Educational Reforms and Public Support for International Organizations: The Roles of Skill Enhancement, Socialization, and Information

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Abstract

Public support for international organizations (IOs) is essential to their legitimacy and effectiveness, yet the sources of such support remain unclear. This paper examines the role of education in shaping attitudes toward IOs, arguing that formal schooling influences support through three potential mechanisms: economic self-interest, socialization into cosmopolitan values, and information about international affairs and IOs. Using compulsory education reforms that raised the minimum school-leaving age in twenty-one countries, we find that reform-induced increases in education significantly and persistently enhance support for IOs and the United Nations. Further investigation using data on school curricula and textbooks indicates that this effect operates primarily through the socialization pathway—education reduces nationalism—while offering more limited support for the information and skill enhancement pathways. The findings advance our understanding of how education shapes popular support for international cooperation and highlight the political implications of educational policy for the legitimacy of global governance institutions.

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Introduction

International organizations (IOs) constitute a cornerstone of international relations, addressing a wide range of transnational security, economic, social, and technical challenges. Public attitudes influence IO-related policies through electoral outcomes, civic engagement, and referenda. Supportive publics can encourage governments to join or deepen their involvement in IOs in pursuit of collective goods—as illustrated by widespread backing for the United Nations (UN), enthusiasm for European Union (EU) membership in its early decades, or the recent accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Forsberg, 2024, 284). Conversely, when public opinion turns against IOs—as has become increasingly evident over the past two decades—states may question their authority, reduce engagement and funding, or even withdraw from them (Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2024; Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019; Voeten, 2020; Walter, 2021). The United Kingdom's Brexit referendum and the Trump administration's withdrawal from several UN bodies, driven largely by support from his political base (Kafura 2025), exemplify how domestic political dynamics can push governments to disengage from global commitments.

Understanding the sources of public support for, or opposition to, IOs is essential, particularly in light of the ongoing backlash against them and their fragile position in today's shifting geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, despite growing scholarly interest in the relationship between public opinion and IOs, the sources of such attitudes remain insufficiently understood. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of this nexus by examining the role of one of the strongest predictors of public support for IOs: education. previous work shows that education is a stronger predictor of popular support for IOs than income, employment status, age, gender, urbanism, and even partisanship (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019). Beyond its predictive power, education is also one of the only policy tools states may use to foster public support for IO membership and cooperation. But the association between

education and support for IOs could be spurious if both outcomes are determined by various potential confounders, including socioeconomic background and personality traits. To what extent does education actually affect public support for IOs? And if it does, what is it in education that generates this effect?

We identify three mechanisms through which this effect may operate. The first is an *economic-based* mechanism, according to which the educated support IOs because they have a material interest in global market integration. The second is a *socialization-based* mechanism, whereby education reduces nationalist sentiments and alleviates concerns about the loss of national sovereignty. The third is an *information-based* mechanism, which posits that learning about international issues and institutions in school increases citizens' awareness of the importance of IOs in facilitating international cooperation. We further argue that the socialization and information mechanisms are more plausible than the economic explanation, and that their effectiveness depends critically on the content and nature of the education provided.

To test these theoretical expectations, we exploit compulsory education reforms that raised the minimum school-leaving age in twenty-one countries, applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design as an identification strategy. After establishing that these reforms effectively increased the number of schooling years, we analyze their impact on support for IOs using individual-level data from large global surveys conducted between the 1990s and 2010s. These surveys capture attitudes toward IOs in general and the UN in particular. We find robust and consistent evidence that additional reform-induced years of schooling have a positive effect on support for IOs. This effect is substantial in magnitude and persists for decades after the educational reforms came into force, indicating a broad and enduring effect. Exploring why education changes attitudes toward IOs, we find that additional schooling reduces nationalism and increases familiarity with IOs and the UN, consistent with both the socialization and information mechanisms. However, although education raises income, it

has little impact on skill levels, offering more limited support for the economic mechanism, at least during secondary education.

To further test and differentiate between the socialization-based and information-based mechanisms, we analyze data on school curricula and textbook content. To capture the socialization mechanism, we assess whether curricula emphasize pluralistic and cosmopolitan values rather than nationalistic and patriotic ones. To capture the information mechanism, we examine the extent to which international issues and IOs are discussed in school textbooks. The results once again suggest that the effect of education on support for IOs is strongly driven by the degree to which cosmopolitan, rather than nationalist, values are embedded in educational content. Although the results also show that the effect of schooling is twice as large in cohorts that were exposed to more information about IOs, this difference is not statistically significant. Overall, our findings indicate that the effect of education on support for IOs operates primarily through socialization and, to a lesser extent, through the acquisition of new information about IOs.

This paper makes several contributions to the existing research. First, while there is much research on the effect of education on mass attitudes towards international phenomena, such as trade, migration and globalization writ large (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Rho and Tomz, 2017; Solodoch, 2024), IOs as such attracted more limited attention in this context, with the notable exception of the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Fernández, Teney, and Díez Medrano, 2023; Kunst, Kuhn, and Werfhorst, 2020). Studies of public opinion toward IOs, by contrast, often overlook the role of education or treat it as a confounding factor. Instead, they tend to emphasize variables that may themselves be shaped by education, such as political ideology, economic skills, or perceptions of IO attributes (Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg, 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2021; Brutger and Clark, 2023; Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2024). But unlike most of these factors, education can also be directly shaped by government policy—both in level and

content—making it a powerful tool for influencing attitudes toward IOs and international cooperation.

Second, several studies that do examine the effect of education on support for IOs suffer from several limitations. To begin with, most existing studies focus on a limited set of countries—primarily in the Global North—and on a small number of prominent IOs, such as the EU, the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and NATO, or both (Dellmuth et al., 2022b; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Dellmuth, and Tallberg, 2024; Edwards, 2009; Ghassim, Koenig-Archibugi, and Cabrera, 2022; Handlin, Kaya, and Gunaydin, 2023; Johnson, 2011; Kiratli, 2022). This limits the ability to generalize from these findings. Unlike previous work, our study considers both general attitudes toward IOs and specific attitudes toward the UN, drawing on data from a wide range of countries to offer what may be the most extensive assessment of these links to date. Equally, nearly all existing studies rely on absolute measures of education—such as years of schooling or completion of specific degrees—and examine their association with attitudes toward international organizations controlling for potential observable confounders (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Dellmuth et al., 2022a; Kiratli, 2022; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). Yet, since education is not randomly assigned, it is likely shaped by additional, unobservable factors. Our study's identification strategy allows us to isolate the causal effect of education from these potential confounders, providing a more rigorous test of its influence than previous research.[1]

Third, much of this literature pays limited attention to the causal mechanisms underlying these relationships.[2] Several studies emphasize an economic-based mechanism, arguing

[1] To our knowledge, Kunst et al. (2020) is the only study that adopts a comparable identification strategy, though it focuses solely on attitudes toward the EU in four European countries.

[2] Research on the EU is an important exception. Most studies find a strong positive link between education and support for the EU, but debate persists over the causal mechanisms. Some emphasize the EU's economic effects, others stress identity and culture, and still others highlight the influence of parties and the media (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Fernández, Teney, and Díez Medrano, 2023). Despite extensive data and analyses, the relative weight of these factors remains unclear. In addition, given the EU's distinctive economic, social, and political reach, generalizing these findings to other IOs requires caution.

that the public associates IOs with globalization, and that individuals with higher levels of education are those who benefit most from globalization (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Dellmuth, and Tallberg, 2024; Edwards, 2009). Theoretically, this mechanism may be plausible for economic IOs and for countries in the Global North, but it is less persuasive for other types of IOs and the Global South (Edwards, 2009). Empirically, this argument must be rigorously tested, especially in light of competing explanations—such as socialization and information—that may also shape support for IOs. Our study takes a first and important step in unpacking the mechanisms that drive these relationships by examining both individual attributes linked to these mechanisms and the content of school curricula and textbooks. This approach enables us to identify the conditions under which education shapes support for IOs, highlighting that a pluralistic, rather than nationalistic, curriculum is particularly influential.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical foundations of the relationship between education and support for IOs, with particular attention to the causal mechanisms that drive it. The third section describes our identification strategy, key variables, and other elements of the research design. The fourth section presents the empirical results, and the final section concludes.

Theoretical Framework

Attitudes toward IOs can be most clearly understood in relation to their authority and independence from member states (Haftel and Thompson, 2006; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks, 2019; Zürn, 2018). In other words, support for IOs may be contested when considered alongside a state's national sovereignty and its capacity to conduct domestic and foreign policy without external constraints. From this perspective, support for IOs can be conceptualized as a perception that such IO authority is not a threat to national sovereignty, the acceptance that IOs may enforce certain policies on one's country even if they are not immediately in

its interest, and that states should comply with rules and policies established by IOs.

Theoretically, education can influence attitudes towards IOs through at least three causal pathways—economic, socialization, and information-based mechanisms. This section elaborates on the logic underlying each mechanism, outlines their observable implications, and discusses the potential limitations of these arguments. Particular attention is given to the implications of educational reforms and to the substantive content of education itself. Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that the three causal pathways are not mutually exclusive; each may contribute to the overall effect of education on mass attitudes toward IOs.

Much of the literature linking education to support for IOs rests on an *economic*, utilitarian, logic (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Dellmuth et al., 2022b; Kiratli and Schlipphak, 2024). Similar arguments are prevalent in explanations of public support for the EU (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Kunst, Kuhn, and Werfhorst, 2020. This argument begins with the assumption that more educated individuals are better endowed with human capital. According to traditional trade models (Rogowski, 1990; Hiscox, 2002), in a globalized economy human capital tends to increase one's competitiveness on the job market and improve employment prospects and income. Insofar as individuals act in their own economic self-interest, they will support policies and institutions associated with economic openness. The implication of this logic is that additional education should result in greater support for IOs.

This expectation is complicated by a couple of factors. First, taking conventional trade models at face value, human capital should be associated with support for economic openness in high-income countries, but not in low-income ones. In the latter, highly educated individuals are expected to have negative views of economic globalization and, in turn, institutions associated with it, such as IOs. Indeed, Edwards (2009), who makes this argument, finds a negative association between education and support for economic IOs in a large number

of countries in the Global South. More recent studies also find a negative or null effect of education on the support of economic IOs in such capital-scarce countries (Dellmuth et al., 2022b; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Dellmuth, and Tallberg, 2024). These observations suggest that the positive impact of education on support for IOs may be more circumscribed than it initially appears, for two reasons. First, the positive effect of education on support for IOs is likely to manifest primarily in countries that are capital abundant and integrated into the global economy (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019). Second, this effect should be more pronounced for IOs that promote economic openness, such as the IMF, EU, and the WTO, whereas individuals asked about IOs in general or broad-mandate IOs such as the UN may be less influenced by this mechanism (Kiratli, 2022).

With respect to the content of education, for this mechanism to materialize, schooling should enhance individuals' skill levels and thereby increase their human capital. While specialized skills are often acquired during post-secondary education (Kunst, Kuhn, and Werfhorst, 2020; Hooghe, Marks, and Kamphorst, 2024), the development of strong foundations in subjects such as mathematics and science during compulsory schooling may also contribute meaningfully to human capital formation. A curriculum that emphasizes analytical reasoning, quantitative literacy, and problem-solving can equip students with cognitive tools that remain relevant across a wide range of occupations. If this logic holds, a corollary is that cohorts that benefit from additional years of secondary education should, on average, attain jobs that demand higher levels of skill and expertise later in life, turning them from losers to winners of economic globalization (*C1*).

The second causal mechanism centers on the *socialization* of individuals into specific cultural and political values through formal education, which functions as a key arena for transmitting societal norms and belief systems. This perspective rests on the assumption that education fosters a cosmopolitan worldview and cultivates cultural openness. Accordingly, it is expected that these values translate into greater support for liberal ideas (Hooghe, Marks,

and Kamphorst, 2024) and increased tolerance toward foreign phenomena—ranging from immigration and international trade to global cooperation (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). In line with this reasoning, we expect education to foster more favorable attitudes toward IOs by strengthening individuals' cosmopolitan orientations, as IOs are often perceived as embodiments of cosmopolitan ideals in practice. Indeed, several studies contend that this mechanism is at least as influential as the utilitarian one—if not more so—in explaining public support for the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Hooghe and Marks, 2005).

When considering the conditions under which this mechanism operates, the first point to note is that—unlike the economic logic—it does not depend on a country's integration into the global economy or its factor endowments, nor on individuals' levels of human capital or specific skill sets. Moreover, it does not require IOs to possess an economic mandate or a distinctly liberal orientation. Consequently, this mechanism is more universal in scope and can be applied across a wider range of countries and IOs with varying policy competencies and ideological orientations.

On the other hand, this causal pathway depends critically on the content of education. Education systems differ in the extent to which they emphasize cosmopolitan values during the years of compulsory schooling, and some may even prioritize nationalistic or inward-looking orientations instead (Bromley and Cole, 2017).[3] This observation gives rise to two corollaries. First, if processes of socialization into cosmopolitan values are indeed at work, we should expect that increasing the length of schooling will strengthen individuals' cosmopolitan orientations (*C2a*). Second, school curricula that emphasize cosmopolitan values, tolerance and multiculturalism should foster more positive attitudes toward IOs later in life, whereas curricula that stress nationalistic, patriotic, or inward-looking values are unlikely

[3]It is also possible that cultural and political attitudes continue to develop during post-secondary education (Hooghe, Marks, and Kamphorst, 2024), including attitudes toward IOs (Kunst, Kuhn, and Werfhorst, 2020, p. 37).

to do so. We therefore expect education to increase support for IOs when the curriculum emphasizes cosmopolitan values. By contrast, in cases where the curriculum highlights nationalism, the effect of education should be much more modest and may even lead to lower levels of support for IOs (*C2b*).

A third possibility is that information about international affairs in general, and about IOs in particular, drives attitudes toward them. This causal pathway rests on the assumption that most individuals possess limited familiarity with international phenomena (Guisinger, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017), including IOs, their operations, and their effects (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019).[4] A lack of knowledge, in turn, may generate anxiety and suspicion toward IOs. In this vein, Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) argues that less educated individuals are more likely to feel overwhelmed by the complexities of globalization and, consequently, to have less confidence in IOs. In the context of the EU, individuals with greater knowledge about the organization were more likely to perceive EU enlargement as an opportunity rather than as a risk (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006). Thus, to the extent that additional education provides individuals with better information about international issues and IOs, it should increase their support for these institutions. As with the socialization mechanism, this pathway does not depend on the economic characteristics of individuals, countries, or IOs. On the other hand, a corollary of this logic is that additional years of schooling will increase an individual's knowledge of IOs (*C3a*). A second corollary is that school curricula that expose students to international phenomena and IOs, thereby increasing knowledge about them, will foster greater support for IOs later in life (*C3b*).

We note that this final expectation should be considered with caution. International politics, as taught in schools, can cover a wide range of topics and be presented in diverse ways. Indeed, Bromley and Cole (2017) find that the most common international themes in high

[4]Consequently, individuals may form their opinion based on their attitudes on more salient issues, such as globalization writ-large or trust in their own government or institutions (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Dellmuth et al., 2022b; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Kaya and Walker, 2014).

school textbooks are conflict, (de)colonialism, and democratization versus authoritarianism, which tend to emphasize nationalism and patriotism at the expense of cosmopolitanism, multilateralism and IOs. Nevertheless, they observe a growing inclusion of global issues—such as the environment, immigration, and health—that may draw attention to IOs engaged in and contribute to addressing these challenges. Thus, *C3b* may depend on the type of information provided to students, including whether it portrays IOs positively or negatively, as well as the social and political values it conveys.

Research Design, Data and Measurement

To address the inferential challenges typically associated with studying the effects of education, our research design exploits compulsory education reforms implemented in twenty-one countries. In this section, we describe the data sources, measures, and empirical strategy used to identify the effect of education on public support for IOs.

Support for IOs We draw our individual-level data from the ISSP's National Identity modules (Henceforth, ISSP-NI) of 1995, 2003, and 2013. Following Bearce and Jolliff Scott (2019), we construct a Pro-IO index variable based on three questions that capture distinct dimensions of attitudes toward IOs:

- IO threat to national sovereignty (*IO Threat*): "International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] government."
- Compliance with IO decisions (*IO Compliance*): "In general, [COUNTRY] should follow the decisions of international organizations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them?"
- Legitimacy of IO enforcement (*IO Enforcement*): "For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions."

Each of the three questions asks respondents how much they agree or disagree with the

statement on the following 5-point scale: 1. agree strongly, 2. agree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. disagree, 5. disagree strongly. Respondents also had the option to answer "Can't choose/don't know", which we treat as a neutral stance on IOs (=3) in the main analysis.[5] We reverse the scale for the *IO Threat* question so that more positive IO attitudes are marked by higher values to make it consistent with the other two questions. The inverse covariance weighting (ICW) index upweights input variables that provide more unique information, reduces random measurement errors in input variables, and increases statistical efficiency (Schwab et al., 2020).

As Bearce and Jolliff Scott (2019, pp. 191–192) observe, taken together, these three questions effectively capture the key dimensions of IO authority and the potential tension between IOs and national sovereignty. At the same time, each question carries distinct limitations and potential sources of bias. Specifically, the *IO Threat* question tends to elicit an anti-IO bias, as it is relatively easy for respondents to agree with the claim that IOs possess too much power. By contrast, the *IO Enforcement* question is likely to introduce a pro-IO bias, given its reference to environmental pollution—a clearly recognized problem requiring collective solutions—and its positively framed language ("international bodies should have the right..."). The *IO Compliance* question presents more contradictory elements. It initially asserts that member states "should follow the decisions of IOs," but then complicates this by adding "even if the government does not agree with them." This question may also be problematic because it fails to contextualize the nature of the disagreement between the IO and the government, forcing respondents to make assumptions about which actor is justified. It is plausible to assume that respondents will, by default, align with their national governments, thereby increasing the likelihood that this question elicits an anti-IO bias.

The survey results are consistent with this assessment. In the entire sample, the per-

[5] In appendix section D, we show that excluding 'don't know" responses and coding them as missing data has no bearing on our results.

centage of agreement with the *IO Enforcement* question (60) is approximately twice as high, and nearly three times as high, as the percentage of agreement with *IO Compliance* and *IO Threat* questions, respectively (34 and 18) (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019, Table 1). From this standpoint, combining the three questions into a single, composite measure helps to balance and offset these differences. To further investigate the sources of support for IOs, we also examine each question separately.

Support for the United Nations The ISSP's Citizenship module (Henceforth, ISSP-C) of 2004 collected data on attitudes toward the United Nations. We construct a Pro-UN index variable based on two questions that are consistent with the IO-Threat and the IO-Enforcement outcomes:[6]

- UN threat to national sovereignty (*UN Threat*): "Now we would like to ask your opinion about international issues. Thinking about the United Nations, which comes closest to your view? 1. The United Nations has too much power; 2. The United Nations has about the right amount of power; 3. The United Nations has too little power; 4. I don't know what the United Nations is; 5. Can't choose, don't know."
- Legitimacy of UN enforcement (*UN Enforcement*): "Which of these two statements comes closer to your view? 1. If a country seriously violates human rights, the United Nations should intervene; 2. Even if human rights are seriously violated, the country's sovereignty must be respected, and the United Nations should not intervene; 3. I don't know what the United Nation is; 4. Can't choose, don't know."

Pro-UN (Threat) is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the respondent believes the UN has either too little or about the right amount of power, and 0 otherwise. Pro-UN (Enforcement) is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the respondent supports UN intervention, and 0 otherwise. Based on these two outcomes and consistent with the Pro-IO index, we construct

[6]There is no question on compliance with IOs, unfortunately

an inverse covariance weighting Pro-UN index.

These data serve three main purposes. First, we test the robustness of our findings using separate survey and measures. Second, as more highly educated respondents might have different organizations in mind when asked about IOs in general, the UN-specific questions allow us to isolate this potential source of influence and examine the effect of education on a particular IO. Finally, in addition to a "don't know or can't choose" option, both UN-specific questions include an answer category of "I don't know what the United Nation is". We use these items to directly test the information-based mechanism, by estimating the effect of education on (lack of) knowledge about IOs.

Education We use two measures for respondents' level of education. The first measure, schooling, is the number of completed years of education with a limit of thirteen, since the reforms did not affect post-secondary education (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Solodoch, 2024). The second measure, compulsory education, is an indicator for respondents who completed the years of schooling eventually required by the compulsory education reform.

Compulsory Education Reforms. We assemble a data set on 23 compulsory education reforms implemented in 21 countries since WWII. Each of the countries participated in at least two of the three National Identity modules of the ISSP or in its Citizenship module (Table 1). Appendix Section A provides more details on each reform and the main sources used to code the reforms.

Professional Skills To test the economic-based mechanism and assess the extent to which education sorts workers out of occupations specifically more affected by global integration as well as low-skilled occupations more generally, we classify respondents according to their professional skills using Oesch's (2006) framework, which relies on four-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) codes. We code three indicators for low-

Table (1) Compulsory education reforms in 21 countries

Country	Reform year	Pivotal cohort	Change in years of compulsory schooling	Change in minimum school-leaving age	Age at school entry
Austria	1966	1952	8–9	14–15	6
Belgium	1983	1968	8–12	14–18	6
Bulgaria	1959	1946	7–8	14–15	7
Czech Republic	1948	1934	8–9	14–15	6
Czech Republic	1960	1946	8–9	14–15	6
Denmark	1958	1944	7–8	14–15	7
France	1959	1953	8–10	14–16	6
Germany	1967	1954	8–9	14–15	6
Hungary	1961	1947	8–10	14–16	6
Ireland	1972	1958	8–9	14–15	6
Japan	1947	1935	6–9	n/a	6
Latvia	1970	1955	8–11	15–18	7
Mexico	1993	1981	6–9	12–15	6
Netherlands	1975	1959	9–10	16–17	6
Portugal	1964	1957	4–6	12–14	8
Slovakia	1948	1934	8–9	14–15	6
Slovenia	1951	1937	7–8	14–15	7
Spain	1970	1957	6–8	12–14	6
Sweden	1949–62	1952	7–9	14–16	7
Taiwan	1968	1956	6–9	12–15	6
United Kingdom	1947	1933	9–10	14–15	5
United Kingdom	1972	1958	10–11	15–16	5
Uruguay	1973	1961	6–9	12–15	6

Note: In Belgium, the additional three years beyond the first compulsory year can be completed on a part-time education basis. For respondents residing in Scotland, we set the pivotal cohort for the United Kingdom's 1972 reform to 1959. In Germany, we assign 1954 as the pivotal cohort in North Rhine–Westphalia, Hesse, Rhineland–Palatinate, and Baden–Württemberg; respondents in other German states are assigned according to their state-specific reform year. In Sweden, where the reform was phased in across municipalities, we follow Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) and code those born in 1952 as the first fully affected cohort.

skilled occupations, capturing low-skilled manual workers, unskilled clerical staff, and low-skilled service personnel.

Nationalism To test the socialization mechanism, similarly to our Pro-IO index, we construct a Nationalism ICW index variable based on three questions that capture nationalist sentiments and are measured using the same 5-point scale of disagreement/agreement:

- "I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world"
- "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country Nationality]"

- "Generally speaking, [Country] is a better country than most other countries"

The Content of Education To further assess the information and socialization mechanisms, we use data on the content of school curricula and textbooks. Measures on the values embedded in education are taken from the Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset on indoctrination in education and the content of school curricula (Neundorf et al., 2023). V-Indoc spans 160 countries during the post-WWII era (1945–2021) and is based on the input of 760 country experts. Information about textbooks' coverage of international organizations and issues is based on the recent version of "The Worldwide Rise of Human Rights Education" project, which includes data on nearly 1,000 civics, social studies, history, and geography textbooks from 1900-2013 in 93 countries (Ramirez, Suárez, and Meyer, 2007; Bromley and Cole, 2017; Russell, Lerch, and Wotipka, 2018; Buckner and Russell, 2013; Lerch, Russell, and Ramirez, 2017; Jiménez and Lerch, 2019).[7]

We use two V-Indoc measures to assess *C2b* and *C3b*.[8] The first, *Pluralism in the curriculum*, assesses the degree to which students are presented with a range of perspectives and interpretations when learning about historical events. The second, *Patriotic education in the curriculum*, evaluates the extent to which the language studies curriculum fosters sentiments of love, pride, loyalty, and commitment toward one's country. These two measures serve as effective proxies for the types of cultural and political values into which students are socialized.

We also rely on two World Textbook measures that are meant to capture whether students could have been exposed to information on IOs and international issues. One indicates whether IOs are mentioned in the textbook in at least one paragraph. Examples given to

[7] Textbooks were coded using a standardized coding protocol designed to increase inter-rater reliability (Jiménez and Lerch, 2019).

[8] Unfortunately, this data set does not include a measure that would allow us to capture economic literacy or acquisition of skills required to enhance one's human capital. We therefore cannot test the economic causal pathway in this way.

coders include the World Economic Forum, G-8, the International Labor Organization, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the European Union, and military organizations such as NATO, Allies, Axis powers. The other measures the approximate percentage of text that addresses international (non-national) issues. We note that these measures are imperfect proxies for knowledge of international affairs and IOs. As discussed in the theoretical section, such topics may be presented in diverse contexts and framed from varying ideological perspectives. Unfortunately, the information collected on this aspect of textbooks—while the only systematic effort to our knowledge—is not sensitive to these nuances. Some of the entities included in the first textbook-based measure are military alliances rather than IOs, and the League of Nations is usually taught as a failed experiment in the interwar period—contexts unlikely to inspire confidence in IOs. By contrast, the UN appears in diverse contexts, from decolonization and peacekeeping to economic and environmental cooperation. Without more detailed information on which IOs are discussed and how, assessing the impact of such exposure on support for IOs is challenging. Nonetheless, we present results on this relationship as a preliminary indication of how educational exposure to IOs might relate to broader patterns of public support, even if the measures are blunt and noisy. Detailed information on the measures drawn from textbooks is provided in the Online Appendix, Section B.

We construct a set of birth cohort-level measures using the country-year data to estimate individuals' potential exposure to pluralistic or patriotic values, as well as to information about IOs or international issues. For each of the four measures, respondents are assigned a value based on the 12-year moving average of their birth cohort, corresponding to ages 6 to 18 (the typical school-age range in most countries). For example, consider individuals born in 1955 in the Netherlands: their cohort-level score is the standardized average of the original variable from 1961 to 1973, reflecting the full period during which their cohort is likely in school.

Identification Strategy

To identify the effect of education on public support for IOs, we compare respondents just young enough to be included in the reforms to their slightly older counterparts not affected by the reforms in a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design. Thus, the running variable that determines assignment to the treatment is respondents' birth cohort relative to the year when the reform came into force. In each country, the cutoff point is the pivotal cohort that has been first affected by the reform.

The compulsory education reforms produce a fuzzy discontinuity in the treatment take-up. Students may drop out earlier than required by law. And they can also complete more years of schooling than required by compulsory education laws. However, the probability of completing compulsory education rises immediately due to the reforms (Figure 1).[9] We leverage this discontinuity and instrument education with individuals' birth cohort relative to the year when compulsory education reforms came into force.

The fuzzy RD design relies on the assumption that individuals' potential outcomes are continuous at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and Klauuw, 2001). This assumption might have been violated if units were able to foresee the timing of the reform and precisely change their birth-cohort to be assigned to their preferred treatment condition. Of course, students cannot change their birth date, and once compulsory education reforms are first proposed and parents can learn about them, it is already too late—they either have young enough children to be affected by the reform or not. The implication is that treatment assignment is as good as randomized around the cutoff: pre-reform and post-reform cohorts should be generally comparable and differ only in their exposure to the new legal requirements regarding compulsory education (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).

We use sorting and balance tests to validate the continuity assumption. The sorting test

[9] Figure A-2 shows that the discontinuity at the cutoff remains very clear using either linear or second-order polynomials, and across both the ISSP-NI and ISSP-C samples.

Figure (1) Compulsory schooling completion around education reforms



Note: Proportion completing compulsory education by birth year cohort pooled across all reforms. Curves are third-order polynomials either side of the cutoff.

fails to reject the hypothesis that the density of the score changes continuously at the cutoff point (Figure A-3). In line with the assumption that respondents were not able to sort around the threshold and their parents had no precise control over their birth cohort relative to the reforms, the proportion of respondents is similar below and above the threshold and grows smoothly around it.

In Table A-3, we employ Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik's (2023) window selector procedure to determine the size of the optimal window around the cutoff. The procedure starts with the narrowest window and, step-by-step, tests balance in every pre-treatment covariate. The optimal window is the first (i.e., smallest) interval in which all covariates are balanced. Consistent with the premise of the local randomization RD framework, which suggests that around the cutoff the RD design can be interpreted as a natural experiment, pre-reform and post-reform cohorts are similar across all pre-treatment characteristics available in the ISSP data.

Instrumental variable estimation identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE). This LATE specifically applies to 'compliers'—individuals who pursue more education only when mandated by compulsory schooling laws. This identification relies on two additional assumptions. The first assumption is monotonicity. It posits that there are no 'defiers'—that is, individuals who would reduce their schooling precisely because they are subject to compulsory education reforms (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996), which is highly unlikely in the current context (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). The second assumption is the exclusion restriction, which states that the reforms' impact on pro-IO attitudes operates solely through the change in educational attainment. The close timing between the reforms and students' decisions to stay in or leave school early significantly minimizes the potential for exclusion restriction violations (Marshall, 2016).

Results: The Effect of Education on Support for IOs

We begin by assessing the effect of the reforms on educational attainment. As column 1 of Table 2 shows, respondents from post-reform cohorts were nearly 20 percentage points more likely to complete the years of education required by those reforms. On average, they completed over one more year of schooling compared to pre-reform respondents (column 2). In both cases, the F-statistic is well above the conventional threshold of 10 and indicates that the reform instrument is strong.

Having established that educational reforms increase schooling years, we turn to our core expectation. Columns 3-5 show the effect of compulsory education reforms and educational attainment on public support for IOs. Overall, affected cohorts are more supportive of IOs later in life. The reduced-form or intention-to-treat estimate suggests that the substantive size of this effect is moderate before accounting for imperfect compliance, with a 0.06 standard deviation (SD) increase in public support for IOs.

The intention-to-treat estimate does not account for the fact that some students drop

Table (2) Effect of Education on Support for International Organizations

Estimate:	(1) First-stage	(2) First-stage	(3) ITT	(4) LATE	(5) LATE
DV:	Compulsory education	Schooling	Pro-IO (index)		
Treated cohort	0.199**	1.009**	0.061**		
	(0.012)	(0.071)	(0.016)		
Compulsory education				0.305**	
				(0.083)	
Schooling					0.060**
					(0.017)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	19634	19634	19634	19634	19634
First-stage F-statistic	265	202		265	202

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±11 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

out early and many others continue in secondary education regardless of the compulsory education law. The local average treatment effect focuses on compliers who remain in school only if required to do so by compulsory-education laws. Here, we see a 0.3 SD increase in support for IOs for individuals who completed compulsory education due to the reforms (column 4), and a 0.06 SD increase for each reform-induced schooling year (column 5).

The effect of reform-induced education on support for IOs is robust to a range of sensitivity analyses. This effect remains stable across alternative bandwidths (Table A-10). Incorporating a broader array of covariates, like employment status or local community type, and replacing country fixed effects with a much broader set of subnational region fixed effects does not change the results (Tables A-5 and A-7). Furthermore, placebo-cutoff tests reveal no statistically significant discontinuities at placebo reform dates, either before or after the actual reform timing (Table A-9).

In Figure 2, we break our pro-IO index by its three different components and examine the effect of reform-induced education on each of them. As the figure shows, education mainly reduces the perceived threat of IOs to national sovereignty. It also enhances the legitimacy

that respondents attribute to IO enforcement, although we find no effect on the perceived desirability of complying with IO decisions when respondents' own governments disagree with them.

In the lower panels of Figure 2, we present a similar analysis using our UN-specific outcomes. Using this alternative outcome and a separate cross-national survey (the ISSP-C), we continue to find that education affects attitudes toward IOs. The LATE estimates show that completing compulsory years of schooling following the reforms increased support for the UN by more than a third of a standard deviation. These effects are substantively large and reflect a 15 percentage point increase in support for UN intervention in cases of human rights violations, and a 13 percentage point increase in believing that the UN has either too little or about the right amount of power.

This analysis also indicates that education increased respondents knowledge of, or familiarity with, the UN. The additional years of education induced by the reforms significantly decreased the likelihood that a respondent would not know what the United Nations is. This result is generally consistent with C3b, which suggests that individuals who acquire higher levels of education are more likely to learn about and be familiar with this prominent, global, IO.

Finally, to assess its durability, we also estimate the effect of compulsory education reforms on public support for IOs across our three survey waves (Figure A-5). The results indicate that the effect remains statistically significant and non-negligible in both 1995 and 2003. By 2013, respondents from post-reform cohorts remain more supportive of IOs only along one of the three components of our Pro-IO index – *IO Threat*. Notably, however, even our earliest survey round, 1995, was conducted several decades after the educational reforms came into force. Overall, then, the analysis indicates that compulsory education reforms lead to a long-lasting shift in favor of IOs, but with a clear and significant pattern of decline over time.

Figure (2) Effect of education reforms by pro-IO outcome



Note: The upper panels use data from the ISSP's National Identity modules (1995, 2003, 2013); the lower panels use data from the ISSP's Citizenship module (2004). The left-panels show the (reduced-form) effect of post-reform cohorts on support for IOs and the UN, respectively. The right-panels show IV estimates for the local average treatment effect of completing compulsory education on support for IOs and the UN. All outcomes are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Markers indicate the effect of completing compulsory education controlling for pre-treatment covariates and country and year fixed effects with 95% confidence intervals (using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by sub-national regions and the optimal bandwidth).

Economic and Ideational Outcomes

The theoretical framework identifies three potential mechanisms through which education may positively influence public support for IOs. The first mechanism posits that education enhances individuals' competitiveness in the global economy, thereby increasing their approval of globalization-related phenomena, including IOs. According to the socialization-based mechanism, students undergo a process of socialization in school, with secondary education fostering humanitarian values, cultural openness, and a cosmopolitan worldview.

Third, the information-based mechanism posits that students acquire knowledge about the critical role IOs play in promoting international cooperation and addressing global challenges such as wars, climate change, and extreme poverty.

Each of these causal mechanisms suggests that education first increases an intermediate outcome before affecting support for IOs. The economic-based mechanism implies that the highly-educated work in highly-skilled occupations and are therefore better positioned to gain from market integration and economic globalization (*C1*). The socialization-based mechanism predicts that the more educated will be more cosmopolitan and less nationalist (*C2a*). According to the information-based mechanism, individuals who spend more time in school are more likely to be exposed to information about IOs and learn about their importance in facilitating international cooperation, for example (*C3a*).

In Table 3, we test these corollaries. The sample size is smaller because information on income and occupation is not available for all respondents. In column (1), we show that the effect of schooling on support for IOs remains similar when we use this more restricted sample. Column (2) shows that the reform-induced added years of schooling increased respondents' income by 0.19 standard deviations. However, this effect was not the result of systemic changes in respondents' level of skill, casting doubt on *C1*. As columns (3)-(5) show, the probability of working in low-skilled occupations did not significantly change despite the additional years of education post-reform cohorts acquired.

In contrast, the analysis supports the corollary associated with the socialization-based mechanism. As column (7) shows, the extra years of schooling following the compulsory education reforms had a substantial 0.26-SD effect on nationalism. Specifically, treated individuals were less inclined to express strong nationalistic sentiments, such as preferring their own country's citizenship above all others or believing their nation superior to most. In addition, column (6) shows that schooling decreased the probability of a "don't know" or "can't choose" response, supporting *C3a*. More highly-educated individuals are more likely

Table (3) Effect of schooling on economic and ideational outcomes

	(1) Pro-IO (Index)	(2) Income (SD)	(3) Low-skilled manual worker	(4) Low-skilled clerks	(5) Low-skilled service worker	(6) IO-DK (Index)	(7) Nationalism (Index)
Schooling	0.042*	0.195**	-0.010	0.000	-0.009	-0.074**	-0.168**
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	12581	12581	12581	12581	12581	12581	12581

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±11 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. First stage F statistic = 190. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

than their less-educated counterparts to form an opinion about IOs. Overall, the evidence indicates that education raises support for IOs primarily through ideational channels: by fostering cultural pluralism and a cosmopolitan worldview and, to some extent, by making individuals more informed or knowledgeable about IOs.

Moderators of the Schooling Effect: Textbook and Curriculum Content

To examine the extent to which socialization or exposure to information in school spur popular support for IOs, encapsulated in *C2b* and *C3b*, we use data on the content of school curriculum and of history, civics, social studies, and geography textbooks. For *C2b*, we divide our sample according to the extent to which birth cohorts were exposed to pluralist and cosmopolitan values, on the one hand, or to nationalist and patriotic themes, on the other. For *C3b*, we draw on information about the presence of IOs and international issues in school textbooks during respondents' formative years. As Figure 3 shows, the effect of education is statistically significant and substantively large among cohorts exposed to high values of pluralism or low values of patriotism (upper panels). In contrast, the effect of

Figure (3) The Effect of Schooling by Education's Content



Note: Each plot depicts the effect of schooling on support for international organizations by values ingrained in school curricula (top panels) or information in textbooks (bottom panels). Markers indicate the effect of schooling with 95% confidence intervals (using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by subnational regions). Low=below median values; High=above median values.

education is negligible and statistically nonsignificant in cohorts that were exposed to low (high) values of pluralism (patriotism) in school. These results are very much consistent with the socialization-based mechanism. One more year in school increases public support for IOs later in life only when education fosters cultural and political cosmopolitanism.

We find weaker evidence that exposure to information similarly conditions the effect of education. Instead, schooling increases support for IOs regardless of the extent to which international issues were discussed in students' textbooks. And while the effect of schooling is twice as large in cohorts that were exposed to more information about IOs, this difference

is not statistically significant. As already discussed, without additional information on the IOs, issues and the context in which they are taught, these results should be interpreted with caution.

Taken together, the results suggest that educational reforms foster support for IOs by socializing students into more pluralist and cosmopolitan worldviews—provided that curricula emphasize such values. In contrast, curricula that promote nationalistic and patriotic perspectives are unlikely to generate pro-IO attitudes. There is more limited evidence in support of the informational causal pathway: while additional education appears to increase knowledge about IOs and the UN, we find no clear indication that learning about international issues—or IOs specifically—translates into greater support for them.

The Effect of Education and Socialization on IO Attitudes Beyond Reforms

Drawing on a robust identification strategy, we demonstrated that education increases public support for IOs, particularly when educational content socializes students into pluralistic or cosmopolitan values. Given that educational reforms typically result in only incremental increases in schooling, and that the number of countries suitable for this analysis is limited, we now turn to a more conventional approach by examining the relationship between years of schooling and attitudes toward IOs, with specific attention to the socialization-based causal mechanism.

In Figure 4, we use the full ISSP sample, rather than focusing on a narrow window around compulsory education reforms in the subset of countries that adopted them. Employing a multiplicative interaction model, we examine how the effect of schooling varies across cohort-specific levels of pluralism in the curriculum. The results show that one more year of schooling is associated with a 0.01 SD increase in support for IOs for respondents from cohorts who

were socialized to low levels of pluralism and cosmopolitanism in the curriculum; and a 0.03 SD increase for respondents from cohorts who were socialized to high levels of such values. Thus, the effect of schooling is almost three times as large at high compared to low levels of pluralist curricula and the difference between these two effects is statistically significant.

Figure (4) The Effect of Schooling by Education's Content



Note: Each plot depicts the effect of schooling on support for international organizations by values of pluralism in school curricula. Markers indicate the effect of schooling with 95% confidence intervals (using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by sub-national regions). The dependent variables are (1) pro-IO index (left panel); and (2) (reversed) IO-threat (right-panel). Each model controls for age, employment status, gender, ethnicity, immigration background, type of locality (rural, suburbs, or big city) and country and year fixed effects.

Furthermore, if we consider the socialization effect of completing secondary education (i.e., 6 schooling years), the substantive size of this difference is large, with a 0.08 SD increase in support for IOs when pluralism is low, compared to a 0.2 SD increase when pluralism is high. To provide a better sense of the effect's magnitude, in the right panel we focus on the *IO Threat* outcome. Here, one more year of schooling is associated with a 0.3 percentage-point increase in support for IOs at low levels of pluralism in the curriculum, and a 1.3 percentage-point increase at high levels of pluralism. Again, the difference is substantively meaningful: respondents from low-pluralism cohorts who complete 6 years of secondary education are

predicted to be 2 percentage points more supportive of IOs compared to individuals with no secondary education. But for those from high-pluralism cohorts, completing secondary education brings about a 8 percentage points increase in support for IOs. This analysis further reinforces the conclusion that socialization to pluralistic values plays a significant role in shaping public support for IOs.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the relationship between education and public support for IOs, with a particular focus on disentangling the mechanisms through which education shapes attitudes toward IOs. Leveraging compulsory schooling reforms in twenty-one countries and applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we find that additional years of education causally increase support for IOs. Crucially, this effect is conditioned by the content of the education received. Specifically, the pro-IO effect of schooling is strongest among cohorts exposed to pluralistic and cosmopolitan curricula and is absent where education emphasizes nationalistic or patriotic values. We find more limited evidence that secondary education transforms students from losers to winners of economic globalization, or that exposure to information about IOs and international issues—whether through textbooks or general knowledge—meaningfully increases support for IOs.

These findings carry significant theoretical implications. They suggest that education's political consequences stem less from cognitive gains or increased knowledge and more from value-based socialization. This supports a broader understanding of education as a mechanism of cultural transmission with long-term attitudinal effects, reinforcing the role of ideational content in shaping political preferences about global issues. Nonetheless, this study has limitations as well. First, while the proxies for information on IOs and international issues in the curricula are innovative, they lack precision and consistency. As such, we cannot rule out the possibility that increased knowledge about IOs influences public attitudes

toward them. Importantly, greater exposure to information may not necessarily foster support; it could also heighten awareness of IOs' shortcomings and institutional "pathologies" (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Future research would benefit from a more fine-grained investigation into the types of knowledge that shape attitudes toward IOs and the conditions under which they contribute to support for, skepticism of, or opposition to IOs.

Second, with the important exception of the UN, this analysis treats IOs mostly as a homogeneous category, despite substantial variation in their mandates, authority and performance (Haftel, 2007, Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks, 2019, Sommerer et al., 2022). It remains an open question whether education fosters support for certain types of IOs than others. Such work would clarify, for example, whether cosmopolitan socialization fosters broad-based support for multilateralism or selectively enhances the legitimacy of particular types of IOs—such as those focused on regional integration, those addressing salient global challenges, or those that encourage involvement of civil society organizations (Tallberg et al., 2013).

This paper also carries important policy implications, highlighting ways in which education can be used to foster greater support for IOs and, more broadly, for international cooperation. The findings suggest that educational systems are not merely channels for skill development but also powerful tools for shaping political and cultural attitudes. In particular, curricula that emphasize pluralism, cultural openness, and cosmopolitan values appear to cultivate more favorable public views toward IOs. Policymakers aiming to strengthen international collaboration should therefore consider not only increasing access to education but also revisiting the content of civic, social studies, and history education. By embedding themes that promote pluralistic education, outward-looking worldviews, and awareness of global interdependence, governments can help cultivate long-term societal support for international engagement.

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Online Appendix for:
Building Public Support for IOs through Education: Culture versus Information

Yoram Z. Haftel and Omer Solodoch

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A Reforms

This section briefly outlines the compulsory schooling reforms utilized as an instrumental variable for education attainment across eighteen countries. A central aspect of coding each reform is identifying the pivotal birth cohort—the first group subject to the new requirements. While this cohort is generally well-established in the literature, some uncertainty and potential measurement error arise because birth years are derived from survey data. Additionally, reforms implemented mid-year can lead to misclassification, where individuals born early in the pivotal cohort remain unaffected but are still coded as treated units. Such instances result in a conservative estimate of the discontinuity at the cutoff for the effect of these reforms on educational attainment.

Austria Austria's 1966 reform was enacted via the 1962 School Amendment Act, which came into force on September 1, 1966. This reform extended compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years, consequently increasing the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. The pivotal birth cohort for this change was 1952, and the age at school entry remained 6 years. Sources for this information include Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) and Hofmarcher (2021).

Belgium In Belgium, the 1983 Law on Compulsory Education led to an extension of compulsory schooling from 8 to 12 years. Under the new law, full-time schooling is compulsory until age 15. From ages 15 to 18, only part-time education is compulsory. The law does not apply to individuals born before 1 January 1968 who had already left school. For the 1968 cohort, only two years of secondary schooling are required (nine years of compulsory full-time education). For the 1969 cohort, schooling is compulsory until age 17 (nine years of compulsory full-time education and two years of compulsory part-time education). This information is sourced from Hofmarcher (2021).

Bulgaria In Bulgaria, the 1959 Law on the Further Development of Public Education led to an extension of compulsory schooling from 7 to 8 years. This reform, affecting the 1946 pivotal birth cohort, raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. The age at school entry was 7. This information is sourced from Hofmarcher (2021).

Czech Republic The Czech Republic experienced three distinct compulsory schooling reforms. **1948 Reform:** The first, in 1948, was initiated by Act No. 95/1948 on the Basic Regulation of Comprehensive Education, passed in April. This reform extended compulsory

schooling from 8 to 9 years, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1934, increasing the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. The age at school entry was 6. The treated cohorts for the extension from 8 to 9 years of compulsory schooling are 1934-1938. **1953 Reform:** A subsequent reform in 1953, based on Act No. 31/1953 on the Education System and Teacher Training, effectively shortened compulsory schooling from 9 to 8 years, decreasing the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 14. The pivotal birth cohort for this change was 1939, maintaining an age at school entry of 6. The non-treated cohorts (with 8 years of compulsory schooling) are 1939-1945. **1960 Reform:** The third reform occurred in 1960, under Act No. 186/1960 on the Education and Training System, passed in December. This again extended compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years for the 1946 pivotal birth cohort, raising the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15, with school entry at age 6. All information for these Czech Republic reforms is sourced from Garrouste (2010).

Denmark Denmark's 1958 reform, enacted through the Executive Order on the Primary School Act on June 18, 1958, extended compulsory schooling from 7 to 8 years. This change meant the minimum school leaving age shifted from 14 to 15. The pivotal birth cohort for this reform was 1944, and students typically entered school at age 7. The reform specifically required all municipalities to provide an 8th year of schooling, which had a disproportionate effect on rural areas. This information is sourced from Cavaille and Marshall (2019).

France France's compulsory schooling was extended by the *Berthoin* reform of January 6, 1959. This reform increased compulsory schooling from 8 to 10 years, changing the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16. The pivotal birth cohort was 1953, and the age at school entry was 6. The extension specifically affected those who turned 6 after January 1, 1959. Sources for this reform include Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009) and Cavaille and Marshall (2019).

Germany Ten states in West Germany extended compulsory education from 8 to 9 years in different years between 1956 and 1969. These reforms consistently raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15, with school entry at age 6 across all states. We use respondents' region of residence at the time of the survey as their region of residence as students, acknowledging that this approach may introduce some measurement error due to movers. However, in the ISSP data, the discontinuity at the cutoff is much clearer with the state-by-state coding compared to using 1954 as a single cutoff year for all respondents. Sources for

the German reforms are Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) and Hofmarcher (2021). **Schleswig-Holstein:** The reform in Schleswig-Holstein occurred in 1956, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1942. **Niedersachsen:** Niedersachsen implemented its reform in 1962, affecting the 1948 pivotal birth cohort. **Bremen:** Bremen's reform took place in 1958, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1944. **Nordrhein-Westphalia:** Nordrhein-Westphalia's reform was in 1967, affecting the 1954 pivotal birth cohort. **Hessen:** Hessen also saw its reform in 1967, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1954. **Rheinland-Pfalz:** Rheinland-Pfalz enacted its reform in 1967, with the 1954 birth cohort being pivotal. **Baden-Württemberg:** Baden-Württemberg's reform was in 1967, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1954. In four states (Nordrhein-Westphalia, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Baden-Württemberg), accounting for almost half of the German population, the reforms came into force in 1967. **Bayern:** Bayern's reform took place in 1969, affecting the 1956 pivotal birth cohort. **Saarland:** Saarland's reform was implemented in 1964, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1950.

Hungary Hungary's 1961 reform extended compulsory schooling from 8 to 10 years, which also increased the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16. The age at school entry was 6. The pivotal birth cohort for this reform was 1947. While Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) note that the extent to which the 1947 cohort was exposed to the compulsory education law is unclear, and they therefore exclude it from their analysis, in the ISSP data, the discontinuity at the cutoff is very clear for the 1947 cohort.

Ireland On April 12, 1972, a ministerial order in Ireland modified the School Attendance Act of 1926, extending compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years. This order came into force on July 1, 1972. The reform changed the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15, with an age at school entry of 6. The first affected birth cohort for this reform was 1958. This information is sourced from Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009).

Japan Japan's compulsory schooling was extended by the Fundamental Law of Education (Law No. 25 of 1947) and the School Education Law (Law No. 26 of 1947), both enacted in 1947. This extended compulsory schooling from 6 to 9 years. While the change in minimum school leaving age is not specified, the age at school entry was 6. The first affected birth cohort was 1935, as these individuals turned 12 during the course of 1947. Sources for these reforms include Kemble (2004) and Kawaguchi (2011).

Latvia In Latvia, compulsory education was extended from 8 to 11 years starting in 1970, although in the Soviet Union more broadly, the extension was from 8 to 10 years. This difference is attributed to variations in the structure of upper secondary education. This reform increased the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 18. The pivotal birth cohort was 1955, and the age at school entry was 7. This information is sourced from Hofmarcher (2021).

Mexico In Mexico, compulsory education was extended from 6 to 9 years starting in 1993. The reform was implemented simultaneously across all Mexican states and made lower secondary education mandatory nationwide. The pivotal birth cohort was 1981, and the age at school entry was 6. This information is sourced from Stevens (2025).

Latvia In Latvia, compulsory education was extended from 8 to 11 years starting in 1970, although in the Soviet Union more broadly, the extension was from 8 to 10 years. This difference is attributed to variations in the structure of upper secondary education. This reform increased the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 18. The pivotal birth cohort was 1955, and the age at school entry was 7. This information is sourced from Hofmarcher (2021).

Netherlands The Netherlands implemented a reform in 1975 that extended compulsory education in the vocational track from three to four years of schooling, effectively increasing total compulsory schooling from 9 to 10 years. This changed the minimum school leaving age from 16 to 17. The pivotal birth cohort for this reform was 1959, and the age at school entry was 6. Sources for this reform include Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009) and Cavaille and Marshall (2019).

Portugal The 1964 reform in Portugal extended compulsory schooling from 4 to 6 years, changing the minimum school leaving age from 12 to 14. The age at school entry remained 8. This reform applied to individuals who entered school from 1964, predominantly those born in 1957. While some individuals born in 1956 were also included in the reform, we follow Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) in defining 1957 as the pivotal cohort.

Slovakia In Slovakia, the 1948 reform, specifically Act No. 95/1948 on the Basic Regulation of Comprehensive Education, extended compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years. This reform affected individuals with a pivotal birth cohort of 1934, changing the minimum school

leaving age from 14 to 15. The age at school entry was 6. This information is sourced from Hofmarcher (2021).

Slovenia Slovenia's reform, implemented between 1951 and 1952, extended compulsory schooling from 7 to 8 years, with a pivotal birth cohort of 1937. This shifted the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15, and the age at school entry was 7. Hofmarcher (2021) notes that scholars disagree on the exact year (1951 or 1952) when compulsory schooling was extended. However, our first-stage results are consistent with the claim that the law was passed in 1951, making the 1937 cohort the first affected.

Spain Spain's 1970 reform, known as the General Act on Education and Financing of the Educational Reform (Law 14/1970 of August 4, 1970), extended compulsory schooling from 6 to 8 years. The pivotal birth cohort for this reform was 1957, increasing the minimum school leaving age from 12 to 14. The age at school entry was 6. This information is sourced from Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009).

Sweden From 1949 to 1962, Swedish municipalities gradually extended compulsory education from 7 to 9 years. This reform changed the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16, with an age at school entry of 7. We follow Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) who define those born in 1952 or later as the treatment group for this reform.

Taiwan Taiwan introduced a 9-year compulsory schooling law on September 1, 1968. This law required students born on or after September 1, 1955, to attend school longer than their older counterparts. The reform extended compulsory schooling from 6 to 9 years, changing the minimum school leaving age from 12 to 15. The age at school entry was 6. We code the 1956 cohort as the pivotal cohort because it is the earliest *fully* affected birth cohort. This information is sourced from Zhang (2018).

United Kingdom I The 1947 reform in the United Kingdom extended compulsory schooling from 9 to 10 years, changing the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. The age at school entry was 5. The pivotal birth cohort for this reform was 1933. This information is sourced from Cavaille and Marshall (2019).

United Kingdom II For the United Kingdom II reform, compulsory schooling was extended from 10 to 11 years, changing the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16, with an

age at school entry of 5. We code the 1934 cohort as the pivotal cohort for the 1947 reform because it is the earliest *fully* affected birth cohort; the 1933 cohort was only partially affected (students born on or after April 1, 1933). Sources for this reform include Mocan and Pogorelova (2017) and Hofmarcher (2021). **England, Wales, and Northern Ireland:** In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, this reform took place in 1972, with the pivotal birth cohort being 1958. **Scotland:** In Scotland, the reform occurred in 1976, with the pivotal birth cohort being 1959.

Uruguay Uruguay extended compulsory education from 6 to 9 years in its 1973 law (number 14.101, Article 5) on public primary, normal, secondary and higher education (Ruiz and Schoo, 2014). The age at school entry was 6. People born in 1961 and some of those born in 1960 were the first to be affected by the new law. Our first-stage results are consistent with classifying 1960 as the pivotal cohort.

B Curriculum and Textbook Measures

V-Indoc Measures *Patriotic education in the curriculum.* Country experts were asked: "How often does the language curriculum promote patriotism?" The survey clarified that patriotism means feelings of love, pride, loyalty and commitment to one's country, and provided examples (e.g., promoting patriotism can take the form of teaching narratives that celebrate the country's national origin stories). Possible responses were: 0. rarely or never; 1. sometimes; 2. often; and 3. extensively.

Pluralism in the curriculum. Experts were asked: "When historical events are taught, to what extent are students exposed to diverse views and/or interpretations of these events?" The survey clarified that the question refers to de-facto subject content and to how much space is given to alternative viewpoints in teaching historical events such as international conflicts. Response categories were located on the same 0-3 ordinal scale.

World Textbook Measures *IGOs mentioned in textbooks (igonmbr)*: Coders were asked: "Are inter-governmental organizations mentioned in at least a paragraph? For example, G-8, World Economic Forum, the International Labor Organization, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the European Union; military organizations such as NATO, Allies, Axis powers." Response categories were either 0 (No) or 1 (Yes).

International issues mentioned in textbooks (percintl): Coders were asked: "Approximate percentage of text that addresses international (non-national) issues." Possible responses were: 0 = none of text addresses international issues; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 3 = 51-100%.

C Additional First-Stage Results

Figure (A-1) First stage results by survey and applying survey weights

(a) ISSP-NI (1995-2013)



(b) ISSP-C (2004)



(c) ISSP-NI (1995-2013), weighted



(d) ISSP-C (2004), weighted



Figure A-1 shows a clear discontinuity at the cutoff of the compulsory eduction reforms using both the main dataset based on the ISSP National Identity module (ISSP-NI) and the additional dataset based on the ISSP Citizenship module (ISSP-C). The curves represent third-order polynomial fits either side of the discontinuity. In both of the datasets, the probability of completing compulsory education increases immediately following the reforms. As the lower panels show, this pattern remains similar either applying survey weights or analyzing the unweighted data. Figure A-2 shows that the discontinuity at the cutoff remains clear using either linear (upper panels) or second-order polynomials (lower panels) in both datasets.

Figure (A-2) First stage results by order of the global polynomial regression function

(a) ISSP-NI, linear



(b) ISSP-C, linear



(c) ISSP-NI, quadratic



(d) ISSP-C, quadratic



D Falsification and Robustness Tests

D.1 The Effect of Education on Support for the United Nations, ISSP-C

In Table 2, we present our main results using the ISSP-NI dataset. In Table A-1, we replicate this analysis using the ISSP-C dataset (2004). The analysis based on the ISSP-C is different from the main analysis in several dimensions. First, the period in the ISSP-C is 2004, while the ISSP-NI includes 3 survey waves—1995, 2003, and 2013. Second, most of the countries in the ISSP-C are the same countries as in our ISSP-NI sample: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. However, there are three

Table (A-1) Effect of Education on Support for the United Nations

Estimate:	(1) First-stage	(2) First-stage	(3) ITT	(4) LATE	(5) LATE
DV:	Compulsory education	Schooling	Pro-UN (index)		
Reform	0.210**	1.147**	0.079**		
	(0.012)	(0.068)	(0.018)		
Compulsory education				0.377**	
				(0.083)	
Schooling					0.069**
					(0.015)
Pretreatment covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9923	9923	9923	9923	9923
First-stage F-statistic	313	288		313	288

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±12 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, and belonging to the country's religious majority group. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

additional countries that are only included in the ISSP-C: Belgium, Mexico, and Uruguay. Third, the dependent variable is our Pro-UN Index, which captures support for the United Nations and is measured using a different scale than the 5-point scale used in the ISSP-NI (see Section Research Design, Data and Measurement in the main text). Finally, we control for respondents' sex in both analyses, but the ISSP-C does not include data on parental immigrant background, and data on ethnicity is missing in many countries. We therefore rely on religious denomination—which is determined at birth in many cases, although not in all cases—to classify whether respondents belong to the country's religious majority group.

The first two columns of Table A-1 show a strong first-stage effect similar to the one found in the ISSP-NI. Respondents from post-reform cohorts were 21 percentage points more likely to complete the years of education required by those reforms. They completed more than one additional year of schooling compared to pre-reform respondents, on average (column 2). In both cases, the F-statistic indicates that the reform instrument is strong. The reduced-form estimate in columns 3 shows that post-reform cohorts exhibit stronger support for the United Nations. The local average treatment effect estimates in columns 4-5 indicate that affected cohorts are significantly more supportive of the United Nations later in life. Support for the United Nations is substantially stronger among individuals who completed compulsory education due to the reforms (0.37 standard deviations).

Overall, this analysis shows that our results are robust to using a separate survey and

Table (A-2) Effect of Education on Support for International Organizations, "don't know" answers excluded

Estimate:	(1) First-stage	(2) First-stage	(3) ITT	(4) LATE	(5) LATE
DV:	Compulsory education	Schooling	Pro-IO (index)		
Reform	0.194**	0.987**	0.049**		
	(0.012)	(0.065)	(0.016)		
Compulsory education				0.255**	
				(0.087)	
Schooling					0.050**
					(0.017)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	18976	18976	18976	18976	18976
First-stage F-statistic	271	228		271	228

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±11 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

sample of countries and an alternative outcome variable.

D.2 The effect of education on support for IOs, excluding "Don't know" responses

Table A-2 shows the main results using the alternative Pro-IO outcome, which excludes "don't know" or "can't choose" responses and treats them as missing data. The results are robust to using this alternative outcome variable.

D.3 Sorting Test

Since respondents have no control over their birthyear and their parents could not have anticipated the timing of the compulsory schooling reforms, selection into cohorts is highly implausible. Nevertheless, in Figure A-3, we conduct a sorting test that examines whether there is an unusually large proportion of respondents being born immediately following the year when the reforms came into force by computing the density of the birth cohort running variable. The smooth density around the threshold suggests that there is no evidence for sorting of respondents into the reforms as expected given that respondents' parents could not have precise control to manipulate the birth year of their children relative to reform.

Figure (A-3) Sorting test



D.4 Balance Test

The local randomization RD approach suggests that pre-reform and post-reform cohorts are comparable within a small window around the cutoff. To choose the window width, we follow the data-driven procedure of Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik: we examine a sequence of nested, symmetric windows around the cutoff, starting from the narrowest, and test balance on all pre-treatment covariates within each window. We use all available pre-treatment covariates in the ISSP-NI: sex (female), immigrant background (citizen parents), and ethnicity (belonging to the country's ethnic majority group). The optimal window is the smallest window with covariate balance. Table A-3 presents the results, indicating that the optimal window with covariate balance is ± 11. In the ISSP-C dataset, the only available covariates that are plausibly pre-treatment are sex and belonging to a religious majority group. Table A-4 shows that the optimal window with covariate balance in this dataset is ± 12.

D.5 Controlling for additional covariates

Education can affect individuals' labor-market outcomes, marital decisions, and residential location choices. Controlling for such posttreatment variables can bias estimates of causal effects (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres, 2018). We therefore control for a set of pretreatment variables that cannot be affected by education in our main analysis—sex, ethnicity, and parental immigrant background.

In Table A-5, we add a set of posttreatment controls to our model specification. Specifically, we include binary indicators for married respondents, unemployed respondents, and

Table (A-3) Balance Test, ISSP-NI (1995-2013)

Window		Bal. test p-value	Var. name (min p-value)	Bin. test p-value	Obs < c	Obs ≥ c
-1.000	1.000	0.504	citizen_parents	0.000	848	1836
-2.000	2.000	0.886	citizen_parents	0.000	1726	2719
-3.000	3.000	0.086	female	0.000	2515	3646
-4.000	4.000	0.082	female	0.000	3436	4549
-5.000	5.000	0.268	female	0.000	4240	5496
-6.000	6.000	0.134	ethnic_majority	0.000	5087	6477
-7.000	7.000	0.446	female	0.000	5854	7211
-8.000	8.000	0.424	ethnic_majority	0.000	6487	8406
-9.000	9.000	0.466	ethnic_majority	0.000	7092	9387
-10.000	10.000	0.476	ethnic_majority	0.000	7727	10305
-11.000	11.000	0.204	citizen_parents	0.000	8314	11261
-12.000	12.000	0.052	citizen_parents	0.000	8845	12235
-13.000	13.000	0.075	citizen_parents	0.000	9405	13158
-14.000	14.000	0.038	ethnic_majority	0.000	9968	14106
-15.000	15.000	0.012	citizen_parents	0.000	10434	14994

Note: Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status.

Table (A-4) Balance Test, ISSP-C (2004)

Window		Bal. test p-value	Var. name (min p-value)	Bin. test p-value	Obs < c	Obs ≥ c
-1.000	1.000	0.396	religous_majority	0.000	373	766
-2.000	2.000	0.324	female	0.000	724	1169
-3.000	3.000	0.272	female	0.000	1131	1579
-4.000	4.000	0.250	religous_majority	0.000	1502	1992
-5.000	5.000	0.320	religous_majority	0.000	1865	2378
-6.000	6.000	0.434	religous_majority	0.000	2260	2821
-7.000	7.000	0.228	religous_majority	0.000	2606	3185
-8.000	8.000	0.218	religous_majority	0.000	2902	3535
-9.000	9.000	0.144	religous_majority	0.000	3191	3891
-10.000	10.000	0.252	religous_majority	0.000	3464	4252
-11.000	11.000	0.152	religous_majority	0.000	3750	4632
-12.000	12.000	0.160	religous_majority	0.000	3999	4979
-13.000	13.000	0.076	religous_majority	0.000	4265	5316
-14.000	14.000	0.056	religous_majority	0.000	4520	5681
-15.000	15.000	0.008	religous_majority	0.000	4739	6030

Note: Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex and belonging to the country's religious majority group.

residents living in rural communities. Including these posttreatment controls has no bearing on our results.

Next, in Tables A-7 and A-8, we replace country fixed effects with subnational region

Table (A-5) Effect of Education on Support for IOs, additional controls

	(1) Comp ed.	(2) Schooling	(3) Pro IO	(4) Pro IO	(5) Pro IO
Treated cohort	0.184**	1.014**	0.035*		
	(0.013)	(0.071)	(0.015)		
Compulsory education				0.200*	
				(0.083)	
Schooling					0.036*
					(0.015)
Pretreatment covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	16327	16327	17080	16327	16327
First-stage F-statistic	211	205		211	205

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±11 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status. Additional controls include: living in a rural community, unemployment status, and marital status (married/other). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

Table (A-6) Effect of Education on Support for the UN, additional controls

	(1) Comp ed.	(2) Schooling	(3) Pro UN	(4) Pro UN	(5) Pro UN
Reform	0.221**	1.237**	0.089**		
	(0.013)	(0.093)	(0.020)		
Compulsory education				0.404**	
				(0.086)	
Schooling					0.072**
					(0.015)
Pretreatment covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9774	9774	9774	9774	9774
First-stage F-statistic	300	178		300	178

fixed effects. The level of subnational regions varies across countries in the ISSP data. In some countries, like Germany, subnational regions are at the NUTS-1 level. And in other countries subnational regions are at the NUTS-2 (e.g., Austria, Spain) or even NUTS-3 level (e.g., France). In total, there are over 230 subnational regions in our ISSP-NI sample and about 290 subnational regions in our ISSP-C sample. Our results remain statistically and substantively similar when we control for subnational region fixed effects in both datasets.

Table (A-7) Effect of Education on Support for IOs, additional controls and region fixed effects

	(1) Comp ed.	(2) Schooling	(3) Pro IO	(4) Pro IO	(5) Pro IO
Treated cohort	0.183**	1.003**	0.033*		
	(0.013)	(0.072)	(0.015)		
Compulsory education				0.190*	
				(0.084)	
Schooling					0.035*
					(0.015)
Pretreatment covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subnational region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	16327	16327	17080	16327	16327
First-stage F-statistic	201	193		201	193

Note: Entries are IV estimates using the ±11 optimal bandwidth. Pre-treatment covariates include respondents' sex, ethnicity, and parents' immigrant status. Additional controls include: living in a rural community, unemployment status, and marital status (married/other). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subnational region. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

Table (A-8) Effect of Education on Support for the UN, additional controls and region fixed effects

	(1) Comp ed.	(2) Schooling	(3) Pro UN	(4) Pro UN	(5) Pro UN
Reform	0.220**	1.233**	0.084**		
	(0.013)	(0.097)	(0.020)		
Compulsory education				0.383**	
				(0.084)	
Schooling					0.068**
					(0.015)
Pretreatment covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9774	9774	9774	9774	9774
First-stage F-statistic	276	161		276	161

D.6 Placebo Cutoff Tests

Throughout the analysis, the cutoff is defined by the first birth cohort affected by the compulsory-schooling reform. In Table A-9, we conduct placebo cutoff tests by shifting the pivotal cohort a decade earlier or a decade later. With a 10-year bandwidth on either side of the cutoff, only the true cutoff separates cohorts by exposure to the reform; the placebo cutoffs occur where the probability of treatment does not change. Consequently, the placebo

specifications compare slightly older to slightly younger cohorts that are all pre-reform (as in columns 1 and 4) or all post-reform (as in columns 3 and 6). Columns 1-3 present ITT estimates and columns 4-6 show LATE estimates.

Consistent with the hypothesis that the reform-induced increase in schooling affected support for IOs, an effect appears only at the true cutoff. Panel (a) shows the results using the Pro-IO index with "Don't know" or "can't choose" responses excluded and coded as missing data. Panel (b) shows the results using the Pro-IO index with "Don't know" or "can't choose" responses included and coded as a neutral stance on IOs (i.e., "Don't know"=3 on the 5-point scale). Panel (c) shows that the same pattern emerges using the ISSP-C dataset and the pro-UN index. Only real post-reform cohorts are significantly more supportive of the United Nations compared to pre-reform cohorts; while (1) older post-reform cohorts are similarly supportive of the United Nations compared to younger post-reform cohorts; and (2) older pre-reform cohorts are similarly supportive of the United Nations compared to younger pre-reform cohorts.

Table (A-9) Placebo Cutoff Test

(a) DV: Pro-IO						
	(1) ITT Placebo c-10	(2) ITT Reform	(3) ITT Placebo c+10	(4) LATE Placebo c-10	(5) LATE Reform	(6) LATE Placebo c+10
Reform	-0.033	0.036*	0.000	-1.188	0.196*	0.001
p-value	0.196	0.010	0.996	0.204	0.018	0.999
Bandwidth	±10	±10	±10	±10	±10	±10
Observations	11259	18071	9260	11259	18071	9260
(b) DV: Pro-UN						
	(1) ITT Placebo c-10	(2) ITT Reform	(3) ITT Placebo c+10	(4) LATE Placebo c-10	(5) LATE Reform	(6) LATE Placebo c+10
Reform	0.026	0.077**	0.029	0.757	0.402**	0.246
p-value	0.134	0.000	0.242	0.161	0.000	0.221
Bandwidth	±10	±10	±10	±10	±10	±10
Observations	8986	8982	7169	8986	8982	7169

Note: Entries are reduced form estimates (columns 1-3) and IV estimates (columns 4-6) using the local-randomization RD approach with a ±10 bandwidth. The real cutoff is c, where the pivotal cohort for each reform is coded as 0 in the running variable. Placebo cutoffs are c-10 and c+10. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $\dagger p < 0.1$.

Table (A-10) The effect of education on support for IOs across alternative bandwidths

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Optimal	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Compulsory education	0.255* (0.113)	0.288** (0.107)	0.319** (0.103)	0.334** (0.092)	0.312** (0.086)	0.305** (0.083)	0.298** (0.076)	0.306** (0.072)	0.281** (0.067)	0.273** (0.065)	0.281** (0.063)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Window	±6	±7	±8	±9	±10	±11	±12	±13	±14	±15	±16
Observations	11507	13231	14886	16501	18071	19634	21161	22675	24212	25579	26925
First-stage F-statistic	169	186	216	224	248	265	274	286	280	283	279
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Optimal	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Schooling	0.057* (0.026)	0.062** (0.024)	0.067** (0.022)	0.069** (0.019)	0.063** (0.018)	0.060** (0.017)	0.058** (0.015)	0.058** (0.014)	0.051** (0.013)	0.049** (0.012)	0.050** (0.011)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Window	±6	±7	±8	±9	±10	±11	±12	±13	±14	±15	±16
Observations	11507	13231	14886	16501	18071	19634	21161	22675	24212	25579	26925
First-stage F-statistic	127	148	169	178	193	202	200	209	201	200	185

Note: Entries are reduced form estimates (columns 1-3) and IV estimates (columns 4-6) using the local-randomization RD approach with a ±10 bandwidth. The real cutoff is c, where the pivotal cohort for each reform is coded as 0 in the running variable. Placebo cutoffs are c-10 and c+10. $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $\dagger p < 0.1$.

D.7 Robustness across Alternative Bandwidths

Throughout the paper, we select bandwidths using the optimal-bandwidth procedure of Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2023). In Table A-10, we assess the sensitivity of the results to alternative bandwidths. The upper panel shows the results using the binary compulsory education treatment, and the lower panel shows the results using the continuous schooling treatment. Point estimates remain highly stable across bandwidths, and although precision declines as bandwidths and the sample size shrink, it remains high even for windows smaller than the optimal ±11 birth cohorts.

D.8 Textbook and Curriculum Content: Robustness tests

Figure A-4 shows that our results are robust to using the alternative Pro-IO outcome, where we exclude "don't know" or "can't choose" responses and code them as missing data. The findings remain statistically and substantively similar to our analysis in Figure 3: while the effect of education is small and statistically non-significant in cohorts exposed to low values of pluralism or high values of patriotism, it is significant and large in cohorts exposed to high values of pluralism or low values of patriotism. Information about IOs in textbooks seems to increase the effect of education on pro-IO attitudes, but this difference is not statistically significant. And the effect of education remains similar regardless of information about

Figure (A-4) The Effect of Schooling by Education's Content, "Don't Know" responses excluded



Note: Each plot depicts the effect of schooling on support for international organizations by values ingrained in school curricula (top panels) or information in textbooks (bottom panels). Markers indicate the effect of schooling with 95% confidence intervals (using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by subnational regions). Low=below median values; High=above median values.

international issues in textbooks.

D.9 Effect Durability

Figure A-5 shows the durability of the post-reform effect over time. The left panel focuses on our Pro-IO index and shows a clear pattern of decline over time. In 1995, where only the IO-compliance component is available, we see that post-reform cohorts are significantly more supportive of international organizations compared to their pre-reform counterparts. The difference is smaller but still statistically significant in 2003. By 2013, however, the size of the effect turns negligible and statistically non-significant.

Figure (A-5) Effect durability over time

(a) Pro-IO Index



(b) Pro-IO Index (DK excluded)



Again, we find that most of the effect of compulsory education reforms is driven by the IO-threat component, suggesting that the reform-induced added years of education reduced perceived threat from IOs. Post-reform cohorts also assign more legitimacy to international organizations and are likelier to think that international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions for certain problems, and this effect also diminishes over time. In contrast, respondents from post-reform cohorts are not more likely to support the notion that their

country should follow the decisions of international organizations to which it belongs even if the government does not agree with them, and this null result remains stable over time.