One Theme to Unite them all? Rhetoric, Dominance, and Unanimity in the UN Security Council.

Johannes Scherzinger (University of Zurich)

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Abstract:

Extant research agrees that unanimity is vital to the functioning and legitimacy of many international organizations (IOs)—the UNSC in particular. Unanimity and unanimous resolutions are seen as "the voice of the international community", as "signals of legitimacy", and as "reference points" for future actions and interventions. Thus, they matter a great deal for the functioning and coordination of global (security) governance. Yet, we do know surprisingly little about how unanimity is actually achieved. This explorative study presents a theory of debate signaling in public UN Security Council debates. Against the expectation that these debates are merely post-hoc justifications for external audiences, this article demonstrates that these debates have an important and understudied function of indicating preferred routes for action through dominant legitimating rhetoric. Using semi-supervised text classifications in combination with Hirschman-Herfindahl models to measure debate dominance, the findings give considerable evidence to the argument that dominant legitimating rhetoric matters for the production of unanimity, even controlling for preference homogeneity and external shocks. Taken together, the findings show that the Elected Ten (E10) can, through their use of rhetoric, partially constrain the Permanent Five (P5).

INTRO

How is unanimity procured in the UN Security Council? There is strong agreement in international relations (IR) scholarship that unanimity is important for the functioning of many international organizations, the UN in particular. Many scholars assume that unanimous resolutions lead to strong signals of legitimacy for a proposed action.[1] Moreover, unanimity may "appear as the voice of the 'international community' as a whole".[2] Further, unanimously authorized resolutions may become "reference points" for future discussions and similar interventions by the UN.[3] Ultimately, for some scholars, approval in the form of a unanimous UNSC resolution is said to boost compliance with the decision and lead governments across the globe to cooperate voluntarily.[4] Thus, unanimity is of great importance for global (security) governance. Against this elevated

[1] Chapman 2012; Thompson 2010; Krisch 2008, 7.
[2] Krisch 2008, 7.
[3] Hurd 2005, 506.
[4] Voeten 2005, 528; Thompson 2010; Grieco et al. 2011.

prominence in the literature, it is startling how little we know about how unanimity in the UN Security Council (UNSC) is achieved.

The sparse information we have on consensus-building[5] in the UNSC largely rests on dated anecdotal evidence[6], on anthropological single case studies,[7] and on one account of power-sharing (I review this literature in more detail below).[8] Because the UNSC is quite an opaque institution—its rules of procedure are still "provisional"[9]—there is a lot of myth and secrecy surrounding the actual working practices of the Council.[10] In addition, since most interviews with diplomats have to remain confidential to protect their profession's neutral candor, scholars have found it difficult to falsify prominent claims concerning the Council's working methods.

For example, the conventional wisdom on the UNSC suggests that almost all agreements are facilitated behind closed doors, and any rhetoric spoken in public debates is simply a post-hoc justification for an ex-ante existing agreement.[11] Following this, it is assumed that unanimity is produced behind closed doors in secretive deal-making. However, reality seems to paint a different picture. To make this point clearer, observe Figure 1 below.

[5] Throughout my writing I use the terms unanimity production and consensus building synonymously.
[6] Feurle 1985. Note that I differentiate here between *procuring unanimity* and getting any *non-unanimous outcome*. For the latter, important studies have shown that P5 interests necessarily matter in getting resolutions authorized, Gilligan and Stedman 2003. That the P5, most prominently the US, likely offer side payments and perks for important votes, Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a, 2009b. And that the UNSC selectively tends to intervene in the most gruesome conflicts, Fortna 2004, specifically those that have generated sunk costs, Binder 2016.
[7] Schia 2013.
[8] Mikulaschek forthcoming.
[9] Gharekhan 2006.
[10] Gifkins 2021.
[11] Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2004, 256.

Figure 1. Percentage of Understanding Reached in Prior Consultations, announced by the UNSC president.



Source: Collected via regular expression pattern matching in UNSC debates (Schönfeld et al. 2019) before the resolution vote (Scherzinger 2022).

On the day of voting, the rotating UNSC president always announces whether the draft resolution in front of the voting diplomats has been facilitated with a so-called "understanding reached in prior consultations". This phrase is UN lingo for backdoor agreement before the submission of the resolution. Because the UNSC is quite a ceremonial institution, the president will always use the same phrase to indicate whether the agreement was facilitated behind closed doors. Through regular expression matching, I tracked each mention of reaching an understanding in prior consultations and calculated its share among all resolution debates (Figure 1). Interestingly, the backdoor agreement rate is not nearly as high as common wisdom would assume. Even at its highest peak in 2001, when many resolutions focused on the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks and the United States tried to lobby for unanimity behind closed doors, less than 40% of resolutions were agreed upon in prior consultations. Even more astonishing is the fact that the backdoor agreement rate has strongly plummeted over the years—past 2015 not a single resolution has been adopted with an "understanding in prior consultations". This trend stands in significant contrast to the solid Council unanimity rate, holding an average of 92% between 1995 and 2018 (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Unanimity Rate in the UN Security Council



Note: Unanimity is calculated as 15 affirmative votes over a resolution. The unanimity rate is the average unanimity over resolutions per year.

How can these two facts be reconciled? How is it that backdoor agreements seemingly have plummeted, but the unanimity rate remains at a high level?[12]

I argue that next to Council preference homogeneity and external shocks, rhetoric influences decision-making in international organizations, most notably unanimity in international institutions. My account suggests that rhetoric affects the decision-making of such international organizations—like the Security Council—that have, qua their mandate, a public venue where speakers are supposed to justify their actions and positions to vital audiences. Most of the scholarship assumes that these audiences must be external to the institution so that diplomats' statements are meant to convince some third party of the rightfulness of an action or the institution's legitimacy as a whole.[13] Although these studies have advanced our knowledge in important ways, I would argue that they overlook another important audience. To be precise, my argument is that there is also *an intra-institutional audience* relevant to these speakers, and this audience consists of other Member states.

[12] The Russian war in Ukraine and the tensions within the P5 have further diminished Council unanimity. At the end of 2022, the unanimity rate stood at 67% (Scherzinger 2023, 205).
[13] Busby et al. 2020; Chapman 2012; Zürn 2018, Chapter 3; Niemann 2018; Thompson 2010; Rauh and Zürn 2020; Binder and Heupel 2015, 2021.

In my conception, based on background interviews with high-ranking Permanent Five (P5) and Elected Ten (E10) diplomats, legitimating diplomatic rhetoric—what I term a *theme*—does not only function to post hoc justify a specific course of action or a position; it may also be used as a *signal* of how a particular speaker understands a given crisis or conflict. In the Security Council, repeating legitimating rhetoric and sharing a signal becomes meaningful for Council decision-making. Security Council Members know that when a state shares a theme, it gives a clue that it is understanding a conflict in the same light and agreeing to a route of plausible action and justification. Thus, legitimating rhetoric has a second and so far understudied institutional function. Apart from its utility as a vehicle for post-hoc justification, it is also a tool for decision-making in the Council; it can be seen as a heuristic to arrive at a decision.[14] Crucially, my conjecture clarifies how diplomats decide which language to include in a resolution and explains the optimal timing for tabling a resolution.

The paper proceeds as follows: I first review existing literature and illustrate a conjecture on how diplomatic rhetoric can help us understand the decision-making process in the UN Security Council. Then, I theorize under which conditions dominant themes (the degree of concentration of one type of legitimating rhetoric) affect Council unanimity. Next, I operationalize my theoretical framework via a textual machine-learning model (seeded-LDA)[15] that classifies UNSC rhetoric into six types of legitimating themes, which exhaustingly cover the agenda in over 1,400 UNSC resolution debates.[16] These themes are "Human Rights and humanitarian action", "development", "combatting terrorism", "curbing weapons of mass destruction", "regional security and territorial integrity", and "protecting women and children in conflict". Further, I employ Hirschman-Herfindahl models to measure if and when a theme becomes dominant during a debate.[17] I find that unmoderated dominant themes may threaten unanimity in the Council—as mere dominance thwarts outlier positions—but that this trend can be ameliorated if the E10 repeat a dominant theme.

In line with my theoretical expectation, I show that dominance is curvilinearly related to unanimity—forming a distinct u-curve. This finding shows that unanimity is associated with rhetoric on two poles. Either, speakers focus on a whole variety of themes; in a sense, they cherry-pick, justifying actions toward their particular home audience—this is highly associated with

[14] Hanrieder 2011; O'Mahoney 2017.
[15] Watanabe and Zhou 2020.
[16] These six themes exhaustingly cover the UNSC agenda apart from mundane organizational talk such as "greeting" fellow diplomats and technical vernacular, which I classify as "procedure". The appendix offers an overview of the six themes and mundane organizational talk.
[17] I understand dominance as the degree of concentration of one type of rhetoric during a debate.

unanimous resolutions. Or, they jointly bring only one theme to dominance—this works particularly well with vague rhetoric like "terrorism" or "women and children in conflict" as these are causes where 'everybody can get behind', i.e., they are so malleable that states may find cover to pursue their preferred strategy.[18]

Most importantly, however, I find that the more the E10 repeat a dominant theme, the higher the likelihood for unanimity—providing strong empirical support for literature that has argued that participatory and procedural notions of legitimacy positively affect institutional decision-making in IOs.[19] Only human rights consistently divide the Council among the six themes, even if diplomats bring this theme to debate dominance. I close the conclusion and discussion section with the implication that while the P5 reign supreme and preference homogeneity matters, unanimity in the Council is also achieved at the behest of the E10, their participation, and rhetoric. If the P5 care about legitimacy—and Council unanimity is a particularly strong signal for legitimacy—then the E10 can partly constrain the great powers through their rhetoric.

BACKGROUND

In terms of UNSC scholarship, conventional wisdom dictates that private diplomatic meetings are where 'the magic happens'.[20] Formally, private negotiations do not exist because the only meeting type that the Charter warrants is the public debate. Technically, no decisions can be reached in private meetings, as these have no legal standing.[21] In reality, however, private negotiations frequently happen in the offices of specific Member States. However, how frequently they happen is anyone's guess, as the Security Council keeps no records of these meetings, not even records indicating whether diplomats talked at all. Perhaps due to this secrecy, some scholars have placed prominence on these meetings for institutional decision-making.[22] And to their credit, states likely do not simply discuss their stakes in the given conflict in these meetings but may agree on more important points, especially if P5's national interests are at stake.

Yet, the claim that virtually *all* issues are agreed upon here (before even one debate is held) is as much a myth as the claim that no issues are ever solved behind closed doors. As a matter of fact, few scholars ever had access to private meetings, so the little that we know stems largely from

[18] Further below, I underscore that these are associations, meaning that unanimity may also lead to either cherry-picking debates or purely dominant debates. Nevertheless, I also add an argument on how to establish a causal arrow here.
[19] Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018; Steffek 2006; Tallberg et al. 2014.
[20] Bosco 2009; Bosco 2014.
[21] Gharekhan 2006, 18–19.
[22] Claude 1966; Feurle 1985.

important but anecdotal evidence.[23] Nevertheless, other scholars could show convincing evidence that the United States was allocating aid from UN agencies to affect Council votes in these private meetings[24] or influenced World Bank decisions.[25] Although studies found correlation evidence, they often could not tie it to particular votes.[26] Still, the amount of correlational and anecdotal evidence points at least in the direction that when a powerful member state sees its national interests at stake, it may be willing to 'offer bribes' as particular perks and hash out all differences behind closed doors.[27] Indeed, also in my dataset, I have strong reason to believe that 17.7% of resolutions are perfectly agreed upon prior to a public meeting (I present evidence for this further below).

Yet, this practice says little about how unanimity is created in a more mundane organizational fashion when no national interests are directly at stake. In this study, I define unanimity as 15 affirmative votes.[28] The conjecture that I am offering here represents more the "ordinary Monday" of the institution, as crises that directly threaten P5 national interests are presumably quite rare. After conducting background interviews with senior E10 and P5 officials and investigating some novel textual evidence, I argue that the P5 often use private meetings to find an agreeable position between each of them but that they *rarely* invite any of the E10 members for private pre-negotiations before any public meeting.[29] In fact, several senior E10 diplomats told me that during their tenure, they were not once invited for private negotiation by one of the P5.[30]

Rather, it seems that the P5 are locking in a particular winset that forms the basis of their agreement in private negotiations. To lock in their winset, they draw up red lines for a given crisis or situation for each P5 member. This is their minimum baseline for a course of action going into the public debates, but to get everyone else on board—to achieve the much-desired unanimity—they are willing to discuss the matter publicly. The P5 fare in such a way because of the Council mandate. Suppose a crisis comes on the agenda with enormous media exposure, such as the Syrian Civil War or an Ebola outbreak in West Africa. In that case, the P5 want to signal to the world that they are

[23] Malone 1998; Schia 2013; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014.
[24] Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Alexander and Rooney 2019.
[25] Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a.
[26] Woodward 2007.
[27] Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009b.
[28] In line with secondary literature, I count abstentions as violations of unanimity as they increase the quorum for a successful resolution.
[29] I held eight confidential online interviews with high-ranking diplomats from E10 as well as P5 nations. The interviews were conducted between October 2020 and June 2022.
[30] Three senior E10 diplomats told me that during their tenure they were not once invited for private negotiations. These interviews were conducted separately over Zoom. Two in May 2022 and one in June 2022. Two other senior E10 diplomats had been invited for private negotiations by at least one P5 member (interviewed in November 2020 and May 2022, via Zoom). One interviewee said that he or she was not regularly invited for pre-negotiation but would be regularly consulted before resolutions were drafted.

seized of the matter and ready to deal with the crisis in public meetings. Quite frankly, they might not have the time to conduct excessive background negotiations with all Council members behind closed doors until they finally arrive at a zone of possible agreement.[31]

A second reason against a long backdoor negotiation with all Council members is that more negotiating parties form more veto players.[32] So even if the P5 would find a winset between them, honing each of their ideal preferences, the added number of E10 members would certainly water down their agreed-upon compromise—pulling it in favor of their individual ideal points. This means that the P5 have little interest in inviting all Council members for their private negotiations before a public debate starts because they think that such discussions would give the E10 leverage over which types of actions to put into resolution drafts.[33] Generally speaking, the P5 are more willing to compromise on individual words in the resolution text—on how something is justified—than on the concrete measures taken.

Moreover, some P5 members were quite confident that they would get to 9 out of 15 votes—these are necessary for any action to go forward[34]—without extensive pre-negotiations with E10 members because they assumed that the two regionally allocated seats for "Western Europe and Others" and, out of historical ties, the three seats for the African continent would vote with them on most matters. They seek to secure the remaining six votes in the public debates.

Taken together, the background interviews and the presidential announcements on the day of voting suggest at least two things. First, there is substantial evidence of background collusion in some instances and thus a strong selection effect concerning which debates are fully open—in a sense that agreement is not fixed beforehand—and those debates, which are practically real-time negotiations. Denying this selection effect means not acknowledging a potential collider in institutional decision-making. Importantly, however, we should recall that the P5 agreement is, either way, *a necessary condition* for any action to take place.[35] Thus, at least some level of background collusion is not surprising but expected.

Second, however, *neither* is the background agreement rate a hundred percent *nor* growing over time. The opposite seems to be the case. At least on a level indicated by the Council president, background agreement has shrunk over time.

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[31] Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011.
[32] Tsebelis 2011.
[33] Confidential background interviews held with three P5 nations, conducted via Zoom in January 2021, March 2021, and April 2021.
[34] Sievers and Daws 2014, 295.
[35] Gilligan and Stedman 2003.

This brings us to the meeting type scrutinized in this explorative study: the public Security Council debates. These are televised, and all speeches are translated into the six formal UN languages. In my view, these meetings are an unjustly overlooked raw diamond of institutional decision-making.[36] I argue that, instead of trying to infer from murky evidence what goes on in private negotiations without having access to them, we should focus on the evidence we have in front of us. This evidence comes from the public Security Council debates. As such, my analysis emphasizes the role of rhetoric in institutional decision-making, contributing to a growing body of literature that values not only the outputs of the UNSC but also the importance of the process itself.[37] To be more concrete regarding secondary literature, in line with Christoph Mikulaschek's account of power-sharing, I also see the E10 as underappreciated actors in Council decision-making. Similarly, the presented evidence indicates that when the P5 see their vital interests threatened—they are willing to hash out differences with the E10 behind closed doors. Thus, they might share their power on some items they deem important. My conjecture is also complementary to Amy Yuen and Susan Allens' study on the influence of the rotating UNSC president on the Council agenda. Without adopting any agenda item, no rhetoric can be spoken, and as such, no debate signaling can occur. Thus, my account provides a complementary exploration of the UNSC's procedural dynamics. Adding to the existing mosaics that have tackled whether issues threaten the interests of powerful P5 members—explained, inter alia, by Erik Voeten, or David Bosco[38]—to their inclusion on the UN agenda, as discussed by Allen and Yuen and Binder and Golub,[39] and ultimately examining how rhetorical debates influence the Council's unanimity (my contribution).

THEORY

I start the theory section with a metaphor. I contend that the public Security Council debates should be understood as a *marketplace*. In the past, different accounts have coined the image of a theater for public debates.[40] Some Security Council debates, especially those where a P5 veto is expected, can turn theatrical. These sessions feature accusations, interruptions, and highly emotional language.[41] Notable instances include U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power's pointed question to her Russian counterpart, asking if he "is truly incapable of shame,"[42] and Ukrainian Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya, who dramatically took out his phone and suggested that the Russian

[36] With some notable exceptions, see: Schönfeld et al. 2019; Eckhard et al. 2021; Sakamoto 2023.
[37] Mikulaschek forthcoming; Allen and Yuen 2022.
[38] Voeten 2001, 2005; Bosco 2009.
[39] Allen and Yuen 2022; Allen and Yuen 2020; Binder and Golub 2020.
[40] Feurle 1985.
[41] Jones 2024.
[42] UN Security Council Meeting, S/PV. 7834, 13 December 2016. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/852068?ln=en&v=pdf

Ambassador call President Putin to end the war in Ukraine.[43] These theatrical sessions are deliberately designed. When a Permanent Member anticipates a veto but proceeds to submit a resolution regardless, the ensuing spectacle is strategic rather than coincidental. The primary intent is to publicly shame the opposing side for obstructing efforts to maintain peace and, or to defend one's reputation to home audiences. Nevertheless, such instances are infrequent. From 1990 to 2020, only three percent of resolutions failed,[44] rendering these dramatic episodes notable yet rare within the broader workings of the Council. In contrast, typical Security Council debates, which involve discussions on crises or threats to international peace and security without predetermined outcomes, are generally more mundane and less theatrical. For these debates, it is helpful to conceptualize the public debates as a marketplace for legitimation strategies. Accordingly, Council members are thought of as buyers looking for a reading of a given situation to 'buy in'. There is an idiosyncratic reason for this type of behavior: SC members are expected to justify their voting position to the world.[45] Therefore, states have to be prepared to give reasons for their actions.[46] Even when the outcome is authorized as "the Security Council" in toto, states behave at least *as if it was an individual obligation to justify one's actions.* Yet, the Council is ridden with power dynamics that lead to unequal distribution of information. With limited intel for some small countries, public justification might not be as easy as it seems. Indeed, the route towards a publicly defendable justification might be very different depending on the institutional role a state fulfills in the Council. The Permanent Five (P5) members hold veto powers and chair their seats indefinitely. Combined with the fact that for all country-file or regional issues (intra or interstate crises), they hold penholdership,[47] the P5 are in a privileged position.

Combined with their own intelligence services, the Permanent Members have unrivaled primacy on information. Because of this primacy, there is a considerable asymmetric information distribution recognizable in Council practice. This asymmetric information distribution works in two ways. P5 members know what they put into the resolution draft, but they do not know how the E10 will react to it. The E10 have their own interests and normative convictions, but they might have limited intel over a given crisis and often no access to the resolution draft.

[43] NPR. 24, Feburary, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/02/24/1082806285/ukraine-ambassador-russia-security-council
[44] Author's own calculation.
[45] Indeed, after Russia's invasion in Ukraine, the General Assembly passed a resolution reminding states of their obligation to explain their conduct and voting—the Permanent Five most of all—to the rest of the world United Nations General Assembly 2022.
[46] Zürn 2004; Forst 2017.
[47] This means that they are the first instance to draft a resolution.

Furthermore, the P5 members want to achieve something that seems paradoxical at first: They would like to negotiate with nobody else, but they want everybody to agree with their resolution. Technically, the P5 would only require four more positive votes—as the voting rules state that the Council needs 9 out of 15 affirmative votes to authorize any action with the concurring votes of the Permanent Five.[48] However, the P5 want the added benefit of unanimity because they believe it will ensure desirable compliance with their decisions.[49]

Elected members have a different structural interest constellation. Elected members do not possess veto power over outcomes and serve two short-lived years on the Council without the option of being re-elected immediately.[50] This means Elected Members want to maximize their time on the Council. Generally speaking, Elected Members are quite eager to pass resolutions and to produce meaningful action because they want to signal to their home audience that they made good use of their short time in this prestigious institution.[51] Certainly, Elected Members also have vested interests in some regions of the world or hold normative convictions over specific issues.

However, generally speaking, Elected Members have significantly fewer resources and fewer far-reaching interests over conflict resolutions in international disputes. This fact should not be interpreted as saying that the Elected Ten have no impact at all. It should also not be misunderstood as saying that the E10 are 'floating in the wind', willing to go with whatever is popular. These facts are meant to highlight that the Elected Ten have, on average, fewer resources at their disposal while having the added pressure of 'making good use of their time'. Thus, the E10 might be particularly pressured to find a plausible route for the justification of their actions and positions.

In my conjecture, the route towards successfully authorized resolutions is then the following: The P5 start pre-negotiating between them and find whatever win-set is acceptable to them. If there is an external crisis taking place, the P5 are pressured to start negotiating in public early on to show that the UN is aware and seized of the crisis. Then, depending on the interest constellation and how deeply vested these are, they try to sell their theme in those public debates. If a crisis threatens the national interests of any P5 member, they engage in behind-the-scenes bargaining with E10 members to forge a consensus. If a crisis poses a lesser threat to the interests of the P5 members, they promptly initiate public debates to demonstrate their commitment to the mandate and their dedication to upholding peace and security. During public debates, the P5 members open with

[48] Sievers and Daws 2014, 295.
[49] Voeten 2005, 528.
[50] United Nations, Article 23.
[51] Confidential background interviews with P5 and E10 diplomats.

rhetoric aimed at legitimizing their position—their theme. They meticulously monitor these debates, checking whether the E10 members echo the same type of legitimizing language. Such debates can last days, weeks, or even months. If or when the E10 share their designated theme, thereby rising to dominance, the P5 see that the E10 accept their signal—i.e., that there is a common understanding (and possible legitimation) of the crisis and intervention reached. In a next step, the P5 reconvene behind closed doors and draft the first instance of their resolution, the so-called zero-draft.[52] In drafting the resolution, they incorporate the same type of rhetoric that dominated during the debate.[53] The process of resolution drafting can take several attempts, where often the type of rhetoric stays the same, but individual words will be changed.[54] Finally, when one theme is highly dominant, and the P5 are confident that they used language that everyone can get behind, they submit it to the Council President, who calls for a vote. The final draft, which is about to be tabled, is supposed to be circulated 24 hours before the vote. However, most of the time, this requirement is waived on the grounds of urgency.[55]

Figure 3. Conjecture of getting Unanimity via the public UNSC Debates



Does this mean that dominant themes are exclusively beneficial, devoid of any drawbacks? Not necessarily. Dominant themes may readily alert the Council that there is a common understanding of how a crisis is perceived, but true dominance is likely to eliminate outlier positions. This rather hurts than helps unanimity because to reach unanimity, quite literally, every single vote counts.

[52] Confidential background interviews with high-ranking P5 and E10 members.
[53] Confidential background interview with senior P5 member, March 2021.
[54] Confidential background interview with senior P5 member, January 2021.
[55] Confidential background interviews with high-ranking P5 and E10 members.

Actions are possible with 9 out of 15 affirmative votes, but unanimity requires 15 affirmatives out of 15 votes. The Council is designed in a way that represents the interests of the international community—via a mechanism of different regions sitting in the Council at all times.[56] These wide-ranging interests' constellations may lead to a heterogeneity of preferences, with some rare outlier positions. If these nations have defended their position in the past against a relevant theme, consistency pressure applies—a need to keep an artificially coherent track record of rhetoric and action to avoid audience costs—and they might need to defend their position against it once more.[57]

Alternatively, they might be silent on the matter, but this leads to withholding of their information on whether they understand the crisis in a similar light. Being silent on a matter is problematic for the P5 as it increases uncertainty over vote choices. Therefore, if a theme is truly dominant with no other option of thematic talk present—it is likely to hurt rather than help unanimity. It is noteworthy, however, that this theoretical model is probabilistic and not deterministic in nature. There might be situations where dominant themes may not threaten outlier positions—simply because there are not any. But this is rare rather than the default scenario due to the ensured preference range via the regional seat distribution system. The next section illustrates the logic of dominance in further depth.

Three Theoretical Illustrations of Dominance

To illustrate how pure dominance may rather hurt than help unanimity, rational institutionalist literature can be useful.[58] This literature has successfully imported spatial theory from committee signaling in legislatures.[59] As a starting point, this literature uses simplified visual schemas to illustrate a range of possible outcomes given a one-dimensional space of preference distribution. Figure 4.1 is meant to demonstrate such a one-dimensional preference space for the UN Security Council.

[56] Thompson 2006, 7–9.
[57] Scherzinger 2022a; Gehring and Dörfler 2019; Franck 1990.
[58] Chapman 2009, 2012; Thompson 2006, 2010.
[59] Thompson 2010, 36–37.

Figure 4.1 Homogenous preference distribution with one dominant theme



Note: The figure is modeled based on the schematic visualizations of Thompson (2010,37).

Figure 4.1 illustrates the rare ideal case of preference distribution within a Security Council debate over a given conflict (C), with one dominant theme and zero outlier positions. The markers XE10, and XP5, give out the different ideal point preference positions along a continuum ranging from authorization unlikely, via authorization likely (crossing the 9/15 requirement), to unanimity likely. On the y-axis, the scale depicts the degree of the dominant theme. Notably, the dotted *horizontal line* [----] indicates a threshold for a signal of acceptance. Of course, where exactly this threshold lies is hard to pinpoint and may vary for different preferences and rhetorical settings. What is clear is that the signaling point should be rather high—the more the E10 shares the rhetoric, the better for the P5—but it should also not be so high to exclude any outlier position of an E10 member who fears going against a consensus in the room.

Most of the signaling literature argues that the UNSC is the most coveted multilateral security organization because it is the most representative of the will of the international community and

has the most diverse interest constellation.[60] This is so because the UN ensures that there is at all times a diverse body of Member states seated in the Council—through a regional representation scheme. That is, at all times, there have to be three Members from African states, two Members from Asia, two Members for Latin America, one Member for Eastern Europe, and two Members for Western Europe and other states (in addition to the five permanent). Through this stratification, the Council is assumed to be operating as a "neutral representative of the international community in a case of military intervention".[61] The idea behind this assumption is that *one* Member state is unlikely to dominate the institution because even powerful members have to work with a stratified sample of UN members, coming to the Council with a diversity of interests. These diverse interests are then meant to translate into a range of policy preferences.

In Figure 4.1, the preferences of all Member states are favorable to action—the E10 are even keener on intervention than the P5—and at the same time, the dominant theme is not leaving the bargaining space of agreement (indicated by the *dotted vertical black line*). This suggests that during the entire debate, only one theme rose to dominance, and every single member state shared the same theme. For the P5, this is good news; every E10 member has repeated their desired theme—showing them that they understand the conflict in the same light. Because the theme has been shared in unison, a clear signal is reached, crossing the threshold indicated by the *dotted horizontal line*. Consistency pressure also does not affect the outcome adversely because no member state has spoken out against the theme in the past. Because there are no outlier positions present, thematic domination does not exclude any Member. This is the optimal scenario for unanimous action. In such a signaling scenario, the P5 may now reconvene behind closed doors and draft their first (and most likely only) resolution. The chances of adopting it unanimously are excellent.

[60] Thompson 2010, 37.
[61] Thompson 2010, 37; Abbott and Snidal 1998, 28.

Figure 4.2 Heterogenous preference distribution with one dominant theme and one outlier position



Note: The figure is modeled based on the schematic visualizations of Thompson (2010,37).

Conversely, Figure 4.2 illustrates a case where there is a more heterogeneous preference distribution around C, although most of them still fall into the spectrum of authorizing action. This is the arguable default scenario of UNSC bargaining. Yet, and this is crucial, one state has an outlier preference. In the past, this state has used countervailing rhetoric against the dominant theme shared by all other P5 and E10 members. While its ideal point is still pointing towards authorization, its rhetorical track record—through consistency pressure—prevents it from repeating the dominant theme.[62] In this scenario, the dominant theme is excluding its outlier position, which is also visualized on the y-axis as the dominant theme fails to reach the dotted horizontal line [---]—indicating a clear signal. Coming to a vote, this state may still not vote "no", as its ideal point preference is to adopt a resolution, but verbally it cannot communicate its stance because of consistency pressure. Its reluctance to repeat the dominant theme creates uncertainty for the P5. Depending on how quickly (C) needs to be resolved, the P5 must now act without a

[62] Scherzinger 2022a; Franck 1990.

signal of benign intention and bring the resolution to a vote without the full knowledge of whether states are going to vote "yes".

Figure 4.3 Illustrative example with one dominant theme and Venezuela's outlier position on R2P



Note: The figure is modeled based on the schematic visualizations of Thompson (2010,37).

Figure 4.3 uses the same logic as the previous scenario but populates it with an illustrative example. Let us assume in the following that there is a civil conflict (C) taking place in a Latin American country, and the UN becomes aware of mass killings taking place within the borders of said country. Furthermore, let us also assume that the head of government of the respective country has declared himself to be unable to secure civilians and stop the killings. The ideal point preference distribution of all Members over (C) is such that action is likely, with XE10 (now actually E9) even being more hawkish than XP5. However, there is one outlier position advocated by Venezuela (XVen). Its ideal point preference would still point towards action (maybe Venezuela is afraid of negative spill-over in the form of refugees entering its own borders). However, Venezuela has not shared the dominant theme of human rights. The reason for that is that some E10 members have strongly invoked the responsibility to protect (R2P) during the debate, and this norm could serve as the prominent argument for intervention. Yet, Venezuela has decried the R2P

in the past as a "perverse pretext for intervention".[63] Consistency pressure applies, and Venezuela must now adhere to its rhetorical track record and avoid repeating the HR theme.

To signal a different understanding, Venezuela has mounted a countervailing theme of regional security as a plausible escape route out of this conundrum, but the theme has not been shared by anybody else. If the P5 now draft a resolution and bring it to a vote, the authorized intervention is unlikely to be unanimous in nature.[64] Simply because Venezuela will have to abstain in the least to signal its dissent towards the R2P and the dominant HR theme, it may even vote "no," knowing that the action will likely take place without it (as everybody else shared the dominant theme). After all, it has a preference for action, but its rhetorical track record prevents it from showing this signal to its fellow members and also prevents it from voting affirmatively. This scenario highlights the extent to which a dominant theme can hurt unanimity. Highly dominant themes allow for little dissent and may feature legitimating rhetoric against which a state has spoken out in the past. Because of consistency pressure, a state holding an outlier position must now refrain from repeating the dominant theme, increasing uncertainty for the P5 and lowering the chances for unanimity.

Of course, the presented scenarios are probabilistic in nature. This means that in rare circumstances, states may actually choose to suffer the audience costs of going against the rhetorical track record and vote affirmatively, even without repeating the dominant theme. Then, unanimity is not something that is fully strategically produced through verbal signaling but simply a product of preference distribution. However, such a scenario is supposedly quite rare as the costs of going against consistency pressure are assumed to be quite high.

To summarize, these three figures illustrate three main points. First, preference homogeneity in the Council is desirable for unanimity because states want to realize specific things in a given resolution. This means that they care about the content of the resolution. The closer the preferences align over a specific conflict resolution, the better. Although this may appear trivial, this should be the default logic for reaching unanimity. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

[63] Scherzinger 2022b, 7.

[64] With China and Russia having very critical stances toward the R2P themselves, such a resolution would have not a real chance for unanimity from the very beginning—as China and Russia would not co-sponsor the draft, perhaps even veto it at a later vote. But for the sakes of simplicity, let us set this fact aside for a moment.

Hypothesis U1: *Preference Homogeneity among Council Members during a debate should positively influence the likelihood of unanimous voting on a subsequent resolution.*

Furthermore, E10 participation is crucial for unanimity production because their theme-retelling decreases the P5's uncertainty about voting choices. If or when the E10 speak, they show whether they understand the conflict in the same light. Even if the E10 may not share the dominant theme, their mere participation in the debate may be important for them, showing their domestic audiences that they are making meaningful contributions towards maintaining international peace and security. As such, their participation may also satisfy shared notions of democratic participation in global governance, making them more receptive towards a consensual outcome.[65] Furthermore, only when a crucial threshold of E10 Member repeats the P5's desired theme, is a clear signal reached. Therefore, one can say that E10 participation is valuable as it may help to create unanimity via public signaling. This leads to two important observable implications. First, the participation of the E10, in general, is beneficial to produce unanimity, and second, the more E10 members repeat a dominant theme, the better.

Hypothesis U2a: *The ratio of E10 participation during a debate should positively influence the likelihood of unanimous voting on a subsequent resolution.*

Hypothesis U2b: *The higher the ratio of E10 members sharing a dominant theme, the better the likelihood of unanimous voting on a subsequent resolution.*

The third implication is that the degree of dominance matters. Low dominance, so a debate that is *not concentrated on one theme but on many*, should positively affect the chances for unanimity as states can adhere to their specific prior track record. In a sense, they could be said to follow the logic of 'you justify on your grounds, and I justify on mine'. High dominance should also positively affect unanimity, as one clear signal of a plausible route for justification is reached throughout the debate. This may only work with such themes that offer a very broad understanding, so different actors may acquiesce to this position—but this is an empirical question to be answered. Therefore, all else being equal, high dominance is more likely to affect the likelihood of unanimity positively. As such, the different degrees of dominance—the more a debate is solely focused on one type of theme—are meaningful for the likelihood of unanimity. This implies a curvilinear trend where low

[65] Confidential background interview with high ranking E10 officials.

dominance is positive towards unanimity; moderate dominance hurts unanimity, and high dominance, again, is helpful towards unanimity production.

Hypothesis U3a: *Low dominance during a Security Council debate should increase rather than decrease the likelihood of unanimity in the subsequent resolution.*

Hypothesis U3b: *Moderate dominance during a Security Council debate should decrease rather than increase the likelihood of unanimity in the subsequent resolution.*

Hypothesis U3c: *High dominance during a Security Council debate should increase rather than decrease the likelihood of unanimity in the subsequent resolution.*

TOWARDS A BASELINE AND IMPROVED UNANIMITY MODEL

Against the previous important ramifications, I will propose a baseline model of Council unanimity by consulting a small but important secondary literature. Then, in a second step, I will populate this baseline model with rhetorical and participatory explanatory variables because I believe that unanimity is substantially facilitated in public Security Council debates—leading to an improved model of unanimity production in the Council.

Institutional Variables and External Shocks

Relevant scholarship has argued that the homogeneity of interest constellations between P5 and E10 actors that allows for Council action. Because assessing vested P5 and E10 interests in over 28,000 votes is a daunting task, I rely on preference homogeneity[66] as an imperfect stand-in proxied through preference alignment through ideal-point voting for all Council Members per year—a common strategy in the relevant literature.[67] To this end, I use United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting data to arrive at ideal-point preferences for each Member state.[68] I rely on *UNGA voting data* to derive preferences and not on SC voting data to avoid conflating my independent measure with the outcome unanimity. Then, I take the ideal-point preferences for each UNSC

[66] Allen and Yuen 2020; Allen and Yuen 2022; Binder and Golub 2020.
[67] Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017.
[68] Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017.

member (not UNGA member) for each debate year and transform the variable in such a way that the average preference alignment greater or equal to 1 indicates preference homogeneity.

The next factor in my baseline model is an external shock disturbing the everyday politics of the Council. Such shocks are more ambivalent in the direction of Council action. External shocks that make it onto the Council agenda often contain serious human suffering in the form of humanitarian crises, natural disasters, or extremely violent civil conflicts, which may be accompanied by global visibility. Extant literature has shown, time and again, that the UN intervenes in the most gruesome conflicts with the highest amounts of human suffering.[69] Yet, this says little about whether such interventions are authorized unanimously. External shocks often come with global visibility and a particular pressure to respond. Relatedly, some studies have shown that heinous war crimes increase intervention speed—especially if such acts use sexual violence as a weapon of war against women.[70] Still, this increased reaction speed might be at the cost of ensuring unanimity. If there is heightened pressure to act and ongoing media coverage suggesting the UN must immediately respond to an external shock, consultations, and pre-negotiations (if there are any) should receive less time.

More importantly, in such scenarios, there would be less time to search for plausible legitimation rhetoric—as states might need to present a solution as soon as possible. This, in turn, decreases the certainty of resolution drafters over voting choices. If there is not enough time to repeat a theme over days, weeks, or even months, the sponsors of a resolution might not know when to submit a resolution to a vote. Thus, external shocks pressure Council Members into quick action, decreasing the time for a careful reading of the room. In all, external shocks should be rather negative for Council unanimity.

To put this logic to the test, I gathered novel Council unanimity data. To do this, I web-scraped all 27,780 UNSC Member votes between 1995-2018 from the UN webpage for all UNSC resolutions during the same time frame. For each resolution, I summarized the votes by the 15 voting Member states. If 15 states voted affirmatively per resolution, I counted the resolution as adopted unanimously—denoting a score of 1. Otherwise, I denoted the resolution with a score of 0. I follow the established practice of counting E10 abstentions as violations of unanimity, as they increase the quorum for a successful resolution.[71] I also removed 15 resolutions where there had been no vote, but Member states adopted these resolutions by consent without a formal public

[69] Binder 2016; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Fortna 2004, 2008; Mullenbach 2005.
[70] Benson and Gizelis 2020.
[71] Sievers and Daws 2014, 317.

vote behind closed doors. During my time of the study, this adoption is only used for the election of judges to vacant posts of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[72] I used logit models with a year-fixed-effects estimator to control for time-related change to predict my baseline model of Council unanimity.

Figure 5. A Baseline Model of Council Unanimity.



Note: Preference Homogeneity is calculated from Bailey et al. 2017, as preference alignment for all Security Council Members in a given resolution-year. The variable has been dichotomized so that average values (for all Council Members during the year of the debate) equal to or greater than 1 indicate homogeneity. External Shocks are proxied through a Chapter 7 reference in the submitted resolution draft on the day of voting. The variable is dichotomized so that values of 1 indicate an external shock. Thick red whiskers show 95-% confidence intervals. The model employs year-fixed effects.

Crucially, Figure 5 supports the assumptions made in Hypothesis U1 and thus confirms relevant literature. Both preference homogeneity and external shocks influence Council unanimity. A one-unit increase in preference homogeneity is associated with a 6-% increased likelihood for Council unanimity in UNSC resolutions. As predicted, external shocks affect unanimity negatively; the occurrence of an external shock is associated with a 4-% decreased likelihood of unanimity. Because my baseline model employed year-fixed-effects, we essentially controlled for any time trend inherent in the data, such as a growing likelihood for preference alignment or a growing likelihood of external shocks due to a higher likelihood of civil conflicts after the end of the Cold

[72] There is also the practice of secret votes for the post of the Secretary-General. However, these are taken behind closed doors and are never circulated.

War. The effects are highly statistically significant ($p<0.001$) and unaffected by model choices. This baseline model is a simplified account of how unanimity is obtained in the Council and will now be augmented further.

Linguistic and Participatory Explanatory Variables

The last section has established my baseline model of Council unanimity—being a function of external shocks and preference homogeneity among Council members. Yet, this model, I argue, is an imperfect understanding of how the Council is operating. In my theoretical framework, the participation of the E10 in a Security Council debate is important for the P5 so that uncertainty over voting preferences decreases. If or when the E10 speak, they show whether they understand the conflict in the same light. Even if the E10 may not share the dominant theme, their mere participation in the debate may be important for them, showing their domestic audiences that they are making meaningful contributions towards maintaining international peace and security. As such, their participation may also satisfy shared notions of democratic participation in global governance, making them more receptive towards a consensual outcome.[73]

To update my baseline model, I used all UNSC public debates from 1995-2018[74] and merged them via their session number, the so-called S/PV number, with my original UNSC voting data and their resolutions.[75] Thus, I arrived at a dataset that contains all speeches nested in 1,449 *UNSC resolution debates*. Then, I measured the themes spoken in these debates by relying on a semi-supervised topic classification model (seeded-LDA).[76] Crucially, I let the model select among six legitimating themes that are said to exhaustively cover the UNSC agenda: "Human Rights and humanitarian action", "development and cooperation", "combatting terrorism", "curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", "regional security and territorial integrity", and "protecting women and children in conflict".[77] I also included two residual categories of mundane organizational rhetoric called "greeting" and "procedure" that have been removed from the analysis (available in the appendix). Crucially, the model achieves an F1 score of 0.81 against hand-coding (also available in the appendix).

Next, to measure dominance, I transform these shares into a market concentration index, using the *Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index* (often shortened as Hirschman Index or HHI) used in

[73] Confidential background interview with high ranking E10 officials.
[74] Schönfeld et al. 2019.
[75] Scherzinger 2021.
[76] Watanabe and Zhou 2020.
[77] Scherzinger 2023, Chapter 2.

macroeconomics and competition law.[78] The Hirschman index is meant to quantify dominance intuitively by applying a measure of market concentration.[79] The idea is here to have a measure of the degree of how unipolar (or exclusive) a debate is. The more the debate is focused on only one theme, the higher the index. The scale is measured as a degree of concentration. I transformed the variable so that when the market of themes is fully equal (i.e., the shares of my six themes are equal), it takes on a value of 0. The more concentrated the market is, i.e., the more one theme is dominant (and the others absent), the closer it gets to the value of 1. The latter can only be attained if one theme is dominant and all others are absent from the debate. The lowest observed value in my dataset is 0.16 (indicating a strongly equal market), and the highest observed value is 0.9, indicating a hugely dominant theme and nearly no other theme present. The average market concentration is 0.3—showing that the public debates are, most of the time, not dominated by one theme but rather divided. Figure 6 then tests the additional hypotheses of the improved model.

Figure 6. An Improved Model of Unanimity in the UNSC.



Note: Preference Homogeneity is calculated from Bailey et al. 2017 for all Security Council Members in a given resolution-year. The variable has been dichotomized so that average values equal to or greater than 1 indicate homogeneity. E10 participation is calculated as the share of E10 members speaking during a debate. Dominant Themes are measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index for market concentration. Its values have been transformed so that a fully equal marketplace (where the shares of all themes are equal) has a value of 0, and a debate with only one dominant theme (and all others are absent) has a value of 1. Furthermore, all variables have been nominalized to range between 0 and 1. The model employs year-fixed effects.

[78] United States Department of Justice 2018.
[79] The Hirschman Index is the sum of the squared share of each market competitor (in my case themes). The result is divided by 10,000 to obtain a simple 0 to 1 scale.

Importantly, my improved model validates several hypotheses. First, as theorized, E10 participation is advantageous in producing unanimity. On average, a one-unit increase in E10 participation is associated with a 4-% increased likelihood for unanimity. This finding challenges the prevailing belief that the interests of the P5 alone dictate unanimous decisions in the Council. It highlights the significant role of the E10 in shaping unanimity, suggesting that their active participation is crucial. This finding also supports the notion that the E10 are committed to 'making their mark during their tenure on the Council'. It also emphasizes the value of democratic participation in global governance.

Crucially, as theorized, a dominant theme is a divisive rhetorical tool without the added benefit of who uses it; these make unanimity less likely. On average, a dominant theme is associated with a decreased likelihood of unanimous voting by 30 percent. In line with prior research, both external shocks and preference homogeneity remain statistically significant toward unanimity production ($p< 0.0001$). Thus, adding rhetoric, and participation, significantly improves our explanatory power (available in the appendix). Without including rhetorical and participatory variables, one cannot fully grasp the complexity of unanimity production in the Council.

The Interplay of Dominance, Unanimity, and the Participation of the Elected Ten

Until now, I have analyzed the statistical significance of two models to understand Council unanimity better. Moving forward, I aim to explore the complex relationships between dominance and unanimity, and how dominance interacts with the participation of the E10 in influencing unanimity. I suggested that dominance and unanimity share a curvilinear relationship. A low degree of dominance generally aids unanimity—as states can cherry-pick their preferred legitimation strategy. Similarly, a high degree of dominance can be beneficial, as it provides a clear directive that states can use to justify a unified approach. Lastly, moderate levels of dominance should be the space where the likelihood of unanimity is lowest, as states may not be able to cherry-pick their favorite route of justification, and no dominant signal has emerged on how to justify a particular course of action. Figure 7 plots the relationship between the degree of Dominance (HHI), taking squared values of the HHI to approximate curvilinearity on the likelihood of unanimity.

Figure 7. Testing Curvilinearity Between Dominance and Unanimity.



In line with my expectation, the relationship between thematic dominance and unanimity does indeed approximate a curvilinear trend; it forms a distinctive U-curve. The trend is highly statistically significant—although uncertainty increases for values greater than 0.6 as there are very few debates with such high dominance (< 5-% of the data). This means that unanimity is likely on two poles of dominance. *Either on very low dominance*, so a debate where speakers talk about a number of themes or a debate where speakers *focus on only one theme.*

As such, I find that very high dominance makes unanimity most likely. That is, the UNSC debates have a nature, whereby speakers seem to anticipate whether this is a moment of individual or collective justification for action and positions. In debates where everyone can justify their course of action on their desired theme—in a sense, 'you justify on your normative grounds, and I justify on mine'—leads to a high likelihood for unanimity, as every state can conform to their individual rhetorical track record, pleasing domestic audiences and avoiding audience costs.

Or, speakers anticipate over the course of a debate that *one* theme is rising to dominance, and when enough speakers are on board, bring it jointly to high dominance. In such situations, the collective pressure for consistency might be higher than the individual need for consistency. This means that either states with outlier positions yield towards the collective and repeat the highly dominant theme, or states with outlier positions remain silent but still vote affirmatively in the end to avoid the costs of going against the collective. Because there are few debates with such high scores of dominance, it could mean that there are fewer instances where 'everybody can get on board'.

Of course, since I effectively demonstrate associations here, it could also mean that unanimity leads either to cherry-picking and low dominance or one jointly debated theme and high dominance. Establishing a causal arrow with observational (text) data is notoriously difficult. To, at the very least, suggest a causal relationship, consider this argument: If unanimity precedes rhetoric, why are highly dominant legitimation themes so infrequent? If states reach a consensus before even the first debate, they could simply unite around a single theme to justify their intervention. The need for and credibility of an intervention arguably increases if the Security Council does not present six varying justifications for why an intervention should occur. When one speaker justifies on "protecting women and children in conflict", and the next speaker on "combatting terrorism" in the region and so on, onlookers to the Council must get the impression that member states are cherry-picking plausible justification rubrics that vary from country to another. If states agree prior to the first day of the debate, they would likely "get their story straight" in more cases, agreeing on a unified justification and opting for more vague language during debates and resolutions to accommodate individual positions.

For now, I have measured dominance without qualifying the type of dominant theme. For example, it could be the case that some states share only such themes from which they expect that they have a chance of reaching a clear signal. Or, it could mean that the P5 selectively steer only such themes from which they expect that no state will hold an outlier position.

In opposite to these two scenarios, when a debate falls in the murky space of a medium dominance, so where speakers discuss two or three themes, but no clear, highly dominant pattern emerges, the likelihood for unanimity drops severely. This seems to be the case because there is neither a clear signal for a preferred route for justification nor could speakers cherry-pick their preferred rubric for individual justification.

The second part of my theoretical argument was that unanimity is brought about at the behest of the E10. Crucially, a clear signal can only set in if the E10 repeat the dominant theme, thereby increasing the likelihood of unanimous voting. Put simply, the higher the dominant theme (when shared by the E10), the better for unanimity.

To investigate this proposed relationship, I estimate an average marginal effect on the interaction between rising degrees of dominance and E10 participation on the likelihood of unanimity. In the logit model, I include a quadradic term to approximate the nonlinear relationship I discovered above. Figure 8 plots the relationship of E10 participation on unanimity across rising degrees of dominance.

Figure 8. Relationship between E10 Participation on Unanimity across rising Degrees of Dominance.



The average marginal effects plot regresses the interaction between E10 participation across squared degrees of dominance (measured as HHI) on the outcome unanimity. The regression includes its constitutive terms (E10 and Dominance) and controls for preference homogeneity and external shocks.

Crucially, the average marginal effects plot confirms my expectation. When dominance rises and the E10 repeat the dominant theme, the likelihood of unanimity grows drastically. For the highest degree of dominance (a value of 0.9), the AME of E10 participation increases the likelihood of unanimity by almost 48-%. This empirical finding bestows considerable evidence to the argument that dominant themes, told and retold by the E10, become signals for a unified course of action, increasing the likelihood of unanimity.

Steering the Debate

We have seen that the likelihood of unanimity is highest when the E10 brings a theme to dominance. Does this mean their participation matters more than what they are actually saying?

To investigate this question, we can dissect the UNSC resolution-debates more deeply. Let us assume, for a moment, that unanimity was solely a function of E10 vs. P5 participation and dominant themes. Of course, we already know that preference homogeneity and external shocks matter (they explain about 60% of the data), but let us set these aside for a moment. If we focus

on the remaining explanatory power of the participatory factor and the rhetorical factor (participation and dominant themes), we can unpack whose rhetoric matters more.

To visualize this, I propose that we think of a UNSC resolution debate along three dimensions. First, we can ask who speaks more (E10 vs. P5 participation). Second, what is the likelihood of unanimity at the end of the debate? Third, how much data (how many resolution debates) can be explained in this way?

Figure 9 uses tile-plotting to illustrate the interplay of these three dimensions across all UNSC resolution debates. The logic of the plot is easily explained. I slice each debate into four equally large shares (participation shares on the y-axis and thematic dominance on the x-axis). Then, I predict the likelihood of unanimity for each slice and calculate how many resolutions (out of the total of 1,449) can be explained in this way. I use color coding schemes to show visually a) the number of resolutions explained and b) the average likelihood for unanimity. Put simply, the darker the quadrant, the better.

Figure 9. Unpacking the Impact of Rhetorical & Participatory Variables on Unanimity.



Figure 9 strongly underscores the importance of the interplay between themes and the participation of the E10. 555 resolutions (38-%) are perfectly explained solely by their low thematic dominance and very high E10 participation (*unanimity rate at 100%*). Even if E10 members fully dominated a debate—so no P5 Member spoke after them—resolutions are unanimously adopted. This is the largest explanatory share across all resolutions. Hence, we can say, once again, that

E10's participation in Security Council debates is important in achieving unanimity. This finding strongly supports research that has argued that procedural and participatory notions of legitimacy matter for the functioning of IOs.[80] Against this perspective could stand the argument that the E10 only participate in "lame duck discussions", and as such, the effect I find here is simply a selection effect of unpolarized debates. As a robustness measure, I calculate the E10 participation rate and unanimity rate, for each agenda item of the resolution debates (available in the appendix). Crucially, the E10 engage highly in politically sensitive agenda items such as "Libya" (participation rate of 72%), Syria (participation rate of 76%), or "the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question" (participation rate of 78%), among others. It is not the case that the E10 only speak up when the agenda item carries low politics.

The avenue that covers the resolutions is that the E10 should have the most—if not almost all speaking time—and should be allowed to pick and choose their preferred theme on which to justify their action and position (the first pole of unanimity). Or, one theme should rise to very high dominance, then the likelihood for unanimity is still very high—contigent on very high levels of E10 participation—but this explains fewer resolutions (because few debates have that high thematic dominance).

There is another cluster where E10 participation is very low (bottom left), meaning P5 participation is very high, and thematic dominance is also low. These might be debates where an agreement was facilitated behind closed doors prior to the debate, and the P5 do most of the talking (17.7% of the data). There are two more indicators that support the pre-agreed nature of these debates. First, there is typically only one or two speakers before the vote—and these are P5 members. Two, these debates feature an uncommonly large share of mundane and technical UN lingo and nearly no legitimating themes (available in the appendix). In those debates, speakers merely announce what is going to happen in a specific crisis and then submit a resolution to a vote.

Markedly, pure dominance and a hundred percent debate participation from E10 Members do empirically not exist. This is further testament to the idea that if a theme becomes dominant against which a particular E10 member state has spoken out in the past—and the collective pressure of consistency applies—this particular state might remain silent in the debate to maintain consistency towards its own rhetoric and to avoid going against the consistency of the collective.

As a last measure for this article, I want to investigate whether a signal can be reached with any of the six themes. The tile plot, in combination with the logic of consistency pressure, has suggested,

[80] Tallberg et al. 2014; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018.

that if a theme becomes dominant against which states have spoken out in the past, these states avoid repeating the theme. In other words, when the E10 *do speak up*, what theme are they actually bringing to dominance, and how does this affect the chances for unanimity?

SPEAKING IN DOMINANT THEMES

To investigate this question, Figure 10 plots the average marginal effect (AME) of E10 participation across different types of rising themes while controlling for preference distribution and the occurrence of an external shock.

Figure 10. AMEs of E10 Participation by Type of Dominant Theme.



Crucially, the figure underscores the importance of the *type* of dominant theme in strengthening the effect of E10 participation on Council unanimity. Starting with WMD thematic dominance, the average marginal effect (AME) of E10 participation increases the likelihood of unanimity on a highly dominant theme by 25 percentage points—the effect is statistically highly significant ($p < 0.001$). This is the highest value among all themes and the marginal effect of E10 participation. Since almost all of the E10 countries do not possess any WMD—specifically, no nuclear weapons,

this might be a moment of clear interest homogeneity among the E10.[81] As such, this theme might hold particular sway in the Council, as almost all states—even the nuclear powers of the P5—can agree that no new state should acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

In a similar direction and with considerable magnitude, falls dominance of the terrorism theme. From a debate that virtually features no terrorism to a debate dominated by the theme, the AME of E10 participation rises by 23 percentage points. Keeping in mind that there is no homogenous definition of what constitutes terrorism in the Security Council, terrorism might be a particularly good sell as diplomats may be able to frame the phenomenon according to their preferred understanding of terrorism—giving them leverage over what the term should cover and what not.

Smaller statistical power comes from appeals to the regional security theme and calls for a theme of development. A rising regional security theme increases the AME of E10 participation; going from a debate that features no security talk to a debate where the theme is highly dominant increases the AME by 13 percentage points. Going from a resolution-debate with no development talk to a debate with high development dominance increases the AME on unanimity by 14 percentage points.

Talking about 'women and children' during a debate has a substantially smaller effect size. Going from zero to full dominance increases the effect of E10 participation on unanimity by around five percentage points. Interestingly, the human rights theme remains a negative factor in promoting E10 participation', even with rising levels of dominance. While the effect size is negligible, the upshot is that human rights have no compelling effect on E10's participatory effect and are *even harmful* to unanimity in the Council. This finding underscores literature that has worried that the power of human rights has mainly been a short-lived momentum in the 1990s.[82]

Furthermore, if we remember that consistency pressure affects the sharing of a theme, this finding might be all the more logical: There are some human rights critical or even dissenting states represented in the Council—even amongst the P5—these states necessarily 'sit out' debates where human rights rhetoric rises to dominance. Another reason for this behavior could also be that, over the years, there have been sporadic claims that human rights rhetoric might be a trojan horse for intervention.[83] States that have used rhetoric to this end are then incentivized to remain silent on the matter to avoid audience costs.

[81] Past Council Member India, Pakistan are outliers here. Technically, Israel would also be an outlier but the country has never sat on the Council.
[82] Moyn 2012; Hafner-Burton 2019.
[83] Thakur 2013; Hehir 2010.

Secondly, given that the responsibility to protect (R2P) loads very prominently in my modeling of the human rights theme, it is plausible that the negative effect of human rights is partly driven by the heterogenous stances towards the norm within the P5 and the Council at large.[84] This finding further underscores the idea that dominant themes that have at their core a signal that goes against the central interests of at least one Member foreclose an avenue toward unanimity.

The marked difference between human rights and women and children immediately alerts us to the different political connotations of the themes. Women and children promote unanimity, but human rights do not. While women and children may seem like a cause where 'everybody can get behind', human rights come with a much more charged level of politics. Human-rights-dissenting states might not be willing to repeat a rising theme of HR but might be willing to share a theme of women and children—allowing them to be 'seen as doing something morally valuable' while maintaining critical stances towards human rights rhetoric—which they reject.[85]

CONCLUSION

I began this article with the observation that there is much scholarly emphasis on the importance of unanimity in the UNSC and international organizations. Unanimity is seen as the "voice of the international community",[86] and as signals for legitimacy.[87] Many scholars believe that unanimously authorized resolutions can affect states' behavior, compelling or inducing them to comply with the Council's will.[88] The literature generally assumes that unanimity is crucial for the institutional decision-making of international organizations. Still, we lack a systematic account of how unanimity is produced and what role diplomatic rhetoric might play.

This lack of knowledge is also visible in the central puzzle of this article. While background agreements in secretive UNSC dealmaking have severely dropped over the years, unanimity remains stable and high. How can this be? How is it that the backdoor agreement is down, but consensus is still regularly achieved by the Council?

To answer these questions, I summarized background interviews with senior diplomats from both the E10 and P5 countries, revealing a *secondary function* of the public Security Council debates. The diplomats participating in these debates not only defend their actions and positions to their

[84] Börzel and Zürn 2021, 295; Welsh 2019, 61.
[85] Welsh 2021; Foot 2020.
[86] Krisch 2008.
[87] Thompson 2010; Chapman 2012.
[88] Voeten 2005; Franck 1990.

domestic audiences but also send signals to *other Council member states* about legitimizing potential interventions. Their statements serve as indicators of their strategic intentions within the Council's decision-making processes. Through their rhetoric, they are signaling to the P5 penholders how they want to legitimate a potential intervention and whether they are on board with the proposed measures. Therefore, rhetoric is meaningful for creating consensus in the Security Council; it is another factor—next to preference homogeneity and external shocks—affecting the likelihood of unanimity. To falsify my interview data, I leveraged original UNSC voting data to arrive at a baseline model of Council unanimity. Then, I operationalized my concept of debate signaling by transforming the public rhetoric of diplomats (measured through a seeded-LDA model) into a measure of debate dominance using the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index.

With this model, I could show that the rhetoric and the participation of the E10 increase the likelihood of consensus-making, even controlling for Council preference homogeneity and external shocks. In line with my theorizing, I also found that dominance is curvilinearly related to unanimity. This means that—to reach unanimity—you either need low or very high debate dominance. This suggests that states either want to individually justify actions and positions to conform to their prior individual track record, cherry-picking their preferred justification strategy. Or, states anticipate that one theme is rising to dominance. Then, states who have spoken out against this theme in the past remain silent—yielding to the pressure of the collective.

Because a highly dominant theme and a hundred percent E10 debate participation did not exist, I suspected that not every type of legitimating rhetoric has the same chance of reaching dominance and, thus, unanimity. To investigate this idea, I differentiated by the type of thematic dominance and the AME of E10s participatory effect on unanimity. I found that "weapons of mass destruction" and "terrorism" seemed to be particularly strong routes for justification, indicating that on these two issues, unanimity might be most likely.

Human rights rhetoric harms the likelihood of unanimity within the Security Council, even when repeatedly invoked by the E10 members. This theme typically polarizes the Council. Conversely, discussions focusing on women and children have facilitated consensus, suggesting that some states, notably China and Russia, prefer these issues to the more contentious general human rights issues. They choose these less politicized themes to portray a commitment to morally commendable actions without engaging in politically charged debates.

These dynamics suggest three rhetorical pathways to achieving unanimity in the Security Council: advocate for causes that are universally supported and less politicized (women and children), employ malleable themes with vague language that states can tailor to their national interests

(terrorism), and focus on areas where member states' interests are aligned (weapons of mass destruction).

This explorative article has also shown that a considerable degree of data could only be well explained by considering rhetorical and participatory variables in the study of institutional decision-making. Omitting these variables from the analysis of Council unanimity fails to give credit to the complex and nuanced way the Council operates in world politics.

Lastly, my analysis reveals that while the Permanent Five control the Security Council's decisions, requiring their consent for any action, the Elected Ten also significantly influence outcomes through their participation and rhetoric. If the P5 are concerned about maintaining legitimacy—and unanimous resolutions are a prime way to achieve this—the E10 can effectively constrain the P5 using specific rhetoric. Although the P5 may not be open to change substantial measures in resolutions and may veto anything they dislike, they are willing to consider the E10's input in crafting the right rhetoric to justify interventions. However, in a world where scholars have demonstrated that rhetoric can constrain behavior through entrapment,[89] coercion,[90] and shaming,[91] these rhetorical choices are not without consequences in the future, highlighting the significant influence of the Elected Ten.

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[89] Schimmelfennig 2001.
[90] Krebs and Jackson 2007.
[91] Hafner-Burton 2008.

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APPENDIX

ITEM A. E10 Participation and Unanimity Rate across Agenda Items

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Date of an election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice	1.0000000	1.0000000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — termination of sanctions	1.0000000	1.0000000
ICJ — Election	1.0000000	1.0000000
ICJ — election	1.0000000	1.0000000
Peace and Security in Africa	1.0000000	1.0000000
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	1.0000000	1.0000000
Prevention of armed conflicts	1.0000000	1.0000000
Report of the Secretary-General in Sudan - South Sudan	1.0000000	1.0000000
Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process	1.0000000	1.0000000
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei	1.0000000	1.0000000
Security Council mission — Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.0000000	1.0000000
Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries	1.0000000	1.0000000
The situation in Western Sahara	1.0000000	1.0000000
The situation in the Great Lakes region	1.0000000	1.0000000
Tribute to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon	1.0000000	1.0000000
UN peacekeeping: Dag Hammarskjold Medal	1.0000000	1.0000000
West Africa	1.0000000	1.0000000
Yugoslavia and Rwanda	1.0000000	1.0000000
East Timor	1.0000000	0.9500000
Sanctions	1.0000000	0.9444444
Small arms — West Africa	1.0000000	0.9166667
Peacekeeping operations	1.0000000	0.9127120
HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping operations	1.0000000	0.9117647
Aggression against non-nuclear weapon states	1.0000000	0.8888889
Zaire	1.0000000	0.8863636

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Peace and security — nuclear tests by India and Pakistan	1.0000000	0.8837209
Guatemala	1.0000000	0.8750000
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	1.0000000	0.8750000
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	1.0000000	0.8611111
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	1.0000000	0.8461538
The situation in Cyprus	1.0000000	0.8428571
Peace and security — terrorist acts committed in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania	1.0000000	0.8333333
Peace and security — terrorist acts Peace and security — Africa	1.0000000	0.8275862
El Salvador	1.0000000	0.8148148
Protection of UN personnel	1.0000000	0.8000000
Threats to international peace and security	1.0000000	0.7946881
Timor-Leste	1.0000000	0.7777778
International Tribunal — Rwanda	1.0000000	0.7670761
Middle East situation - Syria	1.0000000	0.7647059
Africa	1.0000000	0.7500000
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	1.0000000	0.7500000
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.0000000	0.7500000
Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	1.0000000	0.7466667
Peace and security in Africa — Libya	1.0000000	0.7368421
The situation in Afghanistan	1.0000000	0.7349990
Somalia	1.0000000	0.7302045
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1.0000000	0.7222222
The situation in Middle East	1.0000000	0.7222222
Rwanda	1.0000000	0.7196190
The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	1.0000000	0.7178571
Cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	1.0000000	0.7058824

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.0000000	0.7042271
Angola	1.0000000	0.6924419
Peace consolidation in West Africa	1.0000000	0.6875000
Burundi	1.0000000	0.6832766
Civilians in armed conflict	1.0000000	0.6822222
Non-proliferation — Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1.0000000	0.6805556
Women and peace and security	1.0000000	0.6752144
Report of the Secretary-General — Nepal	1.0000000	0.6666667
Special report of the Secretary-General on Somalia	1.0000000	0.6666667
The situation in Sierra Leone	1.0000000	0.6666667
Non-proliferation - Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1.0000000	0.6593430
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1.0000000	0.6558678
Middle East — UNDOF	1.0000000	0.6500000
Middle East — UNIFIL	1.0000000	0.6443586
Eritrea-Ethiopia	1.0000000	0.6428571
Great Lakes region	1.0000000	0.6428571
Côte d'Ivoire	1.0000000	0.6257246
The situation in Mali	1.0000000	0.6125000
Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion	1.0000000	0.6111111
The situation in the former Yugoslavia	1.0000000	0.6069712
Guinea-Bissau	1.0000000	0.6000000
Peace and security — terrorist acts committed in the United States	1.0000000	0.5882353
International Tribunal - Rwanda	1.0000000	0.5833333
Reports of the Secretary-General — Sudan	1.0000000	0.5714286
Croatia	1.0000000	0.5639881
Report of the Secretary-General in Sudan	1.0000000	0.5555556
The situation concerning Iraq	1.0000000	0.5555556
Tajikistan	1.0000000	0.5547138
Libya	1.0000000	0.5452381

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	1.0000000	0.5390169
Report of the Secretary-General — Sudan	1.0000000	0.5333333
Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	1.0000000	0.5259891
Maintenance of peace and security	1.0000000	0.5237500
Middle East	1.0000000	0.5111111
Lebanon	1.0000000	0.5000000
Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1.0000000	0.5000000
Central African Republic	1.0000000	0.4826701
Peace and security in Africa - Ebola	1.0000000	0.4761905
Protection of civilians in armed conflict	1.0000000	0.4750000
Non-proliferation / Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1.0000000	0.4615385
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.0000000	0.3928571
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	1.0000000	0.3846154
Mali	1.0000000	0.3333333
The situation between Iraq and Kuwait	1.0000000	0.3333333
High-level meeting: combating terrorism	1.0000000	0.3225806
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1.0000000	0.2857143
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1.0000000	0.0000000
Guinea Bissau	1.0000000	0.0000000
International Tribunals — appointment of Prosecutor	1.0000000	0.0000000
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme	1.0000000	0.0000000
Navigation on the Danube River	1.0000000	0.0000000
Nepal	1.0000000	0.0000000
Security Council meetings in Nairobi (18-19 November 2004)	1.0000000	0.0000000
Sudan — Abyei	1.0000000	0.0000000
The situation concerning Haiti	1.0000000	0.0000000
UNDOF	1.0000000	0.0000000

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Yugoslavia	1.0000000	0.0000000
Liberia	0.9795918	0.6009322
Sierra Leone	0.9743590	0.7498377
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.9729730	0.6927121
Western Sahara	0.9636364	0.5997199
Peace and security — terrorist acts	0.9545455	0.6542347
Afghanistan	0.9487179	0.7233829
Iraq	0.9411765	0.6318102
Middle East situation	0.9354839	0.6878657
Georgia	0.9354839	0.6718618
The situation in the Central African Republic	0.9333333	0.6908730
International Tribunal — Yugoslavia	0.9259259	0.6563786
The situation in the Middle East	0.9250000	0.5688278
Children and armed conflict	0.9166667	0.8122925
The situation in Liberia	0.9166667	0.6049784
The situation in Libya	0.9047619	0.4391861
Haiti	0.8965517	0.6818107
Iraq-Kuwait	0.8780488	0.5665903
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	0.8717949	0.6824056
The situation in Somalia	0.8666667	0.6998402
Maintenance of international peace and security	0.8666667	0.5801193
International Tribunal — Rwanda & Yugoslavia	0.8571429	0.6598639
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan	0.8333333	0.9583333
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.8333333	0.5184861
Cyprus	0.8292683	0.6434959
Peace and security in Africa	0.8000000	0.6744715
United Nations peacekeeping operations	0.8000000	0.6448551
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.8000000	0.6216792
Sudan	0.7352941	0.7041682

AGENDA ITEM	Unanimity Rate	Share E10 Participation (rounded)
Non-proliferation — Iran	0.6666667	0.6149237
Post-conflict peacebuilding	0.6666667	0.5000000
Non-proliferation	0.6666667	0.4803351
The situation in Burundi	0.6666667	0.3888889
United Nations Protection Force	0.5000000	0.7609890
The question concerning Haiti	0.5000000	0.5419580
International Tribunal - Yugoslavia	0.5000000	0.4750000
Middle East — Lebanon	0.5000000	0.3666667
United Nations peacekeeping	0.5000000	0.2450980
The situation concerning Western Sahara	0.4000000	0.5979304
Ethiopia-Sudan	0.3333333	0.6887927
Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	0.3000000	0.6935990
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) — Sanctions	0.2000000	0.8390415
The situation in the occupied Arab territories	0.0000000	0.8571429
Maintenance of international peace and security: Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament	0.0000000	0.7727273
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	0.0000000	0.7727273
Small arms	0.0000000	0.7214286
Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)	0.0000000	0.6949495
Iraq-Kuwait termination of trade and financial sanctions	0.0000000	0.6875000
Admission of new Members — Nauru	0.0000000	0.6666667
Admission of new Members — Tuvalu	0.0000000	0.6666667
Cuba-USA	0.0000000	0.5185185
International Tribunal - Yugoslavia & Rwanda	0.0000000	0.5000000
Albania	0.0000000	0.4761905
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	0.0000000	0.3333333
The situation the Middle East	0.0000000	0.1538462

ITEM B. Distribution of Rhetoric over UNSC Resolution-Debates (mundane organizational rhetoric has been removed from the main text analysis)



Note: The model is calculated using semi-supervised topic classification seeded-LDA (Watanabe and Zhou), relying on a Bayesian Gibbs Sampler to facilitate the learning process.

ITEM C. Distribution of Rhetoric in Debates with Prior Agreement.



Note: Modeled with seeded-LDA machine-learning model with original seed word dictionary on all UNSC debates that were held after "agreement in prior consultations" was secured.

ITEM D. Classification Scores validated against Human Hand Coding of 100 Speeches

Application	F1	Precision	Recall	Relevant Speeches
Entire Model	0.81	0.82	0.8	100
Greeting	0.94	0.92	0.96	24
Procedure	0.92	0.86	1.0	22
Women and Children	0.87	0.91	0.83	11
Development	0.74	0.77	0.71	14
Weapons of Mass Destruction	0.70	0.88	0.58	8
Human rights	0.67	0.67	0.67	9
Terrorism	0.67	0.5	1.0	4
Regional Security	0.63	0.63	0.63	8

ITEM E. Dominance over UNSC Resolution-Debates (measured via Hirschman-Herfindal-Index)



ITEM F. Model Fit Baseline & Improved Model

Model Type	AIC	BIC	Deviance
Baseline	308.8835	329.9564	103.5616
Improved	279.589	311.1984	101.1849

ITEM G. Formula and Regression Output for the Interaction of the Quadratic Degree of Dominance and E10 Participation on Unanimity

In this logit model, the specification is such that:

$$Unanimity = HHI + E10.Part + HHI * E10.part + E10.part * HHI^2 + Pref.Hom + External\ Shock$$

	Unanimity
Degree of Dominance (Hirschman)	-0.375***
	(0.122)
E10 Participation	0.158**
	(0.071)
Preference Homogeneity	0.060***
	(0.018)
External Shock	-0.038***
	(0.014)
HHI*E10 Participation	-0.790*
	(0.403)
E10 Participation * (HHI)²	1.279**
	(0.545)
Constant	1.000***
	(0.039)
N	1,434
Log Likelihood	-131.928
AIC	277.856

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01