

# **Political Parties and International Organizations: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches**

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How do political parties speak about and compete on issues related to international organizations (IOs)? We argue that partisan discourse about IOs jointly depends on whether a party is a mainstream or niche (or ‘challenger’) party, and whether it is in government or in opposition. Because niche parties usually have more incentives to mobilize on IO-related issues than mainstream parties, they are likely to talk more and more negatively about IOs, especially when they are in opposition. When parties enter government, however, they are ‘forced’ to talk about IOs in positive ways to justify the implementation of IO decisions in domestic law. As a result, niche parties tone down their criticism of IOs, and therefore have incentives to talk less about IOs than when in opposition. In contrast, mainstream parties are expected to talk more and more positively about IOs when in government. We test this argument by analyzing the salience and sentiment of all IO-related speeches in six national parliaments between 1990 and 2018. Our results support the argument that the niche/mainstream party distinction and the governing status jointly explain the tone and frequency of party communication about IOs. These findings not only advance our understanding of party contestation on issues of international cooperation, but also suggests that blame shifting toward IOs by national governments may not be as pronounced as previously thought.

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# 1 Introduction

International cooperation and international organizations (IOs) have become an increasingly salient topic in domestic political debates (Zürn et al. 2012). This discourse matters: Elite communication affects public opinion on foreign policy matters and legitimacy perceptions of IOs (Guisinger and Saunders, Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021). As entrepreneurial politicians and parties have become to talk more about international institutions, international cooperation has turned into an increasingly salient and politicized issue in domestic politics (De Vries et al 2021). Political parties play an important role in this context: Not only are political parties important political actors that pursue different policies with respect to IOs in the domestic political arena, especially when they are in government (Caraway et al. 2012; Beaver and Woo 2015). Partisan discourse on international organizations can also shape public opinion on these issues in significant ways.

Despite this importance of IO-related party discourse, systematic evidence on how political parties speak about IOs is relatively rare. Some studies show descriptively that partisan discourse on issues related to international organizations (Schmidtke 2018) and globalization more generally (Walter 2021) varies a lot. There are some individual case studies such as the Justicialist Party's relations to the IMF (Levitsky and Murillo 2008), Kenya's PNU party and the ICC (Mueller 2013), and how parties in Central and Eastern Europe view NATO membership and enlargement (Epstein 2006). And a very rich research program exists on how parties compete the issue of the EU and European integration more generally. Whilst long considered a 'sleeping giant' in domestic politics (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), the gradual expansion of authority of the EU, combined with favorable opportunity structures for EU politicization such as referendums on treaties or European elections, means has turned the EU

into a salient issue in domestic party competition (De Vries 2007, Hobolt and Rondon 2020, Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2018). Across Europe, party family is a strong predictor of position on European integration, with radical right and radical left parties particularly opposed (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002, Marks et al 2002, De Vries et al 2021, De Vries and Hobolt 2020). But beyond this, systematic analysis of IO-related partisan discourse across party families, IOs, time, and country context is rare.

This paper seeks to fill this gap. It explores how political parties across different countries speak about a large number of different IOs throughout a period of almost thirty years in a central venue of domestic party competition: national parliamentary debates. National parliaments are an ideal venue to test theories of party discourse as they provide a large amount of frequent communication on a wide range of issues, including international institutions. Furthermore, parliamentary debates have hosted some of the most memorable debates on international cooperation in recent years: think of the dramatic attempts to ratify a Brexit deal in the House of Commons, or the Kenyan Assembly's decision to suspend all links with the International Criminal Court in 2013.

Our goal is to explain both the frequency with which political parties talk about IOs, and the sentiment they convey in their communication. Building on research developed to explain party competition on the issue of European integration competition (De Vries 2007, Hobolt and Rondon 2020, Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2018), we argue that partisan discourse on international organizations varies between mainstream and niche (or 'challenger') parties on the one hand and governing and opposition parties on the other. We argue that partisan discourse about IOs jointly depends on whether a party is a mainstream or niche (or 'challenger') party, and whether it is in government or in opposition. Because niche parties usually have more incentives to mobilize on IO-related issues than mainstream parties, they

are likely to talk more and more negatively about IOs, especially when they are in opposition. When parties enter government, however, they are ‘forced’ to talk about IOs in positive ways to justify the implementation of IO decisions in domestic law. As a result, niche parties tone down their criticism of IOs, and therefore have incentives to talk less about IOs than when in opposition. In contrast, mainstream parties are expected to talk more and more positively about IOs when in government.

We test this argument with a dataset of over 600,000 statements on 75 different IOs, made between 1990 and 2018 in six different legislatures (Austria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States). and find evidence for the hypotheses above. Niche (or ‘challenger’) parties from the radical right, radical left, and green party families use more negative language and dedicate more of their parliamentary communication to IOs. Mainstream parties, such as those from Conservative, Social Democratic, Liberal, or Christian Democratic families talk less about IOs in their parliamentary communication, but increase it considerably when they enter government.

These findings have a number of implications. First, they show how party competition on IOs follows a government-opposition logic. IOs in many ways govern: they produce policies that affect the everyday lives of citizens. In that sense, it is logical that they are more likely to be mentioned positively by parties that also govern and with whom they share responsibility for policy outputs, and more likely to be mentioned negatively by parties in opposition whose principal functions in democracies include holding to account governing power and authority in all its forms – be it local, national or international. Second, our findings show the heterogenous effect of entering government for mainstream and niche parties. Whilst for mainstream parties entering government is an opportunity– allowing them to use IOs as a venue for displaying competence - for niche parties entering government suddenly makes their

position on IOs a risk that highlights discrepancies in how they campaign on IOs versus what they are able to deliver in office (particularly if they enter as junior parties) and they in fact. We conclude that governing status, party family/ideology, *and the interaction between the two* is central to understanding party contestation on issues of international cooperation.

## **2 Parties and International Organizations in Parliamentary Debates**

How do parties speak about on IOs? Central to this question is not simply *how* parties talk about IOs (the tone of their IO communication), but *how often* they mention IOs (the salience of IOs in their communication). In this article, we build a theory explaining how parties communicate about IOs in national parliamentary debates.

National parliaments are an ideal venue to test theories on party competition. First, they provide us with a large *amount* of party communication: parliamentary transcripts record a huge amount of speeches from parties across the political spectrum. Furthermore, many of these transcripts have been digitized (see Rauh and Schoonvelde 2021, Greene et al. 2023), thereby facilitating automated analysis of parties' speech. Second, parliamentary debates allow us to capture *frequent* communication by political parties. As opposed to manifestos, which are relatively infrequent and appear every couple of years at best, parliamentary debates provide us with communication by parties on a regular basis. Third, national parliaments are also a highly *relevant* venue to study debates on IOs. International treaties usually need to be ratified by domestic legislatures and IO policy frequently needs to be implemented into national law, providing opportunities for debate and contestation (see also Hunter and Walter 2023). Indeed, the importance of domestic legislatures to international politics is highlighted in some of the most high-profile recent events surrounding international cooperation. The aftermath of the British referendum on EU membership for,

example, was dominated by dramatic attempts to ratify a Brexit deal in the House of Commons (Clarke et al 2017; Hobolt 2018; Hobolt et al 2021). In 2013, the Kenyan Assembly's decision to suspend all links with the International Criminal Court led to media coverage across the world.

### **3.1 Sentiment of IO Parliamentary Discourse**

We first turn to the sentiment of parties' communication on IOs. Do certain parties systematically employ more positive or negative language when discussing international institutions? We build on research about party competition that emphasizes the difference between '*mainstream*' parties (parties of the centre left and centre right with extensive government experience) and '*niche*' or '*challenger*' (parties from more radical party families with limited government experience such as the radical right, the radical left, or the green movement (see Adams 2005, Adams et al. 2008).

The central insight from this literature is that niche parties are the likely mobilizers of IOs as a political issue and likely to adopt more negative language in their communication of IOs. Theories of issue evolution and manipulation (Rikker et al 1996) argue that niche parties are highly incentivized to mobilize issues that can disturb the political equilibrium. Because they are newcomers to the system or hold marginal positions, any potential vote gain will constitute an improvement on their current electoral position, and by mobilizing issues which are not easily subsumed into the dominant left-right (economic) dimension of party competition, they can drive a wedge within mainstream parties and change the basis on which voters make political choices (De Vries and Hobolt 2020, De Vries et al 2021). As mainstream political coalitions are built around commitments to international institutions such as WTO, NATO, or the EU, destabilizing this coalition by taking more critical stances and using more negative

language is inherently risky for mainstream parties. By contrast, niche parties can exploit the ‘elite-citizen gap in IO legitimacy’ (Dellmuth et al 2021) by taking critical stances that are more in tune with citizens’ preferences.

The distinction between governing and opposition parties is also likely to structure the tone of IO communication in parliament. In particular, parties that enter government are likely to find it harder to use more negative language, and have incentives to use more positive language when discussing IOs. Indeed, whilst scholars have suggested IO scapegoating by government is rife, empirical studies have found that it is less widespread than previously assumed (see Hobolt and Tilley 2014, Hunter 2023, Heinkelmann Wild et al 2023). Because governments have a ‘seat at the table’ in IOs, it can be difficult for them to credibly criticize IOs, particularly if they are from countries that are powerful within the IO (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Furthermore, for mainstream parties, criticizing IOs could antagonize a large chunk of their domestic voter base, which is often supportive of international cooperation. Crucially, entering government also provides parties with a positive rhetorical strategy which is unavailable in opposition: credit claiming. By showing what they have achieved for their country on the international stage, governments can show themselves to be competent, effective defenders of the national interest (Hunter 2023).

It is worth noting that these expectations on IO communication reflect patterns of general parliamentary communication, which find that governing parties use consistently more positive language than opposition parties (Slapin and Proksch 2016). Our point here is not that IO communication is exceptional or distinct, but precisely that it follows this government/opposition logic. IOs, in many ways, govern: they produce policies that affect the everyday lives of citizens. In that sense, it is logical that they are more likely to be defended by parties that also govern and with whom they share responsibility for policy

outputs, and more likely to be criticized by parties in opposition whose principal functions in democracies include holding to account governing power and authority in all its forms – be it local, national or international.

It is also important to point out here that the use of negative language in IO communication should not be seen *necessarily* as an explicit criticism of IOs, nor as an instance of delegitimation (see Tallberg and Zurn 2019, Schmidtke 2019, Schmidtke et al 2023 for examples of these rhetorical strategies). For instance, an IO might be mentioned in a negative statement if it is associated with crisis moments, even if it is not held responsible for that crisis. Likewise, positive language should not be seen necessarily as praise of the IO. For instance, the credit claiming statements described above are likely to be very positive, even if they do not praise the IO directly. Nonetheless, these associations around sentiment are strong (it is unlikely that an IO consistently linked with crises will be viewed positively, irrespective of whether it is presented as directly responsible) and scholars have in fact used similar methods to identify blame shifting toward the EU and its institutions strong (Traber et al 2019). Our first hypotheses on IO communication by political parties therefore that *niche parties use more negative and less positive language in their communication of IOs than mainstream parties (H1) and that parties in opposition use more negative and less positive language in their communication of IOs than parties in government (H2)*

### **3.2 Salience of IOs in Parliamentary Discourse**

We now turn our attention to the frequency, or *salience*, of IOs in parties' parliamentary discourse. Do certain parties dedicate substantially more of their communication to IOs than others? Indeed, scholars argue that parties can mobilize issues not simply by adopting positions that distinguish them from the political mainstream, but also by mentioning that



issue consistently in their communication. In Europe for instance, niche or challenger parties do not simply advocate more anti-EU positions than their mainstream counterparts, but also make EU integration a more salient feature of their communication and electoral programme (see Hobolt and De Vries 2020, Marks et al 2021). Scholars have argued that this logic extends to international cooperation generally and that 'a core feature of the politicization of international cooperation comes from challenger (niche) parties that occupy losing positions on the dominant dimension of political competition' (De Vries 2021 p8).

As mentioned in the previous section, niche parties are the likely mobilizers of IOs as a political issue, and we argue that this manifests itself not simply through the use of more negative language, but through a larger focus on IOs in their parliamentary communication. This attempt to make IOs more salient is true of niche parties on both extremes. Radical right parties might want to make IOs more salient to mobilize discontent toward supranational elites and highlight encroachments to national sovereignty. Niche parties with more cosmopolitan tendencies like the greens might want to make IOs more salient to highlight their centrality in solving global issues like climate change. The point here is that because they both stand to gain from reconfiguration of the political competition toward a second dimension, they will both want to raise the salience of IOs and international cooperation as a political issue. Mainstream parties by contrast will seek to avoid IOs in their parliamentary speech if possible. Instead, they prefer to redirect political debates onto issues that fit onto the left-right dimension of conflict where they are dominant. We therefore expect that overall, mainstream parties will dedicate a lower share of their parliamentary communication to IOs than niche parties.

In contrast, mainstream parties have fewer incentives to speak about IOs than niche parties, precisely because IOs constitute a typical wedge issue for them (De Vries and Hobolt 2020, De Vries et al 2021) for which the gap between the views of mainstream political elites and citizens

is large (see Dellmuth et al 2021). With that being said, there are situations where mainstream parties are almost 'forced' to talk about IOs: when they are *in government*. Indeed, scholars of agenda setting have argued that while both parties in government and opposition seek to emphasize issues that are advantageous to themselves, opposition parties are much freer to ignore issues they would prefer not to discuss (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Green-Pedersen 2019). Unlike governing parties, they are not to the same extent held responsible for policy solutions, and can instead focus on criticizing the government on whatever issue they deem advantageous. By contrast, governing parties are forced to respond to issues as soon as they emerge on the agenda, otherwise they are accused of being incompetent and unable to deliver the expected policy solutions. This is particularly the case with respect to IOs. Because government participation in IOs is strongly institutionalized with regular Security Council meetings, UN conferences, and WTO negotiations (to name but a few), members of governing parties (particularly ministers and the heads of government) have to report back and discuss what has been achieved on the international stage. The argument here is that it is basically impossible for the leadership of a mainstream governing party to ignore IOs altogether, even if they would prefer to because, for example, their party is divided on the issue.

By contrast, the pattern for niche parties entering government might be reversed. These parties benefit from mobilizing IOs when they are in opposition and not responsible for delivering policy outputs. Entering government can be a rude awakening for these parties, who suddenly realize that governing comes with many constraints, and that the policies promised in opposition might not be realizable in practice. Niche parties are also more likely to join governments as junior partners, and are therefore not as center stage for the institutionalized international summits and meetings organized by IOs. Whilst for mainstream parties, entering government means using IOs as an opportunity to display competence, for niche parties, there is a strong risk that communication on IOs highlights

the discrepancy between what they promise and what they can deliver. Table 1 summarizes the theoretical argument in a two-by-two. Whilst mainstream parties are likely to talk *more* about IOs when they enter government, for niche parties the incentives are not so clear and it might even benefit them to talk *less* about IOs , to avoid highlighting discrepancies between their campaign promises and what they can actually deliver. Our hypotheses are therefore that *niche parties dedicate a larger share of their parliamentary communication to IOs than mainstream parties (H3)*. We also expect that overall, *parties in government dedicate a larger share of their parliamentary communication to IOs than parties in opposition (H4)*. Our theory also anticipates heterogenous effects of entering government for different party types: we expect that *for mainstream parties, entering government increases the salience of IOs in their parliamentary communication (H4a)* and that *for niche parties, entering government decrease the salience of IOs in their parliamentary communication (H4b)*.

**Table 1 – Governing Status and IO Salience in Parliamentary Discourse**

|                      | <b>Mainstream Party</b> | <b>Niche Party</b> |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| <b>In Opposition</b> | Lower IO Salience       | Higher IO Salience |
| <b>In Government</b> | Higher IO Salience      | Lower IO Salience  |

### 3. Research Design

### 3.1 Original Data of IO Communication in Parliamentary Debates

To test our hypotheses, we draw on an original dataset of IO communication by political parties developed by the authors. *IOParlspeech* is a dataset of over 600,000 statements on 75 different IOs made in six legislatures between 1990 and 2018. The 75 different IOs are drawn from the Measuring International Authority Database and include both global IOs (e.g. United Nations) and regional IOs (e.g. African Union). The parliaments are the US Congress, the British House of Commons, New Zealand's House of Commons, the German Bundestag, Austria's National Rat, and Canada's House of Commons. Although the case selection for *IOParlspeech* is constrained by data availability and feasibility concerns, it reflects a set of geographically diverse countries (the sample spans three continents), hosting a diverse set of niche and mainstream parties.<sup>1</sup> The Appendix contains further details on the list of IOs included in the dataset, the number of statements per IO in each legislature, and validation for false negatives and positives.

### 3.2 Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables

To construct our dependent variables, we use *IOParlspeech* to create panel datasets of IO communication in parliament, using the *party year* as the unit of analysis. Our first dependent variable captures the sentiment of IO communication. To do so, all IO statements by each party are aggregated into one long document for each year. We then combine sentiment dictionaries in English (Young and Soroka 2012) and German (Rauh 2015) with word embedding techniques (Zorn 2019). This allows us to create domain specific

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<sup>1</sup> The one exception is the US Congress, where voting rules and means the two party system is deeply ingrained. Whilst New Zealand, Canada, and the UK's lower house are also elected in 'first past the post' elections, their legislatures are nonetheless populated by a variety of parties from both 'niche' and 'mainstream' party families'.

dictionaries of positive and negative emotion in parties' IO communication and replicates a method used in other studies (see Osnabruegge et al 2021). Note that for the FARRIO workshop our analysis is limited to the initial sentiment dictionaries. In this case, positive sentiment is the share of positive words (e.g. 'valuable', 'smart') in a party's IO communication, negative sentiment is the share of negative words (e.g. 'dangerous', 'undemocratic') in a party's IO communication, and net sentiment is the difference between positive and negative sentiment. Table 2 provides examples of IO statements with high and low net sentiment scores.

Our second dependent variable captures the yearly salience of all IOs for each party, in each parliament, in each year. To create this dependent variable, we capture the share of parliamentary communication the party dedicates to IOs by dividing the cumulative length of all the party's statements about IOs in a year (in words) by the length of its total parliamentary communication that same year (also in words). Note that to avoid our results being skewed by parties who communicate very little in parliament, we exclude from both the sentiment and salience analysis parties who make less than 500 speeches in parliament across the full investigation period

Our two central hypotheses are party type (mainstream vs. niche) and governing status (opposition vs. government). While the precise definition of mainstream and niche parties continues to be a matter of debate in the literature, there is a broad consensus that mainstream parties are typically those belonging to the old party families, while typical niche parties are Radical Right, Radical Left, and Green parties (Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2012; van de Wardt et al. 2014). Traditionally, these parties are less likely to compete mainly on the dominant left right dimension of contestation. Following the literature, we therefore operationalize the mainstream parties as those belonging to the Conservative, Christian

Democrat, Liberal and Socialist party families, while niche parties are Radical Right, Radical Left, and Green (Adams et al. 2006). We use the ParlGov dataset (Doring et al 2022) to identify the families of all parties in our sample. Finally, we include a range of political and economic controls. We control for levels of unemployment, GDP growth, and inflation with data from the World Bank. As domestic politics has been shown to impact on the politicization of IOs (von Brozykowski and Vabulas 2019), we include controls from the DPI dataset that capture whether legislative elections take place in that year, and the levels of polarization in the legislature.

**Table 2. IO statements with high and low net sentiment scores**

| <b>Speaker Details</b>                                  | <b>IO statement</b>   | <b>Net Sent.</b> |
|---|---|------------------|
| Alice Mahon,<br>Labour,<br>British HoC<br>17.06.1999    | “Sadly, we have seen horrendous atrocities all too regularly. It is no secret that I opposed <b>NATO's</b> war on Yugoslavia. I have always believed that it was illegal and immoral.”  | -0.2451          |
| Rod Donald,<br>Green,<br>New Zealand HoC,<br>12.09.2000 | The worst problems of labour exploitation could be overcome straight away if the <b>International Labour Organization</b> . were able to implement its basic standards worldwide. Unfortunately, the ILO has no teeth. Compare that with the fearsome array of trade penalties that the World Trade Organization has! | - 0.1176         |
| Tristan Garel-Jones,<br>Conservative,                   | “My hon Friend is right that the <b>United Nations</b> offers the best hope of progress. It provides the necessary authority and impartiality to encourage  | 0.2432           |

|                            |   |  |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| British HoC,<br>24.03.1992 | the two communities to reach a mutually acceptable and lasting solution.” |  |
|----------------------------|---|--|

**Table 3. Political Parties included in IOParlspeech**

| <b>National Parliament</b> | <b>Parties</b>  |
|----------------------------|---|
| AT – National Rat          | SPÖ (soc) , ÖVP (chr), LIF (lib), NEOS (lib), STRONACH (lib), FPÖ (rad right), Grüne (green) , BZÖ (rad right), |
| DE – Bundestag             | FDP (lib), SPD (soc), CDU (chr), AfD (rad right), GRUENE (green), PDS/LINKE (rad left)                          |
| CAN – House of Commons     | NDP (soc), Liberal (lib), BQ (soc), Prog Con (con), Alliance (con), Con (con), Reform (con), Green (green),     |
| NZ – House of Commons      | Lab (soc), Nat (con), UF (lib), NZ First (con), ACT (lib), Alliance (soc), Green (green)                        |
| UK- House of Commons       | Con (Con), Lab (Soc), LibDem (Lib), SNP (Soc), UKIP (Rad Right), GPEW (Green),                                  |
| US - Congress              | Rep (Con), Dem (Lib)  |

*Note: Party family from Doring et al 2022 in brackets.*

#### **4. Results**

To test our hypotheses, we run two-way fixed effects panel regressions (OLS panel regressions with country and year fixed effects to control for differences across countries and across time).

The first set of models use sentiment of IO parliamentary communication as the dependent variable (results presented in Table 4) whereas the second set of models use IO salience as the dependent variable (results presented in Table 5). Note that the sample size(s) for table 4 is slightly smaller as there are a few years where some smaller parties do not make a single reference to an IO, and where it is therefore not possible to operationalize the sentiment of their IO communication. Their IO salience for these years is 0.

Table 4 shows how the distinction between niche and mainstream parties on the one hand, and governing and opposition parties on the other impacts the sentiment of their IO communication. The dependent variables include positive sentiment (second model in the table), negative sentiment (third model in the table), and net sentiment (first, fourth, and fifth models in the table). The results show how niche and opposition parties use significantly more negative and less positive language in their IO communication. Indeed, the share of negative words in niche parties' IO communication is 3.6 percentage points higher than for mainstream parties, and the equivalent figure for the difference between governing and opposition parties is 5 percentage points. The interaction effect between party type (niche or mainstream) and governing status is insignificant, suggesting that niche parties do not fundamentally alter the tone of their IO communication when entering government.

The difference in sentiment between mainstream parties and niche parties is present for each party family: Christian Democratic and Liberal (the reference category) party families have the highest net sentiment in their IO communication, whereas radical left parties have the lowest. Interestingly, radical right and green party families have similar levels of net sentiment in their communication – both significantly lower than other mainstream parties. In future iterations of this working paper, one interesting avenue could be to explore this surprising similarity in more detail. Are radical right (and left) parties critical of both the principle and output of international



organizations, whereas green parties are supportive of international cooperation in principle, but actually rather critical of the output of IOs ‘on the ground’? These are plausible hypotheses given that the economic platforms of Green parties are usually well to the left of the policies promoted by international economic institutions. One option could be to take random samples of IO statements by parties and handcode their positions on IOs in more granular detail. Even without this granularity, the results present interesting and consistent patterns in IO communication by political parties in parliament.

**Table 4: Panel Regression Results with IO sentiment as Dependent Variable**

| <i>Dependent variable:</i> |                      |                      |                     |                      |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                            | Net. Sent            | Pos. Sent            | Neg. Sent           | Net.Sent             | Net.Sent             |
| Niche                      | -0.075***<br>(0.009) | -0.038***<br>(0.008) | 0.036***<br>(0.006) | -0.063***<br>(0.023) |                      |
| In Opposition              | -0.121***<br>(0.007) | -0.071***<br>(0.006) | 0.050***<br>(0.005) | -0.120***<br>(0.008) | -0.118***<br>(0.008) |
| Niche * Opposition         |                      |                      |                     | -0.014<br>(0.025)    |                      |
| Rad Left                   |                      |                      |                     |                      | -0.140***<br>(0.020) |
| Green                      |                      |                      |                     |                      | -0.075***<br>(0.012) |
| Rad Right                  |                      |                      |                     |                      | -0.074***<br>(0.017) |
| Cons                       |                      |                      |                     |                      | -0.033***<br>(0.010) |
| Soc.                       |                      |                      |                     |                      | -0.021**<br>(0.009)  |
| Christ Dem                 |                      |                      |                     |                      | 0.007<br>(0.015)     |
| Constant                   | 0.271<br>(0.164)     | 0.833***<br>(0.143)  | 0.562***<br>(0.102) | 0.270<br>(0.165)     | 0.316*<br>(0.163)    |
| Observations               | 778                  | 778                  | 778                 | 778                  | 778                  |
| Country Fixed Effects      | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| Year Fixed Effects         | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| Political Controls         | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| Economic Controls          | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                  |

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 5: Panel Regression Results with IO salience as Dependent Variable**

|                       | Without<br>Controls | With<br>Controls    | With<br>Interaction  | Party<br>Families   |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Niche                 | 0.019***<br>(0.003) | 0.018***<br>(0.003) | -0.002<br>(0.008)    |                     |
| In Opposition         | -0.006**<br>(0.003) | -0.005*<br>(0.003)  | -0.007***<br>(0.003) | -0.005*<br>(0.003)  |
| Niche*Opposition      |                     |                     | 0.023***<br>(0.008)  |                     |
| Green                 |                     |                     |                      | 0.022***<br>(0.004) |
| Rad Left              |                     |                     |                      | 0.019***<br>(0.007) |
| Rad Right             |                     |                     |                      | 0.013**<br>(0.006)  |
| Christ Dem            |                     |                     |                      | 0.009*<br>(0.005)   |
| Socialist             |                     |                     |                      | 0.001<br>(0.003)    |
| Cons                  |                     |                     |                      | -0.006*<br>(0.003)  |
| Constant              | 0.033***<br>(0.009) | 0.228***<br>(0.056) | 0.229***<br>(0.055)  | 0.233***<br>(0.056) |
| Observations          | 795                 | 795                 | 795                  | 795                 |
| Country Fixed Effects | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 |
| Year Fixed Effects    | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 |
| Political Controls    | No                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 |
| Economic Controls     | No                  | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 |

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5 shows how the distinction between niche and mainstream parties on the one hand, and governing and opposition parties on the other also impacts the *share* of parliamentary

communication parties dedicate to IOs. Importantly, this difference is not negligible. On average, and all else being equal, the yearly share of parliamentary communication dedicated to IOs is 1.9 percentage points higher for niche parties compared to their mainstream counterparts. The results from the fourth model also show how – like with sentiment - the effect is present for each of the major party niche party families: Green, Radical Left, and Radical Right parties consistently dedicate more of their parliamentary communication to IOs than Christian Democratic, Socialist, Conservative, and Liberal (the reference category) party families.

**Figure 1 – Salience of IO-related parliamentary discourse by political party**




Figure 1 provides further details by plotting the average yearly IO salience for each party in our sample. Interestingly, these results show how it is not simply radical right parties that mobilize IOs in parliamentary debate. The AfD is the party that dedicates the highest share of

its parliamentary communication to IOs in Germany. But in the UK, New Zealand, and Canada, it is in fact green parties that dedicate the most of their parliamentary communication to IOs (note also radical right UKIP in strong second place in the UK). The Figure also reveals interesting cross-national differences: there is no difference in IO salience between Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress, and the salience of IOs overall is significantly lower in New Zealand's parliamentary debates, perhaps a reflection of its smaller power and influence in the international system.

The interaction effect in the third model in Table 5 also shows how the effect of entering government (or being in opposition) differs for niche and mainstream parties. This distinguishes it from the interaction term for sentiment, where the interaction was insignificant. For mainstream parties, there is a significant increase in the share of parliamentary communication dedicated to IOs when they enter government. For niche parties, average levels of IO salience are in fact lower when they enter government compared to being in opposition. Whilst these figures should be interpreted with caution given the relatively few amount of niche parties that enter government in our investigation period it does at least provide some plausibility for the idea that the effect of entering government on the salience of IOs in parliamentary communication does differ across party types.

As a final point of clarification, it is important to remember that whilst IOs are more salient in the discourse of niche parties in relative terms, this isn't to say that niche parties dominate communication on IOs in parliamentary debates. Mainstream parties still claim the lion's share of speaking time in parliament (particularly when they are in government) and as such are responsible for the majority of IO communication in legislatures. In fact, over our full sample, mainstream parties are responsible for over two thirds of statements on IOs. In that sense it is important to remember that the political landscape has been characterized by stability as well

as change (see De Vries and Hobolt 2020). Niche/challenger parties may have grown in popularity and occupy a larger share of seats in legislatures – partly with a discourse that mobilizes international cooperation. But the resilience of mainstream parties, combined with their dominance of executive office, means that they remain (arguably the) central cue givers in political party debates about international cooperation.

## **5. Conclusion**

How do parties compete on issues of international cooperation and speak about IOs? In this early working paper, we explored this question by analyzing the salience and sentiment of IO communication in national parliamentary debates. Our analysis revealed the important effect of governing status and the niche/mainstream party distinction to explain communication on IOs. Niche parties dedicate more of their parliamentary communication to IOs and use more negative language when discussing them. Mainstream parties dedicate less of their communication to IOs in opposition, but significantly increase IO salience and IO sentiment when they enter government, an effect we do not find for niche parties.

Results show how party competition follows a government-opposition logic. IOs are more likely to be mentioned positively by parties that also govern and with whom they share responsibility for policy outputs, and more likely to be mentioned negatively by parties in opposition whose principal functions in democracies include holding to account governing power and authority in all its forms, including the international level. These findings are in line with an emerging literature that suggests blame shifting toward IOs by national governments may not be as pronounced as previously thought (Hunter 2023, Heinkelamm-wild , Hobolt and Tilley 2014)

The findings from this paper, as well as the data introduced, opens avenues for further research. Whilst this first attempt at analyzing the substance of parliamentary communication on IOs finds interesting results regarding sentiment, more specific analysis of parties' communication could yield further valuable insights. For instance, an exciting literature has explored legitimization and delegitimation narratives used on IOs (Schmidtke and Lenz 2023, Ecker-Erhardt 2018, Tallberg and Zurn 2019). The party-panel data introduced could be used to analyze how and why IOs are (de)legitimized in the rhetoric of political parties. In particular, comparing the rhetoric of green parties and radical right and left parties, who all displayed similar levels of negative sentiment, could be interesting. Finally, the data could be used to investigate the consequences of rhetoric for the actions of IOs and the behaviour of member state governments. Scholars have argued that rhetoric surrounding international cooperation is not just 'cheap talk' and that governments can rhetorically entrap themselves, thereby pursuing certain policies because of public positions that become impossible to reverse (Elser 2017, Schimmelfennig 2001). How does rhetoric on IOs at the domestic level effect governments at the international level? Do IO bureaucrats take notice and respond to national debates on international cooperation? What is the relationship between the domestic debate and the policy output of international institutions? Parliamentary discourse on international institutions can help us address these questions in a world where domestic and international politics are increasingly intertwined.

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## Appendix

### 1 - IOs in IOParlspeech

The table below includes the full list of IOs in IOParlspeech. These are drawn from the Measuring International Authority Database (Hooghe and Marks 2017). The search strings include both the IO's acronym and the IO's full name. The languages are English for the USA, UK, Canada, and New Zealand, and German for Germany and Austria.

**Table A1 - List of IOs in IOParlspeech**

| <b>Acronym<br/>in English</b> | <b>Full name in English</b>                         | <b>COW issue<br/>area</b> |
|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| ALADI                         | Latin American Integration Association              | economic                  |
| AMU                           | Arab Maghreb Union                                  | economic                  |
| APEC                          | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation                   | economic                  |
| ASEAN                         | Association of Southeast Asian Nations              | economic                  |
| AU                            | African Union                                       | political                 |
| Benelux                       | Benelux   | political                 |
| BIS                           | Bank for International Settlements                  | economic                  |
| CABI                          | Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International | social                    |
| CAN                           | Andean Community                                    | economic                  |
| Caricom                       | Caribbean Community                                 | economic                  |
| CCNR                          | Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine  | political                 |

|         |   |           |
|---------|---|-----------|
| CEMAC   | Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa     | economic  |
| CERN    | European Organization for Nuclear Research            | economic  |
| CIS     | Commonwealth of Independent States                    | political |
| COE     | Council of Europe                                     | political |
| COMECON | Council for Mutual Economic Assistance                | economic  |
| COMESA  | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa         | economic  |
| ComSec  | Commonwealth Secretariat                              | political |
| EAC2    | East African Community                                | economic  |
| ECCAS   | Economic Community of Central African States          | economic  |
| ECOWAS  | Economic Community of West African States             | economic  |
| EEA     | European Economic Area                                | economic  |
| EFTA    | European Free Trade Agreement                         | economic  |
| ESA     | European Space Agency                                 | political |
| EU      | European Union  | economic  |
| FAO     | Food and Agriculture Organization                     | economic  |
| GCC     | Gulf Cooperation Council                              | economic  |
| GEF     | Global Environment Facility                           | social    |
| IAEA    | International Atomic Energy Agency                    | social    |
| IBRD    | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development | economic  |
| ICAO    | International Civil Aviation Organization             | social    |
| ICC     | International Criminal Court                          | political |
| IGAD    | Intergovernmental Authority on Development            | economic  |
| ILO     | International Labour Organization                     | social    |
| IMF     | International Monetary Fund                           | economic  |



|          |  |           |
|----------|--|-----------|
| IMO      | International Maritime Organization                                  | economic  |
| Interpol | International Criminal Police Organization                           | social    |
| IOM      | International Organization for Migration                             | political |
| ISA      | International Seabed Authority                                       | social    |
| ITU      | International Telecommunication Union                                | economic  |
| IWhale   | International Whaling Commission                                     | economic  |
| LOAS     | Arab League/League of Arab States                                    | political |
| Mercosur | Southern Common Market   | economic  |
| NAFO     | Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization                            | social    |
| NAFTA    | North American Free Trade Agreement                                  | economic  |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                                   | political |
| NordC    | Nordic Council   | political |
| OAPEC    | Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries                   | economic  |
| OAS      | Organization of American States                                      | political |
| OECD     | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development                | economic  |
| OECS     | Organization of Eastern Caribbean States                             | economic  |
| OIC      | Organization of Islamic Cooperation                                  | social    |
| OIF      | International Organisation of La Francophonie                        | social    |
| OPEC     | Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries                    | economic  |
| OSCE     | Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe                  | political |
| OTIF     | Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage<br>by Rail | economic  |
| PCA      | Permanent Court of Arbitration                                       | political |
| PIF      | Pacific Islands Forum  | political |

|        |  |           |
|--------|--|-----------|
| SAARC  | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation                 | political |
| SACU   | Southern African Customs Union                                   | economic  |
| SADC   | Southern African Development Community                           | economic  |
| SCO    | Shanghai Cooperation Organization                                | political |
| SELA   | Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System                 | economic  |
| SICA   | Central American Integration System                              | economic  |
| SPC    | South Pacific Commission   | political |
| UN     | United Nations   | political |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization | social    |
| UNIDO  | United Nations Industrial Development Organization               | economic  |
| UNWTO  | World Tourism Organization                                       | economic  |
| UPU    | Universal Postal Union   | economic  |
| WCO    | World Customs Organization                                       | economic  |
| WHO    | World Health Organization  | social    |
| WIPO   | World Intellectual Property Organization                         | economic  |
| WMO    | World Meteorological Organization                                | social    |
| WTO    | World Trade Organization   | economic  |

## **2 – Validation: Minimizing False Positives and False Negatives in IOParlspeech**

Scholars using automated text analysis methods must validate their use (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). In particular, they should ensure that both false positives (in our case, capturing a statement which isn't in fact about an IO) and false negatives (excluding a statement that is in fact about an IO) are minimized. In our case, identifying statements about IOs requires using acronyms, but some of these could yield false positives. For instance, in the UK 'ISA' might refer to the Individual Savings Account rather than the International Settlements Authority. In Germany, 'WIPO' is not simply an acronym for the World Intellectual Property Organization, but also for 'Wirtschaft/Politik' (Economics/Politics), a subject taught in secondary schools. To guard against false positives, we therefore employ a number of steps. First, handcoders were given a random sample of 5 hits from each acronym search string for each parliament. If any of these random samples returned one or more false positives, hand coders were asked to hand code the full sample hits using the acronyms. Altogether, 17 per cent of acronyms included a false positive, and hand coders coded over 900 additional hits to ensure false positives were excluded from the dataset.

False negatives could also be an issue for IOParlspeech. Parliamentarians might reference an IO without mentioning the IO's name directly by alluding to its policies. For instance, an MP that references the 'Millennium Development Goals' is implicitly referencing the UN. If the majority of mentions of an IO come from mentions of its policies or internal institutions, false negatives are likely to be a significant problem in IOParlspeech. If the majority of mentions of an IO come from direct references of the IO's name or acronym we can be confident that

our method does a decent job of capturing the majority of parliamentary communication on IOs.

To show that our method does not exclude the majority of communication on IOs, we take the case where false negatives seem most likely. The EU, widely considered the most authoritative IO (Hagemann et al 2016) has a considerable policy output and a maze of institutions and agencies that make up the Brussels ‘bubble’. Additionally, it also has the advantage of a validated dictionary of EU-level terms in English and German (see De Wilde and Rauh 2018), that includes a range of policy, institutional, and polity-related EU terms. Altogether, this dictionary consists of 78 EU-level terms in English, and 145 EU-level terms in German. We identify all EU-related parliamentary discourse based on these dictionaries, and find that in all six of our legislatures, the majority of EU communication is drawn from simple mentions of either the ‘European Union’ or the ‘EU’. The figure is higher in non-EU member states (65% in USA, 71% in Canada, 61% in New Zealand) and lower in EU member states, who naturally reference EU policy and institutions more frequently. Even in these case however here the majority of EU references come from these two EU terms (51% in Germany, 58% in Austria, and 60% in the UK). We conclude that the prospect of false negatives, whilst undoubtedly present in the dataset, does not fundamentally question the validity of the data collection process.

It is important to note here that false positives and negatives are unavoidable in quantitative models of language, and that all text as data are by nature ‘wrong’, in the sense that they cannot perfectly capture the variable of interest (in our case, the totality of IO communication in parliamentary debates). In their seminal article on automated text analysis, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) outline that the fact that ‘all automated methods are based on incorrect models of language also implies that models should be evaluated based on their ability to perform some useful social scientific task’. We believe our data generation achieve this criterion:

through our efforts to minimize false positives through hand coding and through our analysis of the extent of false negatives in the case where these are most likely, we conclude that IOParlspeech provides a useful approximation of IO communication in parliamentary debate

**Table A3 – Number of Statements per IO**

| IO name  | Austria |       | Germany |       | UK      |       | Canada |       | USA    |       | New Zealand |       | Full Sample |       |
|----------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|
|          | Total   | Share | Total   | Share | Total   | Share | Total  | Share | Total  | Share | Total       | Share | Total       | Share |
| EU       | 32,895  | 77%   | 44,661  | 58%   | 166,874 | 59%   | 7,355  | 7%    | 5,985  | 5%    | 1,420       | 5%    | 259,190     | 39%   |
| UN       | 1,498   | 4%    | 3,349   | 4%    | 49,473  | 18%   | 32,611 | 32%   | 28,812 | 22%   | 8,083       | 31%   | 123,826     | 19%   |
| NATO     | 2,476   | 6%    | 13,220  | 17%   | 20,692  | 7%    | 7,474  | 7%    | 21,802 | 17%   | 156         | 1%    | 65,820      | 10%   |
| NAFTA    | 60      | 0%    | 142     | 0%    | 468     | 0%    | 24,792 | 24%   | 36,594 | 28%   | 36          | 0%    | 62,092      | 9%    |
| WTO      | 462     | 1%    | 2,453   | 3%    | 7,810   | 3%    | 10,090 | 10%   | 14,311 | 11%   | 2,192       | 8%    | 37,318      | 6%    |
| OECD     | 1,999   | 5%    | 2,492   | 3%    | 3,845   | 1%    | 4,684  | 5%    | 1,069  | 1%    | 6,796       | 26%   | 20,885      | 3%    |
| IMF      | 401     | 1%    | 1,554   | 2%    | 5,067   | 2%    | 2,299  | 2%    | 4,044  | 3%    | 1,463       | 6%    | 14,828      | 2%    |
| IBRD     | 169     | 0%    | 1,227   | 2%    | 3,418   | 1%    | 1,042  | 1%    | 2,172  | 2%    | 498         | 2%    | 8,526       | 1%    |
| WHO      | 311     | 1%    | 890     | 1%    | 2,167   | 1%    | 0      | 0%    | 1,587  | 1%    | 461         | 2%    | 7,394       | 1%    |
| COE      | 640     | 2%    | 719     | 1%    | 4,718   | 2%    | 339    | 0%    | 143    | 0%    | 19          | 0%    | 6,535       | 1%    |
| OSCE     | 535     | 1%    | 2,250   | 3%    | 755     | 0%    | 401    | 0%    | 1,693  | 1%    | 0           | 0%    | 5,634       | 1%    |
| ICC      | 27      | 0%    | 88      | 0%    | 2,049   | 1%    | 875    | 1%    | 811    | 1%    | 414         | 2%    | 4,264       | 1%    |
| IAEA     | 26      | 0%    | 282     | 0%    | 1,184   | 0%    | 203    | 0%    | 2,519  | 2%    | 33          | 0%    | 4,247       | 1%    |
| ILO      | 18      | 0%    | 94      | 0%    | 1,127   | 0%    | 431    | 0%    | 747    | 1%    | 1,069       | 4%    | 3,486       | 1%    |
| UNESCO   | 236     | 1%    | 622     | 1%    | 930     | 0%    | 980    | 1%    | 459    | 0%    | 115         | 0%    | 3,342       | 1%    |
| OPEC     | 47      | 0%    | 93      | 0%    | 147     | 0%    | 109    | 0%    | 2,864  | 2%    | 14          | 0%    | 3,274       | 0%    |
| EEA      | 254     | 1%    | 68      | 0%    | 2,566   | 1%    | 0      | 0%    | 2      | 0%    | 1           | 0%    | 2,891       | 0%    |
| APEC     | 1       | 0%    | 25      | 0%    | 7       | 0%    | 1,268  | 1%    | 59     | 0%    | 0           | 0%    | 2,852       | 0%    |
| AU       | 3       | 0%    | 216     | 0%    | 1,105   | 0%    | 518    | 1%    | 430    | 0%    | 6           | 0%    | 2,278       | 0%    |
| EFTA     | 27      | 0%    | 92      | 0%    | 1,243   | 0%    | 598    | 1%    | 8      | 0%    | 0           | 0%    | 1,968       | 0%    |
| ASEAN    | 10      | 0%    | 192     | 0%    | 390     | 0%    | 95     | 0%    | 487    | 0%    | 572         | 2%    | 1,746       | 0%    |
| NAFO     | 0       | 0%    | 2       | 0%    | 15      | 0%    | 1,572  | 2%    | 57     | 0%    | 3           | 0%    | 1,649       | 0%    |
| LOAS     | 1       | 0%    | 51      | 0%    | 718     | 0%    | 142    | 0%    | 607    | 0%    | 12          | 0%    | 1,531       | 0%    |
| ICAO     | 8       | 0%    | 53      | 0%    | 316     | 0%    | 339    | 0%    | 314    | 0%    | 101         | 0%    | 1,131       | 0%    |
| IMO      | 0       | 0%    | 129     | 0%    | 500     | 0%    | 65     | 0%    | 256    | 0%    | 53          | 0%    | 998         | 0%    |
| Interpol | 59      | 0%    | 90      | 0%    | 439     | 0%    | 156    | 0%    | 197    | 0%    | 55          | 0%    | 996         | 0%    |

|          |    |    |     |    |     |    |     |    |     |    |     |    |     |    |
|----------|----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|
| IWhale   | 6  | 0% | 139 | 0% | 330 | 0% | 7   | 0% | 345 | 0% | 97  | 0% | 924 | 0% |
| CIS      | 27 | 0% | 489 | 1% | 97  | 0% | 13  | 0% | 244 | 0% | 3   | 0% | 873 | 0% |
| OAS      | 0  | 0% | 31  | 0% | 20  | 0% | 139 | 0% | 683 | 1% | 0   | 0% | 873 | 0% |
| FAO      | 18 | 0% | 265 | 0% | 196 | 0% | 138 | 0% | 97  | 0% | 35  | 0% | 749 | 0% |
| ESA      | 45 | 0% | 242 | 0% | 179 | 0% | 23  | 0% | 98  | 0% | 11  | 0% | 598 | 0% |
| WIPO     | 5  | 0% | 12  | 0% | 15  | 0% | 179 | 0% | 311 | 0% | 66  | 0% | 588 | 0% |
| Caricom  | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 118 | 0% | 119 | 0% | 282 | 0% | 2   | 0% | 521 | 0% |
| GEF      | 10 | 0% | 58  | 0% | 67  | 0% | 15  | 0% | 349 | 0% | 1   | 0% | 500 | 0% |
| SADC     | 4  | 0% | 94  | 0% | 329 | 0% | 1   | 0% | 18  | 0% | 7   | 0% | 453 | 0% |
| Mercosur | 32 | 0% | 127 | 0% | 127 | 0% | 75  | 0% | 49  | 0% | 6   | 0% | 416 | 0% |
| ICFO     | 0  | 0% | 1   | 0% | 273 | 0% | 1   | 0% | 19  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 294 | 0% |
| ECOWAS2  | 0  | 0% | 87  | 0% | 104 | 0% | 29  | 0% | 73  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 293 | 0% |
| CERN     | 55 | 0% | 9   | 0% | 208 | 0% | 6   | 0% | 1   | 0% | 2   | 0% | 281 | 0% |
| SPC      | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 2   | 0% | 54  | 0% | 216 | 1% | 272 | 0% |
| IOM      | 16 | 0% | 41  | 0% | 120 | 0% | 65  | 0% | 18  | 0% | 4   | 0% | 264 | 0% |
| PIF      | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 28  | 0% | 8   | 0% | 26  | 0% | 173 | 1% | 235 | 0% |
| GCC      | 0  | 0% | 2   | 0% | 133 | 0% | 1   | 0% | 53  | 0% | 42  | 0% | 231 | 0% |
| Benelux  | 43 | 0% | 70  | 0% | 95  | 0% | 12  | 0% | 7   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 227 | 0% |
| OIC      | 0  | 0% | 2   | 0% | 8   | 0% | 12  | 0% | 199 | 0% | 1   | 0% | 222 | 0% |
| UNIDO    | 12 | 0% | 69  | 0% | 77  | 0% | 1   | 0% | 3   | 0% | 1   | 0% | 163 | 0% |
| ComSec   | 0  | 0% | 1   | 0% | 130 | 0% | 10  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 13  | 0% | 154 | 0% |
| COMECON  | 0  | 0% | 86  | 0% | 22  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 7   | 0% | 1   | 0% | 116 | 0% |
| WMO      | 1  | 0% | 5   | 0% | 14  | 0% | 26  | 0% | 56  | 0% | 11  | 0% | 113 | 0% |
| BIS      | 2  | 0% | 11  | 0% | 35  | 0% | 17  | 0% | 36  | 0% | 11  | 0% | 112 | 0% |
| UPU      | 4  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 14  | 0% | 27  | 0% | 9   | 0% | 44  | 0% | 98  | 0% |
| NordC    | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 32  | 0% | 3   | 0% | 62  | 0% | 42  | 0% | 97  | 0% |
| IGAD     | 0  | 0% | 10  | 0% | 54  | 0% | 19  | 0% | 13  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 96  | 0% |
| WCO      | 6  | 0% | 1   | 0% | 6   | 0% | 22  | 0% | 41  | 0% | 20  | 0% | 96  | 0% |
| CAN      | 0  | 0% | 24  | 0% | 7   | 0% | 4   | 0% | 45  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 80  | 0% |
| ITU      | 0  | 0% | 2   | 0% | 15  | 0% | 5   | 0% | 26  | 0% | 8   | 0% | 56  | 0% |
| UNWTO    | 0  | 0% | 22  | 0% | 8   | 0% | 11  | 0% | 4   | 0% | 1   | 0% | 46  | 0% |
| ISA      | 0  | 0% | 2   | 0% | 35  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 2   | 0% | 39  | 0% |
| EAC2     | 0  | 0% | 3   | 0% | 19  | 0% | 3   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 29  | 0% |
| OIF      | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 20  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 20  | 0% |
| OECS     | 0  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 2   | 0% | 0   | 0% | 14  | 0% | 0   | 0% | 16  | 0% |

|              |               |             |               |             |                |             |                |             |                |             |               |             |                |             |
|--------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| SAARC        | 0             | 0%          | 2             | 0%          | 8              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 6              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 16             | 0%          |
| COMESA       | 0             | 0%          | 2             | 0%          | 12             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 15             | 0%          |
| SCO          | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 3              | 0%          | 4              | 0%          | 7              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 14             | 0%          |
| SICA         | 0             | 0%          | 1             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 13             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 14             | 0%          |
| PCA          | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 9              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 3              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 12             | 0%          |
| SACU         | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 6              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 7              | 0%          |
| CABI         | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 4              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 4              | 0%          |
| ECCAS        | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 2              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 4              | 0%          |
| CCNR         | 1             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 2              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 3              | 0%          |
| AMU          | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          |
| CEMAC        | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          |
| OAPEC        | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 1              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 1              | 0%          |
| ALADI        | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          |
| OTIF         | 0             | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0              | 0%          | 0             | 0%          | 0              | 0%          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>42,450</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>76,964</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>280,979</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>101,401</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>131,298</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>25,842</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>658,938</b> | <b>100%</b> |