

Globalization and Promissory Representation *

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Abstract

Promissory representation holds that political parties make promises to voters during election campaigns and generally keep those promises after elections if they have the opportunity to do so. Specific campaign promises let voters know where parties stand on issues, and voters' assessments of governing parties' past records of pledge fulfillment is one way in which parties are held to account. Despite the centrality of promise keeping to representation, we know little about how it is affected by economic globalization, which is one of the defining characteristics of the modern world. We argue that globalization reduces governing parties' ability to keep their campaign promises. International economic integration increases uncertainty about the feasibility of promises, imposes legal constraints in the form of international commitments that may impede promise keeping in unexpected ways, and empowers market actors that lobby governments when promises threaten their interests. We test the empirical implications of our theory with a mixed-methods approach that combines a large-n quantitative comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with a typical case study to trace the underlying causal mechanisms of the theory. The findings indicate that international economic integration exerts a large negative effect on the likelihood of pledge fulfillment in a broad range of contexts and that the hypothesized mechanisms are clearly observable in the detailed case study. These findings have important implications for democratic representation in a globalized world.

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Representative democracy is a system in which there is a “necessary correspondence between acts of governance and the equally weighted interests of citizens with respect to those acts” (Saward, 1998, 51). Political parties play a vital mediating role in achieving congruence between public sentiment and public policies according to prominent accounts of contemporary mass democracy (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957). The idea of promissory representation, variants of which are found in the responsible party model and the mandate theory of democracy, is that this mediating role consists of parties making promises to voters during election campaigns and then keeping those promises after elections if the election results grant them sufficient authority to do so (Mansbridge, 2003, 515). According to popular understanding of how democracy works, parties that win the popular vote have a mandate to keep their promises. Campaign promises impose political constraints by creating a common understanding of the policies that governments should pursue if conditions do not change in ways that make the implementation of the promises infeasible (Manin, 1997; Stokes, 2001). Governing parties may break some promises for good reasons, but consistent promise breaking undermines parties’ reputations and the legitimacy of democracy.¹

Given the prominence of promise making and keeping to the theory and practice of representation, large bodies of comparative research describe and explain patterns of promise keeping. These studies generally look inward toward domestic political institutions to explain different levels of promise keeping.² While this research has generated important insights into the impacts of domestic institutions, it has not taken into account that democratic politics are increasingly shaped by countries’ integration into the global economy.³ We argue that international economic integration constrains parties’ capacity to fulfill their election pledges if they hold executive power after the elections. Governing parties in countries that are highly internationalized face greater uncertainty about economic business cycles, and they are bound by international agreements that may make some promises hard to keep. Economic internationalization also strengthens the power of domestic and foreign economic actors who may lobby against the fulfillment of certain pledges that threaten their interests.

Our large-n analysis of the fulfillment of thousands of election pledges made by prospective governing parties in 12 countries prior to the formation of 57 governments demonstrates a negative association between globalization and pledge fulfillment. The negative effect is robust to different model specifications, alternative operationalization of globalization, and an instrumental variable approach. It also offers new evidence about the conditional nature of the relationship. Consistent with our argument, globalization presents less of an obstacle to the fulfillment of pledges made by parties of the right than pledges of center-left parties. Since the large-n analysis does not allow us to test the underlying theoretical mechanisms exhaustively, we present a case study of the UK Conservative Party’s now infamous pledge

¹For more extensive discussions of promissory representation see Stokes (2001); Naurin and Oscarsson (2017); Naurin, Soroka and Markwat (2019); Matthiess (2020).

²For example, Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994); McDonald and Budge (2005); Naurin, Royed and Thomson (2019).

³A small but influential and growing body of research examines the impact of globalization on other aspects of democratic performance: for example, Hellwig and Samuels (2007); Rodrik (2012); Ezrow and Hellwig (2014); Hellwig (2015). We define globalization as the extent to which the national economy is integrated into the international system in terms of significant flows of trade in goods and services, large inward and outward investment flows, national regulations that facilitate free movement, and extensive international commitments in the form of trade agreements.

in 2010 to cut net migration to the UK to under 100,000. This typical case illustrates the processes leading to a broken promise in a highly globalized context.

The findings contribute to the emerging comparative literature on promissory representation and are also relevant to the broader theoretical debate regarding the impact of globalization on the quality of democracy and the potential for democratic backsliding, a debate that is highly polarized.⁴ These broader debates address the possible implications of globalization for democracy. Our findings highlight that globalization affects key mechanisms of democratic representation, with important implications for the quality of democracy. Our study also relates to research on the effects of globalization on domestic economic and social governance, which centers on the effects of globalization on governments' policy autonomy and ability to compensate the losers of globalization.⁵ Our findings indicate that even if governments want to respond to public demands for compensation, in globalized contexts they are constrained in fulfilling the very promises that would be most responsive to these demands. This insight may explain why scholars find support for the microfoundations of the compensation hypothesis (Walter, 2010), but more mixed evidence for the macro-relationship between globalization and welfare policies. The constraints that globalization places on promissory representation is particularly troubling when considering the recent globalization backlash.⁶ These constraints on promise fulfillment also limit governments' capacity to counter the backlash effectively through measures that would compensate citizens who are negatively affected by globalization; a solution to the backlash that has gained prominence in the literature (Ruggie, 1982; Goodman and Pepinsky, 2021; Mansfield and Rudra, 2021).

Globalization and the Politics of Election Pledges

Election pledges are “statements committing a party to one specific action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or not” (Royed, 1996, 79). They provide clear information about where parties stand on specific policy issues and are therefore distinct from general rhetoric and principles. Election pledges are also concrete manifestations of differences among parties in the principles they support. Two findings are particularly relevant in this respect. First, parties of all kinds make many pledges, and there are no marked differences in the frequency of pledge making between parties based on institutional context, incumbency status, or ideology (Naurin, Royed and Thomson, 2019, 44). Second, the types of pledges that parties make reflect their ideological differences. While the precise form and strength of the left-right dimension differs across countries and time periods, left-wing parties generally support larger government programs and higher spending and taxes, while right-wing parties support smaller government programs and lower spending and taxes (Klingemann et al., 2006).

⁴See, for example, Dahl (1999); Rudra (2005); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik (2009); Rodrik (1998, 2012); Meyerrose (2020). Milner and Mukherjee (2009) offer an excellent overview of the literature on the effects of globalization on democratization.

⁵For example, Garrett (1998); Iversen and Cusack (2000); Mosley (2000); Adsera and Boix (2002); Swank (2002); Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008).

⁶Walter (2021) offers a succinct summary of the literature.

The idea of promissory representation looms large in the practice of democratic representation.⁷ The extent to which governing parties fulfill their election pledges serves as a benchmark against which voters assess whether their preferred policies, which partly guided them in their vote choice, were indeed implemented. Voters pay attention to pledge fulfillment and punish governments for failing to keep their promises (Naurin and Oscarsson, 2017; Naurin, Soroka and Markwat, 2019; Matthiess, 2020). Broken promises hurt parties' reelection prospects and undermine public confidence in democracy (Stokes, 2001). As Schedler (1998, 195) writes:

If after election day government officials do whatever they want, regardless of any prior campaign commitments, they ridicule the very notion of democracy as well. If electoral results do not produce any policy consequences, elections become mere devices to legitimate arbitrariness and contingency, being mechanisms to replace a random one despotic ruler with another.

Pledges are politically constraining. Parties that hold executive power have strong incentives to fulfill the promises they made during campaigns or at least to explain why fulfillment is no longer desirable or appropriate. The presence of these incentives is confirmed by the evidence that governing parties generally attempt to and often succeed in fulfilling many of their election pledges (Naurin, Royed and Thomson, 2019).

Globalization lowers the likelihood that parties fulfill their election pledges when they hold executive office after the elections through three key mechanisms. First, parties in highly internationalized contexts face greater uncertainty about economic business cycles when they formulate election pledges (Kayser, 2005). Governments face pressures to pursue policies that respond to fluctuating global business cycles and maintain international competitiveness. Jahn (2006, 408) observes that during the period of increased globalization, "international factors became a major driving factor for policy orientation and domestic factors became subordinated to them." Global economic disruptions, such as economic or financial crises, can unexpectedly and profoundly affect countries that are deeply integrated into the international system. Consequently, policies that were considered to be appropriate during the election campaign may appear inappropriate or infeasible later on. Economic disruptions often lead to unexpected fiscal shortfalls, which impede the fulfillment of pledges to expand programs and also to cut taxes. One of the most famous broken promises in U.S. history—George H. W. Bush's promise "read my lips, no new taxes"—was made based on the (incorrect) assumption that the high growth rates of the 1980s would continue during his term in office; the unexpected economic recession in 1990 forced Bush to break this promise in response to a significant increase in the federal budget deficit.

The second mechanism relates to the international legal commitments that governments make in order to reap the benefits of international economic integration. Many countries have signed preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, and they have formed or acceded to international organizations to cooperate on economic issues such as free trade. These agreements often stipulate that governments pursue particular policies and maintain low or minimum levels of protection, and governments are generally committed to complying

⁷While recognizing the prominence of promissory representation, liberal democratic theorists critique the idea that there is a normative reason to desire high levels of promise keeping at all times (Manin, 1997).

with these agreements. Such agreements impose constraints on pledge fulfillment especially when they contain provisions for monitoring and enforcement. It is often not clear to the party officials and candidates who formulate election pledges whether particular domestic policies are consistent with international law until governments attempt to implement these policies. Governments have repeatedly been taken to international courts by other governments and private companies for domestic policies relating to health, the environment, and labor standards when these policies violate international trade or investment law (Foster, 2021).

Finally, globalization shapes the sets of actors who try to influence national governments and the preferences of those actors. These include national and international actors who gain from globalization. Many of these are market actors, such as national export-oriented firms that thrive on their ability to export their products and services to other countries. Other companies benefit from access to cheap and skilled overseas labor owing to increasing international migration. In addition, financial actors have strong interests to lobby because they benefit from particular policies as they have significant impact on their investments (Sattler, 2013). These domestic actors pressure governments to implement policies that ensure their continued access to the benefits of globalization, even if it means that governing parties break election promises. In addition, governments in internationalized contexts must pay more attention to the interests of international economic elites such as multinational corporations and financial institutions, that pressure governments to pursue policies favoring long-term stability and market exchange. Sassen (1996, 54) argues that national governments are accountable to a “global, cross-border economic electorate” consisting of “inflation-obsessed bondholders,” rather than to citizens.

Governing parties respond to these elites because market elites lobby governments directly and can threaten to relocate their economic activities if governments do not pursue economic policies that make their countries competitive with other markets. For example, the French Socialist Party won the 1981 election on promises of nationalization and redistribution, but broke these promises, instead pursuing liberal economic policies that appealed more to international financiers than ordinary citizens (Hellwig, 2015, 147). The influence of market actors limits the ability of governing parties to fulfill their election pledges to the extent that market actors’ interests diverge from the policy preferences of citizens to whom election pledges are primarily directed. There is strong evidence that the policy preferences of market actors and citizens differ significantly (Mosley, 2003; Broz, Frieden and Weymouth, 2008; Hellwig, 2015). Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) find evidence of an ideological gap between citizens and economic elites when it comes to issues that can be placed on a left-right ideological continuum. Whereas citizens are more likely to favor a social model and public spending, albeit with variation across countries, most market actors have strong preferences for lower taxes, fewer regulations, and greater economic exchange over social policies and public spending.

In sum, there are strong theoretical arguments to suppose that *political parties that hold executive power after elections are less likely to fulfill their election pledges in countries and time periods in which governments are more exposed to globalization.*

The primary focus of the following analyses—both the quantitative comparative analysis and the in-depth case study—centres on the average negative effect of globalization on promise keeping, as well as the mechanisms through which this effect occurs. However, our theoretical

argument indicates that the globalization effect is weaker when the policy preferences of governing political parties and market actors converge. In the quantitative comparative analyses, we explore whether the globalization effect weakens when parties further to the right are in government, and whether this is a consequence of right-wing parties making pledges that are aligned with the preferences of market actors.

Research Design

To examine the empirical implications of our theoretical argument, we use the Comparative Pledges Project (CPP) dataset (Thomson et al., 2017; Naurin, Royed and Thomson, 2019), which includes information on over 20,000 election pledges made by parties in 12 countries prior to the formation of 57 governments. The countries covered are Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the United States. The time period ranges from the 1970s to the 2010s, with the data on some countries covering longer time periods than others.⁸ In the main part of the analyses we focus on the fulfillment of 7,770 pledges made by parties that went on to hold executive power after the elections. Some of the analyses include more pledges, including those made by parties that did not hold executive power after the elections, to examine whether globalization affects the number and types of pledges that parties make. The data collection procedure involves human coding of party platforms, manifestos, or equivalent campaign materials to identify statements that qualify as election pledges.

Researchers gathered evidence to assess fulfillment, categorizing pledges as unfulfilled, partially fulfilled or fully fulfilled. A pledge is considered partially fulfilled if some action is taken in the direction of the promise that falls short of full fulfillment, such as reducing a tax rate from 25 to 23 percent when a cut to 20 percent was promised. The evidence gathered to assess fulfillment depends on the substance of what was promised, including changes to legislation, budget allocations, or certain socioeconomic outcomes. Following the practice in previous research, the analyses of pledge fulfillment focus on a dichotomous measure that distinguishes between pledges that were “unfulfilled” and pledges that were either “partially” or “fully” fulfilled. This approach is appropriate given that the possibility of a pledge being partially fulfilled arguably depends partly on the way in which the pledge itself is formulated.⁹

Governing parties vary significantly in the extent to which they fulfilled their election pledges. As Figure 1 shows, relatively high levels of pledge fulfillment are found in most single-party executives including those in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Portugal. Parties that formed single-party governments in the UK fulfilled 86 percent of their pledges at least partially. Lower levels of pledge fulfillment are found in coalition governments, such as those found in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Dutch parties that entered governing coalitions fulfilled 57 percent of their pledges partially or fully. Appendix A summarizes the cases covered by listing the 57 governments that took office after elections in which the

⁸Following previous analyses of this dataset, the models we apply use frequency weights so that the countries are weighted equally.

⁹The results are consistent when estimating a multinomial model that distinguishes between three categories of fulfillment (Appendix H).




Figure 1: Violin Plots of the Fulfillment of Election Pledges (in %) by Government Parties.

pledges were made.

The data include cases where parties and governments were exposed to very different levels of globalization, which is our key explanatory variable. We use the authoritative KOF Economic Globalization Index, which is an annual weighted aggregation of information on *de facto* and *de jure* trade and financial globalization, including trade in goods and services, trade regulations, tariffs and agreements, financial direct investment, investment restrictions and capital account openness (Dreher, 2006). This index has been validated and widely used in the literature cited here, and is the most appropriate index to use given our theory’s focus on economic integration and the associated institutional constraints.¹⁰ The cases studied are all highly developed trading economies, and as such exposed to the international economy to a considerable extent. However, there are marked differences in the relative levels of exposure to economic globalization. In our main analyses, the cases have KOF Economic Globalization Index values ranging from 40 to 91 (mean=73.63; s.d.=11.69), covering contexts relatively insulated from globalization, such as the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as contexts that highly exposed, such as Ireland in the late 1990s and 2000s. We transform the KOF Index into z-scores to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients.

We also examine whether the negative effect of globalization on pledge fulfillment is less severe for right-wing parties, as the theory suggests it is. We test this implication with an interaction term between party ideology and globalization. To measure parties’ ideological positions, we rely on the widely used left-right positions from the Manifesto Project (Volkens

¹⁰The findings are robust to related measures of globalization provided by the KOF Institute, to trade as a percentage of GDP as an alternative measure of international integration (Appendix G), and to an instrumental variable approach (Appendix H).

et al., 2019), which are also derived from parties' election manifestos or platforms. These measures of parties' left-right positions are based on the Manifesto Project's established thematic coding scheme, into which each sentence or quasi-sentence of the manifesto is allocated to a thematic category. The left-right score of each manifesto is based on the proportion of text it devotes to themes considered right-wing themes minus the proportion of text it devotes to themes considered left-wing themes. One of the advantages of the Manifesto Project's measures is that they provide estimates of parties' ideological positions at the same time points as our observations of election pledges.

Comparative Analysis

We estimate a logit model on the 7,770 pledges made by parties that went on to hold executive power after the elections at which they made these pledges. The exponentiated coefficients from the model depicted in Figure 2 summarize the effects of a range of explanatory variables that have been examined in previous studies of pledge fulfillment (Thomson et al., 2017). We describe the operationalization of the variables and present descriptive statistics in Appendix B. The details of this model with numerical estimates are reported in Appendix C. We also present models that control for the median voter position and the party left-right position in Appendix D). Appendix E analyzes the effect by type of pledge (pledges to cut (expand) programs or increase (cut) taxes). We examine the effect of globalization in different types of market economies separately in Appendix F. In Appendix G we use alternative measures of globalization, including trade globalization, financial globalization and trade (as % of GDP). Appendix H presents specifications with additional control variables, country fixed effects, a multinomial estimation to exploit the full variation in our dependent variable, and the results of an instrumental variable approach to deal with the potential endogenous nature of *Globalization*. Appendix I replaces the decade fixed effects with alternative models that include year fixed effects and estimates the models for different decade subsets. In Appendix J, we present results of different analyses to ensure our results are not driven by economic downturns. This includes an interaction between growth and *Globalization* and variables to control for the changes in growth, the magnitude in negative growth, inflation, unemployment, and dummy variables to indicate whether governments experienced crises at different times of the legislative period. Appendix K provides evidence that the results hold when we exclude the United States, account for the number of previous governments and the number of years that a party served in government, and when we aggregate the data to the manifesto level. The main results are robust to these variations.

Globalization has a strong and robust negative association with the likelihood of pledge fulfillment. The exponentiated coefficient, which can be interpreted as an odds ratio, associated with *Globalization* is below 1 and highly significant ($\exp(b)=.59$; $p=.00$), which means that a one standard deviation increase in the level of *Globalization* is associated with a decrease of 41 percent in the odds that a pledge is fulfilled. Figure 3 illustrates the large size of the effect. At relatively low levels of *Globalization*, corresponding to one standard deviation below the average, the probability of pledge fulfillment is 0.69 (95% CI .64; .73). By contrast, at relatively high levels of *Globalization* corresponding to one standard deviation above the average, the probability of pledge fulfillment is 0.47 (95% CI .42; .53). This key




Figure 2: *Globalization* and the Fulfillment of Election Pledges. The graph depicts odds ratios for each variable (dots) together with their 95% confidence intervals (lines). Coefficients (odds ratios) are from a logit model of *Pledge Fulfillment* (n=7,770). Logged scale. Robust standard errors clustered by manifesto. Full models in Appendix C).




Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of *Pledge Fulfillment* at Different Levels of *Globalization*. Predicted probabilities (dots) of pledge fulfillment with their 95% confidence intervals holding other explanatory variables at their mean values. The gray bars represent the histogram for *Globalization*.

finding on the negative effect of *Globalization* does not depend on the inclusion of the relatively internationalized cases with values around 1.5 standard deviations above the average. The coefficient associated with *Globalization* is almost identical when excluding these cases (it remains at $\exp(b)=.59$; $p=.00$).

The case study presented in the next section is the most appropriate way of illustrating the three mechanisms through which globalization affects promise breaking. Nonetheless, further quantitative analyses provide supportive findings in relation to two of the three mechanisms, on international legal commitments and international market actors. The KOF Economic Globalization Index consists of *de jure* and *de facto* components, with the former focusing on rules and the latter focusing on actual flows. Crucially for our purposes, these measures are not so highly correlated that they raise concerns about multicollinearity ($r=.33$, $n=7,770$). In a model with both *de jure* and *de facto* components, the coefficients associated with each of these measures is significant and negative, which is consistent with the argument that globalization constrains pledge fulfillment through both international commitments and the influence of economic actors (Figure 2). While both are significant and strong effects, the effect of the *de facto* globalization indicator, which is most closely associated with our market actors mechanism, is strongest. This may suggest that globalization's negative effect on promise keeping works mainly, though not exclusively, through the empowerment of market actors. We do not find significant quantitative evidence that globalization affects

promise breaking through uncertainty.¹¹ Nonetheless, we do not discount this mechanism, as the case study evidence presented below suggests it can be highly relevant.




Figure 4: Marginal Effects of *Globalization* on *Pledge Fulfillment* under Different Conditions. Logged Scale. The dots present odds ratios together with their 95% confidence intervals. The estimated effects of *Globalization* by the left-right position of the party are estimated in a model with an interaction between economic *Globalization* and *Partisan Left-Right Ideology* (Appendix D). The estimated effects of *Globalization* by type of pledge are estimated in three separate logit models, one for each type of pledge (Appendix E).

We present an interaction term between *Globalization* and *Partisan Left-Right Ideology* to examine whether the effect of *Globalization* depends on the ideological positions of the parties that made the pledge. Figure 4 shows that for all left-wing parties and for right-wing parties with ideology scores up to 1.5 standard deviations above the mean observed ideology score, which means “to the right of the mean,” *Globalization* has a significant negative effect on pledge fulfillment. At the same time, there is a significant interaction between *Globalization* and *Partisan Left-Right Ideology*, which indicates that *Globalization* has a weaker negative effect on pledge fulfillment for right-wing parties than left-wing parties. The coefficient associated with *Globalization* becomes insignificant for parties with *Partisan*

¹¹The non-finding regarding economic uncertainty is reported in Appendix C. These analyses use estimates of economic uncertainty from the World Uncertainty Index developed (Ahir, Bloom and Furceri, 2018). According to our theory, globalization increases uncertainty, which in turn affects pledge (non-)fulfillment. Accordingly, we estimate a model including economic uncertainty, but excluding globalization. This non-finding in combination with the marked effect of uncertainty in the case study leads us to suspect that more refined measures and model specifications are required to detect this mechanism quantitatively.

Left-Right Ideology scores that are 1.5 standard deviations above the observed mean. These are relatively right-wing, if not “extreme right-wing” parties and account for a small but important proportion of our observations; a total of 762 of the 7,770 pledges were made by such parties. The parties concerned are the US Republicans in 1984 and 1988, the UK Conservatives in 1983, 1987 and 1992, the German CDU/CSU in 2005, and the Conservative Party of Canada in 2011. The findings suggest that the fulfillment of these parties’ pledges is not significantly affected by their country’s exposure to international markets.

This finding is consistent with the argument that right-wing parties support policies that are more closely aligned with pro-globalization economic actors (Ward, Ezrow and Dorussen, 2011; Schleiter et al., 2021). This might also explain why we find more support for the international commitments and market actors mechanisms compared to the uncertainty mechanism (though we do find substantial support for uncertainty in the case study, see also fn. 11 for a discussion). To further examine this line of argument, we analyzed the effect of globalization conditional on the type of pledge. We examined 4,444 pledges made by parties in 48 manifestos from six countries (Bulgaria, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, the US, and the UK), for which a detailed categorization of pledge type is available. Each of the pledges was categorized according to whether it involved cutting taxes, cutting government programs, raising taxes, expanding government programs, or an “other” category of promise. The “other” category consists mainly of pledges to change rules and regulations. Pledges to cut taxes, of which there are many, and to cut programs, of which there are few, are typical economically liberal pledges. We group these pledges together to examine whether the proportion of pledges that parties make to cut taxes or programs is related to *Globalization*. The effects of *Globalization* on the fulfillment of different types of pledges are depicted in Figure 4. The odds ratio associated with *Globalization* is insignificant for pledges to cut taxes and programs, but is below 1 and significant for “expansionary pledges” (pledges to expand programs and raise taxes) and for “other” types of pledges. These findings indicate that *Globalization* has no discernible effect on the fulfillment of cut pledges, but has negative effects on the fulfillment of expansionary and other types of pledges, which is consistent with our argument.

The significant and negative impact of *Globalization* on the fulfillment of expansionary and other types of pledges is noteworthy, because it indicates that parties are unlikely to make more modest pledges in globalized contexts knowing that their capacity to fulfill pledges in those contexts is reduced. One might have expected that international integration could lead to fewer pledges or to more modest pledges that are more easily fulfilled. This would mitigate any observable effect of globalization on pledge fulfillment. To the extent that this happens, the observable negative effects of globalization on pledge fulfillment are conservative estimates of the true size of the effect.

Empirically, however, we find that levels of international economic integration have no effect on the numbers of pledges that parties make and only a small effect on the types of pledges that parties make. Parties’ left-right ideological positions are a more important predictor of pledge-making. We examined the 178 manifestos from 11 countries on which we have comparable data on the frequency of pledges made by each party in each manifesto. We estimated a negative binomial model with the count of pledges in each manifesto as the dependent variable and *Globalization* as one of the explanatory variables (Model 1, Appendix L). The coefficient associated with *Globalization* is not significant ($p=.52$), which

is also the case for the other explanatory variables included in the model. These non-findings accord with previous analysis of the frequency of pledge making, which concluded that parties make comparable numbers of pledges, whether they be left-wing or right-wing parties, incumbents or challengers, or in systems where single-party governments or coalitions are the norm (Naurin, Royed and Thomson, 2019, 39-55).

Globalization is weakly related to the types of pledges that parties make. However, the strength of this relationship is conditional and quite modest in comparison to the relationship between parties’ ideological positions and the types of pledges they make. We first estimated a General Linear Model with the proportion of “cut” pledges in each manifesto as the dependent variable and *Globalization* as one of the explanatory variables (Model 2, Appendix L). The coefficient associated with *Globalization* is not significant ($p=.77$). By contrast, *Partisan Left-Right Ideology* has a strong and highly significant association with the proportion of cut pledges they make. Figure 5 depicts these relationships using predicted values. The expected proportion of pledges that are cut pledges is the same, around .10, regardless of the level of *Globalization*. By contrast, parties further to the right make far higher proportions of pledges that are cut pledges than do parties to the left.




Figure 5: *Partisan Left-Right Ideology*, *Globalization*, and Party Pledges to Cut Taxes and Programs. The graphs depict predictive probabilities together with 95% confidence intervals for different levels of *Partisan Left-Right Ideology* (a) and *Globalization* (b). Full models in Appendix L.

Globalization is positively, albeit modestly, associated with the proportion of parties’ pledges that are expansionary. Again, the effect of parties’ ideological positions is far greater than international exposure. Pledges to expand government programs, of which there are many, and pledges to raise taxes, of which there are few, were grouped together to create a category of “expansionary” pledges. We estimated a General Linear Model with the proportion of “expansionary” pledges in each manifesto as the dependent variable and *Globalization* as one of the explanatory variables (Model 3, Appendix L). The coefficient associated with *Globalization* is positive and significant ($p=.00$). As countries are more exposed to international markets, parties tend to make relatively more expansionary pledges. While significant,

this effect of *Globalization* is smaller than the effect of *Partisan Left-Right Ideology*, whereby parties further to the right make relatively fewer expansionary pledges than parties to the left. This adds further evidence to our argument that the globalization constraint may be less binding for parties on the right. The effects of *Globalization* and ideology are depicted as predicted values in Figures 6(a) and 6(b), respectively.




Figure 6: Partisan Ideology, Globalization, and Party Pledges to Expand Programs and Taxes. The graphs depict predictive probabilities together with 95% confidence intervals for different levels of *Partisan Left-Right Ideology* (a) and *Globalization* (b). Full models in Appendix L.

These results indicate that to the extent that manifesto writers respond to the constraints on pledge fulfillment imposed by globalization, these considerations play a minor role compared to the need to formulate policy appeals that win votes and secure the support of key party factions and supporters.

The UK Conservative Party’s Migration Pledge

We complement the quantitative analysis with a qualitative analysis of the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between globalization and pledge breaking. To trace the underlying causal mechanisms of our theoretical argument, we examine why the Conservative Party was unable to fulfill one of its central election pledges of 2010, to reduce net migration to below 100,000, during the 2010-15 governing period when the party held executive office. This is a typical case in the sense described by Gerring (2008), in that it is typical of the relationship between globalization and pledge fulfillment; the governing party could not fulfill a salient election promise in the context of deep integration into the global economy. In 2010, the UK ranked as the fifth most globalized country in the world, just below Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands. Although net migration fell somewhat after the 2010 election, the government failed to bring it even close to the promised benchmark, and numbers rose again after 2012. This failure is noteworthy given that immigration policy promises are more likely kept by governments when they are salient and public pressure

to keep them is intense (Böhmelt and Ezrow, 2022). Because the UK was highly exposed to globalization and the pledge was unfulfilled, we would expect to observe the theoretical mechanisms underlying our argument in operation.

To trace the underlying causal mechanisms, we rely on a range of secondary sources (including academic studies and newspaper articles), primary archival materials (such as election manifestos, consultation reports, and government communications), and interviews with political, administrative, and economic elites who were involved in the debates. In selecting the interviewees, we strove to maintain a balance across political ideologies, views on immigration, and background in terms of public and private sectors. The interviewees included, among others, the former Minister for Immigration, Damian Green, a member of the Conservative Party and the former Secretary of the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills, Sir Vince Cable, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party.¹²

The Genesis of the Migration Pledge

The Conservative Party formulated the pledge to cut net migration in response to public concerns regarding increasing levels of migration in a challenging economic context. Before the 2010 election, the Conservative Party, led by David Cameron, was the main opposition party challenging the incumbent Labour Party, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. At that time, the country was reeling from the global financial crisis, and unemployment had risen to over 2 million for the first time since the 1990s. These economic conditions fueled anti-immigration sentiments in large parts of the population who believed that the economic problems and immigration were intimately linked. A clear majority of British citizens became opposed to immigration. A survey by Ipsos MORI in 2011 found that 64% of respondents believed there were too many immigrants in Britain (Blinder and Richards, 2020).

Public opposition to immigration put pressure on political parties before the 2010 election. The right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) positioned itself as the party to tackle immigration (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). They pledged to end “uncontrolled mass immigration” by imposing an immediate five-year freeze on immigration (Carey and Geddes, 2010, 860). This allowed UKIP to gain public support and put pressure on both the Conservative and Labour Parties. Immigration featured prominently in the 2010 election campaign, including the three leaders debates (Carey and Geddes, 2010). Both major parties responded to public opinion and the UKIP challenge by proposing to control immigration.

The Conservatives were losing supporters to UKIP at an alarming rate. UKIP won second place in the 2009 European Parliament elections, and its transformation into a multi-issue party strengthened its appeal at the national level (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, 84). UKIP’s message resonated with many voters who generally voted for the Conservatives, and it gained most votes in Conservative-held constituencies. With UKIP gaining ground on the Conservative Party and a majority of public opinion in favor of reducing migration, David Cameron committed the party to reducing immigration. On January 10, 2010, just months ahead of the general election, he made the now infamous promise in a BBC interview, stating that if he won the election he would limit net immigration to “tens of thousands” each year. The pledge had been prepared carefully. It was developed by the then-Shadow Minister of

¹²A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix M. Each interview lasted 30 to 60 minutes.

Immigration Damian Green based on a pamphlet he had written on economic migration with David Davies, another prominent Conservative politician. It was agreed upon by a small group of party elites, including the shadow Home Office team and the leadership of the Conservative Party. The 2010 Conservative Party election manifesto made the 100,000 net migration target official party policy (Conservative Party, 2010). According to our interviewees, the pledge was not merely aspirational; or as Cameron put it himself: “no ifs, no buts.”¹³ Our interviewees who participated in the formulation of the pledge shared the view that there was a sincere belief within the party leadership that the target was achievable when it was formulated.

According to many observers and our interviewees, the rationale behind Cameron’s move was to respond to public concerns about immigration and to neutralize migration as an issue during the campaign (Bale, Hampshire and Partos, 2011). And indeed, during the campaign, the Conservative Party won significant political ground on the basis of their pledge on immigration, the only issue on which the party scored significantly better than Labour.¹⁴ According to a YouGov survey, at 25.2% the Conservatives were far ahead of both Labour (6.3%) and the Liberal Democrats (1.8%) on respondents’ judgment of the best party to handle immigration. Immediately after announcing the promise in early 2010, Cameron’s personal favorability ratings increased substantially (Dahlgreen, 2015).

The Road to Failure

The Conservative Party won the 2010 election and subsequently led a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Under the leadership of then-Home Secretary Theresa May, the UK Home Office introduced one of the harshest immigration policies in British history. The government implemented a cap on skilled labour migration from outside the European Union, which was promised in the Conservative’s 2010 manifesto. It introduced a new minimum income threshold for people with spouses from overseas, which was arguably consistent with its 2010 manifesto statement to “limit[...] access only to those who will bring the most value to the British economy,” a statement that conveys intent, but does not specify the action that would be taken. The government also cracked down on “bogus” colleges and “foreign criminals.”¹⁵ In addition, the Hostile Environment Policy, as it was called, included administrative and legislative steps to make it as difficult as possible for non-citizens to stay in the UK.¹⁶ Yet, net migration remained stubbornly above 100,000, and even increased to 336,000 just before the 2015 election (up from 246,000 in 2010) according to the UK Office of National Statistics. Despite failing to fulfill the promise, it was repeated by the Conservative Party during the 2015 election campaign. The same promise was again repeated at the 2017 election, after Theresa May took over the leadership of the party. Only in 2019 did the

¹³Travis, Alan. “Net migration to UK higher than when coalition took office.” *The Guardian*. February 26, 2015.

¹⁴Elliott, Francis. “Cameron steps back to avoid tensions within party.” *The Times*. February 27, 2010.

¹⁵Trilling, Daniel. “10 years on, David Cameron’s toxic net migration pledge still haunts the UK.” *The Guardian*. January 14, 2020.

¹⁶Hill, Amelia. “Hostile Environment: the hardline Home Office policy tearing families apart” *The Guardian*. November 28, 2017; Trilling, Daniel. “10 years on, David Cameron’s toxic net migration pledge still haunts the UK.” *The Guardian*. January 14, 2020.

party replace the net-migration pledge with a promise to implement an Australian-style points-based immigration system.

Our analysis indicates three main reasons why the Conservatives were unable to fulfill the pledge. One obvious (though not the most important) obstacle to fulfilling the pledge was the UK's membership of the European Union. The UK had agreed to freedom of labor movement across Europe as part of the European Single Market. To accede to the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania had agreed to limited movement of labor during a transition period, which came to an end in 2013, followed by substantial increases in migration from both countries to the UK. The European Single Market therefore constrained the government's ability to fulfill its promise. As Theresa May said after it became clear that the government had failed to keep its promise: it was "unlikely" the target of getting net migration below 100,000 would be met, because EU migration had "blown us off course."¹⁷ However, the effect of the EU should not be overstated. Migrants from EU member countries accounted for less than one-third of long-term migrants to the UK. In 2010, of the 281,000 immigrants, 196,000 were from outside the EU (70%). Even if the UK had eliminated all immigration from the EU, they would not have achieved their target of 100,000 (Office of National Statistics). Rather than focusing on EU citizens, the government's attempts focused on cutting immigration from non-EU countries, including the immigration of skilled individuals who were highly sought after by UK businesses and organizations in the private and public sectors. There was also some attempt to cut numbers of overseas students, who brought both economic benefits partly through college tuition fees and also contributed to the UK's scientific community.

The government's inability to affect or even anticipate emigration was another important constraint on its capacity to fulfill the pledge, and one that was subject to considerable uncertainty. A decline in British emigration after 2010 contributed significantly to the failure to fulfill the pledge. The fall in emigration was partly the result of the increased costs of living abroad due to a weak pound, with the government having little control over currency movements due to the UK's integration in global financial markets.¹⁸ In a consultation report from 2010, the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), an independent government advisory committee, had warned the government that uncertainties about emigration numbers as well as EU rules might limit the feasibility of achieving the net migration target (Migration Advisory Committee, 2010). In addition, many Britons returned to the UK during this period from crisis-hit Spain and Dubai, which further contributed to increased net migration.¹⁹

Furthermore, the pledge was opposed by a broad range of national and international actors from the private and public sectors. Following a call for responses on these issues, the Migration Advisory Committee received over 400 responses by domestic and international actors including the Scottish Government, the Government of Ireland, the Embassy of Japan, various trade federations, banking associations, law firms, law associations, the health and social services sectors (including hospitals, medical services and nursing homes), private companies, the British Chamber of Commerce, the oil industry, universities, research institutes, the Royal Bank of Canada, the Greater London Authority, the Department of Health, the

¹⁷"Cameron accused of 'total failure' on immigration." *BBC*. November 27, 2014.

¹⁸Owen, Paul and Alan Travis. "Vince Cable warns coalition colleagues over immigration cap." *The Guardian*. 27 August 2010.

¹⁹Travis, Alan. "Cameron's empty immigration promise." *The Guardian*. January 11, 2010.

Department of Education, the Department of Work and Pensions, and the Migration Policy Institute. The opposition expressed to the cap was as forceful as it was unanimous. Of the responses quoted in the report, only one response from a member of the public argued in favor of the cap on migration.

Private and public sector employers warned that the introduction of a cap would lead to major skill shortages. The lobbying efforts came from a variety of stakeholders, including politicians from all parties, business groups, law firms, car manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies and the National Health Service (NHS). The NHS relied on recruiting skilled and relatively low paid care workers from abroad. Gerwyn Davies from the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development expressed his concerns with a stark warning to the government:

“The reality for employers is that training workers to plug the UK skills gap is a lengthy task. (...) The abrupt introduction of a radical cap would therefore leave many employers with a bigger skills problem and tempt employers with global operations to offshore jobs, where they can find the skills.”²⁰

Sectors with international operations raised concerns about the significant adverse economic effects of restricting immigration. In a joint response to the Migration Advisory Committee consultation, the Association of Foreign Banks (AFB) and British Bankers’ Association (BBA) threatened that:

“If the ability of migrants to enter the UK under Tier 2 is significantly reduced, AFB and BBA members will create jobs overseas, that otherwise would have been created in the UK. As a result, the teams supporting those roles will also be located overseas.” (Migration Advisory Committee, 2010, 105).

Further pressure came from overseas. A major concern was that restrictive immigration measures would make it difficult to secure trade cooperation, and several interviewees noted the effect of the policies on relations with India. The policies threatened to derail negotiations between Britain and India to promote trade between the two countries in 2010. The UK government wanted the Indian government to allow British banks, legal and insurance firms and small manufacturers to operate in India. In return, India asked for mutual recognition of qualifications so that its lawyers and bankers could operate in the UK. The Indian government was concerned that the cap on immigration would make this difficult and was dismayed by what they called racially prejudiced policies toward Indians. The UK had much to lose as total bilateral trade between the UK and India was worth £11.5 billion, and UK exports to India totalled £4.7 billion in 2019.²¹ Our interviews confirmed that the pressure worked; after a high-level meeting between the UK and Indian governments, the UK shelved planned restrictions on intra-company transfers, which were opposed by Indian firms.

The pressure exerted by these actors was intense and multi-dimensional. It was expressed publicly (through the media, including through the notoriously vociferous British tabloid

²⁰Owen, Paul and Alan Travis. “Vince Cable warns coalition colleagues over immigration cap.” *The Guardian*. 27 August 2010.

²¹Waugh, Paul. “Cable warns on immigration as Cameron flies out to woo India.” *The Evening Standard*. July 27, 2010.

newspapers) as well as behind closed doors (through lobbying the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, the Home Office, or the Prime Minister through the Business Advisory Group). Although the pressure did not convince the government to abandon the pledge altogether, the government did not pursue many of the measures it had originally intended to, and many compromises were made. For example, the Home Office agreed not to restrict intra-company transfers, which made up a significant share of immigration, and made significant concessions on foreign students and family policies. As one of the interviewees notes “if there hadn’t been resistance, from lobby groups, from me and my colleagues, they [anti-immigration measures] would have gotten much worse.”²²

In sum, the Conservative Party’s broken net migration pledge provides vivid illustrations of the theoretical mechanisms through which globalization can impede promise keeping. International integration constrained the British government because of its international commitments, especially its membership of the EU. Economic uncertainty associated with globalization also played a role, partly in relation to the unpredictability of both inward and outward migration flows. Finally, the case illustrates how market actors can lobby government successfully when their interests are threatened by the fulfillment of an election pledge. We find little support for alternative explanations of this broken promise, such as the role of coalition politics. Indeed, Sir Vince Cable, the senior Liberal Democrat cabinet member during the 2010-15 government, described the Liberal Democrat’s influence on this issue to us as negligible (see Appendix N). The case illustrates how the causal mechanisms associated with globalization play out in practice.

Conclusion

Globalization poses a formidable challenge to democratic representation at the national level. Governing parties in highly internationalized contexts fulfill significantly fewer of the pledges they made to voters before the elections that brought them to power. Promise keeping is central to promissory representation, which is the mainstay of mainstream democratic theory and popular conceptions of how democracy works. Until now, comparative research on election pledges has looked mainly inward, toward the domestic level, to explain differences in the likelihood of pledge fulfillment in different governments and time periods. But treating governments as independent units is no longer appropriate as modern states are deeply embedded in layers of international interdependence. This applies not only to research on election pledges, but also to other aspects of democratic performance.

Our findings indicate that although globalization has only a modest effect on pledge making, it has a large and negative effect on pledge fulfillment. The negative effect of globalization applies in a broad range of contexts and to a broad range of parties and pledges. It is also striking that it reduces the likelihood of fulfillment of a broad range of pledges, not only pledges that are considered economic pledges. Globalization is, however, especially constraining for center and center-left parties, the very parties that are under most pressure from their core voters to compensate the losers of globalization.

The consequences of promise breaking in the context of international constraints have yet to be examined. Failure to deliver on election pledges is associated with the widespread belief

²²Interview 1.

that politicians are untrustworthy promise breakers. Such lack of trust can be corrosive if it becomes synonymous with expectations of betrayal, rather than healthy vigilance on the part of citizens with respect to government performance. A key question is whether citizens hold governing parties to account for promise breaking if those parties are deeply constrained by globalization. Answering these questions may shed light on the causes of the globalization backlash and the rise of populist parties. Our findings indicate that consistent pledge breaking in globalized contexts may at least contribute to the anti-globalization backlash and the rise of extreme parties, with important implications for promissory representation by mainstream parties.

Our findings do not necessarily indicate that national representative democracy is impossible in the age of globalization. The broader debate on the impact of globalization on democracy includes claims other than promise making and keeping, and a comprehensive assessment requires that these be considered too. Proponents of the view that globalization can enhance democratic performance at the national level assert that globalization enables governments to pursue long-term welfare-enhancing policies for their citizens. While international integration may be costly in terms of promise keeping and policy responsiveness, the costs do not accrue equally to all parties. Future research should address the extent to which the constraints of globalization are contingent on other factors such, as economic conditions, the salience of pledges and different policy areas. Furthermore, globalization may be beneficial in terms of responsibility, which is another key element of democratic representation. One of the major challenges in this field of research is to assess the trade-offs between these different aspects of democratic representation. This research agenda is all the more salient as political movements to limit globalization gather pace.

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Supporting Information for: Globalization and Promissory Representation

To be published as Online Appendix

Contents

A	Sample of Countries, Parties, and Elections	2
B	Variables and Descriptive Statistics	3
C	Pledge Fulfillment (Full Results)	5
D	Left-Right Ideology and Pledge Fulfillment	6
E	Pledge Type and Fulfillment	7
F	VoC and Fulfillment	8
G	Alternative Measures of Globalization	9
H	Alternative Specifications	10
I	Time Effects	13
J	Economic Downturns	14
K	Other Robustness	15
L	Pledge Making	16
M	List of Interviews	17
N	Alternative Considerations	18

A Sample of Countries, Parties, and Elections

Single-party executives with legislative majorities (15 governments)	
Bulgaria:	1997-2001, ODS
Canada:	1993-97, Liberals; 1997-2000, Liberals; 2000-04, Liberals; 2011-15, Conservatives
Ireland:	1977-81, Fianna Fáil
Portugal:	2005-09, PS
Spain:	1989-93, PSOE; 2000-04, PP
UK:	1974-79, Labour; 1979-83, Conservative; 1983-87, Conservative; 1987-92 Conservative; 1992-97, Conservative
United States:	1977-81, Democrats
Single-party executives with legislative minorities (16 governments)	
Bulgaria:	2009-13, GERB
Canada:	2004-06, Liberals; 2006-08, Conservatives; 2008-11, Conservatives
Ireland:	1987-89, Fianna Fáil
Portugal:	1995-99, PS
Spain:	1993-96, PSOE†; 1996-2000, PP†
Sweden:	1994-98, Social Democrats†; 1998-2002, Social Democrats†; 2002-06, Social Democrats†
United States:	1981-85, Republican; 1985-89, Republican; 1989-93, Republican; 1993-97, Democrats; 1997-2001, Democrats
Coalition executives with legislative majorities (22 governments)	
Austria:	2000-03, ÖVP/ FPÖ; 2003-07, ÖVP/ FPÖ; 2007-08, SPÖ/ ÖVP; 2008-13, SPÖ/ ÖVP
Bulgaria:	1995-96, BSP/NS; 2001-05, NDSV/DPS; 2005-09, BSP/NDSV/ DPS‡
Germany:	2002-05, SPD/ Greens; 2005-09, CDU-CSU/ SPD; 2009-13, CDU-CSU/ FDP
Ireland:	1982-87, Fine Gael/Labour; 1989-92, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats; 1992-94, Fianna Fáil/ Labour; 2002-07, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats; 2007-11, Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats/ Greens; 2011-2016, Fine Gael/Labour
Italy:	2001-06, Berlusconi II's coalition (FI/ AN/ LN/ UDC/ NPSI/ PRI)‡; 2008-11, Berlusconi IV's coalition (PdL/ LN/ MpA/ PID)‡
Netherlands:	1986-89, CDA/ VVD; 1989-94, CDA/ PvdA; 1994-98, PvdA/VVD/D66
Sweden:	2006-10, Moderate Party/Centre Party/People's Party/ Christian Democrats‡
Coalition executives with legislative minorities (4 governments)	
Ireland:	1997-02, Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats†
Italy:	1996-98: Prodi I's Ulivo coalition (PDS/PPI/RI/FdV/UD)†‡; 2006-08, Prodi II's coalition Unione (DS/DL/PRC/RnP-PdCI/ IdV/FdV/UDEUR)‡
Sweden:	2010-14, Moderate Party/ Centre Party/ People's Party/ Christian Democrats‡

Note: †: minority governments that had an agreement with one or more opposition parties or parliamentarians to maintain support. ‡: includes pledges made by governing parties that were part of pre-election coalitions. Dataset does not include opposition parties in Italy. *Source:* Thomson et al. (2017).

B Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Variables included in the main analysis of pledge fulfillment.

Pledge Fulfillment: The variable takes a value of 1 if a pledge was partially or fully fulfilled and 0 if it was not fulfilled. Data are from CPPP.

Globalization: Globalization is measured using the KOF Economic Globalization Index, which combines information on *de facto* and *de jure* trade and financial globalization, including trade in goods and services, trade regulations, tariffs and agreements, financial direct investment, investment restrictions and capital account openness. Data are from KOF.

Varieties of Capitalism: The Variety of Capitalism to which each of the twelve countries belongs uses the classifications of (Hall and Soskice, 2001).

Executive-Legislative Relations: Variable that captures whether the country is a parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential system.

Federal System: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a federal system, and 0 if not.

Single-Party Government: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a single party controls the government executive, and 0 if not.

Majority Government: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the party or parties that hold executive office control a majority of legislative seats, and 0 if not.

Chief Executive: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the party holds the chief executive position, and 0 if not. Data from country specialists in the CPPP as necessary supplemented with data from the EJPR Data Yearbooks.

Ministry: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the party holds the ministry relevant to the issue of the pledge, and 0 if not. Data from country specialists in the CPPP as necessary supplemented with data from the EJPR Data Yearbooks.

Partisan Left-Right Ideology: Partisan ideology on the left-right axis from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019). We use the so-called RILE scores, which are also derived from parties' election manifestos or platforms.

Incumbency: Variable that captures whether the party is an incumbent, opposition with experience or opposition without experience. Data from country specialists in the CPPP as necessary supplemented with data from the EJPR Data Yearbooks.

Economic Growth: Average growth rate of the country over the lifetime of the government. Data are from the World Bank.

Government Duration: Variable that captures the duration of the government in months. Data from country specialists in the CPPP as necessary supplemented with data from the EJPR Data Yearbooks.

Agreement on Pledge: The variable takes a value of 1 if a pledge was similar to a pledge made by another party, 0 if not. Data are from CPPP.

Pre-election Agreement: Binary variable that takes value 1 if a coalition agreement existed before the election, and 0 if not. Data from country specialists in the CPPP as necessary supplemented with data from the *European Journal of Political Research* (EJPR) Data Yearbooks.

Decade: Decade in which the pledge was made. Data are from CPPP.

	mean	sd	min	max
Pledge Fulfillment	.5579151	.4966665	0	1
Globalization	.0846585	1.015564	-2.7991	1.584555
Coordinated Market Economies	.2857143	.451783	0	1
Mixed Market Economies	.2687259	.4433256	0	1
Presidential	.0694981	.2543156	0	1
Semi-Presidential	.0305019	.1719749	0	1
Federalism	.3495495	.4768584	0	1
Single Party Minority	.1947233	.396013	0	1
Coalition Majority	.4981982	.5000289	0	1
Coalition Minority	.1226512	.3280575	0	1
Chief Executive	.7700129	.4208513	0	1
Ministry	.7683398	.4219202	0	1
Party Left-Right Ideology	.308134	15.60103	-40	33.6
Opposition with Experience	.3628057	.4808404	0	1
Opposition without Experience	.1548263	.3617623	0	1
Economic Growth	2.45471	2.156673	-1.62	9.14
Government Duration in Years	3.707246	.9389175	1.166667	5.133333
Coalition Pledge Agreement	.0584299	.2345696	0	1
Pre-election Agreement	.1325611	.3391216	0	1
1980s	.127027	.3330247	0	1
1990s	.2788932	.4484837	0	1
2000s	.551094	.4974146	0	1
N	7770			

Note: N refers to the numbers of cases (pledges) in the analysis of pledge fulfillment. For ease of interpretation, the KOF Economic Globalization Index was transformed to z-scores based on the distribution of the variable across the entire sample, which includes pledges of parties that entered the opposition, and of which we do not examine fulfillment in this study.

C Pledge Fulfillment (Full Results)

	Main	Globalization	Uncertainty I	Uncertainty II
Globalization	-0.523*** (0.000)			-0.515*** (0.000)
De Facto Globalization		-0.544*** (0.000)		
De Jure Globalization		-0.191*** (0.006)		
Economic Uncertainty			0.911 (0.286)	0.147 (0.859)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies	0.226* (0.090)	0.154 (0.249)	0.081 (0.592)	0.229* (0.089)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.841*** (0.000)	-0.984*** (0.000)	-0.229 (0.165)	-0.833*** (0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Presidential	-1.517*** (0.000)	-1.617*** (0.000)	-0.886*** (0.006)	-1.493*** (0.000)
Semi-Presidential	0.686*** (0.001)	0.689*** (0.000)	0.280 (0.316)	0.666** (0.014)
Federalism	-0.626*** (0.000)	-0.754*** (0.000)	-0.231 (0.186)	-0.628*** (0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	0.392** (0.024)	0.411** (0.015)	0.326 (0.121)	0.387** (0.041)
Coalition Majority	-0.632*** (0.001)	-0.483** (0.027)	-0.918*** (0.000)	-0.640*** (0.002)
Coalition Minority	-0.486** (0.023)	-0.401* (0.090)	-0.887*** (0.000)	-0.491** (0.026)
Chief Executive	0.249* (0.063)	0.250* (0.069)	0.231 (0.117)	0.252* (0.065)
Ministry	0.254** (0.030)	0.231** (0.048)	0.243** (0.042)	0.255** (0.030)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.008** (0.012)	0.008** (0.013)	0.007* (0.061)	0.008** (0.025)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.303*** (0.008)	-0.301*** (0.007)	-0.304** (0.012)	-0.303*** (0.009)
Opposition without Experience	-0.686*** (0.000)	-0.651*** (0.000)	-0.717*** (0.000)	-0.684*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.117*** (0.000)	0.128*** (0.000)	0.112*** (0.002)	0.117*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.262*** (0.000)	0.259*** (0.000)	0.221*** (0.000)	0.260*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.789*** (0.000)	0.788*** (0.000)	0.805*** (0.000)	0.788*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.357* (0.059)	0.302 (0.112)	0.633*** (0.002)	0.355* (0.060)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>				
1980s	-0.449 (0.142)	-0.482* (0.092)	-0.573* (0.068)	-0.442 (0.179)
1990s	0.052 (0.887)	0.026 (0.938)	-0.336 (0.312)	0.054 (0.885)
2000s	0.565* (0.091)	0.657** (0.036)	-0.116 (0.690)	0.563* (0.090)
Constant	-0.712* (0.072)	-0.730* (0.063)	-0.280 (0.466)	-0.724* (0.092)
Observations	7770	7770	7770	7770

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

D Left-Right Ideology and Pledge Fulfillment

	Party	Party Interaction	Public	Public Interaction
Globalization	-0.523*** (0.000)	-0.483*** (0.000)	-0.699*** (0.000)	-2.197** (0.046)
Globalization × Party Left-Right Ideology		0.007* (0.056)		
Public Left-Right Ideology (Median)			0.077 (0.677)	0.350 (0.193)
Globalization × Public Left-Right Ideology (Median)				0.296 (0.179)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies	0.226* (0.090)	0.147 (0.284)	0.170 (0.206)	0.223* (0.092)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.841*** (0.000)	-0.874*** (0.000)	-1.072*** (0.000)	-1.100*** (0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Presidential	-1.517*** (0.000)	-1.355*** (0.001)	-1.796*** (0.000)	-1.804*** (0.000)
Semi-Presidential	0.686*** (0.001)	0.753*** (0.000)	0.659*** (0.000)	0.669*** (0.000)
Federalism	-0.626*** (0.000)	-0.589*** (0.000)	-0.576*** (0.000)	-0.621*** (0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	0.392** (0.024)	0.446*** (0.008)	0.256* (0.060)	0.224* (0.094)
Coalition Majority	-0.632*** (0.001)	-0.586*** (0.001)	-0.698*** (0.000)	-0.709*** (0.000)
Coalition Minority	-0.486** (0.023)	-0.439** (0.032)	-0.527** (0.013)	-0.529** (0.011)
Chief Executive	0.249* (0.063)	0.222 (0.108)	0.242* (0.062)	0.248** (0.042)
Ministry	0.254** (0.030)	0.265** (0.016)	0.259** (0.025)	0.254** (0.028)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.008** (0.012)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.008)	0.007*** (0.009)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.303*** (0.008)	-0.331*** (0.004)	-0.231*** (0.008)	-0.227*** (0.008)
Opposition without Experience	-0.686*** (0.000)	-0.653*** (0.000)	-0.676*** (0.000)	-0.655*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.117*** (0.000)	0.104*** (0.000)	0.115*** (0.000)	0.114*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.262*** (0.000)	0.273*** (0.000)	0.287*** (0.000)	0.288*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.789*** (0.000)	0.762*** (0.000)	0.816*** (0.000)	0.812*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.357* (0.059)	0.380** (0.040)	0.348 (0.105)	0.324 (0.124)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>				
1980s	-0.449 (0.142)	-0.211 (0.496)	-0.023 (0.944)	-0.064 (0.850)
1990s	0.052 (0.887)	0.210 (0.549)	0.559 (0.107)	0.658* (0.055)
2000s	0.565* (0.091)	0.721** (0.028)	1.037*** (0.003)	1.138*** (0.001)
Constant	-0.712* (0.072)	-0.879** (0.026)	-1.468 (0.224)	-2.921* (0.066)
N	7770	7770	7278	7278

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Models 1 and 2 include Party Left-Right Ideology; data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Models 3 and 4 include the median left-right position of the public; data from XXX

E Pledge Type and Fulfillment

	Cut	Expand	Other	Interaction
Globalization	0.110 (0.770)	-1.033*** (0.000)	-0.614*** (0.000)	-0.587*** (0.000)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies	1.568*** (0.001)	-0.191 (0.665)	-0.164 (0.537)	0.145 (0.565)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.106 (0.899)	-2.322*** (0.000)	-1.559*** (0.000)	-1.489*** (0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Presidential	0.075 (0.931)	-0.464 (0.387)	-0.771** (0.049)	-0.704* (0.071)
Federalism	-0.135 (0.892)	-2.197*** (0.001)	-1.704*** (0.000)	-1.592*** (0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	-1.295*** (0.005)	0.211 (0.514)	-0.158 (0.434)	-0.178 (0.323)
Coalition Majority	-1.391* (0.052)	-0.732* (0.084)	-0.893*** (0.001)	-0.875*** (0.001)
Coalition Minority	-0.644 (0.334)	-0.722 (0.117)	-1.006*** (0.002)	-0.800*** (0.004)
Chief Executive	1.671** (0.035)	0.108 (0.596)	0.531** (0.024)	0.483** (0.019)
Ministry	0.513 (0.486)	0.168 (0.407)	-0.004 (0.987)	0.105 (0.536)
Party Left-Right Ideology	-0.002 (0.893)	0.022*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.000)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.111 (0.714)	-0.932*** (0.000)	-0.105 (0.464)	-0.249* (0.094)
Opposition without Experience	-0.541 (0.163)	-0.659*** (0.000)	-0.228* (0.087)	-0.362*** (0.002)
Economic Growth	0.018 (0.865)	0.207*** (0.000)	0.163*** (0.000)	0.151*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.187 (0.569)	0.058 (0.566)	-0.005 (0.963)	0.001 (0.991)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.564 (0.244)	0.775** (0.015)	-0.101 (0.785)	0.255 (0.235)
Pre-election Agreement	-1.881*** (0.004)	0.724** (0.048)	0.699** (0.031)	0.297 (0.266)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>				
1980s	-0.373 (0.432)	0.217 (0.675)	0.001 (0.998)	0.023 (0.943)
1990s	-0.627 (0.251)	0.939 (0.114)	0.319 (0.287)	0.366 (0.297)
2000s	-0.269 (0.771)	1.781** (0.029)	1.222*** (0.001)	1.170*** (0.004)
<i>Pledge Type (Reference: Other)</i>				
Cut				0.192* (0.096)
Expand				0.548*** (0.000)
Cut × Globalization				0.010 (0.933)
Expand × Globalization				-0.114 (0.104)
Constant	-0.503 (0.709)	0.342 (0.550)	0.051 (0.923)	-0.003 (0.995)
N	422	1412	2610	4444

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

F VoC and Fulfillment

	LMEs	CMEs	Mixed	Interaction
Globalization	-0.357 (0.259)	-1.176** (0.024)	-2.284*** (0.000)	-0.267 (0.101)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Presidential	-0.262 (0.606)			-1.030** (0.014)
Federalism	-1.564*** (0.000)	-0.538** (0.028)		-0.561*** (0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	-0.409* (0.068)		0.994*** (0.002)	0.271** (0.046)
Coalition Majority	-1.716*** (0.003)	-0.781* (0.069)	-1.078*** (0.001)	-0.903*** (0.000)
Coalition Minority	-1.260** (0.050)	-0.839* (0.050)	0.033 (0.951)	-0.783*** (0.000)
Chief Executive	0.260 (0.238)	0.231 (0.109)	1.083** (0.015)	0.239* (0.052)
Ministry	0.143 (0.359)	0.275* (0.056)	0.258 (0.369)	0.273** (0.012)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.007 (0.206)	0.009 (0.125)	0.031* (0.060)	0.011*** (0.000)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.064 (0.768)	-0.330*** (0.007)	-0.887*** (0.001)	-0.247*** (0.008)
Opposition without Experience	-0.285 (0.119)		-1.439*** (0.000)	-0.632*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.132** (0.016)	0.245** (0.019)	0.180*** (0.000)	0.125*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	-0.003 (0.976)	0.305*** (0.001)	0.613*** (0.002)	0.240*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.807*** (0.000)	0.794*** (0.000)	0.108 (0.714)	0.760*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement		0.658* (0.051)	0.581* (0.072)	0.412** (0.031)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>				
1980s	0.414 (0.185)			-0.576** (0.032)
1990s	0.485 (0.135)	0.934*** (0.000)	1.722*** (0.000)	-0.169 (0.593)
2000s	1.456*** (0.001)	1.761*** (0.000)	3.587*** (0.000)	0.470 (0.109)
Semi-Presidential			1.431*** (0.005)	0.809*** (0.000)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies				0.341 (0.313)
Mixed Market Economies				-0.945*** (0.000)
Coordinated Market Economies × Globalization				-0.129 (0.742)
Mixed Market Economies × Globalization				-0.652*** (0.002)
Constant	0.390 (0.418)	-1.373* (0.050)	-6.799*** (0.000)	-0.515 (0.151)
N	3462	2220	2088	7770

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

G Alternative Measures of Globalization

	KOF Trade	KOF Financial	Trade
Globalization	-0.412*** (0.001)	-0.324*** (0.003)	-0.463*** (0.000)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>			
Coordinated Market Economies	0.153 (0.294)	0.164 (0.238)	-0.286 (0.103)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.517*** (0.003)	-0.684*** (0.002)	-0.801*** (0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>			
Presidential	-1.242*** (0.000)	-1.380*** (0.000)	-1.303*** (0.000)
Semi-Presidential	0.485** (0.024)	0.639** (0.012)	0.406* (0.051)
Federalism	-0.541*** (0.003)	-0.393** (0.016)	-0.557*** (0.002)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>			
Single Party Minority	0.476*** (0.008)	0.303 (0.108)	0.447** (0.014)
Coalition Majority	-0.479* (0.056)	-0.927*** (0.000)	-0.426* (0.093)
Coalition Minority	-0.462* (0.086)	-0.770*** (0.001)	-0.564** (0.034)
Chief Executive	0.236* (0.099)	0.237* (0.078)	0.235* (0.069)
Ministry	0.218* (0.072)	0.269** (0.021)	0.171 (0.150)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.006* (0.068)	0.010*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.450)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>			
Opposition with Experience	-0.323*** (0.006)	-0.286** (0.012)	-0.259** (0.020)
Opposition without Experience	-0.701*** (0.000)	-0.700*** (0.000)	-0.579*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.126*** (0.000)	0.107*** (0.001)	0.127*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.262*** (0.000)	0.241*** (0.000)	0.267*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.806*** (0.000)	0.791*** (0.000)	0.820*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.384* (0.072)	0.542*** (0.009)	0.432** (0.047)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>			
1980s	-0.701*** (0.010)	-0.371 (0.226)	-0.428 (0.116)
1990s	-0.312 (0.303)	0.043 (0.900)	-0.091 (0.757)
2000s	0.113 (0.673)	0.434 (0.197)	0.296 (0.314)
Constant	-0.525 (0.161)	-0.499 (0.188)	-0.577 (0.118)
N	7770	7770	7770

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

H Alternative Specifications

In the main analysis, we assume that *Globalization* is exogenous to *Pledge Fulfillment*, but one could be concerned that it is endogenous. Here, we use an instrumental variable approach whereby we exploit the geographically diffuse character of globalization. In particular, following Lang and Tavares (2018) we instrument globalization with a measure of the country-period specific, inverse-distance weighted average of the lagged globalization scores of all other countries (see also Acemogly et al. (2019) who use a similar instrument in a different context).²³ The instrument is a strong predictor of *Globalization* (consistent with the idea that globalization diffuses across borders across periods especially in close geographic proximity). It is also plausibly excludable because prior globalization in neighboring countries only affects *Pledge Fulfillment* through *Globalization* and not through alternative causal pathways. The table presents the results of Newey’s minimum chi-squared two-step estimator. The F-test of the reduced form regression is large and statistically significant, indicating that the instrument is strong. The effect of *Globalization* is robust using the instrumental variable approach. The Wald test of exogeneity does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, which suggest that *Globalization* is not endogenous and our main approach is appropriate.

The expanded model includes a variable for bicameralism, whether the country is an EU member, the left-right ideology range of the government, the Herfindahl index of government fragmentation, the distance of the government to the median legislator.

²³The geographical distance between two countries is the population-weighted distance between the capital cities of the two countries.

	Country FE	Expanded	IV
Globalization	-0.631*** (0.002)	-0.743*** (0.000)	-0.231** (0.017)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>			
Single Party Minority	0.373*** (0.007)	0.387** (0.014)	0.014 (0.862)
Coalition Majority	-0.436** (0.037)	-0.562** (0.033)	-0.452*** (0.000)
Coalition Minority	-0.429 (0.111)	-0.525* (0.091)	-0.453*** (0.003)
Chief Executive	0.269** (0.014)	0.210* (0.093)	0.136*** (0.005)
Ministry	0.216** (0.042)	0.209* (0.080)	0.132*** (0.003)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.005 (0.232)	0.008** (0.014)	0.006*** (0.000)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>			
Opposition with Experience	-0.225** (0.033)	-0.365*** (0.009)	-0.230*** (0.000)
Opposition without Experience	-0.427*** (0.000)	-0.487*** (0.001)	-0.343*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.146*** (0.000)	0.155*** (0.000)	0.093*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.189*** (0.001)	0.274*** (0.000)	0.089*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.742*** (0.000)	0.793*** (0.000)	0.454*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.393* (0.071)	0.519*** (0.003)	0.302*** (0.002)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>			
1980s	-0.020 (0.938)	-0.232 (0.438)	-0.159 (0.146)
1990s	0.473 (0.138)	0.444 (0.189)	0.033 (0.785)
2000s	1.072*** (0.004)	1.166*** (0.002)	0.424*** (0.005)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>			
Coordinated Market Economies		0.695** (0.010)	0.121** (0.030)
Mixed Market Economies		-0.970*** (0.000)	-0.536*** (0.001)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>			
Presidential		-1.241*** (0.002)	-0.556*** (0.000)
Semi-Presidential		1.056*** (0.001)	0.633*** (0.000)
Bicameralism		0.480* (0.063)	
Federalism		-1.129*** (0.000)	-0.417*** (0.000)
EU Member		0.197 (0.323)	
Government Ideology Range		-0.119 (0.316)	
Herfindahl Index		0.423 (0.189)	
Distance to Median Legislator		-0.109 (0.482)	
Number of Pledges/10		-0.011 (0.202)	
Subset		-0.367 (0.163)	
Constant	-3.170*** (0.000)	-1.788*** (0.002)	-0.196 (0.230)
N	7770	7770	7422

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Multinomial		
<i>Fulfillment=0 (Base)</i>		
<i>Fulfillment=1</i>		
Globalization	-0.567***	(0.001)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>		
Coordinated Market Economies	-0.285	(0.121)
Mixed Market Economies	-1.196***	(0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>		
Presidential	-0.845**	(0.018)
Semi-Presidential	1.420***	(0.000)
Federalism	-0.208	(0.447)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>		
Single Party Minority	0.136	(0.441)
Coalition Majority	0.357	(0.216)
Coalition Minority	0.283	(0.464)
Chief Executive	0.049	(0.797)
Ministry	0.018	(0.907)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.012***	(0.003)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>		
Opposition with Experience	-0.071	(0.594)
Opposition without Experience	-0.403**	(0.017)
Economic Growth	0.145***	(0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.281***	(0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	1.081***	(0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	-0.189	(0.587)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>		
1980s	-0.391	(0.126)
1990s	-0.143	(0.637)
2000s	0.315	(0.399)
Constant	-2.705***	(0.000)
<i>Fulfillment=2</i>		
Globalization	-0.470***	(0.006)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>		
Coordinated Market Economies	0.251*	(0.091)
Mixed Market Economies	-1.038***	(0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>		
Presidential	-1.384***	(0.001)
Semi-Presidential	1.147***	(0.000)
Federalism	-0.748***	(0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>		
Single Party Minority	0.249	(0.233)
Coalition Majority	-0.658**	(0.011)
Coalition Minority	-0.688**	(0.038)
Chief Executive	0.300**	(0.034)
Ministry	0.308***	(0.009)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.014***	(0.000)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>		
Opposition with Experience	-0.434***	(0.002)
Opposition without Experience	-0.563***	(0.000)
Economic Growth	0.128***	(0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.217***	(0.003)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.651***	(0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.545**	(0.037)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>		
1980s	-0.681*	(0.067)
1990s	-0.065	(0.865)
2000s	0.548	(0.154)
Constant	-0.705*	(0.096)
N	6813	

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

I Time Effects

	Year FE	Decade 2-4	Decade 3-4	Decade 4
Globalization	-0.546*** (0.000)	-0.439*** (0.000)	-0.510*** (0.000)	-0.564*** (0.000)
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies	0.578*** (0.004)	0.258** (0.031)	0.202 (0.145)	0.434*** (0.000)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.187 (0.451)	-0.884*** (0.000)	-0.838*** (0.000)	-0.869*** (0.000)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Presidential	-2.029*** (0.000)		-1.587*** (0.000)	-1.295** (0.020)
Semi-Presidential	1.438*** (0.000)	1.139*** (0.000)	0.680*** (0.001)	0.916*** (0.000)
Federalism	-0.125 (0.468)	-0.470*** (0.001)	-0.607*** (0.000)	-0.796*** (0.000)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	0.972*** (0.000)	-0.067 (0.691)	0.424** (0.027)	0.506*** (0.002)
Coalition Majority	-0.023 (0.933)	-0.483*** (0.000)	-0.631*** (0.001)	-0.393*** (0.010)
Coalition Minority	0.028 (0.924)	-0.338** (0.038)	-0.498** (0.025)	-0.336* (0.064)
Chief Executive	0.212** (0.039)	0.223** (0.042)	0.245* (0.071)	0.308*** (0.008)
Ministry	0.288** (0.011)	0.264* (0.067)	0.253** (0.032)	0.304** (0.021)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.011*** (0.007)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.008** (0.035)	0.010** (0.012)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.493*** (0.000)	-0.387*** (0.000)	-0.319*** (0.006)	-0.385*** (0.001)
Opposition without Experience	-0.712*** (0.000)	-0.349*** (0.002)	-0.703*** (0.000)	-0.689*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.152*** (0.004)	0.155*** (0.000)	0.121*** (0.000)	0.143*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.319*** (0.000)	0.141*** (0.003)	0.268*** (0.000)	0.199*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.788*** (0.000)	0.606*** (0.000)	0.792*** (0.000)	0.688*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.421* (0.059)	0.466*** (0.000)	0.393** (0.040)	0.254 (0.131)
Time				
Globalization × Time				
Constant	-1.151*** (0.004)	0.073 (0.812)	-1.165*** (0.000)	-0.742*** (0.003)
Year FE	Yes	No	No	No
Decade FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7770	4282	7436	6449

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

J Economic Downturns

	Growth Interaction	Growth Change	Fall Growth	Other Econ Vars	Crisis I	Crisis II	Crisis III
Globalization	-0.572*** (0.000)	-0.503*** (0.000)	-0.509*** (0.000)	-0.544*** (0.000)	-0.478*** (0.007)	-0.478*** (0.007)	-0.468*** (0.008)
Growth Change		0.012 (0.421)					
Magnitude in Recession			-0.012 (0.663)				
Unemployment				0.043*** (0.000)			
Inflation				0.000 (0.523)			
Post-Election Crisis (2 Years)					0.040 (0.727)		
Post-Election Crisis (3 Years)						0.095 (0.430)	
Election and Post-Election Crisis (3 Years)							0.150 (0.244)
Economic Growth	0.117*** (0.000)	0.118*** (0.000)	0.114*** (0.000)	0.100*** (0.000)	0.105** (0.013)	0.112** (0.014)	0.123** (0.014)
Globalization × Economic Growth	0.017 (0.423)						
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>							
Coordinated Market Economies	0.243* (0.078)	0.199 (0.143)	0.208 (0.129)	0.255** (0.020)	0.225 (0.145)	0.229 (0.125)	0.213 (0.135)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.860*** (0.000)	-0.862*** (0.000)	-0.852*** (0.000)	-1.151*** (0.000)	-0.696*** (0.004)	-0.693*** (0.003)	-0.667*** (0.003)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>							
Presidential	-1.476*** (0.000)	-1.463*** (0.000)	-1.490*** (0.000)	-1.655*** (0.000)	-1.513*** (0.000)	-1.522*** (0.000)	-1.489*** (0.000)
Semi-Presidential	0.714*** (0.001)	0.700*** (0.001)	0.681*** (0.002)	0.946*** (0.000)	0.523** (0.035)	0.481** (0.035)	0.480** (0.033)
Federalism	-0.637*** (0.000)	-0.642*** (0.000)	-0.635*** (0.000)	-0.542*** (0.000)	-0.597*** (0.002)	-0.607*** (0.002)	-0.585*** (0.002)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>							
Single Party Minority	0.371** (0.031)	0.376** (0.028)	0.391** (0.025)	0.248* (0.054)	0.486** (0.011)	0.493*** (0.008)	0.441** (0.014)
Coalition Majority	-0.647*** (0.001)	-0.638*** (0.001)	-0.638*** (0.001)	-0.700*** (0.000)	-0.700** (0.012)	-0.713*** (0.008)	-0.708*** (0.010)
Coalition Minority	-0.547** (0.014)	-0.500** (0.019)	-0.482** (0.024)	-0.537*** (0.005)	-0.547** (0.044)	-0.579** (0.024)	-0.650** (0.011)
Chief Executive	0.244* (0.068)	0.251* (0.059)	0.249* (0.063)	0.281** (0.010)	0.184 (0.199)	0.184 (0.190)	0.188 (0.172)
Ministry	0.259** (0.028)	0.253** (0.030)	0.252** (0.031)	0.315*** (0.002)	0.244* (0.058)	0.240* (0.064)	0.240* (0.062)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.008** (0.019)	0.008** (0.013)	0.008** (0.013)	0.008*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.023)	0.008** (0.024)	0.008** (0.025)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>							
Opposition with Experience	-0.313*** (0.006)	-0.316*** (0.007)	-0.310*** (0.008)	-0.234*** (0.009)	-0.278** (0.030)	-0.277** (0.029)	-0.264** (0.032)
Opposition without Experience	-0.654*** (0.000)	-0.698*** (0.000)	-0.693*** (0.000)	-0.695*** (0.000)	-0.680*** (0.000)	-0.685*** (0.000)	-0.639*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.261*** (0.000)	0.253*** (0.000)	0.262*** (0.000)	0.207*** (0.000)	0.281*** (0.000)	0.280*** (0.000)	0.274*** (0.000)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.788*** (0.000)	0.783*** (0.000)	0.786*** (0.000)	0.704*** (0.000)	0.855*** (0.000)	0.850*** (0.000)	0.849*** (0.000)
Pre-election Agreement	0.382** (0.043)	0.390** (0.041)	0.368** (0.050)	0.390*** (0.005)	0.382* (0.087)	0.417* (0.063)	0.439* (0.053)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>							
[1em] 1980s	-0.443 (0.141)	-0.449 (0.150)	-0.458 (0.143)	-0.339* (0.056)	-0.477 (0.116)	-0.467 (0.126)	-0.435 (0.153)
1990s	0.062 (0.862)	0.039 (0.917)	0.037 (0.920)	0.058 (0.819)	-0.015 (0.966)	0.003 (0.993)	0.020 (0.955)
2000s	0.597* (0.066)	0.554 (0.109)	0.555 (0.106)	0.532** (0.022)	0.504 (0.131)	0.487 (0.145)	0.469 (0.162)
Constant	-0.713* (0.070)	-0.640 (0.134)	-0.664 (0.129)	-0.784** (0.022)	-0.674 (0.100)	-0.703* (0.089)	-0.755* (0.067)
N	7770	7770	7770	7301	6876	6876	6876

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

K Other Robustness

	No USA	Incumbent I	Incumbent II	Manifesto
Globalization	-0.492*** (0.000)	-0.598*** (0.000)	-0.597*** (0.000)	-7.490** (0.036)
# Previous Governments		0.105** (0.011)		
Number of Previous Years			0.031*** (0.007)	
<i>Varieties of Capitalism (Reference: LME)</i>				
Coordinated Market Economies	0.178 (0.201)	0.291** (0.041)	0.295** (0.039)	8.603*** (0.008)
Mixed Market Economies	-0.795*** (0.000)	-1.076*** (0.000)	-1.050*** (0.000)	-16.433*** (0.007)
<i>Executive-legislative Relations (Reference: Parliamentary)</i>				
Semi-Presidential	0.807*** (0.000)	0.809*** (0.000)	0.796*** (0.000)	17.444*** (0.002)
Presidential		-1.381*** (0.000)	-1.432*** (0.000)	-18.721** (0.015)
Federalism	-0.588*** (0.000)	-0.763*** (0.000)	-0.727*** (0.000)	-11.271** (0.017)
<i>Executive Power-sharing (Reference: Single Party Majority)</i>				
Single Party Minority	0.473** (0.012)	0.193 (0.283)	0.220 (0.229)	2.896 (0.481)
Coalition Majority	-0.574*** (0.003)	-0.749*** (0.000)	-0.736*** (0.000)	-13.971** (0.012)
Coalition Minority	-0.485** (0.033)	-0.658*** (0.004)	-0.644*** (0.005)	-16.808*** (0.006)
Chief Executive	0.221 (0.108)	0.222 (0.134)	0.228 (0.119)	6.928** (0.030)
Ministry	0.257** (0.031)	0.215* (0.084)	0.215* (0.083)	1.091 (0.716)
Party Left-Right Ideology	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.045)	0.006* (0.071)	0.129 (0.157)
<i>Incumbency (Reference: Incumbent)</i>				
Opposition with Experience	-0.442*** (0.000)			-8.897*** (0.001)
Opposition without Experience	-0.780*** (0.000)			-12.365*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	0.136*** (0.000)	0.123*** (0.000)	0.123*** (0.000)	3.121*** (0.000)
Government Duration in Years	0.258*** (0.000)	0.254*** (0.000)	0.261*** (0.000)	4.299*** (0.002)
Coalition Pledge Agreement	0.793*** (0.000)	0.822*** (0.000)	0.821*** (0.000)	1.737 (0.694)
Pre-election Agreement	0.453** (0.014)	0.406* (0.078)	0.416* (0.070)	9.576** (0.022)
<i>Decade (Reference: 1970)</i>				
1980s	-0.441 (0.168)	-0.255 (0.405)	-0.292 (0.348)	-3.214 (0.720)
1990s	-0.004 (0.991)	0.254 (0.493)	0.204 (0.593)	5.317 (0.600)
2000s	0.527 (0.101)	0.864** (0.012)	0.798** (0.024)	13.413 (0.218)
[lem] Constant	-0.698* (0.075)	-1.004*** (0.004)	-1.016*** (0.003)	41.196*** (0.000)
N	7230.000	7770.000	7770.000	81.000

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

L Pledge Making

	Number	Proportion Cut	Proportion Expand
International Economic Integration	-0.032 (0.050)	0.036 (0.121)	0.219*** (0.067)
Partisan Left-Right Ideology	-0.003 (0.003)	0.026*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.003)
Economic Growth	-0.030* (0.017)	-0.021 (0.034)	0.036* (0.019)
Pre-election Agreement	0.242 (0.192)	0.012 (0.130)	0.620*** (0.115)
Numbers of Pledges/10		-0.044*** (0.008)	-0.014 (0.011)
Constant	4.943*** (0.077)	-1.581*** (0.193)	-0.888*** (0.176)
Wald Test	7.586	57.884***	103.396***
Observations	178	123	123

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M List of Interviews

Below is a list of interviewees. The interviews part of the project was certified as exempt from IRB review. All interviews were loosely structured interviews based on common guiding questions. The interviews were conducted remotely via video conference or telephone call and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Our study presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involved no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context. We initiated discussions by reading our consent script so that the subjects verbally consented to be interviewed. Interview subjects could also consent or decline for our conversation to be recorded. Participants were only interviewed after they provided verbal consent. Interview subjects could also request for the interview to be terminated at any time during the interview. For those participants who consented to audio recording, the consent script indicates that audio recording can be terminated at any time and that any portion of the audio recording can be erased at the participant's request. Finally, we received consent for any direct quotes that we use in the text.

Interview 1 (March 29th, 2021; online interview): Rt Hon Sir Vince Cable, Former Secretary of the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills. Member of the Liberal Democratic Party.

Interview 2 (June 29th 2021; online interview): Dr. Nick Hillman, Former Special Advisor to Baron David Willets at the Ministry of Universities and Sciences and Director of HEPI.

Interview 3 (June 23rd, 2021; phone interview): Professor Sir David Metacalf, Former Chair of the Migration Advisory Committee and Emeritus Professor of the London School of Economics.

Interview 4 (June 28th, 2021; online interview): Ian Robinson, Former Assistant Director responsible for Economic Migration Policy at the UK Home Office, Partner at Fragomen LLP.

Interview 5 (July 7th, 2021; online interview): Jill Rutter, Institute for Government, British Government Civil Servant until 2011.

Interview 6 (July 14th, 2021; online interview): Jonathan Portes: Former Chief Economist in the UK Cabinet Office and Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

Interview 7 (August 2nd, 2021; online interview): Rt Hon Damian Green: Former Immigration Minister, Member of the Conservative Party.

N Alternative Considerations

An alternative and somewhat cynical interpretation of the events described above might be that the Conservative Party’s net migration pledge was mainly symbolic, that the party did not have any serious intention of fulfilling the pledge, and that it did so knowing that there are no significant consequences of breaking campaign promises. The evidence from this case and from comparative research does not support such an interpretation. Although the formulation of the pledge was a response to political circumstances, it was made after a considerable amount of deliberation among party elites. According to those close to the Home Office and David Cameron, there was a belief that the pledge was achievable. One interviewee noted that the target did not seem far off given that net migration had been below 100,000 just a few years earlier. The evidence indicates that the government made sincere attempts to fulfill the pledge. It imposed a cap on non-EU migration, introduced new income requirements for family reunification, implemented tougher standards for education providers that brought in overseas students, and generally created a hostile environment for migrants, all of which were criticized heavily as draconian.

There have clearly been significant consequences from breaking this promise. The net migration pledge became an “albatross around the government’s neck.”²⁴ The non-fulfillment of the pledge fueled the further rise of UKIP, whose leader criticized Cameron for failing to limit migration to the UK. With the looming electoral threat of UKIP, internal divisions widened within the Conservative Party, and many Conservatives left the party to join UKIP. These divisions were among the factors leading to yet another fateful promise by the Conservative Party: its 2015 manifestos pledge to call a referendum on British membership of the European Union (Dorey and Garnett, 2016, 240). In the end, the non-fulfillment of the migration pledge at least indirectly cost Prime Minister David Cameron his political career, as he stepped down as Prime Minister after the leave campaign won the Brexit referendum in 2016. These personal political consequences of pledge breaking for Cameron in this particular case are also on display in the main findings from comparative research, which shows that the non-fulfillment of election pledges can be costly for parties’ electoral support (Naurin and Oscarsson, 2017; Matthiess, 2020).

Another alternative interpretation of the case study might be that the non-fulfillment of the pledge was mainly a consequence of coalition politics, rather than international constraints. Indeed, the Conservative Party’s junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, were much more supportive of immigration and opposed including the pledge in the coalition agreement.²⁵ However, the influence of the Liberal Democrats does not appear to have been decisive in the non-fulfillment of the pledge. Immigration was one of the policy areas in which the Liberal Democrats were unable to exert any significant influence over the Conservative-led government (Partos and Bale, 2015). Not one of the policies outlined in the Conservative Party’s manifesto in that area was dropped from the government’s agenda; all that was added was the inclusion of a Liberal Democrat promise to end the detention of children in asylum cases—a promise that even many “mainstream” Conservatives supported or could tolerate. All accounts of the formation of the coalition suggest that immigration

²⁴Interview 5.

²⁵“Cameron accused of ‘total failure’ on immigration.” *BBC News*. November 27, 2014.

was a non-negotiable ‘red-line’ for the Conservatives and that the Liberal Democrats were made aware of this from the outset (Bale, Hampshire and Partos, 2011).²⁶ In our interview, Sir Vince Cable himself described the Liberal Democrat’s influence as negligible:

“We were preventing them from reaching their target. But of course, the real reason wasn’t our obstruction. I mean, that would have helped, but it was because of when there were gaps in the labour market, there were no restrictions on people coming in from the EU, and there was nothing the government could do to affect them. But having set a target, it made it abundantly clear to the British public what the problem was: the European Union.”

A final argument against the coalition politics interpretation of the case study is that the Conservative Party was unable to fulfill the migration pledge even after the coalition ended in 2015 and it continued governing as a single-party government. This indicates that the presence of the Liberal Democrats in government does not explain the failure to fulfill the pledge in the 2010-15 period.²⁷

²⁶One of our interviewees points out that the forceful opposition by Sir Vince Cable was even counterproductive in that it reduced the willingness of the Home Office to negotiate with the Department of Business.

²⁷Thomson et al. (2017) find that coalition governments are on average less likely to fulfill election pledges. However, senior coalition partners, which control the prime ministership, and coalition partners that control the government departments are in relatively strong positions when it comes to pledge fulfillment. These parties tend to fulfill pledges at similar rates to parties in single-party governments.