Playing Hard to Get: Strategic Signaling in Aid Bargaining*

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Abstract

Foreign aid is a political exchange between a donor and target. Existing literature focuses primarily on donors, but less is known about how targets advance their interests. I model the aid exchange using a costly signaling model in which targets send a (potentially misleading) signal of their policy preferences before the donor makes an aid offer. In equilibrium, when the cost of a misleading signal is sufficiently low, targets who are aligned with a donor on policy lie about their alignment at least some of the time, which yields them aid that they would not have received otherwise. After mapping the model into empirical implications, I show that nonresponse in the UN General Assembly – a low-cost signal of nonalignment – is correlated with higher future aid inflows. This argument highlights the role of aid-receiving states as strategic actors who can extract concessions from donors.

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The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine sparked swift backlash from Western states, who placed harsh sanctions on the Russian economy and provided material assistance to Ukraine's defense efforts. However, the solidarity did not extend to all of the West's partners. A range of states – including US adversaries like China and Iran and US partners like Vietnam and South Africa – abstained in a vote on a UNGA resolution condemning Russia's actions (Voeten, 2022). South Africa – not a formal US ally, but a state that receives significant US and other Western economic and military support (Eligon, 2023) – went even further, hosting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for a visit and participating in joint military exercises with Russia, even as it continued cooperating with its Western partners as normal (Allison, 2023; Makhanya, 2023). Despite Western diplomats' claims that they were not concerned about where South Africa's true loyalties lie, the public friendliness with Russia appears to have sparked concern, with the US quickly arranging several high-profile diplomatic visits (Gramer, 2023, July 19).

Why would South Africa and other states abstain on this vote? It is probably the case that material considerations such as oil and arms played a role. However, it seems unlikely that these states view Russia as a viable partner beyond the short-term; Russia is a relatively weak state with a precarious economy and insignificant development assistance program, and South Africa is not a politically repressive regime that lacks other friends.[1] It also seems unlikely that South Africa – led by the African National Congress, a party with a history of anticolonial activism – views Russia's imperial project as genuinely righteous. In this paper, I argue that aid-receiving states can exaggerate the distance between their policy ideal point and the policy proposal of a donor to incentivize the donor to give them aid in excess of their true reservation price. According to this argument, the reason for the policy divergence between the US and some of its partners on the issue of Russia is an attempt by those partner states to attract more resources from the US. The flurry of diplomatic

[1]The few states who voted against the UNGA resolution were generally pariah states like Belarus, North Korea, Syria, and post-coup Mali.

activity on the US side is early evidence that this strategy is bearing fruit for South Africa; by contrast, Cuba's abstention is unlikely to affect its relationship with the US, as the US does not stand to gain deep Cuban cooperation on the issue of Ukraine.

I focus specifically on this strategy in foreign aid bargaining, a common form of political exchange between donors and recipient states.[2] Donors use aid to stabilize allied regimes, incentivize domestic policy changes by partner states, and purchase support for diplomatic initiatives, among other things (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher, Lang, et al., 2022; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Wright, 2009). Recipients use aid to enhance their political position, which may come through funnelling the benefits of aid to a narrow elite (e.g. through rent seeking opportunities or patronage) or to the population more broadly (by placing projects in politically valuable constituencies or touting the development benefits of projects) (Andersen et al., 2022; Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Dreher, Fuchs, et al., 2019; Morrison, 2009). In general, recipients want to maximize aid inflows while minimizing policy concessions; donors want to achieve certain policy goals while minimizing aid spending. However, donors do not necessarily know the target's true policy preferences and thus cannot discern the amount of aid necessary to ensure its preferred policy is implemented. In this paper, I focus on how target states exploit the donor's dilemma through strategic signaling behavior. This contrasts with most existing work on donors' aid allocation decisions, which focuses on the role of donor interests and structural features of recipients in determining aid flows. I argue that target states that are aligned with the donor may portray themselves as *less* aligned with the donor to receive more aid; under certain conditions, this works by inflating the donor's perception of the target's reservation price for implementing the donor's preferred policy, meaning that the donor believes – inaccurately – that the target will not do what the donor wants without aid as an incentive.

[2]By foreign aid, I mean both official development assistance (ODA) and military aid. I do not distinguish between them in my baseline analyses because they can serve similar purposes, although ODA-eligible countries want and receive military aid too. Military aid may substitute as a means of policy purchase once countries are no longer eligible for ODA.

I develop my argument using a costly signaling model before testing it empirically. In the model, targets send a signal of their type before donors offer them aid; this signal is costly if and only if the target lies about their type. Analysis of the model shows that, when the cost of lying is sufficiently low and donor's interest in the target's policy is sufficiently high, aligned targets optimally claim nonalignment and donors, uncertain over the target's true preferences, give those states aid at least some of the time; with complete information, donors would recognize that such aid is unnecessary for policy alignment. I derive and test implications of the model using data on nonresponse (abstentions and absences) in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), a forum in which signals can be sent clearly and at relatively low cost. I argue that UNGA resolutions are a tool for donors to infer partners' underlying preferences and likely future actions; because UNGA votes are generally inconsequential in their own right, however, recipients do not face high costs to lying in those votes. Using a selection on observables approach, I show that nonresponse is significantly and positively associated with net future aid from the US and US-dominated international institutions. Consistent with the model, these effects are concentrated among US allies and non-aligned states and are not found in target countries that are allies with US adversaries.

Through this project, I contribute to an understanding of recipient agency, which can be used to manipulate the information environment that donors operate in. To this point, the aid allocation literature assumes that donors accurately know how to allocate resources to pursue their goals; theoretically, if targets know donors' goals, they may able to (mis)represent themselves as important to the achievement of those goals and attract aid that is, in reality, unnecessary for the donor. The literature on the impact of foreign aid often takes the aid environment a country operates in as a given, meaning that, for example, countries are either dependent on one donor or not, instead of seeing this feature of politics as an outcome of (constrained) strategic behavior by donor and recipient. The smaller literature on recipient agency similarly does not explore how targets may

behave strategically to gain resources that exceed those conferred by the structural conditions they face.

I also contribute to a novel understanding of the UNGA. Existing work generally follows Dixon (1981) in viewing the UNGA as "little more than a passive arena for the political interaction of member states" (p. 47). This has led scholars to view the institution as generally inconsequential for international politics in its own right and as an imperfect but suitable forum for estimating state's underlying preferences (Bailey et al., 2017; Voeten, 2000). My argument is consistent with the former point but inconsistent with the latter because I show it is a forum for strategic misrepresentation of preferences. I also diverge from the work on aid that assumes that donors are deeply interested in buying UNGA votes with aid (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, et al., 2008; Lundborg, 1998). Instead, I argue that the irrelevance of the UNGA lends itself to a different purpose for developing states in particular: it serves as a forum for signaling policy preferences – not necessarily truthfully – in order to attract resources from donor states. Donors, for their part, use the UNGA as a means of inferring a target's preferences over a certain policy, which are distinct from but related to the content of a UNGA vote; in the case of the invasion of Ukraine, the failure of some Western partners to condemn Russia suggests to the US that those states will not join in sanctions or provide material assistance to Ukraine. If this argument is correct, it raises questions about the validity of UNGA-derived measures of alignment, which are commonly used in studies of international political economy (e.g. Nelson, 2014; Strüver, 2016; Tomashevskiy, 2021).

Literature Review

Since at least the end of World War II, foreign aid has been an important tool for powerful states to advance their foreign policy objectives. According to existing literature, donor states and organizations decide which countries will receive assistance on the basis of the donor's objectives,

which are conditioned by the structural characteristics of the target and the nature of the international environment (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). Scholars have explored aid with relation to a myriad of foreign policy objectives, including (but not limited to) support for diplomatic measures in fora like the UN Security Council and General Assembly (Berlin et al., 2022; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, et al., 2008), cooperation on security issues (Scott and Carter, 2019), market and natural resource access for donor country firms (Dang and Stone, 2021; Nathan and Scobell, 2012, November), political liberalization or autocratization (Vanderhill, 2012; Wright, 2009), and policy changes by the target on any number of domestic issues (Bayer et al., 2015; Horning, 2008). Donors use aid as payments to purchase the cooperation of target states, although scholars differ on whether donors reward states that are politically close or focus on purchasing marginal states (Lee, 2022).

A separate focus in the foreign aid literature is the impact of foreign aid on the receiving state. Scholars generally agree that foreign aid is transformational for the economy, politics, and society of receiving countries, but in many areas contest whether that impact is negative or positive. The most prominent debate concerns the impact of foreign aid on economic growth and poverty, in which some argue that aid provides necessary capital cheaply to areas that otherwise lack it, while others argue that donors fail to understand the necessary inputs for economic growth and/or that the effectiveness of aid is constrained by poor institutional quality in the recipient country (Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dreher and Langlotz, 2020; Easterly, 2007; Moyo, 2009). Scholars also disagree over the effect of aid on recipient state regime type, with most findings pointing towards effects that are, at best, conditional on factors like the presence of competing foreign policy objectives, institutional characteristics of the regime (i.e. party versus military regimes), and structure of the international environment (Bader, 2014; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Li, 2017; Wright, 2009). Portions of this literature point to the ability of incumbents to treat aid as unearned income, funding their patronage networks without increasing taxation and in turn accountability (Morrison,

2007). The literature on aid and recipient state domestic politics covers a number of other areas, including conflict (Findley, 2018), corruption (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018), and perceptions of both the recipient and donor governments (Blair et al., 2022; Sexton and Zürcher, Forthcoming).

Limited work has directly examined recipient agency in aid interactions (Winters, Forthcoming). For example, Swedlund (2017a) focuses on bureaucratic interactions between donor agency officials and recipient governments, in which bureaucrats from donor countries who want to spend the money they are allocated (in order to secure future funding) struggle to deal with host country bureaucrats who are aware of this fact. There is also emerging work on the role of competition between donors, which may lead aid to be offered on more favorable terms and create opportunities for recipient governments to exploit aid without repercussions (Brown, 2023; Clark, 2022; Dunning, 2004; Hernandez, 2017; Horning, 2008; Swedlund, 2017b). Similarly, significant work has been done on the effect of UNSC membership on the terms of aid (Berlin et al., 2022; Dreher, Eichenauer, et al., 2018; Dreher, Sturm, et al., 2009). In these literatures, structural features of the target state – most of which boil down to the ability of the target to inflict costs on the donor in some way – lead to better offers by the donors.

I address three gaps left by these literatures. First, I explore how donors' incomplete information over targets' policy preferences create an opportunity for targets to advantage themselves; this departs from the aid allocation literature's assumption that donors know how to get what they want. Second, I show how targets can influence the degree of reliance on a particular donor; by contrast, the literature on the impact of foreign aid typically takes the makeup of a country's donor pool as a given. Finally, I contribute to the nascent literature on recipient agency by highlighting a previously unidentified way in which recipients behave strategically, allowing them to gain resources beyond those warranted by their structural characteristics.

The existing theories, both formal and informal, that underlie the scholarly literature on foreign

aid either explicitly or implicitly cast aid as a bargaining problem. In general, as in my model, targets decide whether to accept aid and implement the donor's most preferred policy or reject aid and implement their own most preferred policy. Existing models assume that the target's ideal point is commonly and accurately known by all players. The degree of compensation required then follows naturally from the amount of deviation from the ideal point that the donor is asking for, as the amount of target utility lost is easily discernible by both players (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2016; Wright, 2009). Empirically, however, this assumption is dubious in potentially consequential ways. Case evidence suggests that leaders of recipient countries may attempt to muddy the waters around their preferences in order to manipulate their reservation price. For example, in negotiations between the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in pursuit of Saudi-Israeli normalization, Saudi elites – including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and King Salman – have demanded that normalization does not interfere with efforts for Palestinian statehood, along with hefty demands for a US security guarantee, an increase in the quality and quantity of US arms inflows, and the right to circumvent US regulations on civilian nuclear partnerships (Toameh and Lazaroff, 2023). Despite the negotiations, Saudi leaders have not ceased public criticism of Israel for its treatment of Palestinians (Wong, 2023). Although politically consequential in Saudi Arabia, journalists are skeptical of the depth of the Saudi (and especially the Crown Prince's) commitment to Palestine (Turak, 2023); it may instead represent a signal of hesitancy towards normalization with an eye towards increasing US and Israeli receptiveness to its other demands. As discussed in the introduction, South African leaders have also taken a series of steps to develop its ties with Russia in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine without reducing their deep ties to the West; one journalist wrote that these steps were of little concern to Western diplomats, who "[were] not especially concerned about where South Africa's true loyalties lie" (Allison, 2023). This suggests that South African leaders had tried to generate a notion that their ideal points were farther from a donor's than previously believed; despite

those diplomats' comments, the issue of Russia has prompted renewed US diplomatic attention towards South Africa (Gramer, 2023, July 19).

Within the bargaining framework, extant work has highlighted the presence of commitment problems on both the donor and recipient side. Given their interest in maintaining a positive relationship with targets, donors often cannot credibly commit to punish targets who violate conditions on aid, especially when competing donors are present and/or when competing foreign policy objectives are present (Collins, 2009; Curtice and Reinhardt, 2023; Dunning, 2004; Gibson et al., 2005; Hernandez, 2017). Targets often cannot credibly commit to comply with donors' wishes, especially in light of the credible commitment problem faced by donors (Swedlund, 2017a). These commitment problems make cooperation more difficult and are consequential for the empirical reality underlying my theory; for example, targets may take money in exchange for implementing a certain policy, but then fail to implement that policy, leaving the donor worse off. Consistent with other work (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2016), I set these important issues aside for now and instead focus on the role of information problems in aid bargaining.

I explore the role of information problems in aid bargaining using a game theoretic model. I argue that donors may use low-stakes expressions of policy – such as statements, demands made in negotiations, and UN General Assembly votes – as signals of targets' underlying preferences and thus their reservation price for implementing a donor-preferred policy. Knowing this, targets who are aligned with the donor can send misleading signals that overstate the distance between their own ideal point and the donor's, which makes the reservation price appear higher than it actually is.[3] Donors cannot easily distinguish between true and false signals and, at least some of the time, send aid to targets who do not require it in order to ensure a policy is implemented. I then map the insights

[3]I assume, as other literature in this area does, that elites in target states prefer more aid (e.g. Wright, 2009). This assumption stems from the fungibility of aid, which can be used to promote development, fund patronage networks, or simply line the president's pockets. Carnegie and Dolan (2021) present a notable counterexample: states interested in building international prestige may reject foreign assistance to demonstrate their ability to address a crisis.

of the model into observable implications, which I test using data on US, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank aid and information on nonresponses (abstentions and absences) from the UN General Assembly. I find evidence consistent with these implications, demonstrating that targets' agency is consequential for donor aid allocation practices.

Theoretical Model

Comments on the Model

I build a costly signaling model of aid-for-policy deals.[4] Existing work on aid-for-policy deals comes from the selectorate literature and focuses largely on how structural features of donors and recipients shape the nature of foreign aid (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2016). Among other things, this work finds donors must pay more for targets to deviate more from their (commonly known) ideal points. In my model, donors have incomplete information over the target's ideal point; donors have beliefs over the probability that the target is aligned with them, but do not know the realization of that probability. Targets can exploit this lack of information by misrepresenting their type to convince donors that they require aid to implement a certain policy, even though receiving aid would not increase their likelihood of implementing that policy.

In the model, a donor (D) and a target (T) bargain over a transfer of resources from donor to target (r_D) and a policy to be implemented by T (y_T). The target has some genuine preference (θ_T, T's type in signaling terms) that is either aligned with the donor's preferred policy or unaligned. The donor knows the probability that the target is aligned with them, but does not observe the alignment. Both players care to some degree about the target implementing their most preferred policy; α_D

[4]Broadly speaking, aid has two functions: purchasing policy and subsidizing favorable regimes. These two functions have different underlying logics and thus it is difficult to model them together. I focus on the first goal and acknowledge that the model fails to predict certain behaviors that stem from the second goal.

represents the benefit gained by D if T implements her most preferred policy, while α_T is the cost incurred by T implementing a policy other than its most preferred policy. Prior to the offer of aid and policy implementation, the target has an opportunity to send a signal of their view of the donor's policy (s_T); empirically, this could be many things, such as releasing a statement or report of the government's assessment of that policy, votes on non-binding or binding resolutions, or diplomatic visits with proponents or opponents of the policy. This signal does not need to be honest, but the target pays a cost of lying (c); this cost is imposed by the domestic winning coalition, which is unhappy to see their preferences misrepresented on the world stage. The donor observes the signal – but crucially, does not observe any costs of signaling incurred by the target – and then decides on an allocation of resources to send to the target, conditional on the target's implementation of the donor's preferred policy. After seeing the offer, the target decides which policy to implement.

Given its importance to the model and corresponding empirical analysis, I elaborate on the assumption that misrepresentation of type (i.e. sending a dishonest signal) is costly to the target. An assumption that different signals are differentially costly to the sender is a standard feature of signaling games (Tadelis, 2013), and existing models of electoral competition have introduced costs for lying in particular (Callander and Wilkie, 2007; Kartik and McAfee, 2007). I conceptualize this cost as stemming from domestic political consequences of sending a dishonest signal, which allows the realized value to vary by both method of delivery and issue area. This behavior may be punished because the signal has some policy consequences or normative value in its own right to the domestic winning coalition. For example, President Trump was roundly criticized for his performance in a press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin, with members of his own party labelling him weak and pathetic. Although the press conference itself did not change policy, it signaled to observers that Trump was unlikely to be firm towards Russia in the wake of Russian election interference (Gambino, 2018). Lying may be virtually costless when it occurs in fora that

domestic audiences do not value highly or are not aware of. A US diplomat at the UN General Assembly reported that the Tuvalese Permanent Representative relayed that his country's goal at the UNGA was straightforward: "We are here to seek assistance" (Plaisted, 2009, December 18). To this Representative, the content of a particular vote was not particularly consequential and thus any misrepresentation of preferences was not costly. Crucially, this cost is rationally imposed by citizens. Citizens of the target country, like their government, care about receiving aid and implementing policy. If they care about and benefit frrom aid to a sufficiently high degree, then committing to impose lying costs increases the efficacy of type misrepresentation by the target government.

This conceptualization of cost is distinct from audience costs as described by Fearon (1994). Work on audience costs suggests that domestic audiences punish leaders for backing down from publicly stated positions, even if they ultimately agree with the policy implemented. Like this literature, I assume that audiences observe both some public stance taken by the leader and a related policy implemented after that stance. However, I assume that audiences punish leaders for signals and policies that are not in line with the audience's preferences. In my conceptualization, a voter is unhappy if the leader takes a position she does not agree with and unhappy if the leader implements a policy she does not agree with, but consistency between signal and policy does not affect voter utility.[5]

Finally, what policy linkages do donors care about and how do they relate to the target's winning coalition? The answer to this naturally varies by donor and target, as well as over time and space. Donors may care about gaining meaningful support on key diplomatic initiatives, access to markets and natural resources for firms from the donor's country, economic and political liberalization, and other institutional reforms like corruption reduction. Members of the target's winning coalition have preferences over these issues. Ideological and/or material ties may shape preferences over international relations; for example, influential business elites with ties to China may pressure leaders

[5]This is in line with critiques of audience costs presented by Chaudoin (2014) and others.

not to engage diplomatically with Taiwan. Changes to economic policy also threaten business elites as well as laborers. In the past, Western aid has been conditional on reduction in protectionist policies, exposing domestic firms who had benefited from government protection to competition with more efficient foreign firms (Dang and Stone, 2021). Finally, autocratic elites are likely to often oppose political liberalization that upends the political status quo, especially if such liberalization may push them out of power and expose them to retaliation.

Model Setup

I now introduce the game more formally. There are two players, $i \in \{T, D\}$, who have the following utility functions:

$$U_T(s_T, y_T, r_D; \theta_T) = r_D \cdot y_T - \mathbb{1}_{y_T \neq \theta_T} \cdot \alpha_T - \mathbb{1}_{s_T \neq \theta_T} \cdot c$$

$$U_D(r_D, y_T) = \alpha_D \cdot y_T - r_D \cdot y_T$$

where $r_D \geq 0$ is the amount of resources transferred from D to R, $y_T \in \{0, 1\}$ is a policy, $\alpha_i > 0$ is the degree of player i's interest in T's policy, $\theta_T \in \{0, 1\}$ is T's type and corresponds to T's most preferred policy, $s_T \in \{0, 1\}$ is a signal of T's type chosen by T to indicate (not necessarily honestly) their most preferred policy, and $c > 0$ is the cost associated with sending a dishonest signal ($s_T \neq \theta_T$). I assume that D prefers that $y_T = 1$. The probability that T is aligned with D (i.e. the probability that $\theta_T = 1$) is $p \in (0, 1)$. The game proceeds as follows (which is represented in game tree form in Figure 1):[6]

1. Nature draws T's type $\theta_T \in \{0, 1\}$, which is observed only by T. The probability that $\theta_T = 1$ is p.

2. T privately observes θ_T and selects a signal $s_T \in \{0, 1\}$.

[6]Payoffs are displayed with Target utility on top and Donor utility on the bottom.



Figure 1: Game Tree

3. D observes the signal (but not θ_T or any cost incurred by T) and decides how much aid r_D (if any) to offer T, conditional on T's implementation on $y_T = 1$.

4. T observes r_D and chooses to implement a policy $y_T \in \{0, 1\}$. If T chooses $y_T = 1$, D pays r_D to T.

5. Payoffs are realized.

Given this sequence of play, each player has a strategy that maps features of the game and/or other player's actions into their own actions. The target T has a strategy composed of two functions.

The first, $\sigma_T^s : \{0,1\} \rightarrow [0,1]$ maps a type θ_T into a probability of sending a signal $s_T = 1$. The second, $\sigma_T^y(r_D) : \{0,1\} \times \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow [0,1]$, maps the type and D's aid offer (i.e. each pair (θ_T, r_D)) into a probability of implementing the donor's preferred policy $y_T = 1$. I refer to these two strategies together as σ_T (that is, $\sigma_T = \{\sigma_T^s, \sigma_T^y\}$). Likewise, a donor's strategy is a function $\sigma_D(s_T) : \{0,1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ that maps a signal s_T into a weakly positive offer of aid r_D (made before observation of the policy y_T) to be sent if and only if $y_T = 1$. Additionally, β_D denotes D's beliefs over the type θ_T of the target $\beta_D : (0,1) \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow [0,1]$, which defines the posterior probability that $\theta_T = 1$ for each pair (p, s_T), the prior probability of $\theta_T = 1$ and the signal s_T.

My equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). I use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as my solution concept. In PBE, an equilibrium is defined by strategies and beliefs that are internally consistent (Gailmard and Patty, 2019). In my case, an equilibrium is presented in the form $(\sigma_T^*, \sigma_D^*, \beta_D^*)$; a triple is an equilibrium whenever σ_T^* and σ_D^* are optimal, given the beliefs β_D^*. The belief is the posterior probability that $\theta_T = 1$, based on the prior probability of $\theta_T = 1$ and the signal $(\beta_D : (0,1) \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow [0,1])$.

Equilibrium Analysis

Targets will only accept offers of aid that make them weakly better off. Otherwise, they will implement their most preferred policy. This does not mean that targets who do not accept an offer of aid always implement the donor's least preferred policy; if a target truly wants to implement $y_T = 1$, then they will regardless of the offer of aid. Lemma 1 presents this strategy more formally. Proofs of this and all formal results are in the appendix.

Lemma 1 *Targets who receive an offer of aid that is weakly greater than α_T will implement $y_T = 1$. All other Targets will implement their most preferred policy $y_T = \theta_T$. The optimal policy implementation strategy σ_T^{s*} is thus*

$$\sigma_T^{y*}(\theta_T, r_D) = \begin{cases} \theta_T & \text{if } r_D < \alpha_T \\ 1 & \text{if } r_D \geq \alpha_T \end{cases}$$

There are only two possible offered quantities of aid: zero and α_T. The target's interest in implementing its most preferred policy (α_T), is also the target's reservation price for implementing a policy other than its most preferred policy. Because there are only two possible types, there are only two possible reservation prices. An offer between zero and α_T still does not convince unaligned types, while an offer that exceeds α_T results in the same outcomes that an offer of α_T does. This fact allows the bargaining element of the game to be collapsed from a continuum of actions into only two feasible actions.

Lemma 2 *D's equilibrium aid offer will only ever be equal to zero or α_T.*

Lemmas 1 and 2 describe behavior that is consistent across equilibria. I now introduce the other features of equilibria that depend on the values of certain parameters. This behavior depends on the cost of lying (c), the prior probability of alignment (p), and the relative values of the weight placed on T's policy by both the Target and Donor (α_T and α_D, respectively). I introduce the behavior formally in Propositions 1-4, while Figure 2 displays graphically where in the parameter space each equilibrium occurs when the donor is willing to make a strictly positive offer of aid to targets it believes may be unaligned (i.e. $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$).[7] In the formal discussion, I offer the necessary belief structure for the donor, the optimal signal sent by the target, the optimal aid offer by the donor, and finally the optimal policy to be implemented by the target. I make the simplifying assumption that D is only willing to pay for policy change when it makes them strictly better (when $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$). I use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept, which requires definition of internally consistent behaviors and beliefs.

Proposition 1 (Separating Equilibrium) *Suppose that the cost of lying is high ($c \geq \alpha_T$) and the Donor is willing to pay for policy change ($\alpha_D > \alpha_T$). There is a separating equilibrium in which the Target signals honestly and the Donor pays each type of Target its reservation price. The policy y_T*

[7] The figure is arbitrarily scaled and thus should not be understood as a representation of which equilibrium play is most likely.

is implemented according to Lemma 1; in equilibrium, both types of Target will implement $y_T = 1$.

$$\beta_D^*(p, s_T) = \begin{cases} 0 & \textit{if } s_T = 0 \\ 1 & \textit{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$
$$\sigma_T^{s*}(\theta_T) = \theta_T$$
$$\sigma_D^*(s_T) = \begin{cases} 0 & \textit{if } s_T = 0 \\ \alpha_T & \textit{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$

Proposition 1 describes a separating equilibrium, by which I mean each type of Target takes a unique signaling action (in this case sending the signal that matches their type). In this equilibrium, lying is highly costly to the Target, so even though the Donor will respond to an unaligned signal with aid, lying is ultimately not worth the increased aid inflow. Intuitively, this suggests that targets will not use high stakes policy decisions as opportunities to misrepresent their preferences. This is the Donor's most preferred equilibrium, as they will give aid equivalent to the Target's true reservation price for all types of the target.[8]

Proposition 2 (Pooling Equilibrium) *Suppose that the cost of lying is low ($c < \alpha_T$), the prior probability of the Target being aligned with the Donor is low ($p \leq 1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D}$), and the Donor is willing to pay for policy change ($\alpha_D > \alpha_T$). There is a pooling equilibrium in which the Target always signals that they are unaligned with the Donor and the Donor pays all types of the Target the unaligned type's reservation price (α_T). Consistent with Lemma 1, both types of Target will implement* $y_T = 1$ *in equilibrium.*

$$\beta_D^{**}(p, s_T) = \begin{cases} 0 & \textit{if } s_T = 0 \\ 1 & \textit{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$
$$\sigma_T^{s**}(\theta_T) = 0$$
$$\sigma_D^{**}(s_T) = \alpha_T$$

Proposition 2 presents a pooling equilibrium, in which all Targets, regardless of type, send the same signal. In this case, they pool on sending the unaligned signal. Because I have specified that the Donor is willing to pay for policy alignment, all Targets will receive the unaligned Target's

[8]This is not the only pooling equilibrium of the game. As Gailmard and Patty (2019) write, signaling games tend to produce multiple pooling equilibria that vary in one player's off-path beliefs, including substantively strange beliefs. In the appendix, I show that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion described by Cho and Kreps (1987) and (equivalently in my case) the D1 refinement described by Banks and Sobel (1987), which are intended to prune equilibria supported by strange beliefs.

reservation price of α_T. For this equilibrium to occur, the Donor's prior belief must be that alignment is unlikely, so the expected value of an offer of aid conditional on an unaligned signal is sufficiently high that giving aid that exceeds the true reservation price is a relatively remote possibility. Knowing that the Donor is best off giving aid to all ostensibly unaligned Targets, aligned Targets can always fruitfully lie. This is the aligned Target's most preferred region of the parameter space, as lying will always be rewarded; unaligned targets are equally well off in the pooling and separating equilibria. This is clearly an inefficient scenario for the Donor; for a potentially significant portion of Targets (a portion which is increasing in the importance of the Target and decreasing in the reservation price), the Donor gives aid in excess of the true reservation price.

Proposition 3 (Semi-Separating Equilibrium) *Suppose that the cost of lying is low ($c < \alpha_T$), the prior probability of the Target being aligned with the Donor is high ($p > 1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D}$), and the Donor is willing to pay for policy change ($\alpha_D > \alpha_T$). The following strategy-belief profile is a semi-separating equilibrium. An unaligned Target will signal truthfully, while an aligned Target plays a mixed strategy in its signal choice. Conditional on observing an unaligned signal, the Donor offers aid some of the time. Aligned type Targets and unaligned type Targets that receive an offer of aid will implement $y_T = 1$, while unaligned type Targets who do not receive an offer of aid implement $y_T = 0$.*

$$\beta_D^{***}(p, s_T) = \begin{cases} \rho & \text{if } s_T = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\sigma_T^{s***}(\theta_T) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \theta_T = 0 \\ \pi & \text{if } \theta_T = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\sigma_D^{***}(s_T) = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ with probability } 1-q & \text{if } s_T = 0 \\ \alpha_T \text{ with probability } q & \text{if } s_T = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$

where $\rho \equiv Pr[\theta_T = 1 \mid s_T = 0] = \frac{\pi \cdot p \cdot \alpha_D}{1-p+\pi \cdot p}$, $\pi \equiv Pr[s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1] = \frac{(1-p)(\alpha_D - \alpha_T)}{\alpha_T \cdot p}$, *and* $q \equiv Pr[r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0] = \frac{c}{\alpha_T}$.

Proposition 3 introduces a semi-separating equilibrium, a class of equilibria in which at least one type of signal sender plays a mixed strategy in signal choice. In my case, aligned targets sometimes truthfully signal and sometimes lie. Intuitively, aligned targets want to blend in with the nonaligned types, but the existence of an nonaligned type is sufficiently unlikely that the donor does not always

"believe" the signal and reward it with aid. The likelihood of a deceptive signal increases with donor interest in the target's policy (α_D), decreases with the target's reservation price (α_T), and decreases with the probability of alignment (p). The mixed strategy response allows the donor to capture some truly unaligned targets while wasting resources less often than they would if they paid all targets that signaled that they were nonaligned. Donors are more likely to give aid to possibly nonaligned targets when the cost of lying is higher, but less likely to do so when the requisite amount of aid is higher (α_T). This situation is the unaligned Target's least preferred outcome, as their truthful signals sometimes do not yield them aid. This scenario is the only one where the Donor is willing to pay for policy change but may not do so, and thus the only scenario when $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$ *and* the Target may not implement $y_T = 1$. This occurs when an unaligned Target signals truthfully, but the Donor suspects that they are lying and thus offers no aid.

Proposition 4 (Priced-Out Equilibrium) *Suppose that the Donor is not willing to pay for policy change ($\alpha_D \leq \alpha_T$). There is a separating equilibrium in which all types of the Target signal truthfully and the Donor never gives aid. The Target will implement the policy that matches its type.*

$$\beta_D^{****}(p, s_T) = \begin{cases} 0 & \textit{if } s_T = 0 \\ 1 & \textit{if } s_T = 1 \end{cases}$$
$$\sigma_T^{*****}(\theta_T) = \theta_T$$
$$\sigma_D^{****}(s_T) = 0 \textit{ for all } s_T$$

The priced-out equilibrium described in Proposition 4 is a second separating equilibrium. Each type of Target signals truthfully, but not because of a prohibitively high lying cost. Instead, the truthfulness stems from the prohibitively high reservation price of the unaligned types. Even if an aligned Target could convince the Donor that it is unaligned, the Donor would not send aid, leaving the Target to absorb the lying cost with no compensation. With no benefit to lying, the Target signals truthfully and implements its most preferred policy. Because the Donor's willingness to pay does not depend on c or p, there is no variation based on those parameters as depicted in the $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$ case in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Equilibrium Plot when $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$

From Model to Empirics

In this section, I discuss my chosen empirical setting, describe cases of variation in key parameters, and develop hypotheses based on that variation. For reasons I describe below, I choose the UN General Assembly as the empirical setting and the United States as the donor of interest. First, the US has stated publicly that it pays attention to UNGA votes and that aid decisions are made in part based on UNGA votes. Further, the US has a mechanism by which it designates certain votes as important; on important votes, the US lobbies other countries, and other work has found that foreign aid is more strongly correlated with alignment on those votes (Bailey et al., 2017). I expect that, in general, the US does not necessarily care about UNGA votes *in their own right*; instead, the US uses UNGA votes as a signal of the target's orientation on other issues or towards the US more broadly.[9] Second, UNGA resolutions are not binding and thus voting in a way that is divorced from

[9]Related to but not a direct implication of the model is that the US may have an interest in overstating its interest in UNGA outcomes. If votes are a useful signal, the US would like targets to honestly signal their type, which is more

one's preferences is unlikely to cause severe policy repercussions. This suggests that the cost of lying is sufficiently low that targets may misrepresent their true preferences and that we will thus observe non-separating behavior (in model terms, s_T will not necessarily equal θ_T). Third, votes are observable to two key audiences: the US and the target's winning coalition. It is thus unlikely that the US will misinterpret a signal of nonalignment as a signal of alignment or vice versa, which would create some unmodeled mismatch between how the signal is intended to be perceived and how it is actually perceived. The winning coalition has the opportunity to see its (pro- or anti-US) orientation misrepresented by its country on the international stage and inflict costs if necessary. Depending on the orientation of the winning coalition, then, I expect variation in the magnitude of the cost of lying and the target's reservation price.

I briefly discuss donor goals at the UN General Assembly. The UNGA is considered to be of low importance by most scholars of international relations; studies that focus on the UNGA typically justify this focus not by its importance, but its status as the "only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the international community", making it a convenient location to attempt to observe and measure state preferences and international cleavages (Voeten, 2000, p. 186). Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that great powers allocate resources to increase voting alignment (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, et al., 2008; Lundborg, 1998). This work usually makes the implicit assumption that donors are interested in maximizing voting alignment, not in maximizing the likelihood of a resolution passing; this appears to be consistent with evidence from diplomatic cables, where reports center on how countries voted, not which resolutions were passed. For example, one diplomatic cable notes that despite the consistent passage of resolutions with anti-Israel language, the US works to reduce the margin by which they pass. Notably, the US does also work to advance, stop, and/or modify the content of certain resolutions in the committee stage with some success, even on resolutions that would pass a plenary vote by a

likely to work if targets believe votes are consequential to its relationship with the US, including its future aid flows.

wide margin, meaning that aid may be sensitive to unobserved pre-plenary activities (Scott, 2006, December 18).

I focus on abstentions and absences (which I refer to collectively as nonresponse, following Rosas et al., 2015) as a signal of nonalignment.[10] Nonresponse is preferable to all votes that differ from the US's for a few reasons. First, they do not signal strong commitment to a different policy; in terms of the model, it suggests that α_T is not necessarily high. If α_T is high, donors do not distribute aid to the target under any circumstances, as their interest in the policy is not sufficiently high ($\alpha_T \geq \alpha_D$). Second, it is less likely to inflict prohibitively high lying costs on the targets if it does not match the type. If the value of c was too high, then targets would never be willing to incur the cost of lying. Third, it is less likely to capture signals that are primarily directed at other audiences, although this is still a possibility. Nonresponse may be used to draw funds from multiple donors at once, while voting in line with Russia may be more about an interaction with Russia than one with the US.

I use alliance status as a means of varying key parameters. I divide the sample into three groups – US allies, countries allied with adversaries (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran), and countries aligned with neither – based on alliance status in 1997, the year before my empirical analyses begin. This allows me to retain units throughout the entire time period without concerns about post-treatment bias. Alliance status indicates variation in key parameters.

US allies should, on average, have higher likelihood of alignment (high p), lower attachment to implementing their most preferred policy relative to the US's policy (low α_T), and high US interest in their policy (high α_D). *Ex ante*, the US expects an ally to be aligned with them on a given issue, as an alliance generally signifies correlated interests. Pursuing an alliance with the US constrains

[10]Authors differ on whether absences should be grouped together with abstentions. Rosas et al. (2015) maintain that such absences may be strategic, while Voeten (2013) argues absent votes are correlated with conditions of instability that may leave governments without representatives at the UN. US diplomatic cables suggest that at least some "not present" votes are strategic (see for example Plaisted, 2009, December 18; Scott, 2006, December 18). To capture effects of strategic absences while protecting against bias induced by nonstrategic absences, I control for state capacity.

the degree of policy autonomy from the US in favor of cooperative gains, suggesting a lower degree of desire for policy autonomy from the US (low α_T) (Morrow, 2000). Alliance status should also be correlated with the degree of US interest in a state – if a state was completely irrelevant to US foreign policy, then any transaction costs of building an alliance would not be worth it. Further, alliance may endogenously increase US interests, as the US develops deeper cooperative ties with allies, which then raises the importance of those states to US foreign policy. Taken together, these parameter values suggest that US allies are most likely to be in the semi-separating equilibrium when voting in the UNGA, when the cost of lying is low. This gives rise to Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1 (H1) *UNGA nonresponse by a US ally is positively associated with US aid inflows.*

On the other hand, allies of US adversaries should have low probability of alignment (low p), high attachment to implementing their most preferred policy relative to the US's most preferred policy (high α_T), and low US interest in changing their policy (low α_D). Countries aligned with the US's adversaries should have interests that are on average in line with the US's adversaries, meaning that overlap in interests should be quite rare. Seeking out allies that are adversarial with the US similarly suggests that US policies cause some disutility to the target.[11]. Finally, in general, the countries that are allied with US adversaries lack the endogenously created value to the US that I discussed above.

These states are likely to be in the priced-out equilibrium. The US could, in principle, offer them enough money to implement the US's preferred policy. However, the high reservation price (high α_T) means that it would be so costly for the US that the net impact on US utility would be negative. In practice then, nonresponse should be uncorrelated with US foreign aid inflows for these countries.

[11]It may seem inconsistent that US alliance implies a low α_T but alliance with a US adversary implies high α_T, as both denote a target's interest in its own policy. The α_T term is perhaps better understood as interest in policy autonomy from *modeled donor in particular*

Hypothesis 2 (H2) *UNGA nonresponse by states that are allied with US adversaries is not associated with US aid inflows.*

Finally, non-aligned countries should have intermediate probabilities of alignment (intermediate p), low costs of lying (low c), low to intermediate degrees of interest in policy autonomy (moderate to high α_T), and intermediate to high levels of US interest in policy (intermediate or high α_D). Non-alignment suggests that overlap in policy preferences is not so large with any major power that actual preferences may be idiosyncratic to the issue at hand. There are at least two related rationales for formal non-alignment. First, non-alignment allows states complete policy autonomy, allowing them to support policies on their merits. Second, it can allow states to extract maximum rents from one or multiple donors, as their swing voter tendencies mean that their support is potentially pivotal. The dominant rationale for non-alignment is unobservable and may vary over time, issue, and country, but states that favor the first rationale should have higher α_T values, while those that favor the second should have low α_T values. Relatedly, those who are nonaligned for resource extraction reasons should have particularly low costs of lying, while those non-aligned for policy reasons may be punished by domestic elites for appearing too close to any particular world power. Finally, on key votes the US should be particularly interested in securing support from these swing countries on issues where it is important to preclude inroads by adversaries, but this may not be true for all issues and targets.

Non-aligned countries may be in either the pooling equilibrium, semi-separating, or the priced-out equilibrium. The two "affordable" equilibria (pooling and semi-separating) are more likely when the US is pursuing that country's support in a key issue area (when α_D is high) and when the target's winning coalition does not have particularly strong preferences over that policy (when c and α_T are low). When these conditions hold, those states are most likely to be able to signal nonalignment and be courted with high aid inflows. As described above, some nonaligned countries may be

nonaligned because they strongly value policy autonomy, meaning that their reservation price may be prohibitively high for the US to benefit from buying policy. I expect that, empirically, both of these situations exist, but that the affordable equilibria are sufficiently common to be observed empirically due to the political value of aid flows to incumbents in target states.

Hypothesis 3 (H3) *UNGA nonresponse by non-aligned states is positively associated with US aid inflows.*

In addition to my baseline analysis, I subset UN votes to study issues that the US cares more about, allowing me to capture instances where US willingness to pay (α_D) is higher. Although the votes themselves are still on non-binding resolutions, the voting behavior may map onto more consequential actions. The US State Department designates certain votes as important and states that it lobbies other states on those votes. I focus only on abstention rates for these designated votes. In separate analyses, I subset to study only votes related to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which constitutes a significant US interest.[12] Figure 3 displays the incidence of each vote type over time. However, using more votes does not straightforwardly map onto larger effect sizes. The importance of a vote to the US is likely correlated with the importance of a vote to target countries and their winning coalitions; in terms of the model, even if α_D is higher, a higher α_T and value may mean that the US is priced out. Similarly, domestic audiences may pay more attention to votes on key issues, making lying a less attractive option. For example, a US diplomat, referring to a Fijian representative, relayed that "his country is kicking his butt" for not voting with Arab countries on an Israel-Palestine-related vote (Plaisted, 2009, December 18). This domestic backlash is least likely for US allies, who have entered into formal arrangements that constrain their policy independence

[12]Including both types of votes allows me to overcome tradeoffs associated with each. Important votes are designated as such by the US, a process which could be done strategically; for example, the US could only designate certain votes as important if it expects to win or to induce more sincere voting among aid-dependent countries. Votes associated with the Israel-Palestine conflict are designated as such by Bailey et al. (2017), but we cannot be as certain about the importance of individual votes to the US.



Figure 3: Vote Type Prevalence over Time

from the US, but more likely for non-aligned states, who have avoided such arrangements in part to ensure their autonomy over the issues that are most important to them. I expect a larger effect size for US allies but not for non-allies.

Hypothesis 4 (H4) *UNGA nonresponse by US allies on important votes and Israel-Palestine-related votes is positively associated with US aid inflows.*

Hypothesis 5 (H5) *UNGA nonresponse by non-US allies on important votes and Israel-Palestine-related votes is not positively associated with US aid inflows.*

Empirical Analysis

I examine four outcome variables: US bilateral aid disbursements, World Bank loan commitments, and International Monetary Fund loan commitments, and the sum of all three sources. According to Dreher, Lang, et al. (2022), the US may direct aid to targets not aligned with US policy through the

international financial institutions (IFIs); I follow their work in using disbursements for US aid but commitments for the IFIs.[13] Consistent with this work, I expect that the largest effects will be on IFI aid, as US incumbents may face criticism at home for supporting targets that do not support US foreign policy objectives. Existing work tends to use log-like transformations for outcomes like aid, but recent work from Chen and Roth (2023) suggests that this can create arbitrary estimates of the average treatment effect and that scaling the outcome variable is a preferable method for capturing declining marginal effects. I scale by gross national income, which captures the value of the aid to the target state in relation to that state's economy.[14] To ease interpretation, I multiply aid as a percentage of GNI by 100.

I use a selection on observables approach. Using OLS, I estimate the following equation

$$Aid_{i,t+1} = \beta \cdot NonresponsePct_{it} + \gamma \cdot \mathbf{x}_{i,t-1} + Y_t + C_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where β is the parameter of interest and the percentage of votes in which target i abstained or was absent in a given year is the explanatory variable of interest.[15] I use aid as a percentage of GNI for target unit i in year $t+1$ to reduce the likelihood of reverse causality. $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector of pre-treatment covariates and Y and C are time- and target country-fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the target country level.

To capture the heterogeneous effects by alliance status predicted in my hypotheses, I subset my data into three groups based on 1997 alliance status: US allies, allies of US adversaries, and non-aligned states. I use 1997 alliance status to reduce the likelihood that alliance status is endogenous to aid in the analysis. This choice of year, though ultimately arbitrary, is far enough from

[13] Carter and Stone (2015) show that US disbursements diverge from commitments in response to political incentives. I check robustness using US commitments.

[14] Using GNI as opposed to GDP is consistent with prior work for capturing meaningfulness of aid relative to the size of the economy (Galiani et al., 2017; Ping et al., 2022).

[15] Because I am interested in divergence with the US, I only count nonresponses on votes on which the US does not also engage in nonresponse.



Figure 4: Distribution of Nonresponse by Alliance Status

the geopolitical upheaval caused by the end of the Cold War that changes in alliance status should be sufficiently uncommon that it should not alter the results of the analysis. For alliance status, I use data collected by Leeds et al. (2002). For US adversaries, I use China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. In the appendix, I present alternative specifications where I subset using the lagged value of alliance status instead of the 1997 value. I opt to subset the data and conduct separate analyses instead of using interaction terms. Conducting separate analyses is equivalent to interacting alliance status with nonresponse and the covariates in the model as recommended by Brambor et al. (2006), but has the advantage of simple interpretation. Figure 4 shows the distribution of nonresponse percentages broken down by alliance status. My analyses cover all UNGA members from the years 1998-2018.

While only suggestive, it is worth noting that the relative nonresponse patterns depicted in Figure 4 is with the predictions of my model. If US allies are typically "affordable" (low α_T), they are more likely to have opportunities to profitably misrepresent their type. Nonaligned countries

are more often too expensive for the US to purchase policy support from, but are most likely to falsely signal nonalignment if they are affordable and truly aligned, given that their prior probability of alignment is low; this is consistent with the higher variance associated with nonresponse by nonaligned countries. Finally, allies of US adversaries are only rarely affordable, so a low mean and low variance in nonresponse is not surprising. This is far from conclusive evidence that the model is an accurate depiction of reality, but it is consistent.

I include several covariates to alleviate omitted variable bias potentially caused by structural features of the target state. The political and economic contexts shape the interests of countries and thus their voting behavior at the UN, so I control for democracy, gross national income per capita, and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Membership on the UN Security Council has been shown to shape the allocation and terms of foreign aid, as members vote on high-stakes resolutions that matter more to major powers than most UNGA resolutions (e.g. Berlin et al., 2022; Jud, 2023). Population has a theoretically ambiguous relationship with aid: some scholars stress the increased policy salience of large states (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007)) while others note that small states may receive outsized inflows of aid because it is cheaper to purchase their support (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, et al., 2008). Finally, low state capacity may increase the rate of absences via unpredictable government turnover and staff shortages while affecting aid flows in an indeterminate way, as giving is more risky, but may have higher returns (Voeten, 2013).

Results

I present the results for net aid impact by alliance status in Table 1. Among allies (Model 1) and non-aligned countries (Model 2), nonresponses are positively associated with future aid inflows, but that relationship does not exist for countries aligned with US adversaries (Model 3). These results are consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In the Appendix (Tables 3, 4, and 5) I display results with US bilateral, World Bank, and IMF aid decomposed into separate analyses. The positive net effect

on aid is driven primarily by multilateral lending for non-aligned states, while US allies see increases from all three sources. The point estimates can be interpreted as the effect on aid as a percent of GNI if a target state went from never nonresponding to always nonresponding; for allies, the results suggested that aid would increase by about 2 percent of GNI if a state increased its nonresponse from zero to 100 percent, while the effect size for non-aligned states is about a third of that. I also check robustness to possible non-strategic absences in the appendix by removing observations that are prone to non-strategic absences due to instability or low state capacity. In Table 10, I remove country-years where there was a coup or civil war; in Table 12, I remove observations with low state capacity. The results are not meaningfully different. I also test to see if the results are robust to the use of US commitments in the dependent variable instead of US disbursements; some scholars argue that this is the more appropriate means to capturing donor strategy (e.g. Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), while others show that the US president deviates strategically from commitments for political reasons (Carter and Stone, 2015). The result for allies are similar, while the results for non-aligned countries are not statistically significant (Table 14). Finally, I check to see if my results are due to selection of covariates; most of my covariates do not vary much year-to-year, meaning that much of their effect may be picked up country fixed effects. When I remove all covariates, the results for allies are largely unchanged, but the coefficient for non-aligned states is no longer significant, although it does retain its positive sign.

Table 2 displays the results with votes that are either designated as important by the US (Models 1, 3, and 5) or coded as related to Israel and Palestine by Bailey et al. (2017) (Models 2, 4, and 6). Consistent with H4, the positive effect for allies displayed in Model 1 remains. The point estimate is more than two times as large as the effect shown in the analysis with all votes. This is consistent with the idea that votes map onto some related policy, as opposed to the possibility that votes are taken as a general approximation of the particular target's attitude toward the US more broadly. In

Table 1: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.394***	0.5597**	0.5572
	(0.8790)	(0.2582)	(0.8320)
Democracy	1.820	-1.285	0.6483
	(1.256)	(1.018)	(0.8342)
GNI per capita	-2.96×10^{-5}	2.36×10^{-5}***	-0.0001*
	(2×10^{-5})	(6.36×10^{-6})	(6.48×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0459*	0.0061	-0.0059
	(0.0254)	(0.0132)	(0.0150)
UN Security Council	-0.0623	-0.1235	-0.3548
	(0.1257)	(0.1844)	(0.2248)
State capacity	-0.3732	0.4639**	0.0570
	(0.2982)	(0.1897)	(0.4201)
Population	-0.0062	-0.0158*	-0.0010
	(0.0161)	(0.0093)	(0.0008)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	1,120	800	226

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

this case, the US's willingness should be higher than for the typical vote. For non-aligned states, the estimate remains positive but fails to reach statistical significance. To the extent that the positive coefficient can be interpreted, it is consistent with the idea presented in H5 that the US likely still purchases policy in this case, but it is rarer given a higher reservation price among many targets. Interestingly, allies of US adversaries see a positive and insignificant effect that is larger than that for nonaligned states. While this is possible through the same mechanism described for nonaligned states, it is more likely representative of a distinct mechanism: the US paying for abstentions on important vote. I discuss this possibility more below. In the Appendix (Tables 11, 13, and 15, I run the same robustness checks described above; again, the results are not meaningfully different. The strength of the relationship between nonresponse is consistent with the idea that donors' key allies should be best positioned to take strong negotiating positions (Prizzon et al., 2017; Whitfield, 2009).

Table 2: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	6.027**		1.010		3.502	
	(2.592)		(1.355)		(2.906)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		4.618**		0.1457		2.614
		(1.768)		(0.7638)		(2.214)
Democracy	1.782	1.869	-1.310	-1.304	0.6076	0.7389
	(1.274)	(1.293)	(1.016)	(0.9988)	(0.7884)	(0.8507)
GNI per capita	-2.41×10^{-5}	-2.56×10^{-5}	2.27×10^{-5}***	2.37×10^{-5}***	-0.0001*	-0.0001*
	(2×10^{-5})	(1.97×10^{-5})	(6.36×10^{-6})	(6.51×10^{-6})	(6.55×10^{-5})	(6.84×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0492**	-0.0427*	0.0065	0.0063	-0.0060	-0.0045
	(0.0235)	(0.0247)	(0.0133)	(0.0134)	(0.0138)	(0.0145)
UN Security Council	-0.0529	-0.0744	-0.1271	-0.1235	-0.3428	-0.3664
	(0.1271)	(0.1273)	(0.1836)	(0.1837)	(0.2172)	(0.2326)
State capacity	-0.4135	-0.4240	0.4621**	0.4607**	0.0445	0.0255
	(0.3028)	(0.3033)	(0.1894)	(0.1895)	(0.4248)	(0.4220)
Population	-0.0042	-0.0084	-0.0155	-0.0150	-0.0011	-0.0010
	(0.0164)	(0.0166)	(0.0095)	(0.0095)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,120	1,120	800	800	226	226

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.

Discussion

Given my results, why does existing work find a relationship between aid and voting alignment in the UNGA? This relationship is well-established for important votes in particular (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, et al., 2008). Given the predictions of my theory, there are a few reasons we may still observe this pattern. First, it may still be the case that a select few votes are subject to donor interest in the vote itself. This is especially likely for important votes. Second, targets that receive high levels of aid may have preferences over different kinds of aid; for example, if targets have secured a considerable flow of budget support – a particularly fungible and attractive aid modality according to Swedlund (2017a) – they may be unwilling to risk spurring backlash and jeopardizing those resources. Third, aid may be causally related to the underlying likelihood of policy alignment. Aid is given for reasons beyond policy purchase that can make the recipient more likely to align with the donor for instrumental or genuine reasons; for example, aid creates opportunities for interaction between donor and recipient elites that may convince recipient elites of the genuine merit of the donor's orientation. As the probability of alignment p increases, the recipient's probability of lying in the semi-separating equilibrium decreases. Fourth, recipients may have a sense of the maximum resources the donor is willing to dedicate to them. Once this amount is reached, lying no longer generates additional resources, leaving the recipient absorbing any costs of lying with no benefit. Finally, this work may not consider the use of IFI-complimented aid strategies employed by the US as described by Dreher, Lang, et al. (2022); it may be the case that bilateral aid is correlated with UNGA voting alignment, but low-alignment countries receive more from IFIs.

Why would the US continue to consider the UNGA in its aid allocation decisions when it knows them to be potentially misleading? Importantly, the construction of the theoretical model does not require the donor to only consider UNGA votes; other considerations – such as prior experiences with a particular target, intergovernmental dialogue, and assessments of the national interest of the

target by the donor country – form the prior probability of alignment p. Instead, the model describes how new information like a UNGA vote causes the donor to update (or not) *conditional on their priors*. UNGA votes form attractive focal points for a donor to observe because they can be clearly mapped onto policy areas, are relatively clear statements of position, occur in a standardized fashion across states, and are observable (and thus punishable) to some extent by domestic audiences.

The theoretical and statistical results need not be evaluated differently in light of the existence of multiple targets and multiple donors. Nonresponse may serve two functions for targets: they may signal the need for more resources by an existing ally and the openness to new relationships to other donors who may be interested in pursuing them. These two functions complement each other; as existing work from Hernandez (2017) and others shows, donors grant aid on more favorable terms when a target has access to an alternative donor. The existence of multiple targets forms one dimension of the donor's budget constraint, with the other being domestic political concerns. Not every target is important enough to spend additional resources on, as this means fewer resources available to spend on more important targets. Crucially, my claim is not that targets have unrestricted ability to manipulate donor behavior; rather, they are constrained by their importance to donors, among other things.

Alternative Explanation: Purchasing Nonresponse

It may be the case that, for some targets, the US actually aims to purchase abstentions instead of alignment; perhaps purchasing full alignment is too costly and precluding the passage of some unfavorable resolution via abstention or strategic absence is sufficiently helpful to US interests. This is plausible theoretically and I cannot conclusively distinguish between this possibility and the predictions of my theory. I expect that purchasing of nonresponse should be most common among non-allies, whereas allies should be unwilling to vote against the US most of the time because of their underlying preferences. There is some evidence of the purchase of nonresponse. While the net

impact on aid is indistinguishable from zero, allies of US adversaries – the countries who would be most likely to require aid in order to nonrespond, as opposed to vote against the US position – receive more US bilateral aid after nonresponses. This aid may be more valuable than aid from IFIs, which may come with more strings attached and longer time horizons. This pathway is more likely to exist for countries that have ideal points that are distant from the US than for those with closer ideal points.

Conclusion

My findings raise several implications for scholars of international relations. As I discussed in the introduction, they suggest that low stakes actions like UNGA votes do not map neatly onto a state's underlying preferences. Considerable work uses UNGA voting alignment – or some transformation of it, like ideal points generated from certain votes (Bailey et al., 2017) – as an indicator of foreign policy alignment (e.g. Nelson, 2014; Strüver, 2016; Tomashevskiy, 2021). This work often suggests that the symbolic nature of UNGA voting makes it an appealing forum for approximating preferences. Comparing UNGA votes to alliance formation, Gartzke (2006) writes that the relatively low-cost nature of UNGA votes means that preferences should be less distorted; similarly, Bailey et al. (2017) suggest that the nonbinding nature of UNGA resolutions means that strategic voting is less likely. My results challenge this assumption; according to my model, the minimal consequences of UNGA voting are *the source* of strategic distortions, as states can purposefully misrepresent their preferences in search of increased resources. Future research should carefully consider for which dyads strategic distortions are likely and when possible use multiple approximations of state preferences. My results also highlight an additional explanation for the often-adversarial nature of UNGA highlighted by Mesquita and Pires (2022) and others; existing work suggests that dramatic UNGA politics function to reinforce state's international identities and/or appeal to domestic constituencies, while my work

suggests that it may also give states an opportunity to signal profitable recalcitrance to key donors.

This work also holds implications for regime survival in autocratic target states. Aid – a fungible resource – is an important tool for leaders in both democracies and autocracies, as it allows them to engage in several regime maintenance activities; aid may be used to line the pockets of key allies, fund patronage networks to mobilize voters, and tout their economic development credentials, among other activities aimed at building political support. Existing work shows that donors are less likely to pressure for regime liberalization when that regime is a key partner for the donor because liberalization may undermine the achievement of more pressing donor objectives (Collins, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). My work highlights an additional mechanism connecting target importance, aid, and autocratic survival: those key targets are most likely to successfully misrepresent their preferences to draw excess aid, which is in turn used to stabilize the regime.

The basic logic of my argument is also potentially applicable to bargaining contexts outside of international relations, such as legislative bargaining and clientelism. In a legislative setting, potentially pivotal members may fence sit by releasing statements expressing reservations about a particular proposal or failing to vote in favor of the bill on procedural votes that serve as tests of the bill's likelihood to pass, even if they privately support the bill's passage. According to my model, we might expect members like this to secure a disproportionately high amount of government appropriations for their constituency or a more favorable committee assignment. In the case of clientelism, politicians hire brokers to secure votes in a certain area. Brokers, although knowledgeable about the residents of their area, lack complete information over voters' preferences. Some voters – especially those who are less familiar to brokers – may choose to express that they are unlikely to vote for the brokers' candidate in order to attract a bribe.

Although I have set aside the credible commitment component of aid bargaining, my findings do not conflict with the insights of that literature. My model points to an element of aid bargaining that

exists even in the presence of credible commitment. Additionally, realized parameter values in the real world – especially the target's reservation price and the donor's willingness to pay – include consideration of the likelihood of defection from an agreement; in other words, a donor that values a policy at 100 dollars but assigns a 15 percent likelihood to defection (with payoff zero) may only be willing to pay 85 dollars. Additional problems related to commitment also contain informational components. For example, recipients cannot credibly commit to faithfully implement aid programs that they are being paid to implement, and donors may not necessarily be able to observe whether or not implementation occurred in the spirit of the agreement. This informational component may limit the disciplining effect of reputation concerns – targets wish to receive both present and future aid and thus must act in a way that does not preclude future aid – although donor's failure to credibly commit to punish may be sufficient on its own (Dunning, 2004; Swedlund, 2017a). Future research should explore the nexus of commitment and information problems in aid bargaining.

An additional area for future research is strategic creation of value by targets. Targets who are highly valued by donors receive aid may engage in profitably misleading signaling more often, allowing them to capture additional surplus. This makes the creation of value a potentially strategic process. Targets may opt to offer favorable investment terms to influential businesses from the donor country, pursue deeper military cooperation, and/or strengthen diplomatic ties with the donor. This may be costly and in the short term reduce the policy autonomy of the target, but also create a more secure inflow of aid and other resources that ultimately allows the target more flexibility in avoiding punishment for transgressions. Relatedly, future work may explore how targets encourage competition between donors to increase the willingness to pay of multiple donors; for example, countries that recognize Taiwan may threaten to switch their recognition of Taiwan to China in order to prompt an increase in aid from Taiwanese allies (Chen, 2022).

Generally, this work points to a need for further research on strategic decision-making by

aid-receiving countries. While donor-side decision-making is undoubtedly important, the environment that donors evaluate can be profitably manipulated by target states.

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Appendix

Proofs of Formal Results

Proof of Lemma 1

Consider the following policy implementation strategy y_T^* played by T.

$$y_T^* = \begin{cases} \theta_T & \text{if } r_D < \alpha_T \\ \\ 1 & \text{if } r_D \geq \alpha_T \end{cases}$$

I check for profitable deviations below. I do not consider the cost c of a deceptive signal, as it is sunk by this point in the game. At the indifference point, T will take the aid money and implement $y_T = 1$. First, suppose that $r_D < \alpha_T$.

$$U_T(y_T = \theta_T \mid r_D < \alpha_T) > U_T(y_T = 1 \mid r_D < \alpha_T)$$

$$p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(0) > p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(r_D - \alpha_T)$$

$$r_D < \alpha_T \quad \checkmark$$

$$U_T(y_T = \theta_T \mid r_D < \alpha_T) > U_T(y_T = 0 \mid r_D < \alpha_T)$$

$$p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(0) > p(-\alpha_T) + (1-p)(0)$$

$$r_D > -\alpha_T \quad \checkmark$$

Now suppose that $r_D \geq \alpha_T$.

$$U_T(y_T = 1 \mid r_D \geq \alpha_T) \geq U_T(y_T = 1 \mid r_D \geq \alpha_T)$$

$$p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(r_D - \alpha_T) \geq p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(0)$$

$$r_D \geq \alpha_T \quad \checkmark$$

$$U_T(y_T = 1 \mid r_D \geq \alpha_T) \geq U_T(y_T = 0 \mid r_D \geq \alpha_T)$$

$$p \cdot r_D + (1-p)(r_D - \alpha_T) \geq p(-\alpha_T) + (1-p)(0) \quad \checkmark$$

There are no profitable deviations from y_T^*. □

Proof of Lemma 2

Suppose not; that is, suppose that there exists an offer $r_D = \alpha_T \pm \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon > 0$. I demonstrate below that $r_D = \alpha_T - \varepsilon$ and $r_D = \alpha_T + \varepsilon$ are strictly dominated strategies, beginning with $r_D = \alpha_T - \varepsilon$.

$$U_D(r_D = 0 \mid y_T^*) > U_D(r_D = \alpha_T - \epsilon \mid y_T^*)$$

$$p \cdot \alpha_D + (1-p)(0) > p(\alpha_D - (\alpha_T - \varepsilon)) + (1-p)(0)$$

$$\alpha_T > \varepsilon \quad \checkmark$$

$r_D = \alpha_T - \varepsilon$ is thus strictly dominated by $r_D = 0$. I now show that $r_D = \alpha_T + \varepsilon$ is strictly dominated by $r_D = \alpha_T$.

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid y_T^*) > U_D(r_D = \alpha_T + \varepsilon \mid y_T^*)$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T > \alpha_D - (\alpha_T + \varepsilon)$$

$$\varepsilon > 0 \quad \checkmark$$

There are thus only two possible offers, $r_D = 0$ and $r_D = \alpha_T$, that are not strictly dominated strategies, so $r_D \in \{0, \alpha_T\}$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 1

I solve for the equilibrium of this game given the results from Lemmas 1 and 2. Suppose that $s_T^* = \theta_T$ and

$$r_D^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \\ \\ \alpha_T & \text{if } s_T = 0 \end{cases}$$

I check if either player has profitable deviations, beginning with the donor.

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid \beta_D^*, s_T = 0) \geq U_D(r_D = 0 \mid \beta_D^*, s_T = 0)$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T \geq 0$$

$$\alpha_D \geq \alpha_T \quad \checkmark$$

$$U_D(r_D = 0 \mid \beta_D^*, s_T = 1) \geq U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid \beta_D^*, s_T = 1)$$

$$\alpha_D \geq \alpha_D - \alpha_T$$

$$\alpha_T \geq 0 \quad \checkmark$$

The donor has no profitable deviations. I now check the target's incentive compatibility.

$$U_T(s_T = 1 \mid \theta_T = 1, \beta_D^*, r_D^*) \geq U_T(s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1, \beta_D^*, r_D^*)$$

$$0 \geq \alpha_T - c$$

$$c \geq \alpha_T$$

$$U_T(s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 0, \beta_D^*, r_D^*) \geq U_T(s_T = 1 \mid \theta_T = 0, \beta_D^*, r_D^*)$$

$$\alpha_T - \alpha_T \geq -c$$

$$0 \geq -c \quad \checkmark$$

T has a profitable deviation if and only if $c \geq \alpha_T$. This equilibrium therefore exists only if $c \geq \alpha_T$.

□

Proof of Proposition 2

I first derive the prior p for which the expected value of an offer of $r_D = \alpha_T$ without an informative signal is greater than that of $r_D = 0$.

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T) > U_D(r_D = 0)$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T > p \cdot \alpha_D + (1 - p)(0)$$

$$1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D} > p$$

Suppose that $\beta_D^{**}(\theta_T) = s_T$, $p < 1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D}$, $s_T^{**} = 0$, and

$$r_D^{**} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \\ \alpha_T & \text{if } s_T = 0 \text{ and } \alpha_D > \alpha_T \end{cases}$$

I first check the donor's incentive to deviate.

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0, \beta_D^{**}) \geq U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0, \beta_D^{**})$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T \geq p(\alpha_D) + (1-p)(0)$$

$$1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D} \geq p \quad \checkmark$$

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 1, \beta_D^{**}) \geq U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 1, \beta_D^{**})$$

$$\alpha_D \geq \alpha_D - \alpha_T$$

$$\alpha_T \geq 0 \quad \checkmark$$

I now check the target's incentive to deviate.

$$U_T(s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1, r_D^{**}, \beta_D^{**}) \geq U_T(s_T = 1 \mid \theta_T = 1, r_D^{**}, \beta_D^{**})$$

$$\alpha_T - c \geq 0$$

$$\alpha_T \geq c$$

$$U_T(s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 0, r_D^{**}, \beta_D^{**}) \geq U_T(s_T = 1 \mid \theta_T = 0, r_D^{**}, \beta_D^{**})$$

$$\alpha_T \geq -c \quad \checkmark$$

For this equilibrium to hold, the cost of lying must be sufficiently low ($c \leq \alpha_T$). □

Equilibrium Refinement: The Intuitive Criterion I show that the pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion described by Cho and Kreps (1987). First, I show that the aligned type $\theta_T = 1$ is the type of T that has a possible incentive to deviate.

$$U_T(s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 1) < \max U_T(\neg s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 1)$$

$$\alpha_T - c < \alpha_T$$

whereas the unaligned type does not.

$$U_T(s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 0) > \max U_T(\neg s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 0)$$

$$\alpha_T - \alpha_T > \alpha_T - \alpha_T - c \text{ OR } 0 - 0 - c$$

$$0 > -c$$

Even for the type that may have an incentive to deviate, the equilibrium survives based on the second condition of the Intuitive Criterion.

$$U_T(s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 1, r_D^{**}) > \min U_T(\neg s_T^{**} \mid \theta_T = 1, r_D^{**})$$

$$\alpha_T - c > 0$$

This condition is always met, as existence of this equilibrium depends on the condition $\alpha_T > c$. Therefore, the equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion. □

Proof of Proposition 3

Consider the model when $p > 1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D}$ and $\alpha_D > \alpha_T$. I define $\pi = \Pr[s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1] \in (0, 1)$ and $q = \Pr[r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0] \in (0, 1)$. Suppose that D holds the following beliefs:

$$\beta_D^{***}(\theta_T) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \\ 0 \text{ with probability } \pi & \text{if } s_T = 0 \\ 1 \text{ with probability } 1 - \pi & \text{if } s_T = 0. \end{cases}$$

I conjecture the following strategies:

$$s_T^{***} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \theta_T = 0 \\ 0 \text{ with probability } \pi & \text{if } \theta_T = 1 \\ 1 \text{ with probability } 1 - \pi & \text{if } \theta_T = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$r_D^{***} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s_T = 1 \\ \alpha_T \text{ with probability } q & \text{if } s_T = 0 \\ 0 \text{ with probability } 1 - q & \text{if } s_T = 0 \end{cases}$$

I first solve for the posterior belief that a target claiming to be unaligned is actually unaligned, using Bayes' rule.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\theta_T = 0 \mid s_T = 0] &= \frac{\Pr[s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 0] \cdot \Pr[\theta_T = 0]}{\Pr[s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 0] \cdot \Pr[\theta_T = 0] + \Pr[s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1] \cdot \Pr[\theta_T = 1]} \\ &= \frac{1 \cdot (1 - p)}{1 \cdot (1 - p) + \pi \cdot p} \\ &= \frac{1 - p}{(1 - p) + \pi \cdot p} \end{aligned}$$

Using this probability, I solve for the mixing probability by an aligned target ($\theta_T = 1$) necessary to make the donor indifferent between giving $r_D = \alpha_T$ and $r_D = 0$, conditional on observing $s_T = 0$.

$$U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0) = U_D(r_D = 0 \mid s_T = 0)$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T = \textbf{Pr}[\theta_T = 0 \mid s_T = 0] \cdot (0) + \textbf{Pr}[\theta_T = 1 \mid s_T = 0] \cdot (\alpha_D)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1 - p + \pi \cdot p}{1 - p + \pi \cdot p} - \frac{(1-p)}{1 - p + \pi \cdot p} \right) (\alpha_D)$$

$$\alpha_D - \alpha_T = \frac{\pi \cdot p \cdot \alpha_D}{1 - p + \pi \cdot p}$$

$$(\alpha_D - \alpha_T)(1 - p + \pi \cdot p) = \pi \cdot p \cdot \alpha_D$$

$$\alpha_D - p \cdot \alpha_D + \alpha_D \cdot \pi \cdot p - \alpha_T + \alpha_T \cdot p - \alpha_T \cdot \pi \cdot p = \pi \cdot p \cdot \alpha_D$$

$$\alpha_D - p \cdot \alpha_D - \alpha_T + \alpha_T \cdot p = \alpha_T \cdot \pi \cdot p$$

$$\frac{\alpha_D - p \cdot \alpha_D - \alpha_T + \alpha_T \cdot p}{\alpha_T \cdot p} = \pi$$

$$\pi = \frac{(1-p)(\alpha_D - \alpha_T)}{\alpha_T \cdot p}$$

This probability π is between 0 and 1 as long as $p > 1 - \frac{\alpha_T}{\alpha_D}$, which is the same probability that forms the upper bound of the pooling equilibrium. I now determine the mixing probability q for the donor's strategy that makes the aligned type target indifferent between lying and telling the truth.

$$U_T(s_T = 1 \mid \theta_T = 1) = U_T(s_T = 0 \mid \theta_T = 1)$$

$$0 = q \cdot (\alpha_T - c) + (1 - q)(-c)$$

$$q = \frac{c}{\alpha_T}$$

which is in the interval $(0, 1)$ when $c < \alpha_T$.

Because there are neither pooling nor separating strategies that can be sustained in this region of the parameter space and both actors are set indifferent when mixing with probabilities in the interval

$(0, 1)$, this is a PBE (Morrow, 1994). □

Proof of Proposition 4

When $\alpha_T > \alpha_D$, the minimum offer D must make to convince a T with $\theta_T = 0$ to implement $y_T = 1$ is higher than the additional payoff D will receive from policy alignment.

$$U_D(r_D = 0 \mid s_T = 0, \alpha_T > \alpha_D) \geq U_D(r_D = \alpha_T \mid s_T = 0, \alpha_T > \alpha_D)$$

$$0 \geq \alpha_D - \alpha_T$$

$$\alpha_T \geq \alpha_D$$

D will thus never make an offer of aid, as those states that need to be purchased to achieve policy alignment are too pricey ($r_D^{****} = 0$). Because no aid is being offered, no targets have any incentive to deviate from their type ($s_T^{****} = \theta_T$). □

Additional Empirical Analyses

Outcome Variable Decomposed into Specific Donors, All Votes

Table 3: Effect of Nonresponse by US Allies

Dependent Variables:	US aid	WB lending	IMF lending	Summed aid
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
Nonresponses, all votes	0.3608	0.9468**	0.8995	2.394***
	(0.2900)	(0.3847)	(0.5927)	(0.8790)
Democracy	1.217	-0.3526	0.9161	1.820
	(0.7632)	(0.2499)	(0.9522)	(1.256)
GNI per capita	-5.23×10^{-6}	9.77×10^{-7}	-1.89×10^{-5}	-2.96×10^{-5}
	(7.37×10^{-6})	(3.33×10^{-6})	(1.53×10^{-5})	(2×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0086	-0.0090	-0.0280*	-0.0459*
	(0.0068)	(0.0086)	(0.0161)	(0.0254)
UN Security Council	0.0030	0.0041	-0.0735	-0.0623
	(0.0174)	(0.0195)	(0.1243)	(0.1257)
State capacity	-0.3740	0.0953**	-0.0465	-0.3732
	(0.2311)	(0.0422)	(0.1558)	(0.2982)
Population	0.0013	0.0050**	-0.0138	-0.0062
	(0.0031)	(0.0021)	(0.0146)	(0.0161)
Fixed-effects				
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	1,293	1,293	1,120	1,120

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table 4: Effect of Nonresponse by Non-Aligned States

Dependent Variables:	US aid	WB lending	IMF lending	Summed aid
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
Nonresponses, all votes	-0.1883	0.4762*	0.1803	0.5597**
	(0.2098)	(0.2794)	(0.1453)	(0.2582)
Democracy	-0.5139	-0.6751	0.2256	-1.285
	(0.3220)	(0.6932)	(0.2253)	(1.018)
GNI per capita	-3.54×10^{-6}	1.49×10^{-5}***	4.53×10^{-6}	2.36×10^{-5}***
	(8.55×10^{-6})	(4.53×10^{-6})	(3.14×10^{-6})	(6.36×10^{-6})
Oil rents	-0.0043	0.0084	-0.0063*	0.0061
	(0.0093)	(0.0069)	(0.0033)	(0.0132)
UN Security Council	-0.0946	-0.1132	0.0353	-0.1235
	(0.0577)	(0.1208)	(0.0678)	(0.1844)
State capacity	0.0888	0.3008**	0.0089	0.4639**
	(0.0845)	(0.1201)	(0.0457)	(0.1897)
Population	-0.0046	-0.0032	-0.0053*	-0.0158*
	(0.0054)	(0.0057)	(0.0028)	(0.0093)
Fixed-effects				
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	935	935	800	800

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table 5: Effect of Nonresponse by Allies of US Adversaries

Dependent Variables:	US aid	WB lending	IMF lending	Summed aid
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
Nonresponses, all votes	1.076**	-0.3394	-0.3353**	0.5572
	(0.4908)	(0.4322)	(0.1176)	(0.8320)
Democracy	-0.2957	2.777***	0.1828	0.6483
	(0.4651)	(0.9115)	(0.2186)	(0.8342)
GNI per capita	-0.0001***	1.79×10^{-5}	3.49×10^{-5}***	-0.0001*
	(4.73×10^{-5})	(4.1×10^{-5})	(1.01×10^{-5})	(6.48×10^{-5})
Oil rents	0.0022	-0.0121	0.0025	-0.0059
	(0.0034)	(0.0098)	(0.0026)	(0.0150)
UN Security Council	-0.1105	-0.1006	-0.0827*	-0.3548
	(0.0706)	(0.1822)	(0.0422)	(0.2248)
State capacity	-0.2628	-0.0335	0.1608	0.0570
	(0.2665)	(0.1631)	(0.1359)	(0.4201)
Population	-0.0024**	0.0021	0.0010***	-0.0010
	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0003)	(0.0008)
Fixed-effects				
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	276	276	226	226

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Outcome Variable Decomposed into Specific Donors, Key Votes

Table 6: Effect of Nonresponse by US Allies

Dependent Variables:	US aid		WB lending		IMF lending	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	-0.7274		2.974**		2.478	
	(0.7293)		(1.268)		(1.894)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		1.251**		1.600**		1.464
		(0.5388)		(0.7871)		(0.9792)
Democracy	1.234	1.225	-0.3249	-0.3233	0.8979	0.9361
	(0.7872)	(0.7625)	(0.2598)	(0.2482)	(0.9495)	(0.9718)
GNI per capita	-4.35×10^{-6}	-4.94×10^{-6}	3.13×10^{-6}	2.49×10^{-6}	-1.69×10^{-5}	-1.72×10^{-5}
	(7.23×10^{-6})	(7.1×10^{-6})	(4.08×10^{-6})	(3.66×10^{-6})	(1.46×10^{-5})	(1.47×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0092	-0.0076	-0.0083	-0.0082	-0.0292*	-0.0272*
	(0.0063)	(0.0070)	(0.0081)	(0.0085)	(0.0160)	(0.0159)
UN Security Council	0.0005	-0.0009	0.0080	-0.0022	-0.0695	-0.0776
	(0.0170)	(0.0173)	(0.0189)	(0.0192)	(0.1260)	(0.1254)
State capacity	-0.3794	-0.3833	0.0721*	0.0743*	-0.0619	-0.0646
	(0.2384)	(0.2325)	(0.0380)	(0.0406)	(0.1536)	(0.1539)
Population	0.0016	0.0004	0.0054**	0.0042**	-0.0131	-0.0143
	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0023)	(0.0021)	(0.0146)	(0.0149)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,293	1,293	1,293	1,293	1,120	1,120

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*
Issue coding from citetbailey_estimating_2017.

Table 7: Effect of Nonresponse by Non-US Allies

Dependent Variables:	US aid		WB lending		IMF lending	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	-0.3505		0.5655		0.4156	
	(0.9062)		(1.191)		(0.4639)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		-1.033**		0.5865		0.3518
		(0.3957)		(0.6278)		(0.3178)
Democracy	-0.5026	-0.5718*	-0.7042	-0.6655	0.2179	0.2401
	(0.3231)	(0.3306)	(0.6918)	(0.6818)	(0.2287)	(0.2256)
GNI per capita	-3.26×10^{-6}	-3.48×10^{-6}	$1.46 \times 10^{-5***}$	$1.52 \times 10^{-5***}$	4.11×10^{-6}	4.48×10^{-6}
	(8.53×10^{-6})	(8.56×10^{-6})	(4.76×10^{-6})	(4.78×10^{-6})	(3.02×10^{-6})	(3.08×10^{-6})
Oil rents	-0.0045	-0.0037	0.0087	0.0082	-0.0062*	-0.0065*
	(0.0093)	(0.0094)	(0.0070)	(0.0071)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)
UN Security Council	-0.0928	-0.0979*	-0.1174	-0.1142	0.0339	0.0361
	(0.0568)	(0.0583)	(0.1200)	(0.1203)	(0.0678)	(0.0681)
State capacity	0.0890	0.0948	0.3007**	0.2976**	0.0084	0.0064
	(0.0852)	(0.0834)	(0.1207)	(0.1205)	(0.0459)	(0.0465)
Population	-0.0046	-0.0044	-0.0029	-0.0028	-0.0053*	-0.0052*
	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	(0.0060)	(0.0059)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	935	935	935	935	800	800

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*
Issue coding from citetbailey_estimating_2017.

Table 8: Effect of Nonresponse by Allies of US Adversaries

Dependent Variables:	US aid		WB lending		IMF lending	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	2.288		0.3152		0.1470	
	(1.336)		(1.917)		(0.5851)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		2.418*		0.0871		-0.2016
		(1.179)		(1.348)		(0.4317)
Democracy	-0.4290	-0.2899	2.830***	2.833***	0.2539	0.2351
	(0.4686)	(0.4655)	(0.9018)	(0.9165)	(0.2190)	(0.2285)
GNI per capita	-0.0001**	-0.0002***	2.02×10^{-5}	1.9×10^{-5}	3.57×10^{-5}***	3.65×10^{-5}***
	(5.13×10^{-5})	(5.1×10^{-5})	(4.32×10^{-5})	(4.48×10^{-5})	(1.06×10^{-5})	(9.53×10^{-6})
Oil rents	0.0016	0.0018	-0.0121	-0.0121	0.0032	0.0030
	(0.0031)	(0.0036)	(0.0098)	(0.0097)	(0.0027)	(0.0026)
UN Security Council	-0.1117	-0.1235	-0.0957	-0.0971	-0.0801*	-0.0801*
	(0.0720)	(0.0727)	(0.1765)	(0.1790)	(0.0448)	(0.0433)
State capacity	-0.2311	-0.2719	-0.0479	-0.0484	0.1459	0.1515
	(0.2676)	(0.2652)	(0.1657)	(0.1709)	(0.1384)	(0.1380)
Population	-0.0022*	-0.0022*	0.0020	0.0020	0.0009***	0.0009***
	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	276	276	276	276	226	226

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Alternative Specification with Interaction Terms

Table 9: Interaction Models

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses	-0.3171		
	(0.7679)		
US ally	-0.2962*	-0.1118	-0.0359
	(0.1500)	(0.1827)	(0.1182)
Nonaligned	0.0063	0.0600	0.1535
	(0.2127)	(0.2220)	(0.2013)
Democracy	0.4684	0.5178	0.4651
	(0.7745)	(0.7828)	(0.7881)
GNI per capita	-1.29×10^{-5}	-1.37×10^{-5}	-7.21×10^{-6}
	(1.42×10^{-5})	(1.38×10^{-5})	(1.41×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0173	-0.0148	-0.0170
	(0.0112)	(0.0110)	(0.0114)
UN Security Council	-0.1270	-0.1263	-0.1358
	(0.1253)	(0.1260)	(0.1251)
State capacity	0.0968	0.0755	0.0657
	(0.2058)	(0.2115)	(0.2135)
Population	-0.0018	-0.0007	-0.0014
	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)
Nonresponses × US ally	3.121**		
	(1.223)		
Nonresponses × Nonaligned	1.037		
	(0.8257)		
Nonresponses, important votes		3.468	
		(2.902)	
Nonresponses, important votes × US ally		2.100	
		(4.187)	
Nonresponses, important votes × Nonaligned		-0.2411	
		(3.294)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes			1.945
			(1.245)
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes × US ally			3.236
			(2.277)
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes × Nonaligned			-1.210
			(1.457)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	2,136	2,136	2,136

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*
Nonresponses only included when the target does not vote yea or nay and the US does.

Robustness Checks for Non-Strategic Absences

In Tables 10 and 11, I remove country-year observations in which a country experienced a coup (Chin, Carter, et al., 2021; Chin and Kirkpatrick, 2023) or civil war (Dixon and Sarkees, 2016). In Tables 12 and 13, I remove states that score a 0 or 1 (the two lowest scores) on VDEM's "Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration", a measure of state capacity (Vaccaro, 2023).

Table 10: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.510***	0.7578**	0.5176
	(0.8564)	(0.2970)	(0.8428)
Democracy	2.024	-0.8302	0.7834
	(1.319)	(0.9471)	(1.051)
GNI per capita	-3.06×10^{-5}	2.43×10^{-5}***	-0.0001**
	(2.02×10^{-5})	(5.48×10^{-6})	(6.12×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0424*	0.0141	-0.0061
	(0.0254)	(0.0135)	(0.0173)
UN Security Council	-0.0640	-0.0880	-0.3591*
	(0.1304)	(0.1903)	(0.2029)
State capacity	-0.3715	0.4374**	0.3128
	(0.2996)	(0.1919)	(0.4127)
Population	-0.0098	-0.0137	0.0017
	(0.0172)	(0.0107)	(0.0020)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	1,100	737	209

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 11: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	6.494**		2.413		4.267	
	(2.596)		(1.655)		(2.975)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		4.750***		0.6736		2.163
		(1.780)		(0.8834)		(2.469)
Democracy	1.985	2.092	-0.8525	-0.8251	0.7351	0.9136
	(1.334)	(1.355)	(0.9448)	(0.9208)	(0.9894)	(1.078)
GNI per capita	-2.45×10^{-5}	-2.66×10^{-5}	2.16×10^{-5}***	2.4×10^{-5}***	-0.0001**	-0.0002**
	(2.02×10^{-5})	(1.99×10^{-5})	(5.29×10^{-6})	(5.56×10^{-6})	(5.89×10^{-5})	(6.54×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0458*	-0.0393	0.0146	0.0136	-0.0069	-0.0044
	(0.0233)	(0.0245)	(0.0136)	(0.0139)	(0.0157)	(0.0168)
UN Security Council	-0.0624	-0.0777	-0.0940	-0.0843	-0.3476*	-0.3680
	(0.1319)	(0.1323)	(0.1896)	(0.1891)	(0.1951)	(0.2122)
State capacity	-0.4154	-0.4232	0.4381**	0.4345**	0.3163	0.2611
	(0.3040)	(0.3053)	(0.1908)	(0.1932)	(0.3930)	(0.4392)
Population	-0.0076	-0.0124	-0.0135	-0.0128	0.0018	0.0017
	(0.0176)	(0.0175)	(0.0109)	(0.0108)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,100	1,100	737	737	209	209

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 12: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.721**	0.7486**	0.6195
	(1.071)	(0.3034)	(0.9087)
Democracy	2.652*	-1.106	0.0893
	(1.333)	(1.230)	(0.9663)
GNI per capita	2.95×10^{-5}	4.76×10^{-5}	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(9.48×10^{-5})	(8.77×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0413	0.0122	-0.0006
	(0.0299)	(0.0136)	(0.0147)
UN Security Council	0.0335	-0.2635	-0.3216
	(0.3409)	(0.2033)	(0.2131)
State capacity	-0.5360*	0.4780**	0.1999
	(0.2857)	(0.1963)	(0.4919)
Population	-0.0054	-0.0153	-0.0018
	(0.0225)	(0.0097)	(0.0013)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	497	621	208

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 13: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	7.334**		1.143		3.066	
	(3.432)		(1.535)		(3.070)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		5.415***		0.5724		2.586
		(1.961)		(0.8809)		(2.223)
Democracy	2.548*	2.744*	-1.114	-1.078	0.0192	0.1731
	(1.362)	(1.385)	(1.223)	(1.206)	(0.9386)	(0.9639)
GNI per capita	3.33×10^{-5}	3.18×10^{-5}	4.95×10^{-5}	4.58×10^{-5}	-0.0001	-0.0002*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(9.57×10^{-5})	(9.66×10^{-5})	(8.52×10^{-5})	(9.17×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0461	-0.0348	0.0127	0.0121	-0.0014	0.0006
	(0.0282)	(0.0282)	(0.0136)	(0.0139)	(0.0133)	(0.0144)
UN Security Council	0.0276	0.0119	-0.2613	-0.2566	-0.3101	-0.3331
	(0.3554)	(0.3444)	(0.2038)	(0.2044)	(0.2066)	(0.2200)
State capacity	-0.5615*	-0.6026**	0.4845**	0.4800**	0.1884	0.1690
	(0.2960)	(0.2862)	(0.1957)	(0.1966)	(0.4949)	(0.4930)
Population	-0.0017	-0.0075	-0.0146	-0.0142	-0.0019	-0.0017
	(0.0221)	(0.0226)	(0.0098)	(0.0099)	(0.0014)	(0.0012)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	497	497	621	621	208	208

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.

Robustness Check to US Bilateral Aid Outcome Measure

In this robustness check, I replace US disbursements with US commitments.

Table 14: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.990***	0.6987	-0.5000
	(1.060)	(0.4748)	(0.9589)
Democracy	1.894	-1.239	1.350
	(1.418)	(1.058)	(1.341)
GNI per capita	-1.3×10^{-6}	1.91×10^{-5}**	-0.0002**
	(1.84×10^{-5})	(8.72×10^{-6})	(7.22×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0473	0.0074	-6.56×10^{-5}
	(0.0292)	(0.0121)	(0.0168)
UN Security Council	-0.0948	0.0120	-0.2606
	(0.1334)	(0.2304)	(0.3347)
State capacity	-0.3516	0.4834**	0.0185
	(0.3023)	(0.2064)	(0.4110)
Population	0.0052	-0.0143	0.0041**
	(0.0150)	(0.0106)	(0.0019)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	1,071	800	263

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 15: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	9.378***		2.225		3.881	
	(3.096)		(1.775)		(5.061)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		5.721**		0.4429		2.144
		(2.176)		(1.025)		(1.567)
Democracy	1.843	1.988	-1.266	-1.246	1.612	1.609
	(1.425)	(1.457)	(1.056)	(1.038)	(1.421)	(1.379)
GNI per capita	1.35×10^{-6}	3.25×10^{-6}	1.68×10^{-5}**	1.91×10^{-5}**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**
	(1.92×10^{-5})	(1.89×10^{-5})	(8.35×10^{-6})	(8.96×10^{-6})	(6.76×10^{-5})	(7.03×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0501*	-0.0426	0.0080	0.0074	0.0019	0.0030
	(0.0272)	(0.0283)	(0.0122)	(0.0126)	(0.0154)	(0.0162)
UN Security Council	-0.0795	-0.1069	0.0043	0.0127	-0.2519	-0.2567
	(0.1324)	(0.1343)	(0.2309)	(0.2303)	(0.3118)	(0.3160)
State capacity	-0.4104	-0.4215	0.4817**	0.4780**	-0.0408	-0.0458
	(0.3056)	(0.3080)	(0.2066)	(0.2069)	(0.4115)	(0.4114)
Population	0.0069	0.0026	-0.0145	-0.0135	0.0041*	0.0040**
	(0.0158)	(0.0152)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,071	1,071	800	800	263	263

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.

Robustness Check for Subsetting by Lagged Alliance Status

In the main analyses, I subset the data based on alliance status in 1997, the year that immediately precedes the start of data. In the below robustness checks, I subset instead based on the lagged alliance status (i.e. if the country is a US ally in the the year before an observation, then the country is put into the US ally analysis). The results are generally similar to the main results.

Table 16: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.227***	0.5208*	0.0670
	(0.8391)	(0.2714)	(0.8980)
Democracy	2.239	-1.975	-0.3467
	(1.350)	(1.239)	(0.9140)
GNI per capita	-2.91×10^{-5}	2.27×10^{-5}*	-0.0002***
	(1.84×10^{-5})	(1.32×10^{-5})	(6.57×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0433	-0.0149	-0.0126
	(0.0322)	(0.0161)	(0.0143)
UN Security Council	-0.0707	-0.0951	-0.3630
	(0.1295)	(0.1922)	(0.3191)
State capacity	-0.3946	0.4792**	-0.0063
	(0.2936)	(0.1939)	(0.5563)
Population	-0.0048	-0.0171	-0.0020
	(0.0157)	(0.0103)	(0.0021)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	1,148	698	219

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 17: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	5.148*		1.916		3.193	
	(2.656)		(1.438)		(2.945)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		4.236**		0.0836		1.899
		(1.627)		(0.8535)		(2.155)
Democracy	2.238	2.290	-1.993	-1.988	-0.2601	-0.2213
	(1.375)	(1.379)	(1.243)	(1.217)	(0.8772)	(0.8855)
GNI per capita	-2.44×10^{-5}	-2.52×10^{-5}	2.07×10^{-5}	2.23×10^{-5}*	-0.0002***	-0.0002***
	(1.84×10^{-5})	(1.8×10^{-5})	(1.28×10^{-5})	(1.32×10^{-5})	(6.38×10^{-5})	(6.37×10^{-5})
Oil rents	-0.0470	-0.0387	-0.0143	-0.0149	-0.0110	-0.0113
	(0.0308)	(0.0332)	(0.0161)	(0.0163)	(0.0132)	(0.0144)
UN Security Council	-0.0645	-0.0827	-0.1016	-0.0940	-0.3660	-0.3752
	(0.1319)	(0.1301)	(0.1921)	(0.1907)	(0.3010)	(0.3138)
State capacity	-0.4226	-0.4445	0.4761**	0.4755**	-0.0543	-0.0429
	(0.3012)	(0.2991)	(0.1932)	(0.1935)	(0.5612)	(0.5491)
Population	-0.0036	-0.0068	-0.0169	-0.0162	-0.0014	-0.0022
	(0.0160)	(0.0162)	(0.0104)	(0.0107)	(0.0022)	(0.0021)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,148	1,148	698	698	219	219

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.

Robustness Check: No Covariates

Table 18: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Nonresponses, all votes	2.094**	0.1421	0.4570
	(0.8117)	(0.2615)	(0.7104)
Fixed-effects			
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	1,212	931	250

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Model 1 displays results for US allies. Model 2 displays results for non-aligned countries. Model 3 displays results for allies of US adversaries.

Table 19: Effect of Nonresponse on Aid by Alliance Status, Important Votes Only

Dependent Variable:	Summed aid					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Nonresponses, important votes	5.002**		-0.2248		3.458	
	(2.415)		(1.644)		(3.086)	
Nonresponses, Israel-Palestine votes		4.047**		-0.0814		2.423
		(1.611)		(0.7130)		(1.639)
Fixed-effects						
Target country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,212	1,212	931	931	250	250

Clustered (Target country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Models 1 and 2 display results for US allies. Models 3 and 4 display results for non-aligned countries. Model 5 and 6 display results for allies of US adversaries.