

Eroding Democracy from the Outside In:
International Policy Delegation and Democratic Backsliding

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BOOK MANUSCRIPT

Eroding Democracy from the Outside In

The end of the Cold War gave way to a fundamental shift in the structure of the international system. It was an era characterized above all by liberal triumphalism in which western politicians and policymakers turned to international organizations (IOs) to spread and reinforce liberal values. These IOs, backed by the west, proliferated and most other countries had little choice but to join as well. And they did so at exceedingly high rates, with democracies in particular becoming fully integrated members. Scholars agreed with policymakers, finding overwhelming evidence that these IOs were positive forces for democracy, and for several decades liberal democracy appeared ascendant. However, beginning around 2010, liberal democracy's forward march abruptly halted, and ongoing evidence of democratic backsliding—an historically unprecedented phenomenon in which democratically elected officials erode liberal democratic institutions—calls into question the post-Cold War narrative of liberal democratic triumphalism. What explains democracy's sudden reversal of fortune and the emergence of this new form of democratic regression on the heels of unmatched international integration and support for liberal democracy? *Eroding Democracy from the Outside In* proposes a novel international-level theory of democratic backsliding. In the decades after the Soviet Union fell, IOs became not only much more common, but a certain subset of these organizations also gained unprecedented power and influence over domestic affairs and substantive, politically salient policy outcomes. One unintended consequence of this increased delegation of policy authority to IOs has been that over time core domestic representative institutions, such as political parties and legislatures, have been eroded, while power has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of state executives who represent their states at the international level. These weak institutions, unable to either represent citizens' wide-ranging interests or act as a check on growing executive power, have paved the way for would-be autocrats to consolidate their hold on the state. The result all too often has been democratic backsliding.

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Chapter 6: Policy delegation and democratic backsliding: Cross-national evidence

While the European Union is one of, if not the most powerful and integrated international organization in the world, its trends toward extensive policy delegation in 1993 were mirrored in other IOs around the world at the end of the 20th century. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a broad based consensus among political elites and policymakers in the west that delegating a wide range of policy decisions to international actors would promote not only economic prosperity, but would also serve as a powerful tool to promote and protect liberal democracy. Academics similarly heralded multilateralism's prospects for enhancing the quality of national democratic processes, even in well-functioning democracies. While this multilateralism and policy delegation has occurred through multiple channels, it has been implemented most frequently and prominently in the context of international organizations (IOs), which have become both more plentiful and concurrently also more powerful since the fall of the Soviet Union. Indeed, today IOs are “the chief means for national states to collectively solve international policy problems and the most important form of non-state authority in the international domain” (Hooghe et al. 2017, 15-16).

A critical question, therefore, is whether policy delegation to these IOs has indeed strengthened domestic democratic institutions and bolstered liberal democracy. My answer is no, at least in the case of already democratic states. Despite extensive international integration, multilateralism, and policy delegation in the post-Cold War era, democratic backsliding—which at its core is characterized by the erosion of liberal democratic institutions by elected officials—has been steadily on the rise, often in states that are heavily integrated into the international system. I argue that policy delegation has eroded liberal democracy in already democratic states by creating incentives for elected officials to manip-

ulate institutions to maintain power, and made it easier for them to do so by simultaneously increasing executive power and undermining core representative institutions critical for long-term democratic stability.

In this way, my theory adds important caveats to the democratization via international organizations literature. IOs are undoubtedly powerful forces for democracy, and they make states overall more democratic when compared to autocracies. These organizations also provide powerful resources and incentives for states to make their initial transitions to democracy. But I argue that these organizations—and policy delegation to them in particular—also contributes to backsliding in already democratic states.

Existing work on the relationship between IOs and democracy has focused primarily on the incentives and constraints international actors create for governments: IOs leverage reputational and material incentives and sanctions to encourage governments to maintain minimally democratic institutions, and they provide support to help states uphold free and fair elections. While elections and elite compliance with the democratic rules of the game are critical first steps toward democracy, long-term democratic stability also depends on the strength of representative institutions and institutions that can check executive power. Therefore, to fully understand this critical relationship between international organizations and democracy, we also need to explore how states' interactions with these IOs impact domestic democratic institutions.

To this end, in this chapter I explore how membership in IOs to which states have delegated significant political authority and extensive policy competencies impacts liberal democratic institutions. To do so, I focus on 81 states that entered the post-Cold War era as democracies and test the effects that membership in these powerful IOs has had on their liberal democratic trajectories. Analyses show greater levels of policy delegation—proxied by high levels of membership in IOs with extensive policy scopes and political authority—makes democratic backsliding more likely, increases relative executive power, limits the domestic policy space, and undermines critical domestic democratic institutions.

6.1 Which international organizations contribute to democratic backsliding?

There is extensive research linking international organizations and international integration more broadly to democratic success. I extend this work to argue that one aspect of international integration in particular—the delegation of policy-making authority to international actors—can also erode domestic institutions in already democratic states. Testing this argument, however, requires first identifying the IOs to which states have delegated the power to both decide and impose policy outcomes in their member states.

The universe of IOs is extensive. There are over 500 intergovernmental organizations in the world (Pevehouse et al. 2016), and these IOs vary widely with respect to their activities, the influence they have over policy decisions, the autonomy they have from their member states (Hawkins et al. 2006), and, by extension, the influence they exercise over domestic-level policy outcomes. As such, I do not expect *all* IOs will contribute to backsliding; rather, my focus is on a certain subset of organizations that have the power to alter domestic level outcomes, and especially policy outcomes, in their member states.

To identify these relevant institutions, I focus first on the political authority of IOs. The political authority of an IO is its “power to make collective decisions based on a recognized obligation to obey” (Hooghe et al. 2017, 3) on the part of its member states. In other words, the political authority of an IO captures the extent to which that institution can influence domestic-level outcomes in its member states. While IOs with low levels of political authority are dominated by intergovernmental structures, IOs with extensive political authority more closely approximate supranational institutions, like the European Union, that both decide policies on behalf of their member states, and also have the power to enforce these decisions. As such, my theory predicts that IOs with high levels of political authority should be particularly likely to contribute to backsliding in their member states.

To measure the political authority of IOs, I draw on data from the Measure of International Authority (MIA) dataset (Hooghe et al. 2017). The MIA data include fine-grained,

annual-level information about 76 international organizations from 1950 through 2019.¹ The IOs included in the MIA dataset, as well as the first year they appear in the dataset, are listed in Table 6.1.²

Hooghe et al. (2017) conceptualize the political authority of IOs—and therefore that continuum between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism—as being comprised of two distinct dimensions: pooling and delegation. An IO’s pooling score measures the extent to which member states make collective decisions within that organization. This is captured by factors such as the voting rules for reaching common decisions among member states, the extent to which IO-level decisions are binding, and the types of decisions that are pooled within an IO. Delegation, on the other hand, measures the amount of decisions an IO and its constituent institutions can make independent of oversight or control from its member states’ governments.

To clarify these two concepts, consider the Council of Europe, which is both a high pooling and high delegation IO. Within the Council of Europe, each member state has a single representative in the Council of Europe’s executive body, the Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers has the authority to make decisions that, it approved, are implemented at the domestic level in the Council of Europe’s member states. For any given decision, each state representative in the Committee has a single, equally-weighted vote, and any decision that receives at least a two-thirds majority is approved. This decision-making structure is what makes the Council of Europe a high pooling organization: states have agreed to abide by decisions made in the Committee, even if they voted against them. In other words, states have pooled a significant amount of authority in the Committee of

¹This dataset offers considerably more detail about the function and power of IOs than any other existing datasets. First, it is time-varying; other existing datasets that code IOs by their function (e.g., Poast and Urpelainen (2015); Pevehouse et al. (2016)) or level of institutionalization (e.g., Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004)) assign single, rather than time-varying, values to any given IO. In addition, the MIA data capture a wider range of policy competencies of IOs. They are also the first to directly measure the political authority of IOs.

²Where relevant, Table 6.1 also notes the last year of data for a given IO. For all others, the most current version of the MIA dataset codes their political authority through 2019 and their policy scope (discussed below) through 2017.

Table 6.1: International Organizations (IOs) included in the MIA dataset. Years indicates the first year for which data for an IO are available; end dates are noted only in cases where the data do not extend through the end of the dataset.

Acronym	International Organization	Years
ALADI/LAIA	Latin American Integration Association	1961
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	1989
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	1991
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1967
AU/OAU	African Union	1963
BENELUX	Benelux Union	1950
BIS	Bank of International Settlements	1950
CABI	Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International	1987
CAN/Andean	Andean Community	1969
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	1968
CCNR	Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine	1950
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community	1966
CERN	European Organization for Nuclear Research	1954
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1992
CoE	Council of Europe	1950
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	1959-1991
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	1982
ComSec	Commonwealth of Nations	1965
EAC1	East African Community I	1967-1976
EAC2	East African Community II	1993
ECCAS-CEEC	Economic Community of Central African States	1985
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1975
EEA	European Economic Area	1994
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	1960
ESA	European Space Agency	1980
EU	European Union	1952
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	1950
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	1981
GEF	Global Environment Facility	1994
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	1957
IRBD/WB	World Bank	1950
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	1950
ICC	International Criminal Court	2002
ICO	International Coffee Organization	1963
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	1986
ILO	International Labor Organization	1950
IMF	International Monetary Fund	1950
IMO	International Maritime Organization	1960

Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization	1950
IOM	International Organization for Migration	1955
ISA/ISBA	International Seabed Authority	1994
ITU	International Telecommunication Union	1950
Iwhale/IWC	International Whaling Commission	1950
LOAS	League of Arab States	1950
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South	1991
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	1979
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association	1994
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1950
NORDIC	Nordic Council	1952
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	1968
OAS	Organization of American States	1951
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	1950
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	1968
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation	1970
OIF/ACCT	Francophonie	1970
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries	1960
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	1973
OTIF	Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail	1950
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration	1950
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	1973
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	1986
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	1950
SADC	Southern African Development Community	1981
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2002
SELA	Latin American and Caribbean Economic System	1976
SICA	Central American Integration System	1952
SPC	Pacific Community	1950
UN	United Nations	1950
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	1950
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organization	1985
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization	1975
UPU	Universal Postal Union	1950
WCO	World Customs Organization	1985
WHO	World Health Organization	1952
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization	1970
WMO	World Meteorological Organization	1950
WTO	World Trade Organization	1995

Ministers.

The Council of Europe is also a high delegation IO, in part because of its judicial branch, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR is an IO-level institution that operates independent of oversight from the Council of Europe's member states. This court has the power to adjudicate cases regarding legislation in place at the domestic level in states brought before it, and can even require these states to change their domestic laws if they are found to be in violation of the Council of Europe's human rights values. Since this court has the power to make decisions independent of oversight or input from member states or their governments, the Council of Europe is an organization to which states have delegated substantial levels of political authority.

As Figure 6.1 shows, the political authority of IOs expanded significantly following the end of the Cold War. My theory predicts that IOs with greater political authority—in other words, ones with high levels of pooling and delegation—will make states more susceptible to backsliding. High pooling organizations are more likely to have international-level fora in which executives can influence binding policy decisions without oversight from back home. High delegation organizations, on the other hand, have the power to make and enforce decisions that limit the range of domestic policy alternatives available to politicians in their member states.

I follow Hooghe et al. (2017) in distinguishing between IOs with high levels of pooling and those to whom states have delegated significant authority. Although these two characteristics combine to measure the overall political authority of an IO, they are not strongly correlated with one another. States can create mechanisms to facilitate collective decision making in an IO (pooling) without delegating to the IO sufficient authority to make decisions independent of its member states. Alternatively, organizations can have highly developed IO-level institutions that operate independent of member state oversight; if the majority of decisions in an IO are made by these institutions, rather than collectively by the governments of their member countries, then it has low levels of pooling despite extensive delegation.




Figure 6.1: The average amount of political authority states have pooled in and delegated to IOs has increased steadily over time, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. *Data source: Hooghe et al. (2017).*




Figure 6.2: Average Pooling and Delegation Scores by IO, 1991–2019. *Data source: Hooghe et al. (2017).*

Specifically, I code IOs as having high levels of pooling and delegation if their score on each of these dimensions in a given year is greater than the mean score of all other IOs in the MIA dataset for that same year. Figure 6.2 shows the average pooling and delegation levels for each IO in the MIA dataset from 1991 through 2019.³ The vertical red line indicates the average delegation score for all IOs in this time period, while the horizontal red line indicates the same for pooling.

While political authority is important for capturing the amount of influence an IO has over domestic-level outcomes, at its core my theory highlights the consequences of delegating decisions regarding substantive policy issues to international actors. In addition to differing with respect to their political authority, IOs also vary with respect to the number and type(s) of policies over which they have the authority to make decisions. As Figure 6.3 illustrates, mirroring the trends regarding pooling and delegation, the number of policy competences and responsibilities that states have granted to IOs has also increased steadily over time. The policy areas over which IOs have control can include economic issue-areas—such as financial regulation, trade, taxation, and fiscal and welfare policy—as well as policies related to anything from agriculture to human rights, the military, and justice and home affairs.⁴

I expect IOs with more extensive policy scopes will be particularly likely to contribute to democratic backsliding, primarily through the limits they place on states' domestic policy spaces. Drawing again on data from the MIA dataset, I code an IO as a high policy scope IO if the number of policies over which it has authority in a given year is greater than the mean value for all IOs in the dataset in that same year. To illustrate the relative policy

³Figure 6.2 is an oversimplification of the data given that the pooling and delegation scores for each IO are coded annually. Nevertheless, this provides a high-level visualization of how different IOs in the dataset compare to one another with respect to their average levels of pooling and delegation in the post-Cold War era.

⁴The 25 policy issue areas included in the MIA dataset are: agriculture; competition policy, mergers, state aid, antitrust; culture and media; education, vocational training, youth; development, aid to poor countries; financial regulation, banking regulation, monetary policy, currency; welfare state services, employment policy, social affairs, pension systems; energy; environment; financial stabilization (lending); foreign policy; fisheries and maritime affairs; health; humanitarian aid; human rights; industrial policy; justice and home affairs; migration; military cooperation; regional policy; research policy; taxation, fiscal policy coordination, macro-economic policy coordination; telecommunications; trade; and transport.

scope IOs, Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of policy scope across all organizations in the year 2017, as well as the mean policy scope for that same year.⁵




Figure 6.3: The average number of policy areas over which IOs have authority has increased steadily over time. *Data source: Hooghe et al. (2017).*

⁵2017 is the last year for which these data are available. Note that the labels on the plot do not include those IOs that had authority over either 2 (BIS, CABI, WCO, ESA, GEF, ITU, NAFTA, OPEC, UPU, WMO, WIPO, UNWTO) or 3 (IOM, ICAO, ICO, NAFO, ILO, IMO, IMF, iWhale, OAPEC, PCA, UNIDO, WTO) policy areas. These IOs are omitted from the plot in order to simplify the visualization.




Figure 6.4: The policy scope distribution across IOs in 2017. The mean policy scope for all 76 IOs in 2017 was 8.15 policy areas. *Data source: Hooghe et al. (2017).*

Both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercosur are examples of IOs that have high policy scopes, but low levels of pooling and delegation. Unlike the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe, all decisions made within ASEAN and Mercosur require a unanimous vote from member states. Since member governments retain the ability to veto any decisions they oppose, these are low pooling IOs. Furthermore, neither of these organizations has IO-level institutions that, like the European Court of Human Rights, operate independent of oversight from their member states; therefore, they are also low delegation IOs. However, both ASEAN and Mercosur were created to facilitate cooperation between their member states on a wide range of policy issue areas, including economic, cultural, security, social, scientific, and energy policy. As such, they are high policy scope IOs. High policy scope IOs need not have low levels of political authority, however. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the OAS are both high policy scope IOs to which states have delegated significant levels of political authority.

To summarize, I identify three groups of IOs that are relevant to my theory: high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs. These three groups of IOs are not mutually exclusive. As Table 6.2 shows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), like the Council of Europe, scores high both in terms of delegation and pooling, but has a limited policy scope (only three policy areas), while the World Bank allows for extensive collective decision-making on a narrow set of issues among its member states without delegating authority to Bank-level institutions.

States' interactions with these powerful IOs occur on an ongoing basis. IO membership entails a number of ongoing policy commitments that states must meet and opportunities for executives to alter the distribution of domestic power in their favor. These commitments and opportunities continue beyond the accession date, and indeed accumulate both over time within a single IO, and also as states join more of these relevant types of organizations. Since this is the case, the main explanatory variables in my analyses below are counts of a state's

	High pooling	High delegation	High policy scope
ECOWAS			✓
Council of Europe	✓	✓	
Mercosur			✓
OAS		✓	✓
IMF	✓	✓	
World Bank	✓		
ASEAN			✓
EU		✓	✓

Table 6.2: The three broad groups of relevant IOs that I identify —high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs— are not mutually exclusive. Some IOs fall into two or all three of these categories.

number of memberships in these different types of theoretically relevant IOs. Specifically, I create a series of variables measuring the number of high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs a state is a member of in any given year, and then use this to explore how membership in these organizations influences a state’s subsequent democratic trajectory.

Since observations in the MIA dataset are at the IO-year level, to create these membership count variables I combine the data on IO characteristics with country-year data on IO membership. To do so, I begin with the Correlates of War dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2016). However, these data only contain information on state-IO membership through the year 2014. Therefore, I supplement these membership data with information drawn directly from the Union of International Associations’ (UIA) *Yearbook of International Organizations*, which includes detailed and up-to-date membership data on roughly 75,000 international organizations, including the 76 IOs included in the MIA dataset.⁶ With these additional

⁶I worked with data experts at the *Yearbook of International Organizations* to extract the historical membership data for these 76 IOs for the years 2014, 2019, and 2022. They advised that their methodology suggests 5-year intervals are a good indicator of IO membership, as IOs are not required to update their description in the yearbook annually/regularly. They also noted any discrepancies in the samples that might suggest changes between 2014 and 2019 or between 2019 and 2022. Using these data, I code state IO membership in the interim years (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2021). If a state was a member of an IO in 2014 and 2019, I code it as a being a member in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018; similarly, if a state was a member of an organization in 2019 and 2022, I code it as also being a member in 2020 and 2021. For any cases where a state joined an IO after 2014 (for example, if a state was not a member of organization A in 2014, but was a member in 2019 and 2022), then I conservatively code it as only being a member in 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022.

data, I create a dataset at the country-year level throughout the post-Cold War era that includes information on state membership in all 76 IOs coded by MIA.

As states delegate more policies to IOs, their domestic policy space necessarily becomes more limited. As such, my theory implies that IOs with particularly extensive policy scopes and those to which states have delegated significant levels of decision-making power will be more likely to contribute to democratic backsliding in their member states. I expect these high delegation and high policy scope IOs to impact democracy primarily through the limitations they place on the domestic policy space. High pooling IOs, on the other hand, should impact democracy more directly through their effect on executive power. These organizations are the ones with mechanisms to facilitate collective decision-making among their member states; as such, these are the IOs most likely to create international fora in which executives, who frequently represent their states within IOs, can exercise unchecked influence over internationally-determined policy outcomes. In the next section I discuss my approach to measuring democratic backsliding, before then testing these predictions.

6.2 Capturing democratic backsliding in the post-Cold War era

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, policymakers and politicians in the west believed that powerful multilateral institutions to which states delegated extensive policy authority would promote and support liberal democracy around the world. Democracies around the world joined these IOs at exceedingly high rates and became fully integrated members of these institutions. However, less than three decades later, democratic backsliding is on the rise and liberal democracy has declined to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. What role, if any, did these shifts toward policy delegation to IOs play in subsequent democratic backsliding?

I explore this relationship systematically here using a dataset that includes country-year observations for all states that entered the post-Cold War era as democracies. As discussed in

Chapters 2, democratic backsliding begins in democratic regimes, and can result in either an illiberal or diminished democracy or a semi-autocratic regime. Furthermore, backsliding is not an inherently monotonic process; states can indeed backslide and then subsequently begin to regain some previously lost democratic progress. For this reason, focusing exclusively on country-year observations for democratic states, or dropping states once they fall below a certain threshold, risks omitting relevant cases.

Therefore, to construct my dataset, I focus on those states that entered the post-Cold War era as democracies, at a time when states began delegating extensive policy decisions to international actors. As discussed in more detail in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, I include in my full sample all states that qualified as at least minimally democratic in 1996, which corresponds with the end of the third wave of democracy and the beginning of the current wave of global democratic regression.⁷

Democratic backsliding involves the erosion of democratic, and often *liberal* democratic institutions. Therefore, to capture backsliding, I again turn to the Varieties of Democracy's liberal democracy index. As discussed in Chapter 2, this index measures the extent to which a country constitutionally protects individual and minority rights, exhibits strong rule of law, has an independent judiciary, and maintains institutional checks on executive power. As such, it measures subtle differences in levels of democracy that can emerge due to backsliding, and is much better equipped to capture this phenomenon than other existing indicators, the majority of which focus primarily on the quality of elections and related institutions. I measure backsliding as a state's five-year change along this index, with negative values signaling cases of backsliding. My data show that roughly 47% of

⁷The following states meet or exceed the minimal democracy threshold in 1996: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

country-year observations⁸ are cases of backsliding, or instances where the five-year change in the liberal democracy index was negative. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of this five-year change for the democracies included in my dataset. I will also show below that my statistical results are robust to both shorter and longer windows of democratic change.




Figure 6.5: Between 1996 and 2022, for all states that were minimally democratic in 1996, the five-year change in the liberal democracy index ranges from -0.35 to 0.42.

This approach of measuring backsliding as changes over time departs from existing work on IOs and democracy, which tends to focus on the relationship between IOs and *levels* of democracy. This choice is driven by my theory and by my definition of backsliding: I predict IOs make subsequent backsliding, which is conceptually a decrease in a state's level

⁸That is, in the dataset that only includes states with an electoral democracy index score of 0.5 or higher in 1996, and also only includes observations from 1996 to 2022.

of democracy, more likely.

Does policy delegation to international organizations lead to subsequent declines in a state’s level of democracy? My approach to answering this question is to estimate the average democratic change experienced by a country five years after it was a member of certain types of IOs. To know if policy delegation to and membership in these relevant IOs matters for democratic trajectories, I use regression analysis to estimate the conditional democratic change.⁹

As detailed in Section 6.1, the main explanatory variables in these analyses count the number of high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs of which a state is a member in any given year. Since I measure my outcome of interest —democratic backsliding— as the five-year change in a state’s liberal democracy score, in the models below I lag these membership counts by five years. This means that a single observation consists of an independent variable counting the number of, for example, high pooling IOs a state was a member of five years prior, and the subsequent five-year change in its liberal democracy index.

Of course, there are a range of other factors, beyond policy delegation to IOs, that also influence states’ democratic trajectories. I control for these at both the state and regional level in my regression models in order to estimate the additional impact IOs have on changes in levels of democracy. Specifically, I include controls similar to those used to estimate the average effect of EU accession in Chapter 5, namely: GDP per capita (logged); GDP growth

⁹Specifically, I estimate a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) models with random effects by country and region. I group countries by the United Nation’s 22 geographic regions. These models allow me to capture unmeasured factors at the country and regional level that might influence a state’s propensity to backslide. Furthermore, in grouping countries by political-geographic regions, these models leverage information from other states within a country’s neighborhood, many of which are likely in the same IOs due to the often regional nature of these organizations (Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan 1996). Leveraging this region-level information is also important because my dataset is relatively small: the maximum number of observations per state is 32. The standard alternative modeling approach, fixed effects models, produces coefficient estimates with high error levels when there is a small number of observations per unit (Gelman and Hill 2007; Clark and Linzer 2015). This focus on country- and regional-level variation is also supported by the data. In all models reported throughout this chapter, I find that the variance by both country and regions is high. Alternative models that include country and year random effects, on the other hand, find little to no variance by year.

(Fariss 2021); the effective number of political parties; an indicator for if the executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same political party; levels of societal polarization; the presence of internal conflict; and the average regional liberal democracy score.¹⁰

In addition to these factors that may influence a state’s democratic trajectory, any observed relationship between IOs and subsequent backsliding might simply result from states artificially increasing their levels of democracy prior to joining an IO—for example, in order to meet the democratic requirements for membership—and then regressing to their previous regime scores following accession. Alternatively, states that are struggling with democracy may join additional IOs in an attempt to safeguard democracy, but then continue backsliding nonetheless. To account for these possibilities, I control for the five-year change in a state’s level of democracy immediately prior to an observation.

Like the main explanatory variables—IO membership counts—all of these control variables are measured at the beginning of the five-year period captured by the dependent variable. This allows me to estimate the impact of these factors on a state’s subsequent democratic change. This set of control variables is included in all models discussed in the remainder of this chapter, except where otherwise noted.¹¹

6.3 Delegating political authority and policy decisions to IOs makes democratic backsliding more likely

I use regression analysis to estimate the effect of increased membership in IOs with significant levels of political authority (pooling and delegation) and extensive policy competencies on the change in a country’s liberal democracy score in the subsequent five years, using the modeling techniques described above. I estimate three different models, one for each relevant type of IO, for two sets of countries.

My theory is one about the relationship between policy delegation to IOs and democratic

¹⁰See Section 5.1 for a more detailed discussion of how these variables theoretically influence a state’s democratic experience and how they are measured.

¹¹Summary statistics for all variables included in the main regression models can be found in Appendix Table A1.

backsliding—a process unique to democratic regimes—in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the first set of models includes observations for all countries that, as discussed in Section 6.2, qualified as minimally democratic at the end of the Cold War. In other words, these models combine data for both new, third wave democracies, such as Colombia and Senegal, as well as mature democracies concentrated in western Europe and North America.

While all democracies have delegated policy decisions to IOs in the post-Cold War era, and some mature democracies have shown signs of backsliding, I expect the corrosive effects of policy delegation will be particularly salient in new, predominantly third wave democracies. These countries entered the post-Cold War era with relatively low levels of democratic institutional stock. Mature democracies, on the other hand, built up their domestic institutions over the course of decades or even centuries prior to delegating policy decisions to IOs. As such, these mature democracies had far more time to develop robust party systems, legislatures, and other institutional checks on executive power prior to this era of international policy delegation. I argue this democratic institutional stock acts as a buffer against the negative consequences of policy delegation, at least to a point. Descriptive evidence from the EU context presented in Chapter 5 supports this prediction, showing that advanced democracies in western and northern Europe have fared better than third wave EU members in terms of their liberal democratic trajectories.

Given these important differences between new and mature democracies, I estimate a second set of models that only includes the former. Following Flores and Nooruddin (2016), I exclude from my full sample any country for whom a democratic system was a certainty in 1946 or in the year of its birth as a sovereign country, whichever came second. This approach identifies Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States as mature democracies, or, ones that entered the post-Cold War era with relatively high levels of democratic institutional stock.

Figure 6.6 presents the coefficients for my main explanatory variable from each model by plotting the coefficient and 95 percent confidence intervals.¹² I include two coefficients for each type of relevant IO: one from a model including all democracies, and one from a model focused exclusively on new democracies.

In strong support of my theory, the results for the models that only include new democracies show increased membership in all three types of relevant IOs is associated with a significant increased probability of subsequent backsliding.¹³ The models that include all (new and mature) democracies are a more conservative test of my theory, yet still provide compelling support for a relationship between policy delegation and backsliding. First, these models show that increased membership in high pooling IOs makes all democracies, not just new ones, more susceptible to backsliding over a five-year period. For the models focused on high delegation and high pooling IOs, the coefficients no longer reach standard levels of statistical significance when mature democracies are included. On the one hand, this suggests that democratic institutional stock, which is higher in mature democracies, does indeed buffer against the negative consequences of policy delegation. However, the coefficients on the main explanatory variables in both of these models are significant at the 90 percent level.¹⁴ In other words, even when incredibly stable democracies such as Norway and Sweden are included, there is evidence that increased membership in these powerful IOs leads to subsequent declines in a state's liberal democracy score.

A substantive interpretation of these coefficients more clearly illustrates the role that policy delegation to IOs plays in cases of backsliding. For this, I return to the case of Hungary. Between 2009, the year before Orbán and his Fidesz party first came to power,

¹²Full results are reported in Appendix Tables A2 and A3.

¹³The full results, reported in Appendix Table A2 also show that higher levels of domestic political polarization make backsliding significantly more likely, while states where the legislature and executive are controlled by different political parties are more likely to see democratic progress over a five-year period. The models also suggest that states with a fewer number of effective parties are more likely to backslide. Finally, I find that states with higher prior liberal democracy scores are more susceptible to backsliding. This is likely because states where democracy was previously relatively high have more areas in which to regress compared to states that were only minimally democratic from the outset.

¹⁴See Appendix Table A2.




Figure 6.6: Increased membership in IOs with high levels of pooling and delegation —or, political authority— and in ones with extensive policy scopes makes subsequent democratic backsliding more likely. This relationship is particularly strong in the case of new democracies, which have lower levels of democratic institutional stock. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

and 2022, the last year in my dataset, Hungary’s liberal democracy index declined by roughly 0.43. The coefficients on the main independent variables in Figure 6.6 range from -0.06 to -0.37. This means that, for each additional relevant IO of which a state is a member, over the subsequent five year period its liberal democracy level will decline between 14% and 86% of the overall decline that has occurred in Hungary since Orbán took control of the government.

Of course, backsliding can occur over different time periods in different countries. Therefore, I re-estimate each of the models from Figure 6.6 two times to also consider the three- and seven-year changes in a state’s level of democracy. The coefficients on the main independent variables from these alternative models are plotted together with the results from the original five-year models in Figure 6.7.¹⁵

The results here confirm, first, that membership in high pooling IOs has a consistently negative relationship with liberal democracy in all types of democracies across all three time periods. The models for the high delegation and high policy scope IOs, on the other hand, tell a slightly more complex story, and suggest that time is a factor: increased membership in these types of organizations erodes liberal democracy, but these dynamics play out over a longer time period. In the case of new democracies, the relationship becomes significant after five years, whereas in the models that include all democracies, the relationship becomes significant only at the seven-year mark. On the one hand, the longer time frame for models that include mature democracies provides further support for my argument that pre-existing levels of democratic institutional stock can protect states from the negative institutional consequences of policy delegation, at least in the short-term. Given sufficient time and pressure on domestic institutions, however, even these advanced democracies can succumb to erosion as well.

Figure 6.7 also suggests that these different types of IOs impact democracy through distinct channels. In Section 6.1, I argued high pooling IOs—which are organizations that

¹⁵Full results for the three- and seven- year models are reported in Appendix Tables A4, A5, A6, and A7.




Figure 6.7: Increased membership in high pooling IOs has a negative and significant relationship with democratic trajectories across all time periods and all types of democracies. The relationship between high delegation and policy scope IOs and democratic backsliding, on the other hand, develops over a longer time period and suggest that democratic institutional stock buffers against the negative consequences of policy delegation in the short-term. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

create international fora in which executives make un-monitored policy decisions on behalf of their states— should impact democracy primarily through their influence on executive power. High delegation and policy scope IOs, on the other hand, are ones where non-state, IO-level actors and institutions make policy decisions on behalf of their member states. Therefore, these institutions should impact democracy primarily through the limitations they place on the domestic policy space, with detrimental effects for representative institutions, including political parties and the legislature.

While executives seeking to consolidate their power have incentives to take advantage of domestic power asymmetries created by IOs as soon as possible before facing potential (democratic) removal from office, the effect of a limited domestic policy space on representative institutions likely takes place over a longer time period as parties, for example, gradually adapt their platforms and ideological appeals to voters to reflect growing limits on the policy space. For these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that the effect of membership in IOs that primarily influence executive power (high pooling ones) are evident even in the short term, whereas the negative relationship between high delegation and high policy scope IOs, which limit states' domestic policy spaces, and democratic outcomes occurs over a longer time period. In the following sections, I test these theoretical mechanisms more directly and find additional evidence of these dynamics.

In short, the results reported in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 provide support for my theory: when states delegate policy decisions to powerful IOs with the political authority to both make and enforce decisions in their member states, subsequent democratic backsliding becomes more likely. Of course, as discussed in Chapter 1, there is extensive theoretical and empirical research arguing that IOs and international integration more broadly help to promote and support liberal democracy. What accounts for these divergent conclusions?

My answer to this is two-fold. On the one hand, existing research often focuses on the relationship between IOs and aggregate levels of democracy, rather than on the *changes* in levels of democracy that characterize backsliding. Furthermore, these studies frequently




Figure 6.8: Similar to existing research on IOs and democracy, I find that membership in high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs has a positive relationship with overall levels of democracy when compared to autocracy. The plot depicts 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals for each model.

include both democracies and autocracies in their analyses, finding that IO membership makes states overall more democratic *when compared to autocracies*. This is undoubtedly true. In Figure 6.8, I re-estimate my original five-year models from Figure 6.6 with two important changes: I include observations for all countries, not just democracies, and I use aggregate levels of democracy, rather than changes, as the outcome variable. Here I find a positive relationship between membership in these high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs and a state's level of democracy.¹⁶

But even considering changes in levels of democracy in already democratic states, I do

¹⁶Full results are reported in Appendix Table A8.

not argue that all IOs are inherently detrimental for democracy. Rather, it is a particular subset of IOs —powerful ones to which states delegate significant amounts of substantive policy and political authority— that contribute to backsliding by altering critical domestic democratic institutions. As such, membership in less powerful IOs, or in IOs that do not have the political authority to make wide-ranging policy decisions on behalf of their member states should have no impact on subsequent democratic trajectories.

As noted above, the MIA dataset contains detailed information about 76 IOs. All of these organizations have distinct physical locations or websites; formal legislative, executive, or bureaucratic structures; at least thirty permanent staff; a documented constitution or convention; and they meet at least once per year. In other words, these are among the most institutionalized of all IOs that, as a result, should be particularly likely to influence domestic-level outcomes in their member states. On the one hand, this is helpful for testing my theory, which ultimately is one about the effects of highly institutionalized IOs that do indeed have the power and capacity to influence policy outcomes in their member countries. However, this also means these 76 organizations are in many ways outliers when compared to the entire universe of IOs, of which 534 are identified in the most recent and comprehensive dataset on state membership in international organizations ([Pevehouse et al. 2016](#)).

Therefore, to better understand how varying types of IOs impact democratic outcomes in their member states, I draw on an alternative measure of IO power and authority. [Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom \(2004\)](#) develop a three-level coding scheme that categorizes a larger subset of IOs than those included in the MIA dataset by their levels of institutionalization. At the lowest level are minimalist IOs, which are organizations that exist primarily if not exclusively on paper. These organizations can only make non-binding decisions, and therefore have effectively no power to influence domestic-level outcomes in their member states. At the next level of institutionalization are structured IOs, which are institutions that have formal voting rules and codified procedures for member-state interactions, can make binding decisions, and, in some cases, have concrete bureaucratic structures. Finally, at the highest

level of institutionalization are interventionist IOs, which have clear mechanisms to coerce and influence state behavior. These interventionist organizations have codified rules that govern relations between the executive, legislative, and judicial structures of the organization, and they also have the ability to sanction member states in cases of non-compliance with IO-level decisions.¹⁷ In other words, while institutionalized organizations most closely approximate the IOs with high levels of political and policy authority that I analyze in my main models, minimalist and structured organizations have far less power and therefore should be less likely to influence democratic institutions in their member states in the ways I theorize.

To see if this is in fact the case, I replicate my five-year models for all democracies from Figure 6.6 using this alternative coding and subset of IOs to create my main independent variables: IO membership counts. The results of these models are shown in Figure 6.9¹⁸ and provide additional support for my theory. Specifically, I find that membership in minimalist and structured IOs—or, in less institutionalized IOs—has no significant impact on a state’s subsequent democratic trajectory. It is only the most institutionalized and powerful IOs—the IOs that most closely approximate the organizations with high levels of political authority and policy scope analyzed earlier—that make democratic backsliding more likely. The relationship between membership in these organizations and a state’s democratic trajectory is negative and significant at the 95 percent level.

In addition to varying with respect to their political authority, or levels of institutionalization, the substantive *types* of policies over which IOs have the power to make decisions

¹⁷I use the most recent version of the IO institutionalization data, which updated the coding from their 2004 article (Gartzke, Nordstrom and Boehmer 2012). The sample of IOs these authors code is only a subset of all IOs—211 of the 534 included in the Correlates of War dataset—but includes IOs at all levels of institutionalization. It is important to note that I found several discrepancies in the data, which were confirmed by the dataset’s creators. Specifically, the dataset widely used in the literature miscodes the following IOs: the United Nations, the Central European Initiative, the European Union, and the League of Arab States. I manually corrected these IOs, but the possibility of other coding errors remains.

¹⁸As noted above, since the Correlates of War data only contain information through 2014, I collected data from the Union of International Associations’ *Yearbook of International Organizations* to capture membership in the 76 MIA IOs through 2022. However, for the remaining 494 organizations, I only have membership data through 2014. Therefore, the models using these alternative independent variables only include observations through 2014. Full results are reported in Appendix Table A9.




Figure 6.9: Membership in minimalist and structured IOs has no significant relationship with subsequent democratic trajectories in all post-Cold War democracies. It is only membership in IOs with the highest levels of institutionalization, or power to influence outcomes in their member states, that makes democratic backsliding more likely. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

can vary from one IO to the next. Building on the theory developed in Chapter 3, which emphasizes the importance of substantive, ideological, economic and social policy debates for the institutionalization of representative institutions, I expect that delegating authority over substantive, politically salient policy issues will be particularly likely to contribute to backsliding. More specifically, my theory suggests that delegating substantive policy areas that traditionally structured domestic politics —such as core distributional and economic policies— will be more detrimental to democracy than delegating more technical and politically less sensitive issues.

To test this intuition, I return to the MIA dataset. Hooghe et al. (2017) identify 25 possible policy areas over which IOs can exercise authority. From among these, I focus on several particularly politically salient policy areas —trade, welfare, development, military cooperation, and foreign policy— as well as several more technical ones —culture, energy, education, health, and transportation— to create alternative independent variables that capture membership counts in IOs by the *types* of policies over which they exercise influence.

Using these alternative independent variables, I re-estimate my five-year models for all democracies from Figure 6.6; the results are plotted in Figure 6.10.¹⁹ With these alternative aggregations of IO membership, I find that while increased membership in IOs with the power to influence politically salient issues related to economic, security, and foreign policy topics makes democratic backsliding more likely, membership in IOs whose influence is primarily over technical, less politically salient policy areas has no significant impact on a democracy's subsequent regime trajectory.

To summarize, I have shown evidence that increased membership in IOs with high levels of political authority and extensive policy competencies makes subsequent backsliding more likely in democracies in the post-Cold War era. This relationship is particularly strong for new democracies, who entered the post-Cold War era with relatively low levels of democratic institutional stock. However, there is even evidence of these dynamics when models include

¹⁹Full results are reported in Appendix Tables A10 and A11.




Figure 6.10: While increased membership in IOs with the power to influence politically salient domestic issues related to the economy and foreign policy has a negative and significant impact on all democracies' subsequent democratic trajectory, membership in IOs that manage more technical issues has no significant effect. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

mature democracies, suggesting that democratic stock can only guard against the pressures created by policy delegation to a certain point. Further analyses confirm these dynamics do not carry over to less institutionalized IOs with little influence over domestic level outcomes. Furthermore, the *type* of policy decisions that states delegate to IOs also matters: while delegating politically salient issues to these organizations is detrimental for democracy, delegating more technical policy decisions has no significant impact on a state's democratic trajectory. Building on this evidence in support of my overarching argument, I turn now to analyze the extent to which these dynamics are driven by the two mechanisms I propose in Chapter 3: increases in relative executive power and a limited domestic policy space.

6.4 Policy delegation to IOs and executive power

Does policy delegation to international organizations make executives more powerful? In Chapter 3, I argue it does in several related ways. On the one hand, membership in IOs with significant political authority creates opportunities for executives to make meaningful policy decisions on behalf of their state at the international level, often with little oversight from other domestic institutions. In order to effectively participate in these complex IOs, states also build up strong bureaucratic institutions; these un-elected bureaucrats and technocrats, often closely linked to the executive, serve as an additional resource for state leaders. Finally, these IOs often provide financial resources to their states that can be re-appropriated by executives to serve their own domestic political interests. These opportunities for executive self-aggrandizement grow as states become members of more of these relevant types of IOs.

As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional checks on executive power are one of three pillars critical to long-term democratic success. There are a range of institutions that can serve this function, including the legislature, the judiciary, state-based oversight institutions such as the ombudsman, and a constitution that specifies the rules to which democratically elected officials are expected to adhere. If these institutions are unable to effectively act as a check on executive power, that would signal executive power has increased. As such, I use multiple

measures of institutional checks on the executive to capture changes in relative executive power over time.

Specifically, I use five variables from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2021) that capture legislative, judicial, and constitutional checks on executive power. First, I use the horizontal accountability index, which measures the strength of institutional checks that prevent abuses of executive power, including the legislature, judiciary, ombudsmen, and prosecutors and comptrollers general.²⁰ Since this index aggregates several distinct institutional checks on the executive, I also use two of its constitutive measures—legislative and judicial constraints on the executive—as my second and third measures of relative executive power. Next, to more directly capture the extent to which the legislature not only has the power to reign in the executive, but also whether it actually exercises this ability, my fourth measure captures the degree to which the legislature actually investigates—potentially in an unfavorable way—abuses of power by the executive in practice.²¹ Finally, the constitution is widely cited as another important institutional check on the executive; therefore, I capture changes in executive power using an index that measures the extent to which the executive respects their country’s constitution.

As before, my argument is concerned with changes in relative executive power, rather than aggregate levels. Therefore, I adopt the same approach I used in previous models and measure executive power as the five-year change along these various indicators. For each of these variables, lower values denote fewer institutional constraints on the executive, or higher relative executive power. My theory predicts negative changes, which would indicate institutional checks on the executive power have weakened over time along each of these indices as states join more of the relevant IOs discussed in Section 6.1 above.

²⁰Specifically, this index is created by aggregating the following measures: judicial constraints on the executive, an indicator for if a legislature exists, legislative constraints on the executive, the extent to which the legislature regularly questions the executive, the likelihood the legislature will investigate and produce an unfavorable decision against the executive in cases of illegal or unethical activity, and a measure of how likely other state institutions are to investigate and report on illegal activities by the executive.

²¹To elaborate, this index measures whether the legislature would conduct a potentially unfavorable investigation of the executive if they were accused of engaging in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity.

To test the relationship between policy delegation to IOs and executive power, I use the same modeling approach as before, including observations for all post-Cold War democracies, with one modification. In addition to the control variables I outlined in Section 6.1, I also include two additional controls relevant to executive power specifically. First, I expect that, all else equal, individual executives that have been in power for longer will be relatively more powerful than their newly elected counterparts; therefore, I control for the number of years since the current executive of a country was first elected. Since executive power is in many ways a byproduct of the strength of intra-governmental checks and balances, I also control for levels of government fractionalization in the legislature, or whether the executive's party has an absolute majority in legislative houses with lawmaking powers. I expect that legislatures dominated by the executive's own party will be less likely to reign in executive power, even if they have the ability to do so.²² As before, I estimate the effect of increased membership in high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs on subsequent changes in institutional checks on executive power along the five different indicators I described above. Figure 6.11 plots the coefficients for the main independent variables for each of these models.²³

In these models, I find the effects of IO membership on relative executive power depend on both the type of IO and also on the specific measure of executive power. First, I find increased membership in high pooling IOs—which are those organizations in which state actors, and often executives, make a wide range of collective decisions on behalf of their state—leads to a subsequent decline in all five measures of institutional checks on the executive. This suggests those organizations that specifically provide fora for executives to make independent and un-monitored decisions bolster the relative domestic power of executives. In addition, membership in all three of these types of IOs corresponds with a significant decrease in the extent to which the executive adheres to the constitutional rules of the game.

²²Both of these variables are drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Kefer and Scartascini 2016). Summary statistics for these and all other variables in the executive power regression models can be found in Appendix Table A12.

²³Full results are reported in Appendix Tables A13, A14, A15, A16, and A17.




Figure 6.11: The extent to which increased IO membership impacts institutional checks on executive power depends on both the type of IO and the measure of executive power. While membership in high pooling IOs leads to increased relative executive power across all five measures, membership in high delegation IOs only significantly impacts judicial constraints on the executive and executive respect for the constitution. Membership in high policy scope IOs also reduces executive respect for the constitution, but does not significantly impact other institutional checks on the executive. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

The remaining results are more mixed. While increased membership in high delegation IOs—those organizations that have the power to make decisions independent of their member states—leads to reduced judicial and constitutional checks on the executive, the high policy scope IOs have no significant relationship with institutional checks on the executive beyond the constitution.

As discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.3, the relatively limited impact high delegation and high policy scopes have on executive power is perhaps unsurprising. From a theoretical perspective, high pooling IOs wherein executives can make decisions and exercise political authority independent of oversight from domestic institutions, such as the legislature, are the organizations that should be most likely to augment executive power; the results confirm this prediction. Although executives may sometimes influence outcomes in high delegation IOs, these are most frequently organizations where IO-level institutions made decisions on behalf of their member states. An IO's policy scope, on the other hand, simply measures the number of policy areas over which an IO has control; it does not capture *how* these decisions are made. For example, as Figure 6.2 shows, on average, the World Trade Organizations (WTO) stands out from other IOs with high levels of both pooling and delegation; however, its policy scope is limited to just three domains. Therefore, although it provides a forum for executives to act without oversight and make international decisions for their state, these executives can do so only with respect to a narrow set of policy issue areas. Ultimately, it is the ability to make these international-level decisions, rather than the breadth of topics covered by these decisions, that should theoretically empower executives at the expense of other domestic institutions. The breadth of policy topics, on the other hand, will directly limit the domestic policy space, with potentially corrosive effects for political parties and other representative institutions. I test the relationship between IO membership and this second theoretical mechanism in the next section.

6.5 Policy delegation to IOs and the domestic policy space

In addition to increasing relative executive power, policy delegation to IOs by definition also reduces state control over and potential alternatives to domestic policy. I argue the limits IOs place on domestic policy options make democratic backsliding more likely by stunting or eroding party system development and the strength of legislatures and also by limiting governments' abilities to provide public goods to citizens.

As discussed in Chapter 3, a state's domestic policy space consists of the range of possible policies political actors could hypothetically debate, adopt, and implement. Since it is only possible to observe the policies actually implemented, it is impossible to directly measure a state's entire domestic policy space. Therefore, following my approach in Chapters 4 and 5, I rely on several observable implications of a limited domestic policy space to capture this concept.

On the one hand, a limited domestic policy space has implications for ideological differences between parties. In mature democracies with developed and stable party systems, parties adopt distinct positions on substantive policy issues, and use these positions to appeal to voters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, when the domestic policy space is constrained by international actors, it is difficult for parties to credibly debate alternatives to the policy status quo. Instead, all parties increasingly rely on populist appeals or broad-based valence issues on which everyone agrees—such as support for nationalism, anti-corruption, or rule of law (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Ward et al. 2015)—to garner votes. In these scenarios, as more parties campaign on widely popular valence issues, the ideological differences between parties necessarily become less pronounced. As such, one observable implication of a limited domestic policy space is ideological convergence across the issues advocated by political parties within a country.

Therefore, my first measure of the domestic policy space—which I term here the ideological policy space—is the five-year change in the ideological distinctness of party platforms.

This variable from the Varieties of Democracy dataset takes into account how many parties in the national legislature or presidency have made their platforms, or manifestos, publicly available and, more importantly, the extent to which these manifestos are distinct in terms of content or ideology across parties in the same country. This variable is coded on a five-point scale where lower values denote states with less ideologically distinct party platforms. Higher values along this variable indicate states where parties have a wider range of policy options to adopt and debate, or, I argue, states with a more expansive domestic policy space. Therefore, a negative change along this index indicates ideological convergence across parties in a country, or a shrinking domestic policy space.

While states have delegated a wide-range of policy issues to international actors, one of the most common areas of policy delegation is with respect to economic issues. The post-Cold War international economy has been characterized first and foremost by neo-liberal economic policies. This means that countries who delegate decisions to international actors necessarily have adopted more market-oriented policies back home. As such, one domestic consequence of international-level economic policy delegation is to limit traditional sources of government revenue, such as that extracted from higher taxes and import tariffs that are antithetical to neo-liberalism. This lack of revenue, in turn, can make it more difficult for governments to provide public goods to citizens. In these cases, politicians can no longer campaign for re-election based on past evidence of effectively providing public goods, and they also cannot credibly commit to change economic policies in the future. Instead, like the parties in these countries, incumbents and political elites increasingly have to rely on valence and other non-ideological appeals to contest elections.

All of this means that another observable implication of a limited domestic policy space relates to the fiscal capacity of the state. Broadly speaking, a state's fiscal policy space is its ability to spend on projects and initiatives; this ability is contingent on the revenue it has available. Following [Flores and Nooruddin \(2016\)](#), my second measure of the domestic policy space is the fiscal policy space of a state, which I capture using the five-year change

in tax revenue available to the national government.²⁴ As with my ideological policy space indicator, a negative change along this index would indicate a shrinking fiscal policy space as the government's tax revenue decreases over time.

I estimate separate regression models that test the relationship between these two measures of domestic policy space —ideological and fiscal— and increased membership in high pooling, high delegation, and high policy scope IOs for all democracies in the post-Cold War era. My modeling approach is identical to those adopted throughout this chapter, and I use the same set of control variables as those included in my primary analyses linking IOs to backsliding in Section 6.3.²⁵

The results of these models, shown in Figure 6.12,²⁶ provide support for my domestic policy space mechanism. First, increased membership in high delegation and high policy scope IOs—which as I argued above are the ones most likely to limit a state's domestic policy options—leads to a subsequent decline in the ideological distinctness of party platforms in a country, suggesting that membership in these organizations limits the range of ideological positions that parties in these states can credibly take when appealing to voters. The impact of these IOs on the fiscal policy space is similar: increased membership in high pooling and, most relevant to this mechanism, high policy scope IOs, drives statistically significant declines in the tax revenue available to governments.

The effects of a limited domestic policy space, and especially a limited economic policy space, are especially dire for political parties; this is particularly the case for mainstream political parties. As discussed in Chapter 5, political parties in democracies differentiate themselves from one another based on their policy platforms. However, the types of policies parties emphasize when appealing to voters are also tied to their party identity. While mainstream political parties, such as Socialist and Christian democratic ones, define themselves primarily based on their economic policy positions, newer niche parties, including radical

²⁴This variable, taken from the World Development Indicators database, measures tax revenue as a percent of GDP (World Bank 2012).

²⁵Summary statistics for the variables included in these models can be found in Appendix Table A18.

²⁶Full results are reported in Appendix Tables A19 and A20.




Figure 6.12: Increased membership in high delegation and high policy scope IOs reduces the domestic ideological policy space, measured as changes in the ideological distinctness of political party platforms in a country over time. Similarly, I find that increased membership in high pooling and high policy scope IOs significantly reduces the fiscal policy space, measured as changes in government tax revenue over time. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

right and Green parties, focus predominantly on post-materialist issues, such as nationalism, immigration or the environment, rather than the economic-oriented issues that are the purview of their mainstream counterparts.

As such, policy delegation to IOs in the post-Cold War era has been particularly damaging for mainstream parties. When states first began delegating policy decisions to international actors, it was most common to do so in the economic realm. As such, this policy delegation undermined some of the core policy identities of mainstream parties, and led to economic ideological convergence as parties were no longer able to credibly propose policies that conflicted with international dictates. This convergence, in turn, left voters without clear ways to distinguish these parties from one another, and fueled disenchantment as these parties failed to offer economic policy options to offset the negative consequences of globalization and liberalization. All of these dynamics collided to drive voters toward the newer populist and nationalist parties that focused instead on identity and culturally-based appeals, rather than economic ones.

Therefore, another observable implication of a declining domestic policy space is that mainstream political parties will suffer electorally, at the expense of those newer niche and populist parties. As an additional test of my argument, I re-estimate the same models from Figure 6.12, but this time evaluating the impact of IO membership on the five-year change in vote shares for mainstream, nationalist, and populist parties.²⁷

As Figure 6.13 shows, my intuition was correct: as states delegate more political authority and policy decisions to international organizations, votes for mainstream political parties decline, while support for populist and nationalist ones increases.²⁸ These findings have concerning implications for democracy. While not inherently anti-democratic, nationalist and populist parties are often illiberal in that they advocate pure majoritarianism and, to this end, undermine institutions that guarantee minority protections, with critical implications for human and minority rights and other components of liberal democracy (Mudde and Kalt-

²⁷See Section 5.2 in Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of these variables.

²⁸Full results are reported in Appendix Tables A21, A22, and A23.




Figure 6.13: Delegating political authority and policy decisions to IOs has fundamentally changed electoral politics. As states join more of these relevant international organizations, the subsequent vote share of mainstream political parties declines, as voters increasingly opt for nationalist and populist parties. The plot depicts 95 percent confidence intervals.

wasser 2017). In other words, these parties that are benefiting electorally from international policy delegation are often at the forefront of attacks against the very institutions eroded in cases of democratic backsliding.

6.6 Discussion

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, political elites and policymakers alike in the west widely concluded that cooperation through multilateral institutions, including policy delegation to these organizations, would foster economic prosperity while also promoting and protecting liberal democracy. This thinking meant that western-backed liberal IOs became not only increasingly more common in this era, but a certain subset of these organizations were also granted unprecedented amounts of political authority and policy competencies with wide-ranging powers to decide and enforce policy outcomes in their member states. While initially states primarily delegated economic policy decisions to these organizations, over time the range of policy issue areas decided within these fora also expanded. In this chapter I have shown that, despite predictions and best intentions, policy delegation has increased executive power, eroded critical representative institutions that also act as an important check on executive power, and, as a result, made democratic backsliding more likely in already democratic states. The effects are particularly salient in new democracies, but even extend to long-established ones.

At the domestic institutional level, the wide ranging implications of international policy delegation for parties and party systems is of particular concern and speaks to research on the recent rise of populism across democracies. On the international relations side, scholars find aspects of globalization and international economic integration—such as import shocks, off-shoring of jobs, immigration, and automation—have fueled polarization and increased voter support for populist politicians (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Ballard-Rosa, Jensen and Scheve 2021; Milner 2021). However, researchers have only more recently begun to explore how globalization impacts the supply side of politics (Autor et al. 2020; Campello and

Urdinez 2021; Rodrik 2021; Scheve and Serlin 2023; Meyerrose and Watson 2024). Scholars of comparative (and in particular European) politics, on the other hand, have studied the convergence of mainstream party platforms over time (Berman and Snegovaya 2019; Berman and Kundnani 2021), finding this ideological convergence fuels voter support for populist alternatives (D’Alimonte 2019; Grzymala-Busse 2019a; Grant 2021; Vachudova 2021). My findings here bring together and extend these two distinct bodies of research, in several ways. First, I identify one aspect of globalization in particular —policy delegation to IOs— that fuels populist electoral success. But by focusing on how this policy delegation impacts the supply side of politics, namely by undermining the core policy platforms of mainstream parties, I bring in insights from comparative politics about one mechanism through which globalization induces the rise of populist parties: by limiting the domestic policy space.

The evidence shown in this chapter speaks even more directly to the international relations literature on IOs and democracy which, as outlined in Chapter 1, overwhelmingly finds a positive relationship between the two. This research emphasizes the incentives and constraints IOs impose on governments, and finds certain types of IOs can both promote transitions to democracy while also making states overall more democratic when compared to autocracies (Pevehouse 2005; Donno 2013). I do not refute any of these claims — indeed, I find support for these conclusions in Figure 6.8. However, this existing literature also contends IOs can promote democratic consolidation —or long-term democratic success and stability— in their member states (Poast and Urpelainen 2018), and more broadly that international integration helps to sustain liberal democracy in both new and mature democracies (Keohane, MacEdo and Moravcsik 2009). Here, my findings differ. By exploring the ways in which IOs impact domestic democratic institutions —beyond elections and elites— and changes in levels of democracy overtime, I show that IOs with high levels of political authority and extensive policy competencies also contribute to backsliding. By focusing more closely on the ways in which domestic institutions interact with and are altered by IOs, my findings offer a more nuanced perspective of the long-studied relationship between IOs and

democracy and help us better understand why sometimes backsliding occurs even in states that are members of the most democratically committed and heavily integrated international organizations.

Chapter 8: Appendix

Table A1: Summary Statistics, International Organizations Main Results

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Liberal democracy index (5 year change)	2,185	-0.001	0.07	-0.35	0.42
Num. high pooling IOs	2,187	20.49	7.78	0	30
Num. high delegation IOs	2,187	15.16	5.98	0	24
Num. high policy scope IOs	2,187	3.22	1.88	0	6
GDP pc (logged)	1,944	2.56	1.06	0.01	4.53
GDP growth pc	1,944	2.29	3.34	-49.27	13.75
Liberal democracy index	2,187	0.62	0.20	0.03	0.90
Divided party control	2,187	-0.02	0.89	-1.65	1.65
Political polarization	2,179	-0.61	1.38	-3.87	4.18
Effective number of parties (logged)	2,106	1.50	0.97	0.00	3.71
Internal conflict	2,187	0.06	0.24	0	1
Mean region liberal democracy change	2,088	0.004	0.03	-0.13	0.14

Table A2: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, All Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 5 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.30*** (0.09)	-0.15* (0.08)	-0.06* (0.03)
GDP pc (log)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.34** (0.14)	-0.44*** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.75*** (0.06)	-1.78*** (0.06)	-1.81*** (0.06)
Divided party control	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
AIC	5056.37	5063.29	5065.24
BIC	5135.25	5142.18	5144.12
Log. lik.	-2514.18	-2517.64	-2518.62
Observations	2069	2069	2069
Num. countries	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	1.87	2.02	2.15
Variance: regions	1.22	1.36	1.41
Variance: residual	0.54	0.54	0.54

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, New Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 5 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.37*** (0.10)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.16*** (0.04)
GDP pc (log)	-0.30** (0.14)	-0.41*** (0.14)	-0.53*** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.46*** (0.06)	-1.48*** (0.06)	-1.51*** (0.06)
Divided party control	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.33*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
AIC	3807.92	3814.42	3806.81
BIC	3882.90	3889.40	3881.79
Log. lik.	-1889.96	-1893.21	-1889.40
Observations	1565	1565	1565
Num. countries	62	62	62
Num. regions	15	15	15
Variance: countries	1.61	1.70	1.80
Variance: regions	0.68	0.76	0.79
Variance: residual	0.53	0.54	0.53

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, All Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 3 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 3 years prior	-0.29*** (0.11)	-0.17* (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)
GDP pc (log)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.26** (0.11)
GDP growth pc	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.34*** (0.08)	-1.36*** (0.08)	-1.40*** (0.07)
Divided party control	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.32*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
AIC	5798.68	5802.28	5807.71
BIC	5877.91	5881.51	5886.94
Log. lik.	-2885.34	-2887.14	-2889.85
Observations	2120	2120	2120
Num. countries	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	1.10	1.15	1.27
Variance: regions	0.69	0.75	0.79
Variance: residual	0.75	0.75	0.75

Note: Dependent variable: 3-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A5: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, New Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 3 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 3 years prior	-0.29** (0.12)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.03)
GDP pc (log)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.36*** (0.11)
GDP growth pc	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.15*** (0.07)	-1.17*** (0.07)	-1.20*** (0.07)
Divided party control	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.06)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
Internal conflict	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.04 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
AIC	4405.07	4408.42	4412.93
BIC	4480.48	4483.83	4488.34
Log. lik.	-2188.54	-2190.21	-2192.47
Observations	1614	1614	1614
Num. countries	62	62	62
Num. regions	15	15	15
Variance: countries	1.03	1.06	1.12
Variance: regions	0.38	0.42	0.43
Variance: residual	0.74	0.75	0.74

Note: Dependent variable: 3-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A6: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, All Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 7 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 7 years prior	-0.28*** (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.06*** (0.02)
GDP pc (log)	-0.29** (0.12)	-0.44*** (0.12)	-0.58*** (0.11)
GDP growth pc	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Liberal democracy index	-1.72*** (0.04)	-1.76*** (0.04)	-1.80*** (0.04)
Divided party control	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.33*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Internal conflict	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
AIC	3740.71	3754.64	3757.56
BIC	3819.25	3833.19	3836.11
Log. lik.	-1856.35	-1863.32	-1864.78
Observations	2019	2019	2019
Num. countries	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	1.75	1.94	2.14
Variance: regions	1.21	1.39	1.50
Variance: residual	0.29	0.29	0.29

Note: Dependent variable: 7-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A7: Number of IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding, New Democracies, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 7 Years

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 7 years prior	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.03)
GDP pc (log)	-0.36*** (0.12)	-0.47*** (0.12)	-0.61*** (0.11)
GDP growth pc	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.42*** (0.04)	-1.45*** (0.04)	-1.46*** (0.04)
Divided party control	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)
Effec. num. parties (log)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
AIC	2884.22	2893.32	2875.03
BIC	2958.76	2967.87	2949.57
Log. lik.	-1428.11	-1432.66	-1423.51
Observations	1517	1517	1517
Num. countries	62	62	62
Num. regions	15	15	15
Variance: countries	1.44	1.53	1.65
Variance: regions	0.68	0.77	0.83
Variance: residual	0.31	0.31	0.30

Note: Dependent variable: 7-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A8: Number of IO Memberships and Aggregate Regime Outcomes, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, Democracies and Autocracies

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships	0.01* (0.00)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)
GDP pc (log)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)
GDP growth pc	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Divided party control	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.01)
Political polarization	-0.23*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.01)	-0.23*** (0.01)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Internal conflict	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Mean region liberal democracy	0.18*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
AIC	887.43	795.92	887.43
BIC	964.65	873.13	964.65
Log. lik.	-431.72	-385.96	-431.72
Observations	4604	4604	4604
Num. countries	170	170	170
Num. regions	19	19	19
Variance: countries	0.42	0.38	0.42
Variance: regions	0.15	0.18	0.15
Variance: residual	0.06	0.06	0.06

Note: Dependent variable: liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A9: Counterfactual: Varying Political Authority and Democratic Backsliding, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region, 5 Years

	Minimalist IOs	Structured IOs	Interventionist IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.33** (0.17)
GDP pc (log)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.17)
GDP growth pc	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-2.09*** (0.07)	-2.09*** (0.07)	-2.06*** (0.07)
Divided party control	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.07* (0.04)	0.07** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
AIC	3238.71	3239.58	3235.36
BIC	3312.33	3313.21	3308.99
Log. lik.	-1605.35	-1605.79	-1603.68
Observations	1421	1421	1421
Num. countries	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	3.16	3.13	2.99
Variance: regions	1.86	1.98	1.87
Variance: residual	0.41	0.41	0.41

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A10: Number of Politically Salient IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding

	Trade IOs	Welfare IOs	Development IOs	Military Cooperation IOs	Foreign Policy IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.18*** (0.03)
GDP pc (log)	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.45*** (0.12)	-0.31** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.12)	-0.42*** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.75*** (0.06)	-1.82*** (0.06)	-1.77*** (0.06)	-1.81*** (0.06)	-1.78*** (0.06)
Divided party control	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.03 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
AIC	5040.59	5061.90	5062.50	5061.92	5033.46
BIC	5119.47	5140.79	5141.39	5140.81	5112.34
Log. lik.	-2506.29	-2516.95	-2517.25	-2516.96	-2502.73
Observations	2069	2069	2069	2069	2069
Num. countries	81	81	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17	17	17
Variance: countries	1.96	2.18	1.94	2.15	2.08
Variance: regions	1.11	1.45	1.20	1.57	1.17
Variance: residual	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.53

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A11: Number of Technical IO Memberships and Democratic Backsliding

	Culture IOs	Energy IOs	Education IOs	Health IOs	Transportation IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.14 (0.09)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.10 (0.24)	0.01 (0.09)
GDP pc (log)	-0.49*** (0.12)	-0.53*** (0.12)	-0.49*** (0.12)	-0.50*** (0.12)	-0.50*** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-1.80*** (0.06)	-1.82*** (0.06)	-1.81*** (0.06)	-1.82*** (0.06)	-1.82*** (0.06)
Divided party control	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (log)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
AIC	5063.73	5065.83	5065.39	5064.09	5066.24
BIC	5142.61	5144.72	5144.28	5142.98	5145.13
Log. lik.	-2517.86	-2518.91	-2518.69	-2518.05	-2519.12
Observations	2069	2069	2069	2069	2069
Num. countries	81	81	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17	17	17
Variance: countries	2.13	2.25	2.15	2.23	2.23
Variance: regions	1.62	1.47	1.43	1.48	1.47
Variance: residual	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in liberal democracy index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A12: Summary Statistics, International Organizations and Executive Power

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Horizontal accountability index (5 year change)	2,187	-0.002	0.28	-1.74	1.95
Legislative constraints on exec (5 year change)	2,185	-0.002	0.10	-0.69	0.76
Legislature investigates exec (5 year change)	2,187	0.01	0.50	-2.77	3.24
Judicial constraints on exec (5 year change)	2,187	-0.003	0.07	-0.60	0.52
Exec respect for constitution (5 year change)	2,187	-0.05	0.37	-3.01	2.21
Num. high pooling IOs	2,187	20.49	7.78	0	30
Num. high delegation IOs	2,187	15.16	5.98	0	24
Num. high policy scope IOs	2,187	3.22	1.88	0	6
GDP pc (logged)	1,944	2.56	1.06	0.01	4.53
GDP growth pc	1,944	2.29	3.34	-49.27	13.75
Liberal democracy index	2,187	0.62	0.20	0.03	0.90
Divided party control	2,187	-0.02	0.89	-1.65	1.65
Political polarization	2,179	-0.61	1.38	-3.87	4.18
Effective number of parties (logged)	2,106	1.50	0.97	0.00	3.71
Internal conflict	2,187	0.06	0.24	0	1
Executive years in office	1,537	4.09	3.05	1	20
Government frac	1,520	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.90

Table A13: Number of IO Memberships and Horizontal Accountability Index, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.27*** (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.14 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	0.19 (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
Horizontal accountability index	-1.58*** (0.09)	-1.58*** (0.10)	-1.58*** (0.10)
Divided party control	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Executive years in office	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Government frac	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)
AIC	4243.82	4250.00	4252.22
BIC	4337.01	4343.18	4345.40
Log. lik.	-2104.91	-2108.00	-2109.11
Observations	1775	1775	1775
Num. countries	77	77	77
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	1.35	1.45	1.48
Variance: regions	0.44	0.46	0.46
Variance: residual	0.51	0.51	0.51

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in horizontal accountability index. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A14: Number of IO Memberships and Legislative Constraints on Executive, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.26*** (0.10)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)
GDP growth pc	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	0.31*** (0.12)	0.29** (0.12)	0.28** (0.12)
Legislative constraints on exec	-1.53*** (0.08)	-1.54*** (0.08)	-1.54*** (0.08)
Divided party control	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Executive years in office	0.11*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Government frac	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
AIC	4221.35	4227.31	4228.10
BIC	4314.44	4320.40	4321.19
Log. lik.	-2093.67	-2096.65	-2097.05
Observations	1765	1765	1765
Num. countries	77	77	77
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	1.21	1.28	1.29
Variance: regions	0.20	0.20	0.20
Variance: residual	0.51	0.51	0.51

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in legislative constraints on executive. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A15: Number of IO Memberships and Legislature Investigates Executive, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.20* (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.31** (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)	0.18 (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	0.13 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)
Legislative investigates exec	-1.50*** (0.08)	-1.51*** (0.08)	-1.50*** (0.08)
Divided party control	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Executive years in office	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Government frac	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
AIC	4366.25	4369.92	4371.51
BIC	4459.38	4463.05	4464.63
Log. lik.	-2166.13	-2167.96	-2168.75
Observations	1769	1769	1769
Num. countries	77	77	77
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	1.30	1.35	1.34
Variance: regions	0.36	0.36	0.36
Variance: residual	0.55	0.55	0.55

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in extent to which legislature investigates executive. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A16: Number of IO Memberships and Judicial Constraints on Executive, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.31*** (0.10)	-0.20** (0.09)	-0.05 (0.03)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.29** (0.14)	-0.45*** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	0.25** (0.11)	0.23** (0.11)	0.19* (0.11)
Judicial constraints on exec	-1.55*** (0.09)	-1.54*** (0.09)	-1.53*** (0.09)
Divided party control	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.35*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Executive years in office	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Government frac	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
AIC	4157.05	4162.00	4166.76
BIC	4250.23	4255.19	4259.95
Log. lik.	-2061.52	-2064.00	-2066.38
Observations	1775	1775	1775
Num. countries	77	77	77
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	1.74	1.79	1.89
Variance: regions	0.27	0.30	0.32
Variance: residual	0.48	0.48	0.48

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in judicial constraints on executive. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A17: Number of IO Memberships and Executive Respect for Constitution, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.55*** (0.10)	-0.43*** (0.09)	-0.11*** (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.03 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.26** (0.10)
GDP growth pc	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	0.45*** (0.09)	0.43*** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.09)
Executive respect for constitution	-1.27*** (0.08)	-1.25*** (0.08)	-1.21*** (0.08)
Divided party control	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Executive years in office	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Government frac	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Lagged DV	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)
AIC	4318.12	4326.93	4341.05
BIC	4411.31	4420.12	4434.24
Log. lik.	-2142.06	-2146.47	-2153.53
Observations	1775	1775	1775
Num. countries	77	77	77
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	0.80	0.80	0.86
Variance: regions	0.22	0.23	0.23
Variance: residual	0.54	0.54	0.55

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in executive respect for constitution. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A18: Summary Statistics, International Organizations and Domestic Policy Space

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Distinct party platforms (5 year change)	2,187	0.004	0.29	-1.95	3.36
Fiscal space (5 year change)	1,498	0.03	3.43	-36.81	17.03
Votes for nationalist parties (5 year change)	1,972	2.26	11.75	-61.40	65.90
Votes for populist parties (5 year change)	1,175	0.76	6.25	-28.27	36.08
Votes for mainstream parties (5 year change)	1,175	0.50	16.67	-82.91	99.99
Num. high pooling IOs	2,187	20.49	7.78	0	30
Num. high delegation IOs	2,187	15.16	5.98	0	24
Num. high policy scope IOs	2,187	3.22	1.88	0	6
GDP pc (logged)	1,944	2.56	1.06	0.01	4.53
GDP growth pc	1,944	2.29	3.34	-49.27	13.75
Liberal democracy index	2,187	0.62	0.20	0.03	0.90
Divided party control	2,187	-0.02	0.89	-1.65	1.65
Political polarization	2,179	-0.61	1.38	-3.87	4.18
Effective number of parties (logged)	2,106	1.50	0.97	0.00	3.71
Internal conflict	2,187	0.06	0.24	0	1

Table A19: Number of IO Memberships and Ideological Distinctness of Party Platforms, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.07** (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.38** (0.15)	0.47*** (0.14)	0.27** (0.12)
GDP growth pc	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Liberal democracy index	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)
Distinct party platforms	-2.27*** (0.08)	-2.26*** (0.08)	-2.27*** (0.08)
Divided party control	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Political polarization	-0.32*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.05)	-0.32*** (0.05)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Lagged DV	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
AIC	5272.77	5267.12	5274.27
BIC	5357.32	5351.68	5358.82
Log. lik.	-2621.38	-2618.56	-2622.13
Observations	2073	2073	2073
Num. countries	81	81	81
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	1.97	1.90	2.05
Variance: regions	2.03	1.98	2.16
Variance: residual	0.60	0.60	0.60

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in ideological distinctness of party platforms. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A20: Number of IO Memberships and Fiscal Policy Space, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.25*** (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.17 (0.12)
GDP growth pc	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.24*** (0.06)
Liberal democracy index	0.18** (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.18** (0.09)
Tax revenue	-1.42*** (0.07)	-1.45*** (0.07)	-1.44*** (0.07)
Divided party control	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Internal conflict	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Lagged DV	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
AIC	3002.90	3011.96	2983.10
BIC	3079.48	3088.54	3059.67
Log. lik.	-1486.45	-1490.98	-1476.55
Observations	1218	1218	1218
Num. countries	71	71	71
Num. regions	16	16	16
Variance: countries	0.63	0.65	0.70
Variance: regions	0.61	0.59	0.62
Variance: residual	0.54	0.54	0.53

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in fiscal policy space (tax revenue). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A21: Number of IO Memberships and Votes for Nationalist Parties, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	0.96*** (0.15)	0.63*** (0.13)	0.27*** (0.05)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.19)
GDP growth pc	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
Liberal democracy index	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)
Tax revenue	-1.25*** (0.06)	-1.23*** (0.06)	-1.26*** (0.06)
Divided party control	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Political polarization	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Internal conflict	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Lagged DV	0.10*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
AIC	2460.76	2477.06	2473.90
BIC	2534.61	2550.92	2547.75
Log. lik.	-1215.38	-1223.53	-1221.95
Observations	1016	1016	1016
Num. countries	45	45	45
Num. regions	11	11	11
Variance: countries	0.87	0.88	1.00
Variance: regions	0.28	0.29	0.33
Variance: residual	0.52	0.53	0.53

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in votes for nationalist parties. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A22: Number of IO Memberships and Votes for Populist Parties, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
GDP pc (logged)	0.86*** (0.10)	0.62*** (0.09)	0.10** (0.04)
GDP growth pc	-0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)
Liberal democracy index	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Votes for populist parties	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)
Divided party control	-0.42*** (0.02)	-0.41*** (0.02)	-0.41*** (0.02)
Political polarization	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	-0.12*** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)
Internal conflict	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Mean region liberal democracy change	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)
Lagged DV	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)
AIC	4885.00	4910.01	4948.56
BIC	4962.08	4987.09	5025.64
Log. lik.	-2428.50	-2441.01	-2460.28
Observations	1818	1818	1818
Num. countries	74	74	74
Num. regions	17	17	17
Variance: countries	0.14	0.14	0.17
Variance: regions	0.00	0.02	0.03
Variance: residual	0.77	0.78	0.79

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in votes for populist parties. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A23: Number of IO Memberships and Votes for Mainstream Parties, Varying Intercepts by Country and Region

	High pooling IOs	High delegation IOs	High policy scope IOs
Num. IO memberships 5 years prior	-0.63*** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.11)	-0.12*** (0.04)
GDP pc (logged)	0.26** (0.13)	0.21 (0.13)	0.12 (0.13)
GDP growth pc	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Liberal democracy index	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)
Votes for mainstream parties	-1.01*** (0.05)	-1.00*** (0.05)	-1.00*** (0.05)
Divided party control	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Political polarization	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Effec. num. parties (logged)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Internal conflict	0.14*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Mean region liberal democracy change	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Lagged DV	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
AIC	2350.94	2358.07	2368.05
BIC	2424.80	2431.92	2441.91
Log. lik.	-1160.47	-1164.04	-1169.03
Observations	1016	1016	1016
Num. countries	45	45	45
Num. regions	11	11	11
Variance: countries	0.29	0.29	0.30
Variance: regions	0.30	0.29	0.30
Variance: residual	0.49	0.49	0.49

Note: Dependent variable: 5-year change in votes for mainstream parties. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$