

# Accountable to Whom? Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Recipient Countries\*

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April 24, 2023

## Abstract

When donors extend foreign aid, they often attach requirements. While requirements are intended to generate desirable policy reforms, they make recipient governments accountable to donors in addition to their citizens. How does the public in recipient countries view these requirements attached to development finance? We argue that individuals' assessment of aid requirements is a function of their trust in their own government and the foreign donor. When citizens trust their government, aid requirements activate sovereignty concerns, and individuals view them negatively. But when individuals distrust their government, they see requirements as a source of external accountability. Citizens also consider the donor; foreign accountability is welcome only if the donor is trusted. We test our argument using Afrobarometer data on public attitudes toward aid conditionality and an original survey fielded in Kenya, finding evidence that supports our contentions. Our study contributes to an understanding of accountability in global governance.

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\*We thank Ryan Briggs, Susanna Campbell, Lauren Ferry, Dan McDowell, Dan Nielson, Cleo O'Brien-Udry, and participants at the 2022 Meetings of the American Political Science Association and International Political Economy Society for helpful comments on previous drafts. The paper also benefited from feedback from participants at workshops at Cornell University and Syracuse University. Any errors are our own.

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# Introduction

There are numerous challenges involved in creating accountability in a global system (Grant and Keohane, 2005).<sup>1</sup> Governments, and especially democracies, are beholden to the governed (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999). Yet, governments are also responsive to an array of other actors in modern international politics, including international organizations (IOs), other states, and multinational corporations. If governments fail to enact desired reforms, provide diplomatic support to benefactors, or create attractive investment environments, they can face extensive repercussions — such penalties can even amount to regime change, on par with (or worse than) the punishment political leaders can face by disappointing their domestic supporters. Globalization, which strengthens supranational ties, could weaken domestic ones, making it harder for domestic publics to hold their leaders accountable. Such accountability gaps exacerbate concerns about a democratic deficit in global governance (Dahl, 1999).

At the same time, citizens might appreciate external accountability. Individuals may feel that an international actor has a better chance of holding their political leader to high standards than they do. In this case, they may be tolerant of encroachments on their country's sovereignty even though they limit the domestic public's authority over national policy. As long as an international authority roughly shares the public's preferences, individuals may prefer that their political leaders be held to international rather than domestic account. Citizens can then leverage interconnectedness with international actors under globalization by embracing the constraints they impose.<sup>2</sup> Despite the importance of these dynamics, we know little about how citizens feel about the outsourcing of accountability to foreign actors.

Foreign aid is a prominent case illustrative of these tensions. Aid donors often attach requirements to funds.<sup>3</sup> These can include *conditionality* applied by international organizations (IOs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as well as other requirements such as *tied aid* offered by emerging donors like China. In the former case, governments undertake policy reforms and are constrained in how they can spend aid (Ken-

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<sup>1</sup>We follow Grant and Keohane (2005, 29) in defining accountability as implying that “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.”

<sup>2</sup>Also see Keck and Sikkink (1998) on transnational advocacy networks.

<sup>3</sup>Foreign aid comes in many forms, including grants and loans. The degree of concessionality is mostly a function of the development level of the borrower; requirements can be attached regardless of the terms of repayment, if any. Accountability concerns are relevant wherever conditions are attached (i.e., across these various lending arrangements).

tikelenis, Stubbs and King, 2016; Clark and Dolan, 2021). In the latter case, aid favors suppliers from the donor country and can allow the donor privileged access to the recipient’s market (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2017; Zeitz, 2020; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2022). In sum, donors often hold significant leverage over recipients, which enables them to attach and enforce stringent requirements to aid — these requirements must often be met for aid to disburse.

We use the context of aid to understand how individuals think about accountability in a globalized world. Importantly, individuals in recipient countries are highly attuned to foreign economic policy and the impact of aid projects (Dolan, 2020; Dolan and Milner, 2023). This mutes the ability of governments to scapegoat international actors for painful policies; such elite cues are most impactful where individuals have weaker priors (e.g., trade in developed democracies).<sup>4</sup> Moreover, even if citizens do not necessarily think about aid requirements in their daily lives, it is important to understand when citizens are willing to tolerate external sources of accountability. Indeed, from a normative standpoint, if citizens are accepting of foreign constraints, concerns about democratic deficits in global governance may be overblown (Moravcsik, 2004). Conversely, if citizens are concerned about foreign encroachments on their ability to hold their governments accountable, it suggests easing aid requirements may be one way to improve accountability in developing countries.

Understanding public attitudes toward aid requirements is also important from a practical perspective. Of course, individuals are price-takers in this setting; the government selects a given aid project, including any attached conditions, from a menu of donors (Bunte, 2019). We therefore do not argue that citizens constrain such government choices, especially given the asymmetrical power dynamics at play between donors and recipients.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the public can obstruct implementation when they are dissatisfied with aid programs, for instance by refusing to resettle to accommodate new infrastructure or organizing protests. In democratic settings, citizens can sanction the leader at the ballot box for selecting aid projects that contradict their preferences. For these reasons, a 2006 OECD report on development aid argues, “Given the influence of public opinion in matters of development assistance [...] public awareness should be a priority.”<sup>6</sup>

We argue that citizens’ approval of aid requirements is primarily a function of (a) citi-

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<sup>4</sup>See Rho and Tomz (2017); Guisinger and Saunders (2017) on cuing on foreign policy in developed contexts; Vreeland (1999); Kaya, Handlin and Gunaydin (2020) on the varying effectiveness of scapegoating over conditionality.

<sup>5</sup>See Clark (2022) on how relative bargaining leverage varies between donors and recipients in different contexts depending on which donors recipients can access.

<sup>6</sup>See Milner and Tingley (2012, 3) and Brutger and Clark (2022).

zens' trust in their government and (b) citizens' perceptions of the donor. When individuals trust their government, donor requirements are likely to raise sovereignty concerns. In this situation, citizens worry their government will be unable to implement its preferred policies, leading them to oppose aid requirements. Conversely, when individuals distrust the government, they welcome aid requirements as a check on the government — individuals may believe requirements will improve the situation in the home country. Milner, Nielson and Findley (2016) show that citizens who oppose the government are more likely to approve of aid in the first place. We offer a plausible mechanism for this observation: the conditions attached to such aid.

Our argument that public attitudes toward requirements are a function of trust in the donor diverges from earlier scholarly accounts, which emphasized economic ideology. At the peak of structural adjustment (i.e., the 1990s), conditionality was closely associated with neoliberal policy reforms (Santiso, 2004; Babb and Carruthers, 2008), and approval of conditions thus likely mapped onto ideology. Today, aid requirements are more heterogeneous, meaning appraisal of aid requirements is less likely to hew closely to ideological beliefs. We suggest that contemporary aid requirements are nonetheless political, but more so for the constraints they impose on government policymaking than their ideological content.

To test our claims about the determinants of public opinion of aid requirements, we utilize observational data from multiple sources. First, we make use of the Afrobarometer survey series, which collects data on public opinion of aid requirements and trust in various public figures and government institutions. To test our argument about the role of perception of donors, we field an original survey in Kenya that allows us to gain a more detailed understanding of the requirements individuals associate with different donors and their preferences over such donors.

We contribute to several important literatures. First, we extend and revise the large body of work interested in the relationships between aid, perceptions of government legitimacy, and government autonomy. While existing work suggests that aid may undermine government legitimacy (Sacks, 2012), and that aid requirements may limit government autonomy (Shah, 2017), we disentangle the conditions under which citizens in recipient countries may desire these incursions on legitimacy and autonomy. In doing so, we speak to broader debates about accountability gaps and democratic deficits in international relations (Dahl, 1999; Grant and Keohane, 2005).

Second, we build on work on the politics of conditionality and tied aid, though we shift the focus from powerful donor states (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen, 2006; Kilby, 2006;

Copelovitch, 2010; Stone, 2011; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Zeitz, 2020) and horse trading between donors and recipient governments (Dreher, 2009; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2015; Clark, 2022) to the oft-overlooked public in recipient states.<sup>7</sup> Existing work has examined public opinion of aid requirements in the context of highly politicized IMF programs (Kaya, Handlin and Gunaydin, 2020), but there has been less attention paid to the requirements attached to development finance.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, empirical evidence on public opinion of major donors like the World Bank comes mostly from developed donor countries, and especially the U.S., rather than recipient states.<sup>9</sup> This is despite the fact that recipient countries and their citizens play a major role in shaping the performance of aid programs (Mallaby, 2004; Woods, 2007; Malik and Stone, 2018).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. To start, we offer a typology of the diverse requirements that donors attach to aid. We then move to explication of our theoretical framework before presenting evidence from the Afrobarometer and our original survey. We conclude with a discussion of areas for future research and policy implications, including how donors can design requirements to minimize incursions on government accountability.

## A typology of aid requirements

Aid requirements vary in their content and stringency. We begin by specifying the different types of requirements used by development financiers. We make the case that all aid requirements introduce external considerations into the domestic policy process in recipient countries. Our typology specifically applies to prior actions, or *ex ante* conditions that must be completed before funding is disbursed.<sup>10</sup> As such, citizens in aid-recipient countries are likely to have views about these requirements, which we suggest fall into three broad categories, summarized in Table 1.

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<sup>7</sup>Though see Vreeland (2005); Caraway, Rickard and Anner (2012) on the domestic politics of IMF lending.

<sup>8</sup>The conditions attached to IMF loans often incite public unrest given their harshness. For more on the content of IMF loan conditions, see Li, Sy and McMurray (2015); Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King (2016). Conditions attached to development aid, such as that from the World Bank, tend to be softer (Clark and Dolan, 2021).

<sup>9</sup>See e.g., Brutger and Clark (2022); Dellmuth et al. (2022).

<sup>10</sup>This is distinct from *ex post* conditionality, which can be the basis for aid withdrawal (O'Brien-Udry, 2020). It is also distinct from softer benchmarks, which inform donors but are not tied to aid disbursement.

Category	Areas	Donors
Development	Government spending; taxation	World Bank; OECD bilaterals
Governance	Human rights; democratization	USAID; EU
Business	Donor firm contracts; exports	China

Table 1: **A Typology of Aid Requirements.**

## Development requirements

The first category, which encompasses most aid requirements used by multilateral donors and OECD countries, we call *development requirements*. Many aid requirements affect a government’s development policy, including how the government collects and spends public money. For example, the World Bank may mandate reductions in government subsidies for energy, changes to public spending, or alterations to the structure of state-owned companies. Development requirements may also restrict how the recipient can spend donor funds — for instance, earmarking financing for specific infrastructure projects or public goods provision. The literature often refers to these requirements as *conditionality* since aid disbursement can be conditional on the completion of these conditions.

Historically, the most expansive conditionality was associated with structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and 1990s, when requirements attached to World Bank policy lending often entailed substantial changes to government policy at the core of government competencies, including trade policy, regulation, and privatization (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991). Such conditions were (and remain) common in IMF programs as well (Li, Sy and McMurray, 2015; Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King, 2016).

Critiques of the effectiveness and appropriateness of such conditionality mounted during the 2000s, driving changes in aid policy. Affirmed by all OECD donor countries, the 2005 Paris Declaration introduced the principles of “ownership” and “alignment,” which suggest that development policies should be initiated and “owned” by developing countries, and donors should “align” their aid with these policies (OECD, 2005). Multilateral bodies like the World Bank have created new lending instruments like Program-for-Results to this end, emphasizing the importance of buy-in from recipients.<sup>11</sup> This shift in norms has led to a reduction in the number of requirements that donors attach to their aid,<sup>12</sup> but has not eliminated the practice of conditionality. Donors continue to attach requirements to their

<sup>11</sup>See “Program-for-Results Financing (PforR).” *World Bank* <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/program-for-results-financing>

<sup>12</sup>For instance, a series of reforms in 2012 led to a reduction in the average number of conditions applied to Development Policy Financing loans at the World Bank (Clark and Dolan, 2021).

development assistance — at the World Bank, about a quarter of financing is conditional as of 2021. Development requirements can be divisive in the recipient country (Caraway, Rickard and Anner, 2012), with the distribution of costs associated with development requirements varying based on the content of the requirement, such as privatization of state-owned enterprises or including women in a small business program. In extremely divisive cases, requirements can drive unrest and protests, and even thwart leaders' reelection bids (Vreeland, 2005).

## **Governance requirements**

The second category consists of *governance requirements*, which pertain to democratization, domestic institutions, human rights, and transparency. These are foundational issues in developing countries; governance requirements may therefore be highly divisive domestically as well as difficult or undesirable for governments to implement. This may be especially true in authoritarian or weakly democratic contexts, since regime opponents may hope that external conditionality in this vein can create space for them to participate in political life. The ruling party, meanwhile, often utilizes patronage networks and corruption to maintain power and enrich allied elites (Stokes et al., 2013).

Governance conditionality was initially integrated into Western donors' foreign aid programs in the early 1990s alongside the third wave of democratization (Carothers, 2020). Donors explicitly conditioned their aid on recipient countries' democratic credentials, and even supported regime opponents in their efforts to push for free and fair elections. Though democracy promotion has softened over time, becoming more conciliatory toward autocratic regimes (Bush, 2016), many bilateral donors continue to attach governance requirements to their aid (Dietrich and Wright, 2015). Moreover, there is evidence such requirements can improve countries' performance on certain governance criteria, at least in the short term (Carnegie and Marinov, 2017). Governance requirements played an increasingly prominent role in the loan programs of the World Bank and IMF from the mid-2000s with the emergence of the "good governance" agenda that sought to improve the performance of development policy by reforming governance institutions in recipient countries (Rodrik, 2006). Today, the United States and the European Union are most commonly associated with governance requirements at the bilateral level, as is the World Bank.

## **Business requirements**

The final category — often utilized by emerging donors such as China — we refer to as *business requirements*. These include requirements that aid funds be used to purchase goods and services from donor companies (i.e., tied aid) or that aid projects be connected to donors' access to key resources and exports. Tying aid has historical precedence among an array of bilateral donors, largely because it ensures that aid programs generate tangible benefits for influential domestic interests in the donor country.

Among OECD donors, various policy measures have sought to reduce the extent to which aid is tied, though it remains commonplace, especially in the case of food aid (Fritz and Raza, 2017). By contrast, China often use overseas finance to support domestic firms, including state-owned enterprises (Brautigam, 2011). In some cases, these requirements even mandate that development projects use Chinese workers employed by Chinese firms. We include business requirements in our typology to reflect the full range of provisions attached to contemporary development finance. China is an increasingly important financier in the developing world, providing grants and concessional finance as well as more expensive bilateral loans (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, 2021; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2022). As a result, developing country governments are increasingly bound by these business requirements.

Like development and governance requirements, business requirements increase the recipient government's accountability to an external actor — they act as an external input into the domestic policymaking process and can, for instance, constrain the recipient's ability to extend infrastructure contracts to domestic firms. This may provoke negative responses from the domestic public, as frustration can mount from local workers and firms in response to the preferential treatment granted to foreign companies. However, business requirements are distinct because they generate tangible economic gains for the donor. Development and governance requirements, on the other hand, are mostly instruments of soft power.

## **Donors, citizens, aid, and the state**

Given the range of requirements associated with development finance, we seek to understand how the public in developing countries reacts to these external constraints on domestic policymaking. Though extant work examines several themes tangent to public opinion of foreign accountability in recipient states, including perceptions of government legitimacy and autonomy concerns, the topic remains understudied. Here, we outline the scope of existing

research before proceeding with our argument and testable predictions.

## **Aid and government legitimacy**

A strand of scholarship examines the effect of aid on the *legitimacy* of governments in aid recipient countries. This literature is grounded in the notion of a fiscal contract between citizens and the state, in which the state secures citizens' willingness to comply with taxation by providing services in return. Foreign aid (as well as service provision by NGOs and foreign donors) may fracture this contract since aid is a non-tax source of government financing (Sacks, 2012), not unlike natural resource rents (Morrison, 2010). Governments may feel less obligated to invest in public goods when spending these funds, and the public may doubt the legitimacy of the state.

However, there is little empirical evidence that foreign aid damages the legitimacy of recipient governments. Using both observational opinion data (Sacks, 2012) and original survey experiments (Dietrich and Winters, 2015; Blair and Roessler, 2021; Baldwin and Winters, 2020), scholars consistently find that aid does not undermine the legitimacy of recipient governments. In fact, aid inflows appear in some cases to improve the legitimacy of the state, as measured by individuals' willingness to pay taxes (Sacks, 2012). Citizens likely do not expect the government to be self-sufficient (Dolan, 2020), and may even see the government as fulfilling its responsibilities to the public by attracting foreign aid.

## **Aid and policy autonomy**

While the fiscal contract literature focuses on the potentially disruptive effect of *inflows* of aid, a separate body of work considers how the *conditions* attached to aid affect the policy autonomy or sovereignty of recipient governments. The specific conditions attached to aid are the product of negotiations between donor and recipient. The leverage possessed by each party depends on a variety of factors, including geopolitical alignment (Stone, 2011; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Malis, Rosendorff and Smith, 2021), the availability of outside options (Bunte, 2019; Zeitz, 2020; Clark, 2022), the ability to engage in horse-trading (Dreher, 2009; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2015; Dreher, Lang, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2022), and domestic politics in the recipient (Caraway, Rickard and Anner, 2012) and donor (Broz, 2008; Daugirdas, 2013) country.

There is also important variation by issue area and donor type. Emergency lending, such as that administered by the IMF, tends to have the most stringent conditions attached since

countries accept reform requirements in an acute crisis (Henning, 2011). Development aid conditions, in contrast, are softer (Clark and Dolan, 2021) and are negotiated as part of the routine relationship between donors and recipients (Whitfield, 2009; Swedlund, 2017). Nevertheless, developing countries' dependence on foreign aid can mean they are effectively reliant on funds that come with policy strings attached.

The reliance of developing countries on aid accompanied by policy requirements has led critics to claim that conditions constitute an incursion into the policy autonomy, or even sovereignty, of recipient countries (Plank, 1993; Williams, 2008). For donors, requirements are a means of ensuring oversight, while for recipient governments, they can involve a compromise of policy autonomy. Indeed, "accountability in the context of aid dependence is problematic because it addresses two different constituencies: those of the donor country and those of the recipient country" (Mkandawire, 2010, 1168).

## **Aid and public opinion in recipient countries**

Despite this tension, there has been little empirical research examining public opinion in developing countries on the requirements attached to foreign aid.<sup>13</sup> Recent research on public opinion in recipient countries has focused either on the fiscal contract, as discussed above, or on the effect of aid on the opinions that citizens in the recipient country have of donors. This literature shows that aid has a positive effect on opinions of the donor in recipient countries (Goldsmith, 2014), and this holds for both traditional and emerging donors (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021).<sup>14</sup> In broader research, outside of the aid context, there is a recurrent argument that IOs are perceived as more legitimate than other international actors (Milner, 2006; Milner and Tingley, 2012; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019). Indeed, empirical work finds that public approval of policies tends to be higher when they are proposed or endorsed by IOs (Voeten, 2005; Brutger, 2021).

Yet, it is unclear how to translate these findings about IO legitimacy to citizens' attitudes over conditionality. Most of the evidence on the legitimacy and approval of IOs comes from advanced industrialized countries (Bearce and Scott, 2019; Zvogbo, 2019; Voeten, 2020; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2021; Brutger and Clark, 2022). In developing countries, since

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<sup>13</sup>One notable exception is Milner, Nielson and Findley (2016), who, as an extension of their main study, ask Ugandan survey respondents if they believe that aid conditions "help Uganda to reform and become a better country" or "are unfair and hurt Uganda." They find that approximately 50% of respondents support conditionality, with those supporting conditionality more likely to approve of aid overall, but they do not investigate what explains respondents' level of support for conditionality.

<sup>14</sup>When choosing among donors, both the public and elites in recipient countries appear not to have a preference between bilateral and multilateral aid (Findley, Milner and Nielson, 2017).

leading multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are historically associated with the most extensive and intrusive requirements, the public may regard multilateral conditions with suspicion.

## A theory of recipient opinion on aid requirements

Since research shows that foreign aid often improves individuals' perception of donor countries and, in general, individuals perceive IOs to be legitimate, individuals in recipient countries may appreciate when donors (especially multilateral ones) hold their governments accountable. On the other hand, individuals may disapprove of the incursions on policy autonomy and discretion that requirements imply for their government. Crucially, the public may be sensitive to external demands on the policy process across different types of requirements, whether these concern development policy, governance issues, or contracting and business relationships.

Our expectation that citizens may hold meaningful opinions on the requirements attached to foreign aid stems from the notion that aid requirements are a form of external accountability that can undercut citizens' confidence in the responsiveness of the government to their own preferences. Accountability implies a political relationship in which an agent or institution is expected to account for its activities to a principal, with the principal having the ability to sanction the agent for failing to justify its choices (Lindberg, 2013). Moreover, conceptions of accountability often incorporate a notion of responsiveness, in which the agent is not only expected to inform the principal of its activities, but also attempt to satisfy the preferences of the principal (Grossman and Slough, 2022). The requirements attached to aid introduce an accountability relationship between the recipient government and the aid donor, since the government is expected to report on its efforts to satisfy the requirements attached to aid. For donors, this is a crucial tool to ensure that aid funds are not misappropriated and are used in line with the donors' intentions.

This vertical, downward accountability from the aid donor to the recipient government may come into tension with the vertical, upward accountability exercised by citizens via-á-vis their governments.<sup>15</sup> Of course, all governments are subject to countervailing demands, but we are interested in how recipient country publics respond to this external source of accountability given that it may supersede their representational accountability.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>These categorizations of accountability stem from the typology in Lindberg (2013).

<sup>16</sup>Even in less democratic and non-democratic contexts, citizens may have a more diffuse expectation of societal accountability outside of direct electoral accountability that requires representatives to be responsive

## Government support and attitudes toward aid requirements

We argue that individual taste for aid requirements depends on the extent of trust that individuals have in their government's use of policy discretion. When an individual believes the government sets policy in the country's interest or even in their narrow interest, the individual will likely disapprove of constraints on the government's autonomy. By contrast, where an individual disapproves of a government's policy choices or doubts the integrity of the government, they may appreciate the external check provided by aid requirements. In fact, given that aid donors may suspend aid if the government fails to adhere to agreed conditions, donors may have more leverage to enforce their accountability expectations than the public has to enforce their demands on the government. This is especially true for governance and development requirements that are motivated by donors' desire to improve development and governance outcomes, but may also hold for business requirements that tie the government's hands in extending contracts.

We therefore expect that individuals who trust the government are more likely to reject and disapprove of foreign-imposed requirements. This is likely to be true regardless of the substantive content of the requirements that donors attach to their aid. Even if the requirements do not induce the government to diverge considerably from its preferred policy, a government supporter is likely to disagree in principle with constraints that limit the government's room to maneuver. Those who do not trust the governing regime, by contrast, will be more likely to approve of requirements to constrain the government.

**H1:** *Individuals who express **higher** levels of trust in the government will be **less** likely to approve of aid requirements.*

Substantively, trust in the government refers both to individual political leaders and political institutions. Aid requirements are negotiated and implemented at different levels of government. Requirements are often negotiated by cabinet-level officials or even the head of government, while implementation involves civil servants in relevant ministries or sub-national authorities. Conditions thus constrain actors at different levels, limiting the policy autonomy of senior officials and requiring public institutions and civil servants to report to external actors. Therefore, we expect that an individual's trust in individuals and institutions likely to be impacted by requirements will be decisive in shaping their support for conditionality.

Our argument for public support of aid requirements is primarily based on whether  

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to citizens.

individuals approve of an external actor constraining the government’s policy autonomy. Notably, this contention is not based on individuals’ ideological beliefs, i.e., that left-leaning individuals support requirements, while right-leaning individuals oppose them. This is because the ideological character of requirements is heterogeneous, as highlighted above, which means that individuals are unlikely to appraise requirements based on the ideologies they hold. Instead, the characteristic that unites requirements is that they introduce external considerations into the domestic policy process. As such, we think individuals will respond to requirements based on their trust in the government actors that make and implement policy.

Our expectation that individuals that trust the government will dislike requirements is also counter to the finding that individuals use approval of their own government as a heuristic for their support of international organizations. Armingeon and Ceka (2013) find that declining trust in the EU after the global financial crisis was driven by European respondents’ assessment of their own national governments, while Breen and Gillanders (2015) find that African survey respondents’ approval of the IMF and World Bank was driven by their trust in their own government. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2014) similarly find that individuals engage in “confidence extrapolation” when appraising the United Nations, with assessments of the legitimacy of the United Nations stemming from respondents’ faith in political institutions more broadly. By contrast, we do not expect trust in the government and approval of foreign accountability to move in the same direction. Instead, because aid requirements constrain government action, we expect those who approve of the government to be less supportive of these requirements.

## **Opinions of donors and attitudes toward aid requirements**

So far, we have framed the trade-off that individuals consider when evaluating aid requirements as a choice between external accountability and government discretion. However, the identity of the donor likely plays a role in whether individuals — even government opponents — approve of requirements that constrain the government’s policy autonomy. When individuals have a more critical view of a donor country or institution, they are less likely to approve of aid requirements, even if they do not trust the government. After all, requirements introduce the donor’s preferences into the policymaking process. If citizens distrust the donor, they should be less likely to approve of such requirements. On the other hand, individuals that have a positive perception of the donor will likely see the donor as a positive influence on government policymaking.

**H2:** *Individuals who **approve** of a donor will be **more** likely to approve of aid requirements from that donor.*

Variation in attitudes toward donors may be a function of views about the donor’s role in global politics, colonial history, past experience with aid projects from that donor, or media coverage of the donor’s influence. For instance, in countries that have experienced contentious IMF programs, individuals may hold negative views of the Bretton Woods institutions, especially if they were employed in sectors affected by IMF-mandated reforms, such as the public sector. Or, if an individual was forced to relocate their home as a result of World Bank-funded infrastructure development, they may be disdainful of the Bank. Alternatively, individuals who live in close proximity to a donor-funded project and have benefited from its effects may hold a positive view of that donor. Last, individuals may have more positive attitudes toward multilateral donors insofar as they are perceived to be neutral and legitimate actors in global governance (Voeten, 2005; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019; Brutger, 2021), though some may simply perceive them to be instruments of powerful states (Stone, 2008).

Both of our hypotheses rely on the assumption that aid requirements and relationships with donors are salient among the public in aid recipient countries. We test knowledge of aid requirements among respondents empirically in our analysis below, but we also rely on previous work that has highlighted that individuals in developing countries are aware of the impact of aid projects and other foreign economic policy (Dolan, 2020; Dolan and Milner, 2023). In several recent examples, such as Zambia’s 2011 election and Nigeria’s 2023 election, Chinese development finance and the requirements attached to it were highly salient election topics. Since foreign aid is important to the governments of aid-dependent states, relations with donors and providers of development finance are closely reported in the press, giving the public a good sense of the impacts of aid on the policy process. Moreover, publics interact with aid in their day-to-day lives, including through their employment and use of infrastructure, which often prominently displays the names of the donors involved.

## Data

To test these expectations, we combine two different sources of data. First, we rely on the Afrobarometer public opinion survey, which provides extensive data on the topic of aid requirements from countries most exposed to aid policies. Since the Afrobarometer also asks a battery of questions about trust in politicians and public institutions, this data allows us to test our first hypothesis. However, the Afrobarometer survey does not ask

about aid requirements associated with any particular donor, making it difficult to test our second hypothesis. We therefore field our own survey in Kenya, in which we assess respondents’ familiarity with aid requirements and directly test how perceptions of donors impact individuals’ support for aid requirements.

## Evidence from the Afrobarometer

In our first set of analyses, we employ data from Round 8 of the Afrobarometer, which was fielded between 2019 and 2021 in 36 African countries. At the time of our analysis, data had been made available for 27 of these countries.<sup>17</sup>

Our main dependent variables measure support for two types of requirements, as theorized above. The first question we use measures support for development requirements. The question reads: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: When other countries give loans or development assistance to [COUNTRY], they should enforce strict requirements on how the funds are spent. Statement 2: When other countries give [COUNTRY] loans or development assistance, they should allow our government to make its own decisions about how to use the resources.” We view this question as measuring support for development requirements because it focuses on the donor’s ability to require the government to spend public funds in a particular way.

A second question measures support for governance requirements. It reads: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: When other countries give loans or development assistance to [COUNTRY], they should enforce strict requirements to make sure our government promotes democracy and respects human rights. Statement 2: Even if other countries give [COUNTRY] loans or development assistance, our government should make its own decisions about democracy and human rights.” To capture the direction of an individual’s attitude, we operationalize both variables as dummies, where 1 indicates support for conditionality (agrees or strongly agrees with statement 1) and 0 indicates aversion to conditionality (agrees or strongly agrees with statement 2). We omit responses of don’t know, agreed with neither, refused, and missing.

The distribution of both variables appears in Figure 1. On the whole, the sample tends to oppose requirements attached to aid. The modal response for both questions is to strongly agree that the country should get to make its own decisions. This sentiment is stronger

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<sup>17</sup>These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda.

for development requirements than for governance requirements: people are slightly more open to requirements concerning democracy and human rights than they are to requirements concerning financial decisions. However, for both types of requirements, a substantial number of people (about 40 percent) are supportive. This indicates significant variation in attitudes toward donor practices, which we hope to explain. Summary statistics for these and for all variables discussed subsequently can be found in the Appendix (Table A1).

We use various indicators of trust in political leadership and public institutions to capture trust in government.<sup>18</sup> The question reads, “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” Specifically, we focus on trust in the president and the ruling party, as these are the political officials with the greatest authority over domestic policy — authority that is likely to be constrained by aid requirements. Moreover, these are the officials who are elected by the public in democratic settings and should therefore be accountable to the citizenry. We also conduct a Principal Components Analysis on trust in other parts of government to generate an index measuring trust in the government more generally.<sup>19</sup> We use binary probit models for all analysis. We control for age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects and cluster standard errors by region.<sup>20</sup>

Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find that attitudes toward the domestic government strongly predict an individual’s support for attaching requirements to lending. The results appear in Table 2 (complete results in Table A3). The more an individual trusts their government — whether that is the president, the ruling party, or the government more generally — the less willing they are to support the requirements a donor might impose on their government. This is true whether those requirements are development requirements (models 1-3) or related to governance (models 4-6). The substantive effects here are considerable. The negative and statistically significant coefficients we observe range from -.048 to -.105. This means that a one-unit increase in trust results in a 5-11% drop in overall support for requirements. Individuals do not wish a government they like to be constrained in its activities.

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<sup>18</sup>In the Appendix §A, we also present results using beliefs about the corruption of the government as the outcome measure. We do so because corruption and trust should be inversely related but capture similar concepts. The results are similar.

<sup>19</sup>The trust index includes the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities.

<sup>20</sup>Afrobarometer recommends using their combinwt variable for cross-national analysis, but this variable is not yet available for round 8 data. We replicate this variable by taking Afrobarometer’s within-country weighting variable and standardizing so that all countries are weighted as if they have equal populations. Within-country weights are unavailable for Benin, Senegal, Togo, and Liberia, so respondents from these countries are given a weight of 1.

Figure 1: Histogram of support for requirements




Table 2: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.088*** (0.010)			-0.105*** (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.088*** (0.010)			-0.107*** (0.010)	
Trust index			-0.048*** (0.005)			-0.059*** (0.005)
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	35,971	33,243	29,904	35,892	33,181	29,883


*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

We next consider variation across African countries. Figure 2 presents the results of our main model by country. The relationship between trust and support for requirements is strongest for Mauritius, Uganda, and Liberia, and weakest for Tanzania, Senegal, and Botswana. We observe that Uganda and Liberia have long depended on foreign aid, especially from the U.S., which has made extensive use of requirements. In contrast, countries like Tanzania and Botswana have been more aid independent, largely because they have more natural resources at their disposal. It is possible that individuals in aid-dependent countries are more used to requirements being a part of political life, and so trust in government is a more significant predictor of their attitudes toward requirements.

Another possibility is that regime type explains variation in the relationship between trust and support for requirements. For this reason, we order the points in Figure 2 from least to most free using data from Freedom House. We do not observe a clearly increasing or decreasing slope as countries become more democratic. Further, we split our sample into democratic and autocratic countries, and we find that trust negatively predicts requirements in both settings (Appendix Tables A5 and A6). While we do not formally test this, it appears that a country's history with aid is a stronger predictor than regime type in explaining cross-national heterogeneity in our results.

Figure 2: Heterogeneity in relationship between trust and support for requirements



*Note:* Points represent coefficients on trust taken from Models 1 and 4 in Table 2. Countries are ordered according to their Freedom House score, ranging from the least to most free.

We present additional supplementary analysis in the Appendix. First, we consider how an individual’s attitude toward accountability factors into their assessments of aid requirements. We use a question in the Afrobarometer inquiring about individuals’ preference for using Parliament to hold the President accountable. We find that individuals who agree with this are more likely to support donors’ requirements (Table A7). We also show that the relationship between trust and support for donor requirements is stronger for these individuals, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on an interaction between our trust index and this accountability question. This suggests that publics identify aid requirements as an external source of accountability in line with our theoretical mechanism.

Second, we split our sample based on whether the survey was fielded before or after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, and the results are similar in each case (Tables A8 and A9). Third, we consider whether coethnicity drives our results, but it does not. Coethnics are more likely than noncoethnics to oppose governance requirements (Table A10), but trust similarly predicts support for requirements among both coethnics and noncoethnics (Tables A11 and A12). Fourth, we examine whether our results obtain only for highly educated respondents, and they do not. Both low and high education respondents exhibit the relationship between trust and support for requirements (Tables A13 and A14). Fifth, we control for ideology, using a question on individuals’ attitudes toward taxation; this allows us to account for the impact of neoliberal attitudes. Individuals who support high levels of taxes and robust government services are more likely to support both kinds of requirements, but trust in government remains a significant negative predictor (Table A15). On the whole, then, we find consistent support for our first hypothesis across a battery of tests.

## Evidence from Kenya

We have shown that individuals that do not trust the government are more likely to support foreign aid requirements. For individuals to feel comfortable “outsourcing” this accountability to a foreign donor, they would need to know who the foreign donors are and the kinds of requirements they would impose on their governments. Individuals are notoriously uninformed about international politics in developed Western democracies (Rho and Tomz, 2017; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017), and some readers may be skeptical that individuals are sufficiently informed for this model of accountability to hold. To address this skepticism

about awareness of aid requirements and to test our second hypothesis about the role of donor approval in support for requirements, we fielded an original survey in Kenya.

Kenya offers an ideal research environment because it has a vibrant and open media landscape and widespread cellphone usage, which allows us to field a mobile-based survey. Most important, Kenya offers a good test case for our theory. First, questions of sovereignty and autonomy from foreign intrusion have been highly salient in Kenyan politics in recent years, with politicians successfully campaigning on their critiques of foreign intrusion in the form of International Criminal Court investigations (Lynch, 2013). This makes Kenya a “hard test” for our argument, since external involvement has been widely politicized and support for conditionality is likely to be low on average. Second, Kenya allows for a comprehensive test of hypothesis 2, since it has received and continues to receive large volumes of development finance from donors associated with each of the three forms of aid requirements. In the period 1990-2018, Kenya was the second largest recipient of development finance from the U.S. among sub-Saharan African countries, the fourth largest recipient of funds from the World Bank, and the third largest recipient of loans from China.<sup>21</sup> Since U.S. aid is closely associated with governance requirements, the World Bank with development requirements, and China with business requirements, Kenya has had meaningful exposure to each of these forms of requirements.

Kenya is also a rapidly growing economy that transitioned to lower-middle income country status in 2012; it is therefore not overly dependent on foreign aid (ODA averaged 4.15% of GNI 2011-2020). However, Kenya still has substantial development needs, and donors have been willing to continue to fund development projects in the country despite its economic progress. For bilateral donors, including the U.S., this is partly due to strategic interests in Kenya, which has served as an anchor for stability in the Horn of Africa region and an important ally in regional counter-terrorism efforts. Relations with donors are thus an important part of Kenya’s foreign policy and widely covered in the national press.

We worked with a survey company, GeoPoll, to field our survey to 1,000 Kenyans from October 17 to October 24, 2022. Our survey was fielded shortly after Kenya’s election on August 9, 2022 and the final confirmation of the election results by Kenya’s Supreme Court on September 5, 2022. Fielding the survey so soon after the election meant that respondents did not have extensive experience with the current government, though the newly-elected President, William Ruto, had previously served as Deputy President (2013-

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<sup>21</sup>Data from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics and the the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System.

2022). While respondents likely had well-developed beliefs about Ruto from his many years as a leading politician and the polarizing nature of the election campaign, they did not have much experience with Ruto as President. Therefore, we focus our analysis of the Kenya data on hypothesis 2, approval of foreign donors, rather than hypothesis 1, trust in the government. We preregistered this hypothesis with OSF before fielding the survey, as described in the Appendix §B.2.<sup>22</sup>

To administer the survey, GeoPoll recruited 1,000 Kenyans through SMS to invite them to participate in a mobile web survey in exchange for data top up. 8% of those contacted opted into the survey, and 5% completed it. We included soft quotas on age and gender. Because the survey platform requires a data plan, the sample skewed somewhat young, urban, and educated — see Appendix Table A17.<sup>23</sup> While participants had the option of taking the survey in Swahili, most chose to take it in English.

To show that Kenya exhibits similar dynamics to other African aid recipient countries, and results from Kenya are likely to be informative for recipient countries more broadly, we first report our tests of hypothesis 1 with only data from Kenyan respondents in Afrobarometer (Appendix Table A16). As with the full sample, individuals who have more trust in their governments are less supportive of both development and governance requirements. In other words, Kenya seems to be typical of the other African countries in our sample.

In our original survey, we test our earlier supposition that individuals are well-informed about requirements. If they are, then individuals may expect certain donors to be more likely to use certain types of requirements. We present individuals with a list of possible requirements a donor might ask of their government; for each, we ask which donors they can imagine requiring that of their government. We ask about the requirements in a randomized order, and respondents can select one, many, or no donors that they think would issue such a requirement. The specific requirements, drawn from real-world cases, are displayed in Table 3. We are primarily interested in individuals' impressions of the U.S., the World Bank, and China as three prominent donors who typify different approaches to development.<sup>24</sup> Our

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<sup>22</sup>While we originally intended our survey to also test H1, we ultimately concluded that aspects of our design made it difficult for us to do this — see discussion in Appendix §B.1. We describe the survey design and all our preregistered tests more fully in the Appendix §B.2.

<sup>23</sup>As reported in Kenya's 2019 Census, 75% of Kenya's population is under 35, with 39% under the age of 14, meaning our sample is not that far off in age. However, the 2019 Census showed only 31% of respondents living in urban areas, compared to 73% in our sample. The largest discrepancy is in education. According to the 2019 Census, only 35% of Kenyans have secondary education or higher, while in our sample virtually all respondents report secondary or higher level of education.

<sup>24</sup>In the survey, we asked about five donors: the U.S., EU, World Bank, China, and Japan. The full set of results are reported in the Appendix (Figure A1).

prompt reads: “Some international donors and lenders require our government to do a lot to receive a loan. Others don’t require much at all. Which of these donors do you think would require the Kenyan government to...”

Table 3: List of requirements used to test respondent knowledge and hypothesis two


<b>Governance</b>	
Democracy	“Show that elections were fairly run and accurately counted”
Human rights	“Enforce protections of rights of minority ethnicities”
Transparency	“Be transparent about public spending”
<b>Development</b>	
Targeting	“Ensure the project meets those most in need”
Subsidies	“Cut subsidies for fuel”
Safeguards	“Ensure the project doesn’t pollute air or water”
<b>Business</b>	
Tied aid	“Hire their companies for this project”
Exports	“To sell goods to them at discounted prices”

The results of this part of the survey indicate that respondents are well-informed about the requirements employed by different donors (Figure 3). As expected, individuals most strongly associate governance requirements with the U.S. Nearly 70 percent of our sample said they would expect the U.S. to demand the government show its elections were conducted without fraud. Unsurprisingly, only about 15 percent of individuals thought that China would do so. We found similar patterns with respect to enforcement of minority protections. Again, the U.S. is the donor most frequently associated with these requirements and China is the least frequently associated. The World Bank is also strongly associated with these protections.

Also consistent with reality, individuals associate development requirements most with the World Bank. More than any other donor, individuals think the World Bank is likely to require a project to go to the neediest, require the government to cut fuel subsidies, and make sure a project doesn’t cause environmental harm. On all three counts, the U.S. is thought to be the next most likely to impose these requirements.

The requirement individuals thought to be most common, and most common for the World Bank, was the requirement that the government be transparent about public spending. While we classified transparency as a “governance requirement,” thinking that a donor would require the government to improve transparency for all its public spending, we suspect

Figure 3: Perceptions of donors and their requirements



some individuals interpreted this as transparency about how the specific development funds were spent. In fact, this is a common requirement attached to development projects, and individuals are correct to think it is widespread.

We also consider the business requirements that often come from China. Without a doubt, the donor most closely associated with tying aid to purchases from certain business, or requiring governments to export at discounted rates, is China. About 60-70 percent of respondents say that China engages in these practices, and fewer than 40 percent of respondents associate these requirements with any other donor. Although individuals do not associate China with many requirements, they do strongly tie China to these requirements.

Overall, we find that individuals have fairly accurate impressions of the different types of requirements that are preferred by different types of donors; this builds on recent work showing that developing and middle-income populations are attuned to foreign economic policymaking (Dolan, 2020; Dolan and Milner, 2023). We realize our sample is younger, more urban, and more educated than the general population, and we would not necessarily expect the same degree of knowledge in the mass public. Nevertheless, we conclude from this finding that it is plausible that individuals are willing to outsource accountability to foreign donors based on their expectations of how foreign donors would constrain untrustworthy governments.

Having established some of the microfoundations of our argument, we now use our survey to test hypothesis 2, which states that individuals are more likely to support requirements from donors of which they approve. We measure support for requirements through a repeated vignette, in which we describe a hypothetical aid project and associate it with a specific donor.<sup>25</sup> This provides us with each individual’s support for requirements from each of three different donors. The design is also mindful of the benefits of abstraction in survey design (Brutger et al., 2022). The vignette reads:

[**The United States / The World Bank / China**] would like to finance a

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<sup>25</sup>The content of our vignette is similar to articles on aid-funded projects that regularly appear in Kenyan newspapers. For instance, a 2022 article in *The Nation* described a World Bank-funded project as follows: “Kenya Power is also implementing the Sh18.48 billion (\$150 million) World Bank-funded Kenya Off-grid Solar Access Project. . . The off-grid power stations are a critical cog in Kenya’s plan to hit universal electricity access.” A different 2022 article in *The Nation* describes the reform conditions associated with a World Bank energy project, saying “The World Bank is pushing Kenya to accelerate plans to allow private companies to build electricity transmission lines in a bid to unlock private capital to enhance electricity connectivity in the country.” A U.S.-funded project was described in a 2023 article in *The Nation* as follows, “. . . US Agency for International Development (USAid) . . . announc[ed] more than Sh13 billion (\$100 million) in new water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) investment. This will increase access to basic or improved water services for 1.6 million people and provide basic or improved sanitation to 1 million people in the next five years across various counties.”

large project in Kenya’s energy grid. This will help people and businesses in Kenya get access to electricity to make their lives easier and their businesses more productive. For this to happen, [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] will provide money to Kenya, and then the government of Kenya will oversee the project. Do you agree or disagree that [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] should. . .

We then solicited individuals’ attitudes toward the same list of requirements in Table 3, presented in a randomized order. We selected the U.S., the World Bank, and China to provide a variety of types of donors, all of which are important for aid in Kenya. We selected the energy grid as a hypothetical sector because it was an equally plausible investment for all three donors; it can simultaneously promote development, impact governance, and benefit businesses; and it is often linked to various requirements. We presented the vignette to each respondent three times, one for each donor. We presented these in a randomized order. This expanded our sample size by providing three different responses for each individual.

Our dependent variable is a count (0-8) of the number of requirements that individuals expressed support for — we believe this to be a reasonable proxy for the extent to which an individual desires external accountability from a specific foreign donor. Our explanatory variable is the respondent’s opinion of the donor: “In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of [donor] on Kenya is mostly positive or mostly negative?” To test hypothesis 2, we regress the count of requirements from a particular donor on the individual’s opinion of that donor, controlling for their age, gender, rural location, and donor fixed effects. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. We cluster standard errors at the level of the individual to account for correlated responses across the different vignettes.

We find strong support for our hypothesis in Table 4 (complete results in Table A18, model 1). The individual’s approval of the influence of each donor is a statistically significant predictor of the number of requirements they support from that donor. Individuals with more positive opinions of a donor are open to more requirements from that donor. While our repeated measurement design expanded our sample size, it is possible that it induced bias in individual’s responses by calling their attention to the goal of our survey. We report our pre-registered tests for that bias in the Appendix in Table A18, and we show that our results hold even if we restrict our sample to only the first observation from each respondent.

We also control for respondents’ knowledge of conditionality in a robustness check. We do so because it is possible that individuals approve of conditions when they know the specified donor attaches these types of conditions in practice, or because we primed them

Table 4: Support for donors predicts support for requirements

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Number of requirements supported (0-8)	
Influence (1-5)	0.241*** (0.039)
Demographic controls	✓
Donor fixed effects	✓
Observations	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.030
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.028
Residual Std. Error	1.801 (df = 2993)
F Statistic	15.404*** (df = 6; 2993)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

to tie certain conditions to certain donors. To calculate the knowledge score, we compute the total number of conditions that each respondent correctly attached to specific donors (i.e., governance requirements to the U.S., development requirements to the World Bank, and business requirements to China) and then take that number over the total number of conditions rated by each individual. The results appear in Appendix Table A21 — we identify no statistically significant coefficient on our knowledge variable, and our main finding is robust.

Last, we split our sample by whether respondents were located in urban or rural areas. We do so because our sample is younger, more urban, and more educated than the Kenyan population overall. Showing that the results hold on the rural sub-sample should increase confidence in the robustness of our findings across the Kenyan population. Results hold in each case, as Appendix Table A22 shows.<sup>26</sup> In sum, our detailed survey questions illustrate that individuals have accurate perceptions of the different types of requirements used by different donors, and that their opinion of a donor matters for their support for requirements.

<sup>26</sup>We also interact our influence measure with an array of demographic variables (age, college education, and gender) and identify no significant interaction effects. This suggests our mechanisms apply to the population more broadly.

## Conclusion

Accountability is a core tenet of representative government, and scholars have identified a number of variables that may limit the public's ability to hold its government to account (e.g., regime type, resource rents, and foreign aid receipts).<sup>27</sup> Yet, relatively little work examines the link between accountability and the requirements attached to aid. Rarely does foreign aid come without strings, since large bilateral donors like the U.S. and China as well as multilateral entities like the World Bank often make demands of borrowers.

We show with new Afrobarometer data and an original survey fielded in Kenya that although such conditionality may restrict the public's ability to directly hold its leaders accountable, this is not always undesirable for the public. Instead, when citizens distrust the government, or when they have positive feelings about the foreign donor, they may prefer that the donor hold the government to account. Conversely, when they trust the government or distrust the donor, they perceive aid requirements as unwanted incursions on state sovereignty. Our original survey illustrates that individuals actually do associate different donors with different types of requirements, and their opinions of those donors matter for their support for conditionality. In other words, individuals carefully consider the relative positions of multiple political actors and estimate which accountability relationships between them will best advance their political preferences.

We believe our theoretical framework and empirical findings to be generalizable. We show that despite the politicization of aid requirements in Kenya, citizens assess such requirements based on their trust in the government and donor. The Afrobarometer tests cover nearly all countries in Africa that receive large inflows of foreign aid. Moreover, all three types of conditions we discuss — governance, development, and business — are prevalent beyond Africa, including in Southeast Asia and Latin America. As China continues to expand the geographic reach of its development finance, these issues should only become more important.

To that end, this research offers several paths for future study. First, scholars might probe the extent to which elites and publics diverge on the issue of aid requirements. In most contexts related to the technical design of international agreements, especially in developing and non-democratic settings, elites hold greater sway than publics, and so it is important to determine whether and when they tolerate or even embrace accountability to foreign donors. Second, we encourage additional work probing how publics come to form opinions of aid donors, including when they perceive specific types of conditions to be more or less

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<sup>27</sup>See Fearon (1999); Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008); Morrison (2010); Chen, Pan and Xu (2016).

problematic, and whether these public attitudes shape governments' decisions over who they take funding from in world politics.

Our findings also carry normative implications. International organizations and bilateral donors alike often discuss a need for aid recipients to be accountable to their citizens and take ownership of development projects. And yet, the requirements that donors attach to aid are often thought to undermine these goals. However, when the public is on board with the requirements attached to aid, such requirements may actually indirectly *improve* government accountability by promoting outcomes that the public desires. Therefore, we believe donors should be attuned to the public mood in recipient countries. If they can concentrate conditions in governance areas that the public desires or perceives to be less intrusive, donors can help to close rather than exacerbate accountability gaps in the developing world.

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# Appendix of Supporting Information

## A Additional Afrobarometer Analysis

Our first robustness check is to see whether we obtain similar results when we use corruption perceptions instead of trust as the dependent variable. The corruption question reads: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” (None / Some of them / Most of them / All of them) The corruption index consists of questions gauging the corruption prevalent in: the presidency, parliament, civil servants, local government, police, judges, and tax authorities.

People who view the government as highly corrupt are much more likely to support a donor’s use of requirements (Table A4). When they perceive the president to be corrupt, individuals prefer donors to attach both development (model 1) and governance (model 4) requirements to their development finance. The same is true for civil servants; when individuals perceive them to be corrupt, they would prefer both development (model 2) and governance (model 5) requirements. Our corruption index displays similar patterns, and therefore has an understandably stronger relationship with support for development than for governance requirements. In sum, individuals like donors to tie the hands of a government they distrust in ways that address the issue at hand, but they prefer donors to lay off imposing requirements on a government they like.

## B Additional Original Survey Analysis

Figure A1 shows the full set of responses on respondents’ perceptions of conditionality, including Japan and the EU.

Table A18 reports the results of our checks for ordering effects. Since each respondent sees three vignettes in a randomized order, it is possible that the order biases their responses. Model 1 presents our main result, reported in Table 4 in the main text. Model 2 controls for the order of the vignette and also interacts it with our main explanatory variable, approval of the influence of the donor. We do see that the influence of the donor plays a stronger role for the second vignette presented. We therefore follow the protocol we described in our pre-registration and, as a robustness check, limit our analysis to only the first vignette each respondent saw. These results appear in Model 3. We continue to observe a positive and statistically significant relationship between approval of the donor’s influence and the

Figure A1: Perceptions of donors and their requirements




Table A1: Summary statistics

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N = 38,175<sup>1</sup></b>
Supports development reqs (1-4)	36,882	
Mean (SD)		2.31 (1.18)
Supports development reqs (0-1)	36,882	15,624 (42%)
Supports governance reqs (1-4)	36,794	
Mean (SD)		2.41 (1.16)
Supports governance reqs (0-1)	36,794	16,926 (46%)
Trusts president (1-4)	37,174	
Mean (SD)		2.64 (1.16)
Trusts ruling party (1-4)	34,338	
Mean (SD)		2.38 (1.15)
Trust index	30,680	
Mean (SD)		0.00 (2.36)
Corruption of president (1-4)	33,590	
Mean (SD)		2.36 (0.92)
Corruption of civil servants (1-4)	35,280	
Mean (SD)		2.39 (0.79)
Corruption index	28,701	
Mean (SD)		0.00 (1.76)
Approval of UN (1-5)	29,229	
Mean (SD)		3.92 (1.16)
Approval of U.S. (1-5)	30,836	
Mean (SD)		3.84 (1.19)
Approval of UK (1-5)	26,973	
Mean (SD)		3.36 (1.44)
Domestic accountability (0-1)	35,783	
Mean (SD)		0.71 (0.45)
Age	38,164	
Mean (SD)		37 (15)
Female	38,175	
Mean (SD)		0.50 (0.50)
Rural	38,175	
Mean (SD)		0.56 (0.50)

<sup>1</sup>n (%)

support for requirements, so our conclusion reported in the main text does not change.

Another goal we had in designing our survey was to collect a more precise measurement

Table A3: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (full results)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.088*** (0.010)			-0.105*** (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.088*** (0.010)			-0.107*** (0.010)	
Trust index			-0.048*** (0.005)			-0.059*** (0.005)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
Female	-0.042*** (0.015)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.013)	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.058*** (0.016)
Rural	0.001 (0.023)	0.009 (0.025)	0.024 (0.026)	0.002 (0.026)	0.011 (0.028)	0.024 (0.030)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	35,971	33,243	29,904	35,892	33,181	29,883

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Perceptions of government corruption associated with higher support for requirements

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption of president (1-4)	0.071*** (0.011)			0.090*** (0.012)		
Corruption of civil servants (1-4)		0.041*** (0.013)			0.040*** (0.013)	
Corruption index			0.031*** (0.006)			0.034*** (0.007)
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.031** (0.016)	-0.026 (0.019)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.043** (0.017)
Rural	0.0002 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.009 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.027)	0.010 (0.031)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,696	34,315	28,029	32,680	34,280	28,039

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A5: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (democratic countries)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.088*** (0.011)			-0.098*** (0.013)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.075*** (0.010)			-0.092*** (0.011)	
Trust index			-0.044*** (0.006)			-0.053*** (0.006)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
Female	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.050*** (0.016)	-0.043*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.018)
Rural	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.031)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.036)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	25,076	25,187	22,447	25,012	25,139	22,423

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A6: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (autocratic countries)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.089*** (0.020)			-0.122*** (0.021)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.127*** (0.025)			-0.155*** (0.019)	
Trust index			-0.060*** (0.012)			-0.075*** (0.011)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.075*** (0.029)	-0.107*** (0.033)	-0.103*** (0.035)	-0.078*** (0.024)	-0.088*** (0.029)	-0.088*** (0.031)
Rural	0.038 (0.037)	0.091** (0.046)	0.118** (0.047)	0.075* (0.039)	0.129*** (0.050)	0.146*** (0.052)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	10,895	8,056	7,457	10,880	8,042	7,460

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A7: Results somewhat driven by individuals with stronger beliefs in domestic accountability

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.078*** (0.015)			-0.096*** (0.016)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.083*** (0.017)			-0.090*** (0.015)	
Trust index			-0.031*** (0.009)			-0.044*** (0.008)
Domestic accountability (0-1)	0.213*** (0.048)	0.167*** (0.054)	0.156*** (0.026)	0.216*** (0.049)	0.203*** (0.047)	0.154*** (0.024)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Female	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.016)	-0.045*** (0.017)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.056*** (0.014)	-0.058*** (0.016)
Rural	0.005 (0.024)	0.012 (0.025)	0.025 (0.026)	0.010 (0.027)	0.015 (0.028)	0.027 (0.030)
Trust pres X Accountability	-0.017 (0.016)			-0.017 (0.016)		
Trust ruling X Accountability		-0.004 (0.019)			-0.021 (0.017)	
Trust index X Accountability			-0.023** (0.009)			-0.021** (0.009)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	33,865	32,850	29,624	33,795	32,788	29,605

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* The accountability question reads: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the president explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends taxpayers’ money. Statement 2: The president should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions.”

Table A8: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (pre-COVID)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.077*** (0.010)			-0.107*** (0.012)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.082*** (0.012)			-0.094*** (0.011)	
Trust index			-0.044*** (0.006)			-0.058*** (0.006)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Female	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.060*** (0.018)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.063*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.019)
Rural	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.027)	0.011 (0.030)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	22,926	22,843	20,395	22,842	22,774	20,359

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A9: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (post-COVID)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.110*** (0.020)			-0.103*** (0.022)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.103*** (0.020)			-0.137*** (0.020)	
Trust index			-0.058*** (0.010)			-0.062*** (0.012)
Age	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.037 (0.025)	-0.041 (0.028)
Rural	0.032 (0.045)	0.051 (0.054)	0.056 (0.056)	0.019 (0.051)	0.044 (0.059)	0.047 (0.064)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,045	10,400	9,509	13,050	10,407	9,524

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A10: Coethnics more opposed to requirements

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Supports development reqs (0-1)	Supports governance reqs (0-1)
	(1)	(2)
Coethnic (0-1)	-0.053* (0.032)	-0.131*** (0.034)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Female	-0.054*** (0.017)	-0.063*** (0.016)
Rural	0.020 (0.030)	0.018 (0.033)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓
Observations	25,868	25,841

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* Coethnicity data is missing for Botswana, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Tanzania (could not identify leader's ethnicity), Mauritius, Tunisia (no Afrobarometer question on ethnicity), and Sudan (no leader).

Table A11: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (coethnics)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.090*** (0.019)			-0.079*** (0.020)			
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.080*** (0.019)			-0.090*** (0.018)		
Trust index			-0.049*** (0.010)			-0.048*** (0.010)	
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	
Female	0.002 (0.029)	0.011 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.031)	-0.030 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.029)	
Rural	-0.001 (0.044)	0.007 (0.044)	0.015 (0.047)	-0.021 (0.040)	-0.018 (0.040)	0.002 (0.041)	
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	6,332	6,292	5,768	6,319	6,284	5,761	

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* Coethnicity data is missing for Botswana, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Tanzania (could not identify leader's ethnicity), Mauritius, Tunisia (no Afrobarometer question on ethnicity), and Sudan (no leader).

Table A12: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (non-coethnics)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.078*** (0.013)			-0.109*** (0.014)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.091*** (0.012)			-0.115*** (0.012)	
Trust index			-0.045*** (0.007)			-0.061*** (0.007)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Female	-0.073*** (0.020)	-0.079*** (0.021)	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.074*** (0.019)	-0.079*** (0.020)	-0.080*** (0.021)
Rural	0.044 (0.032)	0.055* (0.033)	0.064* (0.033)	0.051 (0.036)	0.059* (0.036)	0.077** (0.036)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	19,207	19,099	17,605	19,193	19,096	17,610

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* Coethnicity data is missing for Botswana, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Tanzania (could not identify leader's ethnicity), Mauritius, Tunisia (no Afrobarometer question on ethnicity), and Sudan (no leader).

Table A13: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (low education)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.081*** (0.010)			-0.100*** (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.083*** (0.011)			-0.105*** (0.011)	
Trust index			-0.041*** (0.006)			-0.057*** (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
Female	-0.058*** (0.018)	-0.061*** (0.019)	-0.058*** (0.021)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.017)	-0.043** (0.019)
Rural	0.020 (0.027)	0.030 (0.028)	0.041 (0.029)	0.022 (0.029)	0.031 (0.030)	0.046 (0.031)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	23,994	22,812	20,216	23,903	22,732	20,176

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* Education is “low” if the individual has not completed secondary school, and “high” for all secondary school graduates and above.

Table A14: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (high education)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.108*** (0.017)			-0.123*** (0.019)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.101*** (0.018)			-0.121*** (0.017)	
Trust index			-0.067*** (0.010)			-0.068*** (0.010)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Female	0.009 (0.026)	0.001 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.076*** (0.026)	-0.074** (0.031)	-0.089*** (0.033)
Rural	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.040)	0.006 (0.042)	-0.024 (0.039)	-0.023 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.047)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	11,897	10,378	9,646	11,912	10,398	9,666

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

*Note:* Education is “low” if the individual has not completed secondary school, and “high” for all secondary school graduates and above.

Table A15: Robust to controlling for ideology

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.085*** (0.010)			-0.105*** (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.085*** (0.010)			-0.105*** (0.010)	
Trust index			-0.049*** (0.006)			-0.059*** (0.006)
Liberal (0-1)	0.064*** (0.019)	0.066*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.020)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.061*** (0.023)	0.065*** (0.023)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Female	-0.041*** (0.016)	-0.046*** (0.017)	-0.048*** (0.018)	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.055*** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.016)
Rural	0.009 (0.024)	0.018 (0.026)	0.035 (0.026)	0.013 (0.026)	0.023 (0.028)	0.037 (0.029)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	33,697	31,140	28,261	33,629	31,086	28,232

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

*Note:* The ideology question reads: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: It is better to pay higher taxes if it means that there will be more services provided by government. Statement 2: It is better to pay lower taxes, even if it means there will be fewer services provided by government.” Individuals are liberal if they agree with statement 1 and 0 otherwise.

Table A16: Afrobarometer results (Kenya only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Supports development reqs (0-1)			Supports governance reqs (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.023			0.005 (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.082			-0.0002 (0.010)	
Trust index			-0.051*** (0.006)			-0.019*** (0.006)
Age	0.004 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.001)
Female	-0.175 (0.017)	-0.170*** (0.016)	-0.192*** (0.018)	-0.115*** (0.014)	-0.122*** (0.015)	-0.135*** (0.016)
Rural	-0.132 (0.030)	-0.112*** (0.033)	-0.109*** (0.026)	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.001 (0.029)
Observations	2,331	2,321	2,164	2,322	2,315	2,156
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table A17: Descriptive statistics of original survey sample

Characteristic	N = 1,000 <sup>1</sup>
Gender	
Female	500 (50%)
Male	500 (50%)
Age Group	
18-24	75 (7.5%)
25-34	746 (75%)
35+	179 (18%)
Urban / Rural	
Rural area	273 (27%)
Urban area	727 (73%)
Highest Education Level	
College	274 (27%)
Primary	7 (0.7%)
Secondary	89 (8.9%)
Technical school	56 (5.6%)
University	574 (57%)

<sup>1</sup>n (%)

of attitudes toward aid requirements, both from various donors and of various types, than the survey questions fielded in Afrobarometer. We had hoped to first validate that our measure actually captured attitudes toward aid requirements and then use the additional detail to support additional analysis of the predictors of attitudes toward aid requirements of different types. However, the novel measure we collected did not map onto the Afrobarometer questions at all, suggesting that we captured something different than support for aid requirements. As such, the additional analysis we preregistered does not constitute a good test of our theory. In this section, we describe our original survey design, present the relationship between the Afrobarometer measures and ours, and discuss why we believe our measurement effort was unsuccessful.

## Survey Design

A goal of our survey was to test whether attitudes toward specific donors influence attitudes toward conditions from those specific donors (H2). The Afrobarometer measures of support for conditionality are very general; an individual might support conditions from the World

Table A18: Robust to ordering effects

<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
Number of requirements supported (0-8)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence (1-5)	0.241*** (0.039)	0.202*** (0.049)	0.193*** (0.050)
Influence*Order:2		0.122** (0.062)	
Influence*Order:3		0.050 (0.057)	
Order:2		-0.430* (0.242)	
Order:3		-0.125 (0.223)	
Donor:U.S.	0.088* (0.045)		0.013 (0.137)
Donor:WB	0.193*** (0.054)		0.092 (0.146)
Age	0.005 (0.009)		0.006 (0.009)
Female	0.001 (0.103)		-0.080 (0.114)
Rural	0.017 (0.110)		0.111 (0.128)
Observations	3,000	3,000	1,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.030	0.029	0.020
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.027	0.014
Residual Std. Error	1.801 (df = 2993)	1.801 (df = 2994)	1.800 (df = 993)
F Statistic	15.404*** (df = 6; 2993)	17.917*** (df = 5; 2994)	3.360*** (df = 6; 993)

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Bank but not the U.S., for example. We addressed this by providing an experimental vignette that described a hypothetical project and randomly manipulated the donor. A second goal of our survey was to ask individuals about specific concrete requirements that may be more familiar to them than the abstract ideas discussed in the Afrobarometer questions. We would then take indices in order to measure support for the different types of requirements.

The vignette read:

[**The United States / The World Bank / China**] would like to finance a large project in Kenya's energy grid. This will help people and businesses in Kenya get access to electricity to make their lives easier and their businesses more productive. For this to happen, [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] will provide money to Kenya, and then the government of Kenya will oversee the project. Do you agree or disagree that [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] should. . .

We then solicited individuals' attitudes toward a variety of different requirements, presented in a randomized order:

1. Require Kenya to show that its elections are free and fair
2. Require Kenya to pass laws that protect the rights of minorities
3. Require Kenya to show how it spends its money
4. Require Kenya to pass laws to sell state-owned companies to private investors
5. Require Kenya to cut government programs it can't pay for
6. Require Kenya to show that the project doesn't hurt the environment
7. Require Kenya to hire certain kinds of companies (such as the donor's) for this project
8. Require Kenya to sell goods to them at discounted prices

While we presented this list in a randomized order, items 1-3 measure governance requirements, 4-6 measure development requirements, and 7-8 measure business requirements. We used Principal Components Analysis to generate three different indices for the three different types of requirements.

We selected the U.S., the World Bank, and China to provide a variety of types of donors, all of which are important for aid in Kenya. The U.S. is a bilateral traditional donor, the World Bank is a multilateral traditional donor, and China is a bilateral new donor. We selected the energy grid as a hypothetical sector. We selected this sector because it was an equally plausible investment for all three donors; it can simultaneously promote development, impact governance, and benefit businesses; and it is often linked to various requirements.

We presented the vignette to each respondent three times, one for each donor. We presented these in a randomized order. This expanded our sample size by providing three different responses for each individual. We preregistered specific tests to check for any ordering effects that could come from individuals noticing the repeated measure. We found very limited evidence of any ordering effects, and following our preregistered analysis did not change our results.

Critically, we also fielded the Afrobarometer questions. In our preregistration document, we write, “Our main contribution is measuring support for aid requirements based on our typology. We take general measures of support for our three different categories of aid requirements, and then we validate those measures with measures of support for specific requirements falling into those categories. Our general measures are modeled on questions included in the Afrobarometer.”

As for independent variables, we measured trust in government, corruption of government, and trust in donors as similarly as possible to the Afrobarometer survey. We ask:

1. How much do you trust President William Ruto? (Not at all / Just a little / Neutral / Somewhat / A lot)
2. How much do you trust the ruling party, the United Democratic Alliance? (Not at all / Just a little / Neutral / Somewhat / A lot)
3. How much do you trust civil servants? (Not at all / Just a little / Neutral / Somewhat / A lot)
  - This question is not included in the Afrobarometer. We included it in case the measures of trust in the president or ruling party were affected by the recent election in Kenya. However, we did not notice much difference between these three measures of trust, so we do not think this was an issue.
4. How many officials working in the office of the presidency do you think are involved in corruption? (None / Some of them / Most of them / All of them)

5. How many Members of Parliament do you think are involved in corruption? (None / Some of them / Most of them / All of them)
6. How many civil servants do you think are involved in corruption? (None / Some of them / Most of them / All of them)
7. In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of the U.S. on Kenya is mostly positive or mostly negative? (Very negative / Somewhat negative / Neither positive nor negative / Somewhat positive / Very positive)
8. In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of the World Bank on Kenya is mostly positive or mostly negative? (Very negative / Somewhat negative / Neither positive nor negative / Somewhat positive / Very positive)
9. In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of China on Kenya is mostly positive or mostly negative? (Very negative / Somewhat negative / Neither positive nor negative / Somewhat positive / Very positive)

## B.1 Measurement of the DV

We found that the Afrobarometer measures were not strongly correlated with the vignette-based measures.

In order to compare the two, we first needed to aggregate the vignette-based measures into three measures of support for requirements — development, governance, and business. This meant that, for each individual, we needed to take a PCA index of the different requirements they considered in each of these three categories and then aggregate (mean) across the different donors they considered. Having done this, we regressed the Afrobarometer general measure of support for development requirements on the vignette-based measure of support for development requirements (and so on for governance, business requirements). The results appear in Table A19.

We find surprisingly little relationship between these measures. In the case of development requirements, there was no relationship between an individual’s response to the Afrobarometer question and whether they checked the boxes saying they supported requirements we classified as “development requirements” in the vignettes they saw. There was slightly more of a connection for governance requirements, but the correlation coefficient is still very small and is only statistically significant at the .1 level. The greatest relationship we observed was for business requirements, where the coefficient was larger and statistically


Table A19: Correlation between vignette-based and general measures of support for requirement types

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Development (general)	Governance (general)	Business (general)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Development (vignette)	0.009 (0.019)		
Governance (vignette)		0.033* (0.020)	
Business (vignette)			0.150*** (0.025)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
Female	0.022 (0.017)	0.013 (0.018)	0.047** (0.023)
Rural	0.017 (0.019)	0.016 (0.020)	0.028 (0.026)
Observations	1,000	1,000	1,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.004	0.042
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0002	0.0001	0.038
Residual Std. Error (df = 995)	0.264	0.285	0.370
F Statistic (df = 4; 995)	0.955	1.026	10.936***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure A2: Relationship between Afrobarometer and vignette-based measures



significant. However, these results made us doubt that respondents’ behavior in our vignettes was related to the general views they expressed in response to the Afrobarometer questions.

We considered whether these disappointing results were simply a product of the indexing we had to do on our vignettes. Figure A2 illustrates the correlation matrix between each requirement-donor and the Afrobarometer general measures. There is very little connection between any of the individual measures and the Afrobarometer questions.

## B.2 Preregistered Tests of H1 and H2

Another clue that our vignette-generated measure captures something quite different from the Afrobarometer questions is that our findings reverse direction when we use a vignette-generated measure as the DV.

As specified in our preregistration, we operationalized overall support for requirements by summing the number of requirements individuals said they supported in each of the vignettes they saw. With three vignettes per person and 1,000 individuals, this gave us a

sample size of 3,000. Since trust in government is an individual-level characteristic, and individuals attitudes may be correlated across the three vignettes they saw, we clustered standard errors at the level of the individual. We tested H1 by regressing the number of requirements on trust (PCA index) and corruption (PCA index). We tested H2 by regressing the number of requirements on the individual’s opinion of the influence of that donor (e.g. for vignettes concerning the U.S., the individual’s opinion of the U.S. is used, and for vignettes concerning China, their opinion of China is used). Across all analyses, we control for the identity of the donor, age, gender, and rural. The results appear in Table A20.

Opposite from what we find in the main paper, we find that individuals who trust their government will be in favor of more requirements in the vignettes. Individuals who think their government is more corrupt seem to select fewer requirements. Both of these relationships are statistically significant and the opposite of our hypotheses and findings using the Afrobarometer measure, both in the Afrobarometer data and with this same survey sample.

The one result that does square with our expectations is the one that concerns the individual’s opinion of each donor. When individuals approve more of the donor, they are more likely to support requirements *from that donor*. This finding is substantively much larger than the others and is statistically significant. It represents strong support for H2.

### **B.3 Discussion of Preregistered Tests**

In the end, we think the Afrobarometer questions did a better job measuring the outcome we were interested in. The flaw we have identified with our questions, that we think accounts for our results, is that the requirements we list make it clear that donors cooperate with governments. If individuals do not trust their governments or think they are corrupt, they may not like seeing the government’s role in the provision of foreign aid, and may express this through their lack of support for these requirements. Whereas we had hoped these questions measured individuals’ desire for requirements, it may be that we are capturing their support for donor-government cooperation. They might prefer thinking about aid projects that are implemented directly by the donor or which bypass government and work through NGOs, and the examples of conditions we provide merely illustrate the government’s involvement in these aid projects. For this reason, we believe the analysis reported in the main text offers a better test of H1, even if it is not the one we registered.

Table A20: Main results from Kenya

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Number of requirements supported (0-8)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trust index	0.063** (0.025)		
Corruption index		-0.143*** (0.051)	
Influence (1-5)			0.241*** (0.039)
Donor: U.S.	0.173*** (0.042)	0.173*** (0.042)	0.088* (0.045)
Donor: WB	0.374*** (0.043)	0.374*** (0.043)	0.193*** (0.054)
Age	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)
Female	0.003 (0.104)	-0.008 (0.104)	0.001 (0.103)
Rural	0.010 (0.112)	-0.005 (0.113)	0.017 (0.110)
Observations	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.014	0.030
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.012	0.028
Residual Std. Error (df = 2993)	1.817	1.816	1.801
F Statistic (df = 6; 2993)	6.153***	6.940***	15.404***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A21: Knowledge control robustness check

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Number of requirements supported (0-8)	
Influence (1-5)	0.241*** (0.039)
Knowledge (0-1)	-0.365 (0.346)
Demographic controls	✓
Donor fixed effects	✓
Observations	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.031
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.028
Residual Std. Error	1.800 (df = 2992)
F Statistic	13.566*** (df = 7; 2992)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A22: Urban/rural divide robustness check

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
Number of requirements supported (0-8)		
	Urban	Rural
Influence (1-5)	0.254*** (0.049)	0.200*** (0.058)
Demographic controls	✓	✓
Donor fixed effects	✓	✓
Observations	2,181	819
R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.054
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.048
Residual Std. Error	1.837 (df = 2175)	1.680 (df = 813)
F Statistic	13.974*** (df = 5; 2175)	9.336*** (df = 5; 813)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

## **B.4 Heterogeneous Effects**

## **C Ethics**

This research conforms to all principles contained within the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. The original survey data we collected were through a reputable local survey firm in Kenya. Identifiable data about participants were never collected. Participation was entirely voluntary and participants completed the survey on their phones in a context of their choice. This study was deemed exempt by the Institutional Review Board at [[UNIVERSITIES REDACTED]].