small monetary incentives for their participation, such as entries into prize draws. More specifically, YouGov invited the target group to participate in the study through e-mail, informing the respondents about the length of the study and offering monetary incentives to participate. Those deciding to participate could access the survey through a link and answer the questions online. YouGov's incentive program is points-based. Point values are determined by survey length and are allocated upon survey completion. Respondents accumulate points for completing surveys and are able to redeem these either for entries into prize draws with a wide range of prizes or towards a cash payment. See YouGov's webpages at https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/ for more information about their methodology. Since our goal is to establish causal effects through an experiment with high internal validity, rather than to identify absolute levels of perceived legitimacy in a population, and since we run attention, manipulation, and other checks along with our experiments, we consider the risk of motivational factors shaping participation acceptable.

On generalizability, Ansolabehere and Rivers (2013) and Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) show that matched sampling also produces accurate population estimates and replicates the correlational structure of random samples using telephones and residential addresses.

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Douglas Rivers. 2013. Cooperative Survey Research. *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 307–29.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Brian F. Schaffner. 2014. Does Survey Mode Still Matter? Findings From a 2010 Multi-Mode Comparison. *Political Analysis* 22(3): 285–303.

Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis* 20(3): 351–68.

Appendix B: Questionnaire

English version

Single Choice

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1 No HS
2 High school graduate
3 Some college
4 2-year
5 4-year
6 Post-grad
8 Skipped
9 Not Asked

Age

What is your age?

Gender

What is your gender?

Intro text

This survey is conducted by researchers at Stockholm University in Sweden.

The purpose of the survey is to get **your opinion on politics in your country and the world**. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions; we are interested in your opinion.

Intentional media consumption (single-choice – single-item)

Q1. Let's start with some questions about your life.

How often do you watch the news on television, radio, printed newspapers or the Internet?

1. Frequently
2. Occasionally
3. Never
4. Don't know

Cognitive mobilization (single choice – single-item)

Q2. When you get together with friends, how often would you say you discuss political matters?

1. Frequently
2. Occasionally
3. Never
4. Don't know

Generalized trust (single choice – single-item)

Q3. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1. You can't be too careful
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Most people can be trusted
12. Don't know

Confidence in domestic government (single choice – single-item)

Q4. How much confidence do you have in the United States (US) government?

1. No confidence at all
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Complete confidence
12. Don't know

Pre-treatment opinion regarding international cooperation (single choice – single-item)

Q5. In your opinion, is international cooperation…

1. A good thing
2. A bad thing
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Don't know

Conjoint experiment

Context introduction (received by all respondents before the first screen with alternatives

Countries around the world are currently discussing how best to cooperate within international organizations. We are interested in what you think about the ways international organizations should work.

We will now provide you with several examples of how international organizations could work. We will always show you two possible organizations in comparison. For each comparison we would like to know which of the two organizations you prefer. You may like both alternatives similarly or may not like either of them at all. Regardless of your overall evaluation, please indicate which organization you prefer over the other.

In total, we will show you four comparisons. People have different opinions about these issues and there are no right or wrong answers. Please take your time when reading the comparisons.

Experimental component

Each respondent receives 4 screens. The order of the attributes should be randomly assigned across respondents, but remain consistent across the four binary comparisons for each respondent to avoid confusion.

Fully-randomized conjoint in which each respondent is shown two international organizations in comparison and (1) asked to choose between them ('Which organization would you have most confidence in?') and (2) asked to evaluate their level of confidence in each of them ('If both organizations existed, how much confidence would you have in each of them?').

In the table below, we list all attributes to be varied on the four screens. In the second table below, we give an example for how such a screen would approximately look like.

Table 1. Attributes to be varied

Attribute	Attribute value
The organization works to…	- protect human rights - promote public health - reduce poverty - promote free trade - ensure peace and security - combat climate change
The organization …	- has limited power over member countries - has some power over member countries - has extensive power over member countries
Information about the organization's decision-making…	- is public - is partially public - is confidential
In the organization's decision-making…	- citizens have a say - Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a say - all countries have an equal say - only the powerful countries have a say
The decisions of the organization…	- benefit all countries equally - benefit some countries more than others
The decisions of the organization…	- solve most important problems - solve some important problems - solve few important problems

Example screen

The figure below shows the features of the two possible international organizations that you will be choosing between. Note that the order of the features may vary from one comparison to the other.



Attention check

Q9. We are interested in learning about your preferences on a variety of topics, including colors. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options. What is your favorite color? (multiple selections possible – single-item)

a. Red
b. Green

Knowledge (single choice- 3 items) [randomize order of items]

Q10. Here are some questions about international organizations. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but if you do please tell me.

Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which ones of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India D) Don't know

Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva D) Don't know

Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments D) Don't know

Left-right ideology (single choice – single-item)

Q11. In politics, people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". How would you place your views on this scale?

1. Left
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Right
12. Don't know

Party identification (single choice – single item)

Q12. Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?

- Democrats
- Republicans
- Don't know

Only for respondents who have chosen a party in Q12

Q13. How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel that you are...

- Very close
- Quite close
- Not close
- Not at all close
- Don't know

German version

Single Choice

Höchste abgeschlossene Ausbildung.

Germany (two versions of answer categories)

Version 1

1 Noch in schulischer Ausbildung
2 Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss
3 Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss (POS, Mittlere Reife)
4 Abitur, Fachhochschulreife
5 Ohne Schulabschluss
777 keine Angabe

Version 2

1 Keinen Abschluss
2 Noch in Ausbildung
3 Noch im Studium
4 Lehre oder vergleichbarer Abschluss
5 Universitäts- oder Fachhochschulabschluss
777 keine Angabe

Age

Wie alt sind sie?

Gender

Geschlecht.

Intro text

Diese Umfrage wird von Politikwissenschaftlern in Schweden an der Universität Stockholm durchgeführt.

Zweck der Umfrage ist es, **Ihre Meinung zur Politik in Ihrem Land und in der Welt zu erfragen**. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten auf die Fragen; wir sind an Ihrer Meinung interessiert.

Intentional media consumption (single-choice – single-item)

Q1. Zunächst einige Fragen zu Ihrem Leben.

Wie oft verfolgen Sie Nachrichten im Fernsehen, Radio, in gedruckten Zeitungen oder im Internet?

1. Oft
2. Gelegentlich
3. Niemals
4. Weiß nicht

Cognitive mobilization (single choice – single-item)

Q2. Wenn Sie mit Freunden zusammen sind, wie oft diskutieren Sie Ihrer Einschätzung nach politische Themen?

1. Oft
2. Gelegentlich
3. Niemals
4. Weiß nicht

Generalized trust (single choice – single-item)

Q3. Würden Sie im Allgemeinen sagen, dass man den meisten Menschen trauen kann oder dass man im Umgang mit Menschen nicht vorsichtig genug sein kann?

1. Man kann nicht vorsichtig genug sein
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Man kann den meisten Menschen trauen
12. Weiß nicht

Confidence in domestic government (single choice – single-item)

Q4. Wie viel Vertrauen haben Sie in die deutsche Bundesregierung?

1. Überhaupt kein Vertrauen
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Volles Vertrauen
12. Weiß nicht

Pre-treatment opinion regarding international cooperation (single choice – single-item)

Q5. Ist internationale Zusammenarbeit Ihrer Meinung nach …

1. Eine gute Sache
2. Eine schlechte Sache

3. Weder gut noch schlecht
4. Weiß nicht

Conjoint experiment

Context introduction (received by all respondents before the first screen with alternatives):

In vielen Ländern weltweit wird zurzeit diskutiert, wie man am besten in internationalen Organisationen zusammenarbeiten kann. Wir sind daran interessiert, wie Ihrer Meinung nach internationale Organisationen arbeiten sollten.

Im Folgenden geben wir Ihnen einige Beispiele, wie internationale Organisationen arbeiten könnten. Wir werden Ihnen immer zwei mögliche Organisationen im Vergleich zeigen. Für jeden Vergleich möchten wir wissen, welche der zwei Organisationen Sie besser finden. Es könnte sein, dass Sie beide Alternativen mögen oder aber keine von beiden. Dessen ungeachtet bitten wir Sie anzugeben, welche der beiden Organisation Sie vorziehen.

Wir werden Ihnen insgesamt vier Vergleiche zeigen. Es gibt verschiedene Meinungen zu diesen Themen und daher gibt es weder richtige noch falsche Antworten. Bitte nehmen Sie sich Zeit, wenn Sie die Vergleiche lesen.

Experimental component

Each respondent receives 4 screens. The order of the attributes should be randomly assigned across respondents, but remain consistent across the four binary comparisons for each respondent to avoid confusion.

Fully-randomized conjoint in which each respondent is shown two international organizations in comparison and (1) asked to choose between them ('Which organization would you have most confidence in?') and (2) asked to evaluate their level of confidence in each of them ('If both organizations existed, how much confidence would you have in each of them?').

In the table below, we list all attributes to be varied on the four screens. In the second table below, we give an example for how such a screen would approximately look like.

Table 1. Attributes to be varied

Attribute	Attribute value
Die Organisation arbeitet darauf hin…	- Menschenrechte zu schützen - die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern - Armut zu bekämpfen - Freihandel voranzutreiben - Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren - den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen
Die Organisation …	- hat begrenzte Macht über Mitgliedsstaaten - hat einige Macht über Mitgliedsstaaten - hat viel Macht über Mitgliedsstaaten
Information über die Entscheidungsweise der Organisation…	- ist öffentlich - ist zum Teil öffentlich - ist vertraulich
Im Entscheidungsprozess der Organisation…	- haben Bürger Mitspracherecht - haben Nichtregierungsorganisationen Mitspracherecht - haben alle Länder gleiches Mitspracherecht

	- haben nur mächtige Länder Mitspracherecht
Die Entscheidungen der Organisation…	- kommen allen Ländern gleichermaßen zugute - kommen einigen Ländern mehr zugute als anderen
Die Entscheidungen der Organisation…	- lösen die meisten wichtigen Probleme - lösen einige wichtige Probleme - lösen wenige wichtige Probleme

Example screen

The table below shows the features of the two possible international organizations that you will be choosing between. Note that the order of the features may vary from one comparison to the other.

Merkmale	Internationale Organisation 1	Internationale Organisation 2
Die Organisation arbeitet darauf hin…	- Menschenrechte zu schützen	- die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern
Die Organisation …	- hat begrenzte Macht über Mitgliedsstaaten	- hat viel Macht über Mitgliedsstaaten
Information über die Entscheidungsweise der Organisation…	- ist vertraulich	- ist öffentlich
Im Entscheidungsprozess der Organisation…	- - haben nur mächtige Länder Mitspracherecht	- haben Bürger Mitspracherecht
Die Entscheidungen der Organisation…	- kommen allen Ländern gleichermaßen zugute	- kommen einigen Ländern mehr zugute als anderen
Die Entscheidungen der Organisation…	- lösen die meisten wichtigen Probleme	- lösen wenige wichtige Probleme
Q6a-d. Welcher Organisation würden Sie am meisten vertrauen?	Organisation 1	Organisation 2
Q7a-d. Falls beide Organisationen existierten, wie viel Vertrauen hätten Sie in Organisation 1?	Überhaupt kein Vertrauen 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 Volles Vertrauen	
Q8a-d. Falls beide Organisationen existierten, wie viel Vertrauen hätten Sie in Organisation 2?	Überhaupt kein Vertrauen 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 Volles Vertrauen	

Attention check (double choice – single-item)

Q9. Wir sind an Ihren Präferenzen zu verschiedenen Themen interessiert, Farben eingeschlossen. Um zu zeigen, dass Sie dies gelesen haben, wählen Sie unten bitte sowohl rot als auch grün aus, egal welche Ihre Lieblingsfarbe ist. Sie lesen richtig, ignorieren Sie die untenstehende Frage und wählen Sie beide Optionen aus. Welche ist Ihre Lieblingsfarbe?

a. Rot
b. Grün

Knowledge (single choice- 3 items) [randomize order of items]

Q10. Nun möchte ich Ihnen einige Fragen zu internationalen Organisationen stellen. Viele Menschen kennen die Antworten nicht, aber wenn Sie sie kennen, antworten Sie bitte.

Fünf Länder haben einen ständigen Sitz im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen. Welches der folgenden Länder ist kein ständiges Mitglied? A) Frankreich, B) China, C) Indien D) Weiß nicht

Wo befindet sich der Hauptsitz des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF)?

A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Genf D) Weiß nicht

Um welches der folgenden Probleme kümmert sich die Organisation Amnesty International?

A) Klimawandel, B) Menschenrechtsverletzungen, C) Zerstörung historischer Baudenkmäler D) Weiß nicht

Left-right ideology (single choice – single-item)

Q11. In Bezug auf die Politik ist manchmal die Rede von „links“ und „rechts“. Wie würden Sie Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala einordnen?

1. Links
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. Rechts
12. Weiß nicht

Party identification (single choice – single item)

Q12. Gibt es eine politische Partei, der Sie näher stehen als allen anderen Parteien?

- CDU/CSU

- SPD
- Die Linke
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- FDP
- AfD
- Piratenpartei
- NPD
- Andere Partei
- Weiß nicht

Only for respondents who have chosen a party in Q5

Q13. Wie nahe stehen Sie dieser Partei? Fühlen Sie sich ihr...

- Sehr nahe
- Ziemlich nahe
- Nicht besonders nahe
- Überhaupt nicht nahe
- Weiß nicht

Appendix C: Additional empirical information



Appendix Figure C1. Left-right ideology in Germany and the US

Notes: Analysis uses design weights. Weighted percentage of total country population.

Appendix D: Numerical results for figures

Appendix Table D1. Numerical results for Figure 7, US

Subgroup	Statistic	Treatment	Estimate	Standard error
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Limited power	0	0
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Some power	0.017	0.066
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Extensive power	-0.008	0.064
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Limited power	0	0
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Some power	-0.038	0.025
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Extensive power	-0.171	0.027
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Limited power	0	0
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Some power	-0.006	0.015
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Extensive power	-0.076	0.016
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Limited power	0.497	0.036
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Some power	0.514	0.038
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Extensive power	0.489	0.037
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Limited power	0.569	0.015
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Some power	0.531	0.014
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Extensive power	0.398	0.016
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Limited power	0.527	0.009
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Some power	0.521	0.008
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Extensive power	0.452	0.009

Notes: The variable *intcoop* is based on the question: In your opinion, is international cooperation…1. A good thing, 2. A bad thing, 3. Neither good nor bad, 4. Don't know. Dependent variable: forced choice dummy. AMCE=Average Marginal Component Effect. MM=Marginal Mean.

Appendix Table D2. Numerical results for Figure 8, Germany

Subgroup	Statistic	Treatment	Estimate	Standard error
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Begrenzte Macht	0	0
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Einige Macht	-0.016	0.052
intcoop: a bad thing	AMCE	Viel Macht	-0.030	0.051
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Begrenzte Macht	0	0
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Einige Macht	-0.031	0.026
intcoop: neither good nor bad	AMCE	Viel Macht	-0.067	0.027
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Begrenzte Macht	0	0
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Einige Macht	0.001	0.014
intcoop: a good thing	AMCE	Viel Macht	-0.030	0.015
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Begrenzte Macht	0.516	0.031
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Einige Macht	0.499	0.028
intcoop: a bad thing	MMs	Viel Macht	0.486	0.027
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Begrenzte Macht	0.533	0.016
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Einige Macht	0.501	0.015
intcoop: neither good nor bad	MMs	Viel Macht	0.466	0.015
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Begrenzte Macht	0.509	0.009
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Einige Macht	0.511	0.008
intcoop: a good thing	MMs	Viel Macht	0.480	0.008

Notes: The variable *intcoop* is based on the question: In your opinion, is international cooperation…1. A good thing, 2. A bad thing, 3. Neither good nor bad, 4. Don't know. Dependent variable: forced choice dummy. AMCE=Average Marginal Component Effect. MM=Marginal Mean.

Appendix Table D3. Numerical results for Figure 9, US

Subgroup	Statistic	Treatment	Estimate	Standard error
Democrats	AMCE	ensure peace and security	0	0
Democrats	AMCE	reduce poverty	0.053	0.022
Democrats	AMCE	protect human rights	0.03	0.022
Democrats	AMCE	promote free trade	-0.075	0.022
Democrats	AMCE	combat climate change	0.041	0.022
Democrats	AMCE	promote public health	0.041	0.022
Republicans	AMCE	ensure peace and security	0	0
Republicans	AMCE	reduce poverty	-0.074	0.027
Republicans	AMCE	protect human rights	0.009	0.024
Republicans	AMCE	promote free trade	0.0039	0.025
Republicans	AMCE	combat climate change	-0.222	0.025
Republicans	AMCE	promote public health	-0.029	0.025
Independents	AMCE	ensure peace and security	0	0
Independents	AMCE	reduce poverty	-0.025	0.036
Independents	AMCE	protect human rights	0.004	0.038
Independents	AMCE	promote free trade	-0.089	0.036
Independents	AMCE	combat climate change	-0.136	0.036
Independents	AMCE	promote public health	-0.027	0.035
Democrats	MMs	ensure peace and security	0.485	0.014
Democrats	MMs	reduce poverty	0.538	0.015
Democrats	MMs	protect human rights	0.517	0.015
Democrats	MMs	promote free trade	0.410	0.015
Democrats	MMs	combat climate change	0.525	0.014
Democrats	MMs	promote public health	0.526	0.014
Republicans	MMs	ensure peace and security	0.552	0.017
Republicans	MMs	reduce poverty	0.478	0.017
Republicans	MMs	protect human rights	0.561	0.016
Republicans	MMs	promote free trade	0.556	0.016
Republicans	MMs	combat climate change	0.330	0.016
Republicans	MMs	promote public health	0.523	0.016
Independents	MMs	ensure peace and security	0.546	0.023
Independents	MMs	reduce poverty	0.521	0.023
Independents	MMs	protect human rights	0.550	0.023
Independents	MMs	promote free trade	0.457	0.024
Independents	MMs	combat climate change	0.410	0.022
Independents	MMs	promote public health	0.519	0.023

Notes: The subgroup variable is based on the question: Is there a particular political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties? Dependent variable: forced choice dummy. AMCE=Average Marginal Component Effect. MM=Marginal Mean.

Appendix Table D4. Numerical results for Figure 10, Germany

Subgroup	Statistic	Treatment	Estimate	Standard error
CDU/CSU	AMCE	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0	0
CDU/CSU	AMCE	Armut zu bekämpfen	-0.044	0.034
CDU/CSU	AMCE	Menschenreche zu schützen	-0.054	0.034
CDU/CSU	AMCE	Freihandel voranzutreiben	-0.182	0.033
CDU/CSU	AMCE	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	-0.037	0.036
CDU/CSU	AMCE	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	-0.131	0.035
SPD	AMCE	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0	0
SPD	AMCE	Armut zu bekämpfen	0.001	0.040
SPD	AMCE	Menschenreche zu schützen	-0.022	0.042
SPD	AMCE	Freihandel voranzutreiben	-0.125	0.043
SPD	AMCE	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	0.016	0.040
SPD	AMCE	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	-0.113	0.042
All others	AMCE	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0	0
All others	AMCE	Armut zu bekämpfen	-0.022	0.018
All others	AMCE	Menschenreche zu schützen	-0.063	0.019
All others	AMCE	Freihandel voranzutreiben	-0.152	0.018
All others	AMCE	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	-0.049	0.018
All others	AMCE	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	-0.096	0.018
CDU/CSU	MMs	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0.575	0.023
CDU/CSU	MMs	Armut zu bekämpfen	0.531	0.021
CDU/CSU	MMs	Menschenreche zu schützen	0.521	0.022
CDU/CSU	MMs	Freihandel voranzutreiben	0.394	0.022
CDU/CSU	MMs	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	0.539	0.023
CDU/CSU	MMs	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	0.444	0.022
SPD	MMs	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0.538	0.026
SPD	MMs	Armut zu bekämpfen	0.539	0.028
SPD	MMs	Menschenreche zu schützen	0.516	0.029
SPD	MMs	Freihandel voranzutreiben	0.413	0.028
SPD	MMs	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	0.555	0.026
SPD	MMs	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	0.426	0.029
All others	MMs	Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewähren	0.563	0.012
All others	MMs	Armut zu bekämpfen	0.541	0.012
All others	MMs	Menschenreche zu schützen	0.500	0.012
All others	MMs	Freihandel voranzutreiben	0.411	0.012
All others	MMs	den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen	0.514	0.012
All others	MMs	die Volksgesundheit zu verbessern	0.468	0.012

Notes: The subgroup variable is based on the question: Is there a particular political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties? Dependent variable: forced choice dummy. AMCE=Average Marginal Component Effect. MM=Marginal Mean.

Appendix E: Validity and robustness checks

Appendix Table E1. Balance tests, US

	(1) Education	(2) Age	(3) Knowledge index	(4) Confidence in government	(5) Internationalist attitudes	(6) Left-right	(7) Generalized trust	(8) News media consumption
Reference category: ensure peace and security								
Reduce poverty	0.000	-0.121	-0.019	-0.030	-0.014	0.067	0.012	-0.012
	(0.04)	(0.44)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Protect human rights	-0.023	0.573	0.007	-0.058	0.001	0.139	-0.041	0.009
	(0.04)	(0.45)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Promote free trade	-0.057	0.026	-0.015	0.021	0.010	0.161*	0.063	0.000
	(0.04)	(0.44)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Combat climate change	-0.025	-0.303	-0.023	-0.065	-0.004	0.006	0.035	0.000
	(0.04)	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Promote public health	-0.046	-0.121	-0.027	-0.057	0.002	0.069	-0.046	-0.008
	(0.04)	(0.44)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Reference category: Has limited power over member countries								
Has some power	-0.012	0.019	-0.004	-0.028	0.002	0.035	-0.021	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)

Has extensive power	-0.008	0.409	-0.005	-0.013	0.013	0.020	0.004	0.000
	(0.02)	(0.25)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Reference category: Is confidential								
Is partially public	0.014	0.073	0.011	0.040	0.004	-0.024	0.037	0.011
	(0.02)	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Is public	-0.002	-0.192	0.007	-0.000	0.005	-0.003	0.044	0.005
	(0.02)	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Reference category: Only the powerful countries have a say								
All countries equal say	-0.016	0.785*	0.007	-0.029	0.013	0.007	0.027	0.008
	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.01)
NGOs have a say	-0.021	0.271	0.001	-0.028	0.004	0.023	0.062	-0.002
	(0.03)	(0.31)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Citizens have a say	0.006	0.451	-0.018	-0.021	0.011	0.048	0.022	-0.008
	(0.03)	(0.34)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Reference category: Benefit some countries more than others								
Benefit countries equally	-0.000	-0.009	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Reference category: Solve few important problems								
Solve some imp. problems	0.015	0.148	0.007	-0.005	-0.010	0.032	-0.027	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.25)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Solve most imp. problems	0.021	-0.268	-0.009	0.048	-0.016*	0.002	-0.044	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.25)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)

Constant	3.615***	48.190***	1.307***	4.392***	1.651***	6.341***	5.059***	1.557***
	(0.05)	(0.57)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.02)
N	16,384	16,384	16,384	15,968	14,656	14,424	16,024	16,096
adj. R^2	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
F	0.482	1.157	0.605	0.492	0.663	0.668	0.658	0.447

Notes: Results from OLS regression analysis using the variables in the columns as dependent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Analyses run with design weights. Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$. The knowledge index is an additive index based on three dummy variables, each scoring 1 if the respondent answered correctly. These variables are coded using the responses to three multiple-choice questions about international issues, which are also included in the WVS7.

Appendix Table E2. Balance tests, Germany

	(1) Education	(2) Age	(3) Knowledge index	(4) Confidence in government	(5) Internationalist attitudes	(6) Left-right	(7) Generalized trust	(8) News media consumption
Reference category: ensure peace and security								
Reduce poverty	-0.043	0.102	-0.023	-0.013	-0.011	0.025	-0.045	0.001
	(0.03)	(0.42)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Protect human rights	-0.025	-0.063	-0.035	0.009	-0.016	-0.011	-0.033	-0.003
	(0.04)	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Promote free trade	-0.026	0.889*	-0.007	-0.034	-0.017	0.040	-0.031	0.025
	(0.04)	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Combat climate change	-0.038	0.157	-0.008	-0.005	-0.013	-0.015	-0.012	0.019
	(0.03)	(0.42)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Promote public health	-0.031	-0.071	0.019	-0.011	-0.013	0.024	-0.032	0.007
	(0.03)	(0.42)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Reference category: Has limited power over member countries								
Has some power	0.032	0.154	-0.007	0.007	0.003	0.041	-0.011	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Has extensive power	0.010	0.020	0.015	-0.028	-0.005	0.047	-0.001	0.009
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Reference category: Is confidential								

Is partially public	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Is public	0.015	0.046	0.002	-0.042	-0.005	0.006	-0.033	-0.005
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Reference category: Only the powerful countries have a say	0.045*	0.138	0.003	0.047	0.017*	-0.011	-0.018	0.007
All countries equal say	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
NGOs have a say	-0.002	0.448	-0.029	-0.039	-0.018	-0.010	-0.004	-0.010
	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Citizens have a say	0.040	0.395	-0.009	0.037	-0.005	0.002	0.048	-0.007
	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Reference category: Benefit some countries more than others	-0.012	0.198	-0.017	-0.010	-0.005	-0.023	-0.042	-0.028**
Benefit countries equally	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Reference category: Solve few important problems	-0.002	0.006	0.000	-0.003	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.000
Solve some imp. problems	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Solve most imp. problems	0.008	-0.141	-0.009	0.016	0.009	-0.018	-0.000	-0.013
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)
3.problemR	0.006	-0.352	-0.010	0.056	0.007	0.003	0.020	-0.013
	(0.02)	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)

Constant	3.766***	48.800***	1.644***	3.908***	1.693***	5.862***	4.443***	1.671***
	(0.04)	(0.55)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.02)
N	15,952	16,352	16,352	15,736	15,352	14,616	15,992	16,104
adj. R^2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
F	1.022	0.925	0.910	0.810	1.037	0.464	0.372	1.660

Notes: Results from OLS regression analysis using the variables in the columns as dependent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Analyses run with design weights. Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$. The knowledge index is an additive index based on three dummy variables, each scoring 1 if the respondent answered correctly. These variables are coded using the responses to three multiple-choice questions about international issues, which are also included in the WVS7.



Figure D1: Results for discrete choice variable

Notes: Average marginal component effects, from logit regression analysis on answers to the question of whether the respondent would chose organization 1 or 2 (1 if yes, and 0 otherwise) and 95% confidence intervals. Analyses run with design weights.



Appendix D2: Contingency on confidence in national government

Notes: Average marginal component effects from OLS regression analysis on confidence in IOs and 95% confidence intervals. Analyses run with design weights. Moderating variable is measured on a quasi-continuous 10-point scale with labeled end points, ranging from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence).



Appendix D3: Replication of Figures 5 and 6, with both attentive and non-attentive respondents

Notes: Average marginal component effects from OLS regression analysis on confidence in IOs and 95% confidence intervals. Analyses run with design weights.



Appendix Figure D4: Contingency of authority and purpose effects on education

Notes: Average marginal component effects from OLS regression analysis on confidence in IOs and 95% confidence intervals. Analyses run with design weights. Education is coded into six categories on the basis of the standard questions about highest educational attainment asked in Yougov panels.



Appendix D5: Contingency of authority and purpose effects on political knowledge about global governance

Notes: Average marginal component effects from OLS regression analysis on confidence in IOs and 95% confidence intervals. Analyses run with design weights. The knowledge index is an additive index based on three dummy variables, each scoring 1 if the respondent answered correctly. These variables are coded using the responses to three multiple-choice questions about international issues, which are also included in the WVS7.