When is Withdrawal from International Organizations Deadly?

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Abstract

Member state withdrawals are a part of the lifecycle of many international organizations (IOs). However, one in six IO withdrawals is followed by IO death. How does membership withdrawal affect the survival of IOs? We argue that any one individual state withdrawal from an IO is unlikely to cause IO death because remaining members are often able to adapt the institution or band together. Nonetheless, member state withdrawal can influence IO death in two ways. First, withdrawal by several member states contributes to IO death because it can deprive the institution of a large share of funding and leadership. Second, a regional hegemon withdrawing can stimulate reform and strengthen the organization, increasing IO survival rather than death. We test these arguments using hazard models on an original dataset of IO withdrawals from 1815 to 2014. Our quantitative and qualitative results show that withdrawal by one member can remain inconsequential for the IO's lifespan, but several members leaving increases the risk of IO death. In contrast, a regional hegemon's withdrawal can stimulate reform, re-entry of countries, and/or resilience. Thus, effects are nuanced: some types of withdrawal can speed IO death but IO withdrawals will not necessarily lead to a crisis in international cooperation.

Keywords: International organizations; withdrawal; lifecycle; death; survival; backlash; liberal international order

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1. Introduction

Recent cases of states withdrawing from international organizations (IOs)—and the public attention surrounding withdrawals—have raised questions about what these exits mean for the vitality of IOs and global governance more broadly. Some suggest that IO withdrawals signal the death knell of IOs. For example, when South Africa began withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2016, the BBC asked "Is this the end for the International Criminal Court?"[3] Similarly, when the US began the process of leaving the Paris climate agreement in November 2019, Vox argued "The Paris climate agreement is at risk of falling apart."[4] But how does membership withdrawal affect the survival of IOs? Under what conditions is membership withdrawal linked to the timing of IO death? These questions have important implications for our understanding of international cooperation, challenges to and backlash against the liberal international order,[5] and the conditions that move IOs through their stages of life.

We argue that any one individual member state withdrawal does not necessarily make IO death more proximate because single exits often reflect the politics and preferences of the leaving country alone, and many IOs are robust to an average member leaving. Even if a member state leaves, IOs can be resilient and persist. Moreover, IO withdrawals that *are* related to IO reforms are often met with institutional adaptation to accommodate the leaving state in the threat stage[6] or by remaining members after a state has departed; some withdrawing states even return. In other words, oftentimes when a member state exits, institutional change seems more likely than IO death. Perhaps counterintuitively, IO withdrawal can strengthen IOs instead of weakening them.

[3] Allen 2016.
[4] Roberts 2019.
[5] Lake, Martin, Risse 2021; Walter 2021.
[6] von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2022.

Nonetheless, we argue that two forms of member state withdrawals change the risk of IO death. First, when not just one state but a larger share of member states withdraws, the chance of IO death increases because it signals fundamental problems in the IO that are difficult to fix from the inside. In other words, one member state withdrawing should not be cause for alarm, but when other member states also withdraw in a similar timeframe, this contagion can speed the IO's demise.

Second, the exit of key member states such as the regional hegemon may affect IO death. On one hand, after the regional hegemon exits, the IO might die sooner because remaining member states may be left with greatly dilapidated funding, leadership, and legitimacy. Hegemonic stability theory[7] argues that the presence of hegemons in international institutions can be key to their sustainability; without them, IOs may be more likely to flounder. On the other hand, regional hegemons may be able to use withdrawal as a bargaining tool to promote change within the IO. Recognizing the importance of bringing the regional hegemon back in (and/or the danger that not changing will lead to further exits), remaining states may support altering the IO, which may foster IO resilience rather than IO death – and sometimes also bring the regional hegemon back in.

We test these arguments using survival analysis on an original dataset of IO withdrawals from 1815-2014.[8] Our findings support our argument that in general, individual member state withdrawals do not affect IO death. However, as the share of member states withdrawing from an IO increases, the risk of IO death also increases. Further, the withdrawal of regional hegemons is associated with IO survival and resilience. Many regional hegemons return to the organization, often after reforms have taken place.

[7] See for example Krasner 1976; Kindleberger 1986.

[8] International organizations are entities between three or more states that have a formal agreement such as a treaty and also an independent secretariat (Pevehouse et al. 2020). Our data is limited to this timeframe due to the Correlates of War IGO data (which end in 2014) as well as IO death data (which end in 2015).

These findings have important implications for the vitality of IOs and the future of the international order as we witness states join but also leave international institutions. First, fears that member state withdrawal is always a warning signal that an IO might be about to breathe its last breath are mostly unfounded. We should not be quick to assume that one state leaving means the IO is soon to collapse. Nonetheless, IOs should be sure to check their vital signs to avoid several members withdrawing as this can be lethal for the IO. Since a high number of states withdrawing makes a death sentence almost incurable, remaining IO member states should take time to reflect and adjust after a single withdrawal to ensure that remaining states are committed to the mission and future of the IO, or initiate institutional changes to ensure buy-in. Sometimes this may naturally occur if the leaving state already diverges from the general preferences of other member states. However, at other times, the departure may prompt an important reconfiguration or reformation of IO policies and procedures to give new lifeblood to the institution.

Indeed, when a powerful country like a regional hegemon withdraws, remaining members may be more likely to enact reforms, showing at least one way that withdrawal may instigate longer lasting changes. While this shows that powerful states can have disproportionate informal power in IOs,[9] it also underscores that even powerful states need and use institutions to govern the global commons in ways they cannot do alone. To be sure, many regional hegemons who withdraw, hoping for a better outside option or a reformed IO, return with little changed. After "punching above their weight," they realize that an imperfect IO can be better than no IO. In returning, the regional hegemon may recommit to multilateral action. In sum, our analysis prompts a different viewpoint of withdrawals from IOs. While many have been quick to link recent exits to "a period

[9] Stone 2011.

of deglobalization,"[10] a general turn against international institutions[11] and more, this analysis reminds us that exit can also help trigger reform or stoke a sense of reality and thus strengthen IOs.

2. Is IO flight fueling fatality?

When member states announce their withdrawal from international organizations—as has occurred over 400 times between 1913 and 2022—analysts are sometimes quick to ponder whether an exit signals IO demise. For example, after Britain announced its withdrawal from the European Union (EU), scholars and the media alike questioned the survival of the institution.[12] Newspapers asked "Is 'Brexit' the Beginning of [the] End for [the] European Union?"[13] and the head of the London Stock Exchange Group argued "… that if the UK were to leave, I don't think the EU would survive."[14]

This coupling of IO withdrawal and IO death has not been limited to Brexit but also been raised for exits by the US and other anchors of the international system.[15] Experts in international relations were concerned[16] when President Trump withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Coffee Organization, and announced the US' withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO).[17] Small state exits

[10] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/10/what-deglobalization. Accessed 5 March 2022.
[11] Lake, Martin, Risse 2021.
[12] Oliver 2017; Scuira 2017; Rosamond 2016.
[13] NBC 2016.
[14] CNBC 2015. https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/13/brexit-would-mean-eu-collapse-lse-ceo.html
[15] Walter 2021.
[16] Lake, Martin, Risse 2021.
[17] President Trump also announced US withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union (UPU) but this was not executed due to UPU reforms during the withdrawal waiting period, and the announced withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) was not executed as President Biden rejoined the WHO in 2021 before the waiting period expired. Trump also withdrew from entities that are not considered formal IGOs per the COW IGO data. These include emanations, treaties, and agreements such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear program, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Global Compact on Refugees, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Optional Protocol of the

have also raised concerns. When Qatar announced its withdrawal from OPEC in 2018, observers noted that it was an ominous sign for the organization.[18] Even though Qatar was a small player in oil markets, they noted that the exit revealed fissures in the IO that could point to its passing.

Beyond individual withdrawal cases, observers have been understandably concerned about a backlash against the liberal order[19] given its importance for international cooperation and stability. Several recent special issues of international relations journals were dedicated to "the end of international cooperation,"[20] "international organizations in a new era of populist nationalism,"[21] and "challenges to the liberal international order"[22] – all of which reference membership withdrawal as a potential lightning rod for IO collapse. Policy experts have also wondered whether states withdrawing from IOs could subsequently be linked to IOs dying, saying that "an inability to address both conflict and crisis has exposed the costs of withdrawal by the United States, the principle underwriter of this liberal order, and the weaknesses of the current multilateral system of governance."[23]

While the attention to potential death in multilateralism has been recent, the link between withdrawals and IO death extends historically. The little known International Commissions of the Rivers Elbe and Oder were abandoned because of German withdrawal in 1936.[24] Perhaps more infamously, the League of Nations—undoubtedly plagued in many ways—also suffered an

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran.

[18] Denning 2018.
[19] Walter 2021; Mearsheimer 2019.
[20] Journal of International Affairs, summer 2017.
[21] Review of International Organizations, spring 2019.
[22] International Organization at 75, spring 2021. Also see International Studies Review, June 2022.
[23] Dempsey 2017.
[24] Wessel 2011:349.

onslaught of state exits before it dissolved. The League reached a highpoint of 58 member states, but membership withdrawals left only 23 countries remaining when it died on 19 April 1946.[25]

We contribute to this debate by theorizing and systematically examining when IO withdrawal leads to IO death. Descriptive data illustrate this empirical puzzle. Systematic data reveal that the historical pattern of states exiting has been rather steady over time and so too has the pattern of IO deaths. Figure 1 shows these two trends in cumulative terms since 1815.[26] Figures 2a and 2b show the frequency distribution for IO withdrawal and death separately over time.[27] This raises the question: does withdrawal change the risk of IO death or are these independent processes?

Figure 1: Cumulative Sum of IO Withdrawals and Deaths (1815-2014)



[25] Magliveras 1991.
[26] We shorten the year range before 1900 since the first IO death occurred in 1909 and the first IO withdrawal occurred in 1913. Data end in 2014 since that is the end of the COW IGO version 3 data.
[27] Figures 2a/b are at the IO-year level, meaning that they show the number of affected IOs. For example, two IOs experienced withdrawals in 2014, but these IOs may have experienced more than one withdrawal each.

Figure 2: Frequency of IO Withdrawals and Deaths, 1815-2014

a) Withdrawals



b) Deaths



3. What we know about IO withdrawals and IO death

Studies on IO withdrawals and IO death have largely developed as separate strands of work.[28] Explaining when and why states withdraw from IOs, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) document that geo-political factors – such as preference divergence and contagion – are the main factors, but that democracy levels in the country and organization also matter. In contrast to some recent cases, nationalism is not linked to IO withdrawals historically (1945-2014). Together, these findings emphasize the importance of individual state politics and partnerships in explaining withdrawals—which may be separate from larger patterns at the institution. Daßler and Heinkelmann-Wild (2021) build on these findings and show that IOs with higher authority experience more withdrawals, arguing that IO authority renders governments (particularly democracies) more vulnerable to audience costs once sovereignty is relinquished.

The consequences of IO withdrawal for IO death have not yet been examined. However, a few insights exist on the consequences of withdrawal for the leaving state. Bakaki and Böhmelt (2022) show that withdrawing from economic IOs lowers the country's likelihood of successfully

[28] Our paper focuses on formal IGOs that have both treaties and secretariats (following the standard COW IGO definition) to improve comparability and because these institutions are the ones that have formed the backbone of the liberal world order.

making subsequent bilateral trade agreements (PTAs) in the first year after leaving. A similar pattern appears when states leave international agreements. Schmidt (2020) shows that states withdrawing from international treaties[29] develop reputations for inconsistency, which leads other states to ratify fewer treaties with them in the future. Nonetheless, Peinhardt and Wellhausen (2016) show that states withdrawing from investment treaties maintain most (if not all) international legal protections for foreign investors due to redundancies in the dense, decentralized network of investment treaties. In other words, (investment) treaty withdrawal allows states to recalibrate their international legal commitments without eschewing international investment law. Scholars are beginning to understand some of the implications for international cooperation after a state ends a formal international commitment, but we do not yet understand the effects of IO withdrawal on IO death.

Studies on IO death have recently cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that IOs rarely die.[30] International relations literature had long emphasized the robustness and institutional stickiness of IOs. However, recent studies show that IOs die more frequently than previously asserted.[31] Using a novel dataset, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020) shows that over a third of the IOs in the Correlates of War (COW) version 2.3 dataset have died over time. Examining the reasons for IO death, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020, 2021) shows four important correlates: IOs' small size, young age, broad mandates, and external shocks like world wars.

Debre and Dijkstra (2021) examine 150 IOs from 1815–2014 and find that IOs with large bureaucracies (secretariats) are less likely to dissolve because they are better at coping with

[29] See for example Helfer 2005, 2006; Koremenos and Nau 2010.
[30] Strange 1998; Keohane 1984:101–7; Jacobson et al. 1986; Stein 1990:51; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Bernholz 2009:364; Johnson and Urpelainen 2012; Johnson 2013; Jupille et al. 2013; Kahler 2009; Shanks et al. 1996; Vaubel 2006.
[31] Fioretos 2018.

external pressures. This finding builds on Gray (2018) who showed that IO secretariats are key for IO vitality, i.e. whether IOs are alive, dead, or "zombies" which continue operating at a low level but without substantial activities or achievements. Because many IOs compete for bureaucrats, the ability of secretariats to attract talented staff and enact independent policy are associated with organizations' vitality. Political will is another important aspect that can keep IOs from dying; Gray (2021:19) shows that "cross-border cooperation has repeatedly been rescued from what seemed to be certain death. As long as one interested party has the political will to resuscitate the organization, and if it can work together with a competent bureaucracy, IOs can often be revitalized or retooled. This indicates that cooperation today can persist in the face of challenges and backlash, although it may take a slightly different form than what the founders had envisaged." While our understanding of IO death has thus advanced greatly in the last few years, we still do not know whether and how IO death is affected by membership withdrawal.

4. Theory: when do IO withdrawals influence IO death?

We argue that only some forms of IO withdrawal contribute to IO death and are skeptical of the withdrawal-death link as a general proposition. That is because the reasons why states withdraw from IOs do not necessarily link to IO death. Research on the reasons for state withdrawal from IOs shows that the major reason is geopolitical divergence,[32] i.e. when a state's preferences significantly deviate from other member states of the organization, making them an outlier. This suggests that while an *individual* member state may not be satisfied with the IO, other member states may still be content in the IO (or at least feel unified in how it needs to change). Indeed, if the leaving state has diverging preferences, the remaining group should, by definition, be *more*

[32] von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019.

homogenous in their viewpoints than before the withdrawal. While the organization might change some of its focus, under certain conditions, it might instead be strengthened post-exit.

In contrast, perhaps the clearest factor linking IO withdrawal and IO death would be organizational ineffectiveness, causing withdrawals and then death. However, states cite problems with "the effectiveness of the IO" as the reason for withdrawal in only a handful of cases; the rarity of this reason raises doubts that the whole IO usually suffers after one state departure. Dissatisfied member states who call for IO reforms often stop short of actual withdrawal and first use bargaining tactics such as withholding funds, not meeting with other state representatives at the IO,[33] making motions for change at IO meetings,[34] or first *threatening* to leave.[35] Again, moving beyond the threat to an *actual* withdrawal indicates that bargaining has failed, meaning that remaining members may be more content with the IO as is, and that they are willing to let a state walk away and continue the mandate of the IO.

Moreover—and related to the discussion above—the rational design literature[36] argues that states design organizations in a way that best helps them meet their goals. If the IO no longer fulfills the purpose (for a majority of states), this research suggests that states will renegotiate and reform the IO rather than let the IO collapse.[37] This is because international organizations are costly to set up and negotiate. Inertia is thus likely even when IOs are not perfect because reconfiguring an existing institution is cheaper than withdrawing and designing a new institution. While states may threaten to leave IOs if reform demands are not met, many of these threats are

[33] For example, in the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022), World Trade Organization officials said numerous delegations refused to meet their Russian counterparts in various formats. See https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-pushes-call-russia-be-excluded-g20-2022-03-22/ Accessed March 23, 2022.
[34] Lipscy 2017.
[35] von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2022.
[36] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
[37] Jupille, Mattli, Snidal 2013; Lipscy 2017.

likely to extract real changes, particularly threats from strong states.[38] It is thus important not to conflate actual withdrawals and withdrawal threats when trying to understand consequences for the IO itself. This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The risk of IO death does not change when any one member state withdraws.*

In contrast to any single state withdrawing from an IO, however, some forms of state withdrawal may indeed affect IO death. We consider in particular two kinds of withdrawals: withdrawals from a larger share of member states and those by the regional hegemon. If several members jump ship, depriving the IO of a large share of its means to thrive and pursue policy, then other members might also abandon the IO. Most IOs have inbuilt scale economies, so the more members withdraw, the fewer gains the IO produces for remaining members. If several states withdraw in a short time and remaining members have to shoulder larger costs and responsibilities, they may no longer gain sufficiently from participating. It may be difficult to make up for decreases in budgetary contributions as well as the IGO's legitimacy and the IO may die. Moreover, since adjusting formal institutions is costly, states that remain after several states have withdrawn may also have difficulty reopening the institutional bargain within the organization. Relatedly, contagion effects are important in international cooperation and may affect IO death.[39] In sum, withdrawals by several member states may destabilize the institution and lead to eventual collapse of the IO. Here, IOs may be similar to treaties where, for example, Druzin (2017) argues that international environmental treaties are fragile, because near unanimity is needed to reap the

[38] von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2022.
[39] Walter 2019.

benefits of cooperation. If one state leaves and others are quick to follow, then the entire *raison d'etre* of the institution may be left in question. This leads to our second hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 2:** *The risk of IO death increases when a larger share of member states withdraws.*

If the withdrawing state is powerful, then the IO's chance of survival might also be affected. One way of measuring powerful states is to think about the role of regional hegemons which often fulfill important functions in both global and regional organizations. We focus on regional rather than global hegemons because many international organizations are regional in nature, allowing us to examine whether the exit of a powerful state from the IO is what matters (rather than maintaining a US-specific argument that would result from the lack-of-variability in global hegemons since WWII).

On one hand, the IO might be worse off after the regional hegemon's exit than after an "ordinary" member state's withdrawal. In departing, a regional hegemon is likely to take its hard and soft power including funding, leadership, and the legitimacy that its membership bestows on the institution. In terms of funding, the regional hegemon usually contributes a disproportionate amount to IOs, and its departure can deprive the IO of a large share of resources for staff and programming, without which the IO may no longer be able to thrive and survive. For example, when the US considered leaving the International Coffee Organization (ICO) in 1986, observers called it "a potential threat to the body's survival."[40] When the US opted to remain in, remaining ICO members breathed a "collective sigh of relief" because the US was the world's biggest

[40] Stainer 1986.

importer of coffee (25 per cent share of the total) which "would be essential in ensuring that export quotas can operate successfully."[41] Indeed, observers clearly stated, "there is little doubt that the ICO could not function effectively without the US."

In terms of leadership and soft power, the withdrawal of a regional hegemon can also leave a void. Indeed, the large body of work on hegemonic stability theory[42] argues this very point. Hegemons contribute material capacity (as mentioned above) and can compel and cajole other IO members to adhere to commitments by using carrots or sticks.[43] Without the regional hegemon, other member states may no longer have sufficient incentives to incur the sovereignty costs that may come with IO adherence.

The IO exit of a regional hegemon may also reduce IO legitimacy because other states take their cues from a lead state's behavior. Multilateral organizations that lose powerful states do not have the same clout. A reduction in the IO's legitimacy may diminish what the IO can accomplish and also the IO's authority.[44] This might lead to the IO's decline or death because remaining states may no longer lean on the IO either, or may propose alternative visions of cooperation in different institutional forms.

Hypothesis 3a: *The risk of IO death increases when the regional hegemon withdraws.*

It is worth considering why a regional hegemon would feel the need to withdraw from an organization they long influenced. A large body of IO research argues that powerful states have disproportionate power in IOs. However, power can shift dynamically and a declining hegemon

[41] Ibid.
[42] See for example Krasner 1976; Kindleberger 1986.
[43] Abbott and Snidal 1998.
[44] Daugardis 2017; Johnstone 2010; Tallberg and Zürn 2019.

can lose relative power in institutions. Rising powers may push the IO in different directions, and declining powers may be out-voted or no longer retain as much power in the IO. In particular, if voting blocs arise, the regional hegemon may be able to project power better in alternative fora.

Therefore, regional hegemons might withdraw from IOs as a bargaining tool to push for change. Powerful states may exit as a strategy to nudge the IO toward reform; by pulling out, regional hegemons can show remaining states just how difficult cooperation might be without their budgetary, leadership, and technocratic contributions. The void left from a regional hegemon's departure may provide a crisis or shock to induce long-needed changes. This logic stems from Ury, Patton, and Fisher's (1991) work on negotiation. By considering one's "Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement" (BATNA), they showed that the results of a negotiation can be greatly improved by identifying the best alternative to completing a deal and then carefully evaluating the negotiated agreement against that alternative. If the negotiated agreement is better, the party should close the deal. If the alternative is better, then the party should walk away. Moreover, by walking away, a party can change the "status quo" ante against which other parties now negotiate. In other words, exiting the IO may give a powerful state even more ability to obtain its preferred change or reform (negotiated agreement) within the institution if it returns. If the requested reform happens, then a regional hegemon's departure may in fact strengthen the chance of IO survival.

But reform is not inevitable, and regional hegemons do not always get what they want by walking away. Indeed, some regional hegemons may withdraw as a tactic to push for their preferred changes but find out they have punched above their weight or overestimated what remaining states might do. Remaining states may not want to or be able to reshape the IO to woo the powerful state back. Instead, remaining states might double down and proceed with the IO as is. Recognizing that outside options are not as palatable as they had seemed, regional hegemons

may recognize the need to return to multilateral cooperation in the IO—particularly after domestic political conditions have shifted. Together, these various reflections can strengthen the longevity of IOs from the reality check as well as practical reflections on what is indeed possible in these institutions. While both possibilities have different explanations, they lead to the same observable outcome: a higher chance of IO survival. This leads to the alternative hypothesis on the effects of regional hegemons leaving:

Hypothesis 3b: *The risk of IO death decreases when the regional hegemon withdraws.*

5. Research Design

We test these hypotheses using survival models on an original dataset of withdrawals from all 532 IOs between 1815 and 2014, controlling for alternative explanations. Survival analyses shed light on whether withdrawal is associated with shorter IO survival (or quicker death). We base our data on the standard COW IGO dataset version 3, which ends in 2014.[45] We present results for two time periods: beginning 1815 (all years available) and beginning 1913, since 1913 is the first year that one of the 532 IGOs experienced a withdrawal from a member state. Since we are interested in IO survival, the unit of analysis is the IO-year.

To provide a descriptive intuition for the data, Figure 3 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. It shows the percent of IOs that survive (from the originally alive IOs) at each year of their life. The x-axis shows IO age (analysis time). The y-axis shows the probability of IO survival, computed as the number of IOs surviving at that point in time divided by the number of IO at risk.

[45] Pevehouse et al. 2020. The withdrawal data extend to 2021 but control variables and the dependent variable limit us to 2014. Data on IO death either ends in 2014 (Pevehouse et al. 2020, Debre and Dijkstra 2021) or offers only one additional case of IO death after 2014 (in 2015, see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020, 2021).

For example, at the year of founding, all IOs were at risk of dying but survived the first year, resulting in 100% probability of survival. A year after founding (at year two of IO age), a very small number of the 532 IOs failed, resulting in a survival probability still close to 100% and so on. Since IOs were founded since 1815, some IOs are over 150 years old. Once IOs have lasted a hundred years, they are unlikely to die and have a high chance of continued survival.

Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate



Moving on from the descriptive IO survival patterns, we code our dependent variable: IO death. We follow the standard definition and measure in the field for IOs and IO death from the COW IGO project. IOs have at least 3 state members, a permanent secretariat and headquarters, and hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years.[46] IOs die when they cease operations. In line with the COW IGO criteria above, this happens when IO membership drops below 3 states (what Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020 calls "dissolution") or when IOs do not hold a plenary meeting in ten consecutive years (what Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020 calls "desuetude") or

[46] Pevehouse et al. 2020 codebook page 2.

dissolve their secretariat/headquarters. We do not consider an IO dying when it continues living under a new identity, that is, when it is replaced/succeeded/superseded by or integrated/merged with another organization. For example, the GATT was *upgraded* to the WTO in 1995 – it was replaced but did not die. As another example, the European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) were *replaced* by the European Space Agency in 1975. ELDO and ESRO continued living in a new form, so we do not consider them dead. For our outcome measure, we thus use the variable *dead* from the COW IGO data but remove from this measure any organizations that were replaced or integrated. This definition and measure are in line with previous studies on IO death[47] and match our theoretical topic of interest. In the resulting IO-year dataset, 0.7% of cases feature IO death.

Our dependent variable, *dead*, captures the event of failure or end of IO survival, while *IO age* is the yearly duration of the IO in the dataset, varying from 1 to 162 years of age, as shown in Figure 2. IOs exit the dataset when they die or when the year 2014 is reached. The data is right censored at 2014 as that is the end of the COW IGO data.

Our independent variables are three measures of withdrawal, matching our hypotheses above: *Withdrawal by Any State, Percent of Withdrawing States,* and *Withdrawal by Regional Hegemon*. We source information on IO withdrawals from a recent dataset,[48] coding withdrawal in the year it was announced (instead of taking effect). This is because announcements usually precede the actual withdrawal by 1 or 2 years due to a treaty-prescribed waiting period. During this time, member states must continue paying dues (keeping the IO alive momentarily) but their

[47] Debre and Dykstra (2021: 319) say "IO death occurs when IOs no longer fulfill the three [COW IGO] criteria above and are also not replaced or integrated into other IOs." They analyze determinants of IO death and IO replacement. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020: 347-349) distinguishes IO death by dissolution and desuetude (like we do) as well as by succession and merger (which we exclude).
[48] von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019.

withdrawal is clearly on the radar of other member states and the secretariat, allowing them to act while IO vitality is at risk. In other words, the risk of death (if any) becomes clear in the year when a member state announces leaving, not just two years later. Further, some withdrawals were announced before the IO died but became effective only after the IO died.[49] Coding only years in which withdrawals became effective would thus be misleading, under-estimating the effect of withdrawal. We only include actual cases of withdrawal (where the announcement became effective), excluding threats of withdrawal that never came to fruition. As we outline in the theory section, several instances of withdrawal threats (that do not actually result in exit) in fact lead to reform, strengthening the chance of IO survival, not death.

Our explanatory variables capturing aspects of IO withdrawal are as follows. First, the binary variable *Withdrawal by Any State* indicates whether any withdrawal occurred among IO members in that year. About 1.3 percent of all IO-year observations experience withdrawal. Second, we measure *Percent of Withdrawing States*, which captures the share of states within the IO that have announced they will leave the organization (i.e. the number of withdrawing member states this year divided by the number of member states in the previous year). It varies between 0 and 75 percent,[50] though most are under 10 percent of member states and withdrawals exceeding 30 percent of member states are quite rare. Third, the binary variable *Withdrawal by Regional Hegemon* indicates whether a regional power left the IO. Regional powers include Brazil (South America), South Africa (Africa), Germany (Western Europe), Russia (Eastern Europe), China

[49] For example, Venezuela announced its withdrawal from the G3 in early 2006, the withdrawal became effective late in 2006, and the IO died in 2006. Similarly, in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran announced their withdrawal in 1979, it became effective later that year, and the IO died that year. This is also why it is important to include lagged announce years as a robustness check.

[50] The 75% is an outlier with CENTO 1979. Other high percentage cases are ATPC in 1997 (40%), G3 in 2006 (33%), and OCAM in 1974 (23%). Of those IO-years with withdrawals, half are under 4% of member states, and another third is under 10% of member states. The distribution (excluding 0%) is shown in Appendix Figure A1.

(Asia), Saudi Arabia (Middle East), Australia (Oceania), and the United States (North America).[51] Regional hegemons withdrew in 0.2 percent of IO-years.

Descriptive statistics of IO withdrawal and IO death show that the two coincide in a small share of cases. About 16 percent of member state withdrawals are followed by IO death, and only 9 percent of IO deaths are preceded by an IO withdrawal.[52] Further—and important for understanding the larger context of IO exit—state withdrawals are often not terminal: in 40 percent of cases, the withdrawing state rejoins the IO in later years—perhaps after it has made amends, working outside the IO to push for change.

We also control for common alternative explanations of IO death noted in previous studies. Following the model specification of Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020), we control for *Number of Member States* (lagged and logged),[53] *IO Region, Mandate, Membership,* and *Scope*. *Region* indicates whether the IO is primarily in Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Intercontinental, or Global. The excluded reference category is Global. *Mandate* indicates whether the IO's function is for a general purpose, judicial, security, social, economic, or technical/scientific. The excluded reference category is economic. *Membership* indicates if the IO form is open or restricted by geography or purpose. The reference category is open. And *Scope* indicates whether the remit of the IO is narrow, medium, or broad, with the latter being the reference.[54] We also control for *World War 1* and *World War 2* since studies show that these are times of upheaval for IO death. These are binary variables coded 1 for the years of the respective World Wars and 0 otherwise. The availability of data on control variables reduces the number of

[51] It is coded as the largest GDP nation in commonly referred-to regions based on UN, Economist, and World Bank data. Defining *the one* "best" representative of the regional power is not as important as recognizing that regional power is influential. The United States is a cross-regional power.
[52] 130 of 532 IOs died between 1909 and 2011; of those 130 IOs, 118 were not preceded and 12 were preceded by a member state withdrawal (12 of 130 is 9 percent).
[53] Data from Pevehouse et al. 2020.
[54] Data for variables on *Region, Mandate, Membership,* and *Scope* is sourced from Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020).

IOs from 532 to 487; results are substantively quite similar when we omit control variables and analyze the (bivariate) correlations in all 532 IOs. Descriptive statistics are in Appendix Table A1.

For the survival model specification, we use Cox proportional hazard models, which non-parametrically estimate the effect of predictors on the survival of IOs, i.e. which factors speed IO death. These models rely on the proportional hazards (PH) assumption, meaning that the effects of covariates remain constant over time. We tested this assumption in two ways: via formal statistical tests and by visually inspecting Schoenfeld residuals. The statistical tests of the PH assumption indicate that the data fulfill the PH assumption globally but one predictor is borderline on violating it individually: *Number of Member States*. To model this time dependence, we follow the standard procedure of interacting this variable with the log of time.[55] As a second test, we also graph the Schoenfeld residuals of our main explanatory variables of interest to check for time trends. These results are in Appendix Figure A2 and show no clear time trend, so do not need to be interacted with time.

6. Results

The empirical results support our arguments. Results indicate that an individual IO withdrawal does not necessarily hasten IO collapse. Withdrawals by larger shares of members are strongly significant and aggravate the risk of institutional death whereas regional hegemons leaving can contribute to IO survival and resilience.

Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients (hazard rates) from Cox regressions. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates for the effect of *Withdrawal by Any State,* columns 3 and 4 for *Percent of Withdrawing States*, and columns 5 and 6 for *Withdrawal by Regional Hegemon.* Columns 1, 3, and 5 show estimates for the full timeframe from 1815 to 2014 while models 2, 4, and 6 show

[55] Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004.

estimates for 1913-2014 (that is, since the first IO withdrawal occurred in 1913). Each model also controls for alternative explanations.

For interpreting survival models, positive coefficients (hazard rates) indicate that the hazard/risk of IO death is increasing as a function of the covariate, meaning that the variable is associated with more proximate IO death (shorter survival time). Negative coefficients indicate a reduced death risk (longer survival times). Results for the control variables are fairly similar to those in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020): the variable *Number of Member States* has a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that larger IOs are less likely to die. Similarly, IOs with technical/scientific mandates (as opposed to economic) are less likely to die, as are those with a general purpose. As in the previous study, *Region* and *Scope* are not significant predictors of IO death but World Wars (and particularly World War 1) saw an uptick in IO terminations.

Table 1: Cox Regression Results

	Model 1 since 1815	Model 2 since 1913	Model 3 since 1815	Model 4 since 1913	Model 5 since 1815	Model 6 since 1913
Withdrawal by Any State	1.014	0.942				
	(0.618)	(0.619)				
Percent of Withdrawing States			0.049***	0.046***		
			(0.010)	(0.011)		
Withdrawal by Regional Hegemon					-32.739***	-30.808***
					(0.419)	(0.408)
Number of Member States	-0.135***	-0.143***	-0.129***	-0.136***	-0.132***	-0.139***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Region: Africa	1.677	1.733	1.629	1.696	1.602	1.671
	(1.222)	(1.124)	(1.229)	(1.131)	(1.222)	(1.123)
Americas	1.259	1.344	1.212	1.308	1.201	1.299
	(1.241)	(1.140)	(1.247)	(1.147)	(1.242)	(1.140)
Asia	1.043	1.064	0.995	1.026	0.967	1.000
	(1.291)	(1.198)	(1.298)	(1.204)	(1.292)	(1.198)
Europe	1.928	2.159*	1.873	2.113*	1.861	2.108*
	(1.213)	(1.117)	(1.219)	(1.123)	(1.215)	(1.118)
Middle East	1.397	1.429	1.348	1.390	1.322	1.366
	(1.288)	(1.200)	(1.294)	(1.206)	(1.289)	(1.200)
Intercontinental	1.186	1.169	1.131	1.121	1.138	1.127
	(1.175)	(1.068)	(1.183)	(1.075)	(1.178)	(1.069)
Mandate: General Purpose	-1.762**	-1.769**	-1.741**	-1.749**	-1.732**	-1.742**
	(0.811)	(0.807)	(0.809)	(0.806)	(0.809)	(0.806)
Judicial	0.214	0.223	0.196	0.207	0.186	0.196
	(0.717)	(0.719)	(0.722)	(0.724)	(0.724)	(0.726)
Security	0.580*	0.570*	0.539	0.535	0.577*	0.570*
	(0.325)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.335)	(0.326)	(0.331)
Social	-0.330	-0.399	-0.315	-0.381	-0.328	-0.395
	(0.241)	(0.245)	(0.241)	(0.244)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Technical/Scientific	-0.743**	-0.764**	-0.736**	-0.755**	-0.748**	-0.770**
	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.328)	(0.330)	(0.326)	(0.328)
Membership: Geographically restricted	-1.431	-1.641	-1.388	-1.608	-1.391	-1.615
	(1.251)	(1.148)	(1.263)	(1.160)	(1.259)	(1.155)
Purpose restricted	-0.678	-0.734	-0.634	-0.696	-0.638	-0.701
	(1.217)	(1.108)	(1.227)	(1.117)	(1.224)	(1.113)
Scope: Medium	-0.415*	-0.400*	-0.372	-0.361	-0.383*	-0.367
	(0.236)	(0.240)	(0.230)	(0.235)	(0.231)	(0.234)
Broad	0.492	0.415	0.505	0.429	0.484	0.407
	(0.573)	(0.566)	(0.574)	(0.567)	(0.574)	(0.566)
World War 1	2.410***	2.277***	2.408***	2.273***	2.400***	2.263***
	(0.385)	(0.373)	(0.388)	(0.376)	(0.388)	(0.375)
World War 2	0.811	0.732	0.834*	0.752	0.822	0.742
	(0.508)	(0.511)	(0.507)	(0.509)	(0.505)	(0.508)
Number of Observations	16873	16052	16873	16052	16873	16052
Number of IGOs	487	486	487	486	487	486
Log Likelihood	-637.19	-622.69	-635.01	-620.64	-638.04	-623.40

Notes: Cox model with standard errors clustered on IGOs in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The table shows coefficients. Excluded reference categories are Region=Global, Mandate=Economic, Membership=Open, Scope=Narrow.

We find support for Hypothesis 1 that any single state leaving does not substantially impact IO death. Columns 1 and 2 show that the estimated coefficient on *Withdrawal by Any State* is not statistically significant. When we plot the IO survival probabilities as a function of

Withdrawal in Figure 4 (based on model 2), the survival lines are very similar and the Log-rank test for the equality of survivor functions is not statistically significant (Pr>chi2=0.45). Thus, we do not find support for the notion that any single IO withdrawal hastens IO death, in line with Hypothesis 1.

Figure 4: Effect of Withdrawal by Any State on IO death (Survival Analysis)



One illustrative example of this is the Seychelles withdrawing its membership from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2003. It is the only country to ever have withdrawn from SADC and the decision "caused little joy in the body."[56] At the time, Seychelles' Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials said that "there was little justification for the US$ 550,000 that Seychelles was expected to contribute to the regional organization annually, especially when the country was undergoing difficulties with the shortage of foreign exchange."[57] When Seychelles' human and financial constraints had ameliorated, it decided to rejoin the SADC

[56] Afrol News 2006.
[57] Ibid.

because "with the increased participation in the country's economy by foreign investors, the economy has improved."[58] Indeed, after Seychelles exited, other member states continued to join SADC (e.g. Madagascar), showing that Seychelles' departure due to its economic situation was not linked to the overall vitality of the SADC. SADC has continued to grow and thrive as a regional economic community. This also underlines that some withdrawals are due to individual state issues rather than backlash against the IO, meaning that oftentimes withdrawal reasons do not theoretically link to IO decline.

For Hypothesis 2, columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show that *Percent of Withdrawing States* has an estimated coefficient of 0.05 and is strongly statistically significant. Further, the Log-rank test for the equality of survivor functions is also highly statistically significant (Pr>chi2=0.00). This suggests that a larger share of member states leaving speeds IO death. We show this pattern in Figure 5. Since this is a continuous predictor (rather than binary as the other two independent variables which can be plotted as two lines), we show the *share* of withdrawing states on the x axis and the predicted hazard ratios on the y axis.[59] Figure 5 shows that the higher the share of leaving states, the higher the predicted hazard ratio (which increases from 1 to 3). That means that the risk of IO death is about 3 times greater when a third of member states withdraws than when no state or very few states withdraw. Descriptively, the data also show that if IO death is preceded by a member state withdrawal, 15 percent of members previously have withdrawn on average.

[58] Ibid.
[59] Exponentiating the hazard rates (coefficients) in Table 1 yields hazard ratios. We end the x axis at 30 instead of 75 because (as noted above) the data get very sparse, with only a few IO-year observations in the higher range.

Figure 5: Effect of Percent of Withdrawing States on Predicted Hazard Ratio



One illustrative example of this is the death of the Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Organization (OCAM) after 23 percent of member states withdrew. The organization's activities were adversely affected by long-standing differences between member countries on fundamental issues such as long-term economic and political goals. As perhaps an early warning sign, Mauritania withdrew in 1965 in part due to the admittance of new member states including the Democratic Republic of the Congo. [60] Political and social unrest in some of the member states as well as economic and financial difficulties hindered cooperation.[61] As the organization became increasingly troubled, Zaire, withdrew in 1972; Congo (Brazzaville) in 1973; Cameroon, Chad, and Madagascar left in 1974; Gabon in 1977; and the Seychelles in 1978.[62] The organization died in 1985.

Moving on, Hypothesis 3a specified that withdrawal by the regional hegemon should hasten IO death while Hypothesis 3b noted the opposite expectation, that it should contribute to IO survival. Columns 5 and 6 show that this coefficient is highly statistically significant, negative, and quite

[60] Schiavone 1983:14.
[61] Kyambalesa and Houngnikpo 2006: 91.
[62] Schiavone 1983:15.

large, indicating that regional hegemons leaving are associated with a lower risk of IO death, i.e. *longer IO survival*. Substantively, the estimated hazard ratio of approximately zero indicates that when withdrawal by a regional hegemon happens, the risk of IO death decreases by about 100%.[63] Figure 6 shows that the two lines diverge sharply, and survival estimates are steady for those IOs which experience withdrawals by regional hegemons. Looking at the data, we see that IOs have experienced withdrawals by regional hegemons in 39 IO-years, but none of the affected IOs died in that year and only 2 of the affected IOs subsequently died, giving rise to the strong effect estimate.

Figure 6: Effect of Withdrawal of Regional Hegemon on IO death (Survival Analysis)



The couple of cases where a regional hegemon's withdrawal was followed by IO death a few years later includes the case of Australia's 1992 exit from the International Bauxite Association (IBA). The IBA was created in 1974 by leading bauxite producing countries and died six years after Australia's departure. Australia was the world's largest producer of bauxite and an

[63] Again, we exponentiate the estimated hazard rate (coefficient) in Table 1 models 6 to compute the hazard ratio, which is near 0.

exporter of other minerals, but since its economy was diversified, its policies sometimes contrasted with those of other producers in the organization. Its differences lead to a diminution in the organization's operational ability, which weakened it to the point of collapsing.[64] Without Australia, which produced 30 percent of world bauxite, the IBA had a void of direction, funding, and leadership. Indeed, "the decision to dissolve the 20-year old organization followed an extended period of uncertainty regarding the future of the group, caused primarily by the recent loss of several key member countries and increasing funding problems."[65] While this is important, the departure of the regional hegemon was probably exacerbated by the withdrawal of the Dominican Republic and Haiti (a larger share of member states), strengthening support for Hypothesis 2.

In further unpacking the relationship of regional hegemons, we look to North America. The US (both a powerful country in the region and also globally) has withdrawn from 11 IOs between 1815 and 2014, but none of these IOs died. Upon further inspection, the US rejoined 5 of the 11 IOs it left, including the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (withdrew in 1920 and returned in 1968), UNESCO (withdrew in 1984 and returned in 2003), the ILO (withdrew in 1977 and returned in 1980), INTERPOL (withdrew in 1950 and returned in 1958), and the International Coffee Organization (withdrew in 1993 and returned in 2005). When George W. Bush announced that the US would rejoin UNESCO in 2002, he stated, "the United States will return to UNESCO. This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights, tolerance, and learning."[66] Similarly, Australia (a powerful country, particularly in the Oceania region) withdrew from the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1988 after a government assessment of UNIDO's administrative and

[64] Araim 1991:171-172.
[65] Sehnke 1994:95.
[66] See https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/2002/13482.htm. Accessed 23 March 2022.

operational effectiveness found it wanting. Nonetheless, Australia rejoined UNIDO in 1992, influenced by an assessment showing that organizational reform was underway and that potential procurement opportunities were available to Australian firms.[67] Instead of a hegemon's exit leading to decline, its withdrawal may have caused change in these cases that both buffered the survival of the IO and enticed powerful countries to rejoin the clubs. Other states may not have this kind of bargaining power to flex their muscles and push for reform.

While these cases show that powerful states (measured here by regional hegemons) can sometimes use withdrawal as a bargaining chip to push for change (and afterwards, rejoin a reformed and more resilient IO), several cases show a different mechanism explaining why withdrawal by a powerful state might aid in IO survival. In several cases, powerful states have withdrawn from IOs out of *their own* perceived need for IO reform. Hoping to use their power in walking away from the table, these states have found that their dissatisfaction is not shared amongst remaining member states. In other words, powerful states sometimes punch above their weight, hoping to use withdrawal to get their preferred outcome, but find they have left behind a relatively unified group of members, aiding in the IO's longevity. Powerful states often return to these resilient IOs after a shift in their own domestic politics (closer to the mainstream in the IO) makes the IO integral to cooperation again. We see this, for example, in the case of South Africa, which withdrew from several IOs during the period of apartheid. In publishing reports on race relations, for example, South Africa perceived UNESCO as intervening in the internal affairs of a member state, and thus withdrew in 1956.[68] South Africa thought that by leaving, it might influence the IO to reconsider this "encroachment" on its sovereignty and change. They were wrong. But South Africa did rejoin in 1994 in an era of domestic political renewal. A similar trajectory had South

[67] Australian Government Publishing Service 1997.
[68] Department of Political and Security Council Affairs 1971.

Africa withdraw then rejoin INTERPOL (1954-1993), the Food and Agriculture Organization (1968-1993), and the International Organization for Migration (1980-1997).

7. Conclusion

Observers have worried for some time whether international organizations will continue survive and continue to play important roles for global governance, and scholars have begun tracking what factors make IO death more likely. In this paper, we examine whether member state withdrawals—a phenomenon that has gained more attention in recent years—affects IO survival. Understanding whether individual countries' membership contributes to the robustness of IOs or their dismantling is key to better understanding the vitality of multilateralism, and of IO life cycles themselves.

We show that while individual member state withdrawals may cause disruption in many ways, this kind of IO exit does not necessarily make IO death more likely. Instead, we outline a more nuanced explanation of the IO withdrawal-IO death connection. A larger share of IO withdrawals indeed makes death more likely, showing that when collective action is greatly reduced in numbers, it can be hard for an IO to survive. On the other hand, when a regional hegemon withdraws from an IO, this heightens the institution's chance of survival, likely because remaining member states use the crisis point related to diminished contributions to reform, and even see the return of the regional power in a few cases. In the long run, this might strengthen the IO. Stronger and more resilient organizations might be left behind if remaining member states' preferences are more homogenous. As Gray (2020:25) says, "One could be forgiven for thinking that instances like Brexit, the US withdrawal from the TPP, and threats to the WTO look to be a stunning blow for international organizations," but we should be careful not to make an unrelated

link between member state withdrawal and IO death. We show that the exit of one member state does not necessarily lead to the end of international cooperation. Indeed, Ikenberry (2018; 2020) also contends that the death of liberal internationalism—a collective term for the survival of IOs—is greatly exaggerated.

This research may therefore serve as a cautionary note for practitioners and policymakers: *who* leaves, and *what the remaining countries do in the wake of withdrawal*, could be crucial for keeping an IO alive. Future research can build on these findings and address related questions. For example, how might withdrawal by an issue-specific hegemon affect IO longevity? Further, even if IOs do not systematically die when a member state leaves, do IOs lose some of their lifeblood? Under what conditions do they undergo fundamental reforms and emerge stronger from crisis? How often is re-joining after leaving due to reform rather than a lack of institutional alternatives? Moreover, how does withdrawal affect the IO's legitimacy, importance, and power in world politics? Even if the IO lives on, can its soul die? When might state exit lead to *more* membership in certain organizations—underscoring that IOs are part of a network of institutions rather than just individual IOs.

Isolationist and populist movements in many countries have underscored that international organizations may be fragile, leaving many of us to ponder the factors that could lead to IO death. Understanding whether individual countries' membership contributes to the robustness of IOs or their dismantling is key to better understanding the vitality of multilateralism.

Statements and Declarations

Competing Interests: The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work.

Data Availability Statement: The datasets generated and analyzed during the current study are not publicly available due the fact that they constitute an excerpt of research in progress but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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Appendix

Appendix Figure A1: Distribution of Percent of Withdrawing States (excluding 0s)



Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
year	1977.862	30.524	1817	2014	17869
IO number	2422.63	1263.893	10	4580	17869
IO start year	1949.545	35.439	1815	2009	17869
IO death year	1973.229	28.033	1909	2011	4201
Dead	0.011	0.105	0	1	17869
Integrated	0.001	0.037	0	1	17869
Replaced	0.002	0.050	0	1	17869
Dependent variables					
Dead (minus replaced and integrated)	0.007	0.085	0	1	17869
IO age	29.08	24.389	2	163	17869
Independent variables					
Withdrawal by Any State	0.013	0.115	0	1	17869
Percent of Withdrawing States	0.094	1.384	0	75	17869
Withdrawal by Regional Hegemon	0.002	0.047	0	1	17869
Control variables					
Number of Member States	2.807	1.021	1.099	5.263	17869
Region	4.124	1.774	1	7	17869
Mandate	4.206	2.128	2	7	16938
Membership	1.887	0.632	1	3	16936
Scope	1.378	0.634	1	3	16987
World War 1	0.010	0.097	0	1	17869
World War 2	0.021	0.144	0	1	17869

Appendix Figure A2: Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption