

# Weapons of the Weak State: How Post-Conflict States Shape International Statebuilding

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## Abstract

International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes these IO statebuilders are the dominant authority, at least temporarily, in seemingly “weak” states. We argue, in contrast, that the post-conflict state retains authority over the IO statebuilding effort via incomplete contracts that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of their *statebuilding contracts* with IOs. Statebuilding contracts provide procedural “weapons of the weak state,” enabling the post-conflict state to shape the content of the IO’s mandate, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using quantitative text analysis of U.N. Security-Council speeches, analysis of 35 U.N. interventions, and in-depth case studies, this paper demonstrates the potential of statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Post-conflict statebuilding seeks to help war-torn states build liberal democratic institutions grounded in rule of law and a market-based economy.<sup>1</sup> To do so, international statebuilders work with the post-conflict government to implement programs focused on

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<sup>1</sup>Barnett (2006); Paris and Sisk (2009); Lake (2016)

stabilization, security sector reform, judicial practices, socio-economic development, and democratic governance.<sup>2</sup> These statebuilding efforts are a core activity of international organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.); nonetheless, after almost 30 years, IO statebuilding has not fully delivered on its promises.<sup>3</sup> While IOs have successfully used peacekeeping and mediation efforts to help post-conflict states reduce civil war recurrence,<sup>4</sup> they have been less successful at contributing to their more ambitious statebuilding aims.

Most scholarship attributes the successes and failures of IO statebuilding to the IOs themselves, arguing missions are not sufficiently robust, impose western norms, support loyal instead of legitimate leaders, reinforce elite pacts among illiberal warlords, lack adequate democratic provisions, support liberalization rather than institutionalization, or undertake tasks that are too complex.<sup>5</sup> This literature largely views IO statebuilding as an endeavor controlled by an intervening IO.<sup>6</sup> We bring the everyday behavior of the host state back into the theory of international statebuilding, showing how contracts between the IO and host government, when used, enable the post-conflict government to shape and, at times, resist IO statebuilding efforts.<sup>7</sup> Challenging assumptions about global hierarchy, we show how seemingly “weak” post-conflict states use a contractual mechanism to wield power over much stronger international actors.<sup>8</sup>

We advance a theory that IO statebuilding increasingly functions through incomplete contracts that give the post-conflict state the authority to resist or alter the IO statebuilding effort.<sup>9</sup> Contracts—“tools for realizing individual self-determination by means of voluntar-

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<sup>2</sup>UNPBSO (2010)

<sup>3</sup>Statebuilding includes peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and development interventions in post-conflict states, all of which operate under similar contractual arrangements.

<sup>4</sup>For example, see Fortna (2008); Beardsley (2011).

<sup>5</sup>Paris (2004); Fearon and Laitin (2004); Krasner (2004b); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Risse (2011); Mukhopadhyay (2014); Krasner and Risse (2014); Lake (2016); Sabaratnam (2017)

<sup>6</sup>For scholars emphasizing the role of post-conflict governments in shaping IO statebuilding, see: Englebert and Tull (2008); Barnett and Zürcher (2009); Mac Ginty (2011); Barma (2016); Duursma (2020)

<sup>7</sup>Host state/government refers to the government hosting the external actor on its territory (Muller, 1995).

<sup>8</sup>Lake (2009); Beardsley et al. (2020).

<sup>9</sup>These are temporary agreements, generally for one to five years, between the host government and the

ily entering legally binding agreements”—are one of the central concepts of liberalism that manifest consent of both the provider and recipient of a good or service.<sup>10</sup> Incomplete contracts, by definition, are not fully specified; they require the contracting parties to engage in continuous negotiation during the contract implementation.<sup>11</sup> The party with the “residual rights of control” over the unnegotiated components of the contract has the authority to influence the implementation of these efforts in fundamental ways.<sup>12</sup> The host state’s territorial sovereignty in the modern system give it the residual rights of control over the unspecified components of its contracts with IO statebuilders.<sup>13</sup>

Therefore, in *statebuilding contracts*, regardless of the strength of the post-conflict country, the host state can use its residual rights of control to alter or resist aspects of the IO statebuilding effort. Specifically, we posit that the implementation of these time-delimited, task-specific *statebuilding contracts* provides a procedural repertoire that the host state can use to influence the behavior of IOs operating on its territory. These *statebuilding contracts* enable the host government to use seemingly banal bureaucratic procedures to influence *what* the IO statebuilding effort is mandated to do, *where* it operates within the country, *whom* it hires, and *when* it begins and ends. Statebuilding contracts, thus, serve as one of the primary vehicles through which host states, first, establish the conditions for contracting out their sovereignty to IOs and, then, control how unspecified components of the contract are implemented. In identifying the host government’s procedural repertoire as “weapons of the weak state,” we build on the work of other scholars who observe the power-shifting potential of banal everyday acts by seemingly less powerful actors.<sup>14</sup> In an alternative to statebuilding contracts, a smaller number of IO statebuilding efforts give the IO the residual rights of control—we refer to these arrangements as *integrated takeovers*—and we expect that these

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intervening IO, such as the country program of a UN agency or the UNSC mandate for a UN peace operation.

<sup>10</sup>Gutmann (2013, 39)

<sup>11</sup>Schmitz (2001); Cooley and Spruyt (2009)

<sup>12</sup>Grossman and Hart (1986)

<sup>13</sup>Shen (2001)

<sup>14</sup>Scott (2008); Tourinho (2021)

arrangements do not see the same tactics used to shape the IO statebuilding effort.

Our theory has three main empirical implications: (1) there are two primary approaches to IO statebuilding—*statebuilding contracts* and *integrated takeovers*—that predict whether the host state or the IO possesses the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of the IO-host state agreement; (2) when the IO-host state agreement is a *statebuilding contract*, the host state will use the residual rights of control to shape the IO statebuilding intervention, including what it does, where it operates in the host country, whom it employs, and when it begins and ends; and (3) repeated host-state use of this procedural repertoire will alter the IO’s ability to achieve its statebuilding aims.

To test our argument, we focus on post-conflict states—states emerging from civil war through a peace agreement and, often, post-conflict elections—and U.N. statebuilding interventions in these states.<sup>15</sup> Post-conflict states have committed to the normative principles advanced by IO statebuilding efforts—rule of law and democratic institutions—at the same time that their leaders have a strong interest in demonstrating their new sovereign authority.<sup>16</sup> These characteristics increase the likelihood these states will both enter into statebuilding contracts and use their residual rights of control to resist or alter the IO statebuilding effort.

We use a multi-method research design.<sup>17</sup> We conduct a quantitative text analysis of UNSC speeches to capture changes in norms around the post-conflict states’ ownership of IO statebuilding interventions. We then analyze our entire universe of 35 U.N. statebuilding interventions between 2000 and 2020 to probe the plausibility of our theory that post-conflict states, when given the opportunity via statebuilding contracts, will resist or alter the IO statebuilding intervention (see Appendix A.4). Finally, we use in-depth diverse case studies of U.N. statebuilding interventions with diverse mandates, statebuilding arrangements, and

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<sup>15</sup>Boyce (2013); Joshi and Quinn (2017).

<sup>16</sup>Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011)

<sup>17</sup>Goertz (2017)

geostrategic ties, focusing on Timor-Leste, Burundi, and Guatemala.<sup>18</sup>

This paper makes important contributions to the international statebuilding literature. First, it identifies a key overlooked source of power held by post-conflict states: the residual rights of control over incomplete statebuilding contracts. Much of the international statebuilding literature has focused on these rarer takeovers,<sup>19</sup> largely overlooking the authority and leverage that statebuilding contracts provide host states.<sup>20</sup> While some statebuilding scholarship acknowledges that host states hold power over intervening IOs, it does not identify the mechanism that provides this leverage or how host states use it.<sup>21</sup> Second, this paper brings the power of the host state back into the discussion of international statebuilding and aid, showing a much stronger “weak” state than is typically portrayed.<sup>22</sup> Third, while IO literature examines the delegation of authority from member states to the IO, this paper introduces statebuilding contracts as a new pathway through which member states can retract their delegated sovereignty.<sup>23</sup> We extend beyond this work by providing a theory of how incomplete contracts in a system of sovereign authority provide a procedural repertoire that enables seemingly “weak” states to wield power over traditionally more powerful international actors. Overall, it also substantively contributes to an explanation of why statebuilding missions do not achieve all of the IO aims in many cases.

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<sup>18</sup>Gerring (2006)

<sup>19</sup>Fearon and Laitin (2004); Lake and Fariss (2014).

<sup>20</sup>We are indebted to other scholars who have worked on dimensions of host-state consent, host-state resistance, and on contracts in peacekeeping; see Barnett and Zürcher (2009), Ciorciari and Krasner (2018), Ciorciari (2021), Duursma (2020), Johnstone (2011), Piccolino and Karlsrud (2011), Sebastián and Gorur (2018).

<sup>21</sup>See Englebert and Tull (2008); Lemay-Hébert (2009); Kurz (2010); Piccolino and Karlsrud (2011); Mukhopadhyay (2014); Barma (2016); Cheng (2018); Adamson (2020). Some focus on complementary mechanisms, such as the state’s receptiveness to IO involvement Girod (2015). Notably, Ciorciari and Krasner (2018), Johnstone (2011), and Barnett and Zürcher (2009) identify the importance of contractual relationships between intervening actors and IOs, but not how contracts distribute power among negotiating parties, nor incompleteness favoring host states.

<sup>22</sup>See Chandler (2006); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Barnett (2006); Paris and Sisk (2009); Autesserre (2014); Carnegie and Dolan (2020)

<sup>23</sup>Hawkins (2006)

## 2 IOS BUILD STATES THROUGH CONTRACTS

Much of the statebuilding scholarship paints the IO-host state relationships as unidirectional: statebuilders intervene and attempt to fix conflict-affected states, which have little power or authority over the intervening actors.<sup>24</sup> We argue, in contrast, that statebuilding in the modern era often occurs through incomplete contracts that reinforce the host state’s authority.<sup>25</sup> Here, we examine the nature of contracts that IOs, as organizations composed of and governed by states, establish with host states to deliver goods and services on their territory.<sup>26</sup> We argue the pooled sovereignty possessed by IO member states, combined with the territorial sovereignty of the host state, give host governments multiple potential sources of authority over contracts between IOs and host states. In the next section, we argue that the incompleteness of these statebuilding contracts enables host governments to use this authority to shape the IO statebuilding effort.

When IOs engage in statebuilding by attempting to keep or build peace in post-conflict states, they often do so under contracts. For an IO to implement a service-delivery project or program on a host-government’s territory, the host government has to sign the project or program document indicating their consent and, often, their commitment to cooperating in the implementation.<sup>27</sup> Through these contracts, host states give intervening IOs permission to disarm combatants in accordance with the peace agreement; rebuild destroyed infrastructure; support security sector reform; and implement projects intended to foster democratic governance and justice, among other liberal peace reforms.<sup>28</sup> These contracts aim to permit

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<sup>24</sup>Fukuyama (2004); Chandler (2006); Paris and Sisk (2009)

<sup>25</sup>See Figure 1 and Appendix A.4 for evidence on this. More broadly, we are indebted to existing work showing how African leaders, in particular, have attempted to take control of “relations with the exterior,” including “opposing it and at other times joining in it”; see Bayart (1993, 21-24), Bayart (2000, 218-219), Clapham (1996). Of particular relevance is literature on how African leaders’ agency and diplomacy have shaped donor efforts; see Brown and Harman (2013), Fisher (2013), Harman and Brown (2013). Developing from Tourinho (2021), we think about how actors with less capacity shape international order.

<sup>26</sup>While, at times, the UNSC provides its authority to intervene in lieu of permission from the host state, the IO usually seeks cooperation on the specific conditions of the service delivery on the host state’s territory.

<sup>27</sup>Campbell (2018)

<sup>28</sup>UNPBO (2010); Corral et al. (2020); Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam (2011)

IOs to fill capacity gaps in the post-conflict state and, simultaneously, reinforce the legitimacy of the post-conflict state.<sup>29</sup> These contracts range from short-term UNSC mandates to multi-year country-program agreements with U.N. development agencies.<sup>30</sup> They focus on establishing, in writing, the specific conditions of the agreement between the IO and the host state, including the precise goods to be delivered, the precise timeframe for delivery, and the accountability arrangements for assessing the success and failure of the contract.

IOs' commitment to pooled sovereignty underpins these statebuilding contracts.<sup>31</sup> The host state, and its allies, are often members of the IO governing body—such as the UNSC, General Assembly, or governing board of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—that mandates, finances, and evaluates the statebuilding intervention. The literature refers to this as pooled sovereignty where “states transfer the authority to make binding decisions from themselves to a collective body of states within which they may exercise more or less influence” [Lake 2007](#), 220. IOs' focus in general, and the UN's in particular, on the importance of host-state support for and involvement in the implementation of statebuilding contracts is underpinned by the fact that IO statebuilding efforts are, ultimately, accountable to IO member states via their pooled sovereignty arrangements.

Statebuilding contracts are, thus, rooted in the interdependent notions of territorial sovereignty and host-state consent. The importance of territorial sovereignty is typically traced back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, when sovereignty became the cornerstone of statehood and non-interference on other states' sovereign territory the organizing principle of the international system.<sup>32</sup> In the 1960s, sovereignty became “the only game in town,” at least normatively, as empires and colonies lost their legitimacy.<sup>33</sup>

In a system where states recognize each others' sovereign authority over territory, con-

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<sup>29</sup>[Shen \(2001\)](#); [UNDP \(2016\)](#)

<sup>30</sup>[Murphy \(2006\)](#)

<sup>31</sup>[Nielson and Tierney \(2003\)](#); [Hawkins \(2006\)](#).

<sup>32</sup>See [Philpott \(1995, 366-367\)](#); [Lyons and Mastanduno \(1995\)](#); [Spruyt \(2002\)](#)

<sup>33</sup>[Krasner \(2004a, 1077\)](#).

sent enables IOs to conduct statebuilding operations, allowing the host state to divide up its sovereign authority and temporarily share it with the IO.<sup>34</sup> Contracts are the main mechanism through which host states consent to having IO statebuilders operate on their territory. Even though contracts may, at first, seem like technical bureaucratic agreements, it is a “fundamental political act” “to consent to a contract.”<sup>36</sup> The majority of U.N. documents on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and statebuilding adopt a deference to host-state consent via contracts, which is often referred to as “national ownership.”<sup>37</sup> Even though the UNSC can authorize Chapter VII peacekeeping missions without the consent of the host state, it still often requires cooperation from the sitting government.<sup>38</sup>

The host state as a partner, based on the modern system of sovereignty and IOs’ reliance on pooled sovereign decision-making, results in the contracts that permit IOs to engage in post-conflict statebuilding. Due to the complexity of post-conflict contexts and emphasis on national ownership, most of these contractual agreements remain incomplete.

### 3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS GIVE HOST STATES CONTROL

In an incomplete contract, the residual rights of control revert to the host state, giving it control over the unspecified components of the contract. Most contracts between post-conflict host states and IOs are incomplete contracts because of the complex nature of statebuilding tasks and the changing conditions. Complete contracts specify all possible decisions that may emerge during contract implementation, removing the need for negotiations between buyer and seller once the contract is signed.<sup>39</sup> Incomplete contracts specify components of the agreement but do not describe all potential contingencies that may arise during implementation, either because they are unknown or because at least one party is

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<sup>34</sup>Lake (2007, 220); <sup>35</sup>

<sup>36</sup>Hurd (2008, 37)

<sup>37</sup>Chesterman (2007)

<sup>38</sup>Voeten (2005); Howard (2008); Lake and Fariss (2014)

<sup>39</sup>Cooley and Spruyt (2009, 8)



interested in renegotiation.<sup>40</sup> All contingencies that could arise during the implementation of a complex *statebuilding contract* in a dynamic post-conflict context cannot be specified ex ante.<sup>41</sup> Newly-formed post-conflict governments may also have incentives to negotiate incomplete contracts that enable them to demonstrate their sovereign authority.

Theories of the firm outline the implications of incomplete contracts for the contracting parties. This scholarship refers to the contractual relationship between a buyer and seller as the “firm,” which can be governed by residual rights or specific rights.<sup>42</sup> Residual rights refer to the rights not specified in the contract, while specific rights refer to the rights specified in the contract.<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, the inherent uncertainty in incomplete contracts for non-transferrable goods gives the buyer the residual rights over the contract implementation.<sup>44</sup> Imagine a seller producing widgets that only fits the buyer’s machines. The non-transferrable character of the widget gives the buyer authority to determine the unspecified aspects of the contract after the seller has begun producing.<sup>45</sup> Given the alternative of not selling the widgets, the seller has to comply with the buyer’s revised demands. Once the buyer and seller enter into a contract, the buyer retains the residual rights of control, giving it considerable leverage over the contract implementation. In many cases, this uncertainty in cases of specialized goods or services leads the seller to “hold-up” the contract negotiation because she does not trust that the buyer will fulfill his part of the contract, once signed.<sup>46</sup>

When applied to *statebuilding contracts*, we consider the IO as the seller and the host government as the buyer. The host government owns the “firm,” which is the agreement

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<sup>40</sup>Cooley and Spruyt (2009, 9) argue incomplete contracts can be procedurally desirable in circumstances where it is difficult to: “(1) anticipate the full array of contingencies that may arise in the future; (2) negotiate optimal agreements given the asymmetries of information that characterize the contracting environment; and/or (3) negotiate an agreement that is verifiable or enforceable by the parties themselves or an outside third party.”

<sup>41</sup>See Pritchett and Woolcock (2004); Risse (2011) for the implications of complex tasks on service delivery.

<sup>42</sup>This discussion of contracts is based on economic theories of the firm, not the principles in international law.

<sup>43</sup>Grossman and Hart (1986, 692)

<sup>44</sup>Aghion and Holden (2011)

<sup>45</sup>Hart (1995)

<sup>46</sup>Schmitz (2001, 6)

between the IO and the host government, and is “buying” the statebuilding goods and services that IO is selling. The IO’s principals mandate it to deliver a specific set of non-transferable goods to the host state. By giving its consent for a specific IO to deliver these goods on its territory, the host government decides to “buy” the goods the IO is offering. The host state, then, possesses the residual rights of control over all unspecified, and even some specified, components of their incomplete contract.

Unlike the seller in the hold-up problem, however, IO member states mandate it to engage in statebuilding in the particular host country and hold it accountable for delivering the specified statebuilding, even if the host-state alters the conditions.<sup>47</sup> The IO is represented at the country level by its office deployed there, known as the country office or mission. If the IO country office were to attempt to sell its statebuilding “good” to another host government, it would result in the loss of the resources allocated to the country office and designation of its statebuilding effort as failed. In other words, there is no other market for improved state capacity in South Sudan beyond South Sudan. Once an IO begins to implement its statebuilding activities, it cannot simply shift these resources to another state while fulfilling the task its members states have mandated. If the IO agrees to the incomplete *statebuilding contract* and delivers the goods and services outlined in the contract, then the IO has fulfilled its part of the agreement even if the statebuilding effort is largely unsuccessful. In contrast to the seller the firm, the IO does not have an incentive to “hold up” the contract, so it proceeds.<sup>48</sup>

The non-transferrable nature of the statebuilding good, and the host state owning the residual rights of control in the IO-host government contract, give the host state the authority to alter the agreement, or even resist aspects of it, especially the unspecified aspects. The IO has few other options than to accept these new terms or leave the country, losing the resources invested there and failing to fulfill the preferences of its member states. These

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<sup>47</sup>Martens et al. (2002); Natsios (2011); Campbell (2018)

<sup>48</sup>Numm (2007)

dynamics give the “weak” state power.

## 4 VARIATION IN HOST-STATE INFLUENCE IN IO STATEBUILDING

What are the implications for IO-host government relations from this theory of incomplete contracts? We focus specifically on post-conflict states because, among states with IO relationships, they may be most likely to use their residual rights of control under these contracts to alter or resist IO statebuilding efforts. The leaders of post-conflict countries have recently been elected subsequent to a civil war that challenged their or their opponents’ authority to govern.<sup>49</sup> Given the prior challenges to their authority, these post-conflict governments are likely to have an incentive to demonstrate their newly-won international and domestic legitimacy.<sup>50</sup> This assumption builds on the idea that, even in stable countries, leaders typically seek not to be bound to outside actors so they maintain maximum flexibility to respond to changing conditions and implement their preferred policies without constraints.<sup>51</sup>

There is an issue of interest alignment underpinning this idea, suggesting that host-government preferences tend to differ to some extent from IO preferences. We have, as noted, selected post-conflict countries because we do not expect that they will be perfectly aligned with the IO for these reasons of power change and consolidation. Of course, there will also be no consensual arrangement if the interests are diametrically opposed. So we are selecting for cases where host states are likely to have some aligned and some opposed interests—we test in this paper whether host states commonly use the tools that we have just described to shape the implementation of contracts with IOs. Future work could also identify systematically different degrees of alignment to test the degree to which host states seek to alter or resist contracts using the same theory. In this paper, we argue that given post-conflict governments’ incentives to demonstrate their sovereign authority, and the growing

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<sup>49</sup>See, for example, [Barma \(2016\)](#)

<sup>50</sup>[Jackson and Rosberg \(1982\)](#); [Englebert and Tull \(2008\)](#); [Risse and Stollenwerk \(2018\)](#); [Malejacq \(2020\)](#)

<sup>51</sup>[Moe \(1990, 227\)](#), [Landes and Posner \(1975, 896\)](#), [Moravcsik \(2000, 228\)](#), [Pasquino \(1998, 49\)](#)

acceptance that U.N. statebuilding arrangements should be “owned” by the host government, host states can use the residual rights of control over statebuilding arrangements to shape IO intervention.

We also expect post-conflict states to use their residual rights of control over IO statebuilding arrangements because of the increasing acceptance within the UN Security Council of the importance of host-state consent.<sup>52</sup> This is demonstrated in numerous UN documents and depicted in Figure 1 which analyzes the frequency of the use of the terms “consent,” “cooperation,” and “support” in 39,271 UNSC Speeches that also contain the word *conflict* between 1995 and 2019.<sup>53</sup> The term “cooperation” generally occurred in 10% and 15% of speeches, and “support” in 20% to 30% of speeches, with an increase in frequency after 2001.<sup>54</sup> “Consent” occurred in less than 3% of speeches. Even though the term appears more often in U.N. doctrinal documents than in UNSC speeches, a more detailed examination of the 2017 speeches, see Appendix A.3, demonstrates that UNSC members use *support* and *cooperation* frequently to express their backing of the host state and its sovereign authority.<sup>55</sup>

In this context, we posit that a post-conflict host state’s ability to alter or resist the IO statebuilding intervention is determined by the type of contractual arrangement that governs the IO-host state relationship, and that host states will use a repertoire of weapons of the weak states that emerge from the contracting framework to do so. Our independent variable captures the difference between two contractual arrangements: *statebuilding contracts* and *integrated takeovers*. *Integrated takeovers* are seemingly complete contracts in which the IO obtains the residual rights of control over the statebuilding arrangement, governs the state and, effectively, determines how the host state is built for a period of time.<sup>56</sup> In *integrated*

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<sup>52</sup>Also see discussion of norm development on contracts in Appendix A.4.


<sup>53</sup>DPKO (2008); U.N. Advisory Group of Experts (2015); Schoenfeld (2019); Appendix 3 presents the word frequency analysis for six additional high-frequency words.

<sup>54</sup>There is an average of 1,985 speeches containing conflict each year between 2000 and 2017.

<sup>55</sup>DPKO (2008)

<sup>56</sup>*Integrated takeovers* are equivalent to the integrated firms described in the Grossman-Hart-Moore the-

**Figure 1:** *Percent Word Frequency in UNSC Speeches Containing “Conflict”*



*Note: Figures depict the frequency of the occurrence of terms “consent,” “cooperation,” and “support” in 39,271 UNSC Speeches between 1995 and 2017 that also contain the word “conflict.” (Note that speeches tended to use cooperation and support more than consent, but all backed host-state sovereign authority; see Appendix A.3.) Lines smoothed using the LOESS method.*

*takeovers*, we do not expect the host government to resist or alter the IO statebuilding effort because it has relinquished its authority to do so.

In contrast, *statebuilding contracts* are incomplete contracts where the host government maintains the residual right of control of the unspecified aspects of the IO-host state agree-

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ory of contract relations between private companies, discussed above (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1999; Hart, 2017). Within our scope conditions of U.N. statebuilding interventions in post-conflict countries, the most obvious examples of *integrated takeovers* are U.N. transitional administrations. In these cases, the UNSC mandates the U.N. peace operation to take over governance of countries that do not have sovereign governments and govern these countries for a period of time in collaboration with unelected representatives from the country. Integrated firms resolve potential hold-up problems in the contract negotiation between the buyer and seller of a good by merging the buyer and seller into a single firm, removing the need for a contract between them.

**Incomplete Contracts:***Statebuilding Contracts*

- Ad Hoc Arrangements
- Peace Operations (Chapter VI & VII)

*Residual rights of control give host state access to Procedural Repertoire to shape IO statebuilding (What, Where, Who, When).*

**“Firm” Integrates by Taking Over:***Integrated Takeovers*

- Transitional Administrations

*Specific rights of control held by IO. Host state lacks Procedural Repertoire to shape IO statebuilding.*

**Figure 2:** *Expected Variation in Host-State Influence by Contract Arrangement*

ment. *Statebuilding contracts* include Chapter VI and Chapter VII peace operations, excluding transitional administrations, as well as delegation agreements where the host state invites an IO to engage in a joint statebuilding effort.<sup>57</sup> As the “buyer” of the statebuilding good that the IO is selling, the host government negotiates the content of the *statebuilding contract* with the IO and, during the contract implementation phase, holds the residual rights of control over the unspecified components of the contract. While there is variation in how contracts are established that can alter when and to what extent states are especially effective, in *statebuilding contracts* generally, and as opposed to *integrated takeovers*, we expect the host states to alter or resist the IO statebuilding effort using their particular *procedural repertoire*, as depicted in Figure 2.

A host-state’s *procedural repertoire* refers to the range of weapons of the weak state or seemingly banal, bureaucratic tactics that the host state uses to alter or resist aspects of *statebuilding contracts*, as depicted in Table 1. And, when combined together, the use of the procedural repertoire can change how the IO implements the contract and its ability to achieve mandated statebuilding aims (see our dependent variable below). Our causal *mechanism*, the use of these weapons, can be any combination of procedural tactics to create their particular particular repertoire. There are, thus, multiple potential pathways within these repertoires that host states can use to influence their *statebuilding contracts* with IOs,

<sup>57</sup>Matanock (2014)

all of which we expect to alter the ability of the IO to achieve its statebuilding aims.<sup>58</sup>

In *statebuilding contracts*, the residual rights of control give the host state authority to deploy bureaucratic and diplomatic procedures to negotiate the *statebuilding contract* or determine the unnegotiated components of the contract, which can have a large influence over *what* statebuilding activities the IO implements, *where* on the host-state's territory the IO implements these activities, *who* the IO hires to implement these activities, and *when* and for how long the IO implements these statebuilding activities. The particular set of procedural tactics deployed are the host state's *procedural repertoire*. This repertoire enables the host state to resist or alter elements of the *statebuilding contract* throughout its implementation, shaping the *statebuilding contract* by using these tools specifically.

*Procedural Tactic 1: **What** statebuilding services the IO implements.* Host states have the authority to shape *what* service provision the IO provides through the *statebuilding contract*, whether governance, security, economic, or social services. The host states may contract or expand the services the IO can provide, using the incompleteness of the contract to change exactly what services the IO provides by decided to cooperate in or resist their implementation, shaping the type of statebuilding outcomes produced.

*Procedural Tactic 2: **Where** the IO implements its statebuilding services.* Host states have the authority to influence *where* IO statebuilding services are implemented. The delivery of statebuilding services relies on state-controlled institutions, such as airports, ports, roads and other transport networks, in addition to staging bases. The territorial sovereignty of the host state gives it the authority to shape where IO statebuilding efforts are planned and, as implementation proceeds, to alter this arrangement, particularly in locations experiencing violence

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<sup>58</sup>The presence of multiple potential resistance pathways points to equifinality within our causal mechanism, which requires the investigation of this mechanism in multiple cases.<sup>59</sup>

or other sources of insecurity.

*Procedural Tactic 3: **Who** the IO hires (or fires) to implement its statebuilding services.* Host states have the authority to shape *who* implements the *statebuilding contract* by giving or rescinding its permission for IO staff to operate on its territory, or by granting or refusing visas for private contractors or INGO staff on which the implementation of the IO statebuilding contract depends. The host government often cannot negotiate which personnel join the IO country office, although it can threaten to declare IO staff that are already in the country *persona non grata* and force them to leave the country.<sup>60</sup>

*Procedural Tactic 4: **When** the statebuilding services begin and how long they last.* Because the host state’s consent is necessary to achieve a *statebuilding contract*, it helps determine when the contract starts and how long it lasts once underway. Even if the host state has agreed to a contract of a certain duration, it can alter this duration by withdrawing or extending its consent.

While we are especially interested in the use of the procedural repertoire, our ultimate dependent variable is the *changed IO ability to implement the statebuilding arrangement*, as opposed unchanged ability or changes in ability due to non-host state actions. Changes in ability refers to changes in capacity, access, resources, or other permissions that affect the IO’s ability to carry out its statebuilding mandate.

In sum, the empirical implications of our theory are: (1) variation in the type of statebuilding arrangement—*integrated takeover* vs. *statebuilding contract*—predicts whether the state possesses the residual rights of control; (2) when the statebuilding arrangement is a

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<sup>60</sup>Although U.N. staff are not subject to *persona non grata* under international law, the threat still seems to lead to the departure of U.N. staff. “Persona Non Grata Doctrine Not Applicable in Respect of United Nations Personnel, Secretary-General Stresses, Expressing Deep Regret over Somalia’s Action,” United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/19424, January 4, 2019.



**Table 1: *Procedural Tactics***

| <i>Type of Tactic</i>                               | <i>Observable Implications of Tactic on IO Mission</i>   |
|---|--|
| <b>What</b><br><i>(type of service or activity)</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Request that mandate include certain tasks and not others.</li> <li>- Stop mission from implementing mandated tasks by shaping where it operates and when it departs.</li> <li>- Request that military, police, investigators, prosecutors, and other mission staff serve certain functions and not others.</li> <li>- Withdraw or grant consent for the type of mission (Chapter IV or VII).</li> <li>- Request an increase or decrease in the number of personnel deployed.</li> <li>- Withdraw or grant consent for the force composition and size.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Where</b><br><i>(territorial access)</i>         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Request that the mission close or relocate its sub-offices or bases.</li> <li>- Restrict where mission personnel can travel within country.</li> <li>- Restrict location of mission headquarters.</li> <li>- Cancel, limit, or restrict purchase and rental agreements, transportation permits, access to airports, and access to goods from ports.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Who</b><br><i>(outside personnel)</i>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Declare (or threaten to declare) mission personnel persona non grata.</li> <li>- Refuse to allow certain classes of foreign personnel into country.</li> <li>- Grant, refuse to grant, or delay work visas for mission personnel or implementing partners.</li> <li>- Grant or restrict types of immunities granted to mission personnel.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>When</b><br><i>(duration)</i>                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Request mission to withdraw early or extend its mandate.</li> <li>- Request specific timeframe for new mandate.</li> <li>- Refuse to cooperate in implementation of mandate activities, delay appropriation of funds, or delay signature of MoUs necessary for implementation of mission mandate.</li> </ul>  |

*statebuilding contract*, the host state will use our posited mechanism—the host state’s procedural repertoire—to resist or alter the IO statebuilding intervention; (3) combined together, successive host-state attempts to influence the IO statebuilding intervention will change the IO’s ability to achieve its statebuilding mandate; and (4) this relationship holds across diverse cases within our scope conditions: host states with diverse characteristics and different types of interventions, as long as they are *statebuilding contracts*, will use a range of procedural tactics to influence the IO statebuilding intervention—including *what* types

of statebuilding activities the IO implements, *where* within the host country the IO implements these, *who* leads and supports the mission, and *when* they are deployed and their agreed-upon activities implemented—and these tactics will change the effectiveness of the IO statebuilding intervention. Table 1 summarizes observable implications of each of these procedural tactics. Below, we outline our research design, which, in addition to testing these empirical implications, enables us to investigate potential alternative explanations advanced in the IO statebuilding literature.<sup>61</sup>

## 5 RESEARCH DESIGN

We employ multiple methods to show the plausibility of our theory across the entire universe of cases and test its implications through both cross-case and within-case analysis of a diverse set of cases.<sup>62</sup> To examine the external validity of our mechanism among the universe of cases that fall within our scope conditions, we probe these dynamics in 35 cases to provide an overall assessment of the presence of our mechanism in the entire universe of cases, seeking to establish the broad “empirical scope” of its occurrence (see full population list in Appendix A.4 and the related codebook in Appendix A.5).<sup>223</sup> The universe of cases from which we draw is composed of post-conflict states (defined as those that experienced a civil war and a peace agreement) in which a U.N. statebuilding intervention has occurred between 2000 and 2020.<sup>63</sup> By focusing on one IO, we are able to isolate organizational factors, such as the range of contractual frameworks deployed and the shared goal of all U.N. statebuilding interventions to increase the core security, judicial, and governance capacities in the aftermath of a civil war.<sup>64</sup> The short timeframe of these mandates also facilitates the involvement of the same U.N. member states in mandate decisions.

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<sup>61</sup>Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Walter, Howard and Fortna (2020)

<sup>62</sup>Gerring (2006); Goertz (2017); Seawright and Gerring (2008)

<sup>223</sup>Goertz (2017)

<sup>63</sup>Goertz (2017)

<sup>64</sup>Barnett (2006); Autesserre (2014); Campbell (2018)

Choosing this time-period and set of cases also allows us to consider alternative factors that might predict host-state use of the procedural repertoire (see Appendix A.4). By focusing on U.N. statebuilding in post-conflict states after 2000, we include the full range of U.N. statebuilding arrangements, ranging from transitional administrations to contracts that include Chapter VII peacekeeping missions, Chapter VI peace operations without peacekeepers, and ad hoc governance arrangements negotiated for particular states. The host states where the U.N. implements these arrangements also vary along multiple factors that could influence their willingness and ability to use their procedural repertoire: state capacity measures, history of prior U.N. peace operations, the density of the broader international statebuilding presence in the country, the strategic interest of UNSC members in the host country, change in international sovereignty norms over time, the relative age of the state, the broader U.N. policy environment, and other factors that may influence the host state's use of its procedural repertoire to resist or alter the U.N. statebuilding arrangement.<sup>65</sup>

Our case studies, in which we seek to process trace our causal mechanism, are then U.N. statebuilding arrangements in Timor-Leste, Burundi, and Guatemala. Our analysis of these cases that vary on our independent variable enable us to demonstrate the plausibility of our theory and rule out alternative explanations.<sup>66</sup> Through comparison among these cases over time, we demonstrate the association between our independent variable (*integrated takeover* vs. *statebuilding contract*) and dependent variable (altering or resisting the IO statebuilding arrangement), as well as rule out several alternative explanations (i.e., state capacity and robustness of the statebuilding arrangement). Our within-case analysis of each case enables us process trace our posited causal mechanism—host states use of the procedural repertoire to alter and resist IO *statebuilding contracts*, when in incomplete contracts—and identify equifinality within this mechanism, demonstrating that host-states' procedural repertoires contain a range of different tactics used in different combinations.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>DPKO (2008)

<sup>66</sup>(Gerring, 2006, 95)

<sup>67</sup>Gerring (2005); Goertz (2017)

Among these, Timor-Leste represents a canonical case of a *integrated takeover* in which we do not expect to see the presence of our posited causal mechanism. Burundi, in contrast, is an iconic case of a *statebuilding contract*, which hosts established arrangements in the form of Chapter VI and Chapter VII peace operations, but is also similar on dimensions important to assessing alternative explanations: the robustness of the statebuilding arrangement, the member states who have strategic interest in the country, the length and type of conflict, the degree of international statebuilding support, and the existence of a prior U.N. statebuilding intervention. Finally, Guatemala is a very different case of a *statebuilding contract*—it has an ad hoc arrangement, which may face more host-state resistance in the negotiation phase, compared to Burundi’s the more standard mission—but we expect to see the presence of our causal mechanisms across both of these cases as well as in the broader universe of cases. If we detect our posited causal mechanism across these diverse *statebuilding contracts*, this would serve as a strong test of our theory.<sup>68</sup>

Our universe of cases includes the 35 U.N. statebuilding interventions that occurred in post-conflict countries between 2000 and 2020. Within this universe of cases, we found 83 instances of host-state use of procedural tactics, including at least one incident for each case, as depicted in Appendix A.4 (see Appendix A.5 for full data collection and coding procedures). This demonstrates the willingness and ability of a wide range of post-conflict states to shape *what* statebuilding activities the U.N. statebuilding intervention is mandated to implement, *where* it operates, *when* the statebuilding intervention takes place, and *who* serves in its leadership roles. The use of these procedural tactics by all states within our universe of cases also demonstrates host-states’ willingness to use their procedural repertoire regardless of their capacity, the amount of aid they receive, the geostrategic interests of the UNSC (as indicated by the presence of 22 states across three continents), the state’s relative age (as indicated by the use of procedural tactics by South Sudan), the number of prior U.N. interventions the state has hosted, or the year that the U.N. statebuilding intervention

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<sup>68</sup>Goertz (2017)

occurs.

## 6 CASE STUDY EVIDENCE

Appendix A.4 provides evidence of host-states' use of their procedural repertoire across all cases of *statebuilding contracts* within our scope conditions. Our detailed case studies use process tracing to test our posited causal mechanism: *statebuilding contracts* permit host states to use a procedural repertoire to influence IO statebuilding interventions both during its negotiation and its implementation, which shapes both the content of the IO's statebuilding mandate (i.e., the statebuilding contract) and the IO's ability to achieve this mandate, while *integrated contracts* do not.

We start with the case of Timor-Leste, the *integrated takeover* case, to illustrate the relationship between the statebuilding arrangement and the host state's use of its procedural repertoire. We then examine the effect of two consecutive *statebuilding contracts* in Burundi, a Chapter VII and Chapter VI peace operation, and, finally, a very different *statebuilding contract* in The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), an ad hoc *statebuilding contract* that authorized UN intervention directly in the Guatemalan judicial system. In each of these *statebuilding contracts*, the host government uses a range of procedural tactics to resist and alter the IO statebuilding intervention.

### 6.1 U.N. in Timor-Leste: From Integrated Takeover to Statebuilding Contract

In 1999, twenty-four years after Indonesian invasion, incorporation, and subsequent control of Timor-Leste, Indonesia suddenly allowed the secession-seeking state to vote on independence. This decision was part of a U.N. process to resolve the territory's status, brokered with Indonesia and Portugal, the territory's colonial power until 1976.<sup>69</sup> Although

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<sup>69</sup>Cotton (2001)

78.5 percent of the population peacefully voted to secede, anti-independence militias, with both implicit and explicit consent from the government forces, retaliated with a widespread “scorched earth” campaign.<sup>70</sup> Over 1,000 civilians were killed, hundreds of thousands fled, and nine U.N. observers were killed while the rest evacuated.<sup>71</sup> The U.N. soon returned to this context, however, with a canonical *integrated takeover*, also called a transitional administration, which the UNSC established with the support of the host government, such as it was. While politically weak, even this new state had elements of organization that could have resisted the U.N. intervention during the negotiation or implementation phase. In fact, they occasionally tried to do so but lacked the procedural repertoire. Eventually the U.N. changed this *integrated takeover* into a *statebuilding contract*, providing the host state access to the procedural repertoire, although we focus on the former case here.

### 6.1.1 INTERFET/UNTAET

Established under U.N. Charter Chapter VII, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), composed of 12,000 primarily Australian troops, deployed in September 1999.<sup>72</sup> INTERFET was an urgent Australian-led mission to restore order in Timor-Leste, leading to the exit of anti-independence militias and the Indonesian military. After five months, it was replaced by the the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), a canonical *integrated takeover*. UNTAET viewed Timor-Leste as a context in which some of “the attributes of the state had been removed.”<sup>73</sup> In establishing this mission, rather than “negotiate,” the U.N. “dreamed up its own plan.”<sup>74</sup> UNTAET set up external structures to do “civilian policing, humanitarian assistance, and, in a unique move, the governing of an

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<sup>70</sup>The campaign killed independence voters, destroyed their villages, and more (Braithwaite 2012; Robinson 2003).

<sup>71</sup>Robinson (2010); Howard (2014, 127)

<sup>72</sup>U.N. (2000)

<sup>73</sup>Cotton (2001, 138)

<sup>74</sup>Howard (2008, 274)

entire country”<sup>75</sup> and acted as both the “state and state builder.”<sup>76</sup>

### 6.1.2 *Implementation*

Timorese officials were uninvolved in the mission though local participation increased over time.<sup>77</sup> Initially, the UNTAET mission excluded all Timorese to avoid any potential for “derailment” due to fears of politicization as well as a limited budget to carry out the mandate.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, the mission was established under Chapter VII, and Resolution 1272 only stated a vague need to “consult and cooperate closely with the Timorese people to carry out its mandate effectively.”<sup>79</sup> Little else in the negotiation process included an explicit decision-making role for Timorese officials.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, only staff in support positions, such as security guards and interpreters, were hired locally. The U.N. responded to progressive criticism by slowly increasing the number of Timorese in support positions, while maintaining control of finances and key institutional positions.<sup>81</sup> UNTAET was undermined by its failure, “to share power sufficiently with Timorese counterparts early on and failing to shift power more fully to them early enough.”<sup>82</sup>

In terms of what UNTAET was mandated to do, the U.N. did not just import police forces, but “also laws and courts; not only administrators, but administrative structures and tribunals.”<sup>83</sup> Scholars find that missions such as Timor-Leste, which have a presence of police forces and involvement in ending the conflict, have a positive effect on the duration of peace.<sup>84</sup> Nonetheless, these findings focus on peacekeeping missions, whereas Timor-Leste

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<sup>75</sup>Howard (2014, 128)

<sup>76</sup>Howard (2008, 139)

<sup>77</sup>Goldstone (2004); Suhrke (2001)

<sup>78</sup>Suhrke (2001)

<sup>79</sup>Goldstone (2004, 87)

<sup>80</sup>Ingram (2012); Suhrke (2001)

<sup>81</sup>Suhrke (2001); Howard (2014); Uesugi (2018)

<sup>82</sup>Braithwaite (2012)

<sup>83</sup>Cotton (2001, 139)

<sup>84</sup>Caplan and Hoeffler (2017)

was one of the first cases of actual statebuilding.<sup>85</sup> Ambassador Peter Galbraith, who served as Head of Political Affairs for UNTAET, wrote that the mission faced uncertainty around its scope, which stemmed from the lack of a political settlement that would dictate its mandate. Consequently, UNTAET officials had to decide whether the mission should create an entirely new system of laws and how/when to return authority to domestic officials.<sup>86</sup>

Timorese leaders had little power to resist UNTAET, although they did attempt some pushback.<sup>87</sup> Although initial mandate drafts included proposals for Timorese political leaders to act as advisors within the mission, factions within the U.N. lobbied for control over planning and Timorese participation dwindled.<sup>88</sup> Local officials, frustrated about not being consulted, called for the UN’s prompt withdrawal after six months, without success.<sup>89</sup>

### 6.1.3 Conclusion

The U.N. largely dictated what INTERFET/UNTAET would do and who would be involved in Timor-Leste. This was a classic transitional administration where the U.N. intervention largely operated only under its own authority. This was just one mission of several sent to Timor-Leste, and some of the later missions were *statebuilding contracts*, as the U.N. came to act as the “navigator” for the Timorese leaders who were placed in the “driver’s seat” and eventually took full ownership.<sup>90</sup> We would expect for each subsequent mission to face more resistance, and these case studies suggest that is true. While scholars debate the effectiveness of transitional administrations such as the one in Timor-Leste, many consider the results of UNTAET positive because of the steady increase in Timor-Leste’s economic and social development scores,<sup>91</sup> although identifying the contribution of each

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<sup>85</sup>Suhrke (2001)

<sup>86</sup>Galbraith (2003)

<sup>87</sup>Uesugi (2018)

<sup>88</sup>Suhrke (2001, 10)

<sup>89</sup>Goldstone (2004, 88); Dee (2001)

<sup>90</sup>Uesugi (2018); Richmond and Franks (2008, 111).

<sup>91</sup>Howard (2014, 126)



aspect of the mission is more difficult. While the neo-trusteeship certainly enabled the U.N. to take actions it might not have otherwise taken, the lack of domestic involvement in UNTAET's structure and decision-making may have contributed to producing authoritarian and dysfunctional dynamics in the state's later institutions.<sup>92</sup>

## 6.2 The U.N. in Burundi: Statebuilding Contract for Peace Operations

Burundi, one of the world's poorest states, faced a devastating civil war that lasted from 1993 to 2005. Ending the conflict required a series of ceasefire agreements and the implementation of the main provisions of the Arusha Agreement, a comprehensive framework for political, security, and economic reform.<sup>93</sup> The agreement, signed by 19 political parties in 2000, established a three-year transition period to implement the most critical security and political reforms and organize the first post-conflict democratic elections. Arusha dictated that this transitional period, which began in 2001, was to be governed by the Transitional Government of National Unity, led for the first half by the main Tutsi party and for the second half by the main Hutu party, and overseen by the top U.N. official in Burundi—the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)—who would serve as the head of the Arusha Agreement's Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC). In so doing, the Burundian signatories to the Arusha Agreement gave the U.N. SRSG the authority to oversee the first peaceful transfer of power between opposing political parties and the implementation of Arusha's main security and governance reforms. After the end of Burundi's transitional period, Burundi continued to permit a U.N. statebuilding mission to operate on its territory, although with much less authority and capacity.

In this context, Burundi's peacekeeping missions represented canonical *statebuilding contracts* under both Chapter VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. First, in 2004, under Chapter VII that allows the U.N. to act on its own authority, the United Nations Operation in Burundi

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<sup>92</sup>Braithwaite (2012); Richmond and Franks (2008); Uesugi (2018, 299), Howard (2014, 129).

<sup>93</sup>(Parties to the Arusha Agreement, 28 August 2000)

(ONUB) deployed.<sup>94</sup> Next, in 2007, under Chapter VI that formally requires host-state consent, the Integrated United Nations Office in Burundi (BINUB) followed. Both of these U.N. peace operations were statebuilding contracts: the Burundi Government held the residual rights of control and used this authority to deploy its full procedural repertoire to influence the content these IO statebuilding mandates and their implementation, fundamentally reshaping what these two U.N. peace operations were permitted to do in Burundi.

### 6.2.1 ONUB

ONUB was mandated by the UNSC to oversee Burundi's transition, but the Transitional Government of Burundi retained the residual rights of control over the unspecified components of this *statebuilding contract*. ONUB was composed of over 5,600 military personnel and 1,100 civilian personnel—stationed in five regional offices around Burundi and in the capital, Bujumbura—and an ambitious mandate that ranged from deploying peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire and the disarmament of ex-combatants, providing training to a newly-reformed security services, and organizing and overseeing the peaceful organization of Burundi's first post-conflict elections, including the passage of the prerequisite constitutional and electoral reforms.<sup>95</sup>

### 6.2.2 ONUB Negotiations

Despite the provisions in the Arusha Agreement, the U.N. was initially reluctant to send a mission in the absence of a ceasefire between the Burundian army and rebel groups,<sup>96</sup> so the African Union's first peace operation, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was deployed instead. Once a comprehensive ceasefire was reached, the Transitional Government of Burundi, in concert with its regional and international allies, as well as the African Union,

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<sup>94</sup>UNSC (2004)

<sup>95</sup>UNSC (2004)

<sup>96</sup>Group (2000); (Parties to the Arusha Agreement, 28 August 2000, 93).

<sup>97</sup> called on the UNSC to deploy the promised Chapter VII peacekeeping mission.<sup>98</sup>

Despite ONUB's Chapter VII mandate, the Burundi Government helped to determine when the UNSC deployed ONUB and the content of the *statebuilding contract* that ONUB implemented on its territory. For example, in January 2004, the Burundian Permanent Representative to the U.N. asked that the UNSC mandate a "Takeover of the responsibilities of the African mission in Burundi (AMIB) by a United Nations peacekeeping operation."<sup>99</sup> U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent assessment missions to Burundi in December 2003 and January 2004, which consulted with a range of Burundi's transitional government officials, rebel group leaders, the South African mediation team, other regional and international diplomats, and civil society actors, and led Annan to recommended the deployment of a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation in Burundi.<sup>100</sup> According to one participant, these assessment missions "consistently heard from Burundian stakeholders that the peace process was now on an irreversible course and that a UN peacekeeping operation would be welcomed."<sup>101</sup>

In March 2004, the Burundian Foreign Minister sent a letter to the UNSC outlining the specific aims of its hoped-for UN peacekeeping mission, including monitoring the ceasefire, supporting ex-combatant disarmament and the creation of a new security force, enabling post-conflict reconstruction and development, and helping to establish the overall conditions for free and fair elections.<sup>102</sup> In April 2004, the Burundian Permanent Representative to the U.N. sent a follow-up letter to the UNSC, expressing additional preferences for the U.N. peacekeeping force's mandate and composition, supporting the proposed mandate submitted by the U.N. Secretary-General, which closely mirrored the aims outlined in the Foreign Minister's March 2004 letter, and calling for the UNSC to endorse these proposals and

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<sup>97</sup>Peen Rodt (2012)

<sup>98</sup>UNSG (2003, para. 30)

<sup>99</sup>Nteturuye (2004a)

<sup>100</sup>UNSG (2004)

<sup>101</sup>Jackson (2006, 9)

<sup>102</sup>Simunguruza (2004, 3)

mandate the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Burundi, as it had in other contexts.<sup>103</sup> On May 21, 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1545 that deployed a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation in Burundi, ONUB.

### 6.2.3 *ONUB Implementation*

Once Burundi and the UNSC had established their *statebuilding contract* in the form of Resolution 1545, the Burundi Government used its residual rights of control to push back on the intervention, initially shaping how long ONUB would be deployed and, as discussed in the next section, who would lead ONUB. ONUB was initially mandated to withdraw from Burundi by the end of the three-year transitional period on October 31, 2004, only five months after its deployment. Different forces within the Transitional Government of Burundi tried to slow ONUB’s withdrawal, while others tried to keep it on track. Some transitional government officials in key positions attempted to delay ONUB’s withdraw, and the consequent end of the transitional period, to avoid losing their coveted, and often lucrative, positions in government.<sup>104</sup> Other members of the Transitional Government of Burundi aimed to speed up the transition period because they believed they would gain more power in Burundi’s general elections.<sup>105</sup>

This inter-party competition led representatives of one former rebel group, National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), to threaten that “a ‘return to war’ remained an option” if the the transitional period did not end and, generally, resulted in significant delays in the end of Burundi’s transitional period—and forced extensions of ONUB’s mandate.<sup>106</sup> For example, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) twice postponed the date of the constitutional referendum, which directly delayed in the elections that ONUB was mandated to help organize and led to the

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<sup>103</sup>Nteturuye (2004b, 2)

<sup>104</sup>International Crisis Group (2004, 13)

<sup>105</sup>International Crisis Group (2005)

<sup>106</sup>UNSG (2005b); International Crisis Group (2005); Jackson (2006)

UNSC twice extending ONUB's mandate.<sup>107</sup>

In 2005, the Burundi Government finally organized the post-conflict elections, with the support of ONUB and other international actors, and Pierre Nkurunziza, the former head of the CNDD-FDD rebels, was elected president in August 2005.<sup>108</sup> Even though the UNSC had mandated ONUB under Chapter VII, it mandated ONUB to help the Burundian parties implement Arusha's conditions for the end of the transitional period and these same parties retained the residual rights of control over the government's *statebuilding contract* with ONUB, both of which enabled the Burundi Government to determine if and when ONUB's mandate was fulfilled.

#### 6.2.4 ONUB to BINUB Transition

In October 2005, the newly-elected Burundi Government notified the U.N. that it wanted ONUB withdrawn, which led the U.N. to initiate extensive negotiations with the Burundi Government to try and enable a U.N. peace operation to remain in the country; they agreed to a *statebuilding contract* for a pared-down political mission, without peacekeepers, that would prioritize post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>109</sup> The Burundi Government used its procedural repertoire to full effect to end ONUB's *statebuilding contract* and establish the terms of its successor. In public statements and in letters to the President of the UNSC, the Burundi Government argued that it did not need further U.N. oversight of Arusha's implementation and had "never asked for it."<sup>110</sup>

Analysts argued that Burundi's first post-conflict government employed these resistance tactics because it was "eager to demonstrate its sovereignty and emboldened by what it

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<sup>107</sup>UNSG (2005b,a, 3)

<sup>108</sup>Reyntjens (2006)

<sup>109</sup>Jackson (2006); Hounbo and Karenga (May 24, 2006); "Burundi tells U.N. it needs schools not soldiers," Reuters, November 8, 2005.

<sup>110</sup>"Burundi: Government rejects UN envoy's proposal on donor forum," *The New Humanitarian*, February 15, 2006.

interpreted as a crushing victory at the polls.”<sup>111</sup> The Burundi Government also admitted to being inspired by Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s president, whose party had forced the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to leave after it failed to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide and had, subsequently, expelled international actors, “readmitting them slowly later once it had established its right and ability to negotiate from strength.”<sup>112</sup>

Recollecting the U.N.’s negotiations with the Burundi Government, ONUB’s SRSG, Carolyn McAskie, indicated that she tried to convince the newly-elected President that she could, in fact, control the terms by saying: “You’re the boss. We’re not trying to run anything here. Take advantage of the UN. You have the right as any member country to take what the UN can offer. We’re here to help you.”<sup>113</sup> But the government responded by forcing SRSG McAskie to leave the country before ONUB’s mandate was finished.<sup>114</sup>

In August 2006, the government declared McAskie’s successor, Nureldin Satti, *persona non grata*, although they later rescinded this designation and allowed him to remain until ONUB’s mandate ended on December 31, 2006.<sup>115</sup> While ONUB achieved its most important goal—facilitating Burundi’s successful post-conflict transition—its forced departure and the contentious relationship with the new Burundi Government led it to fall far short of the longer-term security-sector, governance, and judicial reforms outlined in its mandate.<sup>116</sup>

#### 6.2.5 BINUB

On January 1, 2007, the U.N. deployed BINUB, a Chapter VI peace operation without peacekeepers that was mandated to “consolidate” peace in Burundi.<sup>117</sup> To achieve its post-

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<sup>111</sup>Jackson (2006, 26)

<sup>112</sup>Jackson (2006, 26); “UNSC Ends UNAMIR Mandate on 8 March 1996, Adjusts Objectives, Responds to Wishes of Rwandan Government,” United Nations, Press Release, SC/6141, December 12, 1995.

<sup>113</sup>“Understanding Burundi as it Implodes Again,” Barbara Crosette, PassBlue, December 19, 2015.

<sup>114</sup>Molenaers, Rufyikiri and Vandeginste (2017, 14); Jackson (2006, 23)

<sup>115</sup>“Burundi: Government asks for recall of UN diplomat,” *The New Humanitarian*, August 30, 2006.

<sup>116</sup>Jackson (2006)

<sup>117</sup>UNSC (2006)

conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction tasks, the UNSC mandated BINUB’s civilian peace operation staff to work directly with other U.N. development, humanitarian, and human rights agencies in three integrated units: security-sector reform, rule of law and human rights, and governance and peace.<sup>118</sup> Building on its experience with ONUB, the Burundian government continued to deploy its procedural repertoire to resist and alter its *statebuilding contract* with BINUB, both during the negotiation and implementation phases.

#### 6.2.6 *BINUB Negotiations*

With the promise of millions of dollars in peacebuilding aid, the Burundi Government and the U.N. finally concluded a bilateral agreement to establish a U.N. peace operation that would have the dual focus on both development, as demanded by the Burundi Government, and peacebuilding, as requested by the U.N.<sup>119</sup> The U.N. also agreed to change the title of the head of the mission to Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG), rather than SRSG, providing another signal that BINUB was a different type of mission, as the Burundi Government demanded. UNSC Resolution 1719, which mandated the establishment of BINUB, reflected the precise wording suggested by the Burundi Government in this agreement.<sup>120</sup>

#### 6.2.7 *BINUB Implementation*

The Burundi Government played a central role in the implementation of BINUB’s mandate. This was guided, in part, by the newly-created Joint Steering Committee, composed of the Burundian and U.N. civil servants, which oversaw the allocation of U.N. Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) aid to support projects that were jointly-directed and implemented by BINUB

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<sup>118</sup>UNSC (2006); Basagic (2008)

<sup>119</sup>Houngbo and Karenga (May 24, 2006); The negotiated agreement was signed by Ramadhan Karenga, the Burundi Minister of Information, Communication, Relations with the Parliament and Spokesman, and Gilbert Foussoun Houngbo, the U.N. Assistant Secretary General and the Director of the U.N. Development Program Regional Office for Burundi.

<sup>120</sup>UNSC (2006)

and the corresponding Burundian ministry.<sup>121</sup> To appease the Burundi Government, ERSG Mahmoud also required all staff to ensure that their governmental counterparts could take credit for BINUB's successes.<sup>122</sup> He argued that "building national ownership takes time, patience and requires humility."<sup>123</sup> Mahmoud viewed government appropriation as essential to BINUB's success.<sup>124</sup> "We have to ensure that this strategy is owned and that the Burundians define the priorities and design the projects and who implements it."<sup>125</sup> This approach generally enabled BINUB to carry out its mission in the sectors and locations to which the Burundi Government consented;<sup>126</sup> although, this working relationship began to fall apart in the lead-up to the 2010 presidential elections.

In December 2009, the Burundi Government asked ERSG Mahmoud to leave the country, threatening to declare him *persona non grata* if he refused to go; ERSG Mahmoud complied with their wishes.<sup>127</sup> The government claimed that Mahmoud had sided with Burundi's Independent National Electoral Commission, which Nkurunziza viewed as a threat to his continued hold on power.<sup>128</sup> In reality, Mahmoud had tried to preserve the independence of the electoral commission as the elections approached, a central component of its UNSC mandate, in the face of the Burundi Government's increasing violence and intimidation of opposition politicians and civil society actors.<sup>129</sup>

After winning the highly-contested 2010 elections, Nkurunziza's government requested that BINUB, which had been unable to consolidate peace in the face of Burundi's increasing violence, to leave and be replaced by an even weaker U.N. peace operation.<sup>130</sup> The U.N.

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<sup>121</sup>Basagic (2008); "Deputy Secretary-General hails new monitoring, tracking mechanism for Burundi as practical, powerful tool to ensure dialogue," *United Nations Press Release*, December 5, 2007.

<sup>122</sup>Interview, UN staff member, code 28, Bujumbura, June 25, 2009.

<sup>123</sup>?

<sup>124</sup>Interviews with UN staff, including: code 1.17, Bujumbura, May 25, 2009; code 1.36, Bujumbura, June 25, 2009.

<sup>125</sup>Interview with UN staff, code 62, Bujumbura, June 25, 2009.

<sup>126</sup>Campbell, Kayobera and Nkurunziza (2010)

<sup>127</sup>Human Rights Watch (2012)

<sup>128</sup>Ghoshal (2010a)

<sup>129</sup>Human Rights Watch (2010); UNSC (2006); Ghoshal (2010b, 20-21)

<sup>130</sup>Watch (2012)



complied.<sup>131</sup> The Burundi Government had used its residual rights of control over its *state-building contract* with BINUB to determine what tasks BINUB carried out, who would lead BINUB, when BINUB's mandate ended, and, ultimately, whether BINUB fulfilled its UNSC mandate.

### 6.2.8 Conclusion

As the cases of ONUB and BINUB demonstrate that both Chapter VII and Chapter VI missions, respectively, can operate as *statebuilding contracts*. The Burundi Government used its procedural repertoire to determine what these missions could do, when they could do it, who led them, and even where they operated on Burundi's territory. This case demonstrates that even a highly aid-dependent country with weak state capacity and escalating violent conflict is able to use its authority over incomplete contracts to shape the form and function of U.N. peace operations, helping to determine when they succeed and when they fail.

## 6.3 CICIG in Guatemala: Statebuilding Contract in the Courts

Since its civil war, which ended in 1996, Guatemala had been plagued by crime and impunity. The U.N. Special Rapporteur ironically said that Guatemala was “a good place to commit a murder, because you will almost certainly get away with it.”<sup>132</sup> The crime was fueled by weapons from recent conflicts, high rates of unemployment, and poor governance in the state emerging from a major civil war; however, the primary driver of impunity was embedded illegal networks in the state structures that perpetuated corruption and failed to combat crime.<sup>133</sup> Specifically, criminal structures and clandestine security structures (known as CIACS for their Spanish acronym) had taken over the state institutions. In this context, as the peacekeeping mission wound down, Guatemala and the U.N. established a

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<sup>131</sup>U.N. (2010)

<sup>132</sup>Alston (2007)

<sup>133</sup>Reilly (2009)

*statebuilding contract* focused on the courts. The mission featured cyclic resistance from the host government. While certainly weak relative to the U.N. and the major donors to this mission, the state used the procedural repertoire provided by the process of setting up a new ad hoc contract and, later, by its residual rights of control in under the incomplete contract. Eventually, while the mission stayed for twelve years and conducted many successful cases, it was constrained and eventually pushed out in 2019.

### 6.3.1 *CICIG*

The Guatemalan Government, facing pressure and changing incentives, and after thorough negotiations, signed an agreement with the United Nations to intervene in its courts. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was formed to “dismantle” the CIACS through two roles, according to its mandate: “promot[ing] the investigation, prosecution, and sanction of [their] members” together with domestic counterparts and providing recommendations on “the necessary judicial and institutional reforms” to Guatemalan lawmakers. CICIG’s personnel could investigate any private person, entity, or public official, requesting statements, documents, and general cooperation from anyone, and then it could ask to join criminal proceedings as a “querellente adhesivo,” or joint prosecutor, introducing evidence, filing procedural motions, and otherwise helping its domestic counterparts run the case.<sup>134</sup> CICIG selected and trained domestic counterparts, primarily a special prosecutorial unit, eventually known as the Special Anti-Impunity Prosecutor’s Bureau (FECI), but also National Police.<sup>135</sup> Beyond specific cases, CICIG also recommended reforms to the state’s policies and laws, “Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG” 2006, Articles 2-3 cited in [Wirken \(2011\)](#) including innovations such as providing for witness protection and wiretapping in corruption cases.

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<sup>134</sup>“Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG,” 2006, Article 1; Código Procesal Penal de Guatemala, Decreto 51-92, Articles 116-121 cited in [Wirken \(2011\)](#); [Hudson and Taylor \(2010\)](#).

<sup>135</sup>“Convenio de cooperación bilateral entre el Ministerio Público y la Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG),” February 27, 2008, Article 308 cited in [Wirken \(2011\)](#)

CICIG also identified civil servants that committed infractions and participated in their disciplinary proceedings.<sup>136</sup> CICIG operated for twelve years until, after five renewals to its two-year mandates, the Guatemalan Government eventually did not renew the commission in 2019.

### 6.3.2 *Implementation*

During CICIG, the Guatemalan Government used the incompleteness to push back on the intervention. First, in terms of “what” the mission did, the Guatemalan Government maintained the authority to sign off on the cases in which CICIG could involve itself. In both the 2011 and 2013 renewals, the U.N. agreed to make this a period of transition, steering away initially from new high-profile cases.<sup>137</sup> There were also specific cases in which CICIG sought to participate and was blocked, such as a case against a former president, in which CICIG had investigated extortion and embezzlement charges but then was excluded from the prosecution (and he was acquitted in the case before, with advice from CICIG, he was extradited to the United States and tried)<sup>138</sup>; in other cases, the government just did not bring charges as quickly as CICIG requested.<sup>139</sup> In terms of reform, the Guatemalan Government maintained most of this authority for itself: for example, although a law was passed allowing both CICIG and domestic NGOs to participate in the selection of judicial nominees, their recommendations were not binding, so when CICIG objected to six candidates (out of thirteen) for Supreme Court, three were appointed anyway by the legislature (although all 30 out of 90 that it opposed for the appeals court were rejected).<sup>140</sup> Even more troubling, the Guatemalan president in 2011 selected a public prosecutor who fired more than 20 prosecuting attorneys working on human rights and began dismantling CICIG’s

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<sup>136</sup> “Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG,” 2006, Article 3 cited in Wirken (2011)

<sup>137</sup> Open Society Justice Initiative (2016)

<sup>138</sup> Hudson and Taylor (2010)

<sup>139</sup> Castresana-Fernandez (2011); Open Society Justice Initiative (2016)

<sup>140</sup> Valladares (2009)

domestic partner, leading CICIG’s head to resign, although eventually the Constitutional Court ruled the appointment procedurally improper, so the public prosecutor was removed but not due to CICIG’s direct action.<sup>141</sup> Broadly, the Guatemalan Government could resist changes to policies and laws, such as ending pre-trial protections that allowed public officials to interfere with cases against them, because these final decisions were up to the domestic courts.<sup>142</sup> Finally, and outside of the terms of the agreement, in terms of “who” worked for these missions, the Guatemalan Government also resisted. For example, some administrations, especially the Morales administration in 2019, pushed back against CICIG’s work by declaring its head a persona non grata and revoking visas for other personnel.<sup>143</sup>

### 6.3.3 Conclusion

Guatemala and the U.N. established a canonical *statebuilding contract* that focuses on the courts. During the negotiations of the ad hoc agreement, and its renewals, as well as the implementation, the state used the procedural repertoire to shape especially what the mission could do but also who could do it. While the mission stayed for twelve years and conducted many successful cases — securing a high conviction rate and likely lowering certain crime rates, while also training domestic counterparts and lobbying for some reforms that were enacted<sup>144</sup> — it was not able to more fully significantly improve the rule of law in the state, one of its aims, and it was eventually ended in 2019.

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<sup>141</sup>Schieber (2010)

<sup>142</sup>Hudson and Taylor (2010); Castresana-Fernandez (2011); Wirken (2011)

<sup>143</sup>Beittel et al. (2019).

<sup>144</sup>e.g. Hudson and Taylor (2010); Castresana-Fernandez (2011); Wirken (2011); Castresana-Fernandez (2011); CICIG (2015, 2019); International Crisis Group (2018); Trejo and Nieto Matiz (2019); International Crisis Group (2011); WOLA (2015); Open Society Justice Initiative (2016); Valladares (2009)

## 7 CONCLUSION

IO statebuilding scholarship largely assumes that post-conflict states are passive recipients of international statebuilding efforts over which they have little control.<sup>145</sup> Building on literature that highlights the authority and agency of post-conflict and African states,<sup>146</sup> we argue that seemingly weak post-conflict states shape IO statebuilding, but we also go beyond existing work by theorizing about how *statebuilding contracts* that give post-conflict states residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of the contract empower these states. It is through these incomplete contracts that even seemingly weak post-conflict states can influence the IO's mandate, where it implements its activities, whom the IO hires, and when it withdraws. The procedural repertoire through which host states use their authority appear to be banal and procedural, but they provide a primary source of power over IOs operating on their territory.

We test our argument using a multi-method research design that investigates our posited mechanism in case studies (Timor-Leste, Burundi, and Guatemala), examines the generalizability of this mechanism among the full population of cases within our scope conditions, and investigates changes in U.N.-Security-Council support for host-state authority using text analysis.<sup>147</sup>

This paper contributes to the international statebuilding literature by demonstrating that post-conflict governments actively shape the IO statebuilding effort at all stages via contracts, challenging the common assumption that post-conflict states lack capacity or authority in these processes. This paper brings the recipient state back into the discussion of global governance, which largely views delegation of sovereignty as something that happens at the global level, arguing that states delegate sovereignty to IOs and then attempt to

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<sup>145</sup>Krasner (2004b); Chandler (2006); Krasner and Risse (2014); exceptions include: Johnstone (2011), Duursma (2020).

<sup>146</sup>Englebert and Tull (2008); Mukhopadhyay (2014); Barma (2016); Cheng (2018); Bayart (1993)

<sup>147</sup>Gerring (2006); Grimmer and Stewart (2013); Goertz (2017)

exercise preference control through shared decision-making processes within the IO.<sup>148</sup> We show another avenue through which states can reclaim their delegated sovereignty: the residual rights of control over the unspecified components of an incomplete *statebuilding contract*. In so doing, we contribute to a growing strand in the literature that investigates the hierarchical underpinnings of theories of global governance.<sup>149</sup>

Our investigation of the authority available to host states via *statebuilding contracts* also points to several additional avenues for research. Future research could investigate variation among contracts, examining whether different types, different implementation strategies, and different actor capacity, elicit variation in the host-state response. New research could also examine systematic variation in host-state responses to *statebuilding contracts* and how these responses change with the characteristics of host-state leadership, the proximity of elections, and degree of consensus between the host state and the IO on the statebuilding activities.

Finally, our findings have significance for policies relating to international statebuilding efforts. Host-government ownership of IO statebuilding is becoming the global norm.<sup>150</sup> If the host government and IO statebuilders are committed to the same liberal statebuilding reforms, their statebuilding contracts are likely to support these reforms. But, if they are not, then the IO statebuilding effort, no matter how robust, is unlikely to achieve these aims. Only by accounting for the procedural tactics available to the host government can international policymakers accurately assess the feasibility of international statebuilding in post-conflict states.

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<sup>148</sup>Nielson and Tierney (2003); Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001); Hawkins (2006); Lake (2007)

<sup>149</sup>Acharya (2017); Tourinho (2021)

<sup>150</sup>U.N. Advisory Group of Experts (2015); Aning and Okyere (2016)

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## A APPENDIX

### A.1 Contracts over Time

The norms around using contracts in IO statebuilding have changed over time. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, IOs initially focused on a transitional administration model, where the U.N. mission temporarily took over the governance of the host state, but quickly transitioned to the use of contracts to guarantee host-state consent.<sup>151</sup> This approach quickly but soon a broad consensus emerged in this new statebuilding era, where sovereignty still dominated, that host-state consent and national ownership were central and so contracts dominated (more on this in in Section 2.1, below, including empirical evidence).

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of peacekeeping to help end civil conflicts,<sup>152</sup> and the turn of the century brought a reckoning that reinforced contracts after several major failures led to the Brahimi Report.<sup>153</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, IO statebuilding focused on the transitional administration model, where the U.N. mission temporarily took over the governance of the post-conflict state and possessed the residual rights of control over the IO statebuilding effort.<sup>154</sup> But, as depicted in Appendix A.4, this IO statebuilding model was short lived.<sup>155</sup> After 2000, the U.N. did not deploy new transitional administrations; instead, broad consensus emerged around the importance of host-state consent and national ownership, even in relation to Chapter VII peacekeeping missions, as discussed above.<sup>156</sup> The 2008 U.N. peacekeeping doctrine emphasizes this commitment: “Consent, particularly if given grudgingly under international pressure, may be withdrawn in a variety of ways when a party is not fully committed to the peace process.”

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<sup>151</sup>See DiFelice (2007); Chesterman (2005).

<sup>152</sup>Fortna (2008)

<sup>153</sup>Bellamy and Williams (2015)

<sup>154</sup>Between 1995 and 1999, the U.N. established transitional administrations in Timor-Leste, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Kosovo DiFelice (2007).

<sup>155</sup>Fukuyama (2004); Krasner (2004b); Fearon and Laitin (2004); Howard (2014); Lemay-Hébert (2017)

<sup>156</sup>OECD-DAC (2005); DPKO (2008); Nussbaum, Zorbas and Koros (2012); Koops et al. (2015); OECD (2016)

([DPKO, 2008](#), 32). The liberalism that motivates IO statebuilding has placed contracts at the forefront of these arrangements.<sup>157</sup>

Beyond peacekeeping missions, the New Deal on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, adopted in 2011, offers more evidence of this growing consensus.<sup>158</sup> Its innovation was that donors, whether bilateral or multilateral, committed to supporting the host government's post-conflict recovery policy and capacity above all others.<sup>159</sup>

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
<sup>157</sup>[Barnett \(2006\)](#); [Gutmann \(2013\)](#)

<sup>158</sup>[OECD-DAC \(2007\)](#); [Nussbaum, Zorbas and Koros \(2012\)](#); [OECD \(2016\)](#)

<sup>159</sup>The New Deal on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was chaired by post-conflict states and extended donors' prior commitment to aligning their aid with the needs of fragile and conflict-affected states ([OECD-DAC 2005](#))

## A.2 Word Frequency Analysis of UNSC Speeches

**Figure 3:** *Percent Word Frequency in UNSC Speeches Containing “Conflict”*



*Note: Figures depict the frequency of occurrence of terms “consent,” “cooperation,” “ensure,” “host,” “peacebuilding,” “peacekeeping,” “postconflict,” “respect,” and “support” in 39,271 UNSC Speeches between 1995 and 2017 that also contain the word “conflict.” Lines smoothed using the LOESS method.*

### A.3 Indicative Quotes Using “Support” and “Cooperation” from UNSC Speeches Made in 2017

Below, we provide indicative quotes from UNSC speeches in 2017 related to the Afghanistan peace process and the U.N. Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation.<sup>160</sup> The country of the speaker precedes the quote.

*Kazakhstan:* “Let me once again reiterate our full **support** for the government and the people of Afghanistan in achieving lasting peace and reconciliation, and offering solidarity with their aspirations for progress and prosperity.”

*Uruguay:* “Uruguay reaffirms its **support** for the Government of Afghanistan, as well as for a peaceful, Afghan-led resolution to the conflict.”

*Germany:* “We fully **support** a credible, comprehensive and inclusive political process....We continue to **support** the Afghan Police.”

*Russia:* “It is Kabul that should play the principal role in [launching] that [national reconciliation] process, but the international partners providing external **support** for it should **cooperate** on an equal basis and take into account the national interests of every country in the region, without exception.”

*Afghanistan:* “Collectively, we should seize this opportunity to strengthen consensus and partnership, in a spirit of **cooperation** to buttress Afghanistan’s rightful status as an asset and platform of cordiality for all...”

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<sup>160</sup>[Schoenfeld \(2019\)](#)

Below, we provide additional indicative quotes from UNSC speeches in 2017 related to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, a Chapter VI peace operation. The country of the speaker precedes the quote.

*U.N. SRSG Salame:* “In any case, any efforts to forge a solution must be Libyan led and Libyan owned. The United Nations is here to **support** them in their endeavours and certainly not to replace them. We will in particular work with them to promote the rapid reunification of their political and financial institutions.”

*Senegal:* “Therefore, the implementation of the action plan proposed by Mr. Salame deserves to be **supported**, while also taking advantage of the better coordination of numerous initiatives for the resumption of internal dialogue and Libya’s geopolitical situation. That is why the work of UNSMIL, which has been led in an outstanding manner by Mr. Salame on the ground, is essential and deserves our full **support**.”

*China:* “China **supports** the efforts of Libya to safeguard its national security and stability, and hopes that the Libyan parties will strengthen their dialogue, set aside their differences, and continue to **cooperate** in areas of common interest to the Libyan people, such as fighting terrorism and accelerating economic development.”



#### **A.4 Universe of Cases: Host state procedural tactics for U.N. post-conflict statebuilding missions from 2000 to 2020**

The tables on the following seven pages present at least one procedural tactic per U.N. post-conflict statebuilding mission between 2000 and 2020, which constitute the universe of cases that fall within our scope conditions. Appendix [A.5](#) provides the coding procedures and codebook used to compile this dataset.

|    | A  | B  | C               | D             | E                | F                         | G  | H  | I   | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|--|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|--|--|---|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 1  | Universe of Cases: U.N. post-conflict statebuilding missions from 2000 to 2020 |  |                 |               |                  |                           |  |  |   |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 2  | Country  | Mission Name   | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic | Description of the Procedural Tactic   | Indicative Quote   | Source  | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 3  | Afghanistan  | United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan                                  | UNSMa           | 1993-2001     | 2001             | Tactic 3: Who             | Taliban officials harassed, arrested, and physically abused UN staff. They would not issue visas to staff who would not sign a contract to follow Taliban rules.   | "The United Nations Coordinator reported increased interference by Taliban officials in the work of United Nations personnel, indicating that some United Nations staff had been arrested and even physically abused by the Taliban. The Information Ministry announcement indicated that foreigners, including aid workers, must sign a contract agreeing to abide by Taliban rules before they can be issued a work visa, which would substantially subject them to Islamic laws applying to Afghans and expose them to similar corporal and capital punishment."  | "Situation of human rights in Afghanistan (A/56/409)." Sep 21 2001. UN General Assembly. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-human-rights-afghanistan-a56409">https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-human-rights-afghanistan-a56409</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -2.18                       | 10.25                                   |
| 4  | Afghanistan  | United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan                                  | UNSMa           | 1993-2001     | 2001             | Tactic 2: Where           | Taliban officials forced the closure of four regional offices, forced the relocation of the Kabul office, and tried to threaten other offices into closing or relocating.  | "My Personal Representative was obliged to direct many of his endeavours towards preventing, or at least postponing, the threatened closure by the Taliban of the Mission's offices in Afghanistan. The four regional offices in Taliban-held areas were eventually forced to close in mid-May. Another issue to which Mr. Vendrell devoted considerable time was the forced relocation in July of the Mission's premises in Kabul following the repossession of its compound by the Deputy Chairman of the Taliban Council of Ministers, Hassan Akhund, for his personal use."  | "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General (A/56/681-S/2001/1157)." December 6, 2001. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-afghanistan-and-its-implications-international-peace-and-security-8">https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-afghanistan-and-its-implications-international-peace-and-security-8</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -2.18                       | 10.25                                   |
| 5  | Afghanistan  | United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan                              | UNAMA           | 2002-present  | 2007             | Tactic 3: Who             | Afghanistan officials asked one UNAMA official to leave the country.   | "Afghanistan has asked two foreign officials, a Briton and an Irishman, to leave the country for 'activities incompatible with their mandate,' apparently for contacts with Taliban insurgents, official Afghan and diplomatic sources said on Tuesday. The two foreigners are of 'British nationality and the other holder of an Irish passport,' said a spokesperson for the United Nations office in Afghanistan (UNAMA). One is an employee of UNAMA and the other of the European Union, according to European and UN diplomatic sources."  | "Persona non grata en Afghanistan: l'UE espère une 'solution rapide'". Agence France Presse. December 25, 2007 mardi. <a href="https://advance.lexis-com.proxy.u.wisc.org/api/document?collection=news&amp;id=urn:contentItem:48F9-12W0-TWMD-5199-00000-00&amp;context=1516831">https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.u.wisc.org/api/document?collection=news&amp;id=urn:contentItem:48F9-12W0-TWMD-5199-00000-00&amp;context=1516831</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.57                       | 141.67                                  |
| 6  | Afghanistan  | United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan                              | UNAMA           | 2002-present  | 2007             | Tactic 2: Where           | Taliban officials made it difficult for UNAMA to reach populations in need by harassing and abusing UN staff members and by requiring male escorts for Muslim women to be able to meet with foreign workers.   | "In July the Taliban issued a decree formalizing restrictions on the activities of foreigners. That decree, inter alia, reconfirms the requirement for female Muslim foreign workers to be accompanied by a mahram (male escort) and seemingly prevents foreign workers from meeting with or interviewing Afghan women...United Nations staff and aid project managers have frequently been subjected to coercion and abusive behaviour by the Taliban authorities. As a consequence of those restrictive measures and actions, aid organizations have found it increasingly difficult to reach populations in need, in particular women."   | "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General (A/55/1028-S/2001/789)." Aug 17, 2001. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-afghanistan-and-its-implications-international-peace-and-security-7">https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-afghanistan-and-its-implications-international-peace-and-security-7</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.57                       | 141.67                                  |
| 7  | Bosnia and Herzegovina   | United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina                               | UNMIBH          | 1995-2002     | 2001             | Tactic 3: Who             | Bosnian political leaders threatened the UNMIBH's Mission's international Police Task Force (PTF) over the choice of the new director of police.   | "The Mission's International Police Task Force (IPTF) is led by Commissioner Vincent Coeurderoy." But "certain Bosniac political leaders, who reject the possibility of a Croat being Director of Police, have recently threatened IPTF personnel, including the Commissioner, and have sought to undermine and remove the Interim Director and his (also Bosnian-Croat) Deputy Minister, who have made considerable strides in reintegrating Bosniac and Croat officers and reorganizing the Ministry."   | Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2001, June 8). <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/report-secretary-general-un-mission-bosnia-and-herzegovina-0">ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/report-secretary-general-un-mission-bosnia-and-herzegovina-0</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.19                       | 226.61                                  |
| 8  | Burundi  | United Nations Operation in Burundi  | ONUB            | 2004-2006     | 2006             | Tactic 1: What            | The Burundian government notified the UN that it wanted ONUB to withdraw and for the UN to prioritize development, not peacekeeping or peacebuilding. In the negotiations, the Burundian Government insisted that BINUB be a political mission, or one without any peacekeeping troops.                            | "It was their [members of the Government of Burundi] general view that security had been restored in most areas of the country, and that international support, including that of the United Nations, should now be particularly focused on assisting in institutional capacitybuilding and supporting recovery, reconstruction and development. Consequently, the Government indicated that it favoured an early withdrawal of the ONUB military component, while acknowledging the important role ONUB could continue to play in support of the Government's efforts in other critical areas. A joint Government of Burundi-ONUB technical working group held extensive consultations in Bujumbura from 4 to 14 November to consider the nature of the support that ONUB could provide in the next phase. The major challenges in consolidating peace were discussed and ONUB and other United Nations partners highlighted all the areas related to the Mission's mandate in which its support might continue to be very useful. However, the Government indicated its strong preference for an early disengagement by ONUB in the areas of the military and police. With regard to other areas, the Burundian authorities felt that they should be progressively assumed by the United Nations country team and other international partners during 2006." | "Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi." November 21, 2005. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/609/25/PDF/N0560925.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/609/25/PDF/N0560925.pdf?OpenElement</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 61.93                                   |
| 9  | Burundi  | United Nations Operation in Burundi  | ONUB            | 2004-2006     | 2006             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Burundian government was also adamant that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) who had led ONUB, Carolyn McAskie, be removed from her post in Burundi. To avoid formally being declared persona non grata by the Burundian government, SRSG McAskie left Burundi in April 2006.         | "The government has also compelled three successive heads of the UN mission in Burundi to leave: Carolyn McAskie and Nureldin Satti in 2006, and Youssef Mahmoud in December 2009 [182] The government claimed that Mahmoud, who was widely known for his even-handedness in fostering the peace process and the opening of political space in Burundi, was too close to the opposition. His expulsion came shortly after the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, an entity separate from BINUB, released a report linking Burundian officials to the illegal arms and minerals trade in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo."   | "Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Diplomatic Space in Burundi." November 23, 2010. Human Rights Watch. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closing-doors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi">https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closing-doors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 61.93                                   |
| 10 | Burundi  | United Nations Operation in Burundi  | ONUB            | 2004-2006     | 2006             | Tactic 3: Who             | After the former SRSG McAskie left Burundi in April 2006 to avoid being declared persona non grata, her deputy, Nureldin Satti, took over as acting SRSG until August 2006 when the Burundian government declared him persona non grata.   | "The government of Burundi, faced with accusations of human-rights abuses, has asked the United Nations to recall its acting special representative in the country, Nureldin Satti...Batumbwira said the request to recall Satti had begun several months ago. 'It doesn't have anything to do with the current situation, with the attempted coup plot,' she said. However, Satti has been raising questions about the government's recent actions over the alleged coup plot. On 11 August, following a meeting with the government, Satti issued a statement in which he said, 'We will see to it that all rights are respected and that all current procedures are in accordance with the laws and constitution of Burundi.'"  | "Burundi: Government asks for recall of UN diplomat." August 30, 2006. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-government-asks-recall-un-diplomat">https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-government-asks-recall-un-diplomat</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 61.93                                   |
| 11 | Burundi  | United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi                                    | BINUB           | 2006-2014     | 2009             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Burundian government asked Executive Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Youssef Mahmoud to leave the country, threatening to declare him persona non grata if he refused to go. They claimed he had sided with with Burundi's Independent National Electoral Commission instead of the government. | "The government has also compelled three successive heads of the UN mission in Burundi to leave: Carolyn McAskie and Nureldin Satti in 2006, and Youssef Mahmoud in December 2009 [182] The government claimed that Mahmoud, who was widely known for his even-handedness in fostering the peace process and the opening of political space in Burundi, was too close to the opposition. His expulsion came shortly after the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, an entity separate from BINUB, released a report linking Burundian officials to the illegal arms and minerals trade in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo."   | "Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Diplomatic Space in Burundi." November 23, 2010. Human Rights Watch. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closing-doors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi">https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closing-doors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.10                       | 61.93                                   |
| 12 | Burundi  | United Nations Office in Burundi   | BNUB            | 2011-2014     |                  | Tactic 3: Who             | Burundi denied UN officials access to the country, declared members of the Commission on Inquiry on Burundi persona non grata, opposed dialogue with the Commission, rejected the Commission's report on human rights as biased.   | "The Committee deplored Burundi's increased lack of co-operation with the international community and called on the Government to re-engage with the UN Human Rights Office."  | "Denial of access and lack of cooperation with UN bodies will not diminish scrutiny of a State's human rights record - Human Rights Council 35th session: Opening Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights." June 6, 2017. UN Human Rights Council/ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/denial-access-and-lack-cooperation-un-bodies-will-not-diminish-scrutiny-states-human">https://reliefweb.int/report/world/denial-access-and-lack-cooperation-un-bodies-will-not-diminish-scrutiny-states-human</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.06                       | 57.88                                   |
| 13 | Burundi  | Special Envoy in Burundi   | Special Envoy   | 2016-present  | 2020             | Tactic 3: Who             | UN Human Rights Office and WHO not permitted to enter the country. Burundi shut down the country's United Nations Human Rights Office in early 2019. A UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Burundi has never been given access to the country, despite repeated requests.   | "Burundi refuses to cooperate with international and regional human rights mechanisms and shut down the country's United Nations Human Rights Office in early 2019. A UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Burundi has never been given access to the country, despite repeated requests."   | "A Perfect Storm is Brewing in Burundi." May 14, 2020. Human Rights Watch. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/perfect-storm-brewing-burundi">https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/perfect-storm-brewing-burundi</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.10                       | 57.29                                   |
| 14 | Central African Republic   | United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic | BINUCA          | 2009-2014     | 2011-2012        | Tactic 1: What            | State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.   | "Attacks on humanitarian workers and convoys and the looting of supplies and assets continue to threaten humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. State security forces, non-State armed groups and criminal groups have all been implicated in these kinds of incidents."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/full_report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/full_report_4150.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.41                       | 68.30                                   |

|    | A                                      | B  | C               | D             | E                | F                         | G   | H  | I   | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|--|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|---|--|---|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
|    | Country                                | Mission Name   | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic | Description of the Procedural Tactic  | Indicative Quote   | Source  | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 2  |  |  |                 |               |                  |                           |   |  |   |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 15 | Central African Republic               | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic | MINUSCA         | 2014-present  | 2020             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Central African Republic declared three UN officials persona non grata and requested that they leave the country.   | "Some 2,000 people 17 Feb demonstrated in front of UN offices in capital Bangui to demand departure of three senior MINUSCA officials over allegations of collusion with armed groups; govt next day declared same officials persona non grata and requested that MINUSCA transfer them out of country."   | "Tracking Conflict Worldwide." February 2020. Crisis Group. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/index.php?q=crisisswatches/databas&amp;location=58&amp;5D=5&amp;date_range=last_12_months&amp;from_month=01&amp;from_year=2016&amp;to_month=01&amp;to_year=2016">https://www.crisisgroup.org/index.php?q=crisisswatches/databas&amp;location=58&amp;5D=5&amp;date_range=last_12_months&amp;from_month=01&amp;from_year=2016&amp;to_month=01&amp;to_year=2016</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.85                       | 121.75                                  |
| 16 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2007             | Tactic 1: What            | The Government of Chad requested specific MINURCAT activities and shaped how the mission operated.  | "During the delegation's visit to Chad, Government representatives expressed a desire for the prompt deployment of a civilian United Nations mission, as a first step towards addressing urgent security concerns, particularly with respect to the refugee camps in eastern Chad. They also indicated that a United Nations military presence was not favoured by the Chadian Government, although it could eventually be discussed as a second phase of a United Nations deployment...the head of the United Nations delegation met with President Bozize, who reiterated his appeal for a strong international commitment in support of the efforts of the Central African Republic to bring peace and stability to the country. He also confirmed his request for a peacekeeping presence to be deployed in the north-eastern part of the country, in order to secure the tri-border area in conjunction with FACA, and underlined that insecurity in Vakaga prefecture was directly linked to the conflict in Darfur."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic." United Nations Security Council. August 10, 2007. <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2010%20August%202007.pdf">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2010%20August%202007.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 17 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2008             | Tactic 4: When            | The Government of Chad and Central African Republic delayed signing a memorandum of understanding with MINURCAT, which delayed the mission in training police officers and gendarmes as well as implementing other security activities.   | "A number of challenges affect the full deployment of United Nations police and DIS officers, the greatest being the absence of infrastructure for office and living space, inadequate logistical support for the training facilities and delays in refurbishing of the National Police Academy. Limited ground and air transportation also represent a challenge in the face of the upcoming rainy season. Other issues have been the absence of a legal framework establishing DIS, which is linked to the delay in signing the memorandum of understanding between the Government of Chad and MINURCAT on DIS, and the delay in selecting the first batch of 220 police officers and gendarmes that will integrate with DIS."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad." United Nations Security Council. July 8, 2008. <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2008%20July%202008.pdf">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2008%20July%202008.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 18 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2008             | Tactic 1: What            | The Government of Chad requested that the mission increase the number of security personnel beyond what had been initially proposed by the mission. The Government also delayed signing the necessary presidential decree to allow the military component of the mission to operate in eastern Chad.        | "MINURCAT will continue to support the establishment of DIS. The Government of Chad has requested that the total strength of DIS be raised from 850 to some 1,700 elements. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will examine this request on the basis of lessons learned and a needs assessment mission after the first elements of DIS have been deployed. It is therefore critical that the presidential decree enabling the deployment of DIS to eastern Chad be issued at the earliest possible date. An expanded area of operations of DIS may necessitate a review of the concept of operations of the proposed United Nations military force in order to ensure that the force has the capability to ensure the security of United Nations police deployed to monitor and provide on-the-job training for DIS elements. It may also necessitate the expanded deployment of human rights, rule of law and civil affairs elements of the Mission."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad." United Nations Security Council. September 12, 2008. <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 19 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2008             | Tactic 1: What            | The Central African Republic Government requested that the mission take on military activities from an EU-led mission to address cross-border violence from Darfur.   | "During its visit to Bangui, the United Nations-EU Joint Mission met an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister. On that occasion, representatives of the Government requested that the United Nations take over from EUFOR (European Union-led military force in Chad and the Central African Republic) in order to address possible cross-border violence from Darfur."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad." United Nations Security Council. September 12, 2008. <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 20 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2008             | Tactic 1: What            | The Government of Chad requested that MINURCAT provide more support for internally displaced person and to address the crisis in Darfur.  | "In Chad, President Deby agreed to the deployment of a United Nations follow-on operation, including a military component, to replace EUFOR. The President recognized that further progress was required in the implementation of the 13 August agreement and noted that the European Union and UNDP were assisting the Government to that end. In that regard, President Deby requested that the United Nations follow-on presence remain within the framework provided under Security Council resolution 1778 (2007) to address the spillover of the Darfur crisis and help create conditions conducive to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. President Deby called for greater support for the internally displaced and an increase in the MINURCAT presence at the sites. The President also appealed to the international community to address the causes and consequences of the Darfur crisis."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad." United Nations Security Council. September 12, 2008. <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 21 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2007-2010        | Tactic 1: What            | In response to host government requests and expectations, MINURCAT took on additional projects that were difficult or impossible within the context and shifted its mandate to provide a level of support to the security services that it believed would be difficult for the host governments to sustain. | "Furthermore, the establishment of MINURCAT was characterized by a discrepancy between the expectations and requests of the host Government and the actual structure and purpose of the Mission. In order to address the Government's reservations about an operation whose mandate was not in accordance with its wishes and objectives, the Mission resorted to a number of coping and mitigating strategies. These included committing to substantial projects that at times proved difficult, or even impossible, to carry out, thereby further undermining the trust and confidence of the host Government. In addition, MINURCAT, both before and after the establishment of its military component, invested heavily in DIS (Détachement intégré de sécurité) with a view to its assumption of a portion of the security responsibilities entrusted to the international military forces the deployment of which faced delays. Finally, the Mission agreed to provide, within existing resources, a level of support to DIS that will be difficult to sustain after the departure of MINURCAT." | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad." United Nations Security Council. December 1, 2010. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/611">https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/611</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 22 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2010             | Tactic 1: What            | The government of Chad requested that the military component of the mission withdraw.   | "The government of Chad has told the United Nations that it would like to see peacekeepers leave the country in the next few months...Chad's U.N. Ambassador Ahmad Allam-mi told reporters Wednesday that his country would like the peacekeepers to drawdown or leave completely, but that N'Djamena would be willing to keep on about a thousand international and local civilian staff...U.N. Humanitarian Chief John Holmes said withdrawing MINURCAT too soon could have serious humanitarian consequences. 'We want MINURCAT to stay, and we want them to stay with their full complement. Because we think they are very important for the safety and security of the people in the camps, the civilians in general, and for the humanitarian operation. So we are very concerned by the prospect of withdrawal', he said."   | Chad Wants UN to Withdraw Mission. February 16, 2010. Voice of America. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/chad-wants-un-withdraw-mission">https://www.voanews.com/africa/chad-wants-un-withdraw-mission</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 23 | Central African Republic and Chad      | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                                  | MINURCAT        | 2007-2010     | 2010             | Tactic 4: When            | At the request of the Chadian government, MINURCAT ended its mandate.   | "MINURCAT completed its mandate on 31 December 2010, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1923 (2010) and at the request of the Chadian Government, which had pledged full responsibility for protecting civilians on its territory."  | "Closure of MINURCAT." <a href="https://minurcat.unmissions.org/milestones-and-achievements">https://minurcat.unmissions.org/milestones-and-achievements</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.54/-1.63                 | 54.72/40.71                             |
| 24 | Côte d'Ivoire                          | United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire   | UNOCI           | 2004-2017     | 2011             | Tactic 1: What            | When an opposition leader won, the government restricted UN actions with violent attacks, new restrictive legislation, and misinformation campaigns.  | "Forces loyal to Gbagbo have unleashed a systematic campaign of harassment that has severely diminished the U.N. mission's capacity to protect civilians in this West African country, according to internal U.N. documents obtained by Turtle Bay. An assortment of pro-Gbagbo regular army forces, youth militia, foreign mercenaries and special forces have blocked U.N. food and fuel deliveries, torched vehicles, heaved Molotov cocktails at U.N. installations, shot and kidnapped UN peacekeepers."  | "Laurent Gbagbo's guide to crippling a U.N. peacekeeping mission." April 2, 2011. Foreign Policy. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/02/laurent-gbagbos-guide-to-crippling-a-un-peacekeeping-mission/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/02/laurent-gbagbos-guide-to-crippling-a-un-peacekeeping-mission/</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 44.03                                   |
| 25 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo                      | MONUC           | 2000-2010     | 2000             | Tactic 1: What            | Although the MONUC force commander arrived in DRC in April 2000, the DRC Government did not authorize MONUC to deploy observers to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.  | "...a summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was convened in Windhoek on 7 August with a view to discussing, among other issues, ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the agreement...The summit, which ended in the early hours of 15 August after some 18 hours of continuous discussion, failed to make any progress on [these] issues...principally because of the reluctance of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to allow the deployment of MONUC troops to the government-controlled territory and to accept Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator."   | "Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." September 21, 2000. United Nations Security Council. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/888">https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/888</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 32.85                                   |
| 26 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo                      | MONUC           | 2000-2010     | 2000             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Congolese Government objected to Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator appointed by the Lusaka Agreement.  | "...a summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was convened in Windhoek on 7 August with a view to discussing, among other issues, ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the agreement...The summit, which ended in the early hours of 15 August after some 18 hours of continuous discussion, failed to make any progress on [these] issues...principally because of the reluctance of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to allow the deployment of MONUC troops to the government-controlled territory and to accept Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator."   | "Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." September 21, 2000. United Nations Security Council. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/888">https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/888</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 32.85                                   |
| 27 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo                      | MONUC           | 2000-2010     | 2003             | Tactic 3: Who             | DRC declared the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) representative in Ituri persona non grata, suggesting the reason was that they attempted to lobby for the release of a relief worker.  | "The north-eastern part of the country, following the change of control in Bunia in August 2002, became once again the most dire place in DRC for civilians, as well as for basic, operational humanitarian efforts. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) representative in Ituri was declared persona non grata after attempting to plead for the release of a relief worker."   | "Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003: Mid-Year Review." June 3, 2003. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/consolidated-inter-agency-appeal-democratic-republic-congo-2003-mid">https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/consolidated-inter-agency-appeal-democratic-republic-congo-2003-mid</a>                      | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 32.85                                   |
| 28 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo                      | MONUC           | 2000-2010     | 2004             | Tactic 2: Where           | DRC prevented MONUC from accessing a uranium mine after it collapsed and killed several miners.   | "A team from the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), known by its French acronym MONUC, was prevented on Friday from accessing the site of a uranium mine in Shinkolobwe - in the southeastern province of Katanga - where several miners were killed or injured when the mine collapsed on 8 July, a MONUC spokesman told IRIN."  | "UN mission denied access to collapsed uranium mine." 21 July 2004. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/50751/drc-un-mission-denied-access-collapsed-uranium-mine">https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/50751/drc-un-mission-denied-access-collapsed-uranium-mine</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 32.85                                   |

|    | A                                      | B   | C               | D             | E                | F                               | G   | H   | I  | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|--|---|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---|---|--|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
|    | Country                                | Mission Name  | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic       | Description of the Procedural Tactic  | Indicative Quote  | Source   | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 2  |  |   |                 |               |                  |                                 |   |   |  |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 29 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO         | 2010-present  | 2014             | Tactic 3: Who                   | DRC restricted access for UN officials and there was violence against UN officials. DRC expelled the UN/HRO director after a report documenting the government's human rights violations. | "The decision to declare Scott Campbell, the director of the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UN/HRO), persona non grata, or "unwelcome person", was initially made public by the Ministry of the Interior on Thursday, a day after the release of a UN report detailing serious human rights violations by Congolese security forces, for which the Ministry is responsible."   | "DR Congo: UN rights chief condemns government's decision to expel envoy" October 19, 2014. UN News Service. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-un-rights-chief-condemns-governments-decision-expel-envoy">https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-un-rights-chief-condemns-governments-decision-expel-envoy</a>                             | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.74                       | 40.61                                   |
| 30 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO         | 2010-present  | 2011             | Tactic 3: Who                   | DRC either delayed or refused visas for some UN personnel.  | "In the Democratic Republic of the Congo...humanitarian activities are significantly hampered by the denial of visas or delays in their issuance to international experts."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.74                       | 40.61                                   |
| 31 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO         | 2010-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 2: Where | Local authorities harassed and extorted UN personnel, which resulted in the closure of some offices.  | "In the Democratic Republic of the Congo...attempts by both local authorities and non-State groups to extort funds or appropriate assets from humanitarian actors have resulted in routine harassment, leading in some cases to the closure of offices of humanitarian organizations or the detention of staff. Demands for payment can involve tens of thousands of dollars per agency and are often made outside of official channels. When such fees were not paid or local authorities and humanitarian actors disagreed about operational requirements, humanitarian projects have been shut down by the authorities." | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.74                       | 40.61                                   |
| 32 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO         | 2010-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 1: What                  | State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.  | "Attacks on humanitarian workers and convoys and the looting of supplies and assets continue to threaten humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. State security forces, non-State armed groups and criminal groups have all been implicated in these kinds of incidents."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_eport_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.74                       | 40.61                                   |
| 33 | Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO         | 2010-present  | 2017             | Tactic 2: Where                 | The DRC government restricted peacekeepers' access to areas where their forces had targeted civilians.  | "Government forces have targeted civilians, including women and children, resulting in numerous deaths in central Congo this week and are restricting United Nations peacekeepers' access to the area, the country's U.N. mission said on Saturday."  | "Congo forces targeting civilians, denying peacekeepers access U.N." March 18, 2017. Reuters. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-un-idUSKBN16P0E">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-un-idUSKBN16P0E</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.74                       | 40.61                                   |
| 34 | Guatemala                              | International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala                                    | CIIG            | 2007-2019     | 2017             | Tactic 3: Who                   | Guatemala expelled the UN head of CIIG.   | "...after the decision of Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales to declare Iván Velásquez, the head of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CIIG), and order him expelled from the country."  | "CIDH publica resolución sobre derechos humanos, impunidad y corrupción." September 12, 2017. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/cidh-publica-resolucion-sobre-derechos-humanos-impunidad-y-corrupcion">https://reliefweb.int/report/world/cidh-publica-resolucion-sobre-derechos-humanos-impunidad-y-corrupcion</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -0.55                       | 26.29                                   |
| 35 | Guatemala                              | International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala                                    | CIIG            | 2007-2019     | 2020             | Tactic 4: When                  | Guatemala unilaterally terminated CIIG.   | "On 8 January, the Secretary-General "strongly rejected" the decision by the Government of Guatemala to unilaterally terminate the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, an independent body set up by the United Nations and Guatemala to investigate illegal security groups and high-level corruption in the country."   |  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -0.55                       | 26.29                                   |
| 36 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 1999             | Tactic 1: What                  | The transitional government of Guinea-Bissau requested that UNOGBIS provide international military observers to monitor the situation on the border with Guinea and Senegal.              | "With regard to the border security concerns that had been raised by the authorities, members of the Council will recall that, in my report of 29 September 1999, I promised to revert to the Council regarding the recommendations of a small mission I had dispatched to Guinea-Bissau to look into the transitional Government's request for international military observers to monitor the situation along the borders with Guinea and Senegal and provide a measure of confidence among the population during the electoral period."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that Country." United Nations Security Council. December 23, 1999. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 37 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 1999             | Tactic 1: What                  | Government officials asked that UNOGBIS coordinate election observation with 88 observers from 19 countries.  | "At the request of the Government, UNOGBIS coordinated international observation of the elections, with the participation of 88 short-term observers drawn from the following 19 countries, invited by the Government: Angola, Belgium, Benin, Canada, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Mozambique, the Netherlands, the Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Togo and the United States of America."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that Country." United Nations Security Council. December 23, 1999. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 38 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 1999             | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 4: When  | Guinea-Bissau officials requested that UNOGBIS extend its mandate beyond its original expiration of December 21, 1999.  | "Members of the Council will recall that in my last report (S/1999/1015), I informed the Council that Guinea-Bissau's transitional Government had requested the extension of the mandate of UNOGBIS for one year, after its expiry on 31 December 1999, in order to assist Guinea-Bissau in the fragile post-electoral period; and that I should undertake to revert to the Council on the matter after consultations with the new Government that would have emerged from the elections."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that Country." United Nations Security Council. December 23, 1999. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/401/16/pdf/N9940116.pdf?OpenElement</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 39 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 2001             | Tactic 1: What                  | The Government of Guinea-Bissau requested that UNOGBIS organize a seminar on the revision of the Constitution.  | "Despite the troubling climate of tension, Guinea-Bissau continues with its efforts to consolidate its fragile democratization process. The National Assembly, which resumed its annual session on 28 February 2001, has focused its debates on the revision of the Constitution to bring it into line with the norms of a democratic society. To facilitate these debates, UNOGBIS, at the request of the Assembly, organized a seminar on the revision of the Constitution from 12 to 15 February 2001."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country." United Nations Security Council. March 16, 2001. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/288/22/pdf/N0128822.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/288/22/pdf/N0128822.pdf?OpenElement</a>       | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 40 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 2002             | Tactic 1: What                  | The Government of Guinea-Bissau requested that UNOGBIS establish an Ad Hoc Advisory Group of the Economic and Social Council on Guinea-Bissau.  | "I welcome the work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group of the Economic and Social Council on Guinea-Bissau, recently established at the request of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, as an innovative mechanism of cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council on countries in a postconflict peace-building phase."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country." United Nations Security Council. December 13, 2002. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/726/81/pdf/N0272681.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/726/81/pdf/N0272681.pdf?OpenElement</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 41 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 2005             | Tactic 1: What                  | The Government of Guinea-Bissau requested that UNOGBIS implement a fact-finding and project mission to examine the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.                         | "At the request of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, I dispatched a fact-finding and project development mission to Guinea-Bissau from 7 to 11 March 2005 to examine the challenge posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Working closely with the Government, UNOGBIS, the country team and relevant civil society bodies, the mission has established the operational and conceptual capacity-building needs for the national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons."                           | "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country." United Nations Security Council. March 16, 2005. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/267/58/pdf/N0526758.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/267/58/pdf/N0526758.pdf?OpenElement</a>    | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 42 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau                              | UNOGBIS         | 1999-2009     | 2010             | Tactic 1: What                  | Guinea-Bissau officials requested that UNOGBIS offer support for a national commission of inquiry into the 2009 assassinations.   | "Government officials also reiterated their commitment to fighting corruption and impunity and referred to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General requesting support for a national commission of inquiry into the 2009 assassinations."   | "Report of the Peacebuilding Commission mission to Guinea-Bissau, 16-21 January 2010." United Nations General Assembly Security Council. February 9, 2010. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/235/63/pdf/N1023563.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/235/63/pdf/N1023563.pdf?OpenElement</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.26                       | 70.82                                   |
| 43 | Guinea-Bissau                          | United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau                           | UNIOGBIS        | 2010-present  | 2019             | Tactic 1: What                  | Guinea-Bissau requested that UNIOGBIS provide assistance to combat drug trafficking and organization crime, including to develop a national strategic plan.                               | "At the request of State authorities, the United Nations will continue to provide assistance, including in the development of a national strategic plan on drug trafficking, organized crime and related threats and the functioning of an interministerial coordination mechanism."  | "Developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau." Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations Security Council. August 19, 2019. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/248/33/pdf/N1924833.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/248/33/pdf/N1924833.pdf?OpenElement</a>    | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.03                       | 72.18                                   |

|    | A       | B   | C               | D             | E                | F                         | G   | H   | I   | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|---------|---|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
|    | Country | Mission Name  | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic | Description of the Procedural Tactic  | Indicative Quote  | Source  | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 2  |         |   |                 |               |                  |                           |   |   |   |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 44 | Iraq    | United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq              | UNAMI           | 2003-present  | 2001             | Tactic 3: Who             | Iraq declared 5 international staff persona non grata, claiming that they were participating in activities that threaten national security.   | "In a note verbale dated 2 September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq informed the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator of the Government's decision to declare persona non grata five international staff members of the Office, and requested that they depart from Iraq within 72 hours. According to that note, the Government's decision to expel the staff members concerned was "due to their performing of activities that infringe the national security of the Republic of Iraq, which are inconsistent with their assigned responsibilities". The staff members concerned were the Assistant Humanitarian Coordinator for Observation, the Legal Adviser, the Senior Reports Officer, a reports officer and a data analyst."   | "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1360 (2001) (S/2001/919)." United Nations Security Council, September 28, 2001. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/report-secretary-general-pursuant-paragraph-5-resolution-1360-2001-s2001919">https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/report-secretary-general-pursuant-paragraph-5-resolution-1360-2001-s2001919</a> . See also "Iraq expels five UN staff; UN protests." Reuters, September 5, 2001. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-expels-five-un-staff-un-protests">https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-expels-five-un-staff-un-protests</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.70                       | 167.97                                  |
| 45 | Iraq    | United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq              | UNAMI           | 2003-present  | 2004             | Tactic 3: Who             | Iraq declared 10 UN international staff either persona non grata or requested that these staff withdraw from the country under various pretexts or after they raised unsubstantiated allegations.   | "Between December 1996 and March 2003, about 10 UN international staff were either declared persona non grata by the former Iraqi Government or were requested to be withdrawn from the country under various pretexts or following unsubstantiated allegations."   | "Iraq: Oil-for-food programme responsibilities." February 26, 2004. UN Office of the Iraq Programme. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-oil-for-food-programme-responsibilities">https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-oil-for-food-programme-responsibilities</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.70                       | 167.97                                  |
| 46 | Kosovo  | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo | UNMIK           | 1999-present  | 2019             | Tactic 3: Who             | Kosovo declared a UN official persona non grata.  | "The international staff member received medical treatment in local hospitals and was subsequently transferred to a hospital in Belgrade. He was declared "persona non grata" by Kosovo authorities, a doctrine that is not applicable to, or in respect of, United Nations personnel."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2019/797)." October 4, 2019. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/report-secretary-general-united-nations-interim-administration-mission-kosovo-2019797">https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/report-secretary-general-united-nations-interim-administration-mission-kosovo-2019797</a>  | Integrated Takeover       | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | n/a                         | 287.66                                  |
| 47 | Uberia  | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Uberia   | UNDO            | 1997-2003     | 2002             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Government of Uberia declared a state of emergency and imposed an exit visa on everyone leaving the country, including UN staff.  | "The situation in Monrovia was reportedly tense and some people have started leaving towards the interior of the country or across the border into Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. As a result, the Liberian Government declared a 'state of emergency' on 8 February and reinforced security on the road leading to Klay Junction, 58km from Monrovia. The Government also imposed an exit visa on everyone leaving the country, including UN staff."   | "WFP Emergency Report No. 07 of 2002." February 15, 2002. World Food Program. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-emergency-report-no-07-2002">https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-emergency-report-no-07-2002</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -1.72                       | 26.50                                   |
| 48 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015-2016        | Tactic 1: What            | The Government of Uberia delayed passing budget legislation, which then prevented the UN mission from funding activities within its mandate.  | "One of the potentially serious consequences of the political wrangling in the legislature was a delay in adopting the National Budget for 2016-2017, which he said included the financing of the National Elections Commission. Last week, the Government had announced the closure of several radio stations, with opposition groups perceiving those closures as the Government's attempt to muzzle the independent press."  | "Upcoming Elections Pose 'Critical Test' for Uberia to Sustain Security Gains, Top United Nations Officials Tell Security Council." United Nations Security Council, 7761ST Meeting, S/12490, August 25, 2016. <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12490.doc.htm">https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12490.doc.htm</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 49 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015-2016        | Tactic 4: When            | The Government of Uberia delayed passing key legislation to enable planned mission Statebuilding activities.  | "Some of the planned activities could not be fully implemented owing to delays in the passage of key security legislation, such as the Uberia National Police Act, the Uberia Immigration Service Act and the Firearms and Ammunition Control Act, which were passed between March and May 2016. Although the Firearms and Ammunition Control Act was signed into law on 17 July 2016, the Police Act and the Immigration Service Act remained pending, awaiting approval by the President. The establishment of oversight mechanisms within the Uberia National Police and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation was therefore delayed. In order to expedite the establishment of those mechanisms and the broader implementation of the pending security legislation, related regulations and administrative instructions were drafted during the reporting period. The implementation of other planned rule of law support activities was also affected by delays in the completion of reviews by the Government of key policy frameworks, such as the National Security Strategy, owing to the priority accorded to the security transition."  | "Budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Uberia for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016." United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, December 2, 2016. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 50 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015-2016        | Tactic 4: When            | Because the Uberian government controlled developing and validating the relevant policing policies, the UN mission was delayed in meeting its target of implementing 50% of the recommendations that resulted from the Management and Accountability Review of the Police, Prosecution and Judiciary.   | "The decrease in the percentage of recommendations implemented was owing to the delayed development and validation of relevant policies by national counterparts. The 50 per cent target is expected to be met during the next reporting period."   | "Budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Uberia for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016." United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, December 2, 2016. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 51 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015-2016        | Tactic 4: When            | Because the Government of Uberia was responsible for releasing the budget funds for training corrections and rehabilitation officers, the UN mission trained fewer officers than the targeted amounts due to delays in funding.   | "30 corrections and rehabilitation officers were trained in advanced security and the use of non-lethal force. The reduced number of officers trained was owing to delays in the release of funds for the training by the Government."  | "Budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Uberia for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016." United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, December 2, 2016. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/412/51/pdf/N1641251.pdf?Op=enElement</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 52 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015             | Tactic 4: When            | The Uberian government delayed passing key legislation to assume security functions from UNMIL as specified in the transition plan.   | "The Panel notes that the foregoing constraints are highlighted in the Government's UNMIL transition plan. Approved by the National Security Council on 6 March 2015, the plan provides details of the Government's proposals to assume the security responsibilities currently performed by UNMIL as the Mission accelerates the process of phasing out its security role. The responsibilities cover all aspects of maintaining security throughout Uberia. Although the executive branch and both houses of the Legislature have committed themselves to implementing the Plan, early indications are that implementation will be significantly delayed without strong bilateral and multilateral support and pressure. The financial shortcomings of the plan appear serious. The first meeting of the joint implementation committee, which includes senior government officials, leaders of security agencies, UNMIL and the Ambassador of the United States of America, was held on 3 June 2015, two months behind schedule. UNMIL and government office is informed the Panel that the group had focused on the Government's current budgetary allocation for the plan. The Government had estimated the entire cost of the three-year plan to be \$104.8 million, with an additional \$11.5 million for the related cost of a joint justice and security programme. Government expenditure on the plan had been estimated at \$76.1 million for fiscal year 2015/16, but only \$15 million had actually been allocated to the plan in the draft budget for that period." | "Letter dated 21 July 2015 from the Panel of Experts on Uberia established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) addressed to the President of the Security Council." United Nations Security Council, July 23, 2015. <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2015/558">https://undocs.org/S/2015/558</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 53 | Uberia  | United Nations Mission in Uberia                        | UNMIL           | 2003-2018     | 2015             | Tactic 4: When            | The Government of Uberia expressed its desire to see UNMIL extended through the 2017 elections, and the Security Council then voted to extend the mission through 2018.   | "During a meeting held on 3 March 2016, the Deputy Minister of Defence informed the Panel that the Government is prepared to take ownership of and responsibility for the security sector. However, the Deputy Minister also highlighted some key concerns regarding the goal of meeting all of the established benchmarks by the 30 June 2016 security transition deadline, delays in finalizing the legal framework which required a review of the harmonization issue, and severe budgetary constraints. He also mentioned the inability of the Government to influence the actions of the legislature as one of the key challenges to be overcome. Sources in the Government expressed the wish to see UNMIL ensure the safety of Uberia at least until the 2017 elections."  | "Letter dated 15 April 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Uberia established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) addressed to the President of the Security Council." United Nations Security Council Report, April 15, 2016. <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B686B8F-CF98-6027-4EBC-8D3-CE4F-F96F7967%5B%2016_348.pdf">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B686B8F-CF98-6027-4EBC-8D3-CE4F-F96F7967%5B%2016_348.pdf</a> . See also "Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission in Uberia. Adopting Resolution 2333 (2016) by 12 Votes in Favour, 3 Abstentions." United Nations Security Council, 7851ST Meeting, S/12654, December 23, 2016. | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.39                       | 170.11                                  |
| 54 | Uberia  | United Nations Support Mission in Uberia                | UNSMIL          | 2011-present  | 2014-2018        | Tactic 1: What            | UNSMIL staff were not able to visit government-controlled detention facilities to observe the treatment and due process of detained citizens.   | "Despite repeated requests, UNSMIL was unable to visit prisons and other detention facilities in eastern Uberia under the control of the military police or the Libyan National Army since 2014. Despite repeated requests, UNSMIL continued to be denied access to the Mitiga detention facility, where an estimated 2,600 men, women and children are believed to be held, most without charge or trial."   | "United Nations Support Mission in Uberia. Report of the Secretary-General." August 24, 2018. <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sr-report-on-unsmil_s_2018_780_e.pdf">https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sr-report-on-unsmil_s_2018_780_e.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.31                       | 41.64                                   |
| 55 | Uberia  | United Nations Support Mission in Uberia                | UNSMIL          | 2011-present  | 2018             | Tactic 1: What            | UNSMIL staff were not able to visit government-controlled detention facilities to observe the treatment and due process of detained citizens.   | "Despite repeated requests, the Mission was not able to visit the Mitiga detention facility, controlled by the Special Deterrance Force, where some 2,600 people were held in December. UNSMIL continued to receive credible reports of torture and other ill-treatment, poor detention conditions, medical neglect and the denial of visits from family and lawyers...UNSMIL has raised concerns in writing and other official communications with relevant authorities."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Uberia." February 12, 2018. <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s1803952.pdf">https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s1803952.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.31                       | 41.64                                   |
| 56 | Uberia  | United Nations Support Mission in Uberia                | UNSMIL          | 2011-present  | 2019             | Tactic 1: What            | UNSMIL staff continued to face difficulties in obtaining permission to visit prisons under the control of the Ministry of Justice and the judicial police, particularly in the east. In a meeting with UNSMIL in early July regarding visits to Kuwayfah prison, east of Benghazi, and the Gernada prison in Bayda', General Abdul Razeq al-Naduri, the chief of staff of the Ubyan National Army, instructed the military prosecutor in Benghazi to facilitate visits according to formal procedures." | "UNSMIL continued to face difficulties in obtaining permission to visit prisons under the control of the Ministry of Justice and the judicial police, particularly in the east. In a meeting with UNSMIL in early July regarding visits to Kuwayfah prison, east of Benghazi, and the Gernada prison in Bayda', General Abdul Razeq al-Naduri, the chief of staff of the Ubyan National Army, instructed the military prosecutor in Benghazi to facilitate visits according to formal procedures."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Uberia." August 26, 2019. <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sr_report_on_unsmil_s_2019_628e.pdf">https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sr_report_on_unsmil_s_2019_628e.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.31                       | 41.64                                   |

|    | A            | B  | C               | D             | E                | F                               | G  | H   | I   | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|--------------|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------------|--|---|---|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
|    | Country      | Mission Name   | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic       | Description of the Procedural Tactic   | Indicative Quote  | Source  | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 2  |              |  |                 |               |                  |                                 |  |   |   |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 57 | Mali         | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali | MINUSMA         | 2013-present  | 2020             | Tactic 3: Who                   | Mali declared the MINUSMA Head of Office persona non grata after he delivered remarks to congress that were interpreted to challenge the government's authority.   | "The MINUSMA Head of Office in Kidal delivered remarks at the latter congress, which were interpreted by the Government as a challenge to Mali's sovereignty. On 10 December, the Government issued a communiqué declaring him persona non grata."<br><br>"In a separate development, the Malian government declared the head of MINUSMA in Kidal 'persona non grata', after his remarks at the congress of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)"  | <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/situation-mali-report-secretary-general-s2019983">https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/situation-mali-report-secretary-general-s2019983</a> ;<br><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/acted-regional-overview-africa-8-14-december-2019">https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/acted-regional-overview-africa-8-14-december-2019</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -0.90                       | 74.27                                   |
| 58 | Nepal        | United Nations Mission in Nepal  | UNMIN           | 2007-2010     | 2010             | Tactic 4: When                  | The Government of Nepal requested that UNMIN not extend its mandate and leave before the peace process was completed.  | "The United Nations mission established to monitor Nepal's peace process, Unmin, is scheduled to leave the country on Saturday amid uncertainty about its future. The mission is closing after Nepal's warring political parties agreed not to extend its mandate last September. In a last-minute compromise deal, the government and the Maoists have agreed to take over the UN's monitoring duties... But despite [its] success, Nepal is still a long way from concluding its peace process and writing a new democratic constitution... Many of the conditions of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement have yet to be fulfilled. The Nepalese Army has not been restructured. More than 19,000 former Maoist fighters remain in cantons around the country, their weapons under UN supervision. A deal to either integrate them into the security forces or rehabilitate them into civilian life has stalled because of distrust between the Maoists and an alliance of the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)... The peace process in Nepal has been deadlocked since the collapse of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML coalition government in June."   | "Uncertainty in Nepal as UN mission ends." BBC. January 15, 2011. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12184250">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12184250</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -0.71                       | 24.74                                   |
| 59 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone                                   | UNAMSIL         | 1999-2005     | 2002             | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 4: When  | The Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations outlined his wishes for what activities should be included in the new phase of the UNAMSIL mandate.   | "As you correctly described it, a new phase of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) operation is about to begin, while at the same time, the escalating conflict in Liberia is threatening to destabilize the entire area once again. Therefore, I thought I should share with you my thinking on the manner of accomplishing our common objectives for my country so eloquently articulated by the President of the Security Council and your good self. In my view, this process should be linked to the following: (a) The ongoing restructuring of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and other security institutions in the country; (b) The completion of reorganization, training and equipping the police with the objective of bringing the current grossly inadequate number to at least the pre-war level; (c) The ability of these forces and institutions to perform their respective functions more effectively throughout the territory of Sierra Leone; (d) The status of, and prospects for, integrating all ex-combatants, taking into account that lack of progress in this regard could lead to frustrations that could also threaten the maintenance of law and order and the consolidation of peace; (e) The need for reliable security during the proceedings of the Special Court; (f) The plans now under way for decentralization and the delegation of certain governmental authority to elected local governments; (g) The conflict and fragile political and security situation in Liberia and its repercussions for peace and stability in the Mano River subregion, not forgetting (i) that the 10-year rebel war in Sierra Leone was launched from the territory of Liberia; and (ii) that the former field commander of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sam Bockarie, is still in Liberia; (h) The pending definitive response to the Security Council's request that the Secretary-General consider what support the international community, and in particular the United Nations, might provide to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to ensure security on the borders shared by Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone; (i) The fact that general elections in Liberia are less than a year away, and that at the moment there is no military presence of the United Nations in Liberia; and (j) That there is as yet no discernible plan for possible United Nations involvement in the crucial preparatory process for free, credible and inclusive elections in Liberia." | "Letter from the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General (5/2002/975)." United Nations Security Council. August 29, 2002. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/letter-president-republic-sierra-leone-secretary-general-s2002975">https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/letter-president-republic-sierra-leone-secretary-general-s2002975</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.38                       | 56.82                                   |
| 60 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone                                   | UNAMSIL         | 1999-2005     | 2003             | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 4: When  | The Government of Sierra Leone either made slow or insufficient progress toward addressing security concerns and economic recovery plans, making it difficult for UNAMSIL to execute its mandate.                                    | "Since the successful elections on 14 May of that year, however, the donor community and the people of Sierra Leone have grown increasingly frustrated with stagnating reform and recovery. The government has failed to offer a clear direction, and there are consistent signs that donor dependence and the old political ways are returning. Many are questioning the government's commitment and capacity to address the long list of internal challenges, ranging from security concerns and economic recovery through implementation of a broad spectrum of institutional reforms. The longer the issues are left unaddressed, the harder it will be to keep the peace process on track... The government needs to take a stronger leadership role in the rehabilitation process. Its performance has been disappointing, and complacency appears to have set in. While reform rhetoric abounds, action has yet to follow. There are three main areas of concern... Thirdly, the government has failed to make significant progress on governance reforms since its resounding electoral victory. There is no systematic plan for decentralisation. While elections for paramount chiefs have taken place in 2003, and some semblance of traditional authority has returned to most areas, these communities remain essentially isolated with little monetary or administrative assistance from Freetown. Local elections are scheduled to take place by the end of the year, but given inadequate infrastructure, they are likely to be postponed until early 2004, and few expect them to bring real change."  | "Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance." International Crisis Group. ICG Africa Report N°67. September 2, 2003. <a href="https://d2071andvipowj.doufront.net/67-sierra-leone-the-state-of-security-and-governance.pdf">https://d2071andvipowj.doufront.net/67-sierra-leone-the-state-of-security-and-governance.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.38                       | 56.82                                   |
| 61 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone                                   | UNAMSIL         | 1999-2005     | 2005             | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 4: When  | Due to delayed expansion of the police training school, UNAMSIL was not able to meet a number of planned activities, such as recruiting and training new officers and deploying more police officers to areas of high insecurity.    | "Indicators of achievement] Not fully achieved due to attrition and delayed expansion of police training school to accommodate the recruits per intake."  | "Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005." Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly. December 23, 2005. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/662/99/pdf/N0566299.pdf?Op enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/662/99/pdf/N0566299.pdf?Op enElement</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.38                       | 56.82                                   |
| 62 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone                         | UNIOSIL         | 2005-2008     | 2007             | Tactic 4: When                  | The Government of Sierra Leone requested that the UN extended UNIOSIL's mandate.   | "However, progress and successful implementation of the above-mentioned priority tasks would require the continued engagement and support of the international community, not only as development partners, but also within the peacebuilding and consolidation processes. For this reason, the continued political presence of the United Nations in 2008, represented by a high-level official, as has been the case, is most necessary. I am therefore requesting, and through you the Security Council, that the presence of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone be extended, as currently structured, and with the same institutional link with the Secretariat, through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for a further one year after the end of December 2007."   | "Letter dated 8 November 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council." United Nations Security Council. November 8, 2007. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/590/50/pdf/N0759050.pdf?Op enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/590/50/pdf/N0759050.pdf?Op enElement</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.34                       | 69.81                                   |
| 63 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone                         | UNIOSIL         | 2005-2008     | 2006             | Tactic 1: What                  | Due to a lack of documentation from the government of Sierra Leone, UNIOSIL was unable to organize as many committee meetings as they had planned on support for the diamond sector.   | "1 emergency High-Level Diamond Steering Committee meeting was held [out of 6 planned meetings]. This was due to the Government's state of preparedness to make submissions to such high-level meetings. High-level meetings were indefinitely postponed owing to lack of proper documentation on the part of the Government"   | "Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006." Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly. December 27, 2006. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/684/67/pdf/N0668467.pdf?Op enElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/684/67/pdf/N0668467.pdf?Op enElement</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.34                       | 69.81                                   |
| 64 | Sierra Leone | United Nations Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone                      | UNIPSIL         | 2008-2013     | 2012             | Tactic 3: Who                   | Official expelled due to alleged relations with opposition leader.   | "In 2012, Schulenberg unceremoniously left the country amidst speculation about soured relations with the then government of Ernest Bai Koroma. It later emerged that he had been declared persona non grata and ordered to leave the country over his alleged relations with the opposition."  | "Triumphant return for ex UN diplomat expelled from Sierra Leone." January 24, 2020. APA News. <a href="http://apanews.net/en/news/triumphant-return-for-ex-un-diplomat-expelled-from-sierra-leone">http://apanews.net/en/news/triumphant-return-for-ex-un-diplomat-expelled-from-sierra-leone</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VI  | -1.15                       | 66.68                                   |
| 65 | Somalia      | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia                             | UNSOM           | 2013-present  | 2019             | Tactic 3: Who                   | Somalia declared the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) persona non grata because he was accused of criticizing the current president. | "According to news reports, Mr. Haysom was accused of violating diplomatic rules and overstepping his authority by the Government, in questioning the legal basis for the arrest of a former al-Shabab deputy leader early last month, who was standing for election in South West state." The Secretary-General deeply regrets the decision of the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia to declare the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Nicholas Haysom, persona non grata."   | "UN teaches Somalia diplomacy language: 'doctrine of persona non grata does not apply to United Nations personnel'". MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network). January 5, 2019 Saturday. <a href="https://advance-leis-com.provau-wrfs.org/sites/document?collection=news&amp;id=urn:contentitem:5V49-1451-JCNX-33YD-00000-00&amp;context=1516831">https://advance-leis-com.provau-wrfs.org/sites/document?collection=news&amp;id=urn:contentitem:5V49-1451-JCNX-33YD-00000-00&amp;context=1516831</a> . See also- <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db190104.doc.htm">https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db190104.doc.htm</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -2.22                       | 93.94                                   |
| 66 | Somalia      | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia                             | UNSOM           | 2013-present  | 2019             | Tactic 1: What; Tactic 2: Where | Somali authorities extorted funds, appropriated assets, forced some offices to close or shutdown.  | "In...Somalia...attempts by both local authorities and non-State groups to extort funds or appropriate assets from humanitarian actors have resulted in routine harassment, leading in some cases to the closure of offices of humanitarian organizations or the detention of staff. Demands for payment can involve tens of thousands of dollars per agency and are often made outside of official channels. When such fees were not paid or local authorities and humanitarian actors disagreed about operational requirements, humanitarian projects have been shut down by the authorities."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_A150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_A150.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPA            | Chapter VII | -2.22                       | 93.94                                   |



|    | A           | B  | C               | D             | E                | F                         | G  | H  | I  | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|----|-------------|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|--|--|--|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
|    | Country     | Mission Name   | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic | Description of the Procedural Tactic   | Indicative Quote   | Source   | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| 2  |             |  |                 |               |                  |                           |  |  |  |                           |                 |             |                             |   |
| 67 | South Sudan | United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan    | UNMISS          | 2011-present  | 2015             | Tactic 3: Who             | South Sudan expelled the deputy chief of the UN mission (UNMISS), suggesting that the reason was due to the deputy chief's recent criticism of the government and increased sectarian fighting.  | "The South Sudanese government has decided to expel Toby Lanzer, the outspoken deputy chief of the United Nations mission to the country, UN officials said Monday. The announcement came after Lanzer was refused entry into South Sudan as he tried to return to wrap up official business ahead of the end of his assignment there later this month. Authorities in Juba have not offered an official explanation for the decision, but the UN has suggested that it stems from Lanzer's critique of the government and the rebels over the recent increase in sectarian fighting."   | "South Sudan expels UN aid coordinator." June 6, 2015. Deutsche Welle. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-expels-un-aid-coordinator/a-184912847">https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-expels-un-aid-coordinator/a-184912847</a> maca=en-  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 141.18                                  |
| 68 | South Sudan | United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan    | UNMISS          | 2011-present  | 2016             | Tactic 3: Who             | Three aid workers were killed. Sudan expelled, declared persona non grata, or deported four senior aid workers. UN official expelled due to previous membership in IGAD. Aid staff were also denied access to areas around Yei, Mundri, and Wau. | "The operating environment deteriorated during the quarter. Three aid workers were killed in October, including one in an armed ambush on a marked NGO vehicle outside of Torit. In November, 100 humanitarian access incidents were reported, the highest in any month since June 2015. Four senior aid workers were declared persona non grata, expelled or deported from South Sudan. There were 22 cases of withdrawal of staff or suspension of activities during the quarter. Twenty-one cases of looting were reported, and aid workers were denied access on several occasions to areas outside of Yei, Mundri and Wau towns."   | "2016 South Sudan Humanitarian Response Fourth Quarter In Review." June 2, 2017. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/2016-south-sudan-humanitarian-response-fourth-quarter-review">https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/2016-south-sudan-humanitarian-response-fourth-quarter-review</a> ; <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-unhcr-operational-update-082016-15-30-april-2016">https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-unhcr-operational-update-082016-15-30-april-2016</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 141.18                                  |
| 69 | South Sudan | United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan    | UNMISS          | 2011-present  | 2016             | Tactic 3: Who             | South Sudan expelled a UN official due to his previous membership in IGAD.   | "On April, Aly Verjee, the former acting chief of staff for the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC), which oversees the implementation of peace deal, departed South Sudan after being declared persona non grata in the country."  | "South Sudan UNHCR Operational Update 08/2016, 15-30 April 2016." May 6, 2016. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-unhcr-operational-update-082016-15-30-april-2016">https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-unhcr-operational-update-082016-15-30-april-2016</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 141.18                                  |
| 70 | South Sudan | United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan    | UNMISS          | 2011-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 1: What            | State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.   | "Attacks on humanitarian workers and convoys and the looting of supplies and assets continue to threaten humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. State security forces, non-State armed groups or criminal groups have all been implicated in these kinds of incidents. For example, during the reporting period, in South Sudan at least 51 humanitarian vehicles were commandeered by soldiers for non-humanitarian purposes."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.88                       | 141.18                                  |
| 71 | Sudan       | United Nations Mission in the Sudan                      | UNMIS           | 2005-2011     | 2006             | Tactic 3: Who             | Sudan accused a UN special envoy of being in contact with rebel groups and of spreading misinformation about armed forces and declared them persona non grata.   | "The Sudanese military declared the United Nations special envoy Jan Pronk persona non grata Friday, accusing him of "waging war" against the armed forces."   | "Sudanese Army Says U.N. Envoy Is Declared Persona Non Grata." October 21, 2006. New York Times. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/world/africa/21sudan.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/world/africa/21sudan.html</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.40                       | 49.62                                   |
| 72 | Sudan       | United Nations Mission in the Sudan                      | UNMIS           | 2005-2011     | 2007             | Tactic 3: Who             | Sudan declared EU, Canadian, and UN envoys as persona non grata.   | "The Sudanese Foreign Ministry had declared them persona non grata "for involving themselves in activities that constitute an interference in the internal affairs of the country."  | Sudan tells EU and Canadian envoys to leave." August 23, 2007. Reuters. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-tells-eu-and-canadian-envoys-leave">https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-tells-eu-and-canadian-envoys-leave</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.40                       | 49.62                                   |
| 73 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2014             | Tactic 3: Who             | Sudan declared the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the UNDP Country Director as persona non grata.  | "Last week the Government of Sudan declared the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) Ali Al-Za'tari and UNDP Country Director Yvonne Helle as persona non grata, according to a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UNDP Director was requested to leave Sudan reportedly due to her bias against the Government and for "stopping financial support to several strategic projects and programmes which produced developmental, political and economic benefits for Sudan", according to the statement. The ministry's statement also reported that the RC/HC was requested to leave Sudan due to allegedly offending the Sudanese people and their political leadership in an interview with the Norwegian Bistandsaktuell newspaper. The UN Secretary-General condemned the Government of Sudan's decision to expel the two senior UN officials and called on the Government of Sudan to reverse its decision immediately and to cooperate fully with all United Nations entities present in Sudan." | "Sudan: Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 52   22 – 28 December 2014 [EN/AR]." December 28, 2014. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-bulletin-issue-52-22-28-december-2014-enar">https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-bulletin-issue-52-22-28-december-2014-enar</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 74 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2011             | Tactic 3: Who             | The Government of Sudan delayed mission activities by denying and/or delaying visas for UN personnel.  | "In...the Sudan... humanitarian activities are significantly hampered by the denial of visas or delays in their issuance to international experts."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 75 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 2: Where           | The Government of Sudan restricted UN staff movement in the country by refusing to issue travel permits.   | "In the Sudan...the Government refused to issue travel permits to international staff of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to coordinate humanitarian activities in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States for the first seven months of the humanitarian crisis, which began in mid-2011. A handful of international staff were granted permission to return to state capitals in February 2012, but international humanitarian workers have been unable to travel beyond them to any affected areas. While some national humanitarian workers have been able to cooperate with authorities to provide assistance in Government-held areas, all requests for travel to areas under the control of non-State armed groups have been refused. As a result, some 500,000 conflict-affected people in those two states have received limited or no humanitarian assistance."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 76 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2011-2013        | Tactic 3: Who             | The Sudanese government cancelled humanitarian missions in Darfur and restricted services for internally displaced persons in rebel controlled areas.  | "In Darfur, state authorities cancelled dozens of humanitarian missions in the past 18 months, particularly to areas under the control of armed groups such as Jebel Marra. In Central and Northern Darfur States, the intermittent cancellation of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service by the authorities and a lack of clarity about procedures for controlling the movement of fuel have limited travel by humanitarian personnel to deep field locations. A ban by local authorities in Southern Darfur on movements beyond a 15-km radius around Nyala has significantly restricted the provision of humanitarian services and assistance to camps for internally displaced persons in the area."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 77 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2012             | Tactic 2: Where           | Sudan restricted humanitarian access to Central and Western Darfur states.   | "Following an outbreak of renewed fighting in April 2012...the authorities in Central and Western Darfur States have restricted access to all areas controlled by armed groups and prevented humanitarian actors from responding to new displacements in Bokoro."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 78 | Sudan       | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  | UNAMID          | 2007-present  | 2012             | Tactic 1: What            | State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.   | "Attacks on humanitarian workers and convoys and the looting of supplies and assets continue to threaten humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. State security forces, non-State armed groups or criminal groups have all been implicated in these kinds of incidents. For example, during the reporting period, in South Sudan at least 51 humanitarian vehicles were commandeered by soldiers for non-humanitarian purposes."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -1.10                       | 37.44                                   |
| 79 | Tajikistan  | United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding        | UNTOP           | 2000-2007     | 2004             | Tactic 1: What            | The Government of Tajikistan was able to direct the UNTOP's activities toward less confrontational parts of their mandate.   | "The OSCE and the UN have been quite muted in their criticisms of the regime and have often directed their activities into less confrontational arenas. Though many privately acknowledge the government's spotty record on human rights and political and economic reform, there is little inclination to push for deep changes."   | "Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?" International Crisis Group. Asia Briefing, May 19, 2004. <a href="https://d2071andvipdwj.cloudfront.net/tajikistan-s-politics-confrontation-or-consolidation.pdf">https://d2071andvipdwj.cloudfront.net/tajikistan-s-politics-confrontation-or-consolidation.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding DPPA        |                 | Chapter VII | -1.19                       | 26.69                                   |
| 80 | Timor-Leste | United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor | UNTAET          | 1999-2002     |                  |                           |  |  |  | Integrated Takeover       | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | n/a                         | 222.35                                  |
| 81 | Timor-Leste | United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor          | UNMIST          | 2002-2005     | 2003             | Tactic 1: What            | UNMIST temporarily handed over responsibility for the defence of an area of operation to the Timor-Leste defence force at the request of the Government.   | "In response to a request from the Government, UNMIST temporarily handed over responsibility for the defence of an area of operations around these villages to permit the Timor-Leste defence force (Falintil-FDTL) to conduct a sweeping operation. In the following days more than 90 people were arrested, all but 39 of whom were released immediately by the police. Those remaining in custody were sent to Dili for further judicial action and subsequently released by a Timorese judge."   | "Special report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (S/2003/243)." United Nations Security Council. March 13, 2003. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/special-report-secretary-general-un-mission-support-east-timor-s2003243">https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/special-report-secretary-general-un-mission-support-east-timor-s2003243</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VII | -0.73                       | 193.41                                  |

| A           | B  | C               | D             | E                | F                         | G   | H  | I  | J                         | K               | L           | M                           | N                                       |
|-------------|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|---|--|--|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Country     | Mission Name   | Mission Acronym | Mission Years | Year of Incident | Type of Procedural Tactic | Description of the Procedural Tactic  | Indicative Quote   | Source   | Statebuilding Arrangement | Type of mission | UN Chapter  | State capacity <sup>1</sup> | Average Net ODA per capita <sup>2</sup> |
| Timor-Leste | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor - Leste             | UNMIT           | 2006-2012     | 2006             | Tactic 1: What            | Timor-Leste requested that the UN establish a political mission in Timor-Leste after the completion of the prior mission, UNTIL. This new mission became UNMIT. | "Following consultations with President Xanana Gusmão, I am prepared to inform Your Excellency that we agree that the current United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) should come to an end on 20 May 2006. However, in view of the political consolidation, which the elections are part of, namely the planned elections for the National Parliament and Presidency in 2007, we would like to request that the United Nations consider establishing in Timor-Leste a special political office with the following components: 1. Electoral assistance to provide the Government with technical and logistical support; 2. Civilian advisers. As Your Excellency is aware, while we have made continuing progress during the UNOTIL mandate, there are critical areas that remain in need of secured and steady assistance, namely, in the justice and finance sectors; 3. Timor-Leste still needs support in the area of police training. Although, this can be provided through bilateral arrangements it is important to keep United Nations involvement in the training programme. Also, in view of the forthcoming elections in 2007 and the need to ensure an enhanced dialogue and cooperation between East Timorese and Indonesian security elements in order to prevent tensions and conflicts along the border, we believe the deployment of some 15 to 20 military liaison personnel as part of the special political office would be of crucial importance." | "Letter dated 20 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General." United Nations Security Council. January 20, 2006. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/216/08/pdf/N0621608.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/216/08/pdf/N0621608.pdf?OpenElement</a> | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VI  | -1.20                       | 142.66                                  |
| Timor-Leste | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor - Leste             | UNMIT           | 2006-2012     | 2006             | Tactic 1: What            | The government decided to largely ignore UNMIT recommendations on how to improve the police and have elected to chart their own course.                         | "While it is easy and at times popular to pour blame on the UN, the Timorese Government has made the decision to go it alone. Enabled by growing political confidence and a massive petro-dollar fueled 450% increase in the national budget over the past three years, the Timorese Government has elected to largely ignore the UN on matters relating to the reform of the security sector. Rather it has merged the police and military under a combined Ministry of Defence and Security, so as to minimize rivalry and build confidence."  | "Time for the UN to Withdraw From East Timor?" The Atlantic December 23, 2010<br><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/time-for-the-un-to-withdraw-from-east-timor/68334/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/time-for-the-un-to-withdraw-from-east-timor/68334/</a>   | Statebuilding Contract    | Peacekeeping    | Chapter VI  | -1.20                       | 142.66                                  |
| Yemen       | Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen | OSESGY          | 2011-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 2: Where           | Security checkpoints controlled by various armed groups in Yemen impeded humanitarian access and movement.  | "In 2011, hundreds of checkpoints controlled by various armed groups significantly hindered the movement of humanitarian workers in and around the capital of Yemen, Sana'a. While most were removed at the end of the year, some remain in place and continue to hamper the movement of humanitarian workers and goods."  | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council.<br><a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_report_4150.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPPA           | Chapter VII | -1.15                       | 85.46                                   |
| Yemen       | Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen | OSESGY          | 2011-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 1: What            | State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.  | "Attacks on humanitarian workers and convoys and the looting of supplies and assets continue to threaten humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. State security forces, non-State armed groups and criminal groups have all been implicated in these kinds of incidents. For example, during the reporting period, in South Sudan at least 51 humanitarian vehicles were commandeered by soldiers for non-humanitarian purposes."   | "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict." May 22, 2012. UN Security Council.<br><a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_report_4150.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_R_report_4150.pdf</a>  | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPPA           | Chapter VII | -1.15                       | 85.46                                   |
| Yemen       | Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen | OSESGY          | 2011-present  | 2011-2012        | Tactic 3: Who             | Yemen expelled a UN official, arguing that they supported the opposition.   | UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein on Friday urged the Government of Yemen to reverse its decision to declare his Representative in the country persona non grata, saying that it was "unwarranted, counter-productive and damaging to the reputation of the Government and its coalition partners."  | "Zeid urges Yemen to reverse decision to expel top UN human rights official." January 8, 2016. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights<br><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/zeid-urges-yemen-reverse-decision-expel-top-un-human-rights-official">https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/zeid-urges-yemen-reverse-decision-expel-top-un-human-rights-official</a>    | Statebuilding Contract    | DPPPA           | Chapter VII | -1.15                       | 85.46                                   |

<sup>1</sup> State Capacity—This column is measured by World Bank Governance Indicators for Government Effectiveness in the first year of the mission. Data is unavailable for 1997; for missions that started in 1997, state capacity indicators are only available starting in 1996; for missions starting in 1995, 1996 data is used. Earlier data is coded as n/a.

<sup>2</sup> Average Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) are available in USD during Mission Years from the World-Bank Indicators. This column shows the average amount of aid during all of the mission years. Data is only available through 2018; missions that continue through the present are reported through 2018.



## **A.5 Codebook: Host state procedural tactics for UN post-conflict statebuilding missions (2000 to 2020)**

This dataset contains information on host state procedural tactics used in relation to of United Nations (UN) post-conflict statebuilding missions from 2000 to 2020, which are defined as United Nations (UN) peacekeeping or political missions whose mandate aims to strengthen the war-affected state’s domestic and international legitimacy by helping to build liberal democratic institutions grounded in rule of law and a market-based economy.

### *A.5.1 Scope Conditions*

This section describes our procedure to populate the list of United Nations post-conflict state-building missions. Research assistants used the following steps to arrive at the final list of missions:

1. Compile all the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and Peacekeeping missions that had years of operation after 2000. Missions are labelled as either DPPA or Peacekeeping.
2. Review the core tasks of the mission mandate to determine whether the mission’s primary mandate consisted of post-conflict state-building service delivery activities, which we define as activities that aim to strengthen the war-affected state’s domestic and international legitimacy by helping to build liberal democratic institutions grounded in rule of law and a market-based economy. International state-builders implement a series of projects and programs focused on stabilization, security sector reform, reform of the judicial system, socio-economic development, and democratic governance.
  - (a) Examples of missions with post-conflict state-building service delivery activities:
    - i. Liberia UNOL- “To support the efforts of the Government of Liberia to con-

solidate peace and democracy, and to promote national reconciliation and the rule of law, including the protection of human rights.”

- ii. Afghanistan UNAMA- “To support reconciliation and of advancing regional cooperation to promote security, stability and development in Afghanistan; to support political cohesion, support for the organization of elections, efforts towards a sustainable peace and alignment of international assistance with Government’s priorities, as well as human rights reporting and advocacy and support to national human rights institutions.”
- iii. Democratic Republic of Congo MONUSCO- “To provide protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”
- iv. Somalia UNSOM- “To support national reconciliation, provide strategic and policy advice on various aspects of peacebuilding and state-building, to monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community.”

(b) Examples of missions with excluded mandates, whose primary tasks were to liaise with the civilian authorities or provide support:

- i. Angola UNOA- “To liaise with political, military, police and other civilian authorities with a view to exploring measures for restoring peace, assisting the Angolan people in capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and the coordination of other activities.”
- ii. Central African Republic UNOCA- “To support preventive diplomacy and mediation in situations of tension or potential conflict.”

(c) Most Special Envoy and Personal Envoy missions were excluded, except if they included a significant state-building task.

- i. Special Envoy to Burundi- “To provide assistance to the efforts of the East African Community (EAC) for political dialogue among all Burundians as well as to lead and coordinate the UN political efforts to promote peace and sustainable development in Burundi.”
3. Review the dates of the mission to determine whether the mission’s years of operation were more than 24 months, or 2 years, and exclude all missions with mandates shorter than 24 months.
4. Review the dates of the mission to determine if the mission’s years of operation occurred after the primary peace agreement ending the conflict was signed and exclude missions that began prior to the promulgation of the peace agreement.

#### *A.5.2 Search Methodology*

This section describes our search procedure using Reliefweb (reliefweb.int), New Humanitarian (thenewhumanitarian.org), and the UN Reports to the Secretary General for each mission. Research assistants conducted searches of these sources and coded data using the following steps.

##### *Search Procedure: Relief Web*

1. Click on the “Search” link at the top of the page.
2. In the search dialogue box, enter your search terms: [Country name] AND [prevent OR blocked OR persona non grata OR block access OR access] AND [UN]. Other search terms include: [Mission acronym] AND [prevent OR blocked OR persona non grata OR despite OR challenge OR access].

##### *Search Procedure: New Humanitarian*

1. Click on the search button on upper right of the page that is shaped like a magnifying glass.
2. In the search dialogue box that appears below, enter your search terms: [Country name] AND [prevent OR blocked OR persona non grata OR block access OR access] AND [UN]. Other search terms include: [Mission acronym] AND [prevent OR blocked OR persona non grata OR despite OR challenge OR access].

*Search Procedure: Reports to the Secretary General*

Research assistants located these documents on each of the relevant UN mission websites.

1. Begin with the newest listed story and proceed reverse chronologically. For each story, determine if this information contains relevant information to the data project. Then, determine if the resistance event occurs within the time frame of an active UN state-building mission in that country. Determine if the resistance incident was directed by state officials to UN state-building staff. If not, discard the story.
2. Sometimes many articles will cover a single resistance incident. Group those articles together as one incident. If there are separate incidents (defined as: different tactics or directed toward different UN staff) per year, code each incident separately but with the same year. Avoid double or triple counting a single event.
3. Sometimes, a single article will cover multiple resistance events. If the targets or resistance tactics vary, code these events as separate incidents. Sometimes a source will list the same tactic as being deployed in several countries (for example, “Somalia, Sudan, and Colombia all delayed visa processing for UN peacekeeping staff.” In these cases, list the tactic separately for each country.
4. Sometimes an article will not differentiate the type of UN staff that the state targeted with the resistance tactic. In these cases, confirm that the tactic was deployed during

the years when a state-building mission was active. If the article specifically mentions that the staff member was from a separate agency, such as the WHO, research assistants excluded the incident. If the article does not name the agency, researchers looked at the reporting agency to determine if the agency would have reported on incidents for state-building mission staff (ie, Secretary General reports and not WHO specific reports). If the reporting agency had a broad focus, and there was a state-building mission active during the incident years, assistants included the incident.

5. Code a resistance tactic as a separate event if the target(s) or resistance tactic(s) are different or if there is considerable time between each event (ie, the event occurs in the next calendar year). If the target(s) and tactic(s) are the same, but the events occur within the same calendar year, code as one event in that year.
6. If an article describes an ambiguous event, search for a more detailed description of the event in the relevant Report to the Secretary-General for that particular UN mission.
  - (a) For example, in article with an interview with the MONUC force commander, the article stated the following: “Q: Nevertheless, you have encountered numerous obstacles along the way. What are some of the primary difficulties you encountered during your time as MONUC force commander? A: There were some difficulties. I would say that we encountered some major problems when we were first trying to deploy our observers. I arrived in April 2000, but it was not until the end of the year that we obtained authorization to deploy them. Then, the deployment of troops was not easy, even though we had been given a green light under the Kampala accord and the Harare sub-plan - the famous disengagement/redeployment at the beginning of Phase III.”
  - (b) As it is difficult to ascertain from the above quote who was responsible for delaying the authorization to deploy UN observers, research assistants searched the relevant Reports to the Secretary-General for April-December 2000 and located a more

detailed description of the incident. These reports confirmed that it was the Congolese government who was reluctant to grant authorization for the observers.

#### *A.5.3 How to Read This Codebook*

*Variable Name* - Each variable has a designated variable name that will correspond with one or more columns in the data file.

*Variable Type* - Variable type refers to the form of the data entered. Possible types of variables include Date, Numeric, Categorical, and Text Entry.

*Variable Codes* - Below each description are relevant possible codes.

#### *A.5.4 Coding Procedure*

- Country
  - Type: Text Entry
  - The Countries column lists the country name.
- Mission Name
  - Type: Text Entry
  - Lists the full name for the United Nations state-building mission for the mission that was active during the years of the resistance event.
- Mission Acronym
  - Type: Text Entry
  - Lists the United Nations state-building mission acronym for the mission that was active during the years of the resistance event. Entered as yyyy-yyyy.

- Mission Years
  - Type: Date
  - Lists the years that the United Nations state-building mission was/is active. Missions that are ongoing are coded as YYYY-present. All other missions are coded as 4-digit year-4 digit year (or yyyy-yyyy).
- Year of Resistance Incident
  - Type: Date
  - Lists the year that the resistance incident occurred. If the source listed as resistance incident as occurring over multiple years but did not differentiate any differences in targeted actor(s) or tactic(s) during those years or if it is not possible to differentiate the tactic into separate years, this field lists a range of years. Entered as a 4 digit year (yyyy).
- Resistance Tactic Type
  - Type: Categorical
  - Indicates the type of event according to the following coding scheme:
    - \* Tactic 1: What- Tactics target the type of functions that forces, investigators, and/or prosecutors can serve. Tactics target the incident or cases over which they have jurisdiction or limit the terms of a mandate, either by specifying mission limitations or later invitations to join.
      - Example: When an opposition leader won, the government constricted UN actions with violent attacks, new restrictive legislation, and misinformation campaigns.
      - Example: State security forces attacked humanitarian workers and convoys, preventing humanitarian activities.

- Example: UNSMIL staff were not able to visit government-controlled detention facilities to observe the treatment and due process of detained citizens.
- \* Tactic 2: Where- Tactics target where the mission has its headquarters, where will it have its other offices or bases, where its personnel allowed to travel, purchase and rental agreements, transportation permits, and/or access to state facilities such as airports.
  - Example: Taliban officials made it difficult for UNAMA to reach populations in need by harassing and abusing UN staff members and by requiring male escorts for Muslim women to be able to meet with foreign workers.
  - Example: DRC prevented MONUC from accessing a uranium mine after it collapsed and killed several miners.
  - Example: Security checkpoints controlled by various armed groups in Yemen impeded humanitarian access and movement.
- \* Tactic 3: Who- Tactics target the classes of foreign personnel that are allowed into the country, the immunities that UN personnel have, whether particular individuals are allowed entry into the country. Tactics also target the terms of a mandate specifying force composition and size, SOFA, visa approval, persona non-grata statements, etc.
  - Example: Afghanistan officials asked one UNAMA official to leave the country. Example: Guatemala expelled the UN head of CICIG.
- \* Tactic 4: When- Tactics seek to limit how long the mission allowed in the country, the mission renewal process, the terms of the mission renewal, actions to transition a mission out, etc.
  - Example: Guatemala unilaterally terminated CICIG.

– Description of the Resistance Incident



- \* Type: Text Entry
  - \* Records a brief description of the resistance incident, the actor(s) targeted, and the extent of the disruption to the UN state-building mission.
- Indicative Quote
  - \* Type: Text Entry
  - \* Records a quote from the primary source that captures the extent and targets of the resistance incident.
- Source
  - Type: Text Entry
  - Lists the news article source that describes the resistance incident. Entries are listed as: Title of the document, Date, Source Name, Weblink to source location.
- State-building Contract Type
  - Type: Categorical
  - Categories missions by contract type. In integrated takeovers, which are present in U.N. transitional administrations, the intervening IO holds the residual rights of control over unspecified components of state-building agreement, preventing host-state resistance and change. In state-building contracts, regardless of the strength of the post-conflict country, the host state uses its residual rights of control over the unspecified components of state-building contracts to alter or resist aspects of the IO state-building effort.
    - \* State-building Contract
    - \* Integrated Takeover
- Type of mission
  - Type: Categorical

- Categorizes the mission as either Peacekeeping (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>) or DPPA (UN Political and Peacekeeping Affairs- <https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world>).
- \* DPPA
- \* Peacekeeping
- UN Chapter
  - Type: Categorical
  - Lists the relevant UN chapter for the state-building mission and is coded as either Chapter VI or Chapter VII. Missions are coded as Chapter VII if the mission’s mandate specifically invoked Chapter VII or if the mandate includes strong or binding language. Strong language includes words such as “decide,” “declare,” and “call upon” (Appiagyei-Atua, 2011). Missions are coded as Chapter VI if no chapter is reference or if weaker and/or non-binding language is used in the mandate. Weak language includes, “urge,” “recommend,” “encourage,” “welcomes,” “invites,” “acknowledges,” “takes note,” “requests,” “supporting” (Appiagyei-Atua, 2011). If there is a mixture of weak and strong language and no chapter is invoked in the mandate, the chapter is coded as Chapter VI.
  - \* Chapter VI
  - \* Chapter VII
- State Capacity
  - Type: Numeric
  - Lists the World Bank Governance Indicators for Government Effectiveness score in the first year of the mission. Data is universally unavailable for 1997; for missions that started in 1997, 1996 data was used. World Bank Governance Indicators are

only available starting in 1996; for missions starting in 1995, 1996 data was used. Earlier data is coded as n/a.

- Average ODA per capita in USD during Mission Years
  - Type: Numeric
  - Lists the Average Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) per capita in USD during the active Mission Years of the UN state-building mission from the World Bank Indicators. This column shows the average amount of aid during all of the mission years. Data is only available through 2018; missions that continue through the present are averaged through 2018.