

1 Economic hardship weakens European support for 2 hard power, but not humanitarian aid to Ukraine 3 4

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9 **The durability of European backing for Ukraine depends on how citizens weigh economic**
10 **worries against security and humanitarian commitments. We examine how economic**
11 **concerns, triggered by energy price shocks, shape European attitudes toward military,**
12 **financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine. Using survey data from 33 European countries**
13 **(N = 75,000), we exploit variation in energy prices on unusually cold days to instrument for**
14 **economic concerns. We find that heightened worries about the cost of living reduce support**
15 **for military aid, financial aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. This effect is stronger**
16 **in countries where Russia is not viewed as an immediate threat. By contrast, support for**
17 **accepting Ukrainian refugees remains unaffected, indicating that economic pressure weakens**
18 **backing for hard power policies without eroding humanitarian solidarity. These results**
19 **highlight a vulnerability in the European coalition: compassion for Ukraine endures, but**
20 **sustained unity around military and economic assistance may falter when economic concerns**
21 **rise, particularly in regions distant from the front line of Russian aggression.**

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23 Ukraine War | Public opinion | Energy prices | Military aid | Humanitarian aid
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26 **R**ussia's invasion of Ukraine has upended the European security order, forcing
27 European leaders to confront hard questions about how to safeguard security
28 on the continent.

29 In the early weeks of the war, Europe responded with remarkable unity. The
30 European Peace Facility was rapidly mobilized to fund weapons for Ukraine, harsh
31 sanctions were imposed on Russia, and a partial embargo on Russian energy was
32 enacted. These swift moves align with theories that external threats catalyze
33 integration (1), yet the durability of this consensus remains in question. U.S.
34 President Trump has signaled his desire to reduce support for Ukraine and this
35 has made European contributions even more essential. European governments
36 have pledged increased defense spending and long-term support for Ukraine, but
37 sustaining this commitment while the war continues, has proven politically and
38 economically challenging (2).

39 European public opinion has largely supported Ukraine, but this support is not
40 uniform. Surveys find that a majority of Europeans support defense cooperation
41 between Ukraine and Europe (3–5). However, one-third of European political
42 parties oppose core aspects of support for Ukraine, including military aid, refugee
43 reception, and sanctions that raise energy costs (6). Moreover, among the general
44 public support for pro-Ukraine policies has declined since the beginning of the war
45 (Figure 2).

46 These political developments suggest that the post-invasion consensus may be
47 more fragile than it appears. While the war heightened perceived threats and
48 fostered elite rhetoric in favor of unity (7), it has not overridden domestic cleavages.
49 Analysts caution that mounting economic strains, especially inflation and budgetary
50 pressures, are gradually eroding Western publics' willingness to sustain Ukraine's
51 war effort against Russia (8–10).

52 To understand how economic concerns shape public support for different aspects
53 of the European response to the war, we examine attitudes toward a broad set of
54 policies ranging from military and financial assistance to humanitarian aid and
55 refugee reception. Using an instrumental variables strategy to address concerns
56 about reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we find that heightened economic
57 concern reduces support for what we term *hard power policies*: maintaining sanctions
58 on Russia and providing military or financial aid to Ukraine. In contrast, economic
59 concern does not diminish support for humanitarian aid or for welcoming Ukrainian
60 refugees. These findings suggest that economic hardship selectively erodes support
61 for Europe's military and coercive response to the war, while leaving humanitarian
62 solidarity largely intact.

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 **Significance Statement**

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Sustaining European unity in support of Ukraine is central to deterring Russian aggression. Yet political pledges for long-term military and economic aid are vulnerable to shifts in public opinion. Where Russian threats are immediate, sustaining public support is relatively straightforward, but farther away from the conflict electorates prove more sensitive to rising economic costs. We employ individual-level data from three waves of surveys conducted in 33 European countries (N=75,000) to understand the relationship between Europeans' economic concerns and their support for Ukraine. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that economic concerns triggered by energy prices undermine public support for military aid, financial aid, and sanctions against Russia. Crucially, willingness to provide humanitarian assistance for refugees remains strong, even among economically burdened citizens. These findings highlight that while compassion for Ukraine endures, economic pressures may fracture support for hard power measures, particularly in countries less directly threatened by Russia. Our findings indicate that economic pressures may fracture European unity in responding to the war, not through diminished humanitarian solidarity, but through declining support for hard power measures.

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249 Our study builds on and extends existing research on
 250 how conflict shapes public opinion and geopolitics in Europe.
 251 Prior experimental work shows that priming Europeans to
 252 think about economic problems does not reduce their support
 253 for hosting Ukrainian refugees (11). However, support for
 254 refugees is just one dimension of the European response
 255 and hard power policies are arguably more consequential
 256 for defending Ukraine's sovereignty and deterring Russian
 257 aggression. By broadening the scope of analysis, we show
 258 that economic concerns significantly reduce public support for
 259 these coercive measures. Our findings also complement recent
 260 studies on Europe's ability to resist Russian energy coercion
 261 (12, 13). While those studies focus on state behavior and
 262 reach differing conclusions, we adopt a micro-level perspective
 263 to examine how economic pressures shape citizen preferences.

265 Results

266 To identify the causal effect of economic concern on foreign
 267 policy attitudes, we estimate a series of two-stage least
 268 squares (2SLS) regressions using an instrumental variable
 269 (IV) strategy.


270 Our instrument combines information on recent local
 271 cold weather, measured by Heating Degree Days (HDD),
 272 with household energy inflation at the country-month level.
 273 Specifically, it is the interaction between the average HDD
 274 in the respondent's region during the seven days before the
 275 interview and the corresponding energy inflation. HDD is a
 276 standard metric that quantifies heating demand by measuring
 277 the extent to which temperatures fall below a baseline (18
 278 degrees) at which households typically begin heating their
 279 homes. Both HDD and its cooling equivalent are widely
 280 used for modeling energy demand (e.g. 14). We do not
 281 find that temperature-induced demand for cooling affected
 282 economic concerns, which is not surprising as air conditioners
 283 are relatively uncommon household appliances in Europe
 284 despite increasing heatwaves (15–17).

285 This interaction of short-term weather fluctuations and
 286 macroeconomic price shocks generates plausibly exogenous
 287 variation in the salience of energy-related economic hardship.
 288 On colder days, energy costs are salient regardless of inflation,
 289 whereas on milder days, economic concern rises primarily
 290 when inflation is high. This conditional salience mechanism
 291 supports the validity of the exclusion restriction. The first-
 292 stage F-statistic exceeds 22 in our regressions, indicating a
 293 strong instrument. We also report p-values robust to weak
 294 instruments.

295 Importantly, in all models we include the constituent
 296 terms (*HDD* and *Energy Inflation*) along with our instrument.
 297 Including *HDD* by itself controls for direct temperature effects
 298 on mood, comfort, and seasonal attitudes. Including *Energy*
 299 *Inflation* accounts for its direct economic effects. Region
 300 fixed effects further account for time-invariant differences
 301 in heating infrastructure, mitigating concerns that *HDD* is
 302 confounded by regional variation in heating technology or
 303 energy dependence. As a result, our instrument is based solely
 304 on the interaction between short-term weather fluctuations
 305 and monthly energy inflation.

306 The endogenous regressor is perceived national economic
 307 conditions, and the outcomes are support for Ukraine-related
 308 policies, summarized in indices capturing hard power and
 309 humanitarian dimensions (Figure 1). All models include

Fig. 1. IV Estimate of *Economic Concern* on Support for Various Policies



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Notes: This figure presents the IV estimates (and 95% CI) of *Economic Concern* on support for various policies. Each line represents a separate regression, with the policy listed on the y-axis as the dependent variable. Support is measured on a 4-point scale from "totally disagree" to "totally agree." The instrument is the interaction term *HDD* \times *Energy Inflation*. All regressions include controls for region fixed effects, survey fixed effects, respondent characteristics, *HDD*, and *Energy Inflation*. Full regression results are reported in SI Table 4.

individual-level covariates, region and survey fixed effects, and
 separate controls for *HDD* and energy inflation. Robustness
 checks are listed at the end of this section. More details on
 data sources and model specifications are presented in the
 "Materials and Methods" section.

Main IV estimates. Figure 1 shows the IV estimates of *Economic Concern* on seven distinct outcomes. Two of these outcomes, the *Hard Power Policies Index* and the *Humanitarian Policies Index*, are composite measures, indicated by solid lines. The remaining five outcomes are the individual components that constitute these indices, shown with dashed lines. Full regression results are reported in the Supplementary Information (SI) Table 4.

The *Hard Power Policies Index* combines attitudes toward three forms of coercive support for the Ukrainian war effort: imposing sanctions on Russia, providing military aid, and offering financial aid. Across all four outcomes, we find sizable and statistically significant negative effects. A one-unit increase in *Economic Concern*, roughly equivalent to 1.2 standard deviations (SD), reduces support for the *Hard Power Policies Index* by 0.48 points on a 4-point scale. This effect corresponds to approximately 0.6 SD in the outcome variable. The estimated effects are -0.43 for sanctions (0.45 SD), -0.5 for military aid (0.5 SD), and -0.5 for financial aid (0.55 SD).

In contrast, the *Humanitarian Policies Index*, comprising support for humanitarian aid to Ukraine and for welcoming Ukrainian refugees shows no statistically significant relationship with *Economic Concern*. The estimated coefficient for the index is -0.006 , a substantively and statistically negligible effect. The estimates for the individual components

373 are similarly insignificant: -0.03 for humanitarian aid and
374 -0.01 for welcoming Ukrainian refugees, both equivalent to
375 approximately 0.01 SD.

376 To formally assess whether the effect of *Economic Concern*
377 differs between the *Hard Power Policies Index* and the
378 *Humanitarian Policies Index*, we conducted a Wald test
379 comparing the respective IV estimates. The test indicates
380 a statistically significant difference at the 7% level. It is
381 important to note that IV estimation typically produces
382 larger confidence intervals due to the additional uncertainty
383 introduced by instrumenting. Taken together, the magnitude
384 of the estimated difference and the Wald test provide com-
385 pelling evidence that economic concerns influence attitudes
386 toward hard power and humanitarian policies in distinct ways.

387 We have conducted several analyses to confirm the
388 validity of our IV strategy, and therefore, our findings.
389 Our instrument is statistically strong, with first-stage F-
390 statistics well above conventional thresholds, indicating that
391 economic concern is reliably predicted by the instrument
392 (see Table 2). To address any lingering concerns about
393 instrument weakness, we also conduct analyses robust to
394 weak instruments using the Anderson–Rubin method. These
395 confirm that the effect of economic concerns on humanitarian
396 policies remains statistically insignificant across specifications.
397 These are provided in SI Table 4.

398 Although the null effect on humanitarian policies could
399 be due to social desirability bias, we have reasons to think
400 that this is not the case. First, this null effect is replicated in
401 experimental research (11). Using list experiments designed
402 to reduce participants' concern about expressing unpopular
403 views, researchers still find that economic priming does
404 not reduce support for hosting Ukrainian refugees. Second,
405 support for Ukrainian refugees and humanitarian aid have
406 declined over time (SI Figure 5). If social desirability bias
407 were a dominant factor, we would expect support to remain
408 uniformly high or stable. These empirical patterns suggest
409 that people are expressing their genuine preferences.

410 We conduct several robustness checks including alternative
411 endogenous variables, weather measures, instruments, and
412 various specifications. These are reported in SI Tables 5 and
413 6. Results remain robust when using *personal job insecurity*
414 rather than national economic perceptions as our measure
415 of economic concerns, suggesting our findings reflect genuine
416 economic salience rather than interpretation of national
417 conditions that could be altered by media consumption
418 patterns or partisan attachment. We replace *HDD* with a
419 linear *Temperature* variable; measure it only on the day of the
420 interview; measure it as deviation from its five-year average;
421 winsorize it at the 90th percentile to reduce the influence
422 of outliers. We exclude *Ideology* from the model because
423 it could be affected by the instrument and therefore create
424 post-treatment bias. We also run our analysis with survey
425 weights, which reduces instrument strength. Nonetheless, our
426 main result remains unchanged: economic concerns have a
427 greater negative impact on support for hard power policies
428 than for humanitarian policies.

429 We conduct placebo tests where we re-estimate our models
430 using support for the EU's common trade policy and for free
431 movement of EU citizens as outcomes (SI Table 7). These
432 attitudes capture general views about European integration
433 but are substantively unrelated to the Ukraine conflict,

434 making them suitable "placebo" variables: if our instrument
435 were spuriously shifting broad EU orientations rather than
436 Ukraine-specific hard-power preferences, we would expect to
437 see effects here as well. We find no such effects, supporting
438 the validity of our identification strategy.

439 Lastly, we assess the robustness of our findings by
440 employing an alternative instrumental variable that captures
441 regional exposure to energy price fluctuations. Specifically,
442 we construct an instrument by interacting pre-war regional
443 natural gas demand—as a share of total energy demand in
444 2019—with changes in the energy prices after the war began.
445 The underlying rationale is that regions more reliant on
446 natural gas were disproportionately affected by subsequent
447 energy price shocks, thereby experiencing heightened eco-
448 nomic concern. This alternative specification yields results
449 consistent with our main findings. Further details and results
450 are provided in the SI.

451 Together, these results suggest that economic concerns do
452 not broadly undermine European solidarity with Ukraine but
453 selectively dampen support for more coercive and financially
454 demanding foreign policy tools. While humanitarian com-
455 mitments appear insulated from economic pressures, public
456 support for hard power measures is more contingent on the
457 perceived state of the economy.

458 **Heterogeneity among respondents.** Do all Europeans respond
459 similarly when economic concerns become more salient, or
460 does the relationship between economic concern and support
461 for Ukraine vary across different groups? To explore this, we
462 replicate our main analysis across ten subgroups, dividing
463 respondents by gender, age, political ideology, education
464 (college degree or not), and perceived national threat from
465 Russia.

466 Importantly, instrument strength varies across subgroups.
467 While the instrument is strong in most subgroups, it is weak
468 among women, individuals under 50, and in countries where
469 the perceived threat from Russia is low. We therefore report
470 Anderson–Rubin (AR) p-values which are robust to weak
471 instruments alongside the first-stage F-statistics. This allows
472 for a more cautious interpretation of subgroup results when
473 instrument strength is limited.

474 The upper panel of Table 1 presents IV estimates for the
475 *Hard Power Policies Index*. The results reveal considerable
476 heterogeneity. The estimated effect of *Economic Concern* is
477 especially strong among younger respondents, those with left-
478 leaning political views, individuals without a college degree,
479 and respondents in countries where the perceived threat
480 from Russia is lower. In contrast, the effect is smaller and
481 statistically insignificant among older, right-leaning, college-
482 educated respondents, and those in countries that perceive a
483 high threat from Russia.

484 Further tests (reported in SI Table 8) suggest that
485 differences between college-educated and non-college educated
486 individuals is statistically significant ($p = 0.04$) while those
487 between countries perceiving a high or low threat from Russia
488 barely miss the 10% cutoff ($p = 0.13$). These patterns suggest
489 that individuals in more precarious economic positions,
490 proxied by lack of a college degree, and those geographically
491 more distant from the Russian threat are more responsive to
492 the economic costs of war.

493 The lower panel of Table 1 shows the estimates for the
494 *Humanitarian Policies Index*. Across all ten subgroups, the

497 Table 1. The Impact of *Economic Concern* on Support for Hard Power Policies and Humanitarian Policies Across Subgroups
498

DV: Hard Power Policies Index										
	Gender:		Age:		Political views:		College degree:		Perceived Rus. threat:	
	Male (1)	Female (2)	Below 50 (3)	Above 50 (4)	Left (5)	Right (6)	No (7)	Yes (8)	Low (9)	High (10)
Economic concern	-0.419*** (0.162)	-0.645 (0.509)	-0.765** (0.379)	-0.258 (0.210)	-0.666** (0.293)	-0.157 (0.273)	-0.845*** (0.307)	-0.020 (0.243)	-1.540* (0.885)	-0.158 (0.222)
Controls + Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	35777	36862	35183	37456	42581	30058	42802	29837	42431	23711
KP F-stat in 1 st stage	34.7	4.5	7.3	25.9	14.5	12.1	12.9	19.6	4.0	30.7
Weak IV-robust p-value	0.02	0.20	0.05	0.23	0.02	0.59	0.004	0.93	0.003	0.49

DV: Humanitarian Policies Index										
	Gender:		Age:		Political views:		College degree:		Perceived Rus. threat:	
	Male (1)	Female (2)	Below 50 (3)	Above 50 (4)	Left (5)	Right (6)	No (7)	Yes (8)	Low (9)	High (10)
Economic concern	-0.082 (0.129)	0.244 (0.403)	-0.083 (0.314)	0.123 (0.163)	-0.105 (0.217)	0.223 (0.252)	-0.074 (0.240)	0.083 (0.173)	-0.665 (0.565)	0.252 (0.185)
Controls + Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	36802	38681	36493	38990	44475	31008	44727	30756	44251	24450
KP F-stat in 1 st stage	35.2	5.7	7.9	26.8	14.6	13.9	12.7	21.5	3.9	30.9
Weak IV-robust p-value	0.53	0.51	0.79	0.44	0.63	0.32	0.76	0.62	0.13	0.13

523 Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust s.e. clustered by region-date are in parentheses. This table shows the IV
524 estimate of *Economic Concerns* on two indices (*Hard Power Policies* and *Humanitarian Policies*) across subgroups. The
525 first-stage relationship is reported in Table 2. “Controls” are the following participant characteristics: age, gender, education
526 level, ideology, social class.

527 coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, and the
528 AR p-values confirm that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
529 in any case.

530 These findings reinforce our main conclusion: while
531 economic concerns reduce support for military and coercive
532 measures, they do not erode support for humanitarian aid
533 or refugee protection regardless of demographic or political
534 characteristics.

535 Discussion

536 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered the biggest foreign
537 policy shift in Europe since the Cold War, uniting governments
538 across the continent in support of Ukraine. Yet as the war drags on, the durability of this consensus is increasingly
539 tested by domestic economic strain and shifting political
540 dynamics. A key concern is whether rising economic costs,
541 driven in part by energy inflation, are eroding European
542 public support for Ukraine. Understanding how economic
543 hardship affects European public opinion is thus critical for
544 assessing not only the future of the pro-Ukraine coalition, but
545 also the political feasibility of a European defense strategy
546 in a context where U.S. military support may decline.

547 To identify the causal effect of economic concern on
548 public support for Ukraine, we use an instrumental variable
549 strategy that interacts temperature induced demands for
550 heating (HDD) at the time of interview with energy inflation
551 at the country-month level. We document strong first-
552 stage relationships and argue that the exclusion restriction

553 is credible, because our instrument is the interaction of
554 two variables that are weakly correlated and one of which
555 (temperature) is random. Therefore, given our broad set
556 of controls including survey and region fixed effects, the
557 instrument is plausibly unrelated to political attitudes except
558 through its effect on economic concern.

559 Our findings suggest that economic pressure selectively
560 undermines support for the coercive elements of Europe’s
561 Ukraine policy (such as military aid, financial assistance,
562 and sanctions) while leaving humanitarian commitments
563 largely intact. This asymmetry indicates that the political
564 sustainability of Europe’s “hard power” response is contingent
565 on economic conditions, particularly in countries that do
566 not perceive a direct threat from Russia. As economic
567 concerns mount, the risk of diverging policy preferences across
568 countries grows, threatening the coherence of the pro-Ukraine
569 coalition. If Europeans become less willing to bear the costs
570 of deterrence, maintaining a united and credible front in
571 support of Ukraine will become increasingly difficult.

572 More broadly, this study improves our understanding of
573 how economic conditions shape public support for foreign
574 policy. By distinguishing between hard power and humanitarian
575 responses, we provide a more nuanced account of how citizens
576 evaluate the costs and moral imperatives of international
577 engagement. Our findings challenge perspectives that expect
578 public support for foreign policy to be uniformly shaped by
579 security considerations.

580 While our identification strategy leverages Europe’s unique
581 dependence on Russian pipeline gas during 2022-23, the

underlying mechanism, economic anxieties eroding public support for coercive foreign policy tools, should travel to other advanced democracies and to later stages of the conflict. Outside Europe, similar economic shocks may arise from food price spikes; within Europe after mid-2023, generous energy subsidies muted household price variation, likely weakening the first stage. Replicating our design with alternative shocks will clarify under what conditions the linkage between domestic economy and foreign policy persists.

Materials and Methods

Our analysis combines three data sources: (1) survey data on Europeans' personal characteristics as well as attitudes toward the war and the economy, (2) weather data on average temperatures in a region on the date of interview, and (3) price data on national energy prices over time. Summary statistics for all variables are in SI Table 3.

Survey Data We use individual-level survey data from the Eurobarometer (EB) to analyze Europeans' personal characteristics and attitudes on various issues. We identified three EB surveys conducted between June 2022 and June 2023 that include questions relevant to our study and for which we have the necessary temperature data. These surveys cover 35 countries and include approximately 100,243 respondents. However, we exclude Turkey due to its exceptionally high inflation and Great Britain due to missing inflation data, leaving us with 33 countries.* Additionally, not all questions appear in every survey, resulting in a final sample of about 75,000 respondents.

For each respondent, we have data on political attitudes, perceptions of the economy, and personal characteristics, including age, gender, education level, social class, and left-right ideological self-placement. We provide a detailed description of the political and economic perception measures below.

Eurobarometer also records the date and location of each interview, enabling us to match respondents to local temperature data at the time of the survey. Location data is typically available at the NUTS-2 level.

Temperature Data We obtain weather data from the Copernicus Climate Change Service ERA5-Land dataset.[†] Using this source, we record the average temperature at the exact time and location of each interview. We use these average temperatures to calculate the Heating Degree Days (HDD) and Cooling Degree Days (CDD). These measures are frequently used to build models of heating and cooling energy demand (e.g. 14). The formulas are:

$$\text{HDD} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } T_{\text{avg}} > 15^{\circ}\text{C} \\ 18^{\circ}\text{C} - T_{\text{avg}}, & \text{if } T_{\text{avg}} \leq 15^{\circ}\text{C} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{CDD} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } T_{\text{avg}} > 24^{\circ}\text{C} \\ 21^{\circ}\text{C} - T_{\text{avg}}, & \text{if } T_{\text{avg}} \leq 24^{\circ}\text{C} \end{cases}$$

The energy demand for cooling is low in most European countries, although it may well rise. According to Eurostat, in 2022 cooling was more than 10% of total household energy

* Energy inflation ranged from 380–500% in Turkey and 100–230% in other countries in our dataset.

[†] Including Turkey in the analysis makes our instrument and findings stronger.

[†] <https://cds.climate.copernicus.eu/datasets>

demand only in Cyprus and Malta. In most other countries, including Southern European countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal, it was less than 1% of energy demand. It is therefore not surprising that including CDD weakened the instrument considerably.

Our results are consistent whether we measure HDD as the average over the previous seven days or on the interview date alone. We prefer the seven-day average because it smooths out idiosyncratic shocks and is more likely to influence attitudes and behavior relevant to our research. We refer to this variable as *HDD*. Additionally, we obtain similar results if we calculate deviations from the five-year average for the same location and day of the year or we winsorize *HDD* (at the 90th percentile) to reduce the influence of outliers.

Inflation Data We obtain household energy price data from Eurostat, the European Union's statistical office.[‡] Specifically, we use the energy subcomponent of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which focuses on monitoring changes in the prices of energy-related goods and services purchased by households—such as electricity, gas, and other fuels. These changes take into account taxes and subsidies, thereby capturing the actual prices paid by end users. It is designed to capture shifts in household energy prices over time. These data are available at the country-month level, meaning energy inflation varies across countries and over time. We refer to this variable as *Energy Inflation*.

Dependent Variables We focus on the set of questions asked in multiple surveys and therefore provide sufficient variation to produce a strong instrument. These questions appear in Eurobarometer surveys EB 97.5 (June–July 2022), EB 98.2 (January–February 2023), and EB 99.4 (May–June 2023).

These questions concern the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Respondents were asked the following question, followed by a list of EU policies:


The EU has taken a series of actions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions?

- *Imposing economic sanctions on Russian government, companies and individuals*
- *Financing supply and delivery of military equipment to Ukraine*
- *Providing financial support to Ukraine*
- *Providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war*
- *Welcoming in the EU people fleeing the war*

For all these questions, respondents indicated whether they *totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or totally disagree*.

These five questions fall into two distinct categories, both thematically and statistically. The first three (support for sanctions on Russia, military aid, and financial aid to Ukraine) focus on helping Ukraine resist Russia and sustain its economy. The other two (support for humanitarian aid and welcoming Ukrainian refugees) center on assisting Ukrainian civilians

[‡] <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/data>



Notes: The *Humanitarian Policies Index* (orange line) averages support for humanitarian aid and welcoming Ukrainian refugees. The *Hard Power Policies Index* (blue line) averages support for sanctions on Russia, military aid, and financial aid to Ukraine. For this graph, each component variable was recoded from a 4-point ordinal scale (“totally disagree” to “totally agree”) into a binary indicator, with “tend to agree” or “totally agree” coded as 1. Data come from the Eurobarometer surveys.

Fig. 2. Public Support for Ukraine-related Policies over Time

affected by the war. A principal component analysis (PCA) confirms this division, revealing two components that align with these themes (SI Table 9). Unexplained variances are low, indicating good model fit.

Based on this pattern, we construct two indices: *Hard Power Policies*, averaging support for sanctions, military aid, and financial aid; and *Humanitarian Policies*, averaging support for humanitarian aid and Ukrainian refugees.

Figure 2 shows trends in these questions over time. To facilitate interpretation, we combine the “tend to agree” and “totally agree” responses into a single “agree” category. Each point on the graph represents the average percentage of Eurobarometer respondents who agree with the policies grouped within each index. Support for hard power policies has consistently been lower than support for humanitarian policies. Although support for both types of policies has declined over time, the decline is more pronounced for hard power policies.

Endogenous Variable: Economic Concerns We measure Europeans’ perceptions of the economy using the following survey question:

How would you judge the current situation of the national economy?

Respondents choose from four options ranging from *very good* to *very bad*, without a neutral category.[§] We refer to this variable as *Economic Concerns*.

Although this variable is intended to measure perceived economic hardship, it is better understood as capturing the *salience* of economic hardship. Survey responses often reflect the most immediately accessible considerations rather than deeply reasoned judgments (18). This distinction strengthens the validity of our instrument.

This question captures perceptions of the national economy rather than personal financial situations. Personal economic circumstances change slowly and perceptions of one’s personal economic well-being are more stable than perceptions of the national economy (19). Short-term temperature fluctuations, even amid high inflation, are unlikely to significantly alter a person’s financial situation. However, a cold day can make rising energy costs more salient either by prompting someone to turn up the heat or endure the cold to save money. Thus, our instrument is more likely to reflect the salience of economic concerns rather than objective economic hardship.

Consistent with this argument, our instrument correlates more strongly with national economic perceptions than with personal financial assessments of survey participants. However, we obtain similar results if we repeat our analysis replacing perceptions of national economy with perceptions of one’s personal job security (SI Tables 5 and 6).

Our Instrument. We use the instrumental variable approach to deal with reverse causation (between foreign policy attitudes and economic perceptions) and omitted variable bias (e.g. partisanship effects). We construct our instrument by multiplying *HDD* (average over previous 7 days) with *Energy Inflation*.

The rationale behind our instrument is that cold-weather spikes should augment people’s concerns about the economy, especially when energy prices are already elevated. In such periods, cold weather strains energy supply and raises costs for businesses. Even if consumer prices do not immediately reflect these changes, citizens are familiar with national headlines on inflation and government responses like emergency subsidies or industry support. Therefore, the interaction of daily *HDD* and energy prices should heighten economic concerns.

A valid instrument must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable in a theoretically meaningful way. We provide empirical evidence below showing that our instrument meets this criterion and has the expected sign. Second, it must affect the outcome variables (attitudes) only through the endogenous variable (*Economic Concern*). To ensure this exclusion restriction holds, we control for factors that could create alternative pathways between the instrument and political attitudes.

Specifically, we control for *HDD* and *Energy Inflation* separately to rule out the possibility that our instrument is driven by their independent effects. Higher energy inflation could reflect broader economic conditions rather than household energy concerns, while extremely cold days could influence attitudes through other means, for example affecting overall happiness. We also include region fixed effects, which account for time-invariant factors such as wealth, culture, and historical ties to Russia, and survey fixed

[§]We recoded the original responses so that higher values indicate greater economic concern.




Fig. 3. Geographic Variation in Our Instrument and Its Components During Eurobarometer 98.2 (January–February 2023)

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effects, which control for events affecting all respondents, such as military developments in Ukraine. With these controls in place, our instrument isolates variation arising solely from the interaction of daily temperature fluctuations and national energy price changes.

We control for respondent characteristics to obtain more precise estimates even though they are not systematically related to our instrument. Since the instrument varies at the region-date level, we cluster standard errors at this level to ensure robust inference.

To give a sense of the geographical variation in our instrument, Figure 3 illustrates our instrumental variable and its components (*Energy Inflation* and *HDD*) during the Eurobarometer 98.2 survey period (January–February 2022). The bottom map shows regional variation in 7-day temperature averages, capturing short-term weather shocks. The middle map displays regional averages of monthly energy price inflation, reflecting energy costs across Europe during the survey. The top map plots the interaction term, our instrument.

Although in this period the instrument generally takes lower values in southern Europe, there is significant variation across the continent. For instance, in the north, the Netherlands takes low values of the instrument, mainly due to warm weather. In the Balkans, although the instrument has higher values for Romania, it remains low in other countries such as Greece. We also see significant within-country variation in countries like France and Italy.

This spatial heterogeneity strengthens the credibility of the instrument, as it reflects plausibly exogenous variation in climate and macroeconomic shocks affecting citizens' attention to energy prices but are unlikely to be correlated with unobserved regional preferences or political attitudes.

First Stage Estimates and Instrument Strength. We examine the relationship between our instrument and *Economic Concerns* to ensure that the instrument is sufficiently strong. Table 2 shows that our instrument has a positive and statistically significant effect on *Economic Concerns*. Additionally, *Energy Inflation* is positively and significantly correlated with *Economic Concerns*, while *HDD* has a negative but insignificant estimate, indicating no correlation when energy inflation is held at its mean.

Our instrument is sufficiently strong. The effective F-statistic is 21, well above the threshold of 16, which is necessary to keep bias below 10% (20).

To verify that our instrument relates to *Economic Concerns* as expected, we visualize this relationship in Figure 4. The figure shows the predicted level of *Economic Concerns* based on changes in energy consumption for heating and the rate of energy price inflation.

Figure 4 shows that during warmer periods, when heating needs are low (left side of the graph), people experiencing low inflation (blue line) worry less about the economy than those facing high inflation (red line). However, when heating needs are high (right side of the graph), economic concerns rise for everyone, regardless of inflation. In other words, heating degree days reduce economic worries only when inflation is low. This pattern is consistent with a model where people worry about the economy if either energy prices or consumption is high, but worry less when both are low.

993 These analyses suggest that we have a suitable instrument
994 for *Economic Concern*.

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996 **Table 2. First Stage Relationship Between Our Instrument and**
997 ***Economic Concerns***

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998	Outcome:	Hard power 1000 policies index	Humanitarian 1001 policies index
1002	HDD * Energy inflation	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
1003	HDD	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
1004	Energy inflation	0.072** (0.008)	0.072*** (0.008)
1005	Controls + Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓
1006	N	72639	75483
1007	R ²	0.26	0.26
1008	Effective (KP) F-stat	23.2	24.4
1009	Cragg-Donald F-stat	56.03	59.3

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1014 Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust s.e.
1015 clustered by region-date are in parentheses. This table
1016 presents the first-stage relationship between the endogenous
1017 variable *Economic Concerns* and the instrument *HDD* \times
1018 *Energy Inflation*. Models 1 and 2 use as outcome variables
1019 indices of hard power and humanitarian policies, respectively.
1020 The KP critical F-stat for 10% bias is 16.38. “Controls”
1021 include participant age, gender, education, ideology, and
1022 social class.

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1025 **Data Archival.** All data and code required for replication will
1026 be made publicly available in the Harvard Dataverse upon
1027 publication.

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1241 **Supplementary Information**

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1264 *Years of education:*

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1265 No full-time education

1266 Up to 15 years

1267 16-19 years

1268 20+ years

1269 Still studying

1270 *Social class:*

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1271 Working class

1272 Lower middle class

1273 Middle class

1274 Upper middle class

1275 Higher class

Sample includes the 72,639 individuals analyzed in Model 1 of Table 4.

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Table 3. Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Hard power policies index	3.1	0.85	1	4
Humanitarian policies index	3.5	0.66	1	4
Sanctions on Russia	3.2	0.97	1	4
Military aid for Ukraine	2.9	1.04	1	4
Financial aid for Ukraine	3.2	0.90	1	4
Humanitarian aid for Ukraine	3.5	0.70	1	4
Welcoming Ukrainian refugees	3.4	0.75	1	4
Economic concern	2.6	0.8	1	4
HDD (Heating degree days)	5.8	7.3	0	27.9
Energy inflation (standardized)	0.1	1.1	-2.2	3.5
Instrument: HDD * Energy inflation	2.2	11.0	-26.7	78.7
Age	50.8	17.7	15	99
Female	0.5	0.5	0	1
Ideology	5.3	2.1	1	10
<i>Years of education:</i>				
No full-time education	0.006	0.08	0	1
Up to 15 years	0.097	0.29	0	1
16-19 years	0.419	0.49	0	1
20+ years	0.411	0.49	0	1
Still studying	0.067	0.25	0	1
<i>Social class:</i>				
Working class	0.21	0.41	0	1
Lower middle class	0.16	0.37	0	1
Middle class	0.53	0.49	0	1
Upper middle class	0.09	0.29	0	1
Higher class	0.01	0.09	0	1

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1374								1436	
1375	Table 4. IV estimate of <i>Economic Concern</i> on support for various policies (Regression table for Figure 1)							1437	
1376								1438	
1377								1439	
1378								1440	
1379								1441	
1380		Hard power policies index	Sanctions on Russia	Milit. aid to Ukraine	Fin. aid to Ukraine	Humanitarian policies index	Hum. aid to Ukraine	Welcoming Ukr. refugees	1442
1381		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	1443
1382	Economic concern	-0.479** (0.206)	-0.425* (0.225)	-0.499** (0.238)	-0.501** (0.209)	-0.006 (0.168)	-0.031 (0.168)	-0.016 (0.184)	1444
1383	Heating degree days	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	1445
1384	Energy inflation	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.034** (0.014)	1446
1385	Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	1447
1386	Female	0.021 (0.014)	0.040*** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	0.032** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)	1449
1387	Ideology	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	1451
1388									1452
1389									1453
1390									1454
1391									1455
1392	<i>Years of studying (Baseline: Up to 15 years)</i>								1456
1393	16-19 years	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.011)	1456
1394	20+ years	0.034** (0.016)	0.024 (0.019)	0.020 (0.020)	0.067*** (0.018)	0.133*** (0.014)	0.132*** (0.014)	0.135*** (0.016)	1457
1395	Still studying	0.040 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.039)	0.044 (0.040)	0.102*** (0.036)	0.152*** (0.030)	0.139*** (0.030)	0.161*** (0.033)	1459
1396	No full-time education	-0.083** (0.041)	-0.104** (0.046)	-0.071 (0.048)	-0.086** (0.042)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.076** (0.035)	-0.069* (0.037)	1461
1397									1462
1398									1463
1399									1464
1400									1465
1401	<i>Social class (Baseline: Working class)</i>								1466
1402	Lower middle class	0.003 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.021)	0.010 (0.022)	0.001 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.017)	1467
1403	Middle class	0.035 (0.043)	0.025 (0.047)	0.062 (0.051)	0.026 (0.044)	0.027 (0.035)	0.011 (0.036)	0.037 (0.039)	1468
1404	Upper middle class	0.093 (0.062)	0.086 (0.068)	0.123* (0.073)	0.078 (0.064)	0.099* (0.051)	0.079 (0.052)	0.111* (0.057)	1469
1405	Higher class	0.086 (0.071)	0.071 (0.079)	0.110 (0.085)	0.083 (0.073)	0.096* (0.058)	0.064 (0.059)	0.120* (0.065)	1470
1406	Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	1471
1407	N	72639	74354	74512	75187	75483	76000	75749	1472
1408	1st stage F-stat (KP)	23.2	22.6	22.7	25.0	24.4	24.9	24.4	1473
1409	Weak IV-robust p-value	0.027	0.072	0.045	0.022	0.971	0.854	0.931	1474
1410									1475
1411	Robust s.e. clustered by region-date are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.								1476
1412	The critical F-stat value (KP) for 10% bias is 16.38.								1477
1413									1478
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Table 5. Robustness checks using *Hard Power Policies Index* as the outcome variable

	Econ. Concern: <i>Job Insecurity</i>	HDD: <i>Temperature</i>	HDD: Interview day	HDD: Diff. from 5yr avg.	HDD: Winsorize	Drop <i>Ideology</i>	Survey weights	1561
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	1562
1500								1563
1501								1564
1502	Economic concern	-1.054* (0.565)	-0.582*** (0.222)	-0.481** (0.206)	-0.608* (0.318)	-0.551** (0.223)	-0.478** (0.207)	-2.139** (1.060)
1503	HDD	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.007)
1504								1566
1505	Energy inflation	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.093 (0.063)
1506								1568
1507	Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.002)
1508								1570
1509	Female	0.048 (0.036)	0.027* (0.015)	0.021 (0.014)	0.029 (0.020)	0.025* (0.015)	0.020 (0.014)	0.108 (0.068)
1510								1572
1511	Ideology	-0.010 (0.008)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)		-0.028*** (0.008)
1512								1574
1513								1575
1514	<i>Years of studying (Baseline: Up to 15 years)</i>							1576
1515								1577
1516	16-19 years	-0.069* (0.036)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.027 (0.046)
1517								1578
1518	20+ years	-0.106 (0.091)	0.029* (0.017)	0.034** (0.016)	0.028 (0.020)	0.031* (0.017)	0.034** (0.016)	-0.116 (0.116)
1519								1580
1520	Still studying	0.030 (0.039)	0.026 (0.036)	0.040 (0.034)	0.022 (0.048)	0.030 (0.036)	0.039 (0.033)	-0.219 (0.198)
1521								1582
1522	No full-time education	-0.157** (0.069)	-0.081* (0.043)	-0.083** (0.041)	-0.081* (0.043)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.083** (0.041)	0.011 (0.177)
1523								1585
1524	<i>Social class (Baseline: Working class)</i>							1586
1525								1587
1526	Lower middle class	-0.050 (0.049)	-0.005 (0.021)	0.003 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.003 (0.020)	-0.117 (0.078)
1527								1588
1528	Middle class	-0.212 (0.185)	0.014 (0.047)	0.035 (0.043)	0.008 (0.066)	0.020 (0.047)	0.036 (0.044)	-0.299 (0.209)
1529								1590
1530	Upper middle class	-0.298 (0.289)	0.063 (0.067)	0.093 (0.062)	0.055 (0.096)	0.072 (0.068)	0.095 (0.063)	-0.321 (0.284)
1531								1592
1532	Higher class	-0.414 (0.353)	0.053 (0.076)	0.085 (0.071)	0.045 (0.106)	0.063 (0.077)	0.088 (0.072)	-0.193 (0.264)
1533	Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1534	<i>N</i>	62193	72639	72639	72639	72639	72639	72639
1535	1st stage F-stat (KP)	5.400	21.886	23.478	10.894	20.699	22.983	4.574
1536	Weak IV-robust p-value	0.042	0.013	0.024	0.036	0.019	0.028	0.000

Robust s.e. clustered by region-date are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The critical F-stat value (KP) for 10% bias is 16.38.

M1 uses *Personal Job Insecurity* instead of *National Economic Perceptions* to measure economic concern. M2 replaces *HDD* with a linear *Temperature* measure. M3 measures *HDD* on the day of the interview. M4 measures *HDD* as deviation from its five-year average. M5 winsorizes *HDD* at the 90th percentile. M6 drops *Ideology* to avoid potential post-treatment bias. M7 uses survey weights.

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 1624 **Table 6. Robustness checks using *Humanitarian Policies Index* as the outcome variable**
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	Econ. Concern: <i>Job Insecurity</i> (1)	HDD: <i>Temperature</i> (2)	HDD: Interview day (3)	HDD: Diff. from 5yr avg. (4)	HDD: Winsorize (5)	Drop <i>Ideology</i> (6)	Survey weights (7)
Economic concern	-0.383 (0.395)	-0.152 (0.172)	-0.132 (0.164)	-0.090 (0.246)	-0.100 (0.178)	-0.078 (0.166)	-1.541* (0.822)
HDD	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.005)
Energy inflation	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.022* (0.013)	0.066 (0.050)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)
Female	0.014 (0.025)	0.007 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.003 (0.016)	0.003 (0.012)	0.004 (0.011)	0.079 (0.052)
Ideology	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.006)	
<i>Years of studying (Baseline: Up to 15 years)</i>							
16-19 years	0.010 (0.025)	0.025** (0.010)	0.025** (0.010)	0.025** (0.010)	0.025** (0.010)	0.026*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.036)
20+ years	0.083 (0.064)	0.127*** (0.014)	0.129*** (0.014)	0.130*** (0.016)	0.130*** (0.014)	0.133*** (0.013)	0.007 (0.091)
Still studying	0.104*** (0.027)	0.131*** (0.029)	0.134*** (0.028)	0.139*** (0.038)	0.138*** (0.030)	0.146*** (0.028)	-0.080 (0.154)
No full-time education	-0.097** (0.047)	-0.073** (0.034)	-0.073** (0.034)	-0.074** (0.034)	-0.073** (0.034)	-0.074** (0.034)	-0.028 (0.124)
<i>Social class (Baseline: Working class)</i>							
Lower middle class	-0.047 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.016)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.117* (0.060)
Middle class	-0.097 (0.129)	-0.002 (0.036)	0.002 (0.034)	0.011 (0.051)	0.009 (0.037)	0.011 (0.035)	-0.276* (0.161)
Upper middle class	-0.089 (0.201)	0.058 (0.052)	0.064 (0.050)	0.077 (0.074)	0.074 (0.054)	0.075 (0.051)	-0.284 (0.219)
Higher class	-0.131 (0.246)	0.049 (0.058)	0.056 (0.056)	0.069 (0.080)	0.066 (0.060)	0.066 (0.057)	-0.192 (0.205)
Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	61857	72165	72165	72165	72165	72165	72165
1st stage F-stat (KP)	5.153	22.375	23.872	10.869	21.125	23.473	4.591
Weak IV-robust p-value	0.368	0.393	0.437	0.713	0.588	0.649	0.000


1661 Robust s.e. clustered by region-date are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
 1662 The critical F-stat value (KP) for 10% bias is 16.38.


1663 M1 uses *Personal Job Insecurity* instead of *National Economic Perceptions* to measure economic concern. M2 replaces *HDD* with a linear
 1664 *Temperature* measure. M3 measures *HDD* on the day of the interview. M4 measures *HDD* as deviation from its five-year average. M5 winsorizes
 1665 *HDD* at the 90th percentile. M6 drops *Ideology* to avoid potential post-treatment bias. M7 uses survey weights.

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1751			1813
1752	Placebo DV:		
		<i>Support for EU common trade policy</i>	<i>Support for EU citizens' free movement</i>
		(1)	(2)
1753	Economic concern	-0.152 (0.153)	-0.097 (0.127)
1754	HDD	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
1755	Energy inflation	0.004 (0.010)	0.000 (0.008)
1756	Age	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
1757	Female	0.000 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)
1758	Ideology	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)
1759	<i>Years of studying (Baseline: Up to 15 years)</i>		
1760	16-19 years	-0.000 (0.006)	0.014*** (0.005)
1761	20+ years	0.013 (0.009)	0.038*** (0.008)
1762	Still studying	0.016 (0.023)	0.045** (0.019)
1763	No full-time education	-0.032 (0.024)	0.011 (0.020)
1764	<i>Social class (Baseline: Working class)</i>		
1765	Lower middle class	0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.010)
1766	Middle class	0.017 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.026)
1767	Upper middle class	0.033 (0.044)	0.011 (0.037)
1768	Higher class	0.024 (0.048)	0.004 (0.039)
1769	Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓
1770	<i>N</i>	59912	61482
1771	1st stage F-stat (KP)	9.181	8.274
1772	Weak IV-robust p-value	0.306	0.438
1773	Robust s.e. clustered by region-date are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The critical F-stat value (KP) for 10% bias is 16.38.		
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1897	<p><i>Note:</i> This table reports the estimated differences in coefficients between subgroups for two outcome indices: <i>Hard Power Policies</i> and <i>Humanitarian Policies</i>. Reported p-values correspond to tests of equality of coefficients across subgroups pairs (e.g., male vs. female). Negative values indicate lower estimated coefficients in the first subgroup relative to the second.</p>	
1898	1959	
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2010	2072	
2011	2073	
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2017	2079	
2018	<p><i>Note:</i> This table reports the rotated component loadings from a principal component analysis with varimax rotation, based on five (standardized) outcome variables. Component 1 captures hard power policies, while Component 2 reflects humanitarian policies. The “Unexplained” column indicates the proportion of variance in each variable not accounted for by the two components.</p>	
2022	2080	
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2028	2086	
2029	2087	
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2031	2089	
2032	2090	
2033	2091	
2034	2092	
2035	2093	
2036	2094	
2037	2095	
2038	2096	
2039	2097	
2040	2098	
2041	2099	
2042	2100	
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2044	2102	
2045	2103	
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Notes: Each line shows the percentage of people agreeing or strongly agreeing with a policy. Data come from the Eurobarometer surveys.

Fig. 5. Public Support for Ukraine-related Policies over Time




Fig. 6. OLS Estimate of Relationship Between the *Economic Concern* and Various Attitudes

Notes: This figure shows the point estimates (and 95% CI) of *Economic Concern* in OLS regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is listed on the y-axis. All regressions control for region FE, survey FE, and respondent characteristics.

OLS Regressions. Here we present the “naive” OLS estimates of the relationship between economic concerns and our outcome variables. OLS and IV estimates may differ for several reasons. Measurement error in the endogenous variable and omitted variable bias can both bias OLS estimates toward zero. Conversely, reverse causality, where support for sanctions shapes perceptions of the economy, can inflate OLS estimates. Therefore, we expect OLS estimates to be biased. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful baseline.

Figure 6 displays OLS point estimates (with 95% CI) for the effect of *Economic Concern*. The outcome variables are listed on the y-axis. All regressions include region fixed effects, survey fixed effects, and respondent characteristics.

Across all outcomes, Figure 6 shows that *Economic Concern* is negatively and significantly associated with support for pro-Ukraine policies. Respondents who perceive a weaker national economy are less likely to support sanctions against Russia, aid to Ukraine, or accepting Ukrainian refugees. As in our IV estimates, *Economic Concern* is more strongly linked to hard power policies than to humanitarian ones.

Alternative Instrument. As a robustness check, we construct an alternative, plausibly exogenous measure of local exposure to energy price fluctuations using pre-crisis energy demand data from 2019. The energy demand data come from the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre Energy Atlas[¶], which provides gridded (1x1km) information on regional energy demand across the EU. We aggregate energy demand by source—natural gas, electricity, renewables, oil and petroleum, solid fuels, and heat—at the NUTS level and compute the 2019 share of natural gas out of total demand.^{||} This share serves as a plausibly exogenous pre-war proxy for a region’s vulnerability to energy price shocks. We then interact the 2019 shares of natural gas with changes in the HICP energy index (described in the main text) to construct an alternative shift-share instrument for economic concern.

We estimate the following equation using an instrumental variables approach:

$$Y_{irt} = \text{Economic Concern}_{irt} + \sigma W_i + \gamma_r + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{irt} \quad [1]$$

Where the first-stage equation is:


$$\text{Economic Concern}_{irt} = \hat{\beta} \text{Pre-War Natural Gas Demand Share}_{r,2019} \times \text{Energy Inflation}_{r,t} + \sigma \hat{W}_i + \hat{\gamma}_r + \hat{\delta}_t + \varepsilon_{irt} \quad [2]$$

Here r indexes NUTS region, t indexes time (survey), W_i are individual covariates such as gender, education, age, ideology, and socioeconomic status. Finally, γ_r is a region (NUTS2 in most cases) fixed effect, while δ_t are survey fixed effects.

The results are shown in Figure 7 and Table 10. Similar to our main estimates, we find that economic concerns have a negative impact on support for hard power policies, and to a lesser extent for humanitarian policies.

<https://energy-industry-geolab.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energy-atlas/>

|| Our results are robust to including electricity demand in this calculation.

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Notes: This figure presents the IV estimates (and 95% CI) of *Economic Concern* obtained with the alternative instrument (*Pre-War Natural Gas Demand Share × Energy Inflation*) on support for various policies. Each line represents a separate regression, with the policy listed on the y-axis as the dependent variable. Support is measured on a 4-point scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree.”

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Table 10. IV estimates obtained using the alternative instrument (Pre-War Natural Gas Share x Energy Inflation)

	(1) Hard power policies index	(2) Sanctions on Russia	(3) Milit. aid to Ukraine	(4) Fin. aid to Ukraine	(5) Humanitarian policies index	(6) Hum. aid to Ukraine	(7) Welcoming Ukr. refugees
Economic concern	-0.635*** (0.180)	-0.460** (0.231)	-0.594*** (0.176)	-0.874*** (0.222)	-0.398*** (0.149)	-0.326** (0.149)	-0.497*** (0.166)
Controls + Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	62733	64307	64362	65021	65256	65716	65490
KP F-stat in 1 st stage	30.647	32.591	30.523	28.253	30.176	29.276	30.783
Weak IV-robust p-value	0.001	0.044	0.002	0.000	0.011	0.034	0.004

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust s.e. clustered by region are in parentheses. This table shows the IV estimate of Economic Concerns on outcomes of interest. The first-stage relationship is reported in Table 11. “Controls” are the following participant characteristics: age, gender, education, ideology, and social class.


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Table 11. First stage estimates of Economic Concern and Our Alternative Instrument

	(1) Economic concern: Hard Power Index Model	(2) Economic concern: Humanitarian Index Model
Share Pre-War Natural Gas * Energy Inflation	0.00892*** (0.00162)	0.00885*** (0.00161)
Controls + Region FE + Survey FE	✓	✓
N	62733	65256
Effective (KP) F-stat	30.534	30.069
Cragg-Donald F-stat	103.836	105.84

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust s.e. clustered by region are in parentheses. This table presents the first-stage relationship between the endogenous variable Economic Concerns and the instrument Pre-war Natural Gas Share x Energy Inflation for the samples in the Hard Power Index Model (1) and in the Humanitarian Power Index Model (2). The KP critical F-stat for 10% bias is 16.38. “Controls” include participant age, gender, education, ideology, and social class.

2605
2606 Eurobarometer 98.2 (January–February 2023)
2607 Avg. Pre-War Natural Gas Demand * Energy Inflation Instrument by Region
2608
2609 Variation
2610 107.71 - 136.76
2611 98.72 - 107.71
2612 94.51 - 98.72
2613 82.57 - 94.51
2614 74.22 - 82.57
2615 65.07 - 74.22
2616 59.54 - 65.07
2617 44.85 - 59.54
2618 29.73 - 44.85
2619 0.00 - 29.73
2620 No data
2621
2622
2623
2624
2625
2626
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2629



Pre-War (2019) Natural Gas Demand

