The Politics of National Ties in International Organization Reports*

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Abstract

Reports by international organizations (IOs) are typically seen as providing authoritative and independent information for global governance. In practice, these reports are rarely written by IOs alone. IOs often depend on expertise from outside (to the IO) authors and inputs from IO member governments through consultation, review, and approval processes. We argue that shared nationality between report authors and governments creates ties that can bias IO reports. For the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) flagship *Summary for Policymakers* report on mitigation policy (Working Group III), we show that government comments on draft text are indeed more likely to be accepted when comment-submitting governments and section authors come from the same country. We complement this correlational finding with experimental and qualitative evidence from an elite survey to suggest that career incentives rather than direct government pressure make co-national IPCC authors accommodate their home governments. These results introduce expert authors as an underappreciated type of individual actor in global governance and demonstrate how their agency in IOs with permissive institutional rules can shape IO report production in favor of scientifically powerful states.

Keywords: information provision; IO reports; politics of climate science; IPCC; United Nations.

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Introduction

International organizations (IOs) are maybe best known for the flagship reports they produce. Published with great fanfare typically once a year, IO reports like the United Nation's (UN) *Human Development Report*, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) *Education at a Glance*, or the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) *World Economic Outlook* draw significant attention from governments, businesses, media, and the public all over the world. These reports garner interest because the information they provide has real-world impacts for the global economy (Breen and Doak, 2023; Cormier and Manger, 2022), human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Terman and Byun, 2022), climate negotiations (Hai, 2025), and as evidence before courts (Robinson, Sadai, and Evins-Mackenzie, 2025). IO reports are more than just sheets of paper, they are key instruments for IOs to shape international cooperation through information provision (Keohane, 1984; Milner, 1997; Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Dai, 2007). As such, IO reports hand power from IOs as collective actors to report authors as individual actors: *who* writes a report, and *how* IOs organize report production affects both the credibility of IO-provided information itself and the downstream global governance outcomes this information facilitates.

In writing these reports, IOs rarely ever rely on their own staff alone. Instead, they source external knowledge from outside experts, such as university academics or think tank researchers, while member governments hold mandated forms of control as well. Depending on the IO, governments are asked to review, comment, or even approve draft and final versions of report text (Bayer and Crippa, 2026). As a result, the language and contents of published reports reflect the interaction between expert authors as individual actors and member governments within the institutional rules that govern report production inside IOs.

This relationship is central to our argument, as we theorize that shared nationality between report authors and member governments creates ties that can bias IO reports. Our empirical evidence for this claim comes from the leading United Nations climate science body and, specifically, the

production of a major Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. We use data from the latest 2022 Working Group III *Summary for Policymakers* (SPM) report, which holds outsized significance for multilateral climate governance as the first comprehensive assessment of emission reduction policies after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Falkner, 2016; Rowan, 2025). For this politically consequential report, we show that government requests to edit and change report text are more likely to be accommodated when governments and IPCC authors come from the same country. This pattern holds equally for additions and deletions of text and leads to substantial, rather than purely cosmetic, changes in contents.

As for the mechanism of our argument, we do not believe that governments exercise direct pressure on individual report authors. If this were the case, authors who are directly employed by national governments and seconded to IOs for the purpose of writing reports should be most prone to such forms of political influence. In our IPCC example, we do not find evidence consistent with this logic as government-officials-turned-IPCC-authors do not seem to privilege comments from their home governments. Instead, we argue that the favoritism we observe results from expert authors giving in to career incentives.

These incentives, we claim, play out in two key ways as direct and indirect rewards. While motivations and the relative importance of rewards will vary by author, favoring home governments during report writing can signal loyalty to national administrations. This may prove beneficial when governments appoint experts to national scientific commissions or make nominations for top-brass IO jobs. Next to these direct benefits in the form of high profile appointments, academics, many of whom, as in our IPCC case, often author IO reports, may find indirect rewards even more tempting. These arise when academics are able to feature their own research in IO reports. If successful, authors see their academic reputation and national standing increase, while it also creates the prospect for greater public funding being allocated to priority research areas identified in IO reports. As these areas attract bigger pots of government money, accepting comments from home governments at higher rates is attractive whenever report authors' own research areas align

with those earmarked by governments for greater public funding support.

What, therefore, at the outset, looks like authors ceding to government pressure is, in the end, the result of report authors taking advantage of opportunity structures that institutional rules of IO report production create for them. Similar to the finding of World Bank staff accommodating US interests without the need for direct influence (Clark and Dolan, 2021), we advance the argument that co-produced IO reports will show national bias without governments having to explicitly lean on report authors. In our logic, influence is more indirect and works through career incentives. For academic authors, these incentives materialize when governments steer the development of scientific knowledge by setting national research priorities and allocating science funding (Allan, 2017), and authors follow that steer for self-interested reasons.

We use original elite survey data from 225 IPCC authors to foreground our argument's two main assumptions: first, that IPCC authorship carries significant reputational benefits for advancing academic careers; and second, that IPCC reports shape national research funding strategies. Results from an experiment that we embedded into the same survey and that varied, at random, the nationality of governments whose comments IPCC authors were asked to adjudicate, help us pinpoint the scope conditions of our argument. Unlike what is actual IPCC review practice, where comments are assessed against the full report as the primary benchmark and are handled by author teams rather than single authors individually, our experimental design is necessarily simpler. It both removes the option for authors to legitimize their decisions with deference to the underlying report and makes each decision of whether to accept a government comment or not directly attributable to an individual author, too. Accordingly, we interpret our experimental null results to mean that it is the absence of these two very features that erodes authors' incentives to favor their home government's comments. The major insight here, both for our argument and for arguments about the role of individuals in IOs—many of which are made in the other contributions of this special issue—is that how individual actors, within their respective institutional environments, can *justify* their choices, and how *observable* these choices are, will critically shape these actors'

behaviors and, consequently, global governance outcomes as well.

Our paper makes two contributions. First, and in keeping with the theme of the special issue, we highlight the role of individuals, i.e., IPCC expert authors in our case, for international relations (Weaver, Morrison, and Heinzel, 2026). Taken at face value, it is unsurprising that whoever writes an IO report will leave fingerprints behind. However, despite growing research into how IO bureaucrats and single individuals matter for IO governance and cooperation outcomes (Heinzel, Weaver, and Jorgensen, 2025; Arias and Bare, 2024; Clark and Zucker, 2024; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Malis, 2021; Chwieroth, 2013), much of the existing international institutions literature has traditionally prioritized state power and organizational agency over the agency of individuals. By focusing on report authors as an understudied type of individual actors, who often wield significant pen-holding powers over IOs' key information outputs, we provide original evidence about the influence of individual experts on IPCC reports. We do so by conceptualizing authors' individual agency as a trade-off between upholding an IO report's scientific integrity and furthering personal benefits.

Second, we show that the agency which expert authors hold in writing IO reports can result in biased outcomes, favoring some governments' interests over those of others. Such influence over the contents of IO reports does not emerge from instrumental power exercised by IO member governments, but arises indirectly via a *relational* mechanism. This mechanism aligns government interests with expert authors' behavior through professional career incentives. Our central finding of biased report production has important implications. First, it articulates limits to how credibly IO reports, and IO information more broadly, can constrain government behavior—especially in IOs where organizational rules mandate governments' involvement in information production. And second, it recognizes that co-produced IO reports, in our case on climate change, are not simply the objective representation of state-of-the-art knowledge, but are always a politicized version of scientific evidence that necessarily embodies government preferences as well (Allan, 2017). For climate policy, this is bad news in those instances where obstructionist governments find ways to

impose their national interests on IPCC reports (Bayer and Crippa, 2026).

IO Reports as Instruments of Information Provision

Building on the vast literature that highlights information provision as a central function of IOs (Keohane, 1984; Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Martin and Simmons, 1998), we conceptualize IO reports as the *practical instruments* that IOs use in global governance to provide this very information. These reports come in many different shapes and forms. They cover a wide range of areas, including international finance and trade, health, human rights, education, and climate change. Their impacts can be seen in markets (Breen and Doak, 2023), borrower countries' loan conditions (Cormier and Manger, 2022), human rights enforcement (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Terman and Byun, 2022), and primary education enrollment rates (Bisbee et al., 2019).

As a distinct feature, many major IO reports publish assessments, in one form or another, of countries' global governance track records, either for states individually or collectively. These assessments are based on performance indicators which rate and rank states on a common scale of goal achievement (Kelley and Simmons, 2019). In the hands of IOs, such metrics become compelling tools of reputational pressure because they allow ranked comparisons. The World Bank's *Ease of Doing Business* Index (Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons, 2019) and the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) country blacklists (Morse, 2019) are but two examples of how IOs use their reports (and the rankings published therein) as key information provision instruments in day-to-day IO operations.

IO reports are interesting for two other reasons, too. First, while emblazoned with logos of IOs, many IO reports are not written by IO staff alone. Instead, IOs often source expertise externally, for example, from university academics, researchers in research institutes and think tanks, civil society and private sector employees, or staff seconded from national government departments and other IOs. The extent to which outside experts are involved in the writing of IO reports depends on0 the

length and scope of a report and the IO that publishes it. The IMF's *World Economic Outlook*, for example, is largely written by IMF staff, whereas the World Bank's *World Development Report* explicitly recognizes "external contributions" in the report's foreword. It thanks other World Bank Group colleagues, the High-Level Advisory Panel, and the Academic Advisory Committee for their inputs. Similar variation exists across UN agency reports, too, and external contributions can be extensive. For comprehensive reports, it is not uncommon to see hundreds of listed authors, including large swaths of outside experts.

Second, under delegated authority, member governments as principals in IOs (Pollack, 1997; Nielson and Tierney, 2003) are usually mandated to review, comment on, or approve draft texts of IO reports. The Annual Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collates views expressed by member states, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade Policy Review includes government positions, the UN Human Rights Council reviews country responses for its Universal Periodic Review reports, and the IPCC's Summary for Policymakers requires line-by-line intergovernmental approval of report text. Governments do therefore often hold direct influence in IO report production (Bayer and Crippa, 2026). But, even if their involvement is limited on paper, principals typically control *de facto* access to data, funding, and staff as inputs into IOs' basic operations (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Chwieroth, 2013; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Voeten, 2021; Clark and Zucker, 2024), giving governments indirect means of influence to shape reports.

In sum, IO reports may have less IO "in them" than one might initially suspect. The degree to which this is the case depends on the institutional design that governs IOs' rules around the co-production of their reports. In some IOs, report production has deliberately been firewalled from active government influence, while other IOs seek direct participation of governments, mainly to increase the legitimacy and bindingness of IO reports as soft law instruments (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). In either case, IO reports are not written by the IO as such, but by individual report authors. The argument which we develop below hence centers attention on the relationship between

individual outside authors (who are not IO staff) and their respective national governments. Specifically, we make the case that co-national author-government ties impact the contents of IO reports. This becomes possible because the benefits for academic report authors from seeing their own research featured in IO reports drives the alignment of authors' and home governments' interests in incentive-compatible ways.

Report Authors, Home Governments, and Career Incentives

We begin our argument from the simple, yet underappreciated observation that IO report authors are *single individuals* who are separate from the IO as a collective global governance actor. Report authors have their own agency. As a consequence, their views and behaviors can differ from those of other authors and the IO as a whole. We treat report authors as individual actors in the wider IO ecosystem and not simply as part of a larger group of individuals, such as IO staff, which much of the early delegation and informal governance literature has done (e.g., Pollack, 1997; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Chwieroth, 2013; Johnson, 2014). Importantly, we conceptualize agency as agency of single individuals, instead of agency of IO staff as a single group of multiple individuals. This analytical clarity allows our argument to recognize the many different and (possibly) conflicting structural pressures that individual IO report authors, as actors in their own right, face. These pressures range from normative expectations on one end of the spectrum to self-interested opportunities on the other, and always arise within the institutional context that IO report authors are embedded in.

In many IOs, the remit of expert authors extends far beyond the actual writing of report text. Indeed, authors are usually tasked with seeing the report through from first draft to final publication. Author responsibilities hence involve collating feedback, responding to reviewer comments, and re-writing sections that do not pass member governments' executive scrutiny or lack the IO leadership's approval. Analytically, we do not focus on the technical stage of report writing itself.

Instead, we concentrate on the specific set of tasks that require expert authors to address direct challenges from IO member governments to the report text that authors have written. In the case of the IPCC, these challenges are built into a formal review process and take the form of government comments on draft versions of the report (De Pryck and Hulme, 2022; Hughes, 2024). Similar to academic peer review, report authors then need to decide whether (and how) to incorporate submitted government comments into revised report text (O'Reilly et al., 2024). While we develop our argument within the IPCC's organizational practice, the core logic established below travels to report production in other IOs as long as expert authors have a choice in accommodating (or not) demands to change report text.

In making these choices, individual report authors face a trade-off between, at times, conflicting pressures. On the one hand, authors have been selected as experts in their field to ensure the academic and scientific integrity of IO reports. That is the very reason why they were appointed as report writers. On the other hand, authors who are non-permanent IO staff are naturally embedded within a broader policy and research context in the country which they are working in. We argue that this structural embeddedness creates ties that incentivize authors to give in to demands by co-national governments. We define co-nationality here in terms of the country that report authors are socialized in through formal employment rather than citizenship status at birth. In our logic, where author behavior follows career incentives, what matters most for advancing professional career returns is to maintain a good working relationship with the government of the country that report authors are employed—instead of born—in.[1]

We argue that a close connection with governments is beneficial for IO report authors for two reasons. First, and similar to what others have shown for bureaucrats on IOs' payrolls (Chwieroth, 2013; Malik and Stone, 2018; Clark and Dolan, 2021), co-national government support can create *career benefits* for non-permanent staff, such as external IO report authors, too. Governments are

[1] Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. In our sample, 182 of 237 IPCC experts (76.8%) of Assessment Report 6 (Working Group III) were citizens of the country they were working in.

influential because they control who gets a top job, both at home and, because of nomination rights, in IOs often as well. In the case of the IPCC, where report authors are predominantly academics, prestigious appointments to chair an expert commission, serve as governmental advisor, or lead a national scientific assessment exercise are attractive because they increase academic reputation and public visibility (O'Reilly et al., 2024). Based on data from our original survey with IPCC authors, almost two out of three respondents mentioned greater visibility as an expert in the field among their main motivations to become an IPCC author, while ambitions for future academic or political appointments (26%) and establishing networks with policymakers (19%) also mattered.[2]

However, these positions are not filled on academic merit alone. Instead, governments often seek to appoint academics who are politically aligned. Especially in those IOs where—unlike in the IPCC—the identity of comment-accepting authors is known to governments, incorporating co-national governments' comments more frequently than those of other states can be an effective signal of loyalty to national leaders. Such behavior is, nonetheless, never costless: it can tarnish reputations of individual expert author's objectivity; it can undermine the scientific integrity of the report; and for the IO as an organization, it can erode its legitimacy when public perceptions of IO independence decline (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Dellmuth et al., 2021).

In order to balance these costs against personal career returns, expert authors cannot accept every single comment their home government makes. Such favoritism would be too blatant and the associated cost excessive. We therefore expect authors to prioritize those comments that are most valuable to their co-national governments. Existing research has shown that these are most likely comments on topics and sections in IO reports that matter directly for national interests (Bayer and Crippa, 2026). In the IPCC, these are those parts of the report that tie IPCC knowledge to negotiated outcomes in UN climate summits (O'Reilly, de Pryck, and Hughes, 2025; Hai, 2025; Bayer et al., 2026).

Besides appointment incentives, we propose a second reason for why government-author ties

[2] All descriptive statistics from our elite survey are reported in Table G.1.

matter for IO report production. Our argument here is rooted in the idea that favoring home government comments can be an effective way, for academic authors specifically, to *promote their own research* through IO reports. Quite unsurprisingly, direct references to academic work in major IO reports pay immediate dividends in the form of increased scholarly standing. However, we believe that next to these reputational benefits, the ability of IO reports to shape national research funding priorities is even more important to academics. In our case of the IPCC, two thirds of the experts we surveyed confirmed that IPCC reports directly impact national research strategies and public funding priorities, so similar to IOs functioning as seals of approval in global governance writ large (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Gray, 2009), IO reports, too, serve as authoritative sources of knowledge.

IO reports are therefore forms of epistemic power. They provide effective frames within which governments can embed their research and innovation policy in two important ways. First, they offer politically compelling reference points that can help governments define national research priorities as part of a broader geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy—as, for example, in the case of green industrial policy (Nahm, 2021; Allan and Nahm, 2025). Second, IO reports help governments justify the allocation of taxpayer money to particular research areas relative to others. Without doubt, World Health Organization reports have directed medical research priorities, IPCC reports have spurred research funding into decarbonization technologies, such as carbon dioxide removal and fuel cell batteries, and the UN reports on the Sustainable Development Goals have forever changed national funding agencies' programming of research grants.

Since IO reports have the potential to move the needle on research funding, accepting government comments that align with report authors' own research areas is tempting. It creates the prospect—yet, not a guarantee—for authors to benefit from larger allocations of state funding to exactly those research areas they themselves are working in. Our argument is therefore not one of direct government interference with the work and funding decisions of national grant agencies; instead, it is an argument about the strategic earmarking of public research funds. Greater

appropriations in national science budgets for priority research areas, often those that can help governments address immediate policy challenges, boosts available funding for researchers who can respond to such challenge-led funding calls. Hence, what makes favoring home government comments incentive compatible for academic authors is ultimately an increased chance of access to national research funding. Indeed, the prospect of shaping funding (27%) and broader research priorities (19%) motivates IPCC authors according to our survey data.

No matter whether expert authors are motivated by direct (e.g., appointments) or indirect (e.g., academic reputation and access to research funding) career benefits, our argument's main testable implication remains the same: *government comments on IO report draft text are more likely to be accepted when governments and report authors come from the same country*. This expectation holds for *co-national* government-author ties only because it is the national governments and not foreign ones that control the professional career benefits which report authors are after. Normatively, empirical support for our hypothesis indicates bias in IO reports. That is, bias away from a scientifically 'pure' report (assuming the draft text prior to government review is a credible approximation of this) towards a more political document that reflects state interests. Report authors are generally aware of this tension, with only 10% of our surveyed experts classifying IPCC SPMs as a purely scientific report.

Background: IPCC Reports and Author Selection

We test our main expectation in the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As the UN's main science body on climate change, the IPCC publishes comprehensive reports about the global knowledge on climate change as part of up to 7-year-long assessment cycles. Reports are organized into separate Working Groups (WGs) that focus on climate science (WGI), climate impacts (WGII), and mitigation policies (WGIII). The underlying reports, many of which exceed 1,000 pages in length, and technical summary documents are flanked by a highly

visible and politically consequential Summary for Policymakers (SPM) (De Pryck and Hulme, 2022).[3] Over the years, SPMs have become increasingly politicized (Dubash, Fleurbaey, and Kartha, 2014; Victor, Gerlagh, and Baiocchi, 2014; Edenhofer and Minx, 2014) as governments started to understand the normative power these scientific reports have for structuring bargaining in annual UN climate negotiations (O'Reilly, de Pryck, and Hughes, 2025; De Pryck, 2025; Hai, 2025; Bayer et al., 2026). As a result of heightened attention to these reports by governments, IPCC authors are walking a tightrope to produce report text that is "policy-relevant," without being "policy-prescriptive." This tension between science and policy that individual authors need to resolve when writing their reports captures the conflicting pressures that, according to our argument, characterize author behavior. It also justifies our empirical focus on SPM report production.

IPCC authors are nominated through member governments' (ministerial) Focal Points and usually represent the country they are institutionally affiliated with through their employment contract rather than their country of nationality at birth.[4] The IPCC Bureau then selects authors, primarily based on expertise, while trying to ensure balance of scientific, technical, and socio-economic views, geographic region, gender, and prior IPCC experience. For the Sixth Assessment Report (2015–2023), 721 experts from 90 countries were chosen as report authors from a total of 2,858 nominations (IPCC, 2018). Author selection, albeit government-led, is therefore not within the immediate control of IPCC member states, but instead sits with the IPCC leadership. For our empirical strategy, the separation between author nomination and author selection is important. It prevents governments from controlling author appointments with certainty, which allows

[3] During a typical assessment cycle, the IPCC publishes at least an underlying report, a Technical Summary, and a Summary for Policymakers for each of its three Working Groups plus an overarching Synthesis Report. Additional special reports are sometimes commissioned by IPCC member governments at the start of an assessment cycle, such as the "Special Report on Climate Change and Cities," the "Methodology Report on Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage," and the "2027 IPCC Methodology Report on Inventories for Short-lived Climate Forcers" that are part of the current AR7 cycle (2023-2029). All IPCC publications are available at https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/.

[4] The UK's Focal Point, based in the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), for example, states: "Kindly note that we support experts primarily affiliated with UK institutions. If you are a UK citizen based abroad, please get in touch with the Focal Point of your host country in the first instance." For the purpose of our argument, this supports the above definition of co-nationality in terms of country of employment rather than citizenship.

us to model authors' acceptance decisions of government comments independently from author selection. Governments hence cannot control *individual* appointments of single authors but, on *aggregate*, economically and scientifically powerful countries obtain a larger number of report authors as a result of structural country-level differences, such as variation in research capacity across Global North and Global South nations (Ho-Lem, Zerriffi, and Kandlikar, 2011; Corbera et al., 2016; Hughes and Paterson, 2017).

For the latest WGIII report on mitigation policy, which we study below, the United States (23 authors), the United Kingdom (19 authors), Germany (16 authors), Japan (16 authors), and India (14 authors) accounted for a total of 97 authors—almost four in every ten authors. In terms of institutional affiliations, large research institutes such as IIASA in Austria (6 authors), Mercator (4 authors) and PIK (3 authors) in Germany, or Cicero (3 authors) in Norway dominate. Author concentrations among universities are lower overall, but can be high for some countries with fewer nationally leading institutions, such as the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (6 authors), Tsinghua University (4 authors), the Australian National University (3 authors) or the University of Tokyo (3 authors). Employment in universities and research institutes is most common for the vast majority of authors (79.9%), while others work for national ministries (5.1%), other IOs (5.6%), or the private sector (6.0%) including Saudi Aramco, Chevron, and Toyota. With a varied author pool like this, we use variation in the nationality of governments (which submit comments) and authors (who accept comments) to empirically test the theorized effect of government-author ties on IPCC report production.

Observational Analysis

To conduct this analysis, we construct an original data set that combines government comments on IPCC draft text with relevant biographic author information. We gain analytical leverage from linking comments to exactly (and only) those authors who are in charge of the particular section of

text that a specific government comment is referring to.

Our government comments data comprise the complete list of all 4,954 official government submissions to the IPCC in response to the SPM draft text of Working Group III. Each data entry in that list records a unique ID, the submitting state's nationality, the text of the submitted comment itself, and the page/line information of the exact location in the SPM draft which the comment relates to.[5] From this comment-level information and the comparison of original (before comments) and track changed (after comments) versions of SPM report text, our research assistants coded two binary outcome variables: INCORPORATION and DELETION. The first captures authors' efforts to work a comment's substantive point into the revised SPM text and the second indicates whether comments lead to deletions of text. Together, the two measures offer a richer operationalization of what it means for authors to "accept a government comment" which, conceptually, is our main outcome of interest.

In creating both variables, we adopt a lenient coding framework. For the INCORPORATION measure, we treat *any* change in text by the IPCC authors to address a submitted comment (in language or in spirit) as evidence of incorporation. This approach helps minimize measurement error from variation in authors' individual differences in strategy, taste, and style in addressing government comments. It also avoids the practical difficulty of assessing whether an actual change in report text can be considered substantial enough to qualify as an instance of incorporation. We do exclude purely editorial comments (e.g., correcting grammar, punctuation, or capitalization of words). Following the same logic, the DELETION measure codes *any* cases of words, sentences, or other elements, such as parts of figures or tables, that were deleted, no matter whether the deletion was explicitly requested in the government comment itself or chosen as the best action by the authors to address the comment. As governments differ in how directive their comments are, our coding scheme is based on identifiable changes in text and not subjective perceptions

[5] We verified for all comments that they refer to meaningful positions in the SPM text and corrected 87 instances where such information was missing or linked to non-existing pages and/or lines.

of government intent. Rates of agreement between coders are high for both variables—0.86 for INCORPORATION and 0.94 for DELETION, indicative of a robust and replicable coding protocol.[6]

Next, we link comments to authors in charge of handling them. This becomes possible for two reasons: first, because we know the exact position in the SPM draft which a government comment refers to; and second, because the highly structured SPM text allows us to connect all individual paragraphs, figures, and tables—which we call parts-of-text (POTs)—from the SPM to each of the individual chapters and the associated chapter authors from the underlying IPCC report. By mapping comments to a specific POT in the SPM first[7] and to specific chapters of the full-length IPCC report second, we can identify the author team(s) responsible for addressing government comments. We also leverage biographical information on these authors' nationalities and types of employing institutions from IPCC official data. We can then calculate, for each comment, the share of *co-national* authors separately for three employment categories: those who are employed at a university (ACADEMICS$_{\%}$); those who are employed at a university or a research institute (RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$); and those who work in a national ministry, for another IO, in the private sector, or elsewhere (NON-RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$). We use these shares to operationalize co-national ties in IPCC report production where, similar to other IOs, multiple authors hold joint responsibility for writing chapters and addressing comments.

TABLE 1: Snapshot of 10 government-submitted comments

ID	POT	REFERENCES	COUNTRY	COMMENT	INCORP.	DELET.	ACAD.$_{\%}$	RES.$_{\%}$	NON-RES.$_{\%}$
2614	B.2.1	2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, TS	FRA	Why do 'indirect emissions' exclude the 'embodied emissions' ? In 2019, according to 9-4 and SPM-24, global GHG emissions from buildings stood for 21 % of global GHG emissions including direct, indirect and embodied emissions.	0	0	0.00%	1.65%	1.65%
192	C.1	3	SAU	C1: in the statement 'Without a strengthening of current policies, GHG emissions are projected to rise, leading to a median global warming of 2.4°C to 3.5°C by 2100.' The paragraph language is policy prescriptive. The scenarios include large number of other assumptions and are not limited to policies only. The authors should re-write and avoid policy prescriptive language.	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7006	C.10.3	5, 8, 9, 10, 12	ARG	We request replacing the expression "plant-based diets" for "low carbon options", as it includes other alternatives besides the aforementioned.	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
13948	C.5	11, TS	NOR	Please delete '..for remaining CO2'.	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

[6] We manually coded the 940 comments where the two research assistant coders disagreed on either of the two variables to maximize the total number of comments in our data. Our results are nearly identical when we limit our sample to those comments where coders agreed (Tables D.5 and D.6).

[7] Almost nine in ten comments (4,356 comments, 88%) refer to a single POT and only one in ten (598 comments, 12%) concerns multiple POTs or the whole SPM.

5656	C.5.4	11	GBR	Not clear on what is meant by "gradual expansion of policies to fully cover all GHG emissions", this seems like a catch all for the above. Instead would suggest explicit mention of the use of schemes for cap and trade of carbon credits and carbon pricing and carbon border adjustment mechanisms.	1	1	11.11%	11.11%	0.00%
1104	C.8.3	3, 6, 10	IRL	Are biofuels not an option for HGVs?	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
12722	D.1.2	1, 3, 5, 17	IND	Delete the word 'potential'.	1	1	3.92%	3.92%	0.00%
12804	E.4.3	16	IND	After 'technologies' add ' though the cost of deployment are correspondingly higher'.	0	0	8.33%	8.33%	0.00%
14636	Fig.4	2, 6	USA	If PV and onshore wind are both at about 700GW in 2020, why is PV only 3% of market share of total electricity production while onshore wind is 6%? If this is because of capacity factor, it would be clearer to state this directly in the last sentence of the caption.	1	0	12.50%	16.67%	0.00%
6898	Fig.4	2, 6	JAM	Why are only coal and gas included? Unless oil is included, the grey shading that is included for reference in the renewable energy panels would be misleading?	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 1 details the structure of our data set for ten random comments. For illustration, consider comment #14636 by the United States. It seeks clarification on different renewable technologies' market shares of total electricity production. In response, authors edited the SPM text, noting exactly the differences in capacity factors for solar PV and wind turbines that the US comment requests, and in exactly the place it suggests.[8] This is therefore an example where our INCORPORATION outcome measure equals one, to indicate that authors accepted the comment; DELETION is zero as text was amended by authors, but not deleted.

Apart from its content, we also know that the comment refers to page 11, lines 1-2 in the SPM draft. We use this page and line information to, first, link the comment to Figure 4 as the relevant part-of-text (POT). Next, we use references in the caption text of Figure 4 to sections {2.5, 6.4} of the full IPCC report to identify the authors who wrote the associated chapters 2 and 6 of the underlying report and who were hence responsible for addressing this particular comment.[9] Chapter 2 on "Emissions Trends and Drivers" and chapter 6 on "Energy Systems" had twelve authors each, two of which in each chapter were affiliated with US institutions. Three of them were employed at the universities of Maryland, Stanford, and Wisconsin-Madison (they are coded as academics) and one worked at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (categorized as research institute staff). Ac-

[8] The last sentence in the Figure 4 caption of the SPM draft was changed from "The electricity market share is generally lower than the share of production capacity given lower capacity factors for these renewable technologies." to "The electricity market share reflects different capacity factors, e.g., for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV."

[9] The IPCC SPM is structured in such a way that we can *always* link each POT to either a single or multiple chapters of the underlying IPCC report. This is guaranteed by the IPCC's infamous "line of cite," given in curly brackets at the end of each headline statement/POT.

cordingly, the ACADEMICS$_{\%}$ and RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$ variables are 12.5% (3/24) and 16.67% (4/24). We replicate this procedure for all non-editorial, non-EU government comments that make a single point and refer to a single POT to arrive at a final data set of 3,646 observations.[10]

Descriptive Patterns

These data allow us to map variation in our main variables. They also provide descriptive evidence that acceptance rates of government comments are higher for those countries that have many co-national report authors. This is suggestive support for our claim that national ties matter for SPM report production in the IPCC.

Figure 1, on the left, shows the total number of submitted government comments by country, together with how many of these comments were incorporated (dark gray), deleted (dark gray with dashed border), or remained unaddressed (light gray). From this, we see that a handful of Global North countries, primarily the United States (540 comments), France (393 comments), the UK (381 comments), and Germany (241 comments), dominate comment submissions, while Saudi Arabia (202 comments), India (172 comments), and Norway (171 comments) follow with some distance. Further down the list, small island developing nations, such as St. Kitts & Nevis, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, also comment in large amounts on the SPM draft text—unsurprisingly so, given the existential climate impacts they face. The panel on the right plots each country's share of co-national IPCC authors, averaged across POTs, and points to similar variation in terms of author representation. The US, the UK, Germany, Japan, and India top the list, but countries whose governments submit relatively few comments, such as Denmark, Brazil, or Austria benefit from fairly high, co-national author involvement.

Importantly, co-nationality is not only a descriptively meaningful measure, but matters substan-

[10] Against the full list of 4,954 government comments, our analysis excludes 598 comments that refer to multiple POTs and 253 comments that raise several points in a single comment to minimize mis-classification and measurement error in our coding. We also exclude 304 European Union comments as they are not attribute to a single national government and drop 153 editorial comments to avoid artificially inflating acceptance rates.



FIGURE 1: The left panel shows the number of submitted government comments by country, together with how many of these comments were incorporated (dark gray), deleted (dark gray with dashed border), or remained unaddressed (light gray). The right panel shows the average percentage (across POTs) of co-national IPCC authors by country.

tively for how authors engage with government comments as well. It correlates positively, albeit imperfectly, with success rates both for comment incorporation (0.27, p=0.09) and deletion (0.28, p=0.07). Figure 2 shows acceptance rates for both outcome measures for all 20 governments that submit at least 50 comments on the draft SPM.[11] States with large shares of co-national authors tend to fare well and get comments accepted at higher-than-average rates. While, on average, every third comment gets accepted (31%) and every twelfth comment (8%) leads to a deletion, countries with many co-national authors have relatively higher success rates (e.g., 37% and 12% for the US, 37% and 10% for Germany, or 43% and 9% for Australia, respectively). However, this bivariate relationship is by no means deterministic. High acceptance rates for comments from Belgium and

[11] Countries with a small number of submitted comments can have artificially high acceptance rates, so we exclude them from this figure. Chile, for example, submitted two comments, one of which was accepted, resulting in a notional success rate of 50%. We report the full data in Appendix A.

St. Lucia, for example, indicate that governments can be effective in influencing SPM text even when they have no or only few co-national authors.



FIGURE 2: Acceptance rates of government comments for INCORPORATION and DELETION outcome measures for top-20 governments submitting at least 50 comments each.

These preliminary patterns produce two important insights. First, they offer a reminder that, despite the IPCC report authors' epistemological authority as subject experts, changes to the SPM draft, as part of a *political* process, are common and happen frequently. In our case, government review led authors to incorporate well over 1,000 government comments on a 40-pages-long draft text. On aggregate, political influence in SPM report production is substantial. Taking the expert-produced SPM draft text as the "objective" yardstick of what science has to say about climate change, the evidence we find in terms of extensive commenting by governments together with

high acceptance rates fits well with broader trends of ever greater politicization of climate science (Allan, 2017; Hughes, 2024; Hai, 2025). Second, these descriptive patterns call for a more robust empirical strategy that can credibly identify the effect of co-nationality. Below, we develop such a methodological approach. It leverages our highly granular, comment-level data by modeling the acceptance of government comments as a function of co-nationality in *exactly the specific POT that each comment refers to*. It also helps us isolate idiosyncratic country-level and topic-level variation that shapes acceptance rates for reasons other than co-nationality.

Research Design

We use linear probability models and regress COMMENT ACCEPTANCE, operationalized as one of our binary INCORPORATION or DELETION outcomes, on government-author co-nationality—together with a set of fixed effects. Our main specification, where i, c, and p denote comments, countries, and parts-of-text, respectively, takes the following general form:

$$\text{COMMENT ACCEPTANCE}_{icp} = \beta \times \text{CO-NATIONAL AUTHOR SHARE}_{icp} + \alpha_c + \gamma_p + \varepsilon_{icp} \qquad (1)$$

The main explanatory variable measures national ties as the share of co-national authors (CO-NATIONAL AUTHOR SHARE) in charge of the respective SPM section a government comment refers to (on a 1–100% scale). As noted above, we distinguish between the shares of academics, researchers, and non-researchers among the IPCC chapter author teams. This allows us to provide more nuanced empirical evidence about which author *type* drives our hypothesized relationship. Below, we therefore estimate separate models for each author type for a more compelling test of our argument than when pooling our data across authors' different employment types.

Country and POT-level fixed effects (FEs) are instrumental to our identification strategy. Authors will accept and reject government comments on multiple grounds other than their co-nationality with the commenting government. Industrialized countries with greater research capacity, for ex-

ample, will simultaneously be more likely to submit more compelling comments because of their well-trained and better-resourced staff, while also contributing a much larger share of IPCC expert authors (Ho-Lem, Zerriffi, and Kandlikar, 2011; Corbera et al., 2016). This creates a spurious correlation. The same is true for anglophone countries given that the IPCC's working language in English. We remove this and similar by-country variation with our fixed effects which absorb any systematic differences across countries, such as in research capacity, language, development status, economic wealth, or staff size of government departments that review the SPM draft.

Confounding can also arise from POT-specific factors. Parts-of-text naturally vary in their complexity, scientific uncertainty, interdisciplinarity, and how clearly written and readable they are. If any of these aspects mattered for a comment's probability to be accepted but also correlated with the national composition of IPCC chapter author teams (e.g., because the leading experts on the most complex forms of climate modeling come from a particular country), this would bias our results. We use POT-fixed effects to account for variation in text-level attributes between POTs..

We introduce fixed effects sequentially. First, we only include POT FEs and identify estimates from variation within parts-of-text. This ensures we compare government comments on the *same* topic within a single SPM paragraph, figure, or table. Next, we add country FEs, which results in specifications with an interpretation akin to that of a difference-in-differences estimator. Identifying variation in this case comes from variation in co-nationality for the same country across different POTs relative to average co-nationality in a given POT. As is standard for these two-way fixed effects models, our estimate of interest is identified under the assumption that no comment-level feature is correlated both with our explanatory CO-NATIONAL AUTHOR SHARE variable and our two COMMENT ACCEPTANCE measures. Standard errors in all our models are clustered by country.

Results

We present results by outcome. For comment INCORPORATION, Table 2 shows a positive association with the share of co-national authors. Consistent with our argument's focus on career incentives, effects are strongest for academics and become weaker for the other author types. The effect of national ties is substantively meaningful. Take the example of POT C.10.4 on energy demand, where UK academic authors account for 12% of the author team. This co-nationality share increases the probability of comment acceptance for submissions by the British government by about 0.09.

Table 2: The effect of co-nationality of IPCC authors on the probability of INCORPORATION of a government comment

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS$_{\%}$	0.011***	0.007***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$			0.009***	0.005**		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$					0.009*	0.005
					(0.004)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.105	0.120	0.105	0.120	0.100	0.119
R2 Adj.	0.067	0.072	0.067	0.071	0.061	0.070
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

To assess these effects more systematically, Figure 3 plots predicted probabilities from the two-way fixed effects specifications for all three author groups along the empirical distribution of our co-nationality measures. In the case of academic authors, the baseline probability of comment acceptance for a country without a single co-national author on the relevant writing team increases from 0.43 to 0.63 when roughly every third author is a co-national. Compared to this substantial increase, effect sizes attenuate when pooling university academics and research institute staff

into the 'Researchers' category, suggesting that academic IPCC authors are driving our results. Predicted probabilities are almost flat for the 'Non-researchers' group.



FIGURE 3: Predicted probabilities for comment INCORPORATION outcome for different author groups: academics (left panel), researchers (middle panel), and non-researchers (right panel). Estimates are based on two-way fixed effects models from Table 2.

General patterns are very similar for our DELETION outcome. Again, we find a positive effect of co-nationality that is strongest for academic authors (Table 3). The consistently smaller point estimates are not surprising given a relatively low overall probability of only 0.08 for government comments to lead to a deletion in the SPM.

We visualize substantive effects in Figure 4. Predicted probabilities increase the most for academic IPCC authors, are somewhat smaller for the 'Researchers' group, and are null for the 'Non-researchers.' Important for our argument, effects for academic authors are sizable: when sliding the co-national ACADEMICS$_{\%}$ variable up from bottom to top, deletion becomes *twice* as likely, raising its probability (after country and POT fixed effects) from 0.04 to 0.08. Such a doubling in government influence is particularly consequential for the "nuclear option" of deleting parts of the

Table 3: The effect of co-nationality of IPCC authors on the probability of DELETION of text after a government comment

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.004***	0.002+				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.004***	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.003+	-0.000
					(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.148	0.158	0.147	0.158	0.145	0.158
R2 Adj.	0.111	0.112	0.111	0.111	0.108	0.111
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

report because any dropped text, figures, or tables are permanently gone from the SPM.



FIGURE 4: Predicted probabilities for comment DELETION outcome for different author groups: academics (left panel), researchers (middle panel), and non-researchers (right panel). Estimates are based on two-way fixed effects models from Table 3.

Robustness

Our main findings hold up well in multiple, additional tests. First, we show robustness to alternative model specifications, including pooled and country fixed effects models; logistic regressions; and models that control for three comment-level features that are plausibly correlated with comment acceptance but evade our fixed effects strategy: the length of a comment (measured as the number of words), its readability (measured as the Flesch reading-ease score), and its technicality (measured as type-token ratio). Second, we change the operationalization of co-nationality from author shares to a binary variable for whether at least one chapter author is a co-national, without any changes to our findings. Results are also significant when limiting the pool of authors to only those listed on the SPM itself instead of everyone who wrote the full, underlying report. And third, we demonstrate that our findings remain robust when we change the composition of comments in our sample. Specifically, we drop comments on the introduction of the SPM, which all authors write; comments for which we manually corrected the location in the SPM they point to; comments for which research assistants disagreed in their coding; and in a jackknife fashion, all comments from each government and each POT at a time. For editorial comments, national ties produce null results, which suggests that co-nationality plays out where what matters is contents of the SPM.

Selection Effects

One concern with our analysis is that the results are driven by selection. Above, we argued that this is unlikely because report authors are appointed by the IPCC Bureau and *not* governments. The composition of author teams is, therefore, beyond governments' immediate control. While the IPCC's organizational rules arguably help justify the exogeneity assumption of our co-nationality measures, we present an additional test to support this claim further.

In the absence of access to complete nomination records, which prevents us from modeling author selection directly, we present indirect evidence from recognizing that, if selection were

Table 4: The effect of co-nationality of IPCC authors on the probability of comment submission, incorporation, and text deletion

	Outcomes (binary):								
	SUBMISSION			INCORPORATION			DELETION		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
ACADEMICS$_{\%}$	0.001			0.007**			0.004+		
	(0.003)			(0.002)			(0.002)		
RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$		0.002			0.004			0.003	
		(0.003)			(0.003)			(0.002)	
NON-RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$			0.004			0.004			-0.002
			(0.003)			(0.004)			(0.002)
Num.Obs.	6384	6384	6384	6384	6384	6384	6384	6384	6384
R2	0.375	0.375	0.375	0.258	0.257	0.257	0.181	0.181	0.180
R2 Adj.	0.355	0.355	0.355	0.235	0.234	0.233	0.156	0.156	0.154
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

an issue, governments would want authors be placed in charge of exactly those parts-of-text which they ultimately comment on. Table 4 (models 1–3) offers compelling evidence that governments do, in fact, *not* target comments at SPM sections, which they know their co-national authors write. With our data restructured as a balanced panel of 42 governments and 152 POTs ($N = 42 \times 152 = 6,384$), where we code whether a government submitted a comment for each of the individual POTs (SUBMISSION=$\{0,1\}$), we demonstrate that co-nationality and comment submission are uncorrelated. This mitigates worries about selection effects. For our INCORPORATION and DELETION outcomes measured analogously as binary variables of whether a government $\times$ POT pair saw at least one comment incorporated (models 4–6) or deleted (models 7–9), we confirm earlier findings of national ties for academic IPCC authors with a different data structure and separate modeling strategy.

Elite Survey Evidence

To supplement our observational analysis, we fielded an elite survey with an embedded experiment in late fall/early winter 2025. We invited the full set of all 1,201 IPCC authors from the Fifth (AR5, published in 2013/14) and Sixth Assessment Report (AR6, published in 2022/23) via email to participate in our survey hosted on Qualtrics. The survey was anonymous, participation was

voluntary and uncompensated, and the response rate was 19%.[12] We obtained ethical approval and pre-registered the experimental design before commencing the study.[13]

The elite survey serves two main purposes. For one, to directly collect qualitative data from IPCC authors about key assumptions that underpin our theoretical argument, including on personal motivations to become an IPCC author, the rewards such an appointment brings, and the relationship of IPCC reports and national research and innovation policy. And second, to use experimental evidence to help us replicate our observational results and better characterize our argument's scope conditions.

The survey flow reflects these goals. We start by asking respondents about the country and type of their institutional affiliation, their IPCC author experience, and then administer a repeated task experiment, which randomizes the nationality of government comments. Followed by a set of multiple choice and open-ended questions to probe the career incentives mechanism, socio-demographic data queries about seniority, age, and gender conclude the survey.[14]

Qualitative Results

Our argument that career incentives shape report author behavior is most compelling when two assumptions are true: first, that IPCC authorship confers status benefits and, second, that IPCC reports impact national research policy. Both hold according to our survey respondents.

Increased visibility as a leading researcher in the field (60%), better access to academic networks (58%), helping policymakers understand climate science (62%), and contributing to evidence-based climate policy-making (59%) were central motivations for survey participants to become an IPCC author, all of which back the reputational logic laid out in our argument. One in four specif-

[12] After the initial invitation email on 24 October 2025, we sent reminders on 17 November 2025 and 15 December 2025, before closing the survey on 9 January 2026.

[13] Ethical authorization was granted by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde under reference DECGPP_2025_09_10 on 9 October 2025. Pre-registration materials, including a pre-analysis plan, were uploaded to OSF on 20 October 2025 and are available at https://osf.io/fhnp3/.

[14] The full questionnaire is in appendix F.

ically mentioned building a track record for future academic/political appointments. Similarly, two thirds of our respondents confirmed that IPCC reports matter for national research strategies broadly, and climate science funding priorities, in particular. There was also little doubt about the political nature of SPM reports, with as few as 10% of the surveyed, former IPCC authors considering SPMs as exclusively scientific reports. Open-ended responses that "*policy are (sic!) playing an increasingly important role in different aspects of the IPCC ARs*" and that "*comments by governments are just 'scientific' versions of their politics*" are telling reminders that IPCC authors, whether they like it or not, are being sucked into a politicized report production process, where government-author ties matter.

Unsurprisingly then, almost half of our respondents (49%) reported to either have themselves experienced or heard other authors articulate the trade-off between preserving the report's scientific integrity and promoting their own research.[15] This evidence adds face validity to our claim above that, in addressing government comments, balancing the science (i.e., assessing comments based on their academic merit) and the politics (i.e., assessing comments based on their personal benefits) is central to a report author's cost function. In our open-ended responses, some authors rebuked the idea that nationality matters and made statements, or versions thereof, that "*comments are very much treated on their merits*." Others were more attuned and mentioned that government comments from countries with greater power, higher scientific capacity, particular political agendas or from certain regions are indeed being treated differently as a result of nationality. Direct quotes, such as, that "*authors might fear retaliation*," that "*the nationality of the government can trigger a kind of pattern-recognition in authors that signals the sort of supplementary and additional comments that are likely to come*," and references to "*wariness by authors to ensure that the rejection of proposed amendments by governments are handled very diligently, as it is likely that some governments push back harder than others when their suggestions are not adopted*" reaffirm

[15] Table G.2 shows that survey participants find our claim that authors accept co-national government comments to promote their own research more compelling when they also report that they have firsthand experience of the trade-off between preserving scientific integrity and promoting their own research.

the centrality of government-author ties in what is otherwise often portrayed as an allegedly purely technical comment review.

Experimental Results

Next to this qualitative evidence, our survey-embedded experiment probes the importance of co-national ties for comment acceptance further. We do so by showing survey respondents six fictitious, but credible IPCC draft statements together with hypothetical and similarly realistic government comments for each of these. In half of the cases, comments were shown to come from co-national governments, where we matched the respondent's nationality of institutional affiliation, stated in an earlier part of the survey, to the nationality printed next to the comment. For the other half, we picked nationalities at random from a list of IPCC-active governments to avoid unlikely combinations. The six statement-comment pairs are shown in Table 5. Their order was randomized, and they span the full substantive range of IPCC science from climate physics (covered in Working Group I) and climate impacts (covered in Working Group II) to mitigation policy (covered in Working Group III).

In keeping with the central argument that report authors, and academic ones in particular, are more likely to accommodate comments from co-national governments, our experimental data allow us to empirically test this pre-registered expectation. To do so, we measure our outcome variable from a binary yes/no question. For each of the six repeated assessment tasks, the question asks survey participants whether they would make changes to the presented draft text in view of the shown government comment. We then model this outcome of comment incorporation as a linear function of a CO-NATIONALITY dummy. This dummy equals '1' when the country in which the respondent's employing institution is based matches the (experimentally assigned) country of the commenting government; it is zero otherwise.

Table 6 reports regression results for all authors (models 1–3) and, separately, for the same three categories of author types as in our observational analysis above: academics (models 4–6),

Working group (WG)	IPCC draft statement	Government comment
WGI, climate physics	Global surface temperature has increased by about 1.1°C since 1850–1900, with human influence assessed as the dominant driver of observed warming since the mid-20th century.	Suggest replacing 'dominant driver' with 'primary driver' to better reflect that while human influence is strongest, natural variability continues to play a role.
WGI, climate physics	Sea level rise is virtually certain to continue for centuries, driven by thermal expansion and ice sheet loss, with higher emissions leading to greater increases.	Propose adding the phrase 'subject to significant regional differences' to highlight that global mean sea level projections mask important local variation.
WGII, climate impacts	Climate change has already caused widespread adverse impacts on ecosystems and human systems, with disproportionate impacts observed in low-income regions due to lower adaptive capacity.	Recommend adding 'although attribution of some observed impacts remains complex' to reflect residual uncertainty in linking certain regional impacts directly to climate change.
WGII, climate impacts	Risks from climate change will increase with additional warming, including that the frequency of crop failures and heat-related mortality will rise above 1.5°C of warming (high confidence).	Suggest changing 'high confidence' to 'medium-to-high confidence,' since not all crop systems and regions show consistent evidence across the literature.
WGIII, mitigation policy	Global greenhouse gas emissions from the use of coal, gas, and oil must decline rapidly in the next decade to limit warming to 1.5°C, with modelled pathways showing immediate and substantial reductions are required.	The language is policy prescriptive. Remove "must" and ensure the paragraph is a balanced representation of all GHG sources and pathways.
WGIII, mitigation policy	Mitigation options across energy, transport, and agriculture sectors are technically available, increasingly cost-effective, and deliver co-benefits for health and development.	Recommend inserting 'depending on regional and institutional contexts' after 'cost-effective,' as economic assessments vary across settings.

TABLE 5: Six vignettes for repeated task experiment, showing fictitious draft statement texts and associated government comments for three different working groups (WGs).

researchers (models 7–9), and non-researchers (models 10–12).[16] For each set, we show results from pooled models first, followed by two more specifications that separately include fixed effects for respondent and task. Standard errors are clustered by task.

Table 6: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Main results

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.054	-0.055	-0.057	-0.029	-0.031	-0.030	-0.038	-0.037	-0.040	-0.183+	-0.194*	-0.186*
	(0.051)	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.064)
(Intercept)	0.536***			0.506***			0.524***			0.630***		
	(0.053)			(0.057)			(0.058)			(0.076)		
Num.Obs.	966	966	966	649	649	649	856	856	856	110	110	110
R2	0.003	0.301	0.037	0.001	0.289	0.040	0.001	0.310	0.036	0.034	0.244	0.091
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.154	0.031	-0.001	0.139	0.031	0.000	0.166	0.029	0.025	0.085	0.038
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	167	167	167	113	113	113	148	148	148	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Our results are contrary to our expectations. Point estimates are negative for all models, yet insignificant except for when sub-setting to the 'Non-researchers' group. Given that our analysis is heavily under-powered for models 1–9 (we would need about 400 respondents to detect effect sizes similar to those in model 1), we treat these results with caution and interpret them as null findings: there is no co-nationality effect for 'Academics' and 'Researchers' author groups based on our experimental data. For non-researchers, where the analysis has sufficient statistical power, we find a significantly negative effect that indicates shared nationality between authors and governments to reduce the probability of comment incorporation by about 20 percentage points—an effect size of roughly a quarter of the untreated acceptance probability. An extensive set of additional results and robustness tests confirm that point estimates are generally insignificant and drawn towards the negative, primarily by authors new to the IPCC and tasks associated with Working Groups II and III on climate risks and mitigation options.[17]

[16] Authors are categorized based on their response to a survey question about the type of their employing institution, i.e., university; research center, think tank, policy institute; government body; private non-profit organization; or private for-profit organization.

[17] Appendix H reports additional results, including for models with a different outcome measure; heterogeneous treatment effects by working group, authors' scientific expertise, and IPCC experience; and different samples from when dropping unlikely government-comment pairs and inattentive authors.

How to then best think of these weak experimental results in conjunction with the strong, observational evidence reported earlier? We reconcile these findings not by understanding them as contradictions but as motivation for a reasoned, yet admittedly *ex post*, discussion of our argument's scope conditions. This approach is justifiable because two particular aspects of government comment review, as socialized in the IPCC, could not be adequately captured in our necessarily simpler-than-life experimental design.

One was that, in our experiment, authors were asked to decide on each government comment in relation to a single draft statement without access to the underlying report itself. This matters because comments are not assessed in a vacuum, but judged against the scientific evidence presented in the full IPCC report. In our post-survey correspondence with several authors, many raised this point. One respondent explicitly mentioned "*my response in each case would depend significantly on the text* [i.e., the underlying report] *supporting the statement*," while another former author clarified that "*the reality is that when governments come with the kinds of comments that you included, they are sometimes correct that this nuance or detail is included in the underlying report—however sometimes they just bring their politics. This will make a difference in how authors respond.*" The underlying report, hence, functions to legitimize experts' decisions. In the absence of a full report—as in our experiment, where it is not practical to request assessment of comments against a 1,000-pages-long report—authors will be more cautious to accept proposed textual changes, drawing our estimates downwards (relative to those from our observational analysis). Very likely, these incentives are the strongest for comments by co-national governments where authors might fear losing their academic credibility by being seen as "loyal nationalists" rather than as "objective scientists." We believe that this logic is compelling for explaining the negative sign of our point estimates.

Another aspect where our experiment deviates from actual IPCC practice is in that comments are usually handled by author teams rather than, as in our experimental setup, by single authors individually. This matters because, unlike with team decisions, the outcome of individual choices

can be attributed to the responsible author. This observability of individual behavior very likely changes how authors assess government comments. With the vast majority of survey participants asserting in their open-ended responses that government nationality *should* not affect comment acceptance, we expect norms of social desirability to stymie any intentions to favor co-national government comments. Leaning into this logic even further, non-researcher authors, the group that includes ministerial staff, are most prone to allegations of being arm's length government representatives, and so will have the strongest incentives to push back hard against any behaviors that could potentially raise eyebrows over co-national favoritism. In doing so, they may "over-correct." The fear that accepting co-national comments could be seen as too friendly towards their home governments may trigger the opposite reaction; it may, in fact, lead to co-national comments being rejected more harshly. This is why we think that the significant and negative treatment effect, especially because it is only present among non-researchers, is a symptom of such over-correction behavior. More broadly then, concerns among survey respondents about socially desirable responses in line with socialized norms of objective IPCC science offer a plausible explanation for the differences between our experimental and observational findings. This is even more true because our experimental design, firstly, makes individual respondents' choices observable, while it, secondly, also removes the possibility for authors to justify their decisions with reference to the underlying report as an external source of legitimation.

Conclusion

This paper studies how shared nationality between IPCC member governments and IPCC authors matters for SPM report text. We argue that national ties lead to biased reports that are no longer just a summary of objective climate science but a politicized version thereof. This is the case because report authors have incentives to accept comments from their home governments at a higher rate than those from other states. Importantly, such favoritism does not arise from governments

having to exercise direct control over their co-national authors. Instead, report authors accommodate government requests voluntarily because of professional career incentives. We provide compelling empirical support for this argument from unique observational data in the form of more than 3,500 government comments on IPCC draft text of the Working Group III's *Summary for Policymakers* (SPM). Additional, qualitative evidence from an elite survey with 225 former IPCC authors helps us justify two central assumptions of our argument's mechanism, while the results from an experiment embedded into the same survey shed light on necessary, theoretical scope conditions.

Our findings have three implications for IO scholarship and global governance research. First, and in keeping with the focus of this special issue on the influence of individuals in international relations (Weaver, Morrison, and Heinzel, 2026), we pivot analytical attention to individual report authors as an underappreciated class of actors in the IO literature. This shift from collective agency at the IO-level towards more systematic study of specific individuals inside IOs advances our understanding of how individuals' behaviors shape IO and global governance outcomes. In our case, where IPCC report authors face conflicting pressures between preserving the SPM's scientific integrity and furthering national interests, we argue that career incentives are at the core of how report authors resolve the trade-off between personal rewards and normative, professional, and political costs.

Second, we show that similar to evidence from the World Bank (Clark and Dolan, 2021), influential member governments in IOs may get what they want without having to directly exercise control. When accepting comments from co-national governments helps report authors to also advance their professional careers, national interests and individual incentives align. On balance, this leads to biased reports—that is, reports that are necessarily more politicized versions of what the "same" IO reports would otherwise look like were they based on science alone. For climate policy, this bodes ill when obstructionist governments hold sway over IPCC report production and climate governance in the UN (Hughes, 2024; Roberts et al., 2025).

And third, our findings challenge some of the scholarly optimism around informational constraints of state power. At least for those IOs where institutional rules are permissive and request government input into information production, existing arguments may over-estimate the extent to which IO-supplied information can reign in powerful governments effectively. By being able to shape which information makes it into IO reports when they are being written, governments can indirectly control the "downstream" consequences of these reports (Bayer and Crippa, 2026). As a result, informational constraints become endogenous to IO information production. What this then means for global governance outcomes in practice will vary because the organizational rules, and hence the politics of IO report production differ across reports and IOs. This variation offers fertile ground for future research to revisit the conditions under which IO information can credibly constrain government action and when it cannot. We therefore believe that conceptualizing IO reports, as we do in this paper, as central instruments of IO information provision merits greater attention in the literature as a means to help us refine the informational foundations of our institutional theories of international cooperation.

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The Politics of National Ties in International Organization Reports

—SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS—

Contents

A Observational evidence: Descriptives

A.1 Full Comment Success Rates by Countries



FIGURE A.1: Rates of success of submitted comments for all countries, ordered by number of submitted comments. We exclude editorial comments, those addressing multiple parts of texts, those raising multiple points on a given part of text, and those submitted by the European Union.

A.2 Submitted Comments by POTs



FIGURE A.2: Number of submitted comments by POT and percentage of success. We exclude editorial comments, those addressing multiple parts of texts, and those raising multiple points on a given part of text.

B Observational Evidence: Alternative Model Specifications

B.1 Alternative Fixed-Effects

Tables B.1 and B.2 replicate models from the main text (Tables 2 and 3 respectively) with different fixed effects (FE) specifications. We propose, first, a sparse pooled OLS model with no FEs. Second, a country-FE. Jointly with main text results, these specifications account for all permutations of country and POT FEs (and lack thereof). Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Results are substantively unchanged from the main text.

Table B.1: Robustness to alternative FE specifications (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.010***	0.007***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.008***	0.006***		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.001	-0.002
					(0.004)	(0.003)
(Intercept)	0.286***		0.278***		0.307***	
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.014)	
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.007	0.024	0.006	0.023	0.000	0.021
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.012	0.006	0.012	-0.000	0.010
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B.2: Robustness to alternative FE specifications (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.006***	0.004***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.005***	0.003**		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					-0.001	-0.004**
					(0.002)	(0.001)
(Intercept)	0.072***		0.068***		0.085***	
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.008)	
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.006	0.019	0.006	0.019	0.000	0.018
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.007	-0.000	0.006
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

B.2 Logistic Regressions

Tables B.3 and B.4 replicate our models from the main text (Tables 2 and 3 respectively) substituting linear probability models with (conditional) logit models. Results are largely unchanged.

Table B.3: Robustness to logit models (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.053***	0.037***				
	(0.008)	(0.007)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.044***	0.027**		
			(0.009)	(0.009)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.051*	0.031+
					(0.023)	(0.019)
Num.Obs.	3589	3588	3589	3588	3589	3588
R2	0.083	0.097	0.082	0.096	0.078	0.096
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.015	0.018	0.014	0.013	0.013
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B.4: Robustness to logit models (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.051***	0.014				
	(0.012)	(0.015)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.046***	0.008		
			(0.010)	(0.013)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.062*	-0.010
					(0.028)	(0.031)
Num.Obs.	2466	2377	2466	2377	2466	2377
R2	0.127	0.145	0.127	0.144	0.123	0.144
R2 Adj.	0.032	0.016	0.032	0.015	0.028	0.015
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

B.3 Control for Comment Textual Features

In Tables B.5 and B.6, we replicate our main results after adding three control variables that vary at the comment-level and are not captured by our FEs: the length of a comment (number of words in hundreds), its readability (measured as a Flesch reading-ease score), and its technicality (measured as a type-token ratio). They might correlate with the substantive content of a comment, thus its likelihood of success, and might bias our results if they also correlated with the composition of certain author teams. Results are virtually the same after controlling for these covariates.

Table B.5: Control for comment textual features (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.011***	0.007***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.009***	0.005**		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.010*	0.006+
					(0.005)	(0.003)
LENGTH	-0.018	-0.023	-0.023	-0.025	-0.017	-0.025
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
READABILITY	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
TECHNICALITY	-0.216**	-0.197*	-0.221**	-0.204*	-0.216**	-0.203*
	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.080)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.110	0.124	0.109	0.123	0.104	0.123
R2 Adj.	0.071	0.075	0.070	0.074	0.065	0.073
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B.6: Control for comment textual features (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.004***	0.002+				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.004***	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.003+	-0.000
					(0.002)	(0.002)
LENGTH	-0.003	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
READABILITY	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
TECHNICALITY	-0.084	-0.080	-0.086	-0.082	-0.084	-0.081
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.052)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.149	0.159	0.149	0.159	0.146	0.159
R2 Adj.	0.112	0.112	0.111	0.112	0.109	0.112
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

C Observational Evidence: Alternative Variable Operationalization

C.1 Binary Explanatory Variables

In Tables C.1 and C.2, we replicate Tables 2 and 3 but substitute percentage explanatory variables with binaries capturing whether there are *any* co-national ACADEMICS, RESEARCHERS, and NON-RESEARCHERS with the government reviewers in the team addressing comments. Using a binary variable, we still find significant effects for the team of ACADEMICS, however effects for RESEARCHERS are more muted.

Table C.1: Use binary explanatory variable (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS$_{bin}$	0.092***	0.071**				
	(0.022)	(0.022)				
RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$			0.067**	0.040		
			(0.025)	(0.025)		
NON-RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$					0.050+	0.030
					(0.028)	(0.020)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.106	0.121	0.103	0.119	0.100	0.119
R2 Adj.	0.068	0.073	0.064	0.071	0.061	0.070
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table C.2: Use binary explanatory variable (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS$_{bin}$	0.041***	0.024*				
	(0.008)	(0.010)				
RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$			0.022*	0.003		
			(0.010)	(0.010)		
NON-RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$					0.020	-0.002
					(0.015)	(0.015)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.149	0.158	0.146	0.158	0.145	0.158
R2 Adj.	0.112	0.112	0.109	0.111	0.109	0.111
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

C.2 Percentage of SPM authors

In Tables C.3 and Tables C.4, we replicate our main text tables but re-build the percentages explanatory variables after considering only authors (ACADEMICS, RESEARCHERS, or NON-RESEARCHERS) in the text production that are explicitly mentioned as SPM-contributing authors in the preamble of the SPM document. Results are largely confirmed for the INCORPORATION outcome, but less so for the DELETION outcome.

Table C.3: Consider only SPM authors for percentage explanatory variables (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SPM ACADEMICS%	0.005***	0.002*				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
SPM RESEARCHERS%			0.003*	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
SPM NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.005*	0.003+
					(0.002)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.101	0.119	0.100	0.119	0.099	0.119
R2 Adj.	0.063	0.070	0.062	0.070	0.061	0.070
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table C.4: Consider only SPM authors for percentage explanatory variables (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SPM ACADEMICS%	0.002**	0.000				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
SPM RESEARCHERS%			0.001*	-0.000		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
SPM NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.002	0.000
					(0.002)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.146	0.158	0.146	0.158	0.145	0.158
R2 Adj.	0.109	0.111	0.109	0.111	0.109	0.111
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

C.3 Binary of SPM authors

In Tables C.5 and Tables C.6, we replicate our main text tables but build binary explanatory variables after considering whether there are *any* co-national authors (ACADEMICS, RESEARCHERS, or NON-RESEARCHERS) in the text production that are explicitly mentioned as SPM-contributing authors in the preamble of the document. Here, too, results are confirmed for the INCORPORATION outcome, but are muted for the DELETION ONE.

Table C.5: Consider only SPM authors for binary explanatory variables (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SPM ACADEMICS$_{bin}$	0.089***	0.042*				
	(0.015)	(0.018)				
SPM RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$			0.052+	0.018		
			(0.027)	(0.024)		
SPM NON-RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$					0.047	0.018
					(0.035)	(0.024)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.102	0.119	0.100	0.119	0.099	0.118
R2 Adj.	0.064	0.071	0.062	0.070	0.061	0.070
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table C.6: Consider only SPM authors for binary explanatory variables (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SPM ACADEMICS$_{bin}$	0.037***	0.009				
	(0.010)	(0.011)				
SPM RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$			0.027**	0.007		
			(0.009)	(0.010)		
SPM NON-RESEARCHERS$_{bin}$					0.007	-0.020
					(0.021)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642	3642
R2	0.146	0.158	0.146	0.158	0.145	0.158
R2 Adj.	0.110	0.111	0.110	0.111	0.108	0.111
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

D Observational Evidence: Inclusion and Exclusion of Data

D.1 Exclude Comments about the SPM Introduction

In Tables D.1 and D.2, we replicate our main results after removing all comments that refer to the introduction of the SPM. Because all authors contribute to the introduction, co-nationals might be over-represented in this POT compared to more substantive POTs. After dropping comments about the SPM introduction, results remain virtually the same.

Table D.1: Exclude comments on the SPM introduction (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.011***	0.007***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.009***	0.005**		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.009*	0.005
					(0.004)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	3564	3564	3564	3564	3564	3564
R2	0.107	0.124	0.107	0.123	0.102	0.122
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.075	0.068	0.074	0.063	0.073
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D.2: Exclude comments on the SPM introduction (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.004***	0.002+				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.004***	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.003+	-0.000
					(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	3564	3564	3564	3564	3564	3564
R2	0.152	0.161	0.152	0.161	0.149	0.161
R2 Adj.	0.115	0.114	0.115	0.114	0.112	0.114
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

D.2 Exclude Comments with Manually Corrected Location

Our research assistants manually corrected the location of a minority of comments, whose original information reported incorrect or nonexistent locations in the text. To ensure results do not hinge on this correction, we drop any comment whose textual location we corrected. Results (in Table D.3 and D.4) are consistent with the main ones.

Table D.3: Exclude comments with manually corrected location (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.010***	0.007***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.009***	0.005**		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.010*	0.006+
					(0.004)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	3574	3574	3574	3574	3574	3574
R2	0.107	0.121	0.106	0.121	0.101	0.120
R2 Adj.	0.068	0.072	0.068	0.071	0.062	0.070
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D.4: Exclude comments with manually corrected location (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.004***	0.001+				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.003***	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.003+	0.000
					(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	3574	3574	3574	3574	3574	3574
R2	0.148	0.159	0.148	0.158	0.146	0.158
R2 Adj.	0.111	0.111	0.111	0.111	0.109	0.111
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

D.3 Exclude Comments with RA Disagreement

Here, we show results do not hinge on our reconciliation of the coding where the two RAs disagreed, when they classified the outcome of a comment. We replicate our analysis after excluding any comment where the two RAs disagreed on any coding of the comment. This is an important test, because it allows us to simultaneously verify two important aspects. First, that results do not hinge on our choices to adjudicate INCORPORATION or DELETION in any specific way. Second, that results are independent of excluding comments for whom coding is perhaps more uncertain (evidenced by the disagreement between the two RAs). Tables D.5 and D.6 perform this test for out two outcomes and provide results that are consistent with those in the main text.

Table D.5: Exclude comments with RA disagreement (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS$_{\%}$	0.007***	0.006**				
	(0.002)	(0.002)				
RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$			0.006***	0.005*		
			(0.001)	(0.002)		
NON-RESEARCHERS$_{\%}$					0.007*	0.006*
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	2706	2706	2706	2706	2706	2706
R2	0.122	0.134	0.121	0.133	0.119	0.132
R2 Adj.	0.071	0.068	0.070	0.068	0.067	0.067
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D.6: Exclude comments with RA disagreement (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	0.006***	0.005***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
RESEARCHERS%			0.004***	0.003***		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.001	-0.003
					(0.002)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	2706	2706	2706	2706	2706	2706
R2	0.135	0.144	0.132	0.143	0.124	0.141
R2 Adj.	0.085	0.080	0.081	0.078	0.073	0.076
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

D.4 Exclude one Country at a Time (Jackknife Test)

To ensure our results are not driven by any single influential reviewer country, we re-estimate our models 2, 4, and 6 of Tables 2 and 3 after removing one country from the pool of reviewers at a time. We report results of this country reviewers-jackknife test for models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2 in Figure D.1. We highlight in red estimates from the main text, for comparison. The left-panel reports results relative to the ACADEMICS variable, the mid-panel relative to the RESEARCHERS variable, while the right-panel shows results for the NON-RESEARCHERS variable. We find no strong influencer driving the effects detected for ACADEMICS but we note that excluding the US or the UK renders the effect of the RESEARCHERS variable insignificant.



FIGURE D.1: Exclude one country at the time. Linear probability models of INCORPORATION. Test of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2

We repeat the exercise for the DELETION outcome variable (models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3. Bearing in mind that the effect for model 2 is significant at a p = 0.10 the results, presented in Figure D.2, support similar conclusions.



FIGURE D.2: Exclude one country at the time. Linear probability models of DELETION. Test of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3

D.5 Exclude one POT at a Time (Jackknife Test)

Similarly to what we did in the previous section, here we perform a jackknife test but this time we discard one POT that government comments refer to at a time. Results assessing robustness of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2 are reported in Figure D.3 (left-panel considers percentage of ACADEMICS, mid-panel percentage of RESEARCHERS, and right-panel percentage of NON-RESEARCHERS). Following the same logic, robustness of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3 are reported in Figure D.4. We do not find that any single POT significantly drives the positive effect detected in the main text.



FIGURE D.3: Exclude one POT at the time. Linear probability models of INCORPORATION. Test of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2

We repeat the exercise for the DELETION outcome variable (models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3. Results, presented in Figure D.2, support similar conclusions.



FIGURE D.4: Exclude one POT at the time. Linear probability models of DELETION. Test of models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3

E Observational Evidence: Placebos

E.1 Editorial Comments

We asked the two RAs to classiy whether comments are editorial (i.e., require only cosmetic changes to the text) or substantive. In our main analysis, we drop editorial comments. The results in Tables E.1 and E.2 show that we find null effects for incorporation and deletion of text for editorial comments, as expected.

Table E.1: Placebo: editorial comments (outcome: comment incorporation)

	Outcome: INCORPORATION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	-0.008	-0.009				
	(0.014)	(0.014)				
RESEARCHERS%			-0.008	-0.006		
			(0.012)	(0.012)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					0.011	-0.004
					(0.009)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	153	153	153	153	153	153
R2	0.442	0.600	0.443	0.599	0.440	0.599
R2 Adj.	0.236	0.285	0.237	0.284	0.233	0.283
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table E.2: Placebo: editorial comments (outcome: text deletion)

	Outcome: DELETION (binary)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ACADEMICS%	-0.004	0.003				
	(0.006)	(0.010)				
RESEARCHERS%			-0.006	-0.002		
			(0.006)	(0.008)		
NON-RESEARCHERS%					-0.015	-0.013
					(0.014)	(0.011)
Num.Obs.	153	153	153	153	153	153
R2	0.571	0.651	0.575	0.651	0.571	0.652
R2 Adj.	0.412	0.376	0.418	0.375	0.413	0.377
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: POT	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: country		X		X		X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

F Survey: Questionnaire

Thank you for taking the time to participate in our survey. As academic researchers at the University of Strathclyde and the University of Glasgow we are studying country participation in the production of IPCC reports. With this survey, we seek your input to help us better understand the role of report authors based on your own lived IPCC experience.

Participating in this study will involve reading some text and responding to some questions. It will last approximately 15 minutes. This study is intended solely for research purposes.

Your privacy and data protection are guaranteed under UK GDPR regulation. Participation is anonymous and voluntary. We will not collect any personally identifying information about you. Your individual responses are completely confidential and will not be shared with anyone outside the research team. There are no risks associated with participation in the study, which was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Strathclyde.

If you decide to participate in this research survey, you may withdraw from it at any time without any penalty. You can also decide from the outset not to participate in the survey. No information will be shared with any third party, and no data will be collected that will personally identify you.

If you have any questions or concerns, or would like to withdraw your consent and data at any point, please contact the lead academics of this survey: Dr Lorenzo Crippa (l.crippa@strath.ac.uk) or Professor Patrick Bayer (Patrick.Bayer@glasgow.ac.uk).

Do you consent to participate in the survey?

- Yes
- No

---------- Pre-treatment questions ----------

Q1 In what country is your **primary institution** of employment located?
[Drop down menu with country names]

Q2. Which of the following best characterizes the type of your **primary institution**?
- University
- Research centre, think tank, or policy institute
- Government body (e.g., Ministry)
- Private non-profit organization
- Private for-profit organization
- Prefer not to respond

Q3. In which IPCC Assessment Report (AR) were/are you involved in? (select all that apply)
- AR5
- AR6
- Prefer not to respond

Q4. In which IPCC working group were/are you involved in? (select all that apply)
- WGI
- WGII
- WGIII
- Prefer not to respond

Q5. In what role(s) did/do you participate in IPCC report production? (select all that apply)
- Coordinating lead author (CLA)
- Lead author (LA)
- Review editor
- Prefer not to respond

Q6. Are you or have you been an SPM-contributing author?
- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Q7. How many years have you been taking part in IPCC report production?
- Less than 3 years
- Between 3 and 7 years
- Between 7 and 10 years
- More than 10 years
- Prefer not to respond

---------- Manipulation ----------

We will now present you with a series of six **hypothetical government comments** on a **hypothetical headline statement** of IPCC report text. Please carefully read each headline statement and the submitted comment. Please bear in mind that the provided comments are fictional and have not really been submitted by member governments. However, we ask you to approach this task in the same way as you would approach any real government comment as part of the IPCC review.

Task 1 [RANDOMIZE TASK ORDER]

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Global surface temperature has increased by about 1.1°C since 1850–1900, with human influence assessed as the dominant driver of observed warming since the mid-20th century.	Suggest replacing 'dominant driver' with 'primary driver' to better reflect that while human influence is strongest, natural variability continues to play a role.

Y1.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y1.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y1.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y1.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

Task 2

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Sea level rise is virtually certain to continue for centuries, driven by thermal expansion and ice sheet loss, with higher emissions leading to greater increases.	Propose adding the phrase 'subject to significant regional differences' to highlight that global mean sea level projections mask important local variation.

Y2.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y2.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y2.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y2.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

Task 3

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Climate change has already caused widespread adverse impacts on ecosystems and human systems, with disproportionate impacts observed in low-income regions due to lower adaptive capacity.	Recommend adding 'although attribution of some observed impacts remains complex' to reflect residual uncertainty in linking certain regional impacts directly to climate change.

Y3.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y3.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y3.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y3.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

Task 4

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Risks from climate change will increase with additional warming, including that the frequency of crop failures and heat-related mortality will rise above 1.5°C of warming (high confidence).	Suggest changing 'high confidence' to 'medium-to-high confidence,' since not all crop systems and regions show consistent evidence across the literature.

Y4.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y4.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y4.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y4.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

Task 5

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Global greenhouse gas emissions from the use of coal, gas, and oil must decline rapidly in the next decade to limit warming to 1.5°C, with modelled pathways showing immediate and substantial reductions are required.	The language is policy prescriptive. Remove "must" and ensure the paragraph is a balanced representation of all GHG sources and pathways.

Y5.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y5.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y5.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y5.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

Task 6

Comment by Government of [treatment/control]

Headline statement	Government comment
Mitigation options across energy, transport, and agriculture sectors are technically available, increasingly cost-effective, and deliver co-benefits for health and development.	Recommend inserting 'depending on regional and institutional contexts' after 'cost-effective,' as economic assessments vary across settings.

Y6.1 Would you make **any changes** to the headline statement in view of the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to respond

Y6.2 What **type of edits** would you make to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**?

- No edits
- Minor edits
- Moderate edits
- Major edits
- Full rewrite
- Prefer not to respond

Y6.3 Would you consider the **following changes** to the text based on the above **comment by the Government of [treatment/control]**? (select all that apply)

- No changes
- Add a footnote
- Reword
- Deletion of contested sentence
- Accept proposed language as is
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Y6.4 On a scale from 1 (not realistic at all) to 7 (very realistic), how **realistic** would you say is it for the **Government of [treatment/control]** to make the comment shown above?

1. (not realistic at all)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. (very realistic)

- Prefer not to respond

---------- Open question section ----------

O1. Do you think the **nationality of the government** that submits a comment matters for how likely the comment is going to be accepted? If so, could you please explain briefly.
[Open field]

O2. Some say that in deciding whether to accept a government comment or not, IPCC authors face a **trade-off** between promoting their **own research agendas** and the **integrity of IPCC reports**. Do you think this trade-off exists?

- Yes, this trade-off exists and I have experienced it myself
- Yes, this trade-off exists and I have heard others articulate it
- No, I don't think this trade-off exists
- Prefer not to respond

O3. Assuming for a moment that such a trade-off existed and thinking about interactions with IPCC colleagues, **how strong of a tension** would the majority of your colleagues think this trade-off creates. The scale below ranges from "no tension at all" (=1) to " very strong tension" (=7).

1. (no tension at all)
2.
3.
4. (medium tension)
5.
6.
7. (very strong tension)

- Prefer not to respond

O4. Some say that **Summaries for Policymakers (SPM)** are much more a **political document** than a **scientific report**. On a scale from "an entirely political document" (=1) to "an entirely scientific report" (=7), where would you place IPCC SPMs?

1. (an entirely political document)
2.
3.
4. (half political document, half scientific report)
5.
6.
7. (an entirely scientific document)

- Prefer not to respond

---------- Funding mechanism section ----------

M1. How important do you think IPCC reports are for shaping **national research strategies** and **climate research funding priorities** in the country of your primary institution?

- Not at all important
- Rather unimportant
- Neither important nor unimportant
- Rather important
- Extremely important
- Prefer not to respond

M2. Do you think there is a difference between the **Global North** and the **Global South** in how IPCC reports matter for countries' **national research strategies** and **climate research priorities**? Can you please explain in a few words?
[Open field]

M3. Based on your own experience and on what you hear from colleagues, would you say that being an IPCC author is beneficial when **applying for public research funding** in the country of your primary institution?

- Not at all beneficial
- Rather non-beneficial
- Neither beneficial nor non-beneficial
- Rather beneficial
- Very beneficial
- Prefer not to respond

M4. Based on interviews with IPCC authors from previous ARs, it was indicated to us that IPCC authors face incentives to accept government comments as a way to "**seed their personal research agendas**" into IPCC reports. How plausible do you think this logic is?

- Not at all plausible
- Rather implausible
- Neither plausible nor implausible
- Rather plausible
- Very plausible
- Prefer not to respond

M5. Based on interviews with IPCC authors and public commentary, some of the following reasons have been mentioned as **motivations for becoming an IPCC author**. Which ones do you agree with? (select all that apply)

- Visibility as an expert in the field
- Establish networks with academics
- Establish networks with national policymakers
- Shape national research priorities
- Help policymakers understand the scientific frontier and knowledge gaps
- Shape climate research funding priorities consistent with scientific evidence
- Contribute to debate about evidence-based climate policy
- Build a track record for future academic/political appointments
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

---------- Post-treatment additional questions ----------

Q8. What is your highest academic degree?
- Bachelor's degree (or equivalent)
- Master's degree (or equivalent)
- PhD degree (or equivalent)
- Other
- Prefer not to respond

Q9. How many years ago did you obtain your highest academic degree?
- Less than 5 years ago
- Between 5 and 10 years ago
- Between 10 and 20 years ago
- More than 20 years ago
- Prefer not to respond

Q10. How old are you?
- Younger than 30 years old
- Between 30 and 40 years old
- Between 40 and 50 years old
- Between 50 and 60 years old
- Between 60 and 70 years old
- Older than 70 years
- Prefer not to respond

Q11. What is your gender?
- Male
- Female
- Non-binary / third gender
- Prefer not to respond

---------- End of survey ----------

We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.
Your response has been recorded.

G Survey: Descriptives

We report descriptive statistics about our sample of authors in Table G.1. We complement them with a representation of the distribution of the continuous variables from this table in Figure G.1. We conclude this description with Table G.2, where we model respondents' reported perception of plausibility of our research agenda-informed co-nationality argument (on a 0–6 scale, model 1) and respondents' reported perception of plausibility of the trade off between science and seeding one's own research agenda in the reports (on a 0–4 scale, model 2). We explain these variables in two linear models where, on the right-hand side, we include the respondent's answer to our question about whether they had experienced or heard others articulate this very trade-off. Results indicate that trade-off experiences are correlated with an increase in the perceived plausibility of our argument. Interestingly, we also find some evidence of social desirability bias, as respondents who preferred not to comment on the trade-off experience find our argument more plausible, on average.



FIGURE G.1: Distribution of continuous variables from the survey sample of IPCC authors

Table G.1: Summary statistics of IPCC author survey

	N	Mean	SD	Min	P25	Median	P75	Max
Science vs personal research trade-off:								
Research agenda vs science, trade-off exists (binary)	215	0.493	0.501	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Research agenda vs science, trade-off plausibility (0–6)	156	2.513	1.616	0.000	1.000	3.000	3.000	6.000
Being an IPCC author beneficial when applying for res. funding (0–4)	160	2.375	0.950	0.000	2.000	2.000	3.000	4.000
IPCC authors face incentives to seed personal res. agendas (0–4)	162	1.346	0.961	0.000	1.000	1.000	2.000	4.000
Politicization of IPCC reports:								
SPM is a political vs a scientific document (0–6)	163	3.853	1.420	0.000	3.000	4.000	5.000	6.000
SPM shapes national res. strategies and funding priorities (0–4)	165	2.770	1.119	0.000	2.000	3.000	4.000	4.000
Motivations for becoming an IPCC author:								
Visibility as an expert in the field (binary)	223	0.596	0.492	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Establish networks with academics (binary)	223	0.583	0.494	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Help policymakers understand science (binary)	223	0.623	0.486	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Contribute to debate about evidence-based climate policy (binary)	223	0.587	0.493	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Build track record for future academic/political appointments (binary)	223	0.260	0.440	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Establish networks with policymakers (binary)	223	0.188	0.392	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Shape climate research funding priorities (binary)	223	0.274	0.447	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Shape national research priorities (binary)	223	0.188	0.392	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Other (binary)	223	0.076	0.266	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Primary affiliation:								
University (binary)	213	0.643	0.480	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Research center (binary)	213	0.249	0.433	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Non-researcher (binary)	213	0.108	0.311	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
IPCC experience:								
Number of AR served (1–5)	223	2.063	1.367	0.000	1.000	2.000	3.000	5.000
Served in WGI (binary)	221	0.407	0.492	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Served in WGII (binary)	221	0.403	0.492	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Served in WGIII (binary)	221	0.308	0.463	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Highest degree:								
PhD degree or equivalent (binary)	165	0.970	0.172	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Master's degree or equivalent (binary)	165	0.024	0.154	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Years since highest degree:								
Between 5 and 10 years ago (binary)	165	0.012	0.110	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Between 10 and 20 years ago (binary)	165	0.152	0.360	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
More than 20 years ago (binary)	165	0.836	0.371	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Gender:								
Female (binary)	164	0.268	0.444	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Age:								
Between 30 and 40 years old (binary)	162	0.006	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Between 40 and 50 years old (binary)	162	0.105	0.307	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Between 50 and 60 years old (binary)	162	0.290	0.455	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Between 60 and 70 years old (binary)	162	0.340	0.475	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Older than 70 years (binary)	162	0.259	0.440	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

Table G.2: IPCC author survey. Correlations between perceptions of argument plausibility and reported experience with science-personal research agenda trade-off

	Argument plausibility	Trade-off plausibility
Baseline: This trade-off does not exist	1.131***	2.240***
	(0.080)	(0.162)
I have experienced this trade-off	0.254	0.913*
	(0.313)	(0.382)
I have heard others articulate this trade-off	0.744***	0.789*
	(0.200)	(0.313)
Prefer not to respond	0.769*	0.760
	(0.344)	(0.522)
Num.Obs.	162	156
R2	0.114	0.058
R2 Adj.	0.098	0.039

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Linear models of the perceived plausibility of our proposed co-nationality bias argument (0–4) and of the research agenda-seeding trade-off (0–6). White-robust standard errors in parentheses.

H Survey: Additional results

H.1 Alternative dependent variable

In Table H.1, we replicate the experimental analysis in the main text but model the degree of edits that a respondent would be willing to introduce in a text (0–4 continuous scale from "no edits" to "full rewrite"). We find null effects consistent with those reported in the main text.

Table H.1: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results for degree of acceptance

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.082	-0.099+	-0.095	-0.048	-0.072	-0.053	-0.063	-0.082	-0.074	-0.231	-0.230	-0.240
	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.054)	(0.084)	(0.177)	(0.127)	(0.168)
(Intercept)	0.921***			0.866***			0.913***			0.981**		
	(0.101)			(0.097)			(0.109)			(0.151)		
Num.Obs.	969	969	969	651	651	651	859	859	859	110	110	110
R2	0.002	0.366	0.036	0.001	0.396	0.034	0.001	0.367	0.038	0.018	0.358	0.091
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.234	0.030	-0.001	0.268	0.025	-0.000	0.235	0.031	0.009	0.223	0.038
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	167	167	167	113	113	113	148	148	148	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of degrees of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

H.2 Results by Working Group task

Next, we split our sample (for the binary and continuous measure of comment acceptance) by the presented task's working group, to evaluate if we observe differences across working groups. In this case, we do not fit respondent-FE as that effectively reduces the study to just two observations per respondent (each respondent saw exactly two tasks per working group). We find some evidence of a positive effect of the CO-NATIONALITY treatment on the probability of comment acceptance, in line with our argument and expectations. The treatment increases the probability of comment acceptance by about 0.10. Our power analysis indicates that the sample is just large enough to detect such effect. We find no significant treatment effects otherwise.

Table H.2: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results by working group task

	Comment acceptance						Comment acceptance degree					
	WG1		WG2		WG3		WG1		WG2		WG3	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	0.092+	0.102+	-0.149	-0.149	-0.115	-0.126	0.096	0.110	-0.148	-0.148	-0.215	-0.247
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.129)
(Intercept)	0.421		0.532*		0.662+		0.733		0.869+		1.174	
	(0.095)		(0.025)		(0.078)		(0.121)		(0.072)		(0.219)	
Num.Obs.	322	322	320	320	324	324	323	323	321	321	325	325
R2	0.008	0.050	0.022	0.023	0.014	0.024	0.003	0.032	0.006	0.007	0.011	0.032
R2 Adj.	0.005	0.044	0.019	0.016	0.011	0.018	-0.000	0.026	0.003	0.000	0.008	0.026
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	164	164	165	165	166	166	165	165	165	165	166	166
Task FE		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear models of comment acceptance (models 1–6) and degree of comment acceptance (models 7–12). Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

H.3 Results by IPCC experience

We continue by studying how experience with the IPCC process drives such results. First, we split our sample by whether respondents had any reported experience with the working group of a given task. We report results in Table H.3. We find a negative treatment effect only for tasks that respondents did not have experience with.

Table H.3: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results by experience with the working group's task

	Comment acceptance						Comment acceptance degree					
	WG Experience			No WG Experience			WG Experience			No WG Experience		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.013	-0.008	-0.020	-0.081	-0.109*	-0.081	-0.024	-0.059	-0.042	-0.119	-0.177*	-0.125
	(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.111)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.073)	(0.057)	(0.091)
(Intercept)	0.500***			0.559***			0.895***			0.938***		
	(0.056)			(0.052)			(0.122)			(0.097)		
Num.Obs.	377	377	377	589	589	589	376	376	376	593	593	593
R2	0.000	0.479	0.057	0.007	0.377	0.030	0.000	0.523	0.061	0.004	0.448	0.029
R2 Adj.	-0.002	0.076	0.041	0.005	0.138	0.020	-0.003	0.153	0.045	0.002	0.239	0.019
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	164	164	164	163	163	163	164	164	164	163	163	163
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear models of comment acceptance (models 1–6) and degree of comment acceptance (models 7–12). Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Confirming that, in Figure H.1 we study the treatment effect as moderated by the number of ARs of experience, employing the kernel estimator by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019) to allow for flexible moderation. We model comment acceptance (left) and the degree thereof (right). We find that the negative treatment effect is concentrated among authors with limited IPCC experience.



FIGURE H.1: Treatment effect of co-nationality on the probability of comment acceptance (left) and the degree thereof (right) as moderated by authors' experience with ARs. Kernel estimator by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019).

H.4 Results excluding non-credible comment sources

In Tables H.4 and H.5, we replicate our analysis for both dependent variables after excluding all tasks which authors assessed as not realistic (values of 1–2 on a 1–7 scale between "not realistic at all" and "very realistic"). We find similar null effects as those documented in the main text and above.

Table H.4: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results for credible tasks only

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.013	-0.001	-0.014	0.023	0.030	0.022	0.005	0.014	0.005	-0.139	-0.102	-0.132+
	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.062)
(Intercept)	0.625***			0.578***			0.608***			0.744***		
	(0.045)			(0.053)			(0.052)			(0.058)		
Num.Obs.	656	656	656	448	448	448	575	575	575	81	81	81
R2	0.000	0.394	0.029	0.001	0.393	0.033	0.000	0.399	0.032	0.022	0.356	0.077
R2 Adj.	-0.001	0.200	0.020	-0.002	0.202	0.020	-0.002	0.205	0.021	0.010	0.155	0.003
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	159	159	159	107	107	107	140	140	140	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Table H.5: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results for credible tasks only and degree of acceptance

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	0.014	-0.003	0.004	0.053	0.036	0.050	0.039	0.017	0.035	-0.166	-0.138	-0.165
	(0.062)	(0.021)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.036)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.034)	(0.078)	(0.210)	(0.152)	(0.193)
(Intercept)	1.038***			0.961***			1.023***			1.140***		
	(0.087)			(0.097)			(0.101)			(0.149)		
Num.Obs.	657	657	657	449	449	449	576	576	576	81	81	81
R2	0.000	0.471	0.030	0.001	0.470	0.038	0.000	0.470	0.036	0.009	0.481	0.087
R2 Adj.	-0.001	0.301	0.021	-0.001	0.303	0.025	-0.001	0.300	0.025	-0.003	0.319	0.013
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	159	159	159	107	107	107	140	140	140	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of degrees of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

H.5 Results excluding inattentive respondents and review editors

Here, we discard inattentive authors and authors who only had experience as review editors, given that their role is not to addressing review comments. We discard 47 authors who did not finish the survey. We next discard two respondents who self-identified as inattentive by giving conflicting answers to *all* six tasks (e.g., responding that they would not address a given comment but that they would introduce any type of change in the text to address it). Finally, we discard seven authors who reported to have only served as IPCC review editors. We repeat our analysis in Tables H.6 and H.7 on this reduced sample, where we find similar results as those presented above.

Table H.6: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results with limited sample

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.082+	-0.087*	-0.081	-0.060	-0.071	-0.055	-0.070	-0.076	-0.068	-0.169	-0.162+	-0.168
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.085)
(Intercept)	0.625***			0.594***			0.617***			0.680***		
	(0.047)			(0.053)			(0.053)			(0.078)		
Num.Obs.	784	784	784	534	534	534	687	687	687	97	97	97
R2	0.007	0.343	0.044	0.004	0.357	0.042	0.005	0.356	0.044	0.030	0.256	0.115
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.179	0.037	0.002	0.192	0.031	0.004	0.194	0.036	0.020	0.073	0.056
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	157	157	157	109	109	109	138	138	138	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Table H.7: Survey experiment among IPCC authors. Results with limited sample and degree of acceptance

	All authors			Academics			Researchers			Non-researchers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CO-NATIONALITY	-0.114*	-0.150**	-0.116*	-0.060	-0.113+	-0.052	-0.089	-0.135*	-0.088	-0.297	-0.257	-0.319
	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.184)	(0.129)	(0.174)
(Intercept)	0.974***			0.904***			0.967***			1.020**		
	(0.093)			(0.096)			(0.098)			(0.162)		
Num.Obs.	784	784	784	534	534	534	687	687	687	97	97	97
R2	0.003	0.395	0.044	0.001	0.425	0.042	0.002	0.399	0.045	0.027	0.362	0.110
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.243	0.037	-0.001	0.277	0.031	0.001	0.248	0.037	0.017	0.204	0.051
Std.Errors	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task	by: task
Number of authors	157	157	157	109	109	109	138	138	138	19	19	19
Respondent FE		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes	
Task FE			Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear probability models of degrees of comment acceptance. Task-clustered standard errors in parentheses