

Conflict-related sexual violence and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council *

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Abstract

The regular peer review of the human rights records of all member states of the United Nations (UN) has been touted as one of the main innovations that came with the creation of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) replacing the decried UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). While some studies have highlighted that a large share of recommendations made in this Universal Periodic Review (UPR) are accepted by the state under review and subsequently the latter report having addressed them. Hence, while on paper the UPR appears to work like a charm, we know rather little whether the recommendations made by peers in the UPR actually change the situation on the ground. We address this gap by offering a study on how recommendations dealing with sexual violence in the UPR affect the behavior of states under review engaging in conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Drawing on data for the first three UPR cycles we find mixed evidence for such effects. While for some measures of CRSV we find a reduction, for most of them the negative effects seem to be non-existent. These results, though obtained in a limited policy area of a particular type, question the optimistic assessments regarding improvements in human rights due to the UPR.

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1 Introduction

Sexual violence in conflicts is an endemic problem, both as perpetrated by state and non-state actors. This was recognized by the United Nations through the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1820 in 2008, aiming at protecting women from violence (Binningsbø and Nordås, 2022). This resolution and a similar one proposed by the NGO Geneva Call to non-state actors aim to reduce sexual violence in the context of conflicts.

Another way in which conflict-related sexual violence, especially by state actors, may be addressed is in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)¹ of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The effects of addressing sexual violence in this peer-review process is largely unknown. In an early study Johansson and Kreft (2023) assesses which countries are more likely to receive recommendations with respect to sexual violence, and which member states are more likely to make such recommendations in the context of the UPR process. One of her main findings is that “[a]ll governments with a documented record of widespread, massive and/or systematic CRSV (hereafter referred to as ‘major sexual aggressors’) have been shamed for this by at least one foreign government during their review in the UPR.” (Johansson and Kreft, 2023, 436). Her focus, however, then becomes what countries engage in making recommendations to countries involved in conflict-related sexual violence.

While this is an important first step, in order to address the question whether the UPR process is actually a useful venue to focus on conflict-related sexual violence has to our knowledge not yet been addressed.

Hence, the research question we wish to address in this paper is to what extent recommendations made by UN member-states in the UPR process do actually lead targeted governments to change their behavior. By addressing this research question we can also contribute in a very narrow area to the question whether recommendations made in the UPR-process do actually have tangible consequences, i.e., if policies are implemented.

Conflict-related sexual violence is in this regard a special case, as UNSC resolution 1820 obliges UN member states to take the necessary measures to protect women from

¹With the announcement by the Trump administration that it will not participate in new UPR cycle (see <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-withdraws-key-un-human-rights-report-draws-criticism-rights-advocates-2025-08-28/>, consulted September 9th, 2025), the universality of this review process has taken a hit.

sexual violence in the context of armed conflicts. Hence, implementing policies that lead to a decrease of conflict-related sexual violence, for instance after a state raising this issue in the UPR, reflects, in most cases, a changed implementation of existing rules.

Consequently, what we propose in what follows is an analysis of the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by a state after the latter has received recommendations by its peers in the UPR review process. To do so we rely on data on recommendations linked to sexual violence collected by UPR Sexual Rights Database (<https://www.uprdatabase.org>). We combine this data with information on sexual violence as collected by Cohen and Nordås (2014) (<http://www.sexualviolencedata.org/dataset/>). As the first UPR reports were adopted in 2008, we can study the link between recommendations and sexual violence for the period between 2008 and 2021 (date when the SVAC-data ends) (see also Nordås and Cohen, 2021).

A first analysis to carry out is to check whether it still is the case that all UN member states that have committed some conflict-related sexual violence have been subject to recommendations in the UPR review process as Johansson (2024) finds in her study. We find in the most recent SVAC data 18 countries that engaged in conflict-related sexual violence during their UPR and that received recommendations in the UPR-process. As Table 6 shows, several countries fall in this category multiple times. On the other hand, as Johansson (2024) we find no country subject to an UPR and committing sexual violence which escaped recommendations by its peers according the *Sexual Rights Initiative* data.

2 Literature

Both academics and practitioners put a lot of hope into the main innovation that came with the replacement of the UNCHR by the UNHRC in 2006, namely the UPR. While other aspects of this main human rights body of the UN Voeten2016 changed as well (like the number of sessions, the election of its members, etc.) it was hoped for that having regular peer reviews would improve the operation of this body (Ghanea, 2006; Chetail, 2007; Müller, 2007; Rajagopal, 2007; Forsythe and Park, 2009; Chetail, 2010; Cox, 2010; Davies, 2010; McMahon and Ascherio, 2012; Voss, 2022; Etone, Nazir and Storey, 2024). While critiques warned against too high expectations (Seligman, 2011; Freedman, 2013; Freedman and Houghton, 2017), scholars started to assess the

workings of the UPR in more detail. As this process is a peer review, recommendations presented by the peers of the state under review (SUR) became an important focus (e.g., McMahon, 2010; McMahon, 2012; Freedman, 2013; McMahon, Busia and Ascherio, 2013; Freedman and Houghton, 2017). While the initial preoccupation was mostly descriptive, namely assessing what recommendations were made and whether they were accepted, more recent work focuses on more specific research question. Thus, Terman and Voeten (2018) show that the UPR is also used for strategic purposes, as recommendations are only made in specific situations for allies. Similarly, both Johansson (2024) and Ma (2024) study what leads states make recommendations to particular states under review. While the latter author proposes a more general study, Johansson (2024) focuses on recommendations made by peers with regard to sexual violence. Similarly, Kim (2023, 2024) uses text analysis to uncover networks based on the contents of recommendations.

Thus, it seems fair to say that the literature on the UPR has moved from more descriptive studies to research that focuses on more specific research questions. This has led the field to get a better understanding of what happens in a UPR, what member states make recommendations and of what type, etc. An important aspect, however, is to a large extent still eluding the literature on the UPR, namely, whether this peer review is effective. While some studies assess the share of peer recommendations that a state under review accepts compared to all reviews, others focus on the latter's explanation in the subsequent UPR cycle what it has done to address the recommendations. While these studies provide interesting insights, they do not address directly the issue of implementation, namely whether the state under review has taken in practice (legal) actions to address the recommendations. This is not surprising, as assessing whether recommendations are implemented (voluntarily, as there are no enforcement mechanisms) is fiendishly difficult, as a quick look at the large literature on the much more formalized implementation process of legislation adopted in the European Union quickly shows (e.g., König and Mäder, 2014).

Hence, in what follows we offer an initial assessment on how a very specific set of recommendations made in UPR processes, namely those focusing on sexual violence, lead to changes in policy, especially among member states that perpetrate conflict-related sexual violence.

Siding with the more optimistic assessments of the UPR by some scholars, we expect that recommendations, even in an area as touchy as sexual violence in countries

affected by civil conflict should lead to policy changes. Hence, we posit the following expectation

E1: Countries receiving recommendations on sexual violence in their UPR will strive to reduce sexual violence perpetrated by their armed forces.

While, as stated above, at least at the international level UN member states are bound by UNSC resolution 1820 to protect women, receiving recommendations in this domain is unlikely to lead to new laws being adopted (as recommendations in other domains might aim for), but is more likely to change the behavior on the ground (for similar arguments linked to sexual violence perpetrated by UN peace-keeping troops, see Johansson and Hultman, 2019).

3 Data and methods

As our main independent variable is formed by peer recommendations in the first three UPR cycles (2008-2022) we can look at their effects for (at most) 578 country-cycle pairs (192 in the first cycle, 193 in the second and third cycle). As we use in part Johansson's (2024) codings of recommendations and her data ends in 2019, we have in the most limited dataset 500 observations of member states receiving recommendations (possibly on sexual violence).

We combine these country-UPR cycle observations with a country-year dataset (generated with the help of the `peacesciencer` package) to yield a dataset covering the period from 2000 to 2019 (respectively 2021).² As we are interested in the ways in which recommendations affect UN member states having received recommendations regarding sexual violence, we combine this dataset with Cohen and Nordås's (2014) SVA dataset. We use the codings these authors propose both for state actors and rebel forces (as control) and retain (separately) all that are based on reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US State Department. Hence, these three annual scores will form our dependent variables.

While Johansson's (2024) analyses focuses on what leads peers to make recommendations in the UPR (and hence uses a dyadic (per cycle) dataset) and thus uses

²This latter end-point is due to the fact that the sexual violence data (SAV) by Cohen and Nordås (2014) ends in 2021. As we consider that UPR recommendations might be presented as a function of CRSV committed in the past we (arbitrarily) extend the dataset back to 2000. In some of the analysis we restrict the time period further, by only considering information extending back five years before the first UPR. We chose five years, as a UPR cycle takes four and a half year, which implies that a SUR has at most five years to address recommendations until the next UPR cycle.

both state under review (SUR) and peer specific variables, given our focus we only retain the latter. These are the following:

- Fatalities from the UCDP GED data (Sundberg and Melander, 2013): We aggregated the “best” estimate to the country-year level.
- Civil-society repression as measured by the VDem project (Coppedge and Gerring, 2011): we used the “v2csreprss” mean estimate..
- Human rights record of the SUR: We use the latent human rights score from Fariss (2019)
- Years since the adoption of UNSC resolution 1820 in 2008 (Binningsbø and Nordås, 2022): instead of using a counter of years since 2008 we simply added as covariate the year.
- Conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by the rebels (Cohen and Nordås, 2014)and government forces: We aggregate the CRSV scores based on reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US State Department as recorded in the SVA-data.

Turning to our main independent variable, namely UPR recommendations on sexual violence, we proceed in different ways. First, relying on the database provided by the *Sexual Rights Initiative* we downloaded all recommendations that had been assigned to either of the two issue categories: “violence against women/gender-based violence” respectively “sexual violence.” We aggregated these recommendations to the UPR cycle SUR level and counted the number of accepted and non-accepted recommendations in these two issue areas. As it turns out, in all cycles all SUR received recommendations in this area except Israel in the first UPR cycle (2008). There is, however, variation whether or not, no recommendation was accepted.³ Using this variable allows us to cover the full period for which Cohen and Nordås (2014) provide information on sexual violence committed by states and non-state actors.

This very extensive coding by the *Sexual Rights Initiative* is, however, probably too encompassing. Thus, relying on the new code introduced by *UPR Info* in the

³More specifically in the first three cycles we find that in 42 instances a SUR rejected all recommendations in the area of sexual violence. On the other hand, only in twelve case did a SUR accept all recommendations by its peers.

third cycle, we compare these two codings. As Table 5 (in the Appendix) shows, a series of countries, namely 36, according to UPR Info did not receive recommendations regarding sexual violence, while the *Sexual Rights Initiative* reports some such recommendations. According to Table 3 Johansson's (2024) codings is even more restrictive.⁴

As we wish to cover (at least) all first three cycles, we only have two options. Either we rely on Johansson2024 codings of recommendations based on her reading of the *UPR Info* information, or we rely on the much broader coding provided by the *Sexual Rights Initiative*. As Johansson (2024) shows that all offending member states (according to the data collected by Cohen and Nordås, 2014) get recommendations using her data has the advantage that we do not have a selection into treatment issue (this even more so as we do not retain neither the number of recommendations nor their extent of them, at least in the main analyses) (see relatedly Johansson, 2024).

4 Results

By design of the UPR recommendations induce a staggered treatment, making simple fixes problematic (see Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021; Athey and Imbens, 2022; Imai, Kim and Wang, 2022). Given the rather peculiar characteristics of the data, namely that either all member states that receive recommendations regarding sexual violence are engaged in conflict-related sexual violence, as in Johansson's (2024) data, or that all member states under review (with the exception of Israel in 2008) received such recommendations, as for the data stemming from the *Sexual Rights Initiative*, we resort to two types of analyses.⁵

In a first step we resort to simple panel regression with a “within” estimator (i.e., with country-level fixed effects). As covariates we use the ones employed by Johansson (2024), namely the number conflict- fatalities, the human rights scores from Fariss (2019), a measure of civil society repression (Coppedge and Gerring, 2011), the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by the respective rebel forces and the state forces (lagged by one year), as well as the year (which is identical to controlling for the years

⁴In part this has to do with the fact that Johansson (2024) only retains member states that appear in Cohen and Nordås's (2014) dataset, which excludes microstates. As we are interested in the effects of recommendations on sexual violence perpetrated by states (as reported in Cohen and Nordås, 2014) we will be limited in the same way in the empirical analyses we report upon below.

⁵In future iterations of this paper these issues will be addressed more directly, also by extending the UPR Info coding, as well as coding recommendations for their explicit reference to CRSV.

since the adoption, in 2008, of UNSC resolution 1820 (see Table 7 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics on all variables used in the analyses).




Figure 1: Panel regressions (coefficients and 95 % confidence intervals): recommendations on sexual violence coded by Johansson (2024)

Second, as we are in a typical situation of staggered treatments (as a function of the session in which a UPR is carried out for a particular member state), we also resort to the estimator based on matching treated observations with observations with similar treatment histories as proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2022).⁶ Also this approach is not without problems given the peculiarities of our staggered treatment.

Initial results from the first approach are depicted in Figure 1. We run three models for each of the three dependent variables assuming either a contemporaneous effect of the recommendations, are effects with lags of one or two years. As the three coefficient plots show the evidence for tangible effects of recommendation are hard to find. When we consider the measure based on the reports of Amnesty International, we only find a negative effect on the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by the governments two years after the UPR. In the shorter term the effects are event positive. For the measures based on reports by the Human Rights Watch we find a contemporaneous negative effect, but over the two subsequent year the effect inveres itself. For the measure based on the US State department, we even find systematically negative effects.

When considering recommendations on sexual violence as coded by the *Sexual Rights Initiative* (see Table 2) we find similarly mixed results. For the Amnesty International reports we find as above a slightly negative effect two years after as well as in the year of the UPR, and a positive one in the year in-between. For the Human Rights Watch reports, the contemporaneous effect is negative, as is the one in the year after the

⁶Given that UPR cycles last for four and a half year, we used time periods of five years in this matching exercise.




Figure 2: Panel regressions (coefficients and 95 % confidence intervals): recommendations on sexual violence coded by recommendations on sexual violence coded by *Sexual Rights Initiative*

UPR. In the second year, however, the effect turns around. For US State department reports only effect two years after the UPR is negative.




Figure 3: Matched panel regressions (average treatment effect on the treated and 95 % confidence intervals): recommendations on sexual violence coded by Johansson (2024)

The analyses presented so far do not attempt to take into account the fact that receiving recommendations on sexual violence is not exogenous. This is amply illustrated by Johansson's (2024) finding that all states she identified as having received recommendations on sexual violence in their UPR were committing such crimes at the time of their review. Less problematic (but problematic for other reasons) is that data from the *Sexual Rights Initiative*, as according to their data all member states in all three UPR cycles received such recommendations, except Israel in 2008. We nevertheless resorted to Imai, Kim and Wang's (2022) approach in an exploratory fashion, at least relying on the codings provided by (Johansson, 2024).⁷ Figure 3 reports the

⁷As the codings provided by the *Sexual Rights Initiative* suggests all countries except Israel in 2008

average treatment effects on the treated based on matched observations and several controls⁸ for the year of the treatment and the four subsequent years.⁹ The three panels suggest that at most for sexual violence as reported by Human Rights Watch might we find a small negative effect on sexual violence perpetrated by states forces in the aftermath of UPR recommendations on sexual violence. For those measured based on the reports of Amnesty International and the US State Department, the effects remain positive over all five year, except for the former reports in the fourth year after the UPR.

5 Conclusion

While both among scholars and stakeholders there emerged some timid optimism with respect to the UNHRC and especially its newly institutionalized UPR, solid assessments of the effect of the latter are largely missing from the scholarly literature (or if they exist, these assessments are partial). In this paper we attempted in a very preliminary way to address this issue. Focusing on a very specific policy domain, namely sexual violence, we assessed whether states receiving recommendations regarding sexual violence in the UPR adjusted their behavior in the area of conflict-related sexual violence. The results we reported are mixed. Only in very limited contexts do recommendations, on average, reduce sexual violence perpetrated by state forces. In most cases, the effect goes actually in the opposite direction. This would suggest that in the area of conflict-related sexual violence the UPR process is not of great help in insuring compliance (for instance with the UNSC resolution 1820), respectively implementation of necessary policies.

These results have, however, to be taken with a large grain of salt. For our endeavor, the codings of recommendations as dealing with sexual violence is far from optimal. The three ones that we explored (at least partially) come to quite different assessment how prevalent such recommendations are. In addition, given their characteristics, they make assessing their “effectiveness” difficult. Hence, in future iterations

received recommendations on sexual violence, it implies that all countries have the exact same treatment history. Hence, for each treated (subjected to UPR) member states, all the others are matches, provided they were not part of the same UPR session.

⁸The latter were the previous level of sexual violence perpetrated by the government, sexual violence perpetrated by rebel forces, civil-society repression, the human rights record of the state under review and years.

⁹Note that these longer term effects can only be estimated with observations from the first two cycles, as our data on sexual violence from Cohen and Nordås (2014) ends in 2021.

of this paper we aim at addressing these difficulties in order to arrive at a more solid answer to the question whether recommendations in the UPR process, notably those on sexual violence, are actually complied with, respectively implemented with significant changes on the ground.

Appendix

In Table 5 we list the 36 countries who, according to the SRI database received recommendations on sexual violence in the third cycle of the UPR, while UPR Info codes no recommendations addressed at these countries as dealing with this issue. In Johansson's (2024) database only 28 member states received such recommendations (see Table 3).

| | VI |
|---------------------|----|
| Antigua & Barbuda | 1 |
| Bahamas | 1 |
| Belize | 1 |
| Benin | 1 |
| Bhutan | 1 |
| Brunei | 1 |
| Burundi | 1 |
| China | 1 |
| Cyprus | 1 |
| Czechia | 1 |
| Dominica | 1 |
| Dominican Republic | 1 |
| Eritrea | 1 |
| Eswatini | 1 |
| France | 1 |
| Gabon | 1 |
| Ghana | 1 |
| Greece | 1 |
| Israel | 1 |
| Lebanon | 1 |
| Mauritania | 1 |
| Monaco | 1 |
| North Korea | 1 |
| North Macedonia | 1 |
| Pakistan | 1 |
| Qatar | 1 |
| Romania | 1 |
| São Tomé & Príncipe | 1 |
| Senegal | 1 |
| Singapore | 1 |
| Somalia | 1 |
| Sri Lanka | 1 |
| St. Lucia | 1 |
| Sudan | 1 |
| Syria | 1 |
| Ukraine | 1 |

Table 1: Countries receiving recommendations regarding sexual violence according to the SRI database, but not according to UPR Info in the third cycle

| | V1 |
|--------------------------|----|
| Afghanistan | 1 |
| Algeria | 1 |
| Angola | 1 |
| Azerbaijan | 1 |
| Bangladesh | 1 |
| Cameroon | 1 |
| Central African Republic | 1 |
| Chad | 1 |
| Colombia | 1 |
| Congo - Brazzaville | 1 |
| Congo - Kinshasa | 1 |
| Egypt | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 1 |
| Iran | 1 |
| Iraq | 1 |
| Jordan | 1 |
| Malaysia | 1 |
| Mali | 1 |
| Nigeria | 1 |
| Russia | 1 |
| Yemen | 1 |

Table 2: Countries receiving recommendations regarding sexual violence according to the UPR Info in the first three years of the third cycle, but not according to Johansson's (2024) data

| cycle | year | number of countries |
|-----------|------|---------------------|
| 1st cycle | 2008 | 10 |
| | 2009 | 10 |
| | 2010 | 5 |
| | 2011 | 9 |
| 2nd cycle | 2012 | 6 |
| | 2013 | 11 |
| | 2014 | 9 |
| | 2015 | 6 |
| | 2016 | 7 |
| 3rd cycle | 2017 | 5 |
| | 2018 | 14 |
| | 2019 | 9 |

Table 3: Number of countries receiving recommendations regarding sexual violence per year and cycle according to Johansson (2024).

| | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Afghanistan | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Burundi | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cameroon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Central African Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Chad | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Colombia | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Côte D'Ivoire | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethiopia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Georgia | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| India | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Iraq | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Libya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mali | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Mozambique | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Philippines | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Rwanda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Somalia | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| South Sudan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sudan | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Uganda | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ukraine | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 4: UN member states committing sexual violence since the first UPR cycle until 2021 per year (Source: Cohen and Nordås (2014))

| statename | year of UPR while perpetrating sexual violence |
|--------------------------|--|
| Burundi | 2008 |
| Central African Republic | 2013 |
| Central African Republic | 2018 |
| Chad | 2009 |
| Colombia | 2008 |
| Colombia | 2013 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2009 |
| India | 2017 |
| Iraq | 2014 |
| Libya | 2015 |
| Mali | 2013 |
| Mozambique | 2021 |
| Nigeria | 2013 |
| Nigeria | 2018 |
| Philippines | 2017 |
| Rwanda | 2011 |
| Rwanda | 2015 |
| Somalia | 2011 |
| Somalia | 2016 |
| Somalia | 2021 |
| South Sudan | 2016 |
| Syria | 2016 |
| Uganda | 2011 |
| Ukraine | 2017 |

Table 5: UN member states committing sexual violence and receiving recommendations by their peers in UPR per year (*Source: Cohen and Nordås (2014)*)

| country | start | end |
|------------------------------|-------|------|
| Afghanistan | 2008 | 2024 |
| Algeria | 2009 | 2024 |
| Angola | 2008 | 2024 |
| Azerbaijan | 2009 | 2023 |
| Bangladesh | 2008 | 2022 |
| Burundi | 2009 | 2022 |
| Central African Republic | 2009 | 2024 |
| Chad | 2008 | 2022 |
| China | 2008 | 2023 |
| Colombia | 2009 | 2023 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2009 | 2023 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 2008 | 2024 |
| Egypt | 2008 | 2024 |
| Eritrea | 2008 | 2024 |
| Ethiopia | 2008 | 2024 |
| Georgia | 2008 | 2023 |
| India | 2009 | 2024 |
| Indonesia | 2009 | 2022 |
| Iran | 2008 | 2024 |
| Iraq | 2008 | 2023 |
| Israel | 2008 | 2024 |
| Jordan | 2010 | 2024 |
| Kenya | 2008 | 2024 |
| Lebanon | 2008 | 2023 |
| Libya | 2008 | 2024 |
| Malaysia | 2010 | 2023 |
| Mali | 2009 | 2023 |
| Mozambique | 2008 | 2024 |
| Myanmar | 2008 | 2023 |
| Nepal | 2009 | 2023 |
| Nigeria | 2009 | 2024 |
| Pakistan | 2009 | 2024 |
| Peru | 2009 | 2023 |
| Philippines | 2009 | 2024 |
| Russian Federation | 2009 | 2023 |
| Rwanda | 2008 | 2023 |
| Somalia | 2008 | 2024 |
| South Sudan | 2008 | 2024 |
| Sri Lanka | 2009 | 2023 |
| Sudan | 2008 | 2024 |
| Syria | 2008 | 2024 |
| Tajikistan | 2009 | 2023 |
| Tanzania | 2008 | 2024 |
| Thailand | 2008 | 2024 |
| Tunisia | 2010 | 2024 |
| Turkey | 2008 | 2024 |
| Uganda | 2008 | 2023 |
| Ukraine | 2010 | 2024 |
| Uzbekistan | 2009 | 2022 |

Table 6: Time period covered for UN member states perpetrating sexual violence
(Source: Cohen and Nordås (2014))

| Statistic | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| year | 2,781 | 2,014.539 | 4.065 | 2,008 | 2,021 |
| gwcode | 2,441 | 462.607 | 239.551 | 2 | 950 |
| ai_prev.x | 2,779 | 0.014 | 0.140 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| state_prev.x | 2,779 | 0.035 | 0.253 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| hrw_prev.x | 2,779 | 0.018 | 0.185 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| ai_prev.y | 2,779 | 0.040 | 0.257 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| state_prev.y | 2,779 | 0.066 | 0.329 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| hrw_prev.y | 2,779 | 0.033 | 0.234 | 0.000 | 3.000 |
| sv_shaming_45_dummy | 2,358 | 0.037 | 0.189 | 0 | 1 |
| best | 2,781 | 336.075 | 2,960.524 | 0 | 74,728 |
| v2csreprss | 2,691 | 0.775 | 1.480 | -3.725 | 3.346 |
| theta_mean | 2,393 | 0.664 | 1.568 | -2.771 | 5.541 |

Table 7: Descriptive statistics

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